
Game Theory – Economics and Mathematics

An international workshop in honor of Bezalel Peleg

Program

All regular sessions take place in room O96

Friday Nov. 15th

- 9:00-9:15 Arrival
- 9:15-9:30 Welcome by the Dean
- 9:30-11:30 *Session 1*
- Herbert Hamers (Tilburg University) Price of anarchy in sequencing situations and the impossibility to coordinate
- Ezra Einy (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev) Tullock contests with asymmetric information
- Jens Leth Hougaard (University of Copenhagen) Minimum cost connection networks: truth-telling and implementation
- 11:30-11:45 Coffee break
- 11:45-12:45 *Session 2*
- Bezalel Peleg (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
- 12:45-13:45 Lunch
- 13:45-15:45 *Session 3*
- Hans Peters (Maastricht University) Ex post consistent representation of effectivity functions
- Joseph Abdou (University Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne) A stability index for effectivity structures and game form
- Hans Keiding (University of Copenhagen) Homology and effectivity functions
- 15:45-16:00 Coffee break
- 16:00-17:35 *Session 4*
- Theo Driessen (University of Twente) An axiomatization of the kernel for TU games through reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance
- Pedro Calleja (University of Barcelona) Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games
- Anna Khmelnitskaya (Saint-Petersburg State University) The prenucleolus and the prekernel for games with communication structures
- 17:45-18:30 *Special session in O77*
- Shmuel Zamir (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) and a small reception
- 19:30 Dinner in the city of Odense

Saturday 16th

- 9:15-10:55 *Session 5*
- Guni Orshan (The Open University of Israel) The bilateral consistent prekernel for games and economic environments - Part 1: Balanced NTU games
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	José Zarzuelo (University of the Basque Country) The bilateral consistent prekernel for games and economic environments - Part 2: Exchange economies
	Michel Grabisch (University Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne) The core of games on restricted cooperation
10:55-11:10	Coffee break
11:10-13:10	<i>Session 6</i>
	Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Pablo de Olavide University) Fair Allocation of Disputed Properties
	Agnieszka Rusinowska (University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes
	Karol Szwagrzak (University of Southern Denmark) Strategy-proof package assignment
13:10-14:00	Lunch and goodbye
