Authors: Benoît Carré (DaCHE) & Cécile Gayet (Patheon Sorbonne – Paris 1 University)
We investigate the impact of mandating an increase in the generosity of complementary health insurance (CHI) plans on the take-up rate of CHI. Recent theoretical results indicate a negative expected effect of mandating health insurance benefits on the insurance take-up rate, but empirical evidence is scarce. Using a benefit regulation reform of a French means-tested subsidized CHI program as a quasi-experiment, we examine this question on a population of low-income French retirees. Our analysis shows that healthier individuals have a lower probability of staying in the program after the reform when they face a higher post-reform premium. Our results highlight the insurance-generosity versus take up rate tradeoff policy-makers face in voluntary health insurance markets.
We investigate the impact of mandating an increase in the generosity of complementary health insurance (CHI) plans on the take-up rate of CHI. Recent theoretical results indicate a negative expected effect of mandating health insurance benefits on the insurance take-up rate, but empirical evidence is scarce. Using a benefit regulation reform of a French means-tested subsidized CHI program as a quasi-experiment, we examine this question on a population of low-income French retirees. Our analysis shows that healthier individuals have a lower probability of staying in the program after the reform when they face a higher post-reform premium. Our results highlight the insurance-generosity versus take up rate tradeoff policy-makers face in voluntary health insurance markets.