

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The Gender Difference on Preferences for Redistribution

Testing a New Model in a Gender-Egalitarian Context

The Gender Difference in Preferences for Redistribution:
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Abstract:
We present and test a simple formal model designed to explain why women express stronger support for income redistribution than men. In this model, the gender difference in preference for redistribution may arise from gender differences in human capital and values and may vary across societal context and family background. We use sibling data from Denmark and find that (1) the baseline gender difference in preferences for redistribution is identical within and between families; (2) gender differences in human capital and values account for around one quarter of the baseline gender difference in preference for redistribution; and (3) there is heterogeneity in the gender difference across family background characteristics (e.g., parents' sector of employment, wealth, and attitudes). Our results extend existing research by demonstrating that the gender difference in preferences for redistribution arises in part from gender differences in human capital and values and is contingent upon societal and family context.

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INTRODUCTION

One of the most consistent findings in research on social policy preferences is that women are more likely to support income redistribution than men (Delaney and O'Toole 2008; Edlund and Pande 2002; Emmenegger and Manow 2014; Inglehart and Norris 2003). Even more remarkably, this difference is larger in very gender-egalitarian societies like the Scandinavian countries than in less egalitarian ones. For example, data from the European Social Survey (2009/2010 wave) show that, on a 1-5 scale, Denmark had a .26 difference between men and women, which was the maximum for all 26 countries surveyed. Norway followed shortly behind with a .19 difference, with the overall mean at .12 and the minimum at .004 for Greece.

How do we explain this persistent gender difference in the preference for redistribution? Whereas there is substantial political science work on the gender gap in voting (Giger 2009; Jaime-Castillo et al. 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Studlar, McAllister, and Hayes 1998) or in other forms of political participation (Desposato and Norrander 2009), the gender difference in preference for redistribution, an important intermediary step to understanding the link between gender and voting, has received much less attention (but see Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Jaime-Castillo et al. 2016; Campbell 2004; Linos and West 2003).

In this paper we present and test a simple formal model that seeks to account for the gender difference in preference for redistribution that has exists in most countries. The key idea in our model is that the gender difference arises from differences between men and women in their human capital (education) and its direct material derivatives (income) and values and psychological traits (e.g., pro-

social attitudes and personality). Moreover, we argue that the gender difference depends on societal context because characteristics of contexts, for example the generosity of social security programs, income redistribution, and gender-egalitarian policies, shape the social risks that women and men face. Finally, we argue that the gender difference in preference for redistribution may vary across family background characteristics (for example, parents' sector of employment, wealth, and attitudes) because these characteristics affect the ways in which parents socialize boys and girls. As explained below, our model brings together a range of existing approaches to analyzing the gender difference in preferences for redistribution in a coherent conceptual framework.

We test the key assumptions in our model empirically using data from the Danish Longitudinal Survey of Youth – Children (DLSY-C). We focus on Denmark and use the DLSY-C data for two reasons. First, Denmark exhibits a large gender difference in preference for redistribution compared to other countries, thus making it an extreme case. Second, the DLSY-C data are unusually rich in that they include information on multiple siblings from the same family, information on preference for redistribution, as well as rich socioeconomic information on the parents of these siblings, for example on their education, sector of employment, wealth and gender-egalitarian attitudes in childhood. The availability of sibling data means that we can analyze the extent to which differences between brothers and sisters in their human capital, values and psychological traits account for within-family gender differences in preferences for redistribution. Moreover, by using rich data on the parents of the brothers and sisters whose preferences we study, we can analyze if the gender difference in preference for redistribution within families varies by family background characteristics, for example parents' sector of employment, wealth, and attitudes.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we present the formal theoretical model that we use to analyze the gender difference in preference for redistribution. Based on this model, we derive a set of empirical hypotheses to be tested in the empirical analysis. After presenting the DLSY-C data, variables, and empirical research design, we discuss the empirical findings and how they accord with our model. The main empirical findings are that (a) the gender difference in preference for redistribution is generally large in Denmark, (b) it is as large within families (when we compare brothers and sisters) as between families (when we compare random men and women), (c) gender differences in observed variables that measure human capital and values and psychological traits account for only one-quarter of the baseline gender difference in preference for redistribution, and (d) there is evidence that the gender difference is larger in wealthier and more ideologically conservative families and is reversed in families in which both parents work in the public sector. Together, our theoretical analysis and empirical findings illustrate that the gender difference in preference for redistribution is pervasive, difficult to explain, and socially heterogeneous. We end by discussing the implications of our findings and several ways in which our model could be extended.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

We begin by presenting a formal theoretical model that describes the mechanisms through which men and women may come to differ in their preference for redistribution. In this model, which is a heuristic device and which combines arguments from different literatures, the gender difference in preference for redistribution may arise from gender differences in human capital, values and psychological traits. Moreover, it may vary across societal contexts (which we do not test) and family background (which we do test).

Figure 1 summarizes the main features of our model. We begin by arguing that an individual's preference for redistribution can be written in the following way

$$P = \delta G + hH + vV + sS, \quad (1)$$

where *P* is preference for redistribution which is a function of gender *G*, human capital *H*, values and psychological traits *V* and other factors outside the individual summarized in *S* (for example, societal context). The parameter δ captures the gender difference in preference for redistribution, and *h*, *v* and *s* captures the relative importance of respectively *H*, *V* and *S*. We now describe each model component in detail.

Figure 1. Analytical Model



Human capital: We argue that the preference for redistribution depends through the causal pathway of material self-interest on income and exposure to social risks, both of which in turn depend on human capital *H* (Corneo and Grüner 2002; Fong 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Häusermann, Kurer, and Schwander 2016; Arunachalam and Watson 2018). Since those in advantaged economic positions benefit less from government redistribution than those in disadvantaged positions, economic self-interest entails that those with more human capital *H* are less likely to support redistribution than those with less human capital. We discuss gender differences in *H* bellow.

Values and psychological traits: We argue that individual values and psychological traits, labeled *V* in our model, also affect preferences for redistribution. For example, individuals who possess left-wing, pro-social and altruistic attitudes are more likely to support redistribution compared to those who possess right-wing and individualistic values (Franklin 1984; Fong 2001; van Oorschot 2002). Moreover, individual psychological traits such as aversion to risk, inequality, and competition, and time preferences which might render some individuals more likely to engage in risky behaviors (e.g., smoking and not buying insurance), also affect preferences for redistribution via higher psychic costs associated with exposure to social risks (Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak et al. 2010).

Societal context: Finally, we argue that societal context, in particular the scope of social security programs, income redistribution, and the organization of labor markets, affects preferences for redistribution by reducing or increasing the social risks to which individuals are exposed (Esping-Andersen 1999; Orloff 1993). In particular, living in a societal context with more generous social security programs and less inequality should be associated with a stronger preference for redistribution.

The three components *H*, *V*, and *S* make up the key explanatory dimensions in our model. They affect *P* via two channels: an *indirect effect* via *G* (due to gender differences in *H*, *V* and in the effect of *S*) and a *direct effect* net of *G*. We write the direct effect

$$P = \delta G + h_d H + v_d V + s_d S\,, \tag{2}$$

where subscript *d* refers to a direct effect net of *G*, and the indirect effect

$$\delta G = h_i H + v_i V + s_i S + rR\,, \tag{3}$$

where subscript *i* refers to an indirect effect. *R* refers to other factors that explain differences between men and women. Figure 1 illustrates the indirect effects via the rounded arrow heads (●) pointing toward δ . For example, if men and women differ in their human capital and values and psychological traits, some of the gender difference in preference for redistribution will be mediated indirectly via *H* and *V*. It also follows from the model that the total effect on *P* of *H*, *V,* and *S* are given by the sum of the direct and indirect effects: $hH = h_d H + h_i H$, $vV = v_d V + v_i V$ and $sS = s_d S + s_i S$.

Empirical research suggests that the indirect effects of *H*, *V*, and *S* might be non-trivial. With regard to *H*, women and men have systematically different levels of education, income, and labor market positions. Although women have caught up with men with regard to their overall level of education, they choose fields of study with lower economic returns and, on average, they have lower income than men. They are also more likely to work part time and to be in precarious employment and, as a consequence, on average they face more social risks than men. Together, these factors motivate h_i in our model.

With regard to *V*, women are more likely than men to express left-wing political attitudes and to vote for left-wing political parties, both of which are associated with a stronger preference for redistribution. Moreover, on average they have been found to differ from men with regard to a range of psychological traits that might be linked to preference for redistribution. For example, women have been found to be more averse to risk, inequality, and competition than men (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Croson and Gneezy 2009), and they also express different time preferences than men (Dittrich and Leipold 2014). These arguments motivate v_i in our model. Below, we provide empirical evidence of gender differences in *H* and *V* in our Danish data.

With regard to *S*, systematic gender differences in rates and types of labor market participation, and in other societal factors that shape the social risks women and men face, might also account for the gender difference in preference for redistribution. We provide additional discussion below, but in our Danish case women are much more likely than men to work in the public sector and to benefit from family policy programs, for example, child benefits and public daycare. These differences entail that women would be more likely to support redistribution than men, and they motivate s_i in our model.

Family Background

We now introduce family background into the model and make two arguments. First, individuals' human capital *H* and values and psychological traits *V* is a direct function of their family background, which we label *F*. This means that family background is related to the gender difference in preference for redistribution if it leads men and women to have different values of *H* and *V*. Second, we argue that the gender difference in preference for redistribution may arise in part from gender-specific socialization in the family of origin, i.e. family background moderates the impact of gender on redistribution preferences.

Our first argument is that *H* and *V* depend on family background. We write this argument in the following way

$$H = F + \phi_h$$
$$V = F + \phi_v, \tag{4}$$

where F is family background and ϕ captures the influence of other factors than family background. This argument is supported by research documenting that parents transmit endowments and resources to children that facilitate human capital acquisition (such as cognitive ability and education; Björklund and Salvanes 2010; Devereaux and Black 2011). It is also supported by research on political socialization which documents that, from an early age children learn cues about political actors such as parties and candidates from their parents. Children are thus likely to start their party identification with the party that their parents identify (Healy and Malhotra 2013; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009; Deth, Abendschön, and Vollmar 2011; Urbatsch 2011; Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007; Jennings and Niemi 1968). Finally, our argument is supported by research documenting considerable intergenerational transmission of psychological traits.

Our second argument is that the gender difference in preference for redistribution arises in part from gender-specific socialization within families. In addition to affecting *H* and *V*, parents may treat girls and boys differently. For example, parents may regard boys as future breadwinners who are expected to be successful in the labor market rather than rely on social safety programs funded via taxation. Similarly, they may treat girls as future mothers and wives who are expected to be less career- and more family-oriented, thereby potentially becoming more dependent on the welfare state (Lindsey 1997). Thus, the gender difference in preference for redistribution need not only arise from differences between women and men in *H* and *V (*a direct effect of family background), but also from the ways in which families socialize girls and boys (a moderating effect of family background). Finally, we argue that patterns of gender-specific political socialization may a social gradient such that, for example, parents at different ends of the income distribution, those working in different employment sectors, or those having different gender role attitudes socialize boys and girls in different ways. In our model we conceptualize this scenario in the following way

$$P = (\delta G)F + hH + vV + sS, \tag{5}$$

which states that, conditional on *H* and *V* (which in part themselves depend on family background) and on *S*, the gender difference in preference for redistribution might vary by family background *F* (and where *F* refers to the economic and social characteristics of the families in which girls and boys grow up). We address this possibility in the empirical analysis.

We have now outlined the main features of our theoretical model. In this model we argue that the gender difference in preference for redistribution arises from gender differences in human capital, values and psychological traits, and from societal contexts. Moreover, we argue that family background affects human capital, values and psychological traits, and furthermore that families may engage in gender-specific socialization that leads to social heterogeneity in the gender difference in the preference for redistribution. In the next sections we present our country case and derive a set of hypotheses that follow from our theoretical model.

Country Case

We describe our empirical case before presenting hypotheses concerning *H* and *V*. We do this to provide contextual information on our Danish case, i.e., *S* in our model, and because we cannot directly test *S* in our study. Denmark is characterized by a high level of income redistribution, a comprehensive social safety net, provision of social services (in addition to income replacing benefits) and a large

public sector (see Mandel and Semyonov 2006; Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013), and it is often regarded as a core member of the *Social Democratic welfare regime* (Esping-Andersen 1990). These institutional characteristics are key ingredients in the societal context which shapes the gender difference in preference for redistribution. Compared to elsewhere, these institutional characteristics would be expected to lead to a gender difference in preference for redistribution because, in the Danish case and in the Social Democratic welfare regime in general, women are less economically dependent on men both directly (for example, via high rates of labor market participation among women, especially in the public sector, and generous income replacing benefits in case of unemployment, illness etc.) and indirectly (for example, via high income redistribution and public provision of social services which substitute care work traditionally carried out by women). Women in Denmark are less likely to see their personal insurance in men than women in other welfare states. As a result, we expect a substantial gender difference in preferences for redistribution in Denmark.

Hypotheses

We now derive hypotheses regarding the relative importance of the indirect effects of human capital, values and psychological traits on the gender difference in preferences for redistribution in Denmark, i.e., h_i and v_i in our model.

Human capital and income: In Denmark women have now caught up with men with regard to mean educational attainment. However, they are more likely to complete degrees which target employment in the public sector (for example, school teacher, nurses, and childcare workers). Given that jobs in the public sector generally pay less than those in the private sector (the gender wage gap is around 20 percent in Denmark), women benefit less from their human capital than men with regard to income returns. Moreover, although it used to be the case that job security was significantly higher in the public sector than in the private sector, this is no longer the case. In addition, women in Denmark make up the lion's share of (both voluntary and involuntary) part-time employment that is characterized by lower wages and job security than full-time employment. Finally, women are much more likely than men to go on extended parental leave following childbirth and disproportionally bear the economic consequences of family events such as divorce. Our first hypothesis H1 is then that *gender differences in human capital, and in particular differences that lead to differences in income, mediate some of the gender difference in preference for redistribution in Denmark*.

Values and psychological traits: We draw on evidence that women and men differ in terms of values and psychological traits that are related to preferences for redistribution when forming hypotheses. Women on average express more left-wing and pro-social *values* than men, and since these values have been found to be associated with a stronger preference for redistribution, we expect gender differences in values to account for some of the gender difference in preferences for redistribution in Denmark. The DLSY-C does not include information on party preference or subjective left-right position, so we measure values via an indicator capturing the extent to which respondents believe that getting ahead in life depends on effort rather than on luck and an indicator capturing the extent which they believe that it depends on coming from a rich family. With regard to *psychological traits*, we include an indicator of time preference measured by the respondent's preference for a high-paying job in the future versus a lower-paying job in the present and her score on Rotter's Locus of Control scale (which measures the extent to which a person believes that things that happen in her life is beyond or in her own control). Our second hypothesis H2 is then that *gender differences in values and psychological traits mediate some of the gender difference in preference for redistribution in Denmark*.

Heterogeneity across families: We argue in our model that family background affects preference for redistribution via *H* and *V*. We also argue that the gender difference in preference for

redistribution may have a social gradient and depend on the economic and social characteristics of the family in which children grow up. This argument comes from research showing that economic and social conditions during childhood affect political preferences (Healy and Malhotra 2013; Giuliano and Spilimbergo 2014). If true, a social gradient in gender-specific political socialization would imply that the average gender difference in preference for redistribution in a population reflects substantial subgroup heterogeneity. For example, families in which mothers are highly educated (or have high income) may send a strong signal to children (boys and girls alike) that women are financially independent and should not rely on the welfare state for social protection. This would be expected to lead to a smaller gender difference in preferences for redistribution compared to a family in which the mother has low education (or income). Similarly, if one or both parents work in the public (as opposed to in the private) sector brothers and sisters are both likely to be exposed to a favorable attitude towards the public sector, which might reduce the gender difference in preference for redistribution. This scenario is particularly plausible in Denmark which has a large public sector. Finally, it may be that children who grow up in wealthier families, or in families in which parents hold traditional gender norms, are characterized by a stronger gender difference in preferences for redistribution compared to children who grow up in middle-income or ideologically liberal families. This could be due to the gender-stratified learning of reliance on the welfare state. In wealthy families, boys could internalize more strongly a lower expectation towards the welfare state than girls, compared to poorer families. Given the lack of clear theory to motivate explicit hypotheses, we explore social heterogeneity in the gender difference in preference for redistribution within families using information in the DLSY-C on parents' wealth, sector of employment, education, and left-wing orientation and gender conservatism in adolescence.

This section concludes the theoretical part of the paper. We proceed by presenting the DLSY-C data, variables and the empirical research design.

DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

Data

We use data from the Danish Longitudinal Survey of Youth – Children (DLSY-C). The DLSY-C includes all children of participants in an ongoing Danish cohort study, the Danish Longitudinal Survey of Youth (DLSY).[1] Data collection for the DLSY-C took place in 2010, and the mean age of the participants in the DLSY-C at the time of data collection was 27.1. The response rate was 81 %. We use the DLSY-C for two reasons. First, it includes multiple siblings from the same family and, second, it includes a question which taps respondents' support for redistribution. The DLSY-C thus allows us to study within-family differences in support for redistribution. In addition to support for redistribution, the DLSY-C also includes information on respondents' family background, human capital, values and personality. We restrict our DLSY-C sample to respondents age 18 or older (i.e. legally and politically fully responsible individuals), which yields a sample size of 3,303. This sample is representative of the population of Danish residents who have at least one parent born in or around 1954. In most of the analysis, we limit the sample further to those families with at least two children.

We note that the participants in the DLSY-C were fairly young when they were interviewed (mean age is just over 27 years). Many were still in education, and those who had entered the labor

[1] The primary DLSY participants (N = 3,151) – i.e., the parents of the respondents whose preferences for redistribution we study – were all born in or around 1954 with the primary sample being representative of that birth cohort. More information on the DLSY and DLSY-C is available at www.sfi.dk/dlsy.

market had not been in it for long. This means that we do not observe the full variance in respondents' income that we would have observed in a representative sample of the adult population. A young sample is the data context in which we should expect it to be most likely that family experiences matter still. This means that it is the least conservative test for these kinds of mechanisms. However, these are unique data whose richness remains unrivalled in our view.

Dependent Variable

Our dependent variable is a question from the DLSY-C which is identical to a question asked in the International Social Survey (ISSP) "Role of Government" module. Respondents were asked to express their agreement or disagreement with the statement: "It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes." The response categories were: 1 = "Strongly disagree," 2 = "Disagree," 3 = "Agree" and 4 = "Strongly agree." We treat respondents answering "don't" know as missing values (see Table 1 that shows descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analysis in the sub-panel A).

	A			B		
	Mean	SD	N	By Gender:		
				Women	Men	
Support for redistribution	2.54	0.78	3,219	2.63	2.45	***
Gender (female)	0.52	0.50	3,303			
Human capital						
Upper secondary education	0.66	0.47	3,303	0.76	0.54	***
Income	21.50	21.52	3,273	19.85	23.32	***
Cognitive ability	9.59	3.34	3,241	9.57	9.62	
Values and traits						
Work hard to get ahead	2.69	0.80	3,284	2.56	2.82	***
Important to come from a rich family	1.82	0.65	3,285	1.79	1.86	***
Time discounting preference	1.82	0.70	3,267	1.75	1.89	***
Locus of control	1.28	1.09	3,147	1.38	1.16	***
Controls						
Age	27.80	5.09	3,303	27.89	27.70	
Married	0.57	0.50	3,303	0.62	0.52	***
Number of children	0.61	0.95	3,301	0.72	0.50	***
Family characteristics						
Father works in public sector	0.21	0.41	3,303			
Mother works in public sector	0.50	0.50	3,303			
Both parents work in public sector	0.13	0.34	3,303			
Parents' wealth (standardized index)	0	1.16	2,883			
Father college	0.27	0.44	2,495			
Mother college	0.28	0.45	2,379			
Parents egalitarianism	0	1.00	3,303			
Parent left-wing orientation (age 19)	0	1.00	2,860			
Parent gender conservatism (age 14)	0	1.00	2,785			

Note: *** Gender difference is significant at $p < 0.001$. Respondents aged 18 and older.

This item goes to the core of the welfare state as it asks for the assessment of supporting state intervention to increase material equality. It is thus about the general principle of the welfare state and not about specific policies, institutions or way of financing. It is not a measure that can be expected to be influenced much by institutional variation of the welfare state. More importantly still, there is no reason to believe that the item means something different for men or women.

Explanatory Variables

In addition to gender, our observed explanatory variables capture differences between siblings in human capital factors, values and traits (indicators of *H* and *V* in the model) and some control variables.

Human capital variables include education (a dummy variable for having completed upper secondary education, the college-bound track in Danish secondary education), income (monthly income before tax in Danish *Kroner*) and cognitive ability (the respondent's score on the matrices subtest of the IST 2000R IQ test).

Values and psychological traits include indicators of agreement as to whether hard work leads to achievement in life, agreement as to whether coming from a rich family background matters in life, time discounting preferences and Rotter's locus of control scale. The first two attitudes are items replicated from existing ISSP surveys. The first item addresses the importance of effort vs. luck and asks the extent to which the respondent agrees with the statement: "If you work hard enough you can get anything you want in life." The second item addresses meritocracy vs. ascription and asks how the respondent rates a statement: "How important do you personally think that it is to come from a rich family to get ahead in life?" The response categories for the two variables are the same as the ones for the dependent variable, i.e., 1 = "Strongly disagree," 2 = "Disagree," 3 = "Agree" and 4 = "Strongly agree." Table 1 shows that women are less likely than men to believe that hard work pays off, but are also less likely to believe that it is important to come from a rich family to get ahead in life. Then, we include a measure of time discounting preferences. Time discounting preferences refer to the extent to which an individual weighs a smaller benefit in the present against a larger benefit in the future (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghhue 2002). Our measure of time discounting preferences is based on an item in the DLSY-C in which the respondent was asked: "If you were offered three different jobs with different starting salaries, which one would you take?" The three alternatives are (1) a job with an average salary from the start, (2) a job with a low salary for the first two years, then a high salary later on or (3) a job with a very low salary for the first four years, then a very high salary later on. Table 1 shows that women are more likely than men to prefer a smaller benefit in the present over a larger benefit in the future (i.e., on average women have a higher rate of time discounting). Finally, we include the respondent's score on Rotter's Locus of Control scale. Locus of control refers to whether a person thinks that things that happen in her life are beyond her own control (external locus of control) or whether she thinks that she can control her life (internal locus of control). We use a version of the Locus of Control scale comprised of four items, with higher values indicating stronger external locus of control and thus a stronger belief that forces outside the person is in control. See appendix A for details about the scale construction. Women are on average more believing in forces outside of their person in control (see Table 1).

Control variables include the respondent's age in years, marital status (yes or no) and number of children.

Finally, we include a set of *family background* variables that capture parents' sector of employment, wealth, education, and attitudes. As explained above, we include these variables to explore potential social heterogeneity in the gender difference in preference for redistribution. First, we include dummy variables indicating if respectively the father, mother, and both parents worked in

the public sector. Second, we include an index of family wealth based on information on parents' income and material possessions (appendix B discusses measurement of this and other variables described below). Third, we include dummy variables measuring whether the respondent's mother and father have completed college. Fourth, we include an index measuring *gender egalitarianism* in the family of origin. The index is constructed on the basis of the DLSY-C parent's (either mother or father) responses to a series of questions about household chores in the family (such as preparing breakfast, doing laundry, and cleaning), with higher values indicating that both parents helped with, or took turns doing, household chores as opposed to one parent doing all household chores. Appendix B provides details. Fifth, we include an index measuring the DLSY-C parent's *left-wing orientation* when he or she was an adolescent (the questions were asked in 1973 and 1976). This index is constructed on the basis of the respondent's answers to three questions: (1) "In Denmark all people are equal," (2) "What do you think about wage differences for different kinds of work?", and (3) "Do you think that wage differences for different types of jobs should be bigger, smaller or should remain the same?" The index is constructed such that higher values indicate lower agreement with the statement that everyone is equal, higher agreement that wage differences are too big and higher agreement that differences for different kinds and types of work should be smaller. Appendix B provides details. Finally, we include an index of the DLSY-C parent's *gender conservatism*. This index is constructed on the basis of the respondent's agreement with a series of statements regarding boys and girl when he or she respondent was 14 years old (for example, the statements: "Women are better than men at nursing the sick" and "Most girls want to get married and be a housewife"). Appendix B provides details.

Estimation strategy and Hypotheses

The empirical analysis consists of three steps, and at each step, we are able to test different parts of our model:

(1) We check whether there are actually differences in our indicators variables of *H* and *V* between gender groups by means of t-tests. This is a necessary requirement for the existence of h_i and v_i*.,* the indirect human capital and values effects that are associated with gender. This step allows us to test:

Hypothesis 1a: There significant gender differences in the levels of variables measuring human capital and values.

(2) We estimate the unfiltered effect of gender without further variables in an OLS-regression and compare it with the model that includes all indicators of *H* and *V*. This yields an approximation of the combined strengths of h_i and v_i*.,* the indirect human capital and values effects that are associated with gender. This allows us to test:

Hypothesis 1b: There is a statistically significant change in the coefficient of gender towards zero once we control indicators of human capital and values.

We do this once with an OLS regression with clustered standard errors, controlling for autocorrelation of respondents from the same families, and once with family-fixed effects models where the dependent variable is just the individual deviation of family-specific mean. The OLS models do not take into account that H and V depend on family background, as outlined in Equation (4). This means that estimates of indirect and direct effects may be biased if *H* and *V* are correlated with omitted family background factors also affect P. The family fixed effects (FFE) models control directly for family background *F* by comparing brothers and sisters.

(3) We run an interaction analysis wherein we measure the extent to which parental characteristics affect the residual effect of gender. The model posits that $P = (\delta G)F + \ldots$ meaning that delta, the effect of gender, varies by family background. This can be tested directly in the form of:

Hypothesis 2: The coefficient of gender varies significantly across various measures of socio-economic and attitudinal family background (public sector employment, wealth, education, gender egalitarianism, left-right orientation, gender conservatism, the details of which we will explain later).

Results

Baseline gender differences

We begin by presenting the baseline gender difference in preferences for redistribution in the DLSY-C and how it compares to that found in other datasets. Table 1, sub-panel A shows that the dependent variable (which is scored 1-4) has a mean of 2.54 and a standard deviation of 0.78. Male respondents score on average 2.63 while female respondents score 2.45. Consequently, women in the DLSY-C express stronger support for redistribution than men (the gender difference is 0.18 units on the 1-4 scale or around 0.23 standard deviations in the distribution of the dependent variable). The gender difference in the DLSY-C is similar to what has been found in other datasets for Denmark. In the Danish 2006 ISSP (Role of Government) the baseline gender difference for the same item for respondents aged 18-40 (same age range as in the DLSY-C) is 0.28 units (0.26 standard deviations), while in the Danish 2010 European Social Survey the baseline gender difference for a very similar item (but scored 1-5) for respondents aged 18-40 is 0.26 units (0.23 standard deviations). Thus, the baseline gender difference in preferences for redistribution in the DLSY-C is nontrivial and is similar to what has been found in other samples that are representative of the Danish population.

Table 1, subpanel B also shows significant differences between men and women on a series of indicators variables that capture *V* and *H*, such as education with women in the sample having a higher likelihood of high school degree qualifying for university studies than men. All indicator variables of human capital and values show significant gender differences except for cognitive ability, thus supporting the bivariate hypothesis 1a for these variables.

Explaining gender differences

Table 2 summarizes results from regressions of support for redistribution on gender and other indicator variables. We present results from two model specifications: Baseline OLS regressions (which ignore the clustering of DLSY-C respondents within families) and within-family fixed effect models that compare siblings from the same family.

Table 2. Results from Between- and Within-Family Regression Models of Preferences for Redistribution

	M1	M2	M3	M4
	OLS		Family Fixed Effect	
Gender (female)	0.155	0.077	0.179	0.131
	(0.033)***	(0.035)*	(0.044)***	(0.047)**
Human capital				
Upper secondary education		0.087		-0.031
		(0.038)*		(0.056)
Income		-0.004		-0.003
		(0.001)***		(0.001)*
Cognitive ability		-0.011		-0.017
		(0.005)*		(0.007)*
Values and traits				
Work hard		-0.148		-0.087
		(0.023)***		(0.028)**
Important to come from a rich family		0.033		0.047
		(0.027)		(0.034)
Time discounting preference		-0.047		-0.064
		(0.024)*		(0.032)*
Locus of control		0.031		0.023
		(0.015)*		(0.021)
Controls				
Age		-0.006		-0.009
		(0.005)		(0.006)
Married		0.001		0.019
		(0.039)		(0.053)
Number of children		-0.029		-0.004
		(0.022)		(0.030)
Controls for family background by fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.010	0.064	0.015	0.048
N	2,163	2,163	2,163	2,163

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, # $p < 0.10$. OLS standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering within families. Models estimated for families with sibship size 2 or bigger. Only N for whom all data are available.

Table 2 shows that in the baseline OLS model M1 the gender difference in support for redistribution (on the 1-4 scale) is 0.155 and the *p*-value of the null hypothesis for the coefficient is highly significant. That is, as expected women are in general more supportive of income redistribution than men. When we include the individual-level variables (human capital, values and traits and controls,) the gender difference reduces to 0.077 (model M2). This result suggests that – in basic cross-sectional analysis – we can account for slightly less than 50 percent of the gender difference in support for redistribution by means of our observed explanatory variables from the vectors H and V in our models (and our control variables). Results show that education, time discounting preference, belief in hard work as a means to get ahead in life help, and controls to account for some of the baseline gender difference in preferences for redistribution. There are thus differences in human capital and values between men and women that explain part of the gender difference. The indirect effects of human capital (H) and values (V) are indeed non-trivial.

The OLS regressions compare random men and women and, as a consequence, they do not take shared family environments into account. In the within-family fixed effects models we rely exclusively on variation between brothers and sisters. When comparing brothers and sisters in a baseline model that does not include any individual-level variables, we find that the gender difference in support for redistribution is 0.179 ($p < 0.001$) (Model M3). This result that the baseline gender difference in support for redistribution is basically identical between and within families since family background

does not correlate with gender. Whether you grow up in a particular family is independent of your gender. In other words, we find that shared family background, including political socialization, does not account for the baseline gender difference in support for redistribution. Brothers and their sisters are on average as different as any random men and women with regard to preferences towards redistribution.

Having controlled for shared family background, we now proceed to including the observed explanatory variables in the within-family models. When we add explanatory variables that vary among brothers and sisters (*H*, *V* and controls) in model M4, we find that the gender difference reduces to 0.131 ($p < 0.01$) with the difference between these coefficients not being statistically significant. Thus, in addition to being as large within families as between families, our indicators of individual differences between brothers and sisters account for only about 27 percent of the baseline brother-sister difference in support for redistribution. Among the human capital indicators, higher income is, of course, estimated to have a negative impact on preferences for redistribution with brother having higher income than sisters on average. Cognitive ability has a clear effect, but is not associated significantly with gender (recall from table 1, subpanel B).

Among the values and traits indicators, having a strong belief in meritocracy (hard work as a means of getting ahead) is associated with lower support for redistribution, and that belief is more widespread among men. Preferring a higher-paying job in the future over a lower-paying job in the present (an indicator of low time discounting) is associated with lower support for redistribution. Other variables do not retain a clear effect in the within-family models.

In sum, thus, the fixed-effects models reveal a surprising array of systematic attitudinal effects between brother and sisters. Brothers and sisters do pick up differences from a common family mean that can explain part of their preferences towards redistribution. These differences can be due to parents treating their children differently by gender and/or differences in learning outside of the family, for instance in school. Hypothesis 1b that δ changes once we control for gender-dependent indicators of human capital and values find support in both model specifications.

Gender difference by family background

As we will demonstrate now, the experience within the families differs widely as to the gender-specific experiences that have an impact on preferences towards redistribution. So far, we have identified baseline gender differences in support for redistribution and the extent to which these differences arise from shared family and individual characteristics. In the final part of the paper, we analyze whether the observed gender differences depend on the family context in which siblings grew up. As explained earlier, we hypothesized (H2) that family socioeconomic position and parental attitudes shape the family environment in which political socialization takes place.

Table 3. Results from Fixed Effect Models with Interaction Effects Between Gender and Family Background Characteristics

	M5-M10	M11	M12	M13
Main effect:				
Gender		0.178	0.116	0.129
		(0.051)***	(0.050)*	(0.051)*
Interaction effect:				
Gender*				
Father works in public sector	NS			
Mother works in public sector	NS			
Both parents work in public sector		-0.313		
		(0.122)*		
Parents' wealth (index)			0.083	
			(0.041)*	
Father college	NS			
Mother college	NS			
Parents' gender egalitarianism	NS			
Parent left-wing orientation	NS			
Parent gender conservatism				0.083
				(0.047)#
R2		0.054	0.053	0.059
N		2,163	1,949	1,833

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, # $p < 0.10$. NS = Not statistically significant at $p < 0.10$.. Models include all explanatory variables also included in Table 2, M2 and M4. Models estimated for families with sibship size 2 or bigger.

Table 3 summarizes estimates of an interaction analysis within the fixed-effects framework. This entails the inclusion of the product term between gender and the parental characteristic that we look at, but not the variable of the parental characteristic itself to make the model estimable. This exploratory analysis yields some interesting patterns that *in toto* reveal a high level of heterogeneity of the relationship between parental family background and the residual gender effect. These patterns can be captured most clearly for socio-economic characteristics and less for parental attitudes measured years before the dependent variable.

We find that public sector employment of both parents condition the impact of gender quite heavily. The estimates actually reveal a reverse gender pattern with boys from that family being more supportive of redistribution than girls. In public-sector families, girls are estimated to have a y-value that is .135 lower than that of boys. With our data, we can only speculate about the causal chains behind this. Most likely, children in that family internalise the value of a large public sector through their parents employment and grow more supportive overall, thus reducing or even flipping the gender relationship. In addition, parental wealth acerbates the usual gender gap: in the above-average rich families (one standard deviation above the mean), daughters have a predicted y-value that is .199 higher than that of sons. For poor families (one standard deviation below the mean), daughters and sons have become statistically indistinguishable from one another, all else being equal. Here, we can assume that in poorer families the social safety net of the welfare state is more present in the family's daily lives, be it directly or through information in their social networks, that boys and girls from those families learn the value of redistribution equally strong. Finally, we only find one interaction effect with parental values that is just significant at the .10 level. Parents who, when aged 14 themselves, revealed above average (one standard deviation above the mean) gender conservative attitudes, have daughters with a predicted y-value of .212 compared to their sons whereas again for below-average gender-conservative parents, their offspring shows no difference in preferences for redistribution.

However, we do not find an effect of gender egalitarianism or general left orientation, so that the systematic pattern unearthed here is only weak support for the notion that parental attitudes matter.

This interaction analysis brings to light support for our hypothesis 2, namely that the effect of gender varies by family background (*(δ G)F* in our formal model). More concretely, the findings suggests that growing up with closer proximity to the welfare state with its public sector employment or the reliance on welfare state support directly or indirectly in the family gender differences shrink to nil or are even reversed. There are even constellations in which or models predict that women are not more likely to support redistribution.

Conclusion

We successful tested a simple formal model to explain differences in preferences for income redistribution between men and women. This model explicitly operationalises gender differences as the indirect effects of differences in human capital and in values plus a moderated effect of family background that we explored in a multitude of ways.

We set out to answer two research questions. First, why do brothers (men) and sisters (women) differ in their preferences for redistribution? The average gender difference between siblings in a family was exactly the same as between any random women and man in Denmark in 2010 as someone's gender does not affect whether someone has siblings. Moreover, we are only able to account for about 27 percent of that difference by direct measures of human capital and values along which brothers and sisters differ. When we analyzed across families, these micro factors reduce the gender effect between any woman and man by 50 percent, pointing towards the greater importance of these endowment effects with human capital and certain values for between-family differences between men and women. Among these gender-related variables, income (lower among women on average), the belief in hard work as a meritocratic means in life (lower among women on average) and time discounting preferences (women discount time less than men on average) captured systematic patterns.

Let us move to the second research question: to what extent is this difference contingent on family characteristics? The answer is: a great deal. By systematically looking at different family backgrounds in terms of parental sector of employment, education, wealth and past attitudes, we find that the pattern of preferences changes dramatically between nil and a strong pro-redistribution bias among daughters. If parents work in the public sector or the family is less wealthy, mixed-sex offspring from those families are likely to be very similar in their preferences towards redistribution – the estimated gender gap approaches zero or is even reversed.

We speculate that parents in public employment might either teach explicitly or signal implicitly by their work situation the benefits of a secure job in the public sector, which needs a resource-rich state. These lessons seem to be equally learned by sons and daughters alike. For less wealthy families, the universal importance of the welfare state may be learned by both genders alike. The findings about parental attitudes towards politics or gender roles point towards small or null effects, leaving the socio-economic position of the parents as the main contextualizing factors.

In sum, thus, mixed-sex siblings learn a lot about welfare state preferences within the family, a mechanism that leads to great similarity and thus no gender gap in some constellations and stark differences in others. These causal mechanism run counter to a more objectivist notion of risk perception and insurance as it has been shown with regard to unemployment (Gingrich and Ansell 2012; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rehm 2009). The simple model proved to be useful as it helped us to disentangle the impact of the family through various pathways.

Overall, the findings suggest that gender differences about welfare state redistribution are to a great deal contingent on upbringing in modern-day Denmark. In which families men and women grow up, shapes their welfare state differences drastically in later life. The findings from Denmark can further

be used to put forward hypotheses for other contexts. Recall first of all that one might expect just the opposite of what we see. It is very puzzling that in one of the most gender-egalitarian societies in the world, the difference in support for redistribution is a pro-redistribution bias among women and not a gap of zero. The Social-democratic welfare regime with its strong reliance on direct support by the state might be one explanation here where women turn more towards the state than women in other welfare regimes.

The puzzle of why women are more likely to support redistribution by the welfare state than men finds some partial answers. Within our sample, we could account for a small amount of the differences between brothers and sisters that have to do with differences in attitudes, mostly psychological traits and attitudes. But more importantly, we find that the large mean effect in Demark hides the fact that there is considerable heterogeneity in the redistributive attitudes from one family. In some families, the estimated gender gap between brothers and sisters is even bigger than the average gender gap across all families whereas it disappears to nil in other familial circumstances. Overall, the upbringing of different-gender children varies considerably by family context within Denmark. Given the same societal context, the family is an important socialization context that political scientist must look into in order to understand the learning of social policy attitudes in modern welfare states.

Appendix A

The four pairs of items are the following. For each set of items the respondent should choose which statement fits her own view best (each item was scored 1 or 0, with 1 assigned to the statement signifying that forces outside the person is in control): (a) “What happens to me is my own doing” (0) vs. “Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction my life is taking” (1); (b) “When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work” (0) vs. “It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of luck anyway” (1); (c) “In my case, getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck” (0) vs. “Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin” (1); and (d) “It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my life” (0) vs. “Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me” (1). The Locus of Control scale summarizes the respondents score across the four items.

Appendix B

This appendix describes the empirical indicator of parental wealth, which is based on information collected the 1992 and 2001 waves. This indicator is based on five separate indicators of income and property: (1) the DLSY parent’s gross monthly income in thousands of Danish Kroner in 1992; (2) the DLSY parents’ assessment of the value of the home (if owned); (3) the DLSY parents’ assessment of the value of the family car (if owned); (4) a dummy variable indicating if the family owns a summer house; and (5) a dummy variable indicating if the family owns a private boat. All five items were included in a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) in order to extract a single latent variable that captures parental wealth. The first PCA accounts for 34 % of total variation between the five separate indicators and predicted scores were used as the empirical measure of parental wealth.

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