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**Political Cleavages in Party and Protest Politics:
Evidence from East-Central European
Democracies**

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ABSTRACT Contemporary democracies show considerable differences in the issue composition of their protest politics, which tends to remain relatively stable over time. In countries like Germany or the Czech Republic, the vast majority of protests have been mobilised around socio-cultural issues, such as human rights, peace, nuclear power or the environment, and only a tiny portion of protest has focused on economic issues. At the opposite extreme, protest in France or Poland usually has a strongly economic character and voices demands relating to material redistribution and social policy. What lies behind the cross-country differences in national protest agendas? Here we argue that the national protest agenda depends on what issues mainstream political parties are contesting: the content and strength of the master-issue dimension. We expect that there is a substitutive effect, where the stronger a specific master-issue dimension is in party politics, the less salient that issue dimension is in protest politics. This substitutive effect results from the tendency of electoral politics to reduce political conflict to a single-dimension equilibrium that eliminates the importance of other issues and relegates the contest over secondary, niche issues to the realm of policy-seeking strategies, with protest being a common type of this political strategy. In contexts where the single-dimension equilibrium is disrupted, the same dynamics result in a more convergent relationship between party and protest politics and a greater similarity between the protest- and party-system agendas. To investigate this theory, we examine the national protest agendas in four countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – that show four combinations of two crucial factors that are not available in the old Western democracies – the content and the strength of the master-issue dimension. We draw on an original dataset of protest events organised in the four countries between 1993 and 2010 and on qualitative and quantitative data on issue dimensions of party politics obtained from studies on party politics and expert surveys. The results show that in the Czech Republic, where the master-issue dimension is strongly economic, protest has been predominantly socio-cultural. The opposite is true for Poland between 1993 and 2002 and Hungary, where the master-issue dimension is overwhelmingly socio-cultural and protest is predominantly economic. Party politics in Slovakia and Poland since 2002 have lacked single-dimension equilibrium and mainstream parties compete on both economic and socio-cultural issues. Consequently, the substitutive dynamics between party and protest politics is weakened and the agendas of these two political arenas are more alike.

Introduction

Contemporary democracies show considerable differences in the issue composition of their protest politics, which tends to remain relatively stable over time. In countries like Germany or the Czech Republic, the vast majority of protests have been mobilised around socio-cultural issues, such as human rights, peace, nuclear power or the environment, and only a tiny portion of protest has focused on economic issues (Hutter 2014, 142; Císař 2013; Kriesi et al. 1995, 20, 22; Rucht 1998, 40). At the opposite extreme, protest in France or Poland usually has a strongly economic character and voices demands relating to material redistribution and social policy (Ekiert and Kubik 2001, 130;

Fillieule 1997; Hutter 2014, 142; Kriesi et al. 1995, 20, 22; Mayer 2013, 404). What lies behind the cross-country differences in national protest agendas?

Here we argue that, in addition to other factors (e.g. social structure, historical legacies, and external events) that determine which issues are contested in a given society, the national protest agenda depends on what issues mainstream political parties are contesting: the content and strength of the master-issue dimension. In reference to the literature on the multi-dimensional political space and niche political parties (Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow 2010; Farrer 2014; Miller and Schofield 2003; Meguid 2005; Rovny and Edwards 2012), we expect that there is a substitutive effect, where the stronger a specific master-issue dimension is in party politics, the less salient that issue dimension is in protest politics. This substitutive effect results from the tendency of electoral politics to reduce political conflict to a single-dimension equilibrium that eliminates the importance of other issues and relegates the contest over secondary, niche issues to the realm of policy-seeking strategies, with protest being a common type of this political strategy. In contexts where the single-dimension equilibrium is disrupted, the same dynamics result in a more convergent relationship between party and protest politics and a greater similarity between the protest- and party-system agendas.

To investigate this theory, we examine the national protest agendas in four countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – that show four combinations of two crucial factors that are not available in the old Western democracies – the content and the strength of the master-issue dimension. We draw on an original dataset of protest events organised in the four countries between 1993 and 2010 and on qualitative and quantitative data on issue dimensions of party politics obtained from studies on party politics and expert surveys (Berglund et al. 2013; Benoit and Laver 2006; Bértoa 2014; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Rovny 2015). The results show that in the Czech Republic, where the master-issue dimension is strongly economic, protest has been predominantly socio-cultural. The opposite is true for Poland between 1993 and 2002 and Hungary, where the master-issue dimension is overwhelmingly socio-cultural and protest is predominantly economic. Party politics in Slovakia and Poland since 2002 have lacked single-dimension equilibrium and mainstream parties compete on both economic and socio-cultural issues. Consequently, the substitutive dynamics between party and protest politics is weakened and the agendas of these two political arenas are more alike.

The national protest agenda

The cross-country differences in the composition of national protest agendas have not been studied in great detail. Researchers have examined cross-country variation in the volume of protest, disregarding the variation in issues (e.g. Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon 2010; Kriesi et al. 1995, chap. 2). Studies considering protest issues have mostly focused on a few selected movement families or specific protest claims and issue positions, such as new social movements, the radical right, or global justice protests (e.g. Giugni et al. 2005; Hutter 2014; Koopmans et al. 2005; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam and Tarrow 2013; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Soule et al. 1999). When studying party-protest relations, those studies mostly focus on the actor level (parties and movements) and/or examine the interaction of actors from democratic/left-wing versus republican/right-wing positions in relation to the specific issues of protest that is the subject of study (e.g. Heaney and Rojas 2015; Hutter 2014; Minkenberg 2003; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam and Tarrow 2013; van Dyke 2003). These studies have unravelled the complexity of congruent and countervailing interactions between party

politics and specific movements and protest issues, but they have not captured the aggregate picture of the country's protest politics and the composition of the national protest agenda that this article is interested in.

The national protest agenda is temporally a rather stable systemic-level outcome that shapes the issue dimensions of protest politics in a given country.¹ It is the sum of all protest events that take place in a given country over a certain period of time and it emerges out of the interactions between individual movements and parties. While other studies have mostly sought to examine the dynamics between individual political actors and issues, this article focuses on the aggregate effect of these individual mechanisms on the national protest agenda, and how these mechanisms may help explain the relatively stable cross-country differences in the issue dimensionality of national protest politics.

What determines the national protest agenda? Why does the share of protest addressing economic and socio-cultural issues vary across countries? Drawing on the policy space and niche party literature (Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow 2010; Farrer 2014; Meguid 2005; Miller and Schofield 2003; Rovny and Edwards 2012), below we shall explain how the answers to these questions lie in the issue dimensions of party politics: the content and strength of the master-issue dimension. First, we distinguish between the economic and the socio-cultural issue dimensions of political conflict and then go on to describe the eliminatory effect the master-issue dimension in party politics has on the protest agenda, with party politics having a tendency to reduce political conflict to a single-dimension equilibrium. We then discuss the situation where a single-dimensional equilibrium is hard to achieve and the consequences of this for protest. The empirical section tests our theory on a comparative case study of the national protest agenda in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia between 1993 and 2010.

The dimensionality of the political contest

The various political interests, issues, and identities that exist tend to be clustered around more general issue dimensions that structure the political contest in a given society. In every country we can identify important political divisions that constitute the main axes of the political conflict. Going beyond the original idea of a single left-right dimension, most authors agree that political conflict in contemporary democracies is multi-dimensional (Benoit and Laver 2012; Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012; Lijphart 1969). At least two issue dimensions can be identified that political actors compete around: the economic dimension and the socio-cultural dimension (Miller and Schofield 2003; Marks et al. 2006; Rovny and Edwards 2012). The economic dimension encompasses issues of economic redistribution, government regulation of the economy, taxation, welfare, questions related to socio-economic status etc. This is the dimension that reflects the socialist-capitalist class conflict that exists in every society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Kitschelt 1994). The socio-cultural dimension embraces a variety of non-economic issues that are not primarily or not only focused on material redistribution but relate mainly to culture and identity. It includes issues connected to religion, traditional values and morality, lifestyles and sexuality, the role of authority, nationalism, community, or the environment (Marks et al. 2006) and captures political disputes waged from secular-religious, center-periphery, urban-rural (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Lipset and Rokkan 1967),

¹ For the distinction between the systemic agenda and within-system issue contestation in the case of party politics, see (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Miller and Schofield 2003; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009).

libertarian-authoritarian (Kitschelt 1994), allegiant-assertive/postmaterialist positions (Inglehart 1977; Dalton and Welzel 2014).²

The master-issue dimension

We argue that, in the long term, the national protest agenda is the inverse of the master-issue dimension at the centre of the party-political contest: if the master-issue dimension of party politics is economic, protest will be predominantly focused on socio-cultural issues and vice versa. The reason is that the electoral contest has a tendency to reduce party competition to a single-dimension equilibrium (whether economic or socio-cultural) that produces an eliminatory effect on the secondary issue dimension.

Specifically, party politics tends to reduce the political contest to a single-dimensional equilibrium because in order to maximise voter support and form a government political parties have to find one unifying position under which they can align various other, often conflicting, issues and interests. Coalition governments and mainstream parties are thus “coalitions of enemies” (Miller and Schofield 2003, 249) and their alliance is only possible thanks to the reduction of political conflict to a single dimension demarking the issues that the government can come together around and leaving aside other issues that challenge its unity. Since contestation around a single dimension is a formula for success, mainstream parties strive to maintain this advantageous “dimensional status quo” by “freezing” party competition along one master dimension (Rovny and Edwards 2012: 60). Studies have shown that mainstream parties tend to emphasise the salience of their master issue dimension and employ various strategies to silence potentially disruptive secondary issues, that they are generally reluctant to change their policy focus, and that in order to win elections they respond to the median voter (Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow 2008; Meguid 2005; Meyer and Wagner 2013; Rovny and Edwards 2012).

The tendency of party systems to freeze competition along a single master dimension has important consequences for political contestation on secondary issues that do not fall under this master dimension. Research on niche political parties, which advocate issues neglected by mainstream parties, shows how this mechanism works (Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow 2010; Meguid 2005; Meyer and Wagner 2013; Miller and Schofield 2003; Rovny and Edwards 2012). Unlike mainstream parties, which are driven by office-seeking competition, respond to the median voter, and seek to maintain the single-dimensional status quo, the contest between niche parties is driven by their policy issues – they emphasise the salience of neglected secondary policy issues and respond to the opinions of their issue-defined electorate (Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow 2008; Farrer 2014; Meguid 2005; Meyer and Wagner 2013; Rovny and Edwards 2012). Niche parties thus “challenge the structure of conflict between the major partisan competitors ... by increasing the salience of secondary issues” and operate as a destabilising force that tries to “tear the system apart” (Rovny and Edwards 2012, 56, 61; Sartori 1976, 350).

² Our theoretical mechanism implies a comparison of “master issue dimension versus other”; economic issues have always either the master or the secondary importance. Because of that, if a master issue dimension is socio-cultural (one or more socio-cultural issues), the “other” will always be economic; if a master issue dimension is economic, the “other” will have (some) socio-cultural character.

The implication of this research is that the political contest is driven by the competition over the content of the master dimension, with mainstream parties and candidates seeking to maintain the current single-dimension equilibrium that is challenged by actors asserting other, secondary issues (Rovny and Edwards 2012). We extend this theory to protest. As Farrer (2014; also Ezrow 2010) notes, niche political parties and advocacy groups are, in fact, fundamentally similar types of political actors as both try to pursue neglected policy issues and both are thus very different from mainstream parties that are trying to maximise votes. Like niche parties, non-partisan advocacy actors and protest in general have traditionally been seen as a “rival to the political representation system” (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995, 5) as challenging the existing party system, raising new, neglected issues, and fighting to increase the salience of those issues (Burstein 1999; Gamson 1990; Goldstone 2003; McAdam and Tarrow 2013; Tilly 1978). Both niche parties and protest are thus outcomes of the same process resulting from the single-dimensional tendency of party politics.

This has important consequences when we are trying to explain what aspects of party politics affect protest. Other studies also expect a substitutive relationship between protest and party politics suggesting that “the institutionalization of a cleavage ... implies that the competition is no longer taking place in unconventional terms” (Kriesi et al. 1995, 6). However, those studies do not distinguish between the master and secondary status of the dimensions of political conflict and expect this substitutive effect should be created by all issues expressed in the party arena or by the very presence of different parties in parliament, regardless of what their master or secondary/niche position is. For instance, this theory would imply that the existence of a Green party in parliament (that has a niche position and in most party systems competes on the secondary issue dimension) would have the effect of eliminating socio-cultural environmental protest the same way the presence of a social-democratic party (that in most party systems competes on the master issue dimension) would eliminate economic protest. In contrast, our theory emphasises the crucial importance of distinguishing between the master- and secondary-issue dimensions, with the master-issue dimension being the primary factor because it constrains the actions of both niche parties and protest. Looking only at the institutionalisation of an issue dimension in party politics or the presence of specific political actors in parliament, irrespective of the importance of the issues they compete on, blurs this distinction.

Moreover, protest is probably the primary political strategy used to challenge the content of the master issue dimension and increase the salience of neglected issues. Because of that, the division of issue dimensions between mainstream parties competing around the master dimension in the party arena and the secondary issue dimensions that protest focuses on will be even sharper than in the case of mainstream and niche political parties. Although primarily policy-seeking, niche parties still compete for votes and try to get into office and it is generally difficult for niche parties to find a balance between policy- and office-seeking goals as their issues cannot be co-opted by mainstream parties but cannot be completely dismissed from the party arena either (Adams et al. 2006; Meguid 2005; Ezrow 2010). Also, it is generally easier for mainstream parties to implement the policies of non-partisan than partisan actors, as mainstream parties can appeal to voters who protest, but cannot credibly win over votes from the niche parties that own a specific issue (Farrer 2014). In contrast, these difficulties do not exist with protest, as the electoral-party arena and the protest arena are two separate fields of action that rely on different mechanisms of political representation. The relationship between the party-electoral and the protest arena is not a zero-sum

game. The goal of social movements and protest is not to win votes in elections, but to get neglected issues on the agenda and achieve social change (Burstein 1999, 15).

The strength of the master dimension

The continuous conflict over what is to be the content of the master issue dimension addressed in politics that goes on between mainstream parties on the one side and niche parties and protest on the other side has the aggregate effect of establishing a “dynamic stability” in the dimensional structure of issues (Miller and Schofield 2003, 245). As explained above, the tendency of party competition to converge in single-dimension equilibrium and the stability of the resulting constellation are relatively strong (Rovny and Edwards 2012). Indeed, most contemporary democracies show a relatively stable dimensional structure in party politics over time. Also, Hutter (2014, 142) shows that the differences across six Western democracies in the share of economic and socio-cultural protest between 1970 and 2005 remained relatively unchanged over time.

However, the political contest looks different when the single-dimensional equilibrium of party politics is lost. In those situations, the eliminatory effect of the master dimension on secondary issues is weaker and the two arenas become more interconnected. This disequilibrium may be short term in nature, as in the aftermath of an extremely powerful exogenous shock (economic crisis, regime breakdown, the collapse of one of the mainstream parties following a corruption scandal) or it may be more gradual, as described in the literature on party re-alignment when party and social movement activists try to increase the salience of the secondary issue dimension and mainstream parties start to appeal to potential new voters who are left out by the current single-dimensional structuring of party politics (Miller and Schofield 2003; McAdam and Tarrow 2013).

Importantly for our study, the disequilibrium can also be more permanent in nature. In some countries, it is generally harder to achieve a single-dimensional equilibrium because mainstream parties need to compete on more than one issue dimension at the same time in order to maximise votes and create coalitions (Rovny and Edwards 2012, 60). This means that mainstream parties cannot exploit fully and only the master dimension while doing away with secondary issues by either co-opting them under the master dimension or by dismissing them as in case of single-dimension equilibrium. In contrast, they need to balance their contestation between two independent dimensions, thereby reducing their ability to form a unifying coalition and dividing their support base. By emphasising the secondary issue dimension, they undermine the primary dimension and *vice versa*. The consequence for political conflict in those political systems is that the eliminatory effect of the master dimension on competition on the secondary issue dimension, which takes place when single-dimensional equilibrium is achieved, is weaker here. Because of that, the weaker substitutive effect leads to a greater long-term convergence between party and protest politics and thus a greater long-term similarity between the party and protest agendas.

In sum, the main implications of our theory are: 1) The composition of the national protest agenda – i.e. whether protest mostly focuses on economic or socio-cultural issues – should generally be relatively stable over time. 2) The issue composition of the national protest agenda depends on the content of the master issue dimension contested in party politics. If the master issue dimension in party politics is economic, protest will be predominantly focused on socio-cultural issues and *vice versa*. 3) The strength of this substitutive effect depends on how one-dimensional party politics is: the stronger the single-dimensionality of party politics, the greater the difference between the party

and protest agendas. If competition between mainstream parties forms a single-dimension equilibrium, the national protest agenda will be the inverse of this master issue dimension. However, if the single-dimensional tendency of party politics is weak, the party and protest agendas will be more alike.

Our theory does not of course predict the specific character and dimensionality of political conflict in individual countries. That depends on exogenous factors such as the social structure, historical legacies, political and international events, the design of political institutions etc. (Evans and Whitefield 1993; Kitschelt et al. 1999). Our theory only deals with the relationship between the party and protest arenas and focuses particularly on the system-level consequences of this relationship for the agenda contested in the two arenas.

Design

In almost all Western democracies party politics are dominated by the economic dimension (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Benoit and Laver 2006; Rovny and Edwards 2012). These democracies do not thus provide the variation in the content of the master issue dimension that we are interested in. Therefore, in order to empirically investigate our theory, we focus on four Eastern Central European democracies – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – that show variation in content and a strong master-issue dimension in their party politics. In the analysis below we will present data on the dimensional structure of the four countries' party politics (Berglund et al. 2013; Bértoa 2014; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009; Kitschelt et al. 1999); here we discuss the logic of the design and the specific observable implications.

We analyse the four countries between 1993 and 2010 and ignore the period between the democratic revolutions in 1989 and 1993 as our theory is based on mechanisms that only work in systems defined by somewhat consolidated democratic representation. The structure of political competition in the period of 1989-1993 was in all four countries still influenced by the conflict between the old and new regimes and democratic contestation was only in the process of formation at that time (Enyedi 2005; Enyedi 2006; Mansfeldová 2013, 221-22). In Czechoslovakia, the democratisation process was even accompanied by the breakup of the federation and the creation of two independent states. The data collection ends in 2010, which is often interpreted as a turning point for the party systems of some of the studied countries (Dawson and Hanley 2016).

Table 1 presents a summary of the research design and predictions. The first two columns show the variation in the dimensional structure of party politics in the four countries. Over time the four countries display cross-country and within-country variation in terms of the strength (indicated by + and ++) and content of their master issue dimension (economic or socio-cultural), and this provides a unique opportunity to analyse various combinations of the dimensional structure of party politics. From a cross-sectional perspective, the content of the master dimension is economic in two countries (Czech Republic, CZ, and Slovakia after 2001, SK) and socio-cultural in two countries (Hungary, HU, and Poland, PO). The sample can be split into two groups according to the within-country variation over time: The Czech Republic and Hungary have the same dimensional structure over the period of 1993-2010 and the other two countries show change over time (in SK there is a change in the content of the master dimension and in Poland there is a change in the strength of the same master dimension). The third column in Table 1 shows the character of the national protest agenda that is predicted by our theory.

Table 1: Research design and predictions

Master issue dimension (content and strength)	Country	Prediction: Protest
Economic ++	Czech Republic (1993-2010)	Socio-cultural ++
Economic +	Slovakia (2002-2010)	Socio-cultural +
Socio-cultural +	Slovakia (1993-2001)	Economic +
Socio-cultural +	Poland (2002-2010)	Economic +
Socio-cultural ++	Poland (1993-2001)	Economic ++
Socio-cultural ++	Hungary (1993-2010)	Economic ++

Data and measurement

The national protest agenda

To measure the national protest agenda in the four countries we use data from protest event analysis (PEA), which is based on a content analysis of public records (e.g. newspaper articles) (see, for example, Hutter 2014). The key advantage of this method over other approaches (e.g. surveys of the national population or of organisations representing social movements) is its ability to capture the aggregate levels of protest across space and over time and, especially, its ability to detect the issue agenda of protest.

We collected data from the electronic archives of the national news agencies in the four countries: The Czech News Agency, the News Agency of the Slovak Republic, the MTI Hungarian News Agency Corporation, and the Polish Press Agency. Although the individual news agencies probably did not cover every single protest event that happened in these countries during the studied period, we are positive that the archives of these news agencies are able to provide a very good general picture of protest in the four countries. One reason is that the incidence of protest in the four countries is very low³ and the countries are rather small (with the exception of Poland). This means that protest is a special and remarkable event that attracts a great deal of media attention even at the national level. All four news agencies also have regional offices. As well, unlike print newspapers, the news agencies do not have a limit to the number of news items that can be covered in a given day and thus they do not suffer from the selection bias in their coverage of events that occurs when multiple items have to compete for limited space in a news medium. The archives are moreover the single most important source of event data, more so than newspapers, because there is no explicit political bias in the agencies that we know of in favour of or against a particular type of event or actor. As we are primarily comparing the relative composition of national protest agendas and not the absolute numbers of protest events across the four countries, there is also less potential for bias resulting from the differences in the event coverage of the four news agencies.

A collective political event is defined as an actual gathering of at least three people who convene in a public space in order to assert claims that have a bearing on the interests of an

³ The four countries have some of the lowest levels of public participation in demonstrations among contemporary democracies, as no more than 5% of their populations participate yearly in demonstrations. Also, on most days there are no protest events (there were no protest events on 66% of days in the Czech Republic, 79% of days in Slovakia, 46% of days in Poland and 25% of days in Hungary between 1993 and 2010) and on the majority of protest days there were only a few events (there were three or fewer protest events on 77% of protest days in the Czech Republic, 79% in Slovakia, 60% in Poland, and 49% in Hungary).

institution/collective actor.⁴ A list of 22 keywords referring to collective political events was used to search all the news reported in the electronic archives. The whole period was covered without any sampling of years or days. All news items that matched our definition of protest, described above, were manually selected from the sample produced by the keyword search and a number of variables relevant to collective action studies were manually coded for each event by eight coders.⁵

To measure the issue dimensionality of the national protest agenda (the economic and the socio-cultural dimension) we combined two variables – the “topic/policy area” and the “framing” of individual protest events. Most of the categories of “topics/policy areas” clearly indicate what issue dimension they relate to (such as the policy areas of the economy and human rights), but some policy areas are less clear-cut. For instance, the “topic/policy area” of industry and infrastructure can relate to both issue dimensions. The construction of a building can be protested for economic reasons or also for environmental reasons. For this reason, we added “framing” as a second coding variable indicating whether the framing of the protest event was economic or socio-cultural.

As a result, protest focusing on economic issues encompasses events concerned with economic policies (e.g. monetary issues, taxes) or social policies (welfare state issues) and/or use an economic framing (the main argument is “economic efficiency and economic needs” or “socio-economic rights”). Protest events concerned with socio-cultural issues are events that focus on socio-cultural topics/policy areas⁶ and/or use socio-cultural framing.⁷ ‘Other’ was used as the category for events that do not meet any of the criteria outlined above for categorising the event as concerned with either an economic or socio-cultural issue.⁸ The specific coding scheme is presented in Appendix A. The dimensional structure of the national protest agenda is defined as the relative distribution of economic and socio-cultural issues in a given country at a certain period of time (see also Hutter 2014, 124).

Content and strength of the master issue dimension

To analyse the master issue dimension, we examine the dimensional structure of political conflict in the party arena. The dimensional structure of the national party agenda can be understood as “strongly structured and persistent lines of salient social and ideological division among politically

⁴ Only episodes of collective action that actually took place are included; threats of resorting to collective action, such as strike alerts, are excluded.

⁵ All the coders spoke Czech in addition to the language of the country they coded. The Czech data were used for cross-country reliability tests.

⁶ Ethnic minorities, immigrants, religion, basic human and political rights, women’s rights, LGBT rights, other rights (e.g. children or handicapped people), environment, homeland security, foreign policy and international security, radical right extremism, and historical justice.

⁷ Inclusive pro-minority identity argument, exclusive anti-minority identity, universal human and political rights, pro-life, greater inclusion of citizens, law, order and justice, authority and tradition, benefits of cultural diversity, communist legacy framing.

⁸ Events focusing on topics/policy areas (political institutions, industry, transportation, infrastructure, urban planning, agriculture, quality of consumer products, radical left extremism, and other topics) that do not at the same time also have a specific framing (either economic or socio-cultural) are coded as “other”. The episodes of protest in Slovakia related to the semi-democratic regime of V. Mečiar (1992-1998) that were organised by mainstream political actors (main parties, president, MPs etc.) are also included in the ‘other’ category other (see below).

important actors” (Whitefield 2002, 181).⁹ The same logic is used to distinguish the content of the two types of issue dimensions as in the case of protest events. Issues like taxes, redistribution, or welfare policies fall under the economic dimension. Other issues like religion, nationalism, social issues, environment, decentralisation, communist history, foreign policy, etcetera, fall under the socio-economic dimension.

The strength of the master issue dimension indicates where the two issue dimensions rank in importance in the national party agenda. Two aspects are important here: 1) The content of the master issue dimension, i.e. whether the most important line of political conflict between mainstream parties is economic or socio-cultural. 2) The strength of the master issue dimension, i.e. whether the conflict between mainstream political parties is one-dimensional or whether the single-dimension equilibrium is weak/non-existent. Importantly, the strength of the master issue dimension is a characteristic of the party system as a whole that reflects the degree of the system’s convergence towards single-dimension equilibrium. This means that the strength of the master dimension does not fully overlap with the existence of niche parties that represent alternative issues in party politics. A party system can be strongly single-dimensional and simultaneously have a niche party contesting on an alternative issue dimension that, however, does not have much of an effect on the competition dynamics between mainstream parties.

The strength of the master issue dimension captures its relative salience compared to the secondary dimension in mainstream politics. Full strength is a situation where the master dimension is not threatened by secondary issues, i.e. alternative issues are dismissed and remain outside the competition between mainstream political parties or their salience is decreased by full accommodation, i.e. when the secondary issues are subsumed under the master issue dimension and lack political salience (Meguid 2005). If there is a salient secondary issue in the party system, the master issue dimension is weaker; in this case the secondary issue either aligns itself with the master dimension or, more often, functions as a salient cross-cutting dimension in mainstream party politics (Bértoa 2014).

We apply the conceptualisation described above to the qualitative data on political cleavages (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Berglund et al. 2013; Bértoa 2014; Whitefield 2002) and to standardised data from expert surveys measuring various aspects of party competition (Benoit and Laver 2006; Marks et al. 2006). Specifically, we use variables on the saliency that political parties attach to various issues based on the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey and the 2003 Benoit-Laver expert survey. First, we weight the salience each party attached to the each of the issues covered in the surveys by the party’s vote share in order to identify mainstream and niche political parties, or if you like mainstream and niche issues, to establish the system-level salience of individual issues. Second, we contrast the system-level salience of economic issues with that of socio-cultural issues by calculating the difference between the salience of the economic dimension¹⁰ and the most salient issue among the socio-cultural issues. A plus/minus sign attached to this measure indicates which one of the issue dimensions is the more salient one (i.e. party systems with an economic master dimension have a

⁹ Though there is certainly a connection between party competition and the social structure of the electorate, our primary concern is the competition among political parties, not the link between the social structure of the population and political parties as suggested by the classical conceptualisation of cleavages.


¹⁰ This means the average salience of particular economic issues: the issues in the 2003 Benoit-Laver expert survey were taxes and privatisation and in the 2006 Chapel Hill survey they were spending-taxes, deregulation, and redistribution.

plus sign, party systems with a socio-cultural master issue dimension have a minus sign) and the number indicates the strength of this master issue dimension (a greater number means a bigger difference in the salience of the two issue dimensions).

Results

Figure 1 presents the composition of the national protest agenda in the four countries from 1993 to 2010. Specifically, it shows the three-year average proportions of economic and socio-cultural protest and the ‘other’ category in the national protest agendas. Consistent with our theoretical argument, Figure 1 shows that the composition of the national protest agendas is relatively stable over time. The Czech Republic and Hungary – the extreme cases with a strong master dimension that did not change during the studied period – have very stable agendas. The changes in the protest agendas in Slovakia and Poland after 2001 correspond to the changes in the dimensional structure of party politics that occurred in both countries at the turn of millennium (see below). Nevertheless, the composition of protest before and after 2002 is in these two countries also relatively stable, and the composition of protest issues does not vary greatly (from one three-year interval to the next) either.

Figure 1: National protest agenda (%)



Note: Three-year average proportions of protest issue dimensions. Data: PEA V4.

Importantly for our argument, the relative temporal stability of the protest agenda contrasts with a substantial variation in the institutionalisation of the main party organisations in the four countries over time. Although there is some cross-country variation, party organisations in Eastern Europe are “fundamentally fluid and unstable”, with significant electoral volatility, new parties emerging, and

old parties disappearing at almost every election (Rovny and Polk 2017: 188). This means that, the organisational aspect of party politics, i.e. the institutionalisation of individual parties, cannot be linked to the relatively stable composition of national protest agendas. Instead, the stability of protest issues corresponds to stability in the dimensional structure of party competition in those countries, as suggested by our theory above. As Rovny and Polk (2017) show, the great fluctuation of parties in those countries surprisingly coincides with/ a stability of the issue structure of party competition.

The cross-country variation in the national protest agenda and its relation to the issue structure of party politics is shown in Table 1. The first row presents the differences in the proportion of economic and socio-cultural protest in two periods (1993-2001 and 2002-2010) across the four countries. The second and the third row summarise the results of the qualitative analyses of party competition in the four countries (see below) and show the content of the master dimension and its strength, i.e. the extent to which the one-dimensionality of party competition is disrupted by the secondary dimension. The fourth row presents the standardised measures of the content and strength of the master issue dimension (the difference between the salience of the economic dimension and the most salient socio-cultural issue) calculated on data from the two expert surveys (CHES 2006 and Benoit and Laver 2003) that are available for the second period.

Table 2: National Protest Agenda and Dimensionality of Party Politics

Country-period	National protest agenda (% economic – % socio-cultural dimension)	Content of the master dimension	Strength of the master dimension	Party politics dimensionality (Benoit and Laver 2003/CHES 2006)
Czech Republic (1993-2001)	-41	Economic	Strong one-dimensionality	-
Czech Republic (2002-2010)	-36	Economic	Strong one-dimensionality	1.0/0.27
Slovakia (1993-2001)	8	Cultural	Crosscut by economic	-
Slovakia (2002-2010)	-10	Economic	Crosscut by cultural	0/0.02
Poland (1993-2001)	32	Cultural	One-dimensionality	-
Poland (2002-2010)	8	Cultural	Crosscut by economic	0.05/-0.08
Hungary (1993-2001)	46	Cultural	Strong one-dimensionality	-
Hungary (2002-2010)	32	Cultural	Strong one-dimensionality	-0.8/-0.18

Note: Data on National Protest Agenda come from PEA V4, qualitative data on Content and Dominance of master dimension come from (Berglund et al. 2013; Webb and White 2007; Bértoa 2014), quantitative data on party politics dimensionality are calculated from expert surveys (Benoit and Laver 2003/CHES 2006).

In the Czech Republic, the national protest agenda was predominantly socio-cultural throughout the studied period (Figure 1). As the first row of Table 1 shows, the share of protest events concerned with socio-cultural issues, such as human rights and other post-materialist issues, was much greater during the 1990s (by 41%) and after 2001 (by 36%) than the share of protest events relating to economic issues. This is consistent with the content and strength of the master issue dimension of Czech party politics, as the economic dimension was the strongest issue dimension in party competition in the Czech Republic throughout the period studied (Mansfeldová 2013, 221; Kopecký 2007, 120). Although the Czech Republic was established in 1993 as one of the successor states of the

former Czechoslovakia, a nationalist dimension never played a role in mainstream party politics, and all potentially nationalist claims faded with the partition of the Czechoslovak federation. It was the issues of economic transformation that dominated the 1990s, and economic issues such as taxes, health care, and pensions have structured party politics ever since (Linek and Lacina 2010). The standardised data from the expert surveys (1.0/0.27) confirm the strength of the economic dimension as well. The positive value of the difference indicates that economic issues are the most salient issue dimension in the party competition; that this measure is higher in the CR means that this master dimension is more dominant in the CR than in Slovakia and Poland, which have values closer to zero.

Since 1996 the economic dimension was the focal issue dimension of the two largest political parties: The Czech Social Democratic Party, which was the dominant party on the left side of the political spectrum, and the Civic Democratic Party, which was the dominant party on the right. In this respect, out of our four cases the Czech Republic is closest to Western democracies, where there is typically a strong economic dimension in party politics (Siavelis 2006, 365-67) and where the protest arena mainly revolves around socio-cultural issues (Hutter 2014, 142).

Importantly, the strongly one-dimensional nature of Czech party politics centred mainly on economic issues was not weakened by the presence of niche parties in parliament seeking to compete on socio-cultural issues. These included nationalistic parties fighting for the cultural and territorial autonomy of the eastern part of the country (Self-governing Democracy Movement – Association for Moravia and Silesia, in parliament between 1990 and 1996); a far right nationalist and xenophobic party (Association of the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia, in parliament in 1992-1998); and the Green Party (2006-2010). These parties were relatively small and did not destabilise the strongly one-dimensional nature of party competition over economic issues in Czech party politics. The simultaneous existence of relatively strong single-dimension party competition and the occasional presence of niche parties in parliament competing on the secondary issue dimension provides important support for our theory. As we can see, the mutually exclusive relationship between the party and protest agendas is determined by the content and the strength of the master issue dimension, so that it is not just a matter of the degree to which different issue dimensions are institutionalised in party politics, regardless of the strength of the issue, but whether they form the primary (mainstream parties) or secondary dimension (niche parties and protest). In other words, only conflict between mainstream political parties produces a substitutive effect in relation to political protest.

Like the Czech Republic, Hungary shows the same strong inverted pattern between the national protest agenda and a strong master dimension but with different issue content. As Figure 1 and Table 1 show, the Hungarian protest agenda has been predominantly economic. There were many more economic protest events (by 46% in the 1993-2002 period and by 35% between 2002 and 2010) than there were events focusing on socio-cultural issues. Consistent with our theory, a predominantly economic protest agenda corresponds to a strongly one-dimensional competition on socio-cultural issues in Hungarian party politics. Since 1994, “non-economic issues defined party positions, inter-party distances and electoral behaviour... (and) economic policy issues and social class played a minor role in party competition” (Tóka and Popa 2013, 318). Specifically, the original economic master dimension that dominated Hungarian party competition in the first post-revolutionary years switched to a strong socio-cultural dimension after 1993 (Enyedi 2005). From

1994 to 2010 several socio-cultural issues became more prominent and came to form the basis of the one-dimensional structure that divides Hungarian party politics between two poles: the socially conservative, Christian-national, anti-communist and agrarian position on one side, and the secular, cosmopolitan, and urban one on the other (Rovny and Edwards 2012; Tóka and Popa 2013). After 1993 FIDESZ gradually consolidated its “reign over the [socially conservative] right” (Enyedi 2006, 233) and became the main force of opposition to the secular and cosmopolitan socialists (MSZP, Hungarian Socialist Party). In terms of institutionalisation, these two parties became the organisational hegemons on each side. In the elections between 1998 and 2010 (four elections) the two parties gained between 60 and 85% of the total vote. The relatively strong dominance of the socio-cultural dimension in party politics is also confirmed by the results from the expert surveys (-0.8/-0.18) accompanied by a negative sign (i.e. the socio-cultural content of the master dimension) and a greater value (i.e. the large gap in the strength of salience between the socio-cultural master dimension and the secondary economic issue dimension).

The one-dimensional equilibrium of Hungarian party politics was destabilised after the fall 2006 leak of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány’s (MSZP) secret party meeting speech earlier that year, leading to massive anti-governmental protests and the ensuing collapse of the socialists and strengthening of the conservative pole of Hungarian party politics (Kriesi 2014, 359–60). Due to the collapse of one pole of the main dimension in Hungarian party politics, the one-dimensional equilibrium posited on the socio-cultural dimension that produced the eliminatory effect on the secondary economic dimension was disrupted and opened up the mainstream space of competition to various actors. As a result, the party and protest fields became aligned around anti-government protests that contributed to the 2010 landslide electoral victory of FIDESZ. This mobilisation of the conservative right in the streets is evidenced in Figure 1 by the increased proportion of cultural issues in the last three years of our studied period (see also Greskovits and Wittenberg 2016).

In Slovakia and Poland (after 2001) the composition of the protest agendas is generally more balanced and the gap between economic and socio-cultural protest is much smaller. This pattern is consistent with the fact that party politics is less one-dimensional in those countries than in the Czech Republic and Hungary. The eliminatory effect of the master dimension is weaker here because the single-dimension equilibrium of the whole party system is disrupted by a salient secondary issue dimension that mainstream parties compete on as well, in which case they do not try to push this dimension out of party politics. As a result, we see a greater congruence in these countries between the issues that are contested in party and protest politics. The greater interconnection that exists between party and protest politics when there is a lack of single-dimension equilibrium is also illustrated by the fact that there are more protest events organised by political parties in these two countries than in the Czech Republic and Hungary (the political agendas of the latter two being strongly single-dimensional). Specifically, only 10 percent of all events in Hungary and 11 percent in the Czech Republic were organised by political parties. In contrast, 43 percent of protest events in Slovakia and 28 percent of protest events in Poland were organised by political parties.

Nevertheless, the prevalent protest issues still follow the pattern of being inverse in content to the master issue dimension contested in party politics. In Poland, the national protest agenda was in the first decade predominantly economic: 55% of events were economic, and only 23% were socio-cultural between 1993 and 2001 (difference = 32% in Table 1). In line with our theory, this

corresponds to the strong socio-cultural master dimension that structured Polish party competition in this period. Until 2001, religion and the communist past were more salient in Polish party politics than the economy. Polish party conflict focused on diverging interpretations of basic religious and civilisational values that reflected a conflict between secular and confessional views and contrasting perspectives of the Polish communist past. This affected what 'left' and 'right' stand for in party politics. Unlike in Western Europe and the Czech Republic, where left and right align with different models of political economy, "in the language of Polish politics this ideological cleavage, not the socio-economic one, is defined as the left-right dimension" (Jasiewicz 2007, 88). Throughout the 1990s the one-dimensional socio-cultural party competition was dominated by the post-communist Democratic Left Alliance on the left and there were a number of anti-communist parties on the right.

Around the start of the new millennium the agenda of party politics changed. The economic issues, most notably post-communist economic transformation strategy and privatisation became more relevant than before. It was the 2001 elections that put what at that time were understood to be conservative radicals (the agrarian-populist Self-Defence Party and the catholic-nationalist League of Polish Families) to the centre of attention (Stanley 2013, 180). New issues emerged that weakened the socio-cultural dimension and led to cross-cutting party contestation on both issue dimensions (Bértoa 2014, 26). As a result, the Polish party system became more bi-dimensional, with parties competing on socio-cultural issues intersected by economic issues. The values 0.05 and -0.08 in Table 1 for the indicators on party politics' issue dimensionality according to the expert surveys are very close to zero, which means that the gap between the salience of the economic dimension and the socio-cultural dimension is small and that both dimensions are salient. The negative sign next to the greater figure indicates that the socio-cultural dimension is still the more important dimension.

The bi-dimensional character of Polish party competition is best symbolised by the Law and Justice Party (PiS) established in 2001. For the PiS, the left and liberals of the first transition period posed not just a different model of socio-economic development, but also a serious civilisational threat to the very existence of the Polish nation and its core values. This is a reflection of the character of party competition in the second decade under study, when it revolved around both cultural and economic issues. Accordingly, in its programme PiS successfully merged the defence of Polish culture (issues of cultural nationalism) with the defence of the economically vulnerable parts of the population living outside metropolitan areas (issues of economic equality). The position of the PiS is, however, not countered by a single opposing position serving as the gravitational pole for cultural and economic liberalism, and instead there are two opposing positions: one represents the intersection of economic liberalism and cultural conservatism and the other the intersection of economic and cultural liberalism. This shift in party politics affected Polish protest in the second decade, as we can see in Figure 1 and Table 2. When the exclusion effect of the one-dimensional equilibrium posited on socio-cultural issues observed in the first decade grew weaker, the protest agenda became more like the issues contested in party politics, particularly with the growth of conservative right protest. Nevertheless, protest is still slightly more centred on economic issues, which corresponds to the slightly greater importance of socio-cultural issues in party politics.

Among the four countries the most turbulent protest agenda over time is observed in Slovakia. In the first decade there was slightly more economic protest (8% more economic than socio-cultural, Table 2) and a significant amount of protest fell into the 'other' category. Since 2002,

socio-cultural issues have been the stronger issue dimension contested in protest politics 10 % more socio-cultural than economic protest, Table 2). This development goes hand in hand with the changes that occurred in the structure of Slovak party competition.

The first decade of Slovak party politics was not characterised by the presence of a strong economic master dimension like in the Czech Republic; on the contrary, the more important socio-cultural issues of national identity and the communist legacy were crosscut by less salient but still relevant economic issues (Bértoa 2014, 26). In line with our theory, the Slovak protest agenda followed the opposite pattern during this period: greater importance was given to economic issues over socio-cultural issues (by 8 %).

At the same time, as we can see in Figure 1, a large share of protest fell into the ‘other’ category between 1993 and 2001, the category in which we included protests relating to the semi-authoritarian period of Slovak politics under Prime Minister Mečiar and his Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS, in power 1992-1998). The politics of this semi-authoritarian regime did not follow the standard logic of democratic politics based on parties competing on the most important issue dimension and niche parties and protest politics contesting the secondary issues; instead the political conflict was over the very character of the political regime, with all the democratic forces aligning against HZDS, resulting in a convergence of party and protest politics above and beyond economic or socio-cultural issues. These protests account for 67 percent of the protest in the ‘other’ category and were organised by both HZDS (which kept organising protests even after the 1998 elections, when even though it won the elections it was ousted from government since it lost its coalition partner) and its opponents (civil society actors, the Party of the Democratic Left, the Christian Democratic Movement, and even the President).

Economic issues did not establish themselves as the stronger dimension of party politics until the beginning of the second post-communist decade, after Prime Minister Mečiar’s semi-authoritarian government ended. After 2000, the party conflict settled mainly around economic issues, “without abandoning the nationalist appeals altogether” (Deegan-Krause 2013, 276). In other words, around 2000 Slovakia experienced a shift in the content of its master dimension, which became more economic, though it retained a symbolic nationalist overtone (ibid: 272-273). The data from the expert surveys (0 and 0.02 in Table 1) show that there is no or only a small difference in the salience of the two dimensions, with slightly greater importance given to economic issues. In line with our theory, in the 2002-2007 period we find a balance between economic and socio-cultural protest (Figure 1). In the second half of the 2000s, socio-cultural protest accounted for more than 50 percent of protest in Slovakia. In this period, the dimensional structure of Slovak party politics and its national protest agenda became more like the structure of protest and party issues in the Czech Republic, with economic issues the stronger focus of party politics and socio-cultural issues the more salient concern of protest.

Conclusion

Social movement literature has traditionally recognised the exclusive insider-outsider pattern between party-electoral and protest-advocacy arenas (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 11; Tilly 1978). However, it has never been entirely clear what exactly distinguishes the two arenas as being in opposition to each other. Obviously, the difference does not lie in the type of actors and strategies used – political parties running in elections versus social movements protesting – as parties and

movements get involved in both types of strategies (Goldstone 2003, 7; Kitschelt 2006; Kriesi et al. 1995, 152ff).

Drawing on the conflict dimensionality and niche party literature, our theory suggests that the main line of demarcation lies in the hierarchy of issue dimensions that the actors compete on (master or secondary importance) and the resulting mechanism of representation through office or policy seeking. Specifically, the issue dimensions contested in the two political arenas have a substitutive effect in relation to each other that results from the fact that the office-seeking competition that dominates the electoral arena works to establish a one-dimensional equilibrium. These dynamics tend to reduce political conflict to just one main political divide at the centre of the mainstream parties' competition, squeeze out the other issue dimension, and relegate the competition over this niche dimension to the arena of policy-seeking strategies, with protest being a prominent type of such strategy.

We were able to empirically support this substitutive effect on the sample of four East Central European countries that have a unique combination of characteristics to allow an empirical investigation. In contrast to most Western democracies, three of the four studied countries have had at least in some period of time a socio-cultural master dimension. Also, unlike, for instance, the United States, where the master issue dimension is the only dimension present in party politics and the existing party organisations are centred precisely around that dimension, in the studied countries the combinations of master issue dimension, the salience of issues (in each arena), and party organisations' relation to the issue dimension are much more varied.

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Appendix A

Table A1: Coding of the issue dimensionality of the national protest agenda

MAIN TOPIC/POLICY AREA	
Economic dimension	4. economic issues (monetary/fiscal policy, taxes, wages) 7. social policy (health care, housing, tuition)
Socio-cultural dimension	2. historical justice/recognition 3. European Union 11. homeland security 12. foreign policy, international security 13. environmental issues 14. women's rights 15. LGBT rights 16. ethnic minorities, immigrants 17. basic human and political rights 18. rights of other specific groups (children, disabled) 19. religion 20. radical right and right extremism (for and against)
Other	1. State institutions, quality of democracy (transparency, corruption, etc.) 5. Industry, transportation, energy 6. Land use planning, construction 8. cultural policy 9. agriculture and forestry 10. consumer issues 21. radical left and left extremism (for and against) 22. other 23. missing
FRAMING	
Economic dimension	8. economic efficiency and needs 9. socio-economic rights
Socio-cultural dimension	1. inclusive (pro-minority) 2. exclusive (against-minorities) 3. basic human and political rights in general 4. pro-life 5. active political involvement (direct participation, support for civil society etc.) 6. law, order and justice 7. authority and tradition 10. protection of environment, quality of life 11. diversity 12. "communist" or "former regime" framing
Other	0. not available

Figure A1: Overtime Distribution of Specific Issues in the Czech Republic (Yearly Absolute Counts)




Figure A2: Overtime Distribution of Specific Issues in Slovakia (Yearly Absolute Counts)




Figure A3: Overtime Distribution of Specific Issues in Poland (Yearly Absolute Counts)





Figure A4: Overtime Distribution of Specific Issues in Hungary (Yearly Absolute Counts)



Appendix B

Table B1: Salience of Issue Dimensions in Party Politics from Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2006

	Czech Republic	Slovakia	Poland	Hungary
Redistribution	1.19	0.93	1.06	1.12
Deregulation	1.35	0.88	0.76	0.98
Spending vs. taxes	1.28	0.90	0.92	1.01
Economic dimension average	1.27	0.90	0.91	1.04
Urban vs. rural	0.54	0.70	0.79	1.22
Civil liberties vs. law and order	1.00	0.82	0.99	1.05
Ethnic minorities	0.68	0.88	0.70	0.83
Social lifestyles	0.77	0.72	0.95	0.98
Immigration	0.65	0.54	0.44	1.16
Religion	0.51	0.68	0.89	1.16
Decentralization	0.82	0.75	0.64	0.80
Most salient socio-cultural issue	1.00	0.88	0.99	1.22
Party politics dimensionality (Economic dimension average - Most salient socio-cultural issue)	0.27	0.02	-0.08	-0.18

Note: The data come from Bakker et al. (2015), the entries are country means of weighted (by the vote share) salience that parties attach to the specific issues.

Table B2: Importance of Issue dimension in Party Politics from (Benoit and Laver 2006, Appendix B)

	Czech Republic	Slovakia	Poland	Hungary
Taxes vs spending	13.9	13.4	13.3	12.9
Privatization	14.3	14.6	12.6	13.9
Economic dimension average	14.1	14	12.95	13.4
Nationalism	13.1	13.4	11.8	14.2
Decentralization	12.8	14	12.9	12.6
Foreign land ownership	13.1	13.4	12.4	13.8
Social liberalism	11	13.2	12.2	12.9
Environment	10.8	9.2	8.2	11.5
Former communist	13.0	12.5	11.6	13.5
Media freedom	12.4	12.3	12.5	13.8
Religion	10.7	13.1	12.2	12.5
Urban-rural	10.3	11.5	11.7	12.8
Most salient socio-cultural issue	13.1	14	12.9	14.2
Party politics dimensionality (Economic dimension average - Most salient socio-cultural issue)	1.0	0	0.05	-0.8
EU joining	15.4	15.7	16.6	16.9

Note: The data come from Benoit and Laver (2006, Appendix B), the entries are country means of weighted (by the vote share) salience that parties attach to the specific issues. The table does not include importance of EU joining as the data was collected during the accession to the EU and the topic of the EU was the most important event in all accession countries at that time.

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