Europeanization and Euroscepticism: Experiences from Poland and the Czech Republic

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This publication focuses on the phenomenon Euroscepticism and its manifestations in the EU countries from the East. The scholarly interest in Euroscepticism grew substantially after the Danish, Irish, French and Netherlands “no’s” at EU-referenda and the manifestation of “soft” Euroscepticism in most new EU member countries from the East. Special sections are devoted to EU policy and Euroscepticism in Poland and the Czech Republic. The presentation begins with a brief presentation and clarification of the concepts of national and European identity and after that the phenomena of “Europeanization” and “Euroscepticism” including the most relevant classifications and types of Euroscepticism. Some of those concepts and classifications will be included in the sections dealing with manifestation of Euroscepticism in the region as a whole and in Poland and the Czech Republic in particular. Special emphasis is laid on state strategies and party-based Euroscepticism

As we shall see in the following, the manifestations of “Eurorealism” and “Euroscepticism” have differed much between the countries, also between the two rather “soft” eurosceptic countries, Poland and Czech Republic – and that before as well as after the two countries accession to the EU in 2004.

Key words: National and European identity, Europeanization, Euroscepticism, Poland and the Czech Republic
National and European identity

The concept “national identity” was the object of several scholarly studies already back in the 1950s and 1960s, e.g. Karl Deutsch and Ernest Hass who were inspired by the start of European integration, and the German and French reconciliation after World War II. So the interest in the topic is not anything new. Also many political “ancestors” were dealing with national identity in the years just after national independence following World War I with the fall of Austria-Hungary and the Russian empire.

On the methodological level, national identity can be studied as *a process result* or as the *common characteristics*. However, it is not easy to operationalize the concept of national identity over other forms of collective identity. But from a social constructivist angle we can define national identity as

"*a set of self-perceptions, shared memories and experiences (history), traditions, and the geographical and cultural predisposition of a nation*" (Drulák, 2001:21)

Or in Lesaar’s shorter formulation as

"*people’s sense of being equal with each other or of belonging to a community*” (Drulák, 2001)

and in Kiss’ variant as

"*a synthesis of values, sentiments of attachments, and social representations that are associated with cognitive factors structuring the identification process*” (Kiss, 2001, referring to Rosa, 1996)

As noted by Benedict Anderson (Anderson, 1991), a nation (and “Europe”) has to be “imagined” in order to be a reality. Distinctions like “we-ness” versus “other-ness”, the “them space” versus the “we space” and “inclusion” versus “exclusion” were all important. Interpretation of history and historic events separated national identity from other types of collective identity as each nation has its own “myths” and “narratives”, folklore, geography, language and national symbols.

Former Czech president Václav Havel was inspired by the old “paternal” Czechoslovak president in the interwar period, Tomas G. Masaryk. Thus, national identity was eagerly studied by Masaryk, who used the phrase “the principle of nationality”, which he at one time characterized as
"a distinctive and very powerful feeling; it is the love of the mother tongue and for the group of men speaking
the same or very closely related language, and for the soil on which this group lives, and for the manner in
which it lives. But this love is not only the feeling arising out of the natural habitual life, but it is also an idea
of conscious love; nations have their own cultural and political program growing out of a common history and
in its turn directing this history; it is modern patriotism in this wide and complicated sense, different from the
old patriotism of loyalty to the dynasty and ruling classes ... ““

Later, the Czech exile writer Milan Kundera defined national identity as

"The identity of a people and of a civilisation is reflected and concentrated in what has been created by the
mind- in what is known as "culture”. If this identity is threatened with extinction, cultural life grows
correspondingly more intense, more important, until culture becomes the living value around which all people
rally. That is why, in each of the revolts in Central Europe, the collective cultural memory and the
contemporary creative effort assumed roles so great and so decisive- far greater and far more decisive than they
have been in any other European mass revolt ... ““

For Milan Kundera identity also includes a regional aspect. He belongs to those who underlined Central
Europe’s “otherness” considering the 40 years under communist rule as a “tragedy”.

One of several crucial questions has been (and still is), to what extent national identity constitutes a
barrier for further Europeanization and integration and to what extent national, regional and European
identity and overlapping multiple identities can co-exist in a more integrated Europe.

In the 1980s and 1990s, with the wars in the Balkan, the end of the cold war and transition to
unipolarity, national identity was more than before analyzed by use of social constructivist approaches
(Drulák, 2001:11), and the emphasis on one’s own history did not disappear in any way after EU
membership. One of the most striking things about the new member states of the EU is that they, after
membership, rarely acted as a group, i.e. one that would include all, or almost all the members. The
diversity of the EU-10 (2004 enlargement) has been so great that today the single most unifying factor
of those states seems to be that they all joined the EU together in 2004 (Kaczynski, 2008:4).

As regards national identity, the former GDR constitutes a special case. In contrast to Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, where the abrogation of real socialism meant the return to one's own national history, to distinctive national and state traditions, and values rooted in them, what happened in the GDR, as rightly mentioned by Lukasz Galecki, left its citizens in a great void, because they simply lacked a collective identity of their own. In other words, at the time of the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, Poles had their Poland, Czechs and Slovaks had their Czechoslovakia, Romanians had their Romania, and “we” (the East Germans) our Federal Republic of Germany (Galecki, 2009:509).

After some time of identity-based “Eurooptimism” (neo-)realism and rational choice took over. As a result of that, Eurorealism and sometimes different types of soft and hard Euroscepticism came forth. National identity was now mainly used as the explanation “of the last resort” (Lapid, 1996) and often as “a negative residual category” (Schöpflin, 2000) used when rational explanations had to retreat.

**Europeanization**

Europeanization was studied in a rationalist way often taking as the point of departure the transfer of the EU laws and rule (“aquis communautaire”) into national laws and administrative practices.

Among scholars there is a broad consensus that Europeanization involves mutual adaption of national and subnational governance systems to one European center and common European norms and rules, as

“an incremental process re-orientating the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making” (Laffan, 2003, referring to Ladrech, 1994:69),

and when including both institutional aspects and identity as

“processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms. Styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (Radielli, 2000).
In a rational institutional perspective, the studies of Europeanization pay attention to the extent of the changes in each member country which implements EU decisions, and to what extent the prevailing structures (and norms and rules) are under pressure by developments at the European level. Changes may take place before (“anticipatory adaption”) as well as after membership to the EU. Neofunctionalists regard Europeanization as “inevitable” and “automatic”, driven by spill-over effects and upgrading of common interests with focus on how and to what extent rules and policy are transferred from the EU level to the member countries, sometimes countries outside the EU. Historic institutionalists rely on the importance of historical changes and path-dependence underlining the significance of former decisions, institutional practices and a path “dependency”.

By contrast, liberal institutionalists like Andrew Moravcik pay attention to the significance of the “negotiation games” and the shaping of national preferences as a two-level game with focus on state preferences. As we shall see in the following, state preferences un the shape of interest based Eurorealism and Euroscepticism are often somehow bound to two-level games. The liberal institutional approach is often considered fruitful in studies of “high politics”, e.g. negotiations on key political issues with high preference intensity, e.g. CAP, treaties and the EU budget. In connection with studies of the enlargement process, the role of the Commission has often been discussed. An attempt to combine Andrew Moravcik’s liberal intergovernmentalism with neo-institutional theory (the “Moravcik+” approach) was successfully conducted by e.g. Lykke Friis (Friis, 1996).

In practice, it is difficult to separate and distinguish the impact of Europeanization, convergence, globalization and westernization respectively. In other words, it is difficult conclusively to make clear, to what extent institutional and organizational changes take place due to Europeanization or whether the explanations shall be found elsewhere. In other words, it is difficult precisely to measure out the exact impact of Europeanization. Anyway, there is broad consensus that “Europe” and Europeanization make a difference, that they “do matter” and become an integral part of domestic politics (“domesticated” (Gwiazda, 2002:13)). Some scholars categorize domestic responses to the EU in a threefold manner: low (absoprsion), modest (accomodation) and high (transformation). Low misfit result in low degree of change and absorpsion. (Ladrech 2010:36). The policy of the EU strives to minimize the misfit and can be direct and “hard” or indirect and “soft” (Ladrech, 2010:30). Hence, institutional and political processes, earlier discussed at the national state level, e.g. political parties and local politics, are to a greater extent than before studied in a European and at the same time also in a global perspective. The European institutions and EU regulation are increasingly taken for granted and affect the national
players more than before, which inevitably calls into question the future of the nation-state. National institutions may be so robust that they can withstand the external impact.

Especially large countries have the potential to transform the European institutions according to their national models (“uploading”) (Grote, 2003). France has tried to do it and with some success. Furthermore, by a process of translation and interpretation in the local context, the states can play a certain role in making and interpreting EU rules, in particular factors like national traditions, administrative legacies, fragmentation and segmentation, sectorization and administrative capacity are important factors for shaping adaption strategies in each state.

Small states and states which for decades have been under foreign rule and overlay, often face the “integration dilemma”, the feeling “either to give up a great part of national sovereignty and thereby risking to be “absorbed” by the integration system, or alternately insist on maintaining national sovereignty thereby risking to be left out and isolated and abandoned.”(Kelstrup, in Petersen. ed., 1992:154). National and European identities may be in harmony, but at times in conflict and giving rise to identity based Euroscepticism. The integration dilemma in the East came to play a different role before and after the 2004 EU-membership as the fear of “isolation” and “abandonment” before membership lowered after entering the EU and conditionalities worked less efficiently.

In spite of several barriers, in official declarations there has been much talk about the formation of a common European identity, often as a means for strengthening cooperation within the security and foreign policy field, which has been predominantly intergovernmental. The question is, however, whether a common European identity can be realized at all, and to what extent the greater diversity and new medieval and imperial characteristics after the enlargement will blur the differences between the EU “insiders” and “outsiders”, and eliminate all dreams and plans about the formation of a common European “superstate” signified by closed frontiers and high cultural homogeneity (Rupnik, 2004).

Most observers share the opinion that the foundation of the EU rests more on formal institutionalization than on common attitudes and identities. Europeanization has been signified by “overinstitutionalization” and considerable weaknesses on the “support side”, i.e. concerning socio-cultural foundation and normative integration (Kelstrup, in Petersen, ed., 1992:148). In other words, the common identity that makes institutions legitimate tends to lag behind the formal institutional crafting.
Europeanization and the new member states

Europeanization and politics of adaption to the EU passed at least four different stages,

the first stage of “Euro-Optimism” with vaguely formulated slogans about “catching up” and “return to Europe”, i.e. to a high extent identity based and connected with the systemic cleavage “communist versus anticommunist”.

during the second stage, after the formulation of the Copenhagen criteria, with more focused adaption to the EU and transposition the accession conditionalities into national laws (“pre-accession strategies”),

the third stage, beginning with the accession negotiation from 1998, and finally

the fourth stage, with the accession to the EU in May 2004 and the time thereafter.

For the new EU member countries, it was difficult to distinguish between the changes and the convergence towards market economy and democracy caused by internal and external factors, respectively. The negotiations about EU accession were highly asymmetric signified by hard conditionalities from the side of the EU as regards demands about downloading of the EU aquis in the new member countries. The conditionalities and the asymmetric nature of relationship suggests that Europeanization in the CEECs most resembles the nation “transformation, where fundamental change in core features of structures and policies occurs (Ladrech 2010:186). However, as mentioned above it may be difficult to make sure to what extent institutional changes resulted from demands from the EU or from other institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. Furthermore, the adaptation to the EU rules and norms in the new EU member countries shall also be examined in the context of the previous years of dual or triple transitions. Furthermore, it was difficult to predict how sustainable the commitment to EU norms and rules would be once EU-membership had been achieved. In other words, were changes real or shallow? The CEECs passed from one-party systems and planned economies to market economies and democracy. National identities had to be changed, and some countries, like the Baltic, were “reborn” after 6 decades under soviet rule. Thus, the dual or triple transitions in the CEECs must include a “fourth” dimension, the unexpectedly complex and long-term adaption to the EU norms and rules (the aquis) that aimed to minimize the misfit between on the one hand the national laws and rules and the EU aquis communautaire on the other.

In a social constructivist perspective (the “subjective world”), for the citizens in the CEECs find that “Europe” and “return to Europe” and “ways of doing things” have different meanings. From the outset,
the vision of the future Europe was vague, and most political and administrative resources were absorbed by accession negotiations. For many, the notion of Europeanization was connected with a return to the “normal order” after 40 years under communism, with high expectations of modernization and catching up with the West. However, to what extent the “misfit” between national and European identities could be overcome by Europeanization was an open (and underestimated) problem.

From the outset, the image of the past was complex and contradictory. “Politics of history” became important and a problem for Europe. The “German problem” remained unsolved. Merkel’s acknowledgment of German suffering has been pronounced with regard to victims of the expulsions from Eastern and Central Europe towards the end of WWII and during its immediate aftermath. This did not help for example Polish-German relations, which were already rather tense when Merkel took over from Gerhard Schröder. Plans for a Center Against Expulsions- an idea conceived by expelee organizations already in the late 1990s - and attempts by the Prussian Trust (“Preussische Treuhand”) to challenge ownership rights in Poland and the Czech Republic and pursue restitution claims – even though these were neither supported by the German government nor even by the League of Expellees (“Bund der Vertriebenen”) – did not provide the basis of smooth bilateral relations and continued to cast a shadow over the Polish-German relations even after the change of government in Poland in 2007. The new premier Donald Tusk articulated concerns by pointing out that nobody wanted to prevent the Germans from commemorating their own suffering. What was problematic in his view and caused concern was, when the memory of German suffering happened at the expense of the Holocaust memory and the acceptance of German collective responsibility (Wittinger, 2008:17).

The historic memories have also played a great role also in the case of the Polish-Russian relations. The relations became more “diplomatic” and “business-like” after the defeat of the PiS government. Later, the commemoration of the outbreak of the World WarII 1 September and the anniversary of the Katyn massacre in April 2010 gave rise to at least an “emotional” rapprochement between the two countries. The tragedy at Smolensk 10 April 2010 seems to have brought the two Slavic peoples even closer, at least in the shorter term in spite the fact that the nationalist right in Poland still puts question marks at the role of the Russian authorities’ handling of the safety regulations in Smolensk airport.

Furthermore, opinion polls conducted in several countries around the 20 year anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall evidenced surprisingly positive attitudes towards the time before 1989 and negative
attitudes towards the time after. Dissatisfaction with the present created a specific “retrospective utopia” and increased support to hard and soft right wing populism, e.g. in Hungary at the April 2010 election. Thus the negative “other” exists not only in the past, but often in the present.

The experience with state socialism and the costs of transition gave rise to a distinct “anti-utopian spirit” and a mistrust of long-term idealistic plans for the future, and instead a preference for the “secure” already tested (Rupnik, 2004, 2010). Opinion polls conducted at the time for EU accession evidenced that many East Europeans saw themselves as both “nationals” and “Europeans”. Less than 40 percent declared themselves primarily “nationals”, e.g. being an Hungarian or a Pole before being a European (see the figure). The liberal variant of “Europe” was connected with individualism, liberalism, rule of law, constitutionalism, free market economy, openness and secularization.

Figure 1. The various identities, distribution in percentages, Poland at the time of EU accession. Source: Eurobarometer EB59-CC-EB, 2003:2, “Comparative Highlights”, Publication: July, 2003.
The new EU countries each had their “model-countries.” Some admired certain West European countries or systems, others the US, and some did not separate Europe and the US, expressing themselves as “Euro-Atlantic” (e.g. Václav Havel). To internalize all-European values and identities, Europe needs its own positive narratives and myths, but exactly on that point we are facing many problems. Identities are multiple, multilayered, cross-cutting and rarely consistent. After the cold war and the demise of state socialism, it is no longer sufficient only to look to the common enemy (the (post)communists) as in the late communist years and at the time of “break-through” in 1989.

As mentioned by Jacques Rupnik (Rupnik, 2010:111) the EU’s effective use of conditionality during the accession negotiations played a key role in aiding democratic consolidation across Central East Europe. The EU stressed its prospective members’ willingness and ability to implement the EU legislation, the aquis communautaire. However, the EU insisted so strongly on this that it was charged with having undermined genuine party competition and the parliamentary process. The Europeanization of the East was based on imitation. Some parties and political elites found that the costs of resisting were too high to pay in domestic electoral as well as economic and diplomatic terms, as we shall see in the following sections sometimes giving rise to soft and even hard Euroscepticism.

“Euroscepticism”

The absence of strong European institutions and a common European identity and a high resistance or apathy towards the EU at the EU-referenda, and the first EP elections in the CEECs increased interest in Euroscepticism” and efforts to limit the democratic deficit in the EU by new treaty constitutions and visions for the future of the EU (“la finalité”). Evidence show that common European attitudes that support the Europeanization process do not exist and, if they do, then only in embryonic forms. Basically Euroscepticism is studied at the state level (state strategies), party level and civil society level (public opinion). The issue of EU accession came to play a modest role in national election campaigns and appears to have had almost no significant impact on the party choice of the electorate. Euroscepticism tends to be expressed differently in the “new” and the “old” Europe and in small versus large states. According to a worst case scenario, after EU accession the new EU-members from the East might become the “others” seen from the “old” Europe, i.e. the “EU-15”.

The first years after the “breakthrough” in 1989 in the CEECs were characterized by “Euro-Enthusiasm” and “uninformed enthusiasm”, but the then prevailing Eurooptimism was not backed up by much concrete experience (and knowledge) of the EU system. Among the political parties the
question about future EU-membership constituted a “valens issue”, i.e. an issue about which high consensus was predominant, at least as far as the goal (EU-membership) was concerned. The disagreements primarily concerned the ways to reach the common goal (EU-membership). Unfortunately, Euroenthusiasm was accompanied by a low debate about European affairs, thus unanimity in EU-questions was signified by “consensus without discussion” (Gyarfasova, in Drulák, 2001:55). The debates on “la finalité” of Europe reflected the CEECs status as countries, which had only recently re-gained their sovereignty. Therefore, after some years the issue of national versus European identity, i.e. the integration dilemma, inevitably became a “hot topic”.

As EU membership came closer and became a realistic option, the original EU “enthusiasm” and “naïvité” decreased, and inevitably the costs of future EU-membership constituted an important subject for discussion. After opening of the negotiation, by political learning the populations and the political leaders obtained a more realistic picture about what “the EU really is about”. Thus, coming closer to “paradise” many changed their attitude from “euro-naives” to be “eurorealists”, maybe soft or even hard “eurosceptics”.

Already before membership of the EU became a reality in May 2004, disagreement arose on some of the crucial questions, e.g. about the war in Iraq and the new treaty constitution for the EU. On the horizon difficult negotiations about the future budget of the EU were lurking which might activate the eurosceptical attitudes. Furthermore the war in Iraq divided the “new” and the “old” Europe, but the disagreements also comprised the questions about the future shape of the European project. As put by Henrik Richard Lesaar (Drulák, 2001:194), it turned out to be easier to expand the Union than to overcome the old division of Europe. The lack of confidence between the “new” and “old” Europe inevitably enhanced Atlanticism in the many new EU member states, especially in Poland and the Baltic countries, thereby undermining the popular support for further European integration.

**Euroscepticism: Some definitions**

As mentioned above, often the terms “Euroscepticism,” and “Europeanization,” are often vaguely defined. In working papers and discussion papers published in connection with the cross country research project “Opposing Europe”, started in year 2000 at Sussex University, Aleks Szczepskiak and Paul Taggart tried to overcome the problem by better defining the most relevant concepts and putting forward more robust classifications. However, we are still facing the danger of conceptual stretching by
including too many “EU critical” manifestations and interest articulation under the notion “Euroscepticism”.

Take two examples: should Poland’s defence of the decisions made at the 2000 Nice EU summit and the support of Britain’s and the US’ policy in Iraq be regarded as a “normal defence of national interests”, or should Polish support of intergovernmentalism and Atlanticism be classified as soft or hard Euro-Skepticism, i.e. as reservations against the EU and the European project in general?

Aiming to find a more robust definition, Aleks Szcerbiak and Paul Taggart (Szcerbiak and Taggart, 2000) reached the (revised) conclusion that Euroscepticism “expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration”.

Furthermore, the separation of “hard” from “soft is crucial, but also difficult to operationalize and put into practice empirically. Therefore, Szcerbiak and Taggart ” (Taggart and Szcerbiak, 2001:9-10) also here strived to find a more sustainable conceptualisation, now saying that hard Euroscepticism implies “outright rejection of the entire project of European and economic integration and opposition to their country joining or remaining members of the EU”. i.e. a principled opposition to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU (Taggart and Szcerbiak, 2001:9-10) By contrast, soft Euroscepticism involves contingent qualified opposition to the EU integration (Taggart and Szcerbiak, 2001:10). In other words, the soft Euroscepticism was expressed as a “Yes, but…”.

Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde offer four party party positions on European integration and the EU. The first is the Euroenhusiast position whose proponents “support the general ideas of European integration and believe that the EU is or will soon become the institutionalization of these ideas”. The Eurorejectionist position “subscribes neither to these ideas underlying the process of European integration nor to the EU”. Eurosceptics tend to support European integration, “but are in general pessimistisk about the EU’s current or future reflection of these ideas”, and lack of transparency and democratic practices. The Europragmatists resist the whole integration progress, and may even be anti-EU, but publicly accept enlargement in hopes that accession will aid them politically or improve their country’s economic and political situation (Ashbrook, 2010).
Euroscepticism: classifications

Different classifications of Euroscepticism have been put forward:

- **Identity-based** Euroscepticism is closely linked to the integration dilemma involving a contradiction between national identity and European identity, and including on the one side a fear of being “absorbed” by the supranational institution like the EU and on the other side a fear of being “excluded”.

- **Cleavage-based** Eurosceptism is bound to the main divisions in society, e.g. town versus country, labour versus capital, religion versus secularism etc. People living in the rural areas tended to be more eurosceptical. In addition, the socio-economic cleavages make the important distinction between transformation “winners” versus “transformation” losers.

- **Policy-based** Euroscepticism (or “functional Euro-Realism”), refer to some resistance against particular policies and specific issues, e.g. the CAP, the common currency, the euro and/or demands from the EU for transition-periods for the movement of labour. In some cases we are even dealing with “single issue skepticism”, i.e. sceptical attitudes to the EU on one main issue, for example agriculture, buying land, environment, moral topics, etc.

- **Institutionally** based scepticism is based on the high legitimacy of national versus low of legitimacy of EU institutions (“Scandinavization”). Low confidence in national institutions may increase the support for the EU institutions and for the EU as a whole (“Italianization”).

- **National interest-based** scepticism includes a contradiction between common European goals and national goals. In case of national interest based Euroscepticism, the main goal is to defend vital national interests in spite of a weakening of the common European project. As mentioned above, the national interests are often shaped by liberal institutional type two-level games.

- **Experience** based scepticism refers to the feeling that the negotiations about membership of the EU had been unfair and asymmetric, and the final result of the negotiations for that reason imposed.

- **Party-based** Euroscepticism is formed top-down from political parties and charismatic political leaders with either neoliberal (“Thatcherite”), anti-modern traditionalist or left-populist anti-EU argumentation.

- **Atlantic**-based scepticism refer to a feeling of contradiction or dilemma between pro-Americanism and pro-Europeanism, e.g. in case of a common European foreign and security policy.
And finally, we find a practice-based EU-Scepticism (“shallow Europeanization”). Here we find no principal resistance to the EU and Europeanization, but Europeanism is “nationally” defined much different from what is demanded by the EU according to the “mainstream” interpretation and the Copenhagen criteria. The Europeanization of institutions may also be insufficient. Not many national ressources were spent fulfilling the EU “aquis communautaire” and speeding up market economic and social reforms. This type of Euroscepticism we find in “reluctant democracies” like Slovakia under Meciar, (outside the EU) in Ukraine under Kuchma and to some extent also Hungary under Orban (after the 2010 election).  

Finally, Catharina Sørensen (Sørensen, SEI Working Paper no. 111) use a classification that complements those mentioned above. She says that Euroscepticism

- has an economic side, where EU membership is evaluated material, i.e. according to cost-benefit considerations
- has a sovereignty side, as a fear of encroachment on national sovereignty and national independence
- may focus on inadequacy of EU institutions, e.g. that too much power to supranational institutions
- has a political side, e.g. scepticism toward decisions taken by the Commission, e.g. on social policy (socialists) or regulation (neoliberals).

Political parties and Euroscepticism: some general remarks

Studies of Euro-Scepticism have often focused on the attitudes and strategies of political parties. Thus, the study of political parties and the European Union has established itself as a significant sub-field in political party research not least with the establishment of direct elections and formation of party groups in the European Parliament along partisan lines (Ladrech 2009:5). The authors of the Opposing Europe Research Network considered Euroscepticism as a product of party strategies implying that parties develop their positions towards European integration and European policies mainly in answer to domestic system structures (Taggart, 1998, Taggart and Szcerbiak, 2001; Sitter, 2002). This position has been contested by scholars like e.g. Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002:321) who rather consider party ideologies as the crucial factor in explaining party positions related to issues of European integration. Furthermore, Kopecký and Mudde lean on the Easton’s distinction between

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3 This classification is inspired by the classification made by Aleks Szcerbiak and Paul Taggart., 2000:6-7 and 2001:9-11.
**diffuse and specific support** towards European integration. In other words, to what extent do ideology and/or tactic strategies matter?

Politics just after 1989 was signified by weak parties as well as “non party systems”. Many new politicians became “moral politicians”, and politics became marked by identity politics. Most parties were established almost overnight without close links to the most important groups in society. Antipolitics and the fight against the old system were striking. The numerous broad anti-communist movement parties, e.g. the popular fronts in the Baltic countries, Solidarity in Poland and the Civic Forum in the Czech Republic mainly referred to patriotism, national values and anti-communism and “back to Europe”.

![Diagram of three party-based dimensions of Euroscepticism](image)

**Figure 2:** The three party-based dimensions of Euroscepticism.

Under those circumstances, “future directed” policies played a minor role despite the fact that the slogan “Back to Europe” became an integrated part of the new anti-communist discourse. Thus, in most countries the first free elections were won by those parties using primarily anti-communist symbolic slogans, being mainly referenda for or against the old systems and not election between parties. Later on, national elections became more retrospective and politics in general more “ordinary” and interest-based and thus less symbolic and abstract. Most voters tended to emphasize good
governance and the party leaders’ ability of party to communicate with society when making their party choices at the elections.

As applied to party research, a Europeanization approach means that the focus includes such arenas and activities as party organization, party manifestos and programmes, party-government relations, patterns of party competition and relations beyond the national political system (transnational party federations). As mentioned shortly before, Robert Ladrech (Ladrech 2009, 2010) makes an important distinction between direct and indirect effects of the EU. Direct and “hard” effects Europeanization led to the formation of new political parties. Indirect and “soft” effects change the domestic political system and impact internal features and behaviour of parties. Thus, EU-generated constraints may indirectly affect national parties and, by extension, patterns of party competition (Ladrech 2009:6-8).

Most “euroenthusiasts” seemed to be the reformed “post-communists”. In the beginning less reformminded (post)-communist parties were expected to have an ambivalent approach towards EU accession. After some time Eurorealism, Euroapathy and even Eurosceptism became more pronounced also among most non-communist parties.

Roughly speaking, among the parties three types of party-based Euroscepticism emerged, a neoliberal, a traditionalistic conservative and a left populist (see the figure). As we shall see in the following, ODS in the Czech Republic expressed soft Euroscepticism or Eurorealism, The League of Polish Families (LPR) conservative traditionalist Euroscepticism, and the Czech Communist Party (KSCM) left populism. To a large extent the upcoming party-based Euroscepticism was policy- and experience-based and, moving closer to EU accession, more national interest based.

In other words, the attitudes towards the EU became more practice- and policy-related, sometimes even shallow, and at the same time less symbolic and abstract. Under the negotiations about the EU’s new treaty constitution, political parties in small countries claimed to keep their own EU-commissioner and secure the Commission’s strong position at the expense of the Council of Ministers, which by small countries is often seen as the large countries’ own “battlefield”. In the accession countries, questions related to the EU never became the decisive factor at national elections, as social frustrations mostly impacted domestic politics rarely reflected in popular attitudes to the EU.
Like in the EU-15, EU-related questions played no crucial role at the national elections. As noted above, in the new member countries EU-related questions became “valens issues”, in which case all relevant parties agree on the common goals (the EU membership). Discussions and disagreements therefore mainly concerned the extent to which the governments had done their “home-work” well, e.g. sufficiently defended national interests in their negotiations with the EU. Only few parties declared themselves hard eurosceptical, i.e. against the membership of the EU and “Europe” as such. More problematic was the lack of interest and apathy concerning the EU questions. Therefore, at the referenda about EU-membership, the political elite often feared the non-voters more than the no-votes.

Szczerbiak and Taggart (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003) take as their point of departure some working hypotheses, which they want to test without knowing the final conclusions as there until then were no scientifically verified answers.

Among the most important:

- A party’s position on the left-right scala is not decisive when determining whether a party shall be considered as euro-skeptic or not

- The place in the party system plays a crucial role. Normally, outsider parties express hard or soft Euroscepticism

- That Euroscepticism on party level does not necessarily follow the extent of Euro-Skepticism in the population, in other words, Euroscepticism may be expressed differently at the elite and the popular level

- Euroscepticism tends to be strongest in states which are within close reach of EU membership

- Hard Eurosceptism is less widespread than soft

- Resistance to the EU among parties is strongest in states that are new nation states

- And finally, variations on the form and strength of Euroscepticism work differently from country to country.
Some of those classifications and working hypotheses are tested in the sections on Poland and the Czech Republic.

“Outsider” parties are defined differently. Among those parties, resistance against the EU has not necessarily been the most decisive, as it must be taken in consideration that outsider parties are not necessarily protest parties. In the case of “Smer” in Slovakia, “Respublica” in Estonia, and “New Era” in Latvia, we are dealing with protest parties, but they mainly criticised bad governance of the parties in government, not the EU policy. Those parties were relevant and able to take over government responsibilities, maybe national interest-based EU-realists. The Hungarian extreme right wing party MIEP followed a “hard” eurosceptical line, but strong Euroscepticism was only the one side of the xenophobia that characterized the MIEP. Most important was the questions connected to the Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring states, in particular in Slovakia and Romania.

From the outset, the new populist party Jobbik criticized the EU integration and the Lisbon treaty. According to party chairman Gábor Vona, the ratification of the Lisbon treaty will make the day of ratification the most disgraceful in the history of European integration. The reason is that the treaty moves Europe in a federalist direction “entirely at odds with the continent’s development”. The final result, he argues, can only be dissolution and division. The European electorate is left out of the ratification process, thus placing the decision in the hands of an “ininitely corruptible political elite”\(^4\). At the 2009 EP election, Jobbik surprisingly obtained 3 seats in the European Parliament.

In the case of FIDESZ, it has been no easy task to separate “Eurorealism” from “soft” Euroscepticism. FIDESZ was the ruling party between 1998 and 2002 and constitutes the strongest opposition party in the Hungarian parliament after the 2009 EP election. Before the 2002 national election when opposing the socialist-liberal government after the 2002 election, FIDESZ’ leader Viktor Orban several times put forward views that could be regarded as soft or even hard “eurosceptical”.

Thus, before the Hungarian referendum about the EU membership, Orban declared that Hungary in principle could remain outside the EU. That statement was strongly criticized by socialists and liberals. After the 2002 election, Orban favoured a Europe of nation states, intergovernmentalism and doubted whether we need a new treaty at all. He also raised the questions of the Benes decrees, and in

\(^4\) [www.jobbik.com](http://www.jobbik.com) 13.11.2009, "VONA: The Lisbon Treason".
government he proposed the controversial “status laws” with special rights in Hungary for the Hungarian diaspora. As in the case of the HZDS in Slovakia, also in the case of FIDESZ we can observe practice related (“shallow”) Euroscepticism determined by the domestic political agenda. In government and speaking in West-European countries, however, Viktor Orban mostly behaved like a “good European” politician. In Romania, some political parties, for example the Greater Romanian Party, opposed the EU’s Copenhagen criteria for providing political and social rights to ethnic minorities, especially the Hungarians. At the EP and national elections 2009, the Greater Romanian Party did not succeed in passing the election threshold.

The more refined delimitations of “Europeanization” decide to what extent acts and declarations on the EU should be interpreted as interest-based Euroscepticism, or only as a normal defence of national interests and as a part of the “political game” and without any great impact. The limit is blurred, but not impossible to draw. Basic reservations against the EU as a project were not striking in the case of FIDESZ, but soft eurosceptical declarations became a part of the electoral strategy. In the case of FIDESZ we were rather dealing with “normal” defence of national interests.

From the outset, the EU questions in Hungary were “valens issues” with a high diffuse support for the EU membership, for, if we disregard MIEP and Jobbik, eurorealist and soft eurosceptical statements have not been related to the EU membership as such, rather the handling of EU-questions by the government, i.e. the ability to negotiate successfully with the EU and defend national interests. In the case of Hungary the soft or hard Euroscepticism is mainly emanating from the Right (MIEP, Jobbik and FIDESZ), contrary to Slovakia where the EU-policy does not follows the right-left divide. The move to more Eurorealism and maybe evidenced after the 2010 election in Hungary. From the beginning, the new FIDESZ government introduced a tough “Kaczynski-like” national interest EU-line, e.g. on the economic policy, bringing the government in an open conflict with the EU and (in particular) IMF, and at the same time proclaiming a more strict policy on the question about sale of land.

In the 1990s, the Slovak party The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), belonged to the parties which in their actual behaviour expressed “anti-Europeanism” due to internal policy, e.g. on questions about the rights of minorities. Thus, the Euroscepticism of the HZDS tended to be “practice related” (“shallow”). In the programme declarations and election manifestos from the party there has been much talk about a unified Europe, which guarantees freedom, peace and security, promotes
economic growth and social justice and, at the same time, guarantees the invulnerability of existing frontiers and territorial status quo. Thus, the picture of Europe was “coloured” by national values and national interest. The HZDS can hardly be placed on left-right scales due to the fact that the right-left divide had become blurred. At the 2010 election, for the first time since 1993, HZDS lost representation in parliament. The Christian-Democratic Movement (KDH) used the more common argumentation of the right about defence of national sovereignty and basic moral and ethic issues, e.g. in the debates on the new EU constitutional treaty agreed upon at the EU summit in June 2004.

As regards Slovakia, Euroscepticism has not increased with the approach of the membership of the EU. The main problem was a general lack of public debate and widespread apathy as regards the EU. Not even in the case of protest parties like “Smer” have EU questions played any crucial role. In spite of some scepticism from Brussels towards the Smer-SNS government Slovakia joined the euro in 2009.

The polarization of the political scene in Slovakia was caused by the conflicts and the general lack of loyalty and coherence among the political elites and their use of social and economic issues for mainly political purposes. In other words, the hypothesis that right-left does not have any real impact on the policy choices and strategies of parties is confirmed in the case of Slovakia. The broad centre right government established after the 2010 election hardly changed the Slovak EU-policy in spite the fact that the Radicova-government laid out with a rather tough policy line e.g. on the issue of financial support to Greece and the common stabilization mechanism.

**National identity, Europeanization and Euroscepticism in the region as a whole**

As mentioned above, the attitudes and discourses concerning European integration have come through different stages stretching from Euronaivité and Euroenthusiasm to Eurorealism and sometimes even soft or hard Euroscepticism. The party-based Euroscepticism has been closely bound to the dominant attitudes and discourses in society and closely connected to the ideological uses of history (“policy of history”). Successive generations are moulded to see the past in certain ways. Thus, the relationship between Germany and France was to a large extent tied to the memories of the wars between the two countries.

In the new EU member countries from the East, the “We versus Them” dimension is mainly connected with the communist and pre-communist past, the Soviet Union and relations to the neighbouring states, and, in the case of Hungary Slovakia and Romania. On Balkan the Serbs proudly spoke about their resistance to the Turks when defending their policy in Kosovo, the Romanians spoke about their
Dacian past and Latin alphabet. The Bulgarian Revival in the 19th century (until 1878) and the uprising in 1876 present a source of coveted symbolic capital, the building of Bulgarian self-identity and the anchoring of the collective “we” (Daskalov, 2004). For Slovenians, the Yugoslavia, not “Europe”, constituted the negative “Other”. During Slovenia’s negotiations with the EU, some problems arose concerning its relations to Italy, which for a time blocked negotiations about membership of the EU. The problems tied to the unsolved restitution questions were primarily connected to the questions about foreigners.

In Croatia, there is a widespread feeling of unfair treatment by the EU during the accession negotiations, especially in comparison to many members of the fifth EU-enlargement. Thus, it is argued that Romania and Bulgaria, arguably less economically and politically developed than Croatia, were not enforced into for example a general Balkan agreement before their accessions, even though both are Balkan states (Asbrook, 2010:28-29).

Figure: Post-communist identities

| “We versus Them”: | the official system versus opposition, low consensus in society |
| “I”: | short-term individual strategies are dominant |
| "Ourselves": | identities formed within social groups, collective feelings dominant |
| “I-We”: | one’s own identity confronted with group-identity |
| “I myself-the others”: | “national egoistic” short-term thinking |

In countries like Slovakia and the Baltic countries, national identity was formed primarily by those circumstances that were leading to independence with the need to fill out the emerging discursive vacuum caused by the collapse of the old systems. The integration dilemma did not play a crucial role in the case of Slovakia, rather the fear of being kept “outside” the European integration process as such. Territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers were top priority for Slovakia due to the fear of Hungarian revanchism and thus in practice more important than EU-related subjects. As regards attitudes to European related problems, differences between political elites and civil societies have not
been especially large in Slovakia. The main problem has rather been high level of apathy at the EP elections, and the low interest in EU-related subjects in general. Thus the hypothesis, that newly independent states are characterized by a relatively high Euroscepticism, is confirmed in case of Slovakia. Slovakia became independent as late as in 1993, and after 1998-election persistently strived to catch up with the other applicant states having been “frozen out” of Europe under the rule of Meciar.

Thus some post-communist states based their new post-communist identity on memories and myths dating back to pre-communist times. Patriotic feelings, protection of the rights of Hungarian diaspora, respect for national symbols were seen as important for the right to call oneself a “true Hungarian” (Kiss, 2001). Hungary, it has been argued, has always been a part of the West, a bulwark against penetrating “outsiders”, e.g. the Turks, and only for a short time forcefully being separated from the West. However, for Hungary it has not been easy to accept the present territorial frontiers, which were decided upon at the Trianon peace conference after WWI. Former prime minister Jozef Antall declared himself the spiritual leader of all Hungarians, i.e. also those Hungarians living abroad. Some observers considered entering the EU as solution to the “Trianon-problem” thereby breaking down existing territorial and mental frontiers and create free movement of persons. With FIDESZ’ come-back in 2010 4 June, the day of the 1920 Trianon treaty, became a national (memorial) holiday, and the new government introduced double citizenship for the Hungarian diaspora’s. Identity politics and soft and hard nationalism was reinforced after the victory of FIDESZ and Jobbik at the 2010 election inevitably worsening in particular the relations to Slovakia and to some extent the EU. The EU policy of FIDESZ became distinct national interest based.

More about national identity, Europeanization and Euroscepticism in Poland

Also in Poland, the attitudes to the EU and European integration have passed through different stages, stretching from Euro-Enthusiasm to hard and soft Euroscepticism. However, Poland has been regarded as the largest and most “complicated” among the new EU member countries. In some ways, Poland has behaved like the “old Europe”; the Poles are stubborn like the Spaniards, arrogant like the French and eurosceptic like the British. Like Hungary, the old bulwork thesis, referring to the argument that through history of Europe, the Poles several times defended Christianity against penetrators from the outside, especially from the East, has played a crucial role on the symbolic level. This perception forged a specific spiritual community and aroused a feeling of belonging manifested for example during the negotiations about the constitutional treaty of the EU by the Polish demand of inclusion of Christian values in the preamble of the new treaty.
Poland is different from the other new EU member countries not only in size, but also in its attitude to Europe and Europeanization and in particular how to negotiate. Instinctively most Poles are intergovernmentalists in favour of state-to-state cooperation, like the Gaullists in France and the British conservatives who are spokesmen for interstate cooperation and a Europe of “homelands” without federal structures and including a certain amount of Atlanticism and with close bonds to the US. Thus, Polish (soft) Euroscepticism has largely been regarded as Atlantic-based.

After 1980, the national identity was influenced by Solidarity and the Solidarity myth. Solidarity did not only constitute a trade union in the usual sense, but more a patriotic movement fighting for the liberation of Poland from communist rule. After 1989, Solidarity took over governmental responsibilities and became the ruling party deciding the speed and form of transition. Solidarity repeatedly spoke about returning to Europe, but several times the national and patriotic appeals and the economic and social policy deviated from the demands emanating from Brussels, thus expressing a “shallow” and practice-based type Euroscepticism. Unlike in the case of the Slovak Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), Solidarity never came under heavy fire from the EU, maybe because of the political “self-limitation” and pragmatism and, not to forget, the fact that the West regarded Solidarity as the leading force in the fight for the liberation of Poland (and East Europe as a whole) from communism.

From the outset, the formulation about a solidary EU (i.e. money from the EU) and an intergovernmentalist and transatlantic EU with continuous American military presence in Europe had a strong appeal to many Poles. Furthermore, after some time most politicians and negotiators gained a more realistic idea of what the EU really was about, and that one condition of electoral success was to give the voters the impression that vital Polish interests are strongly defended by its political leaders.

In addition, the support for EU-membership in Poland had a institutional side, as many voters compensated for strong European institutions with a low support for domestic political institutions, e.g. national parliament and political parties. As shown by figure 4, at the moment of EU entry a great majority of the Poles supported the EU institutions more than the national institutions. Only the presidential institution obtained a high popular support. Thus the institutional type Euroscepticism has been low in Poland. In other words, as regards support for national versus EU institutions, the Polish population was closer to “italianization” than “scandinavianization”, for also in Italy low support for the national institutions has been counterbalanced by higher support to European. For many East
Europeans the common European institutions are more able to ensure rule of law, good governance and “catching up” than the national. Polish Euroscepticism seems mainly to have been identity-based (to a smaller extent institutional) and connected to the integration dilemma and the “instinctively” high support for intergovernmentalism. Euroscepticism has to some extent also been policy-based with demands for better safeguard of national interest in the negotiations about EU-accession. Cleavage-based Euroscepticism is most widespread among the rural population.

Before the EU referendum there was a certain fear that the question about EU membership would develop into a referendum for or against the transformation in Poland as such, in which case, the transformation losers would transfer their social frustrations to the EU thereby creating some barriers for future Polish EU-membership. However, EU-membership was supported by a large majority of the voters. Even among Polish farmers there was a majority, yet not a great one. Opinion polls, conducted after the Copenhagen summit December 2002, confirmed this trend, though the majority of Poles shared the opinion that Poland was not sufficiently prepared for a membership of the EU.

As we all know, Poland caused much trouble during the Copenhagen summit, and, only one year later during the EU summit in Rome, Poland together with Spain vetoed the proposal about the new treaty constitution and the new voting principles, which, on the demand of Germany, would change the voting rules in the Council of Ministers decided upon in Nice. Most parties in Poland supported the slogan about “Nice or die” – and later “the square root” principle - formulated by the Civic Platform (PO).

The topic about Poland in the new Europe has been eagerly discussed, but mostly among intellectuals. Thus, Bronislaw Gemerek, former foreign minister and member of the think tank about Europe established by the former prime minister of Belgium Guy Verhofstadt to prepare the EU Convention, argued that after 40 years of state socialism, membership of the EU had become a “must” for Poland. However, many Poles still have the feeling that EU-15 do not want Poland as a member, which means that some of the Polish EU apathy and scepticism tended to become experience based. Therefore, the “old Europe” must show more understanding for the situation in the new member countries. Gemerek also referred to the negative experiences from the accession negotiations, and said:

"I don’t think that one can exclude from politics the social psychology as a factor. It wouldn’t be good to accept candidate countries after, I would say a depressive process of negotiation which will leave the public of these
countries feeling humiliated” ….. Continuing passivity within the European Union, the passivity of its citizens towards European politics would have a disastrous effect”.

As regards party based Euroscepticism, at the 2001 election eurosceptical parties gained a rather strong representation. Thus, the new right-wing Catholic eurosceptical The League of Polish Families (LPR) and the populist agrarian movement Self-defence (Samoobrona) led by Andrzej Lepper presented strong eurosceptical statements and the criticism was not silenced after the election. Selfdefence (Samoobrona) put forward an extreme type economy and policy-based Euro-Skepticism, while the League’s criticism was deeper and more identity-based. The League combined the strong sense of nationalism with the conviction that EU accession in the current form would ruin the Polish economy, especially the agricultural sector. For LPR the EU posed a multifaceted threat to Poland. First, LPR perceived the EU as a secular institution and as such endangering Poland’s identity as a Catholic nation. Second, the LPR claimed that the EU has an erosive effect on national sovereignty of the Polish state. Moreover, the party believed that the EU forces its members to expand minority rights and therefore, poses a threat to Poland’s cultural homogeneity. Finally, the EU was seen as a project of the political elites and not for the European people. In short, Catholic conservatism, nationalism and populism all resurfaced on the questions of European integration (Lange and Guerra, 2009:540).

Selfdefence in principle supported Polish EU-membership, but did not accept the conditions offered by the EU-15. Unlike the League of Polish Families, Selfdefence conceded that EU accession would bring some advantages for Poland that, however, would be outweighted by the negative effects. The fact that the European question at the 2007 election no longer featured very prominently on the political agenda, and that the Law and Justice Party “stole” many of the LPR’s Catholic conservative and nationalist stances explain the demise of the League of Polish Families at the 2009 EP and the 2007 national elections. Finally, in the case of Poland, Euroscepticism confirms the argument that hard (and soft) Euroscepticism is mainly expressed by “outsider parties”.

From the outset, the third among the new parties at the 2001 election, The Law and Justice Party (PiS), in principle supported membership of the EU, at the same time being against the EU Convention’s proposal of a new Union Treaty demanding a referendum about the new treaty and speaking in favour of a “Europe of nation states”. First, the party recommended voting no at the EU referendum, but then
changed its position into a “yes” shortly before the day of the referendum. At the 2004 election to the European Parliament (EP) the PiS obtained 16.42 pct of the votes and 10 seats in the EP.

By contrast, the liberal Civic Platform (PO) tended to behave more “European”, being in favour of national interest-based Eurorealism with a better defence of Polish national interest launching the famous slogan about “Nice or dead” when discussing the new EU constitutional treaty proposal. At the 2004 election to the European Parliament, the PO came out as the largest party, obtaining 23.48 pct. of the votes and 15 seats.

The Peasants Party (PSL) was divided in the question about membership and especially on the conditions of membership. The scepticism that came forward, was mostly related to the question about the sale of land to foreigners and financial support to Polish farmers from the EU budget, i.e. policy based. In other words, the Euroscepticism of the party has been rather soft and policy related. At the 2004 election to the European Parliament, PSL obtained 6.88 pct. of the votes and 4 seats in EP. The cleavage-based Euroscepticism almost disappeared in the rural areas along with the growing support for the EU in rural areas.

Within the then governing parties, the SLD and the Labour Union (UP), no distinct hard or soft euroskeptical factions existed, but due to the weak position of the government in parliament and opinion polls, the two parties were exposed to “blackmailing” from eurosceptical parties like the PO, the PiS and Samoobrona. However, Euroscepticism was higher among the social democratic voters than among the party leaders, due to the fact that many SLD voters belonged to the transition loosers. The weaker electoral position of the left was confirmed at the election to the European Parliament (EP) in June 2004, where the SLD-UP obtained 9.11 pct. of the votes and 5 seats in the EP. The social democratic “defector party”, Poland’s Social Democratic Party (SDPL), obtained 5.07 pct. of the votes and 3 seats. The participation in the Polish election was low, only 20 pct.

During the endgame of the negotiations about accession to the EU, the blackmailing potential and the strength of the opposition increased. The different attitudes of the political elite and the demands for a strong defence of Polish national interests were reflected in the attitudes of the population as a whole. The political parties aimed to bring their EU policies in accordance with the attitudes of the electorate and the most important social groups in society. Furthermore, the many “trade wars” between Poland and the EU and the criticism on the part of the EU of the insufficient implementation of the aquis
communautaire in Poland inevitably reinforced euro-skeptical attitudes among the population. The extent of Euroscepticism has been fluctuating over time, it increased in 1999, but lowered when coming to the end game of the accession negotiations, thus once more rejecting the hypothesis mentioned above that EU-scepticism tends to increase when the EU membership is approaching.

At the end of the 1990s, the Catholic Church leaders openly supported Polish EU-membership with the aim of eradicating the impression of many believers that ethical values and Polish patriotism underlining national suffering and the bulwark thesis, could be upheld after EU-membership. However, the leadership of the Church had to fight against anti-Semitic and anti-German feelings from below based on the rather strong national democratic tradition (“Endecja”) that included the fundamentalist and xenophobic messages, in most cases originating from the “bottom” within the Catholic Church and brought to the awareness of people via e.g. “Radio Mariya”.
Poland’s behaviour during the accession negotiations and the negotiations about the constitutional treaty became the object of much domestic and internal debate. Some reactions have been sharp and confrontational, but most conclusions were inconclusive. In Germany and France there was talk about enhanced cooperation among the “old” EU countries, while the British reactions were more moderate. Also the comments in the European press varied. The German Süddeutsche Zeitung did not hide its frustrations and openly declared that Poland’s insistence on keeping the voting rules decided upon in Nice showed that the Polish government does not understand that the principle about handing over some sovereignty to the EU is the secret behind the success of the EU and the European project, and subsequently warned that the end result might be the establishment of a “core Europe” with Germany and France as the core. Others, such as Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, criticized Poland’s behaviour moderately by saying that the failure of the summit in Rome showed us that an EU with 25 countries
and maybe more will simply make a further deepening of integration impossible. And the French Liberation argued that the French-German motor has lost its original strength, and that Euro-Skepticism seems to grow stronger in the whole of Europe.⁵

In Poland itself only few put question marks at the “tough” negotiating line of the government. So most important was to “keep the flag high”. Nevertheless, in the foreign policy general debate in the Polish parliament in January 2004, foreign minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz declared that Poland “today stands stronger than ever before”. The most crucial, he argued, was to enhance national sovereignty, normalize the relationship to neighbouring countries, promote regional cooperation, security and social welfare by entering NATO and the EU. Those goals, he said, had all been fulfilled.⁶

For geo-strategic reasons it has been important for Poland to impact the EU’s new neighbourhood policy and bring to Ukraine an EU-membership perspective, thereby avoiding to be the EU’s new “frontline-state” to the East. The national interest based policies do not necessarily correspond with the prevailing priorities of the EU-Commission and the EU-15 countries, where issues like national sovereignty and further EU-expansion to the East were not especially high on the political agenda.

Only the two populist parties in the Polish parliament, Selfdefence (Samoobrona) and the League of Polish Families (LPR) criticized the outlines put forward by the government, demanding an even harder line in the negotiations with the EU. The League of Polish Families requested legal proceeding against the then prime minister, Marek Belka due to the Polish government’s support for the compromise on the European constitutional treaty at the EU summit in Ireland in the summer of 2004. Also the Peasants’ Party and the then party chairman, Janusz Wojciechowski, rejected the compromise, calling the government’s foreign policy “weak” and out of touch with the mood in the parliament and the population, but he did not support the demand for legal proceedings against the prime minister.

The national interest-based policy line was basically supported by the two “responsible” opposition parties, Civic Platform (PO) and the Rights and Justice Party (PiS). Nothing indicated that the negotiation tactics would become “softer” after establishment of a new centre right government. PO and PiS both supported Polish EU-membership, but demanded more respect for Polish interests in the negotiation about a new EU constitutional treaty thus speaking in favour of high Polish foreign policy

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⁵ An overview in BBC News 15 December 2003, www.bbc.co.uk
⁶ Minute in Gazeta Wyborcza 22 January 2004:8, “Rzeczpospolita silna jak nigdy”.

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activism and more strict defence of national interests, yet without being placed in the group of hard and soft eurosceptical parties. The “tough” line of negotiating with the EU was supported not only by the two opposition parties the PO and the PiS, but also by intellectuals as for example the chief editor of the largest Polish daily “Gazeta Wyborcza”, Adam Michnik, who directed attention to the alleged “arrogance” of France towards Poland, in general being outspoken “British” and pro-Atlantic”.

The two main opposition parties, the Civic Platform and the Law and Justice Party kept to the tough line also in the case of the appointment of Danuta Hübner, Minister of European Affairs in Leszek Miller’s government, as the first Polish EU commissioner, arguing that Hübner had been too “soft” during negotiations with the EU system and more serving the interests of France and Germany than Poland. Some argued, that when former EU President Romano Prodi talked about the need for more women in the EU Commission, he was mainly thinking about Danuta Hübner. The alternative was to appoint a “hardliner” like Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, member of the Civic Platform (PO).

Atlantic based Euroscepticism has also been striking. The participation in the war in Iraq, the choice of US F-16 fighters in the “arms deal of the century” and the veto at the EU summit in Rome fostered a considerable self-confidence inside the foreign policy establishment. As mentioned before, on the one hand, hard defence of national interests cannot in itself be called “eurosceptical”, but on the other side, it did not promote European integration and the formation of a separate European foreign policy profile. France and Germany’s sympathy for Russia’s demands concerning the status of Kaliningrad after EU enlargement, also raised much indignation in Warsaw and Vilnius and gave an impetus for more policy and Atlantic based Euroscepticism. Neither was the agreement between the EU Commission and Russia in April 2004 received well in Poland and the Baltic states.

However, it has to be taken into consideration that the close relationship between Poland and the US became worse as Poland lost some tenders concerning the sale of equipment to the new Iraqi army, and the US government refused to liberalize its visa policy to Poland, despite Poland’s status a “friendly” country due to the active Polish participation in the war and occupation of Iraq. Furthermore, Poland called for more financial support and better equipment to the Polish military forces, including air defence. In addition, the loss of several Polish citizens’ lives in Iraq did not heighten the interest in staying in Iraq. More parties openly requested Poland’s withdrawal from Iraq.

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A move to improve the relationship with the more war sceptical “old Europe”, most of all Germany and France, might take place. However, close relations to the US and US military presence in Europe remained important for Poland as a guarantee for hard security, better opportunities for influencing Ukraine and limitation of French and German (and Russian) domination in Europe.

The Polish foreign policy activism activated the “integration dilemma” - with on the one hand a fear of being “excluded”, on the other hand a fear of being “absorbed” (by EU supranationalism). Repeatedly, fear has been expressed not only of French-German dominance, but maybe also a fear of a new “Berlin Triangle”, a “intergovernmental directoire” consisting of the three largest EU countries, France, Germany and, not to forget, Poland’s ally in the Iraq war, Great Britain. The “Berlin-triangle” might decide on important security and foreign policy questions and thus undermine Poland’s position including the British “understanding” of Polish requests as regards the final shape of the European project. The passing of a resolution in the Sejm September 2004 demanding more economic compensation because of the German occupation in World War II and therefore exposed the cooling down of the German-Polish relations after Poland’s accession to EU and NATO.

At a conference, which took place in the presidential palace in February 2004, there was a discussion on how Poland could avoid the integration dilemma and the “deadlock” in its relations to the EU. However, something new to the debate was not brought to the light. Former Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki spoke about “defence of Nice”, but not to “die for Nice” such as proclaimed by Jan Rokita and the PO as there was a serious risk of being more isolated and marginalized in Europe. Therefore, a new political slogan was proclaimed, called “For a strong Poland in a strong EU”.

The official “semi-sceptical” activist line has been criticized, e.g. in the open letter from October 2003 subscribed by 2000 citizens, mainly intellectuals supporting the Convention draft to a new constitutional treaty. Furthermore, open criticism of the official Polish position has also been put forward by two former foreign ministers Andrzej Olechowski and Dariusz Rosati (MEP’s 2004-2009), both expressing a fear of isolation and marginalization in the EU and warning against the fragile alliance with Spain on the constitutional draft and speaking in favour of stronger Polish support for the Weimar Triangle and the Visegrad cooperation. According to Olechowski and Rosati the keywords of Polish EU policy should be “dialogue” and “compromise”. Most political parties considered the EU membership

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8 These questions are discussed in Gazeta Wyborcza, 4 February 2004:11, “Trójkat berlinski?”
an act of justice, a moral issue and a compensation for the division of Europe (“Yalta”) and the 40 years of suffering under communist rule.⁹

Before the EP election in June 2004, Bronislaw Gemerek, former foreign minister (like Dariusz Rosati elected to the European Parliament in 2004), argued that future Polish Eurodeputies should spare no effort to avert the threat of a multi-speed Europe, for

“A two-speed Europe would mean that new members of the EU, Poland among them, will stay in a room watching through the windows of what is happening in this European Union, in the centre of European integration, this best speed of the EU.”¹⁰

Mateusz Stachura pointed out the contradiction between on the one hand refusing to offer the large countries in the EU better voting rights and on the other hand demanding more money from the larger EU member states, pointing out a contradiction between on the one side the aim of a more “solidaric” EU that spends more money for poor countries and on the other being against deepening of integration.¹¹ Poland appears to Europe, maybe not intentionally, like a cool calculating “money-thinking” and eurosceptical country. It will be a major task to change that picture of Poland in the EU-15 countries.

According to Marek Ostrowski, the slogan about “Nice or die” and the negative comments on the constitutional draft did not set in motion any constructive debate about the future of Europe, but rather brought old stereotypes, historic wounds and national phobias to the surface. The consequence of status quo, argues Slawomir Sierakowski, chief editor of Krytyka Polityczna might be further marginalization of Poland, and a multi-speed Europe led by France, Germany and maybe Great Britain.¹² The Polish government was forced to accept those arguments, at least to some extent.

President Alexander Kwasniewski tried to balance between Euro-Skepticism, a national interest based foreign policy and the inevitable national self-limitation in relation to the EU’s largest countries. Commenting on the break down at the Rome EU summit in December 2003, he openly and honestly declared that Poland kept to the Nice agreement primarily because of a fear of dominance of the

¹⁰ “European elections important for Poland”, www.incentraleurope.com.
strongest (Germany, France and Great Britain). Germany, he continued, aimed to change the decisions from Nice, as Germany in the long run may not count on the support from Great Britain, Poland and maybe even France. In short, distrust seemed to be the main problem for Europe. Europe, Kwasniewski said, not only fears competition from the US but also fears itself. After the change of government in Spain in March 2004, Poland had lost its most important ally in the issue of the war in Iraq and the negotiation about the constitutional treaty. However, the change of government in Spain paved the way for the compromise at the EU summit in Ireland in June 2004.

When the French and Netherland voted “no” to the constitutional treaty in 2005, the prospects for Poland to impact European politics became better, but the new position was lost due to the policy of the PiS government 2005-2007, where Polish EU policy was characterized by a strange national-state thinking and a specific Atlantic type Euroscepticism.

But why did pro-European Poles elect anti-European leaders? Here we must take in consideration that Polish internal political life and electoral decisions are rarely organized around the European agenda (which seems to be the pattern in most national elections in the EU); thus, the reason for electing the Kaczynski brothers in 2005 were not mainly related to their European views (Kaczynski, 2008:15).

The greatest problems were connected with the anti-German rhetoric and the illiberal policy internally. Dealing with “high politics”, e.g. negotiations on the EU budget and CAP, the policy of the Kaczynski brothers does not deviate much from previous governments. Thus, the introduction of the “square root” principle for counting votes in the EU Council of Ministers was based on a similar proposal presented earlier by the Civic Platform.

Under the PiS-led governments in 2005-2007, the EU policy became soft eurosceptical and national interest based. After the change of government in 2007 the policy became more eurorealist interest based. During Donald Tusk’s government, the tone and style have been less nationalistic, less anti-German, less anti-Russian and even less Atlantic, in spite of the fact that the basic Polish interests looked rather stable. After the 2008 war in Georgia, the critical line towards Russia increased manifested in e.g. the formula “Partnership with the East”, the new EU neighbourhood policy promoted together with Sweden, in order to strengthen the EU in competition with Russia within the

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13 ibid.
CIS area. Energy security remained a high priority and was reflected in fierce but futile resistance against the North Stream project, the planned German-Russian gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea.

The adoption by the EU of the “Eastern Partnership”, a joint Polish-Swedish plan, was probably the first offensive test passed by the Poles. Not only was this proposal adopted in June 2008, but it was invoked by the EU Extraordinary Council on September 1, 2008. Energy security remained one of the driving motives for stronger involvement in the Caucasus since 2006: strong relations with Georgia and attempts to engage with Azerbaijan were visible, also the criticism of the North Stream pipeline project and plans for the energy bridge with Lithuania, Polish involvement in the Ignalina nuclear power plant and Polish investments in the Mazeiku refinery (Kaczynski, 2008:16-17). The euro-realist policy line was also reflected in the negotiations on the EU climate policy before the COP15 2009 UN summit in Copenhagen, where Poland led the eastern coalition of “climate-sceptics”.

In the first month of the Tusk government there was talk about a “smiling diplomacy”, in particular when visiting Germany. The 2009 elections to the European Parliament gave the Civic Platform 25 seats, i.e. half of the Polish seats in the EP, and neither the League of Polish Families nor Selfdefence passed the threshold for election.

One important problem for the Polish foreign policy became the strong disagreements between the prime minister (Tusk) and the president (Kaczynski) about who should decide the foreign policy line and represent Poland at EU meetings. The Polish constitution is not entirely clear when it comes to the distribution of powers in foreign policy although the intention of the constitutional amendment in 1997 had been to strengthen the position of the prime minister. Hence, we had to do with two different lines in foreign policy – a moderate diplomatic (Tusk) and a more radical-nationalist (Kaczynski). Thus, Kaczynski strongly engaged himself on the side of Georgia in the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia. The Lisbon Treaty was approved by the Polish parliament, but like Klaus in the Czech Republic, Lech Kaczynski refused to sign the treaty as long as the “Irish problem” had not found its final solution. Basically, the two presidents had similar views as regards the final shape of the European project. Finally, after the Irish “yes” to the treaty autumn 2009, Kaczynski decided to sign the treaty.

The new composition of the Polish parliamentary group after the 2009 EP elections meant that the nationalist component and the traditionally strong focus on EU’s east policy were somewhat subdued.
Due to the domestic political and economic problems in Ukraine, the future the EU membership of Ukraine became highly uncertain. Poland remained numerically underrepresented in the EU institutions, but some progress took place thanks to the appointment of Janusz Lewandowski to the prestigious position as EU Commissioner for Finances and Jerzy Buzek to the post as Chairman of the EU Parliament. Furthermore Jan Truszczynski was appointed as Director General, Poland’s first on that post. Poland also succeeded to obtain important concessions in the negotiations on the EU budget. A big challenge will be the Polish EU chairmanship in the second half of 2011 that takes place after the 2010 presidential election and (maybe) at the same time as the 2011 national election. The election of Bronislaw Komorowski as president undoubtedly turns the EU policy of Poland more EU-positive eurorealist and, at least until the 2011 national election, removes the cohabitation problems in Polish foreign policy between the president and the prime minister. No doubt Poland – like Spain in the first half of 2010- will try to leave its own mark on the EU agenda, e.g. on questions about the EU budget, further EU enlargement and upgrading of the EU partnership to the East in spite of changes of the function of the EU chairmanship according to the Lisbon Treaty.14

**Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic**

After 1989, and after 40 years of communism, the Czechs changed their attitudes to democracy, religion and history. Almost all topics could be questioned and were constantly changing. Before that took place, national self-criticism had been rare. It had not been moral victories and heroic uprisings, but rather the ability to *survive* three hundred years of Habsburg rule, six years of nazi occupation and 43 years under Stalinism and post-stalinism, that has marked the national identity. Thus, many Czechs had the feeling that national identity had been “given” them from the outside, forced upon them by the great powers. The claim that Euroscepticism is the greatest in new nationbuilding states we cannot confirm in the case of the Czech Republic, for the Czech Republic is not a country “without history” such as Slovakia. Neither can the hypothesis be confirmed that Euroscepticism grows the closer it comes to the membership of the EU. Almost all participants of the Czech “Future of Europe Debate” agreed that there was no alternative to the EU membership. In stead the discussions mostly dealt with the *type* of future for European integration.

Compared to other candidate countries, the Czech EU debate has seemed to be a more intense, involving all key players on the political scene. As in the case of Poland, the resistance to EU

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membership was greatest in the late 1990s, and then decreased during the negotiations about accession and before the EU referendum in the summer of 2003. Evidence from most opinion polls showed that most Czechs were not “eurosceptics” even though many had certain fears of the European Union. When STEM asked citizens to define their stand on the EU, only one fourth said they were “Eurooptimists”, 54.5 percent “Eurorealists” and 20.5 percent “Eurosceptics”. However, according to STEM, less than 20 percent of the voters said they would come to a referendum on the EU constitutional treaty if the vote had been held in spring 2005, thus showing a considerable amount of “Euro-apathy”.

There has also been much talk about of the Czech “ littleness” and the “small Czech man” (“malý ceský clovek”), both movingly described in Hasek’s beautiful story about the Good Soldier Svejk. More problematically, through history many citizens inclined silently or openly to cooperate with occupational powers, to prefer the easiest solutions to complex problems, believe in “nothing”, move to internal exile, act in opportunistic ways when seeking the easiest ways of social and national survival. These negative characteristics seem to be more striking than heroism, national uprisings and active resistance such as in Poland and Hungary (Drulák, 2001:24-25, Holý, 1996:130). More positively, Czech intellectuals have regarded their country as democratic, civilized and cultural, situated at the crossroads between East and West Europe, and with the belonging to the West as the long-term “normal order”. The deviation from that order is explained as the “un-normal”, considered as the “negative otherness”.

As opposed to the Czechs, the Slovaks are considered a people “without a history” and historic consciousness. There have been references to the Moravian kingdom in the 9th century and the missionaries St. Cyril and St. Metodius, the introduction of Christianity and national awakening in the 19th century, but those references were rather few. Thus, for the Slovaks we were mostly dealing with “going to Europe”, not “returning to Europe” as in the Czech Republic, who proudly refer to the great Bohemian kingdom in the Medieval ages and the democracy under Tomas G. Masaryk in the mid-war years. For no less than 1000 years, the Slovaks were under strict Magyar rule, and for that reason they did not have their heroes and memories about national uprisings like in e.g. Poland and Hungary.


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Soon after the velvet revolution in 1989, the Czech Republic went through a dramatic stage in a steady
search for a new political identity and the best as possible construction of the federation (Drulák,
2001:26). Furthermore, the Czechs and the Slovaks interpreted the Prague Spring, the normalization
years and the “breakthrough” in 1989 and the velvet revolution differently. From the outset, most
intellectuals in the Czech Republic supported the “return to Europe” and the transition to free market
economy and the establishment of a new Czech-Slovak federation according to the civic principles.

Those aims and especially the positive attitudes to free market economy were not shared by very many
Slovaks, who demanded a more confederative construction. After the division of Czechoslovakia in
1993, the Czechs moved closer to the West. Not only did the Czech Republic no longer share common
borders with the former Soviet Union, also the direct geographical link to the Danube area had gone
forever. Thus, strictly geographically speaking the Czech Republic came closer to West Europe, to
which it according to the official national discourse has always belonged.

From the outset, the project for the non-communist new Czechoslovakia was different in the yes of the
two presidents in the Czech Republic. Václav Havel (1993-2003) and Václav Klaus (since 2003) have
one common feature, which has strongly contributed to how the Czech foreign policy had been
organized since 2004: being anti-communist. From the beginning anti-communism and “Europe” were
explained differently by the two “strong men” in Czech post-1989 politics. Václav Havel was an anti-
communist activist and one of the leaders of the Czechoslovakian opposition before 1989. Throughout
Central Europe, former dissidents tended to be pro-American on issues such as freedom, democracy
and security and Václav Havel was no exeption from that rule (Kaczynski, 2008:11). By contrast, before
1989 Václav Klaus had been a technocrat in the second “tier” between the official system and the anti-
system, the “non-system”.

Also their “model-countries” were different. Thus, Havel gave high marks to the Scandinavian social-
liberal welfare model, while Klaus was “anglo-saxic” and neo-liberal minded and highly critical of the
“Scandinavian model”, which he had studied as a visiting professor at the Aarhus University in
Denmark in the late 1980s (Hanley, 1999). Also questions about the future of the federation, the future
of Europe and the way “back to Europe” were given different meanings.
Thus, at least three different “tracks” in Czech foreign policy can be observed:

- The *pan-European* about the undivided Europe without military pacts and with the OSCE as pivotal point

- The *federal*, the belief in a strong EU with functional institutions and backed up by a common European identity

- The *liberal eurosceptical* (and eurorealist) with support of a EU with an internal market and “nothing else”

*Kaj-Olaf Lang* points to a “national realpolitik” focusing on taking care of Czech national interests and keeping national independence, much in line with the third liberal eurosceptical track. The second line he calls the “*value-based* moral policy line” that refers to the “non-political politics” and the visions for Europe that were presented by former president Václav Havel. This line is rather close to the “*federal*” one mentioned above. Finally, he outlined a specific “*European activist* line”, based on flexibility, pragmatism, cooperation and engagement aiming at constructing the “new Europe”.

At the beginning, Havel spoke about a new pan-European system without military pacts and a confederal Europe with the OSCE as the pivotal point much inspired by former President Tomas G. Masaryk’s ideas about a Europe with “unity in differences”. Like the then foreign minister, Jiri Dienstbier, he flirted with a utopian vision of dismantling all the existing European institutions and replacing them with a loose confederal structure (Hanley, 2002). A revitalization of the old plans about a Polish-Czech confederation was also raised. Havel became an energetic spokesman of “Euro-optimism” and “Transatlanticism” by being in favour of a federal construction of Europe in the same line as the German foreign minister Joschka Fisher. He also called for a second chamber of the EP whose members would not be elected by direct ballot but by the parliaments of the member states from among their ranks. Furthermore, Havel spoke in favour of Czech membership of NATO and reinforcement of transatlanticism. As regards the wars against Serbia and Iraq, he supported the US and British line.

At the end of the 1990’s, Havel expressed his concern that the Czech Republic might be left out in the competition to be an EU member in the first EU enlargement to the East. Therefore he opposed the pacifism and Euroscepticism, that were gaining renewed strength during the airstrikes against Serbia
and the negotiations with the EU-Commission about future membership of the EU, which were expressed not only by communists (KSCM) but also by the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). However, criticism of the EU was not absent in speeches made by the president himself. Thus, several times Havel paid attention to the questions about a common European identity. In a speech in the European Parliament in 1994, he said that for many Europeans, the EU looks like a bureaucratic institution with mainly economic goals. Unfortunately, only few see the Union as a community of values. Therefore, he continued,

*That is why to me the perhaps most important task facing the European Union today is coming up with a new and genuinely clear reflection on what might be called European identity .......”*

and about the Maastricht Treaty,

“*simply reading the Maastricht Treaty, despite its historical importance, will hardly win enthusiasm for the European Union. Nor will it win patriots ...”* (in Drulák, 2001:188-189).

According to Václav Havel, the Maastricht Treaty seemed to be too “technical” and thus un-popular. Therefore, he spoke in favour of adopting a new charter for the Union that emphasizes the common European ideas and values being a lever as regards the aim to encourage popular support for the EU. In other words, the common European institutions and the EU-technocracy should better than until now adhere to democratic, moral and ethical values. Finally, several times Václav Havel warned against a new division of Europe. After the enlargement, there ought to be one Europe despite the greater diversity.

In the Czech Republic, the visions for Europe put forward by the former president had some impact on the debate about the future of Europe and on the role to play by the Czech Republic and that in spite of the limited power of the president according to the constitution and the fact that the diffuse support remained high. The Czech finalité debate tended either towards federal settlements or intergovernmentalism. Former President Václav Havel’s supranationalism seemed to be rather close to post-Westphalian type of Europe. As we shall see in the following, federalist concepts have been the ones to which in particular the Social Democrats and the centre right parties of the former Quad-Coalition (4K) have subscribed. By contrast, the Civic Democratic Party has been the strongest proponent of the
nation state and intergovernmental cooperation. According to the ODS, it is on the internal market that national groups and enterprises have to compete.

The Czech negotiating line to the EU has not been signified by the same high level of activism as in Poland. The European policy and the policy on cooperation among the Visegrad countries have varied over time. The nation state line dominated under the government of Václav Klaus, while “flexibility” and “dynamism” became key words under the social democrat-led governments. The social democrat-led government was, however, not enthusiastic about the draft for a new constitutional treaty put forward by the European convention and, for that reason, called for a meeting in Prague with participation of smaller EU countries with the aim of strengthening the position of the small accession countries. During the EU-summit in Rome, December 2003, the Czech Republic accepted the proposal for a new distribution of votes in the Council of Ministers, although not deploring the breakdown in Rome, contending that the decisions on that issue had been taken without the necessary consultations. The statements from the government, however, were not clear-cut. Some were openly “eurosceptical”, while others expressed the fear among the smaller EU countries of a multi-speed and core Europe consisting of “old” EU countries (Germany, France and the Benelux).

The party-based Euroscepticism had mostly been connected with the communist party (KSCM) and the liberal Civic Democratic Party (ODS), and in particular the former chairman and the later president Václav Klaus. The xenophobic populist Republican Party (RS-RSC) of Miroslav Sladek lost its parliamentarian representation already at the 1998 national election. The Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) did not gain any seats in the national parliament at the first free election in 1990 and obtained only a modest representation at the 1992 election. However, from the mid-1990s the situation changed, and at the 1998 election CSSD became the largest individual party. From the outset the CSSD spoke about Europe almost enthusiastically. Thus, the chairman Milos Zeman declared that the future lies in federalism, but Europe, he argued, must also be “strong, flexible and diversified”. The EU has to be more than just a market and therefore needs a common foreign and security policy and also common social and economic policy, including a common tax system.

Furthermore, according to the social democrats Europe need an active industrial policy, a social dimension, and closer cooperation on the foreign and security policy. Thus the intention behind

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16 www.ceskenoviny.cz 15 March 2002, "Diversity is EU’s asset, the future lies in federation".
European integration was to be a balanced living standard for citizens of all EU countries, provision for common security, social justice and access to education and the job market (Havlik et al., 2008:172).

During his hearing in the European Parliament the nominated Czech EU Commissioner, former CSSD premier Vladimir Spidla, claimed that the European social model should be a part of Europe’s competitive advantage and for the social democrats, it is possible to create an efficient balance between employment, economy and social sphere, or between solidarity and productivity.\textsuperscript{17}

The social democrat foreign minister until the 2002 election, Jan Kavan quoted former president Tomas G. Masaryk’s formulation, that Europe should become a “big union of great and small nations”, also claiming that peace in Europe will rest on close cooperation between former enemies, Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany. Europe should be cooperative and “solidaric”, respect national identities and the role of the European Commission as initiator and engine for the EU integration. Kavan became a proponent of the community method but with retention of intergovernmental decision-making on some levels and in some areas.\textsuperscript{18} In spring 2005 he became a spokesman for breaking with the pro-US foreign policy of the government, e.g. on the war in Iraq, thus joining the French-German line.

Parts of the policy of the social democratic government did not correspond with the “spirit” of the EU’s demands for free competition and a functional internal market such as the revitalization programme with support for debt ridden state enterprises, also some statements of the prime minister (Milos Zeman), e.g. about the Benes decrees, the expulsion of Czechoslovakia’s then 2.5 million ethnic German population and relations to Germany and Austria were considered “euro-skeptical” (shallow and/or practice based). The 1999 EU progress report criticized the Czech Republic for slow and insufficient implementation of the EU aquis communautaire, thus fostering more Euroscepticism among some Czech politicians, in particular those from the ODS.

From the outset, the communist party (KSCM) followed an almost hard eurosceptical line, but gradually that line became more “blurred” and sometimes even “softer”. At the same time, the resistance to Czech membership of NATO sharpened due to the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 and the war in Iraq from 2003. In spite of some “softness” the KSCM included several points in its program that

\textsuperscript{17} www.ceskenoviny.cz 28 September 2004, “Spidla favours the EU social model, but also for reforms”.

show incompatibility with the principles of the European Union. The proposals adopted at the 1999 party congress revealed the dilemma. On the one hand, the party rejected the form of EU integration, on the other hand it said that the Czech Republic should maximize its influence in the EU. The KSCM in particular viewed a role for the EU in ensuring social welfare (Beichelt, 2004:36), but at least officially still denounced EU as well as NATO membership.

Miroslav Ransdorf spoke about a future “socialist Europe”, but that vision was rejected by the majority of the party’s delegates. Thus party members seemed to be more eurosceptical than the party leaders. The criticism focused on the EU in its present shape, which according to the party was dominated by Germany and too liberal and bourgeois. To sum up, in principle the party was not against EU integration, and there was also talk about further democratization of the EU’s institutions and more power to the European Parliament. Due to the past the KSCM remained a distinct “outsider party”, but not distinctly anti-European moving closer to the Slovak sister party (KSS), which behaved more “pro-European”, but was strongly against Slovak membership of NATO. The rather hard Euroscepticism of the KSCM confirms the hypothesis that the position in the party system right-centre-left plays a crucial role for the strength as well as the type of Euroscepticism.

Prior to the 2003 EU referendum, the KSCM declared that it will respect the decision by the voters, knowing that the likely result would be a yes and that about one fourth of the KSCM voters would vote in favour of Czech membership of the union. After the entry of the Czech Republic into the EU, the election programmes were typified by their high degree of generality not being given an independent chapter, and always being part of another chapter devoted to foreign policy and security (Halvlik et al., 2008:176).

Thus, after the Czech referendum a qualitatively new situation emerged. On the one hand KSCM insisted that the Czech Republic was not sufficiently prepared for EU membership and that the Czech government to a large extent yielded to the demands from Brussels. On the other hand the party would intensify the endeavours to reform the EU from “within”. In addition, a more accommodating line in the EU policy might contribute to break the political isolation of the party. Yet, persistent resistance to EU membership might be tempting, as resistance against the EU might increase electoral support in the first “hard years” after membership, where the Czech Republic was expected to become a net-contributer to the EU budget. In other words, the EU strategy contained tactical as well as strategic dimensions, thus confirming the abovementioned hypothesis of Scherbiak and Sitter that parties often
develop their positions towards European integration as an answer to domestic system structures. Miroslav Ransdorf, known for his “soft” pro-EU line, was the EU frontrunner and the head of the campaign of the party at the EP election in June 2004 and he argued energetically but unsuccessfully in favour of establishing a new common European Left Party.

Much focus of course has been directed toward the policy of the main liberal party, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the “eurosceptical” political entrepreneur, and present president, Václav Klaus. The statements of the party were rather EU-positive in the first years where the slogan about “return to Europe” had a rather strong power of penetration. The main argument was that the Czech Republic is the “frontrunner” among the Central European countries with references to for example the fact that the Czech Republic had become the first full member of the OECD.

For that reason the ODS was sceptical about closer cooperation among the Visegrad countries, especially the more “foot-dragging” among them. At the same time, the belief in an almost crisis free transition from plan to market gained more strength and became important for the ideology behind the more euro critical, high-profile “Thatcherite” line in the second half of the 1990s.

According to Klaus, the EU’s desire for supranationalism, manifested in the new treaties, was a proof of “left-collectivism”, exaggerated bureaucratization and a belief in a future for the failed social democratic welfare state. The ODS opposed the development of a European defence capacity as unnecessary, impractical and undermining cooperation within NATO. The ODS Euroscepticism was mainly ideological, economic and Atlantic based. Czech pro-Americanism is the result of a combination of several historical facts, such as the Western European decision to give away to Nazi Germany in Munich; or the ambivalence in the West towards the Prague Spring in 1968, and the Soviet military intervention. The US therefore has often been seen as the only credible and capable partner able to provide security for the Czech Republic, hence the decision to allow for the American radar as part of the US missile defence system (Kaczynski, 2008:13). By contrast, the ODS’ EU-scepticism has only to a small extent been cleavage-based as far as most of the ODS voters have been in favour of EU membership without expressing the same reservations toward European integration as Klaus.

By the end of the 1990s, the national “self-confidence” of the ODS became more obvious to the world and manifested itself in a sharper criticism of the federal visions for Europe, a firm belief in the national state and a “Anglo-Saxon” neoliberal type opposition to the introduction of a common currency and
federal reforms. With its liberal program, the party became more critical of the EU bureaucracy and its alleged tendency to regulate all and everything, and of the social dimension of the European economic sphere (Beichelt, 2004:38). Also, the nationalist tendency with a mistrust of German influence in the EU came into the open. On issues like the common currency, the Temelin nuclear power station and EU sanctions against Austria due to Haider’s Freedom Party’s participation in the government, the ODS refused to support a common EU line that was regarded as interference in a sovereign state’s internal affairs.

The eurorealist or eurosceptical line was manifested in the “Czech Eurorealist Manifesto”, formulated on the third “idea conference” in 2001, in which the scenarios for Czech non-membership of the EU was contemplated according to the Norwegian or Swiss model. The Manifesto argued against a further extension of the QMV, instead asking for existing national veto rights to be maintained as a tool for safeguarding national sovereignty. The Manifesto, which was largely constructed by the foreign affairs spokesman Jan Zahradil, combined the EU in its present shape with “lobbyism” and “corporatism”. Therefore, intergovernmentalism was the preferred construction. The eurorealistic line of the Manifesto featured prominently in the ODS 2002 election programme.

Later, during a visit to France in July 2003, i.e. after the taking over of the position of president and the introduction of the common currency in the EU, Klaus maintained his criticism of the EMU and the common currency, which, according to him, was no necessity and depriving the countries the possibility of choosing their own monetary policy and decisions about the most proper exchange rates. The convergence criteria were simply not suitable for countries that had existed for 40 years under planned economies. In fact, the common currency was the main explanation for the economic recession in Europe and most of all a political project. Europe, he continued, lacked a common identity. Europe was in possession of its own currency but of no common policy to back up the project. The inflexible monetary policy of the ECB only reinforces the already serious problems for the European economies.19

Later, in a speech at the Passau University in Germany, Václav Klaus made clear that the common currency primarily constitutes a political project, a “Trojan Horse” for harmonizing economies, policies and law regulation. The lack of financial and economic discipline, he argued, may do irreparable damage to the new fragile post-communist economies. He ironically and provocatively stated that the

19 www.ceskenoviny.cz 21 July 2003, "Klaus describes adoption of the euro as "unreasonable".
experience from the division of Czechoslovakia evidenced that it is a relatively easy task and almost cost free to do away with a common currency that does not work.  

Finally, during his official visit to Spain in September 2004 he once again claimed that the authors of the constitutional treaty base their ideas on false preconditions, such as the idea of a non-existent European identity. In addition to the label of being a “eurosceptic”, Klaus made the distinction between “Eurorealist” and “Euronaivist”, adding that the second group (the “naivists”) reminds him of those naïve people under the communists, “they had the same mentality”. In contrast, Eurorealists (like himself) believe that Europe must be freer, more democratic and efficient when it comes to productivity. He called for a new name for the EU, something like “The Organization of European States”.

The support of the EU-15 to the bombing of ex-Yugoslavia in 1999, which grossly violated the sovereignty of Yugoslavia, was met by sharp criticism from the ODS and brought the party on a collision with not only the EU but also the US. Thus, Sean Hanley (Hanley, 2002) associates the Euroscepticism of the ODS from the late 1990s with exactly the war against Serbia, which for Klaus questioned the quality of supranational decision-making and underlined the necessity of the right to say “no”. Furthermore, the ODS’ eurosceptical path should be seen in the light of the ongoing organizational problems within the party and the problems concerning the formulation of consistent and long-term strategies.

As put by Mats Braun (Braun, 2009), the ODS Euroscepticism became increasingly ideological and non-populist. Several pro-EU politicians left the party in the late 1990s due to the internal party split, thereby strengthening the position of Václav Klaus and the euro-skeptical faction of the party. Some of the party leaders, e.g. former Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec, minister of finance Ivan Kocarnik and the former dissidents Václav Benda and Jan Ruml took a more pro-EU integration position. These characteristics and policies of the ODS we also find in several other weakly institutionalized new centre-right political formations in Europe, signified by populist leadership, e.g. the Austrian Freedom Party, Forza Italia and some Gaullist associations in France.

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22 They all left the ODS in the late 1990s.
The eurosceptical line was concentrated around a group of persons around the chairman Václav Klaus. To those belonged among others one of the party’s vice-chairmen and spokesman for defence affairs, Petr Necas, and the then shadow foreign minister and leader of the election campaign before the 2004 election to the European Parliament, Jan Zahradil, a member of the euro-skeptical anti-federal alliance of eurocritical movements “TEAM”, that consisted of more than 40 cross-party political groups.\(^{23}\) Zahradil persistently argued against a transfer of more power to supranational institutions. As an example, he made references to an article in the French daily newspaper “le Monde” that pessimistically predicted, after the enlargement the EU would be transformed to a free trade zone without much supra-state regulation. That development Zahradil considered this development highly beneficial for a small country like the Czech Republic with an open economy that would profit from an internal market but be “absorbed” in a supranational federation.\(^{24}\) In other words, further enlargement of the EU might be the best guarantee against the formation of a European “super-state”.

Thus, the ODS’ scepticism has been mainly ideological, confirming the thesis of Mudde and Kopecky mentioned above, and thus closely connected to the “integration dilemma”, the fear of being “absorbed” by supra-national structures, and with the Anglo-Saxon type “Thatcherite” critique aiming to keep the EU an internal market and “nothing more”. As noted above, the resistance against further EU integration was stronger among the ODS leaders than among the ODS voters, who typically belonged to the “transformation winners” and therefore to a great extent were speaking in favour of Czech EU membership confirming the ODS’ Euroscepticism as only to a small extent cleavage based. Thus, the thesis mentioned above about Euroscepticism as decided mainly by domestic strategic and voter-maximizing strategies and the position in the party system (as a non-relevant “outsiderparty”) cannot be confirmed in the case of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS).

After Václav Klaus’ resignation as ODS party chairman and the takeover of the post by Mirek Topolanek, the EU policy line became “softer”. Mirek Topolanek criticized the result of the Copenhagen Summit December 2002, later he expressed some reservation as regards the compromise on the constitutional treaty in June 2004. At the voting in The European Parliament on the constitutional treaty in January 2005 a greater proportion of the Czech EP members, 15 among 24, including the nine from the ODS, voted against, more votes than from any of the other 25 member


\(^{24}\) [www.ceskenoviny.cz](http://www.ceskenoviny.cz) 11 March 2002, “EU enlargement will help prevent its further unification- Zahradil”.
states. However, before the EU referendum Topolanek recommended a “yes” and as regards the constitutional treaty, he was asking for time for closer “studies”, arguing that the new European constitutional treaty must not be unduly hastened and that people should get one and a half two years to study the constitution. He was thus indicating that the final result might be a “yes”, maybe the final decision would be taken after a ODS takeover of government. However, ODS-sponsored polls still evidenced a “great yes” among the ODS voters. The ODS might, therefore, loose votes at the 2006 national election due to its eurosceptical stance. The Dutch and French people’s “no” to the treaty “saved” the eurosceptic position of the ODS. In contrast to the social democrats, the ODS spoke in favour of cancelling the ratification procedure due to the French and Dutch rejection of the treaty.

Before the EU referendum, president Václav Klaus refused to recommend a “yes” or “no”, and his comments on the result of the EU referendum did not indicate any shift in the attitude towards EU integration at all. Václav Klaus’ “Euroscepticism” led him on a course of confrontation not only with former president Václav Havel, but also with the then social democratic Prime Minister Vladimír Sipla and the liberal foreign minister Cyril Svoboda. The different policy of the government and the president inevitably also enhanced conflicts between the president and the later social democratic prime minister (Paroubek).

Those conflicts became open at the ceremony in Athens in April 2003 with the signing of the accession treaties, at which occasion the then Czech government spoke in favour of a common foreign and security policy and a rotating EU chairmanship. It also attracted attention that Klaus refused take part in the ceremony in the National Theatre marking the Czech accession to the EU and did not attend the ceremony in Rome on the European constitution treaty. Unsurprisingly, Klaus did not hide his great satisfaction with the French and Dutch no to the constitutional treaty in May 2005 calling himself an “eurooptimist” and in favour of a “minimalist” type constitutional treaty.

With the new government led by the ODS chairman Mirek Topolanek, the EU line became more eurorealistic and less eurosceptic. The Czech Republic did not cause problems for the EU on big issues like the budget and relations to Russia. However, in the upper house, the Senate, there has persistently been a hard core of eurosceptics. The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty was seriously challenged in the Czech Senate, dominated by the ODS party, which referred the document to the Supreme Court.

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26 www.ceskenoviny.cz 23 April 2003, “Klaus-Svoboda meeting does not settle their dispute over EU”.
The eurorealistic or soft eurosceptical and in the Cas-Mudde terminology europragmatist line was not welcomed in the “old” EU and certainly not after New Year 2008-09, when the Czech Republic took over the EU presidency after France. Thus, the motto of the French presidency was the “protective Europe”, while the objective of the Czech presidency was “Europe without frontiers”. It was problematic for the euro-enthusiastics in the “old” Europe that the Czech Republic had not joined the euro, was politically unstable and had a blatant eurosceptic president. In the late 2008 unconfirmed reports circulated that France, due to the financial crisis, the problems with ratification of the Lisbon treaty and the problems in relation to Russia after the war in Georgia, would have extended the French EU chairmanship into January 2009, what did not happen anyway.

The Czechs escaped fairly unscathed through the presidency, but the presidency was significantly weakened by the resignation of the Czech government in February 2009 due to the majority at the vote of non-confidence to the government in parliament. Klaus refused to sign the Lisbon Treaty until the “Irish problem” had been solved\(^{28}\), i.e. several months after the Czech presidency had expired. In that respect there was an alliance between the then Polish president Lech Kaczynski and the Czech Václav Klaus. In the Czech daily “Hospodarske Noviny” (26.1.2010) Kaczynski said (on an official visit to the Czech Republic) that Europe “needs opponents”, and in that respect Václav Klaus in his view is a personality able to face the sometimes ridiculous correctness that rules in the EU today. However, with the return of the broad centre-right regovernment after the 2010 election and Karel Schwarzenberg back as the foreign minister the Czech EU-policy seem to become more consistently pro-EU.

**Final remarks**

As we have seen in the previous sections, questions concerning national identity and Europeanization have been the object of great attention. Until recently, subjects connected to “Euroscepticism” have only been scantily explored, but we need not start from scratch due for example to the above mentioned cross-country research project (“Opposing Europe”), figures from Eurobarometer and national opinion polls. The discourses about “Europe” have passed different stages, usually with Euroenthusiasm as the starting point. The approach to the study of Euroscepticism has in turn been rationalist, institutional, often emphasizing each state’s policy and institutional choices and administrative structures, or social-constructivist with much focus on identity.

\(^{28}\) That happened in late 2009.
National consciousness and identity matter, but need not be separated from rationalist interest-based approaches. With time, along with a transition to more ordinary interest-based national policies and the adaption to the EU, interest and institutional types of approaches became more attractive. The symbolic policy (“return to Europa”) was most striking about the time of the demise of the old systems, also as regards the questions connected with the future shape of Europe (“la Finalité). In the course of time, the East European political leaders and populations behaved more europragmatic and eurorealistic, sometimes based on national interests and feeling of unfair treatment by the EU on shift expressing soft Euroscepticism, Eurorealism or Europragmatism.

Several research questions and working hypotheses have been raised, and in the course of time also more discussed and further explored and defined. Some delimitations and definitions remain undecided to a large extent, including the notion of “Euroscepticism”. Thus, it is still difficult to to say conclusively when we are talking about “safeguarding of national interests”, e.g. according to the Polish slogan about “Nice or die”, or soft or hard Euroscepticism, where the EU project as such is questioned.

As we have seen, Euroscepticism has an institutional as well as an identity-based angle. Institutionalist as well as socialconstructivist approaches have been used by scholars. The integration dilemma has a special East European angle when dealing with young states, with 40 years under communist rule and with the hope of a “return to Europe” and “catching up with the West”. Most East Europeans are instinctively intergovernmentalists (fear of being “absorbed”) and pro-atlanticists, but hard Euroscepticism is not widespread due to the fear of becoming an “outsider”. Thus the diffuse support for the EU has been high. However, accession to the EU did not solve the integration dilemma, the fear of absorption and the fear of being “kept outside”, as EU membership was connected with second rate membership and a multi-speed Europe with core and non-core member states.

Euroscepticism also has an institutional angle, as the mistrust to national institutions in most cases seems to be higher than to European (“italienization”). In the case of high mistrust to national institutions people seemed to be more willing to leave some national sovereignty to the EU. Among the EU institutions, the small accession countries have received much support from the EU Commission, while the EU Council of Ministers is by the “new” Europe often considered as mainly the “big countries’ club”.

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From the outset, the question about EU membership was a “valens issue”, but nonetheless an integral part of the domestic policy game. The questions, which split the parties and the voters, mostly concerned whether the parties in government were sufficiently able to defend national interest when negotiating with the EU. If not, soft eurosceptical positions were put forward as it happened in the case of parties like the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in the Czech Republic, the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland (2005-2007) and the FIDESZ in Hungary (after the 2010 election).

Among the relevant political parties we did not find many which we can call “hard euro-sceptical”. Euroscepticism has mainly marked the right traditionalist parties, e.g. the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland with the Czech Republic, in particular the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) as an exception from that rule. Several (non-relevant) “soft eurosceptical” parties emerged and mostly on the extreme right and left, but the exact delimitation of hard and soft Euro-Skepticism and soft Euroscepticism and Eurorealism was no easy task. In all circumstances, a move is observed away from identity-based Euroenthusiasm of the first stage, according to the slogan about “back to Europe”, toward a more interest-based relationship to the EU in the later stages, in particular after EU accession, sometimes based on “cool cash thinking”. Euroscepticism we found in different forms. The cleavage-based and policy-based Euroscepticism are striking in the case of the Polish Peasant’s Party and Selfdefence (Samoobrona), while the identity- and policy and ideologically based Euroscepticism were mainly expressed by the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in the Czech Republic. Finally, the practice-related Euroscepticism signified the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HSDS) under Vladimir Meciar and to some extent the FIDESZ in Hungary.

By left-right standards, eurosceptical attitudes we can observe on both sides of the political spectrum, as regards the Czech Republic in the case of the ODS and the KSCM, but the exact boundary between Eurorealism and Euroscepticism is blurred. In the case of Poland and Hungary, strong Euroscepticism was mainly found on the traditionalist Right, in Poland the League of Polish Families (LPR) and in Hungary Istvan Czurka’s MIEP and Jobbik. However, outsider parties and protest parties do not necessarily have resistance to Brussels as their key policy. We are more likely dealing with voter protest against domestic politics and bad governance by the parties in government, which in Slovakia strengthened the electoral position of “Smer” up to the 2006 election, and in the Baltic countries paved the way for two new protest parties, New Era (Latvia) and Respublica (Estonia).
After the stage of extraordinary politics also European politics obtained more “ordinary” characteristics. Like domestic politics, the EU politics has become more interest-based and the elections more retrospective and determined by domestic factors. As regards EU politics, after EU accession the defence of national interests gained a high priority, but EU-parliamentary elections in June 2004 mainly reflected domestic politics. Thus, by most voters political leaders, national governments and political parties are mostly evaluated according to the quality of governance, not their role under the communist rule.

With accession, a new “malaise” spread out in Central and Eastern Europe as some newly installed governments turned out to be populist, unpredictable, at times maybe even endangering liberal democracy. The governments of Jaroslaw Kaczynski in Poland, Ferenc Gyurczany in Hungary and Robert Fico in Slovakia were “controversial” and criticized in the “old” West-Europe (Wittinger, 2008:18). After the election of Bronislaw Komorowski as president Poland overcame its cohabitation problem in the EU policy. The important question was “how the new members “learned their lesson”. The learning process seemed to be applicable to all (or most) new members, as well as those states that adhered to the EU before. Any new member country tried at first to “defend” its national interests.

Hence, new states applied mainly defensive, not offensive tools. The most visible of them has been the veto power. As time passed, states and state officials learned that vetoing may be counterproductive as the veto power constitutes “the nuclear weapon” of EU decision making. One should therefore avoid inflating a nuclear weapon because its use brings unexpected consequences (Kaczynski, 2008: 23). After membership, the “pressure of the Copenhagen criteria” disappeared and hard Euro-Skepticism (leaving the EU) was decreasing, but soft “practice-based” Euroscepticism (“shallow Europeanization”) and populism and use of “politics of history” became striking raising several new problems and barriers for further European integration and enlargement. Thus, the 2004 EU enlargement did in no ways make studies of Euroscepticism irrelevant, but the approaches to the topic have to be different as scepticism before membership was “artificially subdued” due to fear of remaining an “outsider” and then, after membership when the fear of “exclusion” dissipated, “anti-Europeanism” came into the open, for example in the shape of “politics of history” or shallow Europeanism. Non-membership is not on the agenda, more how to be a good “European”. Thus, compliance problems remained a problem, also after EU entry, although in a new form.
Finally, as the new EU member states moved to “ordinary politics”, also the EU politics to a large extent became similar to the EU politics of the “old Europe” and the "EU-15”, being mainly elite-driven, with a rather low electoral appeal and challenged not by hard Euroscepticism, rather by intergovernmentalism and populism.
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