When Alliances Falter: Europe’s Struggle for Security in a New World Order

Europe is facing its most severe security crisis since the Cold War

How do you assess Europe’s geopolitical position in recent years, and are we truly on the threshold of a future where Europe must manage without an American security guarantee?

Since World War I and II, Europe has diplomatically accepted - something the U.S. has also encouraged - the role of “little brother” to the United States in the geopolitical schoolyard. With Trump 2.0, Europe has woken up to the realization that the big brother has not only moved out but has almost announced that the family ties were never entirely real, more akin to an adoption.

As long as Trump or like‑minded leaders hold power in the U.S., Europe must look itself in the mirror and acknowledge that it has grown up - and both should and actually can stand on its own feet. The latter, however, requires both military and mental readiness among the population, including accepting that war is not a distant hypothetical fear but - without being alarmist - a real risk.

Saying that the American security guarantee has been “gone with the Trump‑wind” is probably an exaggeration, but it has certainly been redefined and will come at a price or with concessions - at least if we end up needing it.

Negotiations in the Arctic are intensifying in step with great‑power interest in the region

How do you see the development of negotiations between the U.S., Greenland, and the EU (Denmark)? And which negotiation strategies dominate today—the competitive, the cooperative, or a hybrid?

I see a clear development where Greenland and the EU (Denmark) have relied on classic diplomacy in response to what I call Trump’s “deal‑o‑macy” (constant deal‑making), which is open and direct quid pro quo -but more often nimis pro quo (a lot for something).

At the same time, Europe has leaned too heavily on an “Avoiding negotiation strategy,” postponing matters and hoping Trump might forget or shift focus, supported by a friendly tone and attitude. Trump, by contrast, has most visibly used the “Competing negotiation strategy” - with threats, pressure, temper, bluffing, and a hostile attitude - yet also elements of the “Compromising” strategy and a fairness‑oriented approach (e.g., insisting NATO countries contribute more financially and increase defense spending).

He has recognized that Europe often tends to say: “Agreed…we’ll look into that…” without taking real action. From Trump’s perspective, when a negotiation partner must be pushed from “looking into it” to “doing something,” the competitive strategy combined with a hostile tone becomes necessary.

Recently, however, we have seen the EU, Denmark, and Greenland maintain a relatively friendly tone but shift toward a more assertive attitude. They have also begun mirroring Trump by adopting a more competitive strategy while keeping the door open to both compromise and, importantly, the “Collaborative negotiation strategy,” which seeks creative alternatives that genuinely serve all parties’ interests.

Trump has repeatedly commented on Greenland’s strategic value and floated ideas about annexation

How seriously should we take such signals in the context of Arctic negotiations and Europe’s broader security architecture?

We have had to - and still must - take this very seriously. Not only because it poses a possible risk - though experts directly involved assess the risk of escalation with the U.S. as minimal - but because Russia and China closely watch how Trump continuously challenges the NATO alliance, at times bringing it to the brink of disintegration. This happens almost every time he comments - directly or ambiguously - on the U.S.’s future role in NATO and uses tariffs to weaken, among others, the European economy.

For now, though, there appears to be a negotiation track open - especially after NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s meeting with Trump in Davos - emphasizing that the “Collaborative” and “Compromising” strategies should guide the high‑level working group where diplomats from the U.S., Denmark, and Greenland aim to craft solutions for their respective leaders.

Europe’s security architecture has also been challenged to a degree where procurement and supply security are being renegotiated with new priorities, including “Made in Europe” where feasible. Ukraine, meanwhile, has become a major producer of weapons and defense systems for modern drone warfare - on land, sea, and in the air. Europe should invest far more in this and secure access through strategic investment. This includes licensing agreements to enable domestic production where relevant.

Drone technology is evolving so rapidly that the concept of DaaS (Drone‑as‑a‑Service) has emerged - suggesting it may be better to buy components and frames, while software and other systems can be adapted when drones are needed, rather than stockpiling drones that risk becoming obsolete in a few years. This is a fundamentally different mode of warfare and one reason Russia suffers massive material and personnel losses, while an undermanned Ukrainian military has managed to hold the front lines against what was once considered the world’s second‑strongest military.

This must be integrated into Europe’s security thinking. Personally, I am cautious about the billions allocated to rebuilding a classic Danish naval fleet with frigates, etc. Ukraine has no navy - but with limited means has destroyed large parts of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. What remains is effectively trapped, as Russia cannot protect these assets from sea and air drones. Ukraine has shown that a few advanced drones costing a few million dollars can sink a billion‑dollar warship requiring years to build.

If Denmark and Europe ignore these lessons and continue buying equipment as if blind to this new reality, we risk incredibly slow, expensive, poor, and ultimately ineffective investments.

From diplomacy to transactional power politics

Do you see a global shift from classic diplomacy toward a more transactional principle - where almost everything - people, territories, resources -are treated as bargaining chips? And what does that mean for stability and international law?

Yes - and especially due to Trump 2.0 - diplomacy has shifted dramatically toward the aforementioned “deal‑o‑macy,” where everything is potentially up for trade.

However, 98% (figuratively speaking) of the world’s countries still operate through more classic diplomacy. If Republicans lose the 2026 midterms (assuming they take place - and are carried out democratically), we could see a shift before Trump’s term ends. Much also depends on who takes the presidency after Trump, just as upcoming European elections will determine whether Europe becomes more unified or more fragmented.

In my view, 2026-2030 - or at the latest 2035 - will be decisive for how much the world order changes, and whether the new order stabilizes into something resembling what we came from - or something closer to what we fear.

Future politicians and diplomats must master the full arsenal of negotiation strategies and tactics - and work extremely professionally, structurally, proactively, and with agility.