International Conference
Need to Know II: ‘Lessons learned’
16–17 October 2012
Odense, University of Southern Denmark
Room O100
Program
Opening of the Conference
Session I: HUMINT
Chair: Erik Kulavig (Denmark)
- Prof. Kurt Jensen (Canada) – A Non-Clandestine Model for HUMINT Collection
- Daniel Běloušek (Czech Republic) – The Rivalry between Czechoslovak Military Intelligence Services as Manifested by the Failure of Residency „VIKING" in Sweden in 1986
- Dieter Bacher/Philipp Lesiak (Austria) – A Struggle for Influence and a Key Position. Actions of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence in Austria and American and British Counterintelligence Operations against Them at the Dawn of the Cold War, 1948–1955
- Przemysław Gasztold-Seń (Poland) – Troublesome "Allies": Polish Counterintelligence and the Arab Embassies in Warsaw
- Dr Patryk Pleskot (Poland) – Need to Know about Poland. HUMINT Strategies of Western Diplomats in Communist Poland (1956–1989)
- Discussion
Opening of the exhibition "The Cold War: A Short History of a World Divided"
Session II: Betrayers
Chair: Dr Łukasz Kamiński (Poland)
- John Buckley (United Kingdom) – Ethical Betrayal – Human Sources and the Lessons to be Learned
- Dr Władysław Bułhak (Poland) – Betrayal at the Holy See. Human Sources of the Polish Communist Intelligence in Vatican in 1960s and 1970s.
- Witold Bagieński (Poland) – Defectors from the Civil Intelligencein the Last Two Decades of Communist Poland
- Discussion
Session III: Bias, part 1
Chair: Flemming Splidsboel (Denmark)
- Michael Andregg (USA) – A Critical Lesson not yet Learned in America: Intelligence Ethics Matter
- Dr Rory Cormac (United Kingdom) – Using Secret Intelligence to Protect Economic Security: Lessons from the Recent Past
- Dr Sławomir Łukasiewicz (Poland) – Power, Ideology and the Intelligence in Poland 1945–1954
- Dr Paul Maddrell (United Kingdom) – The Stasi’s Intelligence Reporting to the German Democratic Republic’s (GDR) Political Leadership
- Discussion
Session IV: Bias, part 2
Chair: Dr Władysław Bułhak (Poland)
- Dr Helmut Müller-Enbergs (Germany) – What Is and for What Purpose There Is "Intelligence Psychology"?
- Prof. Jacek Tebinka (Poland) – Political Bias in Anglo-Polish Cold War Intelligence Encounters
- Prof. Jakub Tyszkiewicz (Poland) – Biased or Objective? Lessons from the Past. Martial Law in Poland in the Eyes of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Impact of Its Analyses on U.S. Policymaking 1981–1983
- Antoni Diaz (Spain) – Knowing the Enemies of the Regime: The Fight against Subversive Movement in Spain 1968–1976
- Discussion
Session V: Crises
Chair: Jørgen Bro (Denmark)
- Dr Michael Goodman (United Kingdom) – Learning to Predict Crises: The Lessons of the Nicoll Report
- Peer Henrik Hansen (Denmark) – The Cuban Missile Crisis and Intelligence
- Prof. Mark Kramer (USA) – The KGB, the 1983 Soviet "War Scare", and the Purported Impact of NATO’s Able Archer 83: Sifting Myths from Reality
- Dr Mirosław Sikora (Poland) – Intercepting the Ideas: Intelligence and Science on Example of Communist Poland
- Discussion
Session VI: Emigration
Chair: Dr Krzysztof Persak (Poland)
- Thomas W. Friis (Denmark) – Refugees and Emigrants as a Security Issue
- Dr hab. Paweł Jaworski (Poland) – Polish Intelligence Service towards Poles in Sweden after WWII. Case Study on the Attitude to Émigrés in the West
- Dan Draghia (Romania) – Intelligence as a Tool of Personal Vendetta: Physical Attacks by Ceauşescu’s Regime against the Critical Romanian Voices from the Exile after 1977
- Dr hab. Joanna Wojdon (Poland) – Polish Americans and the Intelligence of the "People’s Poland" 1955–1989
- Discussion
Conclusion