

# SING12 – Program

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## Conference schedule

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday
Registration 8:10-9:10		
Opening session 9:10-9:25	Parallel sessions 8:30-10:00	Parallel sessions 8:30-10:00
<b>Plenary session 1</b> 9:25-10:25	Coffee break 10:00-10:30	Coffee break 10:00-10:30
Coffee break 10:25-10:45	<b>Plenary session 3</b> 10:30-11:30	<b>Plenary session 4</b> 10:30-11:30
<b>Plenary session 2</b> 10:45-11:45	Break 11:30-11:50	Break 11:30-11:50
Parallel sessions 11:50-13:00	Parallel sessions 11:50-13:00	Parallel sessions 11:50-13:00
<b>Lunch</b> 13:00-14:15	<b>Lunch</b> 13:00-14:30	<b>Lunch</b> 13:00-14:30
Parallel sessions 14:15-15:25	Parallel sessions 14:30-16:00	Parallel sessions 14:30-16:00
Coffee break 15:25-15:45		Coffee break 16:00-16:15
Parallel sessions 15:45-16:55		Closing session 16:15-16:30
<b>SING representatives meeting</b> 17:00-18:00	Departure for Odense ZOO Bus leaves at 16:30	<b>SING assembly</b> 16:30-17:30
	<b>Barbecue at Odense Zoo</b> 17:00-22:00	
<b>Welcome reception at "Møntergården"</b> 19:30-22:00		<b>Conference dinner at Hotel First Grand</b> 19:00

## Monday – July 11

8:10-9:10	Registration			
9:10-9:25	Opening session (O100)			
9:25-10:25	Plenary session 1(O100): Gabrielle Demange – Rankings on data: the one and two-sided settings			
10:25-10:45	Coffee break			
10:45-11:45	Plenary session 2(O100): Jens Leth Hougaard – Sharing the cost of access to a set of public goods			
<b>Parallel sessions</b>	<b>Non-cooperative two-player games</b>	<b>Cost sharing problems: networks</b>	<b>Cooperative games: Generalizations</b>	<b>Bargaining</b>
11:50-13:00	O100	O99	O96	O95
	Catch games: Analysis of values ANNA ZSELEVA	Minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources LETICIA LORENZO	Solutions for vectorial cooperative games with matrix characteristic function WILLIAM OLVERA-LOPEZ	Effect of strike pays in wage bargaining model AHMET OZKARDAS
	Two-person pairwise solvable games TOSHIMNAMA MARUTA	From spanning trees to arborescences: new and extended cost sharing solutions ERIC BAHREL	Three-valued simple games and applications to minimum coloring problems MARIEKE MUSEGAAS	Truncated leximin solutions BRAM DRIESEN
	Policy improvement for perfect information additive reward and additive transition stochastic games with discounted and average payoffs T.E.S. RAGHAVAN	Customer and cost sharing in a Jackson network JUDITH TIMMER	Soft cooperation and games INÉS GALLEGO	A characterization of the Nash Maximum Product (NMP) solution for fair division problems ELENA YANOVSKAYA
13:00-14:15	Lunch			
<b>Parallel sessions</b>	<b>Cooperative games: graphs and networks</b>	<b>Matching Problems I</b>	<b>Non-cooperative games</b>	<b>Voting: case study</b>
14:15-15:25	O100	O99	O96	O95
	On cooperative connection situations where the players are located at the edges STEFONA MORETTI	Cumulative offer process with continuous transfers KOJI YOKOTE	Communication games with optional verification SIMON SCHOPHOL	Approval voting as tool of political predictions. Case of Poland 2015 HONORATA SOSNOWSKA
	Dynamic Shapley value for irreducible networks YIN LI	Context dependence in two-sided matching LAURA KASPER	Several remarks on the role of certain positional and social games in the creation of the selected EWA DRABIK	The distribution of power in the Lebanese parliament revisited FRANK STEFFEN
	The Shapley value for directed graph games DOLF TALMAN	Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic pairing JENS GUDMUNDSSON	The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games CLAUDIA MERONI	On power measures and public goods IZABELLA STACH

## Monday – July 11 – continued

15:25-15:45 Coffee break					
Parallel sessions	Social choice I	Assignment games	Experimental studies	Bankruptcy problems	Cooperative games: centrality measures
15:45-16:55	O100	O99	O96	O95	O94
	Properties and characterization of a general equilibrium concept in multi-agent decision problems MANUEL LASZLO MAGO	Graphical algorithms for the Nucleolus of binary assignment games JOHN HARDWICK	Imagine-self perspective-taking promotes Nash choices in a simple experimental normal-form game MICHAŁ RAMSZA	Claims-separable consistency and potential for claims problems M. JOSUNE ALBIZURI	The closeness and the betweenness Myerson values CONRADO MANUEL GARCÍA
	Solidarity properties of choice correspondences PANOS PROTOPAPAS	The stability of the core in multi-sided assignment games DEZSŐ BEDNAY	Discrimination in a public goods experiment and gender inequality in the country of origin JANA VYRASTEKOVA	The RTAL-family of rules for bankruptcy problems: A characterization JAVIER ARIN	Revisiting game theoretical closeness and betweenness centrality measures. ENRIQUE GONZÁLES-ARANGÜENA
	How to apply penalties for avoiding delays in projects GUSTAVO BERGANTIÑOS	Multi-sided assignment games on m-partite graphs ATA ATAY	Communication situations with partially verifiable information: An experimental study MARIA MONTERO	Bankruptcy solutions for TU-games VITO FRAGNELLI	Generalization of binomial coefficients to numbers on the nodes of graphs ANNA KHMELNITSKAYA
17:00-18:00 SING representatives meeting (O99)					
19:30-22:00 Reception at Møntergården					

## Tuesday – July 12

Parallel sessions	Auctions	Cost sharing problems	Public goods games	Cooperative games: properties and classes
8:30-10:00	O100	O99	O96	O95
	Ranking asymmetric auctions with several bidders RENE KIRKEGAARD	Combined tickets in a public transport system ENCARNACIÓN ALGABA	Sophisticatedly stable equilibria in the local public goods game PETER BAYER	Population monotonic path schemes in coalitional games JESÚS MONTES
	Common value allocation mechanisms with private information: contests or auctions? ALEX POSSAJENNIKOV	Cost allocation in rural electrification projects: case study of an Indian village GIORGIO BONAMINI	Optimal strategy and effort input in group work evaluation in higher education MEHDI CHOWDHURY	A new contribution to the validity of the Coase theorem using the core. STÉPHANE GONZALES
	Axioms for a multi-item auction FRANCISCO ROBLES	A new rule for allocating costs of cleaning a river: fairness versus incentive compatibility MARÍA GÓMEZ-RÚA	Non-cooperative dynamic contribution to a public project SÉBASTIAN ROUILLON	Clan information market games SILVIA MIQUEL
	Distributional perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games with applications to Auctions ELNAZ BAJOORI	Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure RENE VAN DEN BRINK	Decentralized clearing in financial networks PETER CSOKA	von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game NAOKI WATANABE
10:00-10:30 Coffee break				
10:30-11:30 Plenary session 3 (O100): Shmuel Zamir – The strategic use of seller’s information in first-price auction				
11:30-11:50 Break				
Parallel sessions	Cooperative games: solutions	Computation	Economic applications: networks	Non-cooperative games: classes
11:50-13:00	O100	O99	O96	O95
	The SD-prenucleolus and the SD-prekernel ILYA KATSEV	Finding vertices of the core of a cooperative game JESÚS GETÁN	Sharing sequential profits in a network JINQYI XUE	Equilibria representing preferences of the players in multicriteria noncooperative games LECH KRUS
	The proportionate prenucleolus RUUD HENDRICKX	Approximation of (k,t)-robust equilibria NOÉMI GASKÓ	Stable networks in peer-to-peer based sharing economies NAGARAJAN KRISHNAMURTHY	Purification without common knowledge of priors IBRAHIM INAL
	On computing the per-capita nucleolus in balanced games TAMÁS SOLYMOSI	A package for finding asymptotic stable states in the sampling dynamics RAINER BERKEMER	The strategic formation of interbank networks NOEMÍ NAVARRO	On dynamic stability of equilibrium in network game with production and externalities VLADIMIR MATVEENKO
13:00-14:30 Lunch				

Tuesday – July 12 – continued

Parallel sessions	Mechanism design	Cooperative games: restricted cooperation	Oligopoly	Voting
14:30-16:00	O100	O99	O96	O95
	An outcome mechanism for partially honest Nash implementation HIROFUMI YAMAMURA	Restricted games induced by minimum partitions: complexity of inheritance of convexity ALEXANDRE SKODA	Cournot competition with an external supplier under capacity constraints and demand uncertainty STEFANOS LEONARDOS	Voting power on a linear political space STEFANO BENATI
	Implementation in partial equilibrium MICHELE LOMBARDI	Reactive and semi-reactive bargaining sets for games with restricted cooperation NATALIA NAUMOVA	Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with a socially concerned firm BALÁZS NAGY	Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations MARCUS PIVATO
	Incentive pay for policy-makers AFSOON EBRAHIMI	Position value for link weighted graph MÓNICA DEL POZO	Nothing so certain as your anchors? A consumer bias that lowers prices and might prevent cartels BARNA BAKO	Choosing when to delegate: endogenous cooperation and optimal voting rules. RAFAEL TREIBICH
	Comparing voting by committees according to their manipulability JORDI MASSÓ	Associations of players, tree-restricted games and external neutrality MARCIN MALAWSKI	Potential competition and quality disclosure JUNGHUM PARK	The degree measure as a utility function for positions in weighted graphs and digraphs AGNIESZKA RUSINOWSKA
16:30	Departure for ZOO – bus by the main entrance			
17:00-22:00	Barbecue at ZOO			

Parallel sessions	Cooperative games: values	Networks	Economic applications	Decision making	
8:30-10:00	O100	O99	O96	O95	
	Marginalism and egalitarianism under the equal effect of players' nullification on the others TAKUMI KONGO	Game theory, extremal optimization, and community structure detection in complex networks RODICA IOANA LUNG	Reforms of the common agricultural policy of the EU: theory of moves approach EWA KIRYLUK-DRYJSKA	Rational allocation of attention in decision-making STEFANIE SCHMITT	
	The balanced contribution property for equal contributors YUKIHIKO FUNAKI	Co-authorship and the measurement of individual productivity KAROL SZWAGRZAK	Sustainable allocation of a greenhouse gas emission permits among firms with linear technologies NATIVIDAD LLORCA	Behavioral game theory: a study in the decision making process of university students in Lebanon GHINWA EL CHLOUK	
	Decomposition, value, and power ANDRÉ CASAJUS	Individual power in social exchange networks - a theoretical analysis using cooperative game theory FRIEDERIKE BLÖNNIGEN	Managing innovation in the presence of spillover risks: a game-theoretic model SAŠA PEKEČ	How Jeremy Bentham would defend against coordinated attacks OLE JANN	
	Consistency: The difference between the (weighted) Shapley value and the (weighted) equal surplus division value PEDRO CALLEJA	Extractive structures in networks: definition, measurement and formation ROBERT GILLES	Dictate a dictator, succeed a successor CHIU YO KO	Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired CHRISTOPH SCHOTTMUELLER	
10:00-10:30	Coffee Break				
10:30-11:30	Plenary session 4(O100): Ron Holzman – Strong equilibrium in network congestion games				
11:30-11:50	Break				
Parallel sessions	NTU games	Matching Problems II	Forms of games/games in normal and extensive form	Partition function form games and games with externalities	Cooperative solutions: axiomatizations
11:50-13:00	O100	O99	O96	O95	O94
	Inducing stability in hedonic games EMILIYA LAZAROVA	Pareto efficient school choice mechanism under distributional constraints with initial endowments TAKAMASA SUZUKI	Non-cooperative games with prospect theory players and dominated strategies LARZ METZGER	On the structure of the set of embedded coalitions M.GLORIA FIESTRAS-JANIERO	An axiomatic analysis of joint liability problems with rooted-tree structure TAKAYUKI OISHI
	Bankruptcy problems with nontransferable Utility BAS DIETZENBACHER	A centralized matching market with early matches VINCENT IEHLE	Moves of the third kind in solving games of strategy GABRIEL TURBAY	Efficiency and the core in cooperative games with positive and negative externalities TAKAAKI ABE	On the Owen-Shapley spatial power index JOSÉ MANUEL ZARZUELO

## Wednesday – July 13 – continued

	A cardinally convex game with empty core MIKLOS PINTER	The Tinder stable marriage problem JOSUE ORTEGA	Transforming games with affinities from characteristic into normal form GIANFRANCO GAMBARELLI	A value for stochastic coalition formation processes with externalities MICHEL GRABISCH	
13:00-14:30	Lunch				
Parallel sessions	<b>Cost sharing problems: special classes and situations</b>	<b>Empirical studies</b>	<b>Cooperative games with communication structures</b>	<b>Social Choice II</b>	
14:30-16:00	O100	O99	O96	O95	
	Maximal covering location games LOE SCHLICHER	Testable implications of fair allocations YASUSHI AGATSUMA	On solutions in games with graph-restricted communication and coalition structure SILVIA LORENZO-FREIRE	Collective deliberation under non-common prior ADDISON PAN	
	Solutions for sharing the cost of a set covering situation MANUEL PULIDO	Analysis of mating fights from observable behavior in Boil and doily spiders ASSAF ENGEL	Axiomatization of the average tree solution for TU-games with cycle-free communication structure OZER SELCUK	Individual utility and social choice generated by choice of attitudes ANDREI MATVEENKO	
	Inventory games: myopic vs. farsighted stability ANA MECA	Clustered pricing in the corporate loan market: theory and empirical evidence SAJID MUKHTAR CHAUDRY	Weak necessary players, Myerson fairness and the concept of equality FLORIAN NAVARRO	Retail competition based on calorie content differentiation when consumers care for products' energy ABDULFATAH ADAM	
	Cost allocation rules for elastic single-attribute situations MARCO SLIKKER	A wavelet-game theory approach to the modelling of contagion: the case of energy markets BORYANA BOGDANOVA	Inclusive collusion neutrality on networks BIUNG-GHI JU	On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness SHUROJIT CHATTERJI	
16:00-16:15	Coffee break				
16:15-16:30	Closing session (O100)				
16:30-17:30	SING assembly (O100)				
19:00	Conference dinner at Hotel First Grand				