1. Introduction: Globalization and globalism

There is considerable agreement that we live in the age of globalization. There is considerably less agreement about when this age of globalization is supposed to have begun. In his book *What is globalization?*, Ulrich Beck gives several possible dates for the onset of globalization according to different theoreticians:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>Theme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marx</td>
<td>15th century</td>
<td>modern capitalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallerstein</td>
<td>15th century</td>
<td>capitalist world system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robertson</td>
<td>1870–1920</td>
<td>multidimensional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giddens</td>
<td>18th century</td>
<td>modernization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perlmutter</td>
<td>end of East-West conflict</td>
<td>global civilization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Beck 2000:167 (fn. 5))

These dates span six centuries. One asks oneself whether the authors talk about the same phenomenon. In a certain way they do; but the concept of globalization is not so much vague as multifaceted. Several contributors to the discussion have pointed out that there are at least
two facets of globalization that require attention. On the one hand, the concept is a cover term for a number of the significant social transformations we have experienced: new information and communication technologies, reduced transportation costs, and (as a consequence of both) the 'compression of space and time', resulting in an intensification of cross-border economic processes, the weakening of the sovereignty of the national state, and a restructuring of spatial and social conditions. On the other hand, the term globalization plays an ideological role. By referring to the material constraints created by these restructuring processes, globalization can be invoked to justify power relationships as being irrevocable and 'natural'. Within a Marxist analytical framework, talking about globalization (rather than globalization itself) becomes an element of ideological dominance.

Ulrich Beck has systematized this analysis of the Janus-headed character of globalization by distinguishing GLOBALIZATION as a historical process, both from its effects, viz. the ever increasing degree of GLOBALITY in world society, and from the ideology that is both the result and the bearer of globalization, viz. GLOBALISM (Beck 2000). What is particular for us, living just after the turn from the twentieth to the twenty-first century, is therefore not globalization as such (all of its several components have occurred much earlier), but the high degree of globality attained, and the impact of the ideology of globalism. According to Beck, globalism is 'the view that the world market eliminates or supplants political action – that is, the ideology of rule by the world market, the ideology of neo-liberalism' (2000:9).

In the following, I will adopt Beck's terminology, and use 'globalization' as a cover term for those social transformations that (possibly as early as the fifteenth century, but increasingly so during the second half of the twentieth) have broken up the narrow confines of local and even national social units and created a growing network of long-distance dependencies and cooperation. Globalism, on the other hand, is the ideological standpoint – hence a way of thinking and talking about globalization – that accepts certain features of the
globalized world, not least its power structures\(^3\) as natural and welcome and certainly unavoidable.

That the concept of globalization has a strong ideological component has also been remarked upon by those who do not reserve the term 'globalism' for this ideological component. As Florian Coulmas\(^4\) has expressed it,

> [g]lobalization enthusiasts believe that contemporary economic and political developments are beneficial and will bring about a prosperous world of pluralistic, free-market democracy, because, as one of them put it, 'globalization tends to turn all friends and enemies into competitors'. (Coulmas 2005:9)

In the following, I want to argue that the ideology of globalism supports what I call 'hegemonic thinking', and that the discourse of globalism (even where it includes the term 'globalization') is a way of preparing us towards accepting certain contingent (but by no means arbitrary) consequences of globalization. Hence the discourse of globalism is a form of hegemonic discourse.

The international role that English plays today has often been associated with, and explained as a consequence of, globalization. But in his book *English as a global language* (which carefully avoids the term 'globalization'), David Crystal states that 'a language achieves a genuinely global status when it develops a special role that is recognized in every country' (1997:2). Recognition or consent are not raw facts like numbers of speakers of languages, of learners of foreign or second languages, or of web users or of web pages; they represent ways of thinking about the world. If we interpret recognition as belonging to the realm of ideology (Crystal apparently claims that the role of English as a global language 'is all in the head',\(^5\) and thus primarily a matter of ideology), the question is if this view doesn't have the consequence that English should be considered the language of globalism rather than the language of globalization. Which is what the present paper wants to investigate.
2. Globalism and hegemony

It has been noticed by several authors that there are interesting connections between globalism and Gramsci's concept of hegemony (egemonia). Gramsci's concept of hegemony is historically developed from (and therefore related to, but certainly not simply identical with) the concept of 'dominance'. In his *Prison Notebooks*, Gramsci uses the terms direzione (leadership) and egemonia (hegemony) interchangeably, but distinguishes them from dominazione (dominance), as Roger Simon remarks. In Simon's words, hegemony is the 'organisation of consent' (Simon 1982:21). Here, the following problem has to be kept in mind: in the Marxist tradition since Plekhanov and Lenin, 'hegemony' was a rather narrow strategic term that referred to the political role of the working class, originally in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. But Gramsci uses the word in a more generalized sense, in that it also can be applied to the leadership of any ruling class. In a discussion of globalization, the level of generalization is lifted one level up: we are now talking about the hegemony of global economic and political forces. It is in this sense that I will use the term 'hegemony' in the following.

Since hegemony is the organization of consent, it is not a relation of dominance by means of force, be it brute or symbolic. Hegemony creates consent by means of political and ideological leadership (Simon 1982:21). Consent is more than consensus. What we consent to is a particular way of making sense of the world, which we not just passively accept, but also actively make our own and reproduce. But although this way of making sense of the world essentially is an ideology, it doesn't present itself as such; like every ideology, it daren't speak its name. It presents itself as the obvious, as the natural, unquestionable way of looking at things. Those who opt out from this consent are considered sectarian, cantankerous or simply difficult. Those who do not opt out show common sense, which is not necessarily good sense.
In order to understand the relation between an ideology and the individuals who are influenced by it, Gramsci starts with what he calls *common sense*, the uncritical and largely unconscious way in which a person perceives the world, often confused and contradictory, and compounded of folklore, myths and popular experience. (Simon 1982:25)

Since the ideology of globalism strives to gain popular support and consent, it uses a common-sense approach to globalization. We could call this 'hegemonic thinking': viz., a way of thinking which consents to the ruling ideas that picture the existing 'facts' of our immediate experience as natural, and hence acceptable. The leadership of globalism 'works out', if nobody seriously challenges the assumptions that are made to justify the economic and political developments (and the choices that lead to them) as being inevitable: the natural consequences of a historical development.

An alternative, closely related view of hegemony has been developed by Ranajit Guha (1997) for the analysis of colonial situations. In such a situation, in particular in Indian colonial history, power simply is a series of inequalities between rulers and ruled, between classes, strata, and individuals. Inequality relations consist of two components: dominance (D) and subordination (S). Both dominance and subordination, in their turn, each have two components: dominance is made up by coercion (C) and persuasion (P), while subordination is made up by collaboration (C*) and resistance (R). (See Table 1).
Table 1: General configuration of power according to Guha (1997:20)

D = Dominance, S = Subordination
C = Coercion, P = Persuasion, C* = Collaboration, R = Resistance

While D and S imply each other logically and invariably (no dominance without subordination and no subordination without dominance), the relationships between C and P, as well as between C* and R, are contingent and historically variable. Quoting Hegel, it is exactly the interplay between the universal and the contingent – between the logical and the empirical aspects of dominance and subordination – that makes up 'the warp and the weft in the fabric of world history' (Hegel 1982:71 [1837], quoted in Guha 1997:21).

In this view, hegemony is something that occurs when persuasion outweighs coercion in the configuration of power (1997:23). Guha's view avoids the problem of Gramsci's juxtaposition of dominance and hegemony as antinomies, since hegemony for Guha simply is a historically variable way of organizing dominance. Importantly, while coercion can be brute, persuasion implies consent. In language policy, brute coercion has happened – examples like the 'Basque stick' abound – and still happens; but in global language politics, the ideology of globalism seems to be a strong tool for inducing a consent that largely can manage without coercion. This is where globalism and hegemony touch, and where the linguistic component of globalism becomes relevant for linguistic hegemonic thinking.
Some of my readers may wonder why I insist on definitional niceties which could sound like quibbles between different Marxist and neo-Marxist schools. I find it important to insist on using a term like 'hegemony' in a precise way and to point out its potential ambiguities. Spicing up the term with vague references to a term like 'cultural imperialism' produces a radical rhetoric that falls short of providing an analysis which can be used in a strategy for that which Guha identifies as an organic part of subordination, viz. resistance.

3. Hegemony and language

Many of our experiences with globalization have to do with language. One of the most common consequences of recent globalization processes is a change in the options for macro-linguistic choices. Forty years ago, one could assume that Japanese doctors and dentists could speak at least some German, since they had been used to keeping their records in German. As reported by Coulmas, it was not until the 1980s that German banks in Tokyo made it a rule for their German employees to use English (and only English) as the language of the workplace. Today, when a traveler refers to an Italian hospital for treatment, he might still meet the monolingual doctor, or one that speaks French as his or her only second language; but if this doctor decides to ask a colleague for help with interpreting, he or she will invariably and as a matter of course call for a colleague that speaks English.

Academic publications used to come in a variety of languages. On the one hand, the preferred languages of publication varied according to subjects and periods: French for mathematics, German for biology and chemistry, and so on. Studying Chinese in the West without being able to use a Chinese-Russian dictionary would have been impossible 50 years ago. It was not until the 1950s that medical research by Japanese researchers ceased to appear in German. With German as a lingua franca being replaced by English, impact studies show that
attention to German-language publications still is high internationally.\textsuperscript{11} On the other hand, many subjects, especially in the humanities, had no single preferred language of publication.\textsuperscript{12}

Many universities and academic research institutes present themselves on their web home pages in a number of different languages, among which English – along with the national language – is near-obligatory and often the only language represented besides the national language;\textsuperscript{13} monolingual home pages are practically only found in English-speaking countries. If other languages than English are represented, the material offered in these languages is often limited and the links provided are rather shallow.

Thus, several local language regimes (Coulmas 2005) show a trend for macro-language choices in standard situations to converge on English. This trend impresses itself strongly on the language users. Whether the trend is counterbalanced by an undercurrent of similarly increased use of other languages in non-standard situations (the number of people who make language choices in non-standard situation increases even more with globalization than does the number of users experiencing standard situations), is simply not known; as a result, such a possible countertrend is beyond the reach of common sense and has no impact on the ruling ideas about the global linguistic situation. What common sense does tell us is that English has a leading position among the languages of the world. If it makes sense to talk about a global language at all, then common sense tells us that currently, it has to be English.

Languages as such do not have power. Hence talking about 'powerful languages' is mainly metaphorical. But languages empower those users who can choose among various languages in a communicative situation; in certain situations, native speakers of a language enjoy a high degree of empowerment. Seen this way, it makes sense to talk about the hegemony of a particular language, inasmuch as speakers of other languages turn to using it – not so much by coercion as by persuasion. Moreover, this persuasion is usually organized
through the consent of those speakers to whom the choice of the hegemonic language seems natural.

There is no shortage of descriptions of the current leading status of the English language globally. English has become a hegemonic language: by general consent, speakers of other languages choose English in a large number of situations, and consider this choice natural with respect to the existing linguistic world order.

This consent is not something that the speakers of English have created, even though it seems to bring them definite advantages. It is not even manufactured by the Anglophone nation-states, although these states do everything to encourage it. As David Graddol put it,

[t]he concept of linguistic imperialism, such as put forward in Robert Phillipson's ground-breaking book in 1992, does not wholly explain the current enthusiasm for English which seems driven primarily by parental and governmental demand, rather than promotion by Anglophone countries. (Graddol 2006:112)

Amazingly though, this state of affairs seems only in part to depend on direct manipulation or manufacturing of consent. To a large extent, the system reproduces itself: the speakers of dominated languages willingly accept English as the favored language choice. This is a true sign of the hegemonic character of the English language in the present global linguistic world order.

On the other hand, a hegemonic language also carries certain disadvantages for its native speakers. Karen Dovring (1997) complains that English is being 'body-snatched' when used as a lingua franca. In a wider perspective, there lurks the danger of weakened competitiveness, if the success of English as an international language lures its native speakers into dismissing the need to learn other languages. (Their record is less than impressive in the first place.) As Philippe Van Parijs puts it,
the cost of learning English for non-Anglophones keeps falling while the cost of learning other languages for Anglophones (and everyone else) keeps increasing. One consequence of the universal spread of the lingua franca would then be that Anglophones will face competition on their home labour markets with everyone else in the world, while having no real access to those labour markets in which another language remains required. (Van Parijs 2004:130, fn. 14)

Language professionals agree that there are no intrinsic reasons for English to have become the global language during the second half of the twentieth century. As Crystal points out, it is certainly not the ease of learning English (1997:6), nor its intrinsic structural properties, the size of its vocabulary, its being a vehicle of a great literature, or its great cultural or religious traditions (1997:7). The ease of learning that comes from the lack of a complex morphology is certainly set off by a highly marked and unusual phonetics, a huge vocabulary, and an intricate syntax. Edward Sapir wrote, 'The simplicity of English in its formal aspect is … really a pseudo-simplicity or masked complexity' (1949:115). It is also generally agreed that the huge number of non-native speakers in itself is a consequence of, rather than the reason for, the global status of English.

4. Classical and modern concepts of hegemony

An attractive explanation of the present degree of globality of English is to derive it from the political dominance (or hegemony) of the powerful English-speaking nation states. Eco (1993:356) refers to British colonialism and US American technology. This is in line with traditional concepts of hegemony that concentrate on the role of states (and later, nation-states) as described by Robinson (2005). Hegemony is sometimes simply considered as the dominance of a particular nation state with respect to other nation-states. Originally, hegemony meant
the 'leadership' of a state within an association of states; early examples (not mentioned by Robinson) being Sparta, Athens, and Thebes as successive hegemonic (city) states in Greece, their leadership role later being taken over by Macedonia. From the Italian city states (first of all, the marine republics of Genoa, Venice, Pisa, and Amalfi), the mantle of European hegemony passed first to the Netherlands and then to Great Britain. After that, the United States took over on a world scale, and many researchers expect to see the rise of an East Asian hegemony.

In contrast to this, a modern, neo-Gramscian, concept of hegemony stresses not so much the hegemonic states and the order of their succession as their successive hegemonic projects. Recent such projects are the liberal international economy (1789-1873) under British leadership, the era of rival imperialisms (1873-1945), and the post-World War II era of Pax Americana since 1945, under US leadership (Robinson 2005:561).

4.1. Linguistic hegemonic projects

In the following, I will apply Robinson's criticism of nation-state centered concepts of hegemony to the field of linguistic hegemony, in line with David Graddol's warnings against attempting to understand the continued adoption of English as the language of international communication and its consequences exclusively within a nation-state centered 'imperialism framework'. On the one hand, this analysis 'may even have the ironic effect of keeping native speakers centre-stage, flattering their self-importance in a world that is fast passing them by'. On the other hand, 'it may also distract from the new forms of hegemony which are arising, which cannot be understood simply in terms of national interests in competition with each other' (Graddol 2006:112). Similarly, Van Parijs explains the dominance of English not as a
hidden conspiracy by the Brits, let alone the Americans, but [as] the spontaneous outcome of a huge set of decentralised decisions, mainly by non-Anglophones, about which language to learn and which language to use. (Van Parijs 2004:124)

Tentatively, one could suggest that parallel to, and in the wake of, the historical emergence of hegemonic projects, a sequence of different linguistic hegemonic projects have arisen. These projects may emerge from, but are not simply part of, the corresponding political-economic hegemonic projects.

One the one hand, languages do not always have single strong centers which can be identified with a nation state. Thus it can be difficult to identify the political source of a linguistic hegemonic project. English is an instructive example: its present hegemonic status connects in intricate ways to the former (but waning) British imperial power as well as to the Pax Americana of the second half of the past century.

On the other hand, there is a curious (but maybe easily explained) lagging behind of these projects vis-à-vis political hegemonic projects. Latin became a global language in the world that mattered then, and continued this role long after the decline of the Roman Empire. The rise of English as a global language was definitely helped along by the ground-breaking work of Britain's imperial administrations and military forces, even though British colonial politics certainly did not aim at making everybody in the colonies speak English (often to the contrary)\(^{14}\), but English became only truly global at a time when the Empire was a mere shadow of itself.

From a Eurocentric vantage point, Greek \textit{koiné} became the first 'world' language in the third century BC. It was spoken as far as in the Tadjik part of the Ferghana valley, where Alexander the Great is reported to have founded a city that was called \textit{Alexandria Eskhate}, 'Furthest Alexandria', today's Khujand (former Leninabad). The \textit{koiné} continued to have the role of an important language, both in the religious context of the Greek Orthodox Church and in the
administration (not just of Byzantium and later the East Roman empire, but also in the multilingual Greek Orthodox community (Rûm millet) until the end of the Osman Empire; cf. Tsoukalas 1977).

Greek was followed by Latin, the language of the Roman Empire. It was established in a wide geographical area through the Roman conquests and was for several centuries the language of the Pax Romana domain, where it largely replaced the original languages of the autochthonous populations. As spoken language of everyday communication it was soon replaced by new local (Romance) languages, but it lingered on for much longer in diplomacy and law, in the Church (both as the language of liturgy, scholarship, and administration), and the domain of secular learning. In almost all these areas, it was gradually replaced by local languages. Latin continues to have some functions in the Catholic Church, although an important step was taken after the Second Vatican Council when priests and members of the religious orders ceased to use the Latin breviary and Office, thus losing their daily contact with the language.

The medieval university was international in that it used Latin, both as the language of teaching and that of scholarship. Scholarship and research (in the modern sense) were the first areas where Latin was given up, at least in part. Galilei and Newton in the seventeenth and Celsius in the eighteenth wrote in their respective vernaculars (albeit not exclusively). Research was, of course, not necessarily conducted at the at times rather conservative universities and thus did not have to conform to the latter's linguistic hegemonic projects.

But even at the universities, Latin lost ground. It was first replaced in teaching. Paracelsus in Basel taught in German already in the sixteenth century, but he was rather an exception; Thomasius set more of a trend in the last decade of the seventeenth. In exams, Latin lingered on for much longer. It survived longest in purely ceremonial functions. By the nineteenth century, the Latin hegemonic project had largely been abandoned; this was in many ways the century of the national languages (cf. Bull 2004, Haberland and Mortensen 2008). At the universities, in research, in the administration, and at least to some
extent in the Church, the national languages dominated, but not to the exclusion of other languages, which had an important international function (and by now, more languages had to be learnt than had been the case earlier, when one could restrict oneself to Latin). As to a possible hegemonic project in the period from 1810 (the inauguration of Berlin University) until the end of WW II, all one can say is that we are faced with a joint European linguistic hegemony, where French, German, and later English were the leading languages. This period roughly coincides with two of Robinson's hegemonic projects, liberal international economy (1789-1873) under British leadership, and the era of rival imperialisms (1873-1945).

It was only during the last century that English emerged as a world language, marking the beginning of the current hegemonic project. Significantly, although the Bologna declaration of 1999 does not explicitly encourage the use of an academic *lingua franca* – it does not even mention English –, it was in many places interpreted as an incentive to offer courses and programs in English so as to facilitate student exchange. In a clear case of hegemonic thinking, common sense tells us that there is no alternative to English if we want to attract, e.g., international students to Italian or Icelandic universities. Any other options seem to be excluded beforehand and are not even discussed. 15

As far as our own century is concerned, one might wonder if Chinese is about to take over. While it certainly not even has come close to English as a *lingua franca*, it is interesting that one of the reasons why such a development should have seemed to be impossible for a while, viz. the increased use of computer technology, now rather seems to work in the other direction. Whereas traditional typewriters only with difficulty could be modified to work with Chinese characters (using a 'point-and-click' technology combined with a visual display), there is no principled reason why any standard run-of-the-mill modern computer with keyboard and printer could not handle Chinese input or output; e-mail and web pages in Chinese are so to speak at the fingertips of billions of computer users who have not (yet) acquired any knowledge of Chinese.
4.2. Projects of linguistic hegemony in Denmark

Although Denmark never belonged to the sphere of *Pax Romana*, it became part of the Latin hegemonic project ever since its Christianization. Denmark left the project in successive steps. The first law texts in Danish date from around 1200; in the late fourteenth century, Queen Margaret I replaced Latin with Danish as the language of administration. With the Reformation, Latin was replaced by the vernacular in the Church, but held out in theological studies and university teaching in general. At Copenhagen University, teaching was done in Latin. The new university constitution of 1737 does not even mention the teaching language, since it was obvious that teaching had to be in Latin; by contrast the 'Academy' at Sorø (a school frequented by those members of the Danish aristocracy who did not attend university) offered instruction in a vernacular: German during the seventeenth century and Danish since 1747. In the next century, Latin was gradually replaced by Danish (occasionally German) at the university. The law faculty of Copenhagen University had proposed teaching in Danish already in 1742, referring to the fact that the relevant literature was available in Danish, German, and French, that the laws were in Danish, and that the courts used Danish as well (Løgstrup 1991:482). Around 1840, teaching in Latin stopped altogether.

A similar pattern is found in scholarly publications: already in the seventeenth century, works like Judichær's *Extract aff Rûmkunsten* and Peder Syv's *Nogle Betænkninger om det Cimbriske Sprog* could appear in Danish (in 1650 and 1663, respectively), and university textbooks were increasingly written in Danish, German, and French. The teaching language occasionally followed that of the textbooks.\(^{16}\)

While Latin had been the language of internationalization in Denmark during the Middle Ages, now modern vernaculars, especially German and French, replaced Latin in this role; at the same time, the use of Danish itself was strengthened. When H.C. Ørsted discovered electromagnetism in 1820,\(^{17}\) he published his results in Latin, in an
article entitled *Experimenta circa effectum conflictus electrici in acum magneticam* (Meyer (ed.) 1920:214-219). This is one of the very few papers Ørsted published in Latin (mostly he wrote in Danish, German, French and, increasingly, English). The rationale for choosing Latin in this case seems to have been the wish to facilitate swift publication in translation: while the paper was published in Latin in Nuremberg, translations became available in Copenhagen, Paris, Brussels, Geneva, Pavia, Rome, Leipzig, Paris, Jena, and London all within the same year (Meyer (ed.) 1920:214 fn 1).

While Latin kept certain ceremonial functions in Denmark (as it did elsewhere in Europe, especially in connection with doctoral theses and defenses; Hellesen and Tuxen 1993:260f), it was not until the twentieth century that English established itself as a serious competitor of French and German; in Denmark, it took the lead only after 1945, at the end of (Robinson's) era of rival imperialisms (1873-1945).

A breakdown by publication language of the *Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague* shows the same tendency with regard to the last century. This series of publications started in 1944 with two volumes in French and one in English. By 1954, four volumes in French had been published, three in German and two in English. Between 1957 and 1993 there were six publications in French and nine in English. Since 1994, all publications have been in English, whereas the number of publications in Danish (two in all) has been negligible throughout the period (Haberland 2008:233). In other words, while French, German and English roughly had the same status in the first ten years (with French being slightly favored), there have been no German publications since 1954 and no French publications since 1993.18

Gunnarsson's (2001) analysis of the use of Swedish and other languages in Swedish universities shows similar tendencies: we witness a growing use of English, which to a large degree happens at the expense of languages like French and German.
ENGLISH – THE LANGUAGE OF GLOBALISM?

5. Hegemonic discourse

I said before that while Dominance (D) and Subordination (S) imply each other logically, the relationships between C and P, as well as between C* and R, are contingent and historically variable. According to Guha, hegemony occurs when persuasion outweighs coercion in the configuration of power. Hegemonic discourse is the reflection of hegemony (a specific C – P relationship within D) through a specific relationship between collaboration (C*) and resistance (R). Hegemonic discourse is a specific organization of subordination. It reflects and reproduces hegemony by accepting the given leadership as natural. It often occurs as implicit consent (C*), even in the guise of critical rhetoric (R). A particular manifestation is the widely accepted ideology one could call 'language globalism'. It assumes that the market forces have organized the global language market in such a way that English has taken over all relevant linguistic functions in international and transnational communicative exchanges; English is then the only relevant international language on a global scale. In the global language situation, the hegemonic discourse expresses the common sense about the global linguistic situation and the acceptance of its supposed constraints. Just as does the discourse of globalism, it prepares us to consent to certain contingent (but again, by no means arbitrary) linguistic consequences of globalization.

Interestingly, in a paper on language policy written for the Danish Ministry of Culture in 2003, entitled Sprog på spil ('Language in action'), the authors consider the ongoing linguistic hegemonic project as 'natural' and common sense. Thus, every time the paper mentions English, words like 'inevitable', 'natural', or 'obvious' occur close by. Here are some examples (the original Danish text is reproduced in the footnotes; the emphases are mine, HH):

'The business sector's international orientation has turned English into the corporate language in many large companies. This is an INEVITABLE consequence of globalization'.19
'The advantages in using English ARE OBVIOUS'.\textsuperscript{20}

'IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING that for Danish researchers it is valuable to be good at English'.\textsuperscript{21}

'One argument for not teaching in Danish is that one wants to attract foreign students on the B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. level. Another is the ability to offer international programs for interested Danish students. Both these aims are NATURALLY well-motivated and have to be taken into account, but …'\textsuperscript{22}

Discussing attitudes in Sweden, they remark:

'The current concern for the Swedish language is NATURALLY due to the pressure from English'.\textsuperscript{23}

This kind of statements represents the 'rhetoric of consent'. Basically it goes like this: 'We trust the reader will not ask us to produce any arguments in support of what we are saying, since all of it is already generally accepted and thus needs no further argumentation'.

The fact that even positions close to Guha's 'R' (resistance) can be tainted by this rhetoric serves to show how deeply entrenched this consent already is. An example is the Danish Rectors' Conference's paper on language policy of March 2003 – a paper that is otherwise very critical of the role of English (see below, section 7), but still uses the rhetoric of consent:

'THERE IS NO DOUBT that English not only in the Anglo-American cultural sphere, but also in large parts of Europe and the rest of the world is the lingua franca, both in trade and transportation and within large segments of higher education and research'.\textsuperscript{24}
While this tendency is explicitly characterized as 'Anglicization' or 'Americanization', rather than 'internationalization', its effects are accepted as natural:

'On the other hand IT IS NATURAL that also Danish universities and their employees increasingly use English for publishing scientific results, for the dissemination of scientific results in teaching, and for communication with foreign colleagues and students'.

The question is not whether these statements are correct or not – in my opinion, they mostly are – but whether the facts described are considered natural and common sense. No explanation is offered why 'Anglicization' or 'Americanization' should be considered natural, especially since these phenomena are explicitly not considered as cases of internationalization tout court – which is amazing in view of the fact that the authors immediately follow up by arguing that these 'Anglicizing' and 'Americanizing' tendencies are fraught with serious problems for Danish society as a whole.

6. The future of linguistic globalism

What's actually wrong with linguistic globalism? One should not underestimate the need for a common ground (as in 'speaking the same language') in international and intercultural communication. In a curious way, the Chomskyan misconception of language as a means of expression rather than of interaction has fostered the thought that not only everybody ought to have the right to express themselves in their own language, but also that this kind of self-expression may further cross-cultural understanding. But expressing oneself is not the same as making oneself understood. It has been said that one doesn't just sound less intelligent when trying to express oneself through the medium of another language, but that one is less intelligent. Unfortunately, this does not imply that one should use one's own language at all times:
international communication is neither about expressing oneself nor about demonstrating one's intelligence, but about getting one's ideas across and coordinating practices. The right to use one's own language should, therefore, be exercised judiciously.

National languages are insufficient (now as they always have been) for international communication. Basically, there are four possibilities: translation (or interpretation); expecting the foreign partner to learn one's own national language; use of the partner's language; or use of a *lingua franca*, where the latter can be some other national language or a neutral language like Esperanto.\(^{26}\) Ulrich Ammon similarly considers three possible choices:

Grundsätzlich kann man sich drei Wahlmöglichkeiten vorstellen:
– beide Sprecher sprechen ihre Muttersprache,
– die Sprecher wählen die Muttersprache eines der Sprecher, oder
– die Sprecher wählen eine Sprache, die Muttersprache keines der beiden Sprecher ist. (Ammon 1991:12f)

As to the last of these choices: relying on just one international language for communicative purposes turns out to be insufficient as well. The earlier mentioned working paper of the Danish Rectors' Conference of 2003 gives a number of reasons:

The wide-spread use of English in European academia nonetheless creates a number of problems:
A number of cultures, even within Europe, communicate primarily in other languages than English (e.g. French, Spanish, or German). A Dane who is exclusively able to communicate in Danish and English, cannot attain a level of interaction within these cultures that is satisfactory e.g. for trade purposes or in a job application situation.\(^{27}\)

What is often overlooked is why the use of 'just one lingua franca for all purposes' sometimes works and sometimes does not. Where
reference is more important than denotation – or, in Wilson and Sperber's words, where descriptive use of language prevails over interpretive use (1988) – the language chosen does not matter highly, and the choice of language is up to the producer rather than to the receiver of the text. When compiling a set of instructions for preparing a frozen pizza, language choice is a matter of convenience: which language are the authors likely to express themselves in unambiguously, and which language are the receivers likely to understand with sufficient clarity? Here, cultural and cognitive differences are restricted to minor issues like the choice between metric vs. imperial measurements and certain cultural conventions. But if it is true that we do not express ourselves through language but in a language, language choice is not just a matter of convenience, but will affect the content conveyed.

The issue of the relationship between language, culture, and cognition can simply not be sidestepped, not even in trade relations. The old saying that the buyer has no problem using a lingua franca, while the seller had better use the customer's language, turns out to be a variant of the descriptive/interpretive distinction alluded to above. The seller relies on the conative function of language in Jakobson's sense (Bühler's Appelfunktion), and is therefore oriented towards interpretive language use. The buyer, on the other hand, has no particular a priori interest in being persuaded and can therefore easily orient towards a descriptive language use. Hence, ironically, the ideology of linguistic globalism, while born out of a naïve trust in the forces of the market, does not serve the international markets well.

Similar considerations probably underlie Graddol's (2006) warning that the spread of English as an international language might cost the English speaking countries hugely in the long run. Graddol argues that, with the spread of international English, the high 'export value' of English (from which the English-speaking countries so far have benefited) will decrease, while the economic burden of teaching other languages will increase for the English speaking countries.
7. Counter hegemonies and counter strategies

For Ulrich Beck, globalism expresses the view that 'the world market eliminates and supplants political action' (2000:9). As I have pointed out, globalism has to be distinguished from globalization, which refers to 'the processes through which sovereign national states are criss-crossed and undermined by transnational actors with varying prospects of power, orientations, identities and networks' (2000:11). Note that Beck doesn't talk about other national states as actors, but rather about transnational actors; this fits in with Robinson's call for 'expunging nation-state centrism from the discussion of hegemony' (2005:561). Ever since the beginning of globalization we have been increasingly living in a world society; according to Beck, the 'new globality cannot be reversed' (2000:11).

Globalism 'casts its spell even over its opponents' (Beck 2000:9). First of all, it is worth noting that what sometimes is called resistance to globalization, more appropriately should be labeled anti-globalism. We cannot really be against globalization, no matter how much we disagree with, are opposed to, or even fight certain of its manifestations. Groups like ATTAC do not so much oppose globalization as they do globalism, the ideology which considers the global replacement of politically governed thought and action by market principles as natural and unquestionable. This opposition to globalism can (and often does) take on the shape of protectionism; in this case the basic position of globalism is reproduced in its rejection. For Beck, there are three kinds of protectionists: conservative protectionists, green protectionists, and red protectionists. While conservative protectionists 'bewail the collapse of values and the declining significance of the national dimension', they also – ironically and maybe involuntarily – 'pursue the neoliberal destruction of the national state' (2000:10). Green protectionists see the national state as a kind of endangered biological species. Red protectionists, according to Beck, tell you that globalism is just another form of class struggle and that they had known it all along.
Since the nation state is strongly connected with one (and occasionally a number of) national language(s), defending the national language not unexpectedly often takes the form of an appeal to the nation state to protect the threatened national language(s). While the perceived threat is real enough, it is not always too clear what it actually consists in; even so, the protectionist reaction to a perceived threat does not require an analysis of its objective content. Protectionism may have its short-term merits, but it also can prevent real change in the long run. 'Own dragon keeps other dragons away', as the strategy is formulated in the Russian playwright Yevgeny Schwartz' (1897-1958) play 'The dragon' (1943; original Russian title Drakon). In the play, the representative of the locals, Charlemagne, argues with the dragon-hunter Lancelot, who wants to rid the townsfolk of a dragon.

LANCELOT: He's eating you around!
CHARLEMAGNE: Not at all! We're not complaining. How else can it be? As long as he's here, no other dragons would dare touch us. … Let me tell you: the only way to get rid of dragons is to have one of your own.

The fear of 'other (outside) dragons' can thus lead to a less than dynamic politics at home. Protectionism as the only form of resistance – a retreat to the local duck pond – is not a suitable response to the challenges posed by the hegemony of English: it only substitutes one form of hegemony for another – and at that, a less functional one. The solution is rather to be found in the recognition of diversity as our strongest resource.

Roskilde University
Department of Culture and Identity
POB 260
DK-4000 Roskilde
Notes

1. 'For it seems impossible to alter what has long not been altered. We are always coming on things that are too obvious for us to bother to understand them. What men experience among themselves they think of as "the" human experience'. Bertolt Brecht, *A short organum for the theatre*, transl. John Willett, 1964.

I would like to thank my old friend Klaus Schulte for numerous discussions about the topic of this paper. A first draft of the paper was written during a month's stay at the former Benedictine convent of S. Cataldo near Amalfi in September 2006; I want to thank the San Cataldo Foundation (Copenhagen) for this opportunity. Some ideas of this paper were also presented in a paper 'Hegemonisk tænknign og globalisme i sprogpolitiken' at the International conference on language planning and language policy arranged by the Swedish Language Council in Saltsjöbaden, Sweden, on June 10, 2008. The final version has benefited from extensive comments by Janus Mortensen, Jacob L. Mey, Bent Preisler and David C.S. Li.

2. The *Historisch-kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus* (Haug (ed.) 2001:869) locates these phenomena in the last quarter of the past century. This might be too narrow a view.

3. 'Power' is itself a word with many meanings. I am not necessarily talking of hierarchical power or the possibility to force others into doing what they would not choose to do themselves (coercion). Power can also be the range of possibilities of, or degrees of freedom for, action.

4. Coulmas’ distinction of economical, political, and ideological aspects of globalization quite closely follows Gramsci’s distinction between the relations of production, state apparatuses, and civil society (*società civile*) (cf. Simon 1982:26).

5. One is tempted to think of the line by Epictetus that Laurence Sterne used as a motto for his *Tristram Shandy*, ‘Ταράσσει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων δόγματα’. ('Men are disturbed, not by things, but by the principles and notions which they form concerning things' (Epictetus, *Encheiridion*, 5, transl. Elizabeth Carter)).

6. On the other hand, refusing to consent does not prove that one is right. Sectarianism does exist.

7. In colonial history, this element of brute force has never been completely absent, according to Guha. Persuasion totally outweighing coercion is not a
possible option, since without a certain element of coercion there would have been no dominance.

8. The 'Basque stick' was a 'punitive device used in the schools in the Basque region, where pupils were forced to carry a stick on their outstretched arms as punishment for having used a Basque word or expression' (Mey 1985:27).


10. Personal communication.


12. For an example (academic production in linguistics in Denmark), see below, section 4.2.

13. And increasingly so. The Aristotle University of Thessalonica (Greece) until recently had web pages in Greek, English, French, German, Spanish, Italian, and Russian, but has discontinued most of them. The same goes for Lund University (Sweden) and the Australian National University, Canberra, with regard to their Chinese webpages. One of the remaining universities which uses another international language besides English (in addition to the national language) is Dokkyo University, Soka (Japan).


15. As a side-effect, even for those who could use other languages than English, such a use is excluded due to the need of a 'common language ground'. Thus, internationalizing the university as a whole has the paradoxical effect of making the individual student less internationalized (Saarinen, Pöyhönen and Nikula 2008).


17. His research notes were written in Danish; see Hellesen and Tuxen (1993:251) for a facsimile.

18. In this connection, talking about a 'domain loss' of Danish in favor of English would be misleading. If there is anything like a 'domain loss' involved here, the example indicates a 'loss' not for Danish, but for German and especially French. 'Domain loss' is probably a misleading metaphor anyway, no matter whether one uses a naïve concept of 'domain', or Fishman's far more sophisticated one (Haberland 2008). Languages do not have domains, therefore they cannot lose them. Rather, we have to describe what happens as languages disappear from their communities.

19. 'Erhvervslivets internationale orientering har gjort engelsk til koncernsprog i mange store virksomheder. Dette er en uundgåelig følge af globaliseringen' (Kulturministeriet 2003:10).
20. 'Fordelene ved at bruge engelsk er indlysende' (Kulturministeriet 2003:23).
23. 'Den aktuelle omsorg for det svenske sprog skyldes naturligvis især presset fra engelsk' (Kulturministeriet 2003:10).
25. 'Det er imidlertid naturligt, at også danske universiteter og deres ansatte i stigende grad anvender engelsk, når videnskabelige resultater publiceres, når videnskabelige resultater formidles i undervisning, og når de kommunikerer med udenlandske fagkolleger eller studerende' (Rektorkollegiet 2003:4).
27. 'Den udbredte anvendelse af engelsk i den europæiske universitetsverden skaber dog også en række problemer:
   En række kulturer, også inden for Europa, kommunikerer primært på andre sprog end engelsk (fx fransk, spansk og tysk). Hvis man som dansker udelukkende kan kommunikere på dansk og engelsk, kan man ikke opnå en tilstrækkelig grad af kontakt med disse kulturer, fx i handelsøjemed eller i en ansættelsessituation' (Rektorkollegiet 2003:5).
28. Minor, but not necessarily trivial. A recipe for preparing rice for sushi says in Japanese 'take x ml gohan' and in English 'take x oz. of rice'. Since gohan is cooked rice, while rice can refer to either uncooked or cooked rice, misunderstandings could arise here.
   Compare also the ease with which the Irish have 'translated' their former road distances into kilometers (whereas they stick to expressing speed in miles per hour). This may have something to do with the fact that distances are less 'embodied' (as compared to speeds), so that 'mph' and 'km/h' simply 'feel' different in ways that 'miles' and 'kilometers' do not.
29. At least this is how I interpret Walter Benjamin's saying, 'Es ist fundamental zu wissen, dass dieses geistige Wesen sich in der Sprache mitteilt und nicht durch die Sprache' (Benjamin 1988:10).
References


Haberland, Hartmut and Janus Mortensen. 2008. A very short history of Danish universities 1479-2007 from the point of view of the languages used. Roskilde: Roskilde University, Department of Culture and Identity. CALPIU Spring meeting, April 2008.


Tsoukalas, Konstantinos. 1977. Εξάρτηση και αναπαραγωγή. Ο κινονικός ρόλος των εκπαιδευτικών μηχανισμών στην Ελλάδα (1830-1922). Athens: Themelio. (‘Dependence and reproduction. The social role of the educational mechanisms in Greece’. In Greek).
