# Contradiction between Ecology and International Law The case of the North Atlantic Mackerel

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# On International Fisheries Agreement, Entry Deterrence and Ecological Uncertainty

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



## International agreements


- United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (1973-1982)
  - 200 nautical mile EEZ
  - Problems with
    - Transboundary fish stocks
    - Straddling stocks
    - Highly migratory species
- UN Fish stocks agreement 1995
  - Cooperation among all parties in regional fisheries management organizations,
- North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC)
- Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO)
- International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT











# Two Explanations

- Temporary Change
   Because the stock is above 3.5 mil ton
- Permanent Change Climate change







#### Model


- ICES mackrel model run 50 years
- Two scenarios
  - Permanent change Always avaiable for Island
  - Temporary change Only avaiable to Island if stock > 3.5 mil ton
- Game setting
  - 1. Two players 1) Incumbent (EU, Norway, Faeroe) 2) Entrant (Island)
  - 2. Cooperative (Max total rent)
  - 3. Nash game with two fishing mortalities

















#### Conclusion

- Uncertainty regarding the migration pattern lead to the breakdown of an international fishery agreement
- More research into the ecology of the fish population?
- Fishery agreements, normally be based on a fixed sharing rule of e.g. a TAC
- Implicitly this assumes that the ecology of the fish population is static.





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- Inappropriate to base international agreements on a property that are highly variable with the implicit assumption that it is fixed.
- United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982
- UN Fish stocks agreement 1995
- Contradiction between ecology and international law
- Contradiction between game theory and International Law
- Ecology can not today point to the solution, but the solution should be found by a combination of ecology, economics and international law.





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