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Need to Know II: Lessons Learned

 International Conference
Need to Know II: ‘Lessons learned’
16–17 October 2012
Odense, University of Southern Denmark
 Room O100

 

Program 

Opening of the Conference

Session I: HUMINT

Chair: Erik Kulavig (Denmark)

  • Prof. Kurt Jensen (Canada) – A Non-Clandestine Model for HUMINT Collection
  • Daniel Běloušek (Czech Republic) – The Rivalry between Czechoslovak Military Intelligence Services as Manifested by the Failure of Residency „VIKING" in Sweden in 1986
  • Dieter Bacher/Philipp Lesiak (Austria) – A Struggle for Influence and a Key Position. Actions of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence in Austria and American and British Counterintelligence Operations against Them at the Dawn of the Cold War, 1948–1955
  • Przemysław Gasztold-Seń (Poland) – Troublesome "Allies": Polish Counterintelligence and the Arab Embassies in Warsaw
  • Dr Patryk Pleskot (Poland) – Need to Know about Poland. HUMINT Strategies of Western Diplomats in Communist Poland (1956–1989)
  • Discussion

Opening of the exhibition "The Cold War: A Short History of a World Divided"

Session II: Betrayers

Chair: Dr Łukasz Kamiński (Poland)

  • John Buckley (United Kingdom) – Ethical Betrayal – Human Sources and the Lessons to be Learned
  • Dr Władysław Bułhak (Poland) – Betrayal at the Holy See. Human Sources of the Polish Communist Intelligence in Vatican in 1960s and 1970s.
  • Witold Bagieński (Poland) – Defectors from the Civil Intelligencein the Last Two Decades of Communist Poland
  • Discussion

Session III: Bias, part 1

Chair: Flemming Splidsboel (Denmark)

  • Michael Andregg (USA) – A Critical Lesson not yet Learned in America: Intelligence Ethics Matter
  • Dr Rory Cormac (United Kingdom) – Using Secret Intelligence to Protect Economic Security: Lessons from the Recent Past
  • Dr Sławomir Łukasiewicz (Poland) – Power, Ideology and the Intelligence in Poland 1945–1954
  • Dr Paul Maddrell (United Kingdom) – The Stasi’s Intelligence Reporting to the German Democratic Republic’s (GDR) Political Leadership
  • Discussion

 

Session IV: Bias, part 2

Chair: Dr Władysław Bułhak (Poland)

  • Dr Helmut Müller-Enbergs (Germany) – What Is and for What Purpose There Is "Intelligence Psychology"?
  • Prof. Jacek Tebinka (Poland) – Political Bias in Anglo-Polish Cold War Intelligence Encounters
  • Prof. Jakub Tyszkiewicz (Poland) – Biased or Objective? Lessons from the Past. Martial Law in Poland in the Eyes of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Impact of Its Analyses on U.S. Policymaking 1981–1983
  • Antoni Diaz (Spain) – Knowing the Enemies of the Regime: The Fight against Subversive Movement in Spain 1968–1976
  • Discussion

 

Session V: Crises

Chair: Jørgen Bro (Denmark)

  • Dr Michael Goodman (United Kingdom) – Learning to Predict Crises: The Lessons of the Nicoll Report
  • Peer Henrik Hansen (Denmark) – The Cuban Missile Crisis and Intelligence
  • Prof. Mark Kramer (USA) – The KGB, the 1983 Soviet "War Scare", and the Purported Impact of NATO’s Able Archer 83: Sifting Myths from Reality
  • Dr Mirosław Sikora (Poland) – Intercepting the Ideas: Intelligence and Science on Example of Communist Poland
  • Discussion

 

Session VI: Emigration

Chair: Dr Krzysztof Persak (Poland)

  • Thomas W. Friis (Denmark) – Refugees and Emigrants as a Security Issue
  • Dr hab. Paweł Jaworski (Poland) – Polish Intelligence Service towards Poles in Sweden after WWII. Case Study on the Attitude to Émigrés in the West
  • Dan Draghia (Romania) – Intelligence as a Tool of Personal Vendetta: Physical Attacks by Ceauşescu’s Regime against the Critical Romanian Voices from the Exile after 1977
  • Dr hab. Joanna Wojdon (Poland) – Polish Americans and the Intelligence of the "People’s Poland" 1955–1989
  • Discussion

Conclusion

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