

Point of departure: Rise of political Islam in the last to decades.

Daniel Brumberg divides political Islamist movements into three sub-categories (p. 87)

- 1) Radical/militant fundamentalist;
  - "(...) groups that explicitly reject democracy and aim at establishing an Islamic state, often with recourse to violence"
- 2) Reformist fundamentals/tactical modernists;
  - who "(...) also pursue an Islamic state as their ultimate goal, but agree to make use of democratic instruments and discourses in achieving it"
- 3) Strategic modernist;
  - This sub-group contains "(...) Muslim liberal democrats that embrace democratic values and seek to extend religious freedoms in a political environment where they co-exist among other political movements in a secular order"

The case of Turkey;

- 1) Hizbollah in the south-east
- 2) The Welfare Party and its successors: The Virtue Party → the Felicity Party
- 3) The Justice and Development Party, known as the AKP.  
Reservations by Düzgit and Cakir – to some segments of the Turkish society??

→ Tell the story of the parties, while presenting the above categorization!

AKP's turning against the line of the Welfare Party is by Düzgit and Cakir "a major example of de-radicalization" (p. 89)

- Turned from reformist fundamentalism – working for an Islamic state to the strategic modernism now espousing liberal democracy and supporting a global liberal economy.

1.2 The AKP in power.

- Opponents of radical Islamist movements
  - Internal factors:
    - Institutional level; The military and the judiciary

- Micro-level; 76% of the population is against the implementation of sharia, while only 9% are in favour.
  - Among the AKP-voters 70% are against.
- External factors:
  - EU and NATO → pushes toward moderation
  - Turkish economy is integrated in the global economy, hence anti-Western and anti-globalisation discourse from the powerholders will cost dearly.
    - Note that the article is printed in 2009; Maybe these external factors to some degree are losing their importance?
      - The agitation against Israel and closer connection to Arab countries.
      - The decline of Western economic superiority.

#### Increasing religiosity

- Primary identification:
  - "Muslim": 44,6% (opposed to 36% in 1999)
  - "Citizen of the Turkish Republic": 29,9%
  - "Turk": 19,4

1/3 of the Turks fear the rise of Islamism and hence a erosion of the secularism – correlates with the Citizens of the Turkish Republic

- Erosion – a natural process, which takes place over a long period of time
- Wikipedia.com "Erosion is the process by which material is removed from a region of the Earth surface"
  - →Example given by secularists; The party's public-sector recruitments policies. AKP are eroding the public sector by recruiting people with Islamic background i.e in the educational system, while promoting Islamic conservatism through schoolbook.
    - Claims for an opposition, thus not reliable indicators.

- Direct legal-political attempts for change

#### The headscarf controversy;

- The AKP has three times tried to dissolve the headscarf ban from 1984 and 1997 in all public institutions.
  - 2008; last try was turned down by the Constitutional Court concluding “that the party had become the “centre for activities against secularism” (p.92)
  - For the secularists the headscarf has become a “visible symbol of the Islamisation of the Turkish society”
    - (p.93)
    - 2010 after the referendum; informal lift of the ban.
      - After winning a referendum in September 2010, the ruling AK Party vowed to support any student who was disciplined for wearing the headscarf on a university campus. Following this, the head of the Turkish Higher Educational council( YÖK ), Yusuf Ziya Özcan, announced that instructors in universities may no longer take action against students wearing the headscarf. While this goes against the Constitutional Court ruling of 2008, most universities have started permitting students to wear the headscarf on campus.
  - 64% in the survey found that the number wearing headscarves was increasing, however the same survey indicates that the number have decreased from 1996-2006
    - Düzgit and Cakir – Due to urbanization and migration. .
    - I say; Secularist discourse still strong, natural assumption with the AKP’s legitimizing Islam.
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- Democratization
  - P.94

- Post-2005 the AKP has been cautious about legal-political change, which can be interpreted as Islamic and at the same time reluctant to improve democratization.
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- Democratic consolidation:
  - All established democracies have some type of consolidated secular system enjoying acceptance by the majority of the socio-political actors.
  - Needs:
    - Economic development – to sustain the support of the middle class
    - A credible external anchor EU traditionally!
    - Ideological change among both the Islamists and the secularists – trust; AKP must be clear i.e about the party’s line on the public role – they need to wipe away the fears of the secularist. and ambiguity
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- The Leyla Sahin vs. Turkey case tried at the European Council of Human Rights in 2005
  - Rise of national sentiments as a reaction against the PKK
- No strong opposition – contesting AKP by imposing individual rights and freedom, while making the axis between Islamists and secularists more visible
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- AKP’s attempts towards EU harmonisation gives it legitimacy in the Constitutional Court and was the main reason why the party was not banned in 2008.
- Grigoriadis; Optimistic; AKP leading members state that the democratization process in Turkey has become independent for their EU relations
  - Copenhagen Criteria → Ankara Criteria
  - NB: Printed in 2009, before the ambivalence.
- Kubicek: AKP’s desire to change the constitution – free of the military drafts form 1982; Positive.
  - Düzgüt and Cakir → Possible Islamisation.

- However the AKP did not gain enough seats in parliament in the June 2011 election

New strong middle class, who upholds liberal economy, while “remaining” conservative religiously on social issues.

- Serif Mardin – Increased Islamisation of Turkish society
  - New middle class and the AKP in combination
    - Diversity within the AKP – a more conservative right!
- Democratic consolidation as key issue in the view of Düzgit and Cakir

## 2. The violent fringe

- Generally the radical/militant Islamic fundamentalism has been marginal in Turkey.
  - Currently two main groups: Al-Queda and Hizbollah

### 2.1 Al-Queda

- Responsible of bombing:
  - Two synagogues
  - The British Consulate General
  - HSBC Bank headquarters in Istanbul 2003
  - US Consulate in Istanbul 2008
- → Shock that al-Queda bombed in a Muslim country, however Turkey was obvious torn in the eyes of radical Islamist fundamentalists
  - Secular political state which incorporate the Islamists
  - Coexisting democracy and Islam
  - General ally with the West
- Geo-strategic importance especially after the war in Iraq.
  - Transmission of weapons, members and money from Syria to Iraq.
- Other small groups, who are inspired, but directly linked to al-Queda.
- Turkey is ill prepared to fight against al-Queda:
  - the otherwise “equipped and experienced” counter-terrorism forces are concentrating on the PKK.
  - Public opinion – not a great treat to Turkey
    - Product of the west in order to colonize the Middle East.

- Turkey is run Islamistic, due to the roots of AKP.
- The attacks are in Turkey, but against foreign “Western” and Israeli interests.

## 2.2 Hizbollah

- The re.emergence of Hizbollah in Turkey
- NB: Differs from the Shiite Lebanon-based Hizbollah
- Turkish Hizbollah:
  - “(...) is a militant, Islamist Sunni group in south-east Turkey, where a conservative understanding of Islam is predominately embraced” (p.101)
  - Initiated in the 1970s by Kurdish youngsters 1988-1990 – supported by Iran.
  - Fighting the PKK in order to become the one and only opposition.
  - 1993-1995 – great losses on both sides
    - Kurdistan Islamic Movement in Iraq and the Iraqi Kurdish Revolutionary Hizbollah party mediate in a “peace-process”
  - 1990s activities in western Turkey; assassinations.
  - First crackdown
    - 2000: Leader of the organisation was killed in police raid in Istanbul – weakens the Hizbollah.
  - Second crackdown
    - 2001: The Hizbollah assassins the chief of police in revenge. Both the perpetrators of the assassination and the majority of the leaders of the organisation were caught afterwards, while some fled.
  - Post-9.11: low profile.
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- Ideology: The “Three stage-rocket” towards an Islamic State
  - 1) Propaganda –
    - convince people to live Islamic, support the Islamic state
  - 2) Community
    - Reorganize the local communities to live by Islamic rules
  - 3) Jihad

- Struggle violently to establish and defend the Islamic state

Universalistic goal.

- Members are primarily Kurdish, but has no Kurdish nationalistic agenda

Matyrdom is seen as the highest sacrifice for the ummah

→For those of you interested in reformist Islam - Not critical of tradition, unlike most radical movements in the region, interesting!

- Revival:

- Reported in 2006 and 2007
- Change of strategy
  - From violence to grassroots support
  - February 2006; Gathering tens of thousands for a demonstration against the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in the town Diyarbakir
  - Communication and new technology must be used as a platform for education, invitation and communication
    - Step 1 and 2 in the rocket
    - → De-radicalisation; turning toward a non-violent campaign of enlightenment, however Düzgüt and Cakir are not totally optimistic – the third and violent step is never mentioned in their publications, but they still praise the leader, who introduced the three stage rocket as a “martyr guide”.

- Turkish Hizbollah in Europe

- New leader, Isa Altsoy
  - Since 2002 rising activities among Kurds in Europe
  - Altsoy’s strategy is to establish a strong Hizbollah in Europe.
    - A strong diaspora, which can act through Europe deriving the benefit of freedom granted there
      - Example?

- Re-emergence in Turkey

- PKK's influence is declining in the south-east, leaving a space for Hizbollah to fill
- The AKP's has legitimated various interpretations of political Islam – creating a room for organisations like Hizbollah
- The exhaustion of the PKK in the south-east and the AKP nationally
- → Hizbollah may enter the role of the new fresh blood and inspirer hope

Conclusion: Clear tendencies of de-radicalization in Turkey both within the AKP and the Hizbollah, however it is not an inevitable path.



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