

CURRICULUM VITAE

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Study details	Date	School	Degree
	2000 – To date	University of Economy, Prague (VSE) Faculty of economics and public administration	Ph.D.
	1997 - 2000	University of Economy, Prague (VSE) Major specialization: Business Economy and Management Minor specialization: Philosophy Thesis: Ethics of liberalism	Master Degree
	1993 - 1997	University of Economy, Prague (VSE)	B. Sc. 1997
	1989 – 1993	High School	Graduate
Employment	1999 – 2000	Unilever (sales operation analyzer and key account assistant)	
	1999	Manager of three days movie festival in Prague	

Research (leader of research: **Doc. Ing. Petr Sauer, CSc.**):

Sustainable Development: a Concept Preserved by a Laissez-faire Economy or by an Expert Board? Praha 15.10.2002 – 16.10.2002. In: SAUER, Petr (ed.). Environmental Economics, Policy and International Environmental Relations: Focus on Visegrad Group Countries. Praha : Nakladatelství a vydavatelství litomyšlského semináře, 2002, s. 60–67. ISBN 80-902168-8-9.

Filosofické základy ekologie (*Philosophical frame of environmental policy and ecology*). In: SAUER, Petr. Environmentální ekonomie, politika a vnější vztahy České republiky. Praha : NVLS, 2001, s. 204–222. ISBN 80-902168-7-0.

SAUER, Petr. Společensko-vední východiska ekonomie a politiky životního prostředí (*Socio-scientist foundations of economics and policy of environment*). Prague: University of Economics, 2001. 158 pg. (Others: DVORAK, Antonin, LISA, Ales, BUDSKY, Simon, CAPEK, Ondrej, CHLEBIK, Robert, SOUKUP, Petr, KLUSAK, Jaroslav, MELICHAR, Jan).

SAUER, Petr. Politika a ekonomie ekologických problémů. (*Policy and Economy of Environmental Problems*), Prague: University of Economics, 2000. 141 s. (Others: BUDSKY, Simon, CAPEK, Ondrej, DVORAK, Antonin, CHLEBIK, Robert, LISA, Ales, SOUKUP, Petr).

Articles

Mohou být Lyotardovy „Rozepře“ inspirací nové metodologie ve společenských vědách? (*Is Lyotard's logo-centrism possible concept for new economic paradigms?*), E-LOGOS/2001 ISSN 1121-0442, <http://nb.vse.cz/kfil/elogos/science/Capek1-01.htm>

Morální filosofie Adama Smitha (*Moral philosophy of Adam Smith*), E-LOGOS/2001 ISSN 1121-0442, <http://nb.vse.cz/kfil/elogos/ethics/Capek2-01.htm>

Konzervativní kritika liberalismu (*Conservative critics of liberalism*) In. Sborník politologický IV, University of Economics, Prague, OECONOMICA, 2002 ,

A process of negotiation between producer of software and consumer, In: Opportunities of Change, ed. Krzysztof Piech, The Knowledge Institute, Warsaw School of Economics, 2002

Participation at international conferences (courses)

10. 3. – 14. 3. 2003, International Trade, Resources and Environment, Esbjerg, Denmark

Summer 2002, Murray Seminars and Mises University at Auburn USA

22. 5. – 25. 5. 2002 Evaluation of Sustainability Euroconference Series

20. 3. – 23. 3. 2002 V4 Seminars Budapest on EU and Economics Policy

November 2001 Opportunities of Change, Warsaw

Project of PhD. Thesis: Liberalism, Adam Smith's Moral Sentiments and phenomenology

In an important part of current literature, a reader can find assumptions that economics is insufficient as the science of human behavior. The authors take for granted that morality is significantly absent in economics. On the contrary, I claim that modern economics started as the specific concept of a moral philosophy. In my opinion, the study of the moral philosophy could offer a better understanding for ambitions to 'economize' the human being. The reason is not that economics is "immoral", but the morality behind the theories has been more or less forgotten. Owing to this misconception, many corrective theories have been added in order to make economics more realistic or more predictive (the Charles Taylor's theory of authenticity, an additional moral dimension to economics, additional solidarity, class consciousness...)

I will focus on the *Scottish Enlightenment* and the '*sentimentalist*' school, mainly in the period pertaining to Adam Smith, but I want to present the philosophy of Smith's and Hume's forerunners too (mainly Anthony Ashley Cooper Third Earl of Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson). These authors reacted to major changes in society accompanied by many scandals, to clashing regional progress, and to the endeavor of the centralization of government powers. I want to describe their rejection of rationalistic concepts developed by Descartes, Hobbes etc.

I want to show that only the oversight of the integral part of Smith's oeuvre (mainly his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*) or the partial misunderstanding of aprioristic theories can make this prejudice possible. The insufficiency of these attitudes has been admitted by economists of the Chicago school, like James Buchanan, who explicitly cited Adam Smith in his works about ethics. I will try to defend a claim that Smith was a liberal thinker, but the absence of coherence of his oeuvre has led to misapprehensions. Smith's undervaluation has been weighty, mainly due to his theory of moral sentiments that covers specific philosophical trends (*Zeitgeist*) of his time. **I would like to present the trends as the coherent system of thought. I will compare Smith's method with Austrian apriorism and empiricism in second part of my discussion.**

In the second part, I want to define and describe the distinction between 'rationalistic' **A - concepts** and the 'Adam Smith's concept' (**B-concept**). An a-priori formalization exists for all **A-concepts**. Among others, Marshall's system of mutual equilibrium could be added in the group of A-concepts, but it is not included in my discussion. The Kantian aprioristic theories, the methodology of Austrian School (Hayek, Mises) are more interesting to me in the field of the methodology of economics. Jeremy Bentham used a different method – theories of pleasure and pain and *felicific calculus*.

The B-concept is similar to the feeling-oriented position presented on the beginning. It highlights the unreplaceable importance of spontaneous human behavior with a fundamental determinateness as a "human nature". The substance of "human nature" is accessible by rational analysis only a-posteriori. For Smith's method, the name *conjectural history* is used. The way in which this concept applies to modern capitalist society (*spiritus movens* inside the theory) can be described by these ways: The human nature has inborn proneness for... (exchange, division of labor, etc.) According to contemporary thinker Roger Scruton, the origin of morality is that a man has an inborn proneness to ignore his selfish interest and he prefers to see an impartial situation. If not, we must choose a rational type of morality, but knowledge about limits of reason would lead to skepticism. According to Adam Smith, everybody wants to better his life *from the cradle to the grave* and this process is interpersonally comprehensible. Grace to hidden "harmony" which is inserted inside *human nature* by

the *Author of the world*. Adam Smith assumed that a correct behavior between people produce pleasure emerging from hidden harmony. This happiness is an aesthetic feeling and it is inaccessible through human reason, because man's consciousness is limited by bodily passions (as determinateness of human nature). It is close to Hutcheson's understanding. We can ex-post perceive Divine intention. (Hegel's metaphor of the *Minerva's owl*, is very much influenced by Smith's works).

I assume that the difference between A and B is fundamental for economic thought, but the understandable explanation will be very difficult. My explanation in this chapter is only first step, a future remake of the distinctions would be possible **One important aim of my work will be making a perfect distinction between A and B concepts not only at level of description, but on the level of methodology too.**

The B-concept makes the direct application of the methods of exact science ("hard science") to economics impossible. It is very difficult to find any unique principles of human motivation. A man's correct understanding of the world is possible only in regard to his main principles (as to the usefulness of the division of labor), but never at the level of all individual decisions. These decisions must be established by a specific, experienced mental operation. The Smithean *Natural Jurisprudence* is not guided by an independent-minded nature, but by the *impartial spectator*. The *impartial spectator* is a name for specific mental "measure of everyone's behavior" based on inborn bodily passions, shared cultural conditions, and individual experience. It is not something like an "idea of the soul" in Aristotelian sense. We cannot "discover" good rules by pure rationality, but we have to learn *technique*, or *practice* of judgment.

Adam Smith's philosophy can be compared with Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl rejected the classic understanding of science, but he focused on an a-priori pre-scientific form of actions. This form used pre-conceptual research. Wightam interpreted Smith's works as the precursor of phenomenology: "*A more cogent claim can be put forward for his application to human experience in general of the philosophical method more rigorously grounded by Edmund Husserl under the name 'transcendental phenomenology'. Already in the Treatise had made a similar effort.*"

I want to show that the Smith assumption could be a basis for a phenomenological understanding of morality. Barry Smith compares Smith and Hume with Husserl, and with Kirzner's concept of entrepreneurship decision making. I will also consider the contributions of Adolf Reinach (1883 – 1917) and Max Scheler (1874-1928), who added ethics, value theory, religion, and philosophical anthropology. **The reinterpretation of Smith's works as the daybreak of future phenomenological inquiries will be a very important point in my thesis.**

For that reasons I am convinced that Adam Smith is a relevant author for current discourse in social sciences. He offers a critical valuation of the (neo) Kantian forms of apriorism. There is a problem of scales in the A-concepts. Adam Smith subordinates the scale of a specific form of social institution to "the circles of sympathy with limited number of individuals (family, community, state, culture...). The collaboration inside these social formations is based on specific "principles" (but the basis – the human nature with the sentiments – stays the same in any case). Compared with Smith, the A-concepts do not have any restriction against infinite addition of quantities: There is no indifference when we assume ten, hundred or million individuals in these theories. Due to indifference, the A-concepts could abandon a "human scale": see debates on the boundaries of Rothbard's process of primary appropriation or Gary Becker's time preferences based on the length of *whole*

human life. Smith's theory is similar to the concept of life-world (*Lebenswelt*) developed by Edmund Husserl and his followers: French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) and Czech phenomenologist Jan Patočka (1907 – 1977).

Smith used very vivid language with a lot of examples. I showed that the systematic basis of his works is relatively hidden, incomplete, and weak. A reader could sometimes feel that Smith totally abandons rationality and he sails into postmodern think-trash. But important passages (process of correct judgment driven by the impartial spectator, for example) provide a 'return back to reason', supported by enormous intellectual gains. Some "Smithean" attitudes can be found in unexpected places in liberal thought, like in Mises's *Human Action*:
"As long as a man lives, he cannot help obeying the cardinal impulse, the élan vital. ... In every living being there works an ineradicable and nonanalyzable Id. This Id is the impulsion of all impulses, the force that drives man into life and action, the original and ineradicable craving for a fuller and happier existence"