Preaching Democracy

by

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Abstract

This paper presents evidence that the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) exerted a critical influence on the evolution of democracy worldwide, a view first advanced in the seminal work of Huntington (1991). We gather qualitative case-study evidence on how the Catholic Church influenced the post-Conciliar democratization process in different national contexts. We also adopt a difference-in-difference estimation strategy to show that Vatican II strongly predicts different measures of democracy. Taken together, the evidence substantiates Huntington's dictum that the third wave of democratization was a Catholic wave.

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> "I am not the evangelizer of democracy; I am the evangelizer of the Gospel. To the Gospel message, of course, belong all the problems of human rights; and, if democracy means human rights, it also belongs to the message of the Church." Spoken by Pope John Paul II in Chile, 1987 (cited in Huntington 1991, p. 84).

1. Introduction

In his seminal 1991 book, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Samuel Huntington ponders what changes in plausible independent variables most likely in the 1960s and 1970s produced the dependent variable 'democratizing regime changes' in the 1970s and 1980s.[1] One of the important changes that Huntington emphasized was the striking shift in doctrines and activities of the Catholic Church, manifested in the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) and the subsequent changes in national churches from defenders of *status quo* to proponents of social, economic and political reform.[2] In this paper we explore the role of this factor: the Second Vatican Council.[3]

Scholars have identified the Second Vatican Council (or simply Vatican II) as a watershed moment in Catholicism (Gonzáles 2010; Mockabee 2010; Wilde 2007; Philpott 2001; Huntington 1991; Mainwaring 1986; Payne 1984), which is not unlike the Protestant Reformation.[4] According to Gonzáles (2010), Vatican II set in motion a process that could not be stopped; Wilde (2007) asserts that Vatican II represents the most significant example of institutionalized religious change since the Protestant Reformation; and Payne (1984) calls it the most sweeping reform in Catholic history since the Counter-Reformation.

Prior to Vatican II the Church made uncompromising secular demands on its followers.[5] Under the papacy of Pius XII (1939-58), for example, where the Church maintained close ties to Mussolini and responded inconsistently to Nazism,[6] voters were left in no doubt as to the spiritual indecorum

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[1] Democracy, according to Huntington (1991), is when the "most powerful decision makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote" (p. 7).

[2] Anderson (2007, p. 387) notes that "what Huntington offered was a revised Protestant ethic argument that focused on Western Christianity rather than Protestantism as a positive force for democratization." Huntington also proposed other changes: the deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian regimes in a world where democratic values were widely accepted; the unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s, which raised living standards, increased education and greatly expanded the urban middle class; changes in policies of external actors, such as the European Community, the US and the USSR; and the demonstration effect of democratic transitions earlier in the third wave.

[3] See also Hebir (1990) for an early post-Cold War account of the Church's role in democratization.

[4] Vatican II is also known as the Catholic *aggiornamento*, which etymologically means "bringing up to date". Interestingly, sociologists of religion work with three classifications of Catholics: pre-Vatican II, Vatican II and post-Vatican II (Mockabee 2010). Pre-Vatican II Catholics are born before 1941, were raised in the "old Church" and tend to have traditional views. Vatican II Catholics were born between 1941 and 1960, and so they have experienced both the "old Church" and the sweeping changes within the Church induced by Vatican II. Post-Vatican II Catholics were born after 1960 and thus grew up in the post-Conciliar era. This serves to underscore that Vatican II brought significant changes.

[5] With respect to the US, Greeley (2004, p. 71) puts it like this: "Before 1965 the model was clear and precise: If you were a Catholic (in this country at any rate), you accepted what the Church said on everything, large or small, important or unimportant. When Rome decided on a difficult matter, your choice was simple. Either you went along, perhaps reluctantly, and stayed in the Church, or you dissented and, again perhaps reluctantly, decamped from the Church."

[6] The high point of relations between the Church and the Fascist Italian state was in 1929, when Mussolini recognized Vatican City as a sovereign state. It was only after Fascists attempted to suppress the Church that the institution

of voting against Catholic political parties.[7] Not until 1967, two years into the post-Conciliar era and nine years after Pope Pius XII had passed away, did a Dutch bishop venture to speak in public that Catholics might vote for a non-Catholic without risking excommunication.[8] In his *magnum opus* on the European post-war history, Judt (2010) argues that this change was a direct result of Vatican II. Philpott (2001) adds that virtually every Catholic effort to promote democracy gained vigour and explicitness in the aftermath of Vatican II.[9]

Prior to Vatican II the Church had been intimately involved with governments around the world. Several countries had even made Catholicism their national religion, which provided the Church with unique advantages. Vatican II weakened the power of the Church in several of these countries, it removed earlier rationalizations for war and colonization based on Catholic supremacy, and it restored old teachings that only "free" individuals can discover spiritual truth. Indeed, the recognition by the Church of the absolute right of every individual to religious freedom meant that the Church gave up its compulsory character and acknowledged the fundamental principle of separation of church and state (Wilde 2007). Moreover, the Church's espousal of the modern human rights discourse allowed it to play a vital role in the democratization of the Catholic world (Casanova 2012; Fleet and Smith 1997; Weigel 1992; Huntington 1991; Mainwaring 1986; Payne 1984).

There is plenty of qualitative evidence that the post-Vatican II Church played important roles in various national democratization processes. In Brazil the Church vitally empowered civil society through Catholic grassroots organizations, through Church leaders' denunciations of the repression, and through calls for a more democratic order (Mainwaring 1986); in Chile the Church kept its compatriots informed about the extent of human rights violations, and it openly challenged the regime when no one else could (Fleet and Smith 1997); in Poland the Catholic Church was instrumental in overthrowing communism through *inter alia* its vigorous moral and psychological support of the opposition movement (Weigel 1992); in Spain the Church played a crucial role in the demise of authoritarianism, not least by helping the country reach a constitutional compromise on Church-state relations that would avoid a replay of the Spanish civil war (Linz 1991; Payne 1984;

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began to criticize Hitler and Mussolini. In Spain, partly because the Church had been the victim of virulent anticlericalism during the Second Republic and the civil war, and partly because Franco did not try to suppress the Church, bishops insisted in a pastoral letter that all Catholics should support Franco. Relations between the Church and Franco remained warm until the early 1960s (Mainwaring 1986).

[7] In Brazil the Church set up an electoral league to tell Catholics how to vote (Mainwaring 1986). In Chile, however, after the 1938 election Church leaders "had unanimously reaffirmed the freedom of Catholics to join any party that respected Church values and interests" (Fleet and Smith 1997, p. 43).

[8] The extreme intransigence of the Church makes more sense than immediately meets the eye. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Catholic Church had organized itself to battle the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the *Kulturkampf* of Bismarck's Germany, etc. The Church categorically resisted the modern world; it excommunicated, silenced or denounced any of its members, who voiced the slightest dissent. Under constant attack from liberals, secularists, evolutionists, etc., the Church worked on the hard-headed assumption that change (i.e., reform) was treason (Greeley 2005; Philpott 2004).

[9] Since the reaffirmation of Vatican authority over national churches in the nineteenth century, Rome has been able set the parameters of permissible Church developments. The Vatican can encourage, discourage, or prohibit different theologies and pastoral practices. The Church helps shape political changes; it forms the consciousness of the various social classes, it musters political forces to act, and it enters coalitions with political elites or criticizes them (Mainwaring 1986).

Gunther and Blough 1981).

Consequently, it is surprising that the extant quantitative literature on the determinants of democracy has paid scant attention to Vatican II in particular and religion more generally.[10] Barro (1999), whose estimation sample marginally predates Vatican II, does not mention the Council at all. He merely notes that religious affiliation has been stressed as an important determinant of democracy, but that the theory of the interplay between religion and democracy is less developed than other aspects of the theory of democracy. Moreover, he lumps Catholicism and Eastern Orthodox Christianity into one category and then adds various (time-invariant) religious dummies to his specification. Acemoglu et al. (2008, footnote 7) note that Huntington (2001) has hypothesized that "religion might have an important effect on economic and political development". However, there is no mention of Vatican II in their paper. Murtin and Wacziarg (2014), who analyze a sample going back to 1870, also do not mention Vatican II. They include country fixed effects, which they note account for "time-invariant factors such as religion and culture" (p. 174). Gleditsch and Ward (2006) do actually mention Vatican II, but only in a few lines in a footnote. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, p. 78), in a work on democratization theory, briefly mention "the change in the attitude of the Catholic Church" as a factor highlighted by Huntington. This neglect of Vatican II in the extant literature is unfortunate, as the Council offers a unique opportunity to study a potentially important *time-varying impact* of religion on democratization. The present paper is, to our knowledge, the first paper to quantitatively explore Vatican II's effect on democracy in a long panel of countries.[11]

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some background on Vatican II and its impact on democracy, whereas Section 3 presents qualitative evidence on this link from different national contexts. Section 4 contains the quantitative analysis. Section 5 concludes.

2. Vatican II and democracy

Present-day progressives are likely cognizant of nineteenth-century papal admonitions of religious liberty as well as twentieth-century accords between the Church and various fascist states. The Church's hostility toward religious liberty derived from hostility toward the sovereign state *per se* (Philpott 2004).[12] Pope Innocent declared the Peace of Westphalia "null, void, invalid, iniquitous,

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[10] This neglect may (partly) stem from the widespread belief in the social sciences that religion and religious organizations would fade from social life. However, ignoring religion means overlooking a potentially important variable in explaining politics (Gill 2001).

[11] The only quantitative evidence that we are aware of which suggests a time-varying impact of religion on democratization is Gill (1998), who provides evidence that Vatican II and the Latin American Bishops Conference in 1968 in Medellin (itself inspired by Vatican II) contributed to a more "progressive mindset" within the Latin American Catholic Church. This new mindset translated into "opposition to dictatorial rule" (Gill 1998, p. 104).

[12] In the 1860s Pope Pius IX rejected outright the possible separation of church and state. Moreover, the Roman Pontiff termed progress, liberalism and modern civilization "the principal errors of our time" (cited in Fleet and Smith 1997, p. 1).

unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane, empty of meaning and effect for all time."[13] The Church's vision of society was a unity rooted in the Christian faith: the so-called *Respublica Christiania*. Westphalia substituted segmentation for unity; it envisioned a system of polities defined by territory, each being governed by a single sovereign authority. As the sovereign, which was accountable to no moral order, could set the terms of religious practice throughout its territory, the Church found this system reprehensible. When the sovereign upheld the Church's authority in its territory (as in Spain, Portugal and their offshoots), the Church tended to let its guards drop.

As the notions of popular suffrage and the rights of man dawned in the eighteenth century, the Church perceived them as threats and upheld its longstanding doctrine that secular authorities should promote the Church's prerogatives and offer dissidents no rights (Philpott 2004). However, beginning in the 1930s Catholic intellectuals (inspired by the US constitutional guarantee of religious freedom) began to offer moral arguments for religious freedom.[14] While these Catholic thinkers denounced the sovereign state, they also provided arguments (rooted in Catholic tradition) in favour of democracy and human rights. Religious freedom, on the other hand, was not seen as an article of faith (i.e., theological truth), but only as an article of peace (i.e., morally laudable). However, in an institution as hierarchical as the Roman Catholic Church far-reaching new ideas or theologies are stillborn without some sort of endorsement from above (Mainwaring 1986). Change can be initiated from below, but it will only take hold when endorsed from above. This endorsement came with the completely unexpected Second Vatican Council.

More concretely, on 25 January 1959 the Catholic Church and the world at large were taken by surprise as Pope John XXIII, less than three months after his election, called "a general Council for the Universal Church".[15] The state of bewilderment even extended to the most conspicuous bishops (Wilde 2007). Most observers, bishops included, expected little from the Council, as preparations were strictly controlled by the eminently conservative Roman Curia.[16] Nevertheless, by the time the first session of the Council was completed, the Curia's role in the Council had been considerably curtailed and its hold on power significantly weakened. According to Wilde (2007), this development could not have been (and in fact was not) predicted when the Council opened.[17] What happened was that the preparatory commissions merely reiterated Church doctrine in preparatory documents.

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[13] Cited in Philpott (2004, p. 33).

[14] The writings of the American Jesuit John Courtney Murray were most influential in this regard.

[15] Vatican II was by and large a European event, dominated by bishops and theologians from Europe, and principally aimed at the European Catholic Church. Furthermore, Pope John XXIII (1881-1963) probably had no clear vision of where the Council would lead, but in his opening address he accepted that a change in mentalities, ways of thinking, and prejudices would be part of the renewal (Anderson 2009). Somewhat surprisingly, the Council actually led to more fundamental changes in many Latin American countries than in Europe (Mainwaring 1986).

[16] The Curia was the dominant mode of power in the pre-Conciliar Church, as it determined which doctrines were legitimate, who had access to which resources, and as it adjudicated in conflicts (Wilde 2007). As for Vatican II preparations, they took more than three years.

[17] The Council, which opened on 11 October 1962, was a massive event. The bishops who attended came from 116 countries, and many brought with them a secretary. To this we should add others who came to Rome on business related to the Council, the hundred observers from other churches, and the thousand journalists which had received a press card. O'Malley (2006) estimates that 10,000 people were in Rome on any given day during the three years the Council was open for council-related business.

When progressive bishops received these documents, they would find their ideas disapproved, suppressed and sometimes downright ignored. In an unruly first few weeks of the Council, progressive bishops somehow succeeded (using a combination of protest events and hard-won votes) in building an organizational structure, which would marginalize the role of the Curia in the Council going forward.[18]

The principal formative influence on the life of the Roman Catholic Church prior to the Second Vatican Council was the Council of Trent (1545-63). The First Vatican Council (1869-70), as it were, more or less continued the policies and attitudes set at Trent,[19] which meant that the Church had adopted a comprehensive and dogmatic view of its duties as the moral upholder of its congregation (Encyclopedia of Religion 2005a). The deliberations of Vatican II completely changed this state of affairs. The Church would no longer be frightened by change; it would no longer be an opponent of liberal democracy, mixed economies, modern science, rational thought, and even secular politics (Judt 2010; Mainwaring 1986). The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (*Gaudium et Spes*), for example, set a tone that was drastically different from nineteenth century Catholic thinking (Gonzáles 2010).[20] While insisting on principles of faith and morality, "the document shows genuine openness to the positive aspects of modernity, and deals creatively with family life, economic and social issues, politics, technology and science, the significance and diversity of human cultures, and so forth" (Gonzáles 2010, p. 446). With respect to politics, the document focused on rights and civil liberties as means of achieving the "common good". However, this traditional perception was reshaped in ways that tended to focus on democracy as likely the best means of governance for achieving this end (Anderson 2009).[21] The Vatican II document on the Church (*Lumen Gentium*) invited to an interfaith dialogue; it somewhat confusingly proclaimed that truth subsisted in the Catholic Church, but that the faithful were invited to discover the truth in other religions (Encyclopedia of Religion 2005b). With respect to Judaism, the Council explicitly rejected prejudice against Jews, and it recognized the unique bond between the Catholic faith and that of Israel (Gonzáles 2010).

Consequently, Vatican II represented a profound reorientation of the Church (Gonzáles 2010; Judt 2010; Anderson 2009; Wilde 2007; O'Malley 2006; Philpott 2004; Huntington 1991; Mainwaring 1986). Prior to Vatican II, for example, the proclamations of the Church derived from "objective truths" expressed in ahistorical language. In contrast, the sixteen Vatican II documents are marked by a sense of *historicity* (Encyclopedia 2005b). Likewise, prior to Vatican II *authority* in the church was

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[18] On the first day of the Council the French Cardinal Achille Liénart played a crucial part in obstructing the Curia's domination of the Council (see Wilde 2007, Ch. 1, for an account of events).

[19] It is true that the First Vatican Council had expanded to some extent the decisions made at Trent, specifically with respect to its definition of the universal primacy and infallibility of the pope. It did not, however, address the altered circumstances resulting from industrialization and modernization more generally (Encyclopedia of Religion 2005a).

[20] In total, there are 16 Vatican II documents: four constitutions, three declarations, and nine decrees. All documents are available online at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/index.htm. *Gaudium et Spes* is one of the four constitutions.

[21] *Gaudium et Spes* was also the charter for the Christian-Marxist dialogue of the 1960s, which took place at the most senior levels (Weigel 1992).

exercised in a hierarchical manner. In Vatican II documents, collegiality (i.e., sharing of authority by bishops) and subsidiarity (i.e., decisions should be made at the lowest level of authority) became trademarks of authentic authority (Encyclopedia 2005b). And while neither the consequences of historicity for morality and doctrine nor the more inclusive understanding of the exercise of authority have run a smooth course since Vatican II, nothing which has come about ever since is unaffected by these two characteristics.

With respect to historicity, Vatican II adopted the understanding that humans are shaped by the particular conditions of their lives. These conditions shape meanings and values, which grows into particular cultures. Because of their particularity, cultures cannot claim complete universality of their values. Cultures are not static; they change and develop. Humans can certainly know truth, but they can never fully come to possess it. This understanding of human history and culture strongly influenced both the documents of Vatican II as well as the theology to which these documents eventually gave rise. In particular, Vatican II instigated a new era in Catholic biblical studies, which acknowledged the historicity of sacred texts (Encyclopedia of Religion 2005b).[22] Moreover, if Jesus was a "historically conditioned person", so were his life choices, his teachings, and even the founding of the Church itself. Once adopted, historicity opens up all dogmas of faith to reinterpretation. With respect to authority, *Lumen Gentium* expounds that bishops receive their authority from Christ (as opposed to receiving it from the pope) and that the universal church results from the union of local churches.[23]

Vatican II also had significant implications for liturgy. Most conspicuous are the celebration of Mass in the vernacular, the change from the celebrant facing front to the altar to facing front to the congregation, acceptance of the Sacred Host in one's hand rather than on one's tongue, receiving the consecrated wine, and the integration of the congregation into the ritual. These changes signalled a new ecclesiology, which calls attention to the spiritual union that exists among the members of the church and the fact that the priest only leads the congregation, as opposed to being a mediator between God and congregation (Encyclopedia of Religion 2005b).[24]

Pre-eminent in the history of Vatican II, however, is the Declaration of Religious Liberty (*Dignitatis Humanae*). It is widely perceived as unparalleled in Catholic history (Wilde 2007), and it had a decisive impact on the post-Conciliar Church's approach to politics (Weigel 1992). The

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[22] This had profound implications for extant doctrine. The doctrine of original sin, for example, had to be rethought, as it was based on a literal understanding of Scripture.

[23] While bishops are not to exercise their authority without the consent of the pope, the pope is under no obligation to consult the bishops. As could be expected, this has led to some ambiguity (Encyclopedia of Religion 2005b). Subsidiarity is fraught with similar ambiguities. The Council had in mind a new model of Church leadership, but the murkiness resulting from the document's inconsistent models of authority led to a crisis of papal authority. The 1968 encyclical of Paul VI, *Humanae Vitae*, reaffirmed the prohibition of artificial birth control despite the fact that the preponderance of members of a panel of experts (scientists, theologians, clergy and laity) constituted by him recommended against this. Yet before Vatican II such dissent from the teachings of a pope was nearly unthinkable.

[24] The architecture that characterized most churches constructed in the aftermath of the Council also reflected these ecclesiological changes.

Declaration most clearly states that the foremost system of government is one which permits people to worship as they please. It challenged the view that "error has no right" (O'Collins 2012); and it suggested that while natural law required all states to protect the rights of Catholics where they were a minority, the same obligation was beholden on Catholic states *vis-à-vis* other minorities (Anderson 2009). It taught "that within every human person was a *sanctum sanctorum*, a holy of holies, into which the coercive power of the state could not thread" (Weigel 1992, p. 72). As such, the Declaration was a profound challenge to authoritarianism far and wide (Weigel 1992).

The first half of the Declaration of Religious Liberty appeals to reason, basically arguing that true faith is discovered through free communication, teaching, expression, dialogue and assent; this, in turn, necessitates psychological freedom as well as freedom from coercion. Importantly, it laid the basis for religious activists to get involved in wider campaigns for human rights: to defend those who were abused by the powerful regardless of religious observance. The second half is rooted in revelation, stating that coercion in faith is the antithesis to the way of Christ. As many critics noted, this meant accepting that the constitutional democratic state would almost inescapably be a secular state, which (by definition) is neutral on matters of a religious nature (Anderson 2009; Weigel 1992). Officially, however, the Vatican maintained that it was not sanctioning a theory of liberal democracy; rather, it was merely forbidding coercive restriction of the pursuit of truth (Philpott 2004); see also the introductory quote from a 1987 speech by Pope John Paul II.[25]

3. Qualitative evidence

The secular implications of this sea change in official Church thinking were likely enormous. Huntington (1991) observes that the third wave of democratization was overwhelmingly a Catholic wave; and he posits that the striking shift in doctrine and activities of the Catholic Church, manifested in the Second Vatican council, played a crucial role in timing and occurrence of the third-wave transitions to democracy. John Paul II "seemed to have a way of showing up in full pontifical majesty at critical points in democratization process: Poland, June 1979, June 1983, and June 1987; Brazil, June-July 1980; the Philippines, February 1981; Argentina, June 1982; Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti, March 1983; Korea, May 1984; Chile, April 1987; Paraguay, May 1988" notes Huntington (1991, p. 83).[26] The new teachings propagated through the Church via the transnational ligatures of authority, which is a global network of bishops united around the pope (Philpott 2001). Practically every Catholic effort to support and promote democracy gained strength and explicitness once the Vatican had pronounced it officially.

In this section we review some of the qualitative evidence on the role of the post-Conciliar

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[25] According to John Paul II democracy should not be idolized. It "is a 'system' and as such is a means to an end. Its 'moral' value is not automatic, but depends on conformity to the moral law to which it, like any other form of human behavior, must be subject" (cited in Kmiec 1996, p. 69).

[26] After the end of the Cold War he also carefully preached the virtues of liberal democracy in his encyclical *Centesimus Annus*.

Catholic Church in democratization.[27]

<u>**Brazil**</u>

Brazil experienced a military coup on March 31, 1964, while Vatican II was still in progress. In his fascinating study of the role of the Catholic Church in Brazilian politics during the period 1916-85, Mainwaring (1986) shows that the Brazilian Church initially welcomed (at least partly) what had taken place. The National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) issued a statement on June 2, 1964, which gave thanks for the coup: "the armed forces arrived in time and prevented the implementation of a Bolshevik regime in our country" (cited in Mainwaring 1986, p. 80). On May 6, 1973, however, twenty three Bishops signed the two most radical episcopal documents ever issued at the time, both of which denounced the military for systematic violations of human rights and extensive social marginalization.[28] The documents asserted that the regime's actions defied all major principles of the Church's social doctrine and its emphasis on human dignity.

What was behind this dramatic reversal of Church thinking? Part of it was encouraged by Rome, and thus "in good part due to Vatican II's influence" (Philpott 2007, p. 511), as well as the Latin American Bishops Conference (CELAM), itself inspired by Vatican II.[29] Or in the words of José Maria Pires, an archbishop and a prominent church leader, "Vatican II was the motor of this change" (cited in Mainwaring 1986, p. 44).

In the decade leading up to the reintroduction of democracy (which was in March 1985) the Brazilian Church assumed importance in international Catholicism and became the most progressive Church in the world.[30] During this period the bishops, as a collective body, reached an understanding of the mission of the Church which stood in sharp contrast to models of the Church that were dominant earlier. It now accepted secularization and renounced ecclesial efforts to control society. The CNBB issued an important document in 1976 (*Pastoral Communication to the People of God*), which marked a new and more incisive phase of criticism of authoritarianism. From now on the Church insisted on the importance of including everyone in the sharing of benefits of developments, and it was highly critical of inequality and marginalization of peasants and small-scale farmers. The

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[27] Statistical analysis pertains to dataset observation; i.e., observations that are causally comparable with one another, for which reason they may be treated as rows in a matrix. By contrast, a causal-process observation (CPO) assists causal assessment, but, unlike dataset observations, one CPO is not comparable with another. While each observation is different from the next, in the sense of not being causally comparable, each is at the same relevant to the causal argument. CPOs are therefore qualitative in nature (Gerring 2012). CPOs are especially valuable when attempting to reach causal inferences about a single - even highly singular - event, as befits Vatican II. Specifically, they complement standard econometric research designs. Woodberry (2012), Haggard and Kaufmann (2012), and Dunning (2012) also argue that statistical analyses need to be supplemented by CPOs. Teorell (2010) also maintain the view that qualitative and quantitative approaches are complementary and should be combined to maximize the overall quality of inference. Consequently, we trust these arguments justify the length of Section 3 in the main text.

[28] The treatment of the Amazon population was especially horrendous.

[29] The 1968 Medellín gathering of CELAM was the watershed of the Latin American Church. It began as an attempt, enthused by Vatican II, to grasp the Church's role in a changing Latin America, yet it ended reaching conclusions that went well beyond those of Vatican II (Mainwaring 1986).

[30] As documented at various junctures in Mainwaring (1986), the Church had a broad view of democracy; it focused not just on political freedoms but also on the distributional issues (with a particular focus on the poorest).

bishops repeatedly stressed democracy, human rights and participation as ideals that a fair political system must realize. In short, the bishops' vision of the good society would require a deep reorganization of the current political order.

Tensions between the Church and the state remained at a high point during 1974-1978, as elements within the military came to regard the Church as one of the nation's main enemies. Priests were at the receiving end of regime brutality; some were even murdered. After 1978, when the country saw some political liberalization, Church-state relations gradually improved.[31] However, while extoling advances in the human rights situation in Brazil, the Church emphasized the importance of a more open, participatory and egalitarian political system. In a 1981 document (*Christian Reflection on the Political Situation*) the CNBB proclaimed that democracy must include the masses in the political process. According to Mainwaring (1986) the Church thus played a most important role in the transition to democracy by empowering civil society; it did so through grass-roots Catholic organizations, through bishops' denunciations of the regime and through calls for a more democratic order.

Chile

In Chile, the bishops were initially divided toward Pinochet's 1973 coup.[32] During the first three years of military rule bishops sidestepped any open confrontation with the new government, as many of them believed it was more productive to express concerns directly to military commanders (Fleet and Smith 1997). The bishops' first criticism came in 1974 in a letter (*Reconciliation in Chile*) in which they lamented the "climate of insecurity and fear" and expressed concerns over "interrogations which include physical or moral constraints", but, at the same time, also affirmed their trust in the "good intensions" and "good will" of the government (Fleet and Smith 1997, p. 60). As rumours and evidence of human rights abuses and repression became rife, another Church document (*Gospel and Peace*) was circulated in 1975. The document again combined a critique of human rights violations with expression of gratitude to the military for "freeing" the country "from a Marxist dictatorship which appeared inevitable and would have been irreversible" (Fleet and Smith 1997, p. 61).

There were notable exceptions such as Cardinal Silva Henríquez of Santiago. He was an outspoken critic of the military cum political activist from the very beginning, for which reason the junta tried to persuade the Vatican to "reassign" him to other duties (Fleet and Smith 1997, p. 62). As of 1976, however, when it became clear that the military would not surrender power, a more unified Chilean Church fought vigorously to expose the human rights violations of the Pinochet junta.[33] In fact, the Church's "ability to keep the country reliably informed of the extent of human rights

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[31] While liberalization eased tensions between the Church and the state at the national level, in the rural areas the Church allied itself with the peasantry; and where the latter continued to be a victim of ongoing repression, grave conflict prevailed (Mainwaring 1986).

[32] The Church top was supportive of civilian rule to the end, but many bishops actually welcomed the coup of September 1973 (Fleet and Smith 1997).

[33] A triggering factor was the public mistreatment of three bishops in 1976.

violations, and to publicly challenge the government when no one else could do so, would be its most important contribution to the restoration of democracy" (Fleet and Smith 1997, p. 66). According to Fleet and Smith (1997, p. 73) the Chilean experience supports the hypothesis of the ability of "post-Vatican II Catholicism to act as a political protagonist".

The Chilean transition to democracy formally began with Pinochet's defeat in a 1988 plebiscite, but it would arguably be more correct to say that it dates back to the early 1980s. Austere economic conditions fuelled massive protests, which revitalized the opposition. This weakened the regime and set the stage for the defeat in the plebiscite in 1988. The Church played an important role in both the protests and in the rise of an essentially unified opposition. Concretely, the Church helped the opposition develop a moderate alternative to the regime which most Chileans (including key parts of the military and political elites) could, and ultimately would, support. Trust is one of the first and most lasting casualties of military rule, for which reason the Church was in a unique position to play the role of impartial mediator. Church leaders, in other words, took on the role of "surrogate political brokers bringing estranged military and civilian leaders together" (Fleet and Smith 1997, p. 113). As the Church served as a refuge for activists under siege from the military, it also enabled people with very different beliefs and expectations to work together in order to safeguard basic human values. This helped resist the lure of radicalization and to better manage trepidations and tensions during the transition to democracy (Fleet and Smith 1997).

Poland

In Poland, the Catholic Church played a crucial role in overthrowing the communist regime.[34] Weigel (1992, p. 16), for example, posits that "it is impossible to understand both the why of the revolution (the fact that, in 1989, at this discrete point in history, and after more than forty years of totalitarian oppression, the people of central and eastern Europe cast off the political chains that had bound them since the end of the Second World War) and the how (its nonviolent and democratic character) without taking considerable account of the Catholic Church and, pre-eminently, of its supreme pastor, Karol Wojtyla of Kraków, latterly Bishop of Rome, John Paul II."

Concretely, Weigel argues that the usual accounts of the collapse of the Iron Curtain are inadequate. Gorbachev, for example, was merely a reform Communist, and he never abandoned his faith in Marxist-Leninism. Gorbachev added a critical measure of realism into Soviet foreign policy, which allowed it to untangle itself from the Brezhnev doctrine (a doctrine that taught the perpetuity of communist regimes and the special role of the USSR in ensuring this). He should therefore receive credit for choosing not to "send in the tanks" (p. 20), but nothing much beyond that. His goal was controlled liberalization, but he never intended full freedom, constitutional government and capitalism. Rather, the fall of Communism really began in earnest in June 1979, during the first papal visit to Poland. Here the country experienced a "moral, even spiritual, earthquake in which millions

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[34] When the teachings of Vatican II arrived, the church in Poland became an explicit advocate of human rights and democracy (Philpott 2001).

of Poles decided that it was time to live "as if": "as if" they were free men and women" (p. 134). The 1979 pilgrimage was the "fulcrum of the Revolution of 1989, and the point at which Poland irreversibly turned toward a non-communist future" (p. 134).[35] A former Solidarity spokesman described the 1979 pilgrimage as the point at which "we" and "they" were decisively clarified in the struggle between "the society" and "the power". Prior to 1979, all knew who "they" were; post 1979, the "we" also became clear. The fact that people "felt their moral and social power during those nine days [of the pilgrimage] was a major moral and psychological victory, a historical turning point from which there could be no retreat. The Pope had exorcised the fear that kept the "we" of society from coalescing (p. 165).

A more critical account of the Catholic Church's role in Polish politics is offered by Byrnes (1997),[36] yet he still concurs with Weigel's assessment: "most would probably agree with the basic argument that John Paul's election, and his triumphant return to Poland in the Spring of 1979, played an important part in the rise of Solidarity the following year, in the subsequent weakening of the Polish regime, and in the eventual disintegration of the Soviet bloc" (Byrnes 1997, p. 437).

Spain
Traditional religion underwent significant change in Spain during the 1950s and 1960s. While faith in late Franco Spain could not be formally confronted, much less overtly criticized, it was diluted and transformed by rapid social, cultural and economic change. Foreign cultural influences (the result of mass tourism inflows as well hundreds of thousands of Spaniards moving abroad) entered Spain on a massive scale. This exposed society to the lures of mass consumerism and hedonism, which was alien to traditional Spanish culture (Payne 1984).

The clergy was not immune to these influences. Some Catholic laymen began to take advantage of the tolerance shown them by the Franco regime to espouse subversive positions. In Catalonia and the Basque provinces the clergy even began to speak directly on specific social and cultural matters that had political connotations;[37] individual prelates in other areas of the country also became slightly more independent (Payne 1984).

It was into this brewing environment that Vatican II made its influence felt. Payne (1984, p. 194) writes that "Franco's most informed biographer has observed that of all the reverses suffered by Franco during his long career, by far the most serious was not inflicted by domestic foes or hostile foreign powers but by the Roman Catholic Church through the reforms of Vatican II." Payne (1984, p.

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[35] Hebir (1990) stresses in addition the 1981 reception of Lech Walesa in the Vatican as an event that provided Solidarity with singular stature and legitimacy.

[36] Byrnes (1997) argues that the Pope was involved in a grand design of reconquest and recatholization of Europe; a "Catholic Poland should serve as an instrument for the re-evangelization of the Orthodox East, and as a spiritual and moral exemplar to the secular West" (p. 434).

[37] In May of 1960 the Basque clergy revolted against the regime in an open letter signed by 339 priests; they critiqued the close links between the Church and Franco's regime, whose structure and practice they condemned. The letter, however, was formally rejected by the Basque bishops (Payne 1984).

195) writes further that in "no Catholic country did the dramatic new doctrines of Vatican II have such a marked effect as in Spain."[38] Importantly, it was not the Franco regime that changed; it was the Church. Linz (1991, p. 169) sums it up nicely: "In Europe conflicts between the Church and the state generally have been a result of policies of the state, liberal or left anticlericalism, efforts of secularization, and 'state paganism.' In the late Franco regime there was no change in the position of the state initiating conflict but a profound change within the church."[39]

Attitudes within the Church continued to shift after Vatican II. In 1968, when the first post-Vatican II Church appointments took place, the regime could no longer force the selection of conservatives, but only veto the most liberal. Moreover, new liberal appointments took place each successive year. When an aged cardinal died in 1968 the Vatican even ruled out a conservative and instead selected a more liberal candidate, who had written three books in support of Vatican II.[40] In 1971, following the Joint Assembly (*Asamblea Conjunta*) of prelates and other representatives, the Spanish Church officially began to advocate the separation of Church and state, recommend that prelates give up all state posts, and speak out in favor of full civil rights and a political system of representation.[41]

The early 1970s saw significant Church activism. In 1972 the Church offered sanctuary to a group of 111 political protesters; in 1973 the Church circulated a document (*La Iglesia y la Communidad Política*), which championed democratic pluralism; also in 1972 the Bishop of Bilbao led an official ceremony of excommunication against the policemen who had beaten up an activist priest. Linz (1991) emphasizes that the Church offered support as well as sanctuary to many of the Franco regime's opponents, several of whom had never had ties with the Church. Opponents of the regime were for instance allowed to write for religious publications and hold their meetings in convents. Funerals of victims of the regime were allowed to turn into political events, and the Church intervened on behalf of those being tried or sentenced by the regime for insurrection.

When Franco died of old age in 1975 the world would experience one of the most successful democratization processes in modern history.[42] Under the tutelage of King Juan Carlos, the Spanish government and institutions were fundamentally transformed; and by December 27, 1978, King Juan Carlos signed into law the new Spanish Constitution (Gunther and Blough 1981). To understand why the transition was so successful, one must look to the issue of Church-state relations.

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[38] To many in Spain, John XXIII's 1963 encyclical *Pacem in terries*, which espoused freedom of speech and association as well as freedom of political choice in government representation, was directed as much against the Franco regime as against the Communist system of government.

[39] It is true that the Spanish episcopacy generally represented the most conservative segment among the prelates assembled in the Second Vatican Council, surpassed perhaps only by the Polish in terms of their conservativeness (Payne 1984). However, the bishops felt the winds of change. According to Linz (1991, p. 168), the bishops "were affected by it [Vatican II] as much as other episcopacies. They were possibly even more eager than those from other countries to find out what other bishops were thinking. Perhaps their previous isolation and their desire to be with […] the majority consensus […] contributed to their openness."

[40] The Vatican's candidate had prudently avoided public controversy with the regime.

[41] According to Huntington (1991) this meeting was the key breaking point in Church-state relations.

[42] The first parliamentary elections were held in June 1977.

Concretely, the origins of the Spanish civil war can be seen in the 1931 Constitution of the Second Republic: a document that was aggressively anticlerical (Linz 1991; Payne 1984; Gunther and Blough 1981),[43] and which was imposed on the country by a (bogus) leftish parliamentary majority (Payne 1984). The extremely anticlerical nature of the 1931 Constitution served to poison the political atmosphere of the early 1930s, and the issue of Church-state relations was the most central and divisive issue in the constitutional debates (Gunther and Blough 1981).

Not so for the 1978 Constitution, where a compromise resolution of these previously contentious issues was reached. The fact that the political and social evolution of the Church itself had changed, as described above, meant that compromise came easier (Linz 1991; Payne 1984; Gunther and Blough 1981). Within the Episcopal Conference of the Catholic Church more than 85 percent of the bishops favored the Constitution (Payne 1984). The official position of the Church, which was entirely in the spirit of Vatican II, was set by Cardinal Tarancón, president of the Episcopal Conference and effective head of the Spanish Church: "Officially the Church cannot impose a specific stand in the political realm. It can only demand of the faithful who participate in politics that they act according to their own consciences, illuminated by faith, but not for motives of faith, but rather for reasons of good government" (cited in Gunther and Blough 1981, p. 379). Under the shrewd leadership of Cardinal Tarancón the Church mediated tactfully between opposing groups, which guaranteed that needless conflict was avoided and helped ensure that the tragic experience of the Second Republic would not be repeated (Gunther and Blough 1981; Payne 1984).[44] The Church was cautious to maintain scrupulous neutrality, refusing for example to explicitly endorse the two leading Christian Democratic groups.[45] Gunther and Blough (1981) conclude that the moderation of the Church's traditional position over the preceding two decades facilitated a compromise resolution.

4. Quantitative evidence

As the previous section has demonstrated, there is ample qualitative evidence to support the thesis that Vatican II importantly influenced the democratization processes observed in its aftermath. In this section we turn to the quantitative evidence in order to establish whether the said thesis can be put on a more formal inferential foundation.

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[43] Article 3 of the Second Constitution declared: "The Spanish state has no official religion." Article 26 terminated the Church's privileged legal status. Article 27 secularized cemeteries and public religious activities without prior government consent. Article 48 attacked the Church's education system. According to a Catholic priest, the Constitution was an invitation to civil war (Gunther and Blough 1981).

[44] Cardinal Tarancón put it like this: "We are convinced that the greatest service that we can render to the Church and the Spanish people is precisely this: to manifest clearly and publicly that we want to remain outside all the vicissitudes of the struggle for power; and to recognize the liberty of Christians to confront temporal problems of their own accord, according to the dictates of their own consciences" (cited in Gunther and Blough 1981, p. 381).

[45] The Church did, however, issue warnings against a vote on the newly legalized Spanish Communist Party (Payne 1984).

Empirical design

Vatican II is most likely exogenous to developments in any given country. As noted above, the Council is widely regarded as having been an *unexpected* event, which produced an outcome that surprised even the most avid observers of the Catholic Church (Wilde 2007). It is not out-of-bounds therefore to presume that causality is unidirectional; i.e., causality will run from Vatican II to democracy. This allows us to rule out simultaneity bias, for which reason the main threat to internal validity is omitted variables.

Democracy and Vatican II may be under the influence of the same global trends. Fleet and Smith (1997), for example, argue that some Catholics (reluctantly) concluded that the Church would have to either accommodate modern values or lose influence and appeal. Yet such concerns can be (at least to some extent) be addressed by including time fixed effects in our empirical model. Moreover, we are interested in the time-series variation (i.e., whether Catholic countries *became* more democratic as the impulse of Vatican II made itself felt), not the cross-sectional ditto (i.e., whether Catholic countries *are* more democratic). This dictates that our empirical model should also include country dummies. Put differently, we face an exogenous Vatican II *shock* that likely changed the democracy trend in Catholic countries while leaving non-Catholic countries unaffected.

The above deliberations suggest that we adopt a difference-in-difference type empirical strategy. Consider therefore the following estimating equation:

(1) $\qquad d_{it} = \gamma \, CATH_i \, I_t^{1965} + \boldsymbol{x}'_{it} \, \beta + \mu_t + \delta_i + u_{it}.$

In equation (1), d_{it} is democracy in country i at time t; I_t^{1965} is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 as of 1965, zero otherwise; $CATH_i$ is a time-invariant measure of the (average) share of the population that is Catholic in country i; $\boldsymbol{x}_{it}$ is a vector of confounders; the μ_t's are year fixed effects, which pick up common shocks to democracy; the δ_i's are country fixed effects; and u_{it} is an error term. Causal identification of Vatican II's effect on democracy (γ) hinges on the assumption that (conditionally) there are no other changes occurring around the time of Vatican II,[46] which concurrently correlate with countries' (average) share of Catholics and affect democratization.[47]

Which potential confounders should be included in $\boldsymbol{x}_{it}$? There are basically two approaches to

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[46] Relevant changes could be changes in the policies of external actors, such as the US, the USSR, or the European Community (see Huntington 1991). We deal with this issue below.

[47] Gleditsch and Ward (2006) argue that countries may learn from reforms in neighbouring countries. The basic idea is that "initially reluctant leaders in autocracies may be more willing to initiate difficult reforms if the experiences of other states suggest that the costs and consequences of reforms may not be as bad as they had feared" (Gleditsch and Ward 2006, p. 920). Put differently, fears of democracy are likely to wane as 'comparison countries' come to be democratic. This is much the same logic as Huntington's (1991) snowballing/demonstration effect. We will make no attempt to separate out this diffusion effect from the effect of Vatican II, as it is a mediating channel through which Vatican II operates: Vatican II shock → diffusion effect → democracy. If we define the total effect of Vatican II as the sum of a direct effect and an indirect effect, we are in effect estimating the total effect. In this terminology, the diffusion effect is the indirect effect. We trust that the interesting effect is the total effect of Vatican II.

democratization, which offer tangible confounders to be included in in x_{it} (see Teorell 2010).

The *structural approach to democratization* (i.e., modernization theory) holds that countries having undergone societal modernization are more likely to be democratic. The literature has identified a number of structural determinants, which include state involvement in the economy, income inequality, economic crises, natural resource abundance, country size, religious composition, societal fractionalization, colonial heritage, social capital, and mass political culture (Teorell 2010). The bulk of the variation in these structural indicators is cross-sectional, for which reason it is partially or fully picked up by country dummies (the $\delta_i's$). Moreover, many structural indicators are best considered as proximate determinants of democracy; they are themselves governed by a limited set of fundamental (or deep) determinants, many of which are time-invariant geography and biogeography variables (see e.g. Spolaore and Wacziarg 2013). Again, this means that the variation is purely cross-sectional and thus picked up by country dummies.

Using formal models, the *economic approach to democratization* focuses on the preferences of the entire population and seeks to explain political outcomes in terms of structural preconditions and material resources. Assuming for instance that people care only about income, and hence evaluate their preferences for democracy or dictatorship in terms of this variable, the median voter will prefer a high degree of income redistribution under democracy if she is poor. In contrast, under (right wing) dictatorship the rich (not the median voter) will determine economic policies, and thus there will be no redistribution. The poor will therefore prefer democracy, while the rich opt for dictatorship. The fundamental variables that will disturb this prediction are income inequality and asset mobility: With low income inequality and/or high asset mobility the cost of democracy to the rich is low (Teorell 2010).[48]

Data

Dependent variable:

According to Dahl's (1971, p.2) widely accepted definition, democracy is "a political system one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens". The exact term "democracy" is assigned for the ideal system, whereas the term "polyarchies" refers to countries living up to the empirical requirements of the ideal system of democracy. These are (a) elected officials, (b) free, fair and frequent elections, (c) associational autonomy, (d) inclusive citizenship, and (e) freedom of expression. For purposes of the present

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[48] There are other approaches, but they offer less in terms of tangible confounders to be included in x_{it}. The *strategic approach to democratization* (transition paradigm) holds that democratization transpires in a sequence of "phases", that no structural preconditions exist for its instigation, and that the skill and the luck of elite actors are crucial. Consequently, "democratization may crop up under extremely varying historical, institutional and structural conditions" (Teorell 2010, p. 20), for which reason it really offers no confounders to be included in x_{it} (it is all in the $u_{it}'s$). The *social forces approach to democratization* holds that the "characteristics of and relationships among social classes in society" is important (Teorell 2010, p. 22). That is, it leads to a focus on class-based definitions of social actors; when the material interests of these collective actors are at odds with the authoritarian state, they will back democracy. With its empirical foundations being dominated by case studies (Teorell 2010), this approach also offers little in terms of confounders.

paper, Huntington (1991) importantly notes that his definition of democracy (see footnote 1) fits well with Dahl's polyarchy term.

In important new work, Teorell et al. (2016) have compiled, documented and convincingly validated a new index of polyarchy, *V-Dem polyarchy index*, which goes back to 1900 and includes 173 countries.[49] The index is based on 350 detailed questions with well-defined measurement scales; it captures all of the components (a) to (e) above with multiple indicators (save for one component); the bulk of the used indicators stems from data collected from country experts, typically academics from each country in question.[50] The V-Dem polyarchy index is equal to (MPI + API)/2, where MPI (Multiplicative Polyarchy Index) is the joint product of five underlying indices (elected officials, clean elections, freedom of organization, suffrage, and freedom of expression) and API (Additive Polyarchy Index) is a weighted sum of these five underlying indices.[51]

Teorell et al. validate the polyarchy index in two principal ways. First, they compare the ratings of different country experts for the same indicators, countries and years. They find no evidence to suggest noticeable disagreements among country experts; and when there is occasional disagreement, it is related to indicators further back in time, to lack of media information, and to intermediate values of the indicators they are assessing. Moreover, based on a post-survey questionnaire that country experts were asked to fill out, they have information on the following list of coder characteristics: gender, age, whether the coder has a PhD education, whether the coder is a government employee, country of birth, country of residence, "Western" origin, free-market support, and the coder's understanding of democracy. It is generally the case that coder characteristics are *unrelated* to how country experts rate electoral democracy indicators. Second, they compare coder-level ratings, as well as the aggregated index, to other measures of electoral democracy from alternative datasets. The pairwise correlation between the V-Dem polyarchy index and other extant measures of democracy is above 0.85. Coder characteristics, however, sometimes predict differences between V-Dem polyarchy index and alternative measures such as Polity and the Freedom House. When larger shares of coders are born in the countries they code, V-Dem tend to rate countries as less democratic than both Polity and Freedom House. Moreover, as larger shares of coders hold alternative conceptions of democracy, V-Dem tend to rank countries as less democratic than the polity score. However, the practical effects are very small. On the whole, the evidence suggests that discrepancies between the V-Dem polyarchy index and Polity and Freedom House are not due to coder characteristics.[52]

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[49] Available at: https://www.v-dem.net/en/.

[50] The aim was to have five experts per (collected) indicator per country, meaning that more than 2,600 experts were recruited based on their credentials as field specialists, on their seriousness of purpose, and their impartiality

[51] The V-Dem polyarchy index ranges from 0.008 in Guinea-Bissau in 1929-33 to 0.958 in France in 2012. The mean is 0.323, the median is 0.209, and the standard deviation is 0.282.

[52] At an aggregate level, V-Dem adds a few twists to our understanding of the evolution of democracy. First, the index suggests that democracy's first wave of the early 19th century was far less pronounced than commonly thought. Second, V-Dem suggests that the second wave was far more gradual and in fact stretched into the 1960s, as opposed to ending immediately after the Second World War. Thirdly, V-Dem is a more conservative electoral democracy index than Polity.

We will use the V-Dem polyarchy index as our principal measure of democracy in this paper; i.e., we use it to measure d_{it} in equation (1). However, we also report results when we use a modified version of the polity variable, which facilitate the use of the polity regime measure in time-series analyses.[53] This variable is included in the V-Dem dataset.

Independent variables

In order to construct a variable that measures how 'Catholic' a country is, we use the share of the population that is Roman Catholic. This variable is taken from the *World Religion Dataset*, which is documented in Maoz and Henderson (2013).[54] We calculate the average share over the entire post-war period; it therefore becomes time invariant, as befits $CATH_i$ in equation (1). This should reduce any endogeneity problems, due to measurement error, say.

To control for the modernization channel, as per the structural approach to democratization, we control for real GDP per capita (log).[55] The simple logic is that Catholic countries could on average be richer, which in turn has pushed them toward democracy (Lipset 1959).

As per the economic approach to democratization, we add two variables: inequality (Gini) and trade openness. Inequality (also identified as relevant in the structural approach) proxies the level of discontent in the population. Rising inequality makes revolution more attractive (Robinson 2006).[56] To be able to get sufficient observations in order to implement our difference-in-difference strategy, we employ educational inequality instead of income inequality.[57] Turning finally to trade openness, this variable serves as a proxy for the ease at which capital can be exported out of the country (asset mobility). Moreover, a case can be made that trade integration *per se* could affect democratization (López-Córdova and Meissner 2008).[58]

Main results

Consider first Figure 1, which plots the evolution of democracy in both countries with a Catholic

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[53] It modifies the combined annual Polity score by applying a simple rule to convert instances of "standardized authority scores" (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10).

[54] The dataset can be downloaded from http://www.thearda.com.

[55] This is constructed as log(*e_GDP_Per_Cap_Haber_Men_2*) in the V-Dem dataset.

[56] The theoretical work in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) emphasizes inequality and its effect on the threat of revolution as an important factor in democratization. For quantitative work on this, see e.g. Przeworski (2009) or Aidt and Franck (2015).

[57] The measure of income inequality in the V-Dem dataset (*e_peginiwi*) is seriously challenged in terms of the number of observations. For example, in 1950 there are only observations for three Catholic majority countries (i.e., Catholic share > 50%), namely Guatemala, Italy, and Mexico. For educational inequality (*e_peedgini*) the corresponding number is 32. The correlation between the two inequality measures is 0.23 (*p*-value < 0.0000). A linear regression of *e_peginiwi* on *e_peedgini* and a constant gives a (cluster robust) *t*-value of 3.48 (number of observations is 5,427); with time fixed effects included, the *t*-value increases marginally to 3.59. Overall, this tells us that the educational inequality is statistically informative about income inequality.

[58] Trade openness is (export + import)/GDP; in terms of V-Dem's nomenclature, it is (*e_cow_exports* + *e_cow_imports*)/(*e_migdppc* × *e_population/*1000000).

majority (treated countries) and countries without such majority (untreated countries). The uppermost panel measures democracy using the V-Dem polyarchy index, whereas the bottommost panel relies on the polity score. The first thing to note upon eyeballing the figure is that prior to 1965 the identification assumption of common trends in treated and untreated countries appears to be satisfied. At the same time, there is (visually) clear indication of a trend break in the evolution of democracy in Catholic majority countries in the late 1970s.[59] In the remainder of this section we will use statistical techniques to explore whether this trend break represents a causal impact of the Vatican II impulse on democracy.

[Figure 1 about here]

The fact that pre-Vatican II democracy trends appear to be very similar across treated and untreated countries suggests that a simple difference-in-difference estimation setup may in fact be appropriate for purposes of identification. Consider therefore some baseline regressions where we omit the vector of confounders, x_{it}, from equation (1). In columns 1-3 of Table 1 we report results when the V-Dem polyarchy index is used to measure democracy; in columns 4-6 the dependent variable is the polity score. The length of panels differs across columns: 1900-2015 (maximum length), 1950-2015, and 1950-2000 in respectively columns 1 & 4, 2 & 5, and 3 & 6.[60] Inspection of the table reveals that the coefficient on Vatican II is estimated with high precision in all columns; the ratio of slope estimate to standard error (i.e., the *t*-value) is always above two.

[Table 1 about here]

In Table 2 we report the results from estimating equation (1) with (the log of) real GDP per capita included in x_{it}, as per the structural approach to democracy. To eliminate any simultaneity concerns, we lag GDP per capita five years. Beyond the inclusion of GDP per capita, Table 2 is analogous to Table 1. The first thing to note is that the inclusion of GDP per capita affects neither the statistical nor the economic significance of Vatican II. Moreover, in accordance with the results of Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), there is no relationship between income and democracy – as measured by the polity score – in the fixed effects setting. In some samples, however, there is a relationship between the two variables when we use the V-Dem polyarchy index, cf. columns 1 and 3.[61]

[Table 2 about here]

Table 3 (Table 4) replicates Table 2 with the only difference that inequality (trade openness) is

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[59] Figures S1 and S2 in the Supplementary Appendix basically provide the same information as that in Figure 1, but they do so in a more formal way. That is, based on flexible estimations these two figures validate the assumption of common pre-intervention trends.

[60] Polity ends in 2013.

[61] Results on the effect of GDP per capita are in general mixed. Boix (2011) and Barro (2015) are examples of evidence that GDP per capita predicts democracy.

substituted for GDP per capita. Inspection reveals that this changes nothing of substance. In fact, the only surprising finding is that trade openness (which proxies asset mobility) is generally a significant negative predictor of democracy. As per the economic approach to democratization, we would have expected to see a positive impact.

[Tables 3 and 4 about here]

In Table 5 we add all controls simultaneously. Again, this has no implication whatsoever for the estimated impact of Vatican II.

[Table 5 about here]

As noted in the Introduction, Huntington (1991) pondered the question of which changes in independent variables in the 1960s and 1970s produced regime changes in the 1970s and 1980s. This suggests that there is a time lag of at least ten years before the Vatican II impulse made its influence felt. It may therefore be of some interest to study the time-varying impact of Vatican II. Consequently, in Table 6 we allow the impact of Vatican II to differ across decades by means of dummies for the periods 1965-69, 1970-79, 1980-89, 1990-99, 2000-09, and 2010-15. Columns 1-5 of the table pertain to polyarchy, whereas columns 6-10 pertain to the polity score. The first thing to note upon inspection of Table 6 is that the Vatican II impulse first becomes visible in the 1980s; in the 1960s and 1970s it is nil, statistically speaking. As of the 1980s it is visible in all specifications save for column 3, where it first becomes visible in the 1990s. Moreover, with the exception of column 1, the time-varying impact of Vatican II follows an inverted-U shape, which reaches its maximum in the 1990s.[62]

[Insert Table 6 about here]

How should we think about this inverted-U? It is obvious that there will be a certain delay between the Vatican impulse and any response in democracy trajectories, as also suggested by Huntington (1991).[63] The estimates as well as Figure 1 suggest that this lag is about 10-15 years, which is consistent with Huntington's expectation. The inverted-U is also consistent with Huntington's snowballing/demonstration effect (see also footnote 47), which likely served as a magnifier of the Vatican II impulse. According to this logic, the total effect (the effect we estimate) of Vatican II is the sum of a *direct* effect (Vatican II → democracy) and an *indirect* amplifying effect (Vatican II → snowballing/demonstration effect → democracy). Importantly, the indirect effect is also caused by Vatican II.

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[62] In Table S1 of the Supplementary Appendix we report results from estimation of a fully flexible model. In Table S2 and S3 of the Supplementary Appendix, we shorten the sample as an alternative to interacting Vatican II with time fixed effects.

[63] As noted in Section 3, the teachings of Vatican II propagated through the Church via the transnational ligatures of authority (Philpott 2001), which of course did not happen overnight. Moreover, it would take time before the teachings would have any actual influence on society, as also demonstrated in Section 3.

So far we have said little about the economic significance of Vatican II. One way to address this issue is to evaluate the expression $\hat{\gamma}\,\overline{CATH}/\bar{d}$. Here $\hat{\gamma}$ is the estimated coefficient associated with the Vatican II variable, $CATH_i\,I_t^{1965}$; $\overline{CATH}$ is the post-1965 average share of Catholics; and $\bar{d}$ is post-1965 average democracy. The expression provides us with a rough estimate of how much of post-Vatican II democracy can be attributed to the Vatican II impulse. If we use $\hat{\gamma} = 0.1$, we find that 6.5 percent of post-Conciliar democracy (as measured by the V-Dem polyarchy index) is due to Vatican II.[64] We will not push this too far, but just note that the estimated effect is nontrivial.

Robustness

In this section we pursue a few additional robustness issues, which we believe arise naturally in the present context. These are exclusion of regions, a dichotomous *substantial* Catholic majority variable, inclusion of lagged dependent variable, and using a dichotomous measure of democracy.

Excluding regions

As already noted, our identification strategy hinges on the assumption that (conditionally) there are no other changes occurring around the time of Vatican II, which concurrently correlate with countries' (average) share of Catholics and affect democratization. Relevant changes, as per Huntington (1991), are changes in the policies of external actors, such as the US, the USSR or the European Community. It appears reasonable that any changes in US policy would influence its backyard – Latin America – comparatively more; it also appears reasonable that any changes in the policies of the USSR (and, post-1991, Russia) would influence its front yard – Eastern Europe – comparatively more; and it appears reasonable that any changes in the policies of the European Community would influence Europe comparatively more. An obvious way to deal with this issue is therefore to exclude regions one at a time.

Consequently, we will investigate the robustness of our results to the exclusion of different politico-geographic regions from the Quality of Government Standard Dataset.[65] These regions are based on geographical proximity as well as features that add to regional understanding as identified by democratization researchers. If results are robust to the sequential exclusion of regions, it is improbably that changes other than Vatican II will threaten internal validity.

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[64] An alternative (but less informative) way to shed light on the question of economic significance is by means of beta (or standardized) coefficients. Using column 1 of Table 5 (which employs V-Dem polyarchy), we get beta coefficients 0.15, 0.24, -0.05 and -0.04 associated with respectively Vatican II, GDP per capita, inequality and trade; in column 4 (which employs polity), the corresponding numbers are 0.13, 0.11, -0.20 and -0.07.

[65] These regions are included in the V-Dem dataset as *e_regionpol*. The different regions are Eastern Europe and Central Asia (post-Communist; including Mongolia), Latin America (including Cuba and the Dominican Republic), Middle East and North Africa (including Israel and Turkey), Sub-Saharan Africa, Western Europe and North America (including Cyprus, Australia and New Zealand), East Asia, South-East Asia, South Asia, the Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand), and the Caribbean (including Belize, Haiti, Guyana and Suriname).

Inspection of Table 7 reveals that results are fully robust to the exclusion of regions one-by-one when polyarchy is used. When we use the polity score, statistical significance disappears in only one instance, which is when the Latin American countries are excluded (cf. column 2 of Table 8). In the said case, it is mostly a question of less precision.[66] Moreover, as reported in the Supplementary Appendix, when we alternatively employ a Catholic dummy variable equal to one if there is a Catholic majority, zero else (i.e., set $CATH_i = 1[\text{Catholic share in country } i \geq 50\%]$), we obtain that results are robust to the exclusion of all regions, even when we use the polity score (cf. Table S4). Finally, figure 2 demonstrates that the trend break remains visually clear in the non-Latin American sample of countries when either of the two democracy measures is used. However, consistent with column 2 of Table 8, it is somewhat noisier when Polity is used to measure democracy.[67] Overall, this leads us to conclude that 'other changes' are unlikely to constitute a threat to internal validity.

[Tables 7 and 8 about here]

[Figure 2 about here]

Substantial Catholic majority

Consider next constructing a new Vatican II variable, which takes the value one if the share of Catholics in a country is larger than or equal to 75%, zero else. Despite the fact that this binary variable is coarser than the continuous variable, $CATH_i$, used so far, it should not have any bearings on our findings. In fact, it should – if anything – only make results stronger, as only countries with a substantial Catholic majority are considered as treated. Moreover, this coarser variable has the advantage that it reduces any measurement error issues. Tables 9 and 10 confirm prior expectations: nothing changes.

[Tables 9 and 10 about here]

Regression-to-mean effects

In Tables 11 and 12 we estimate an autoregressive model where the country fixed effects are excluded, as they are likely correlated with the autoregressive term.[68] The autoregressive term in turn captures persistence in democracy and also mean-reverting dynamics (i.e., the tendency of the democracy score to return to some equilibrium value). Table 11 excludes the vector of confounders, x_{it}, whereas Table 12 includes it.

Turning first to table 11, we see that Vatican II is always statistically significant at a one percent

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[66] The *p*-value is 0.161 (*t*-value is 1.409 = 2.289/1.624).
[67] Latin America is a Catholic majority region, which saw many countries democratize during the third waved, so it is perhaps not surprising that it will impact or findings. At the same time, the qualitative evidence reviewed in Section 3 does not suggest that the US played any role in democratization in neither Brazil nor Chile.
[68] Both Barro (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2008) entertain models with autoregressive terms.

size level. Moreover, the estimated coefficients associated with the autoregressive terms are close to one, which reveals that democracy is a highly persistent variable. When we include the three confounders, GDP per capita, inequality and trade openness, as done in Table 12, we see that results are similar to Table 11. Consequently, coding the Vatican II variable as an indicator and estimating an autoregressive model does not change any of the qualitative conclusions reported so far. Vatican II appears to be a strong predictor of the evolution of democracy in Catholic countries, which lends strong support to Huntington's (1991) thesis.

[Tables 11 and 12 about here]

The Boix et al. (2013) dichotomous democracy measure

So far we have relied on a continuous measure of democracy. However, Huntington (1991) notes that a dichotomous approach better serves the purpose of his study because it concerns itself with the transition from a nondemocratic regime to a democratic one. Consequently, we employ the Boix et al. (2013) dichotomous democracy measure based on contestation and participation. Countries coded as democratic have political leaders that are chosen through free and fair elections and a minimal level of suffrage.[69]

Table 13 reports results from estimation of equation (1). Inspection of the table reveals that Vatican II is always significant at 10 percent irrespective of whether confounders are included or not.

[Table 13 about here]

It may also be of some interest to construct a figure using the dichotomous variable. This is done in Figure 3 below. The figure shows that prior to 1965 the identification assumption of common trends in treated (Catholic majority countries) and non-treated (non-Catholic majority countries) appears more problematic when we use the Boix et al. (2013) democracy measure. Nevertheless, the figure does depict a clear trend break in the evolution in democracy in Catholic majority countries in the late 1970s, as befits Huntington's (1991) thesis.

[Figure 3 about here]

5. Concluding remarks

In this paper we have investigated the thesis of Huntington (1991) that the Second Vatican Council was an important determinant of third wave democratization. Our results strongly support his thesis. First, there is an abundance of qualitative evidence which documents that the post-Conciliar Catholic Church was instrumental in steering formerly authoritarian regimes safely to toward democracy.

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[69] This measure is included in the V-Dem dataset as *e_boix_regime*.

Second, employing a difference-in-difference strategy, we find that Vatican II is a statistically significant predictor of the evolution of post-Conciliar democracy. The identification assumption required for a difference-in-difference strategy also appears to be satisfied. Concretely, pre-Conciliar democratization trends in Catholic majority and Catholic minority countries are comparable. At the same time, Vatican II was an unexpected event (an exogenous shock); the Council is, in other words, best thought of as exogenous to developments in any particular Catholic country.

Our quantitative estimations allow us to provide a rough calculation of the economic impact of the Vatican II impulse. Specifically, we find that about 6.5 percent of post-Conciliar (measured) democracy is due to the Second Vatican Council. We trust that this finding will provide a corrective to the quantitative literature on the determinants of democracy, which has tended to neglect time-varying aspects of religion.

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Figures

Figure 1: Catholicism and the evolution of democracy

Notes: Democracy is measured using the V-Dem polyarchy index (topmost panel) and the revised combined polity score (bottommost panel). Bold line (thin line) represents countries with a Catholic (non-Catholic) majority. Catholic majority is defined as a share of Catholics larger than 50 percent of the population. Vertical lines are placed at 1962 and 1965 to mark the Vatican II period.

Summary: The figure shows that prior to 1965 the identification assumption of common trends in treated (Catholic majority countries) and untreated (non-Catholic majority countries) appears to be satisfied, irrespective of which of the two the democracy indices is used. Moreover, the figure depicts a clear trend break in the evolution in democracy in Catholic majority countries in the late 1970s, as befits Huntington's (1991) thesis. The pre-Conciliar correlation (1900-64) between the two series is 0.95 and 0.62 in respectively the topmost and the bottommost panel.

Figure 2: Catholicism and the democracy in non-Latin American countries

Notes: In the figure, Latin American countries are excluded. Democracy is measured using the V-Dem polyarchy index (topmost panel) and the revised combined polity score (bottommost panel). Bold line (thin line) represents countries with a Catholic (non-Catholic) majority. Catholic majority is defined as a share of Catholics larger than 50 percent of the population. Vertical lines are placed at 1962 and 1965 to mark the Vatican II period.

Summary: The figure shows that it is not the Latin American countries, which drive our results. The trend break in Catholic majority countries is still visually clear in both the topmost and the bottommost panel, albeit less so than in the full sample.

Figure 3: Catholicism and the Boix et al. (2013) dichotomous democracy measure

Notes: Democracy is measured using the Boix et al. (2013) dichotomous democracy measure (*e_boix_regime*). Bold line (thin line) represents countries with a Catholic (non-Catholic) majority. Catholic majority is defined as a share of Catholics larger than 50 percent of the population. Vertical lines are placed at 1962 and 1965 to mark the Vatican II period.

Summary: The figure shows that prior to 1965 the identification assumption of common trends in treated (Catholic majority countries) and non-treated (non-Catholic majority countries) appears more problematic when we use the Boix et al. democracy measure. However, the figure does depict a clear trend break in the evolution in democracy in Catholic majority countries in the late 1970s, as befits Huntington's (1991) thesis.

Supplementary appendix

<u>Tables</u>

[Table S1 here]

[Table S2 here]

[Table S3 here]

[Table S4 here]

Figures

Figure S1: Results from estimation of a fully flexible model

Notes: The figure reports estimates of the following fully flexible model:

$$d_{it} = \sum_{\substack{j=1910 \\ j \neq 1950}}^{2010} \gamma_j \, CATH_i \, I_t^j + x'_{it} \, \beta + \mu_t + \delta_i + u_{it},$$

where the 1950s is the omitted decade. Democracy, d, is measured using the V-Dem polyarchy index. The used estimates are those associated with column 1 of Table S1 in the Supplementary Appendix. The broken lines are 95-% confidence intervals. The omitted decade is 1950, so +10 is the 1960s, -10 the 1940s, and so on and so forth.

Summary: The figure shows that the identification assumption of common pre-intervention trends is also borne out when we estimate a fully flexible model. The trend break in the evolution in democracy in Catholic countries becomes visible as of the 1980s.

Figure S2: Results from estimation of a fully flexible model

Notes: Figure is similar to Figure S1; see notes there. The only difference is that democracy is measured using the polity score and that estimates are those associated with column 6 of Supplementary Table S1.

Summary: The figure shows that the identification assumption of common pre-intervention trends is also borne out when we estimate a fully flexible model. The trend break in the evolution in democracy in Catholic countries becomes visible as of the 1980s.

Table 1: Fixed effects estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable:		Polyarchy			Polity	
CATH x I^{1965}	0.101***	0.108***	0.079**	3.139***	3.298***	3.031***
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(1.104)	(1.219)	(1.140)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time period	Full	Post 1950	1950-2000	Full	Post 1950	1950-2000
Observations	16,102	9,802	7,544	11,224	8,261	6,333
R-squared	0.536	0.41	0.307	0.259	0.288	0.206
Number of countries	168	168	168	162	162	160

Notes: All standard errors, which are reported in paranthesis, are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Summary: The table reports results from the estimation of equation (1) wit the vector of confounders, ***x***, excluded. Inspection of the table reveals that Vatican II is a significant predictor of the evolution of post-Conciliar democracy. As the identification assumption of common pre-Conciliar democracy trends appears to be satisfied (cf. Figure 1), it is not unreasonably to presume that the estimated effects can be given a causal interpretation.

Table 2: Fixed effects estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable:		Polyarchy			Polity	
CATH x I^{1965}	0.116***	0.123***	0.106***	3.486***	3.077**	2.930**
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(1.128)	(1.232)	(1.168)
$\log(GDPCAP_{t-5})$	0.052**	0.036	0.073**	0.657	-0.341	0.780
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.734)	(0.805)	(0.848)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time period	Full	Post 1950	1950-2000	Full	Post 1950	1950-2000
Observations	9,118	7,509	5,793	8,859	7,340	5,673
R-squared	0.466	0.379	0.306	0.288	0.305	0.235
Number of countries	157	157	156	155	155	154

Notes: All standard errors, which are reported in paranthesis, are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. GDP per capita is lagged five years to avoid any simultaneity issues.

Summary: The table reports results from the estimation of equation (1) with real GDP per capita (log) included in the vector of confounders, *x* Inspection of the table reveals that Vatican II remains a significant predictor of the evolution of post-Conciliar democracy. As the identification assumption of common pre-Conciliar democracy trends appears to be satisfied (cf. Figure 1), and as the results are unchanged after controlling for "the modernization hypothesis", the presumption that the estimated effects can be given a causal interpretation is strengthened.

Table 3: Fixed effects estimation

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Polyarchy			Polity	
CATH x I^{1965}	0.079**	0.103**	0.072*	3.659***	4.146***	3.457***
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(1.114)	(1.244)	(1.177)
INEQUALITY$_{t-5}$	-0.001	-0.000	0.000	-0.036*	-0.047	-0.022
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time period	Full	Post 1950	1950-2000	Full	Post 1950	1950-2000
Observations	10,613	7,810	5,974	8,778	6,992	5,381
R-squared	0.504	0.388	0.290	0.264	0.281	0.204
Number of countries	135	135	135	132	132	132

Notes: All standard errors, which are reported in paranthesis, are clustered at the country level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Inequality is lagged five years to avoid any simultaneity issues.

Summary: The table reports results from the estimation of equation (1) with inequality included in the vector of confounders, **x** . Inspection of the table reveals that Vatican II remains a significant predictor of the of evolution post-Conciliar democracy. As the identification assumption of common pre-Conciliar democracy trends appears to be satisfied (cf. Figure 1), and as the results are unchanged after controlling for "threat of revolution", the presumption that the estimated effects can be given a causal interpretation is strengthened.

Table 4: Fixed effects estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable:		Polyarchy			Polity	
CATH x I^{1965}	0.127***	0.118***	0.094**	2.761**	2.994**	2.567**
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(1.082)	(1.239)	(1.168)
TRADE$_{t-5}$	-0.036	-0.052	-0.098***	-2.382**	-2.258**	-3.092**
	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(1.041)	(1.110)	(1.424)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time period	Full	Post 1950	1950-2000	Full	Post 1950	1950-2000
Observations	8,303	6,868	5,322	8,220	6,784	5,277
R-squared	0.469	0.394	0.311	0.313	0.326	0.253
Number of countries	145	145	145	144	144	144

Notes: All standard errors, which are reported in paranthesis, are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Trade openness is lagged five years to avoid any simultaneity issues.

Summary: The table reports results from the estimation of equation (1) with trade openness included in the vector of confounders, x. Inspection of the table reveals that Vatican II remains a significant predictor of the evolution of post-Conciliar democracy. As the identification assumption of common pre-Conciliar democracy trends appears to be satisfied (cf. Figure 1), and as the results are unchanged after controlling for "asset mobility", the presumption that the estimated effects can be given a causal interpretation is strengthened.

Table 5: Fixed effects estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable:		Polyarchy			Polity	
CATH x I^{1965}	0.129***	0.141***	0.117***	2.914***	3.747***	3.258***
	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(1.068)	(1.271)	(1.216)
$\log(GDPCAP_{t-5})$	0.068**	0.045	0.099***	0.777	-0.009	1.459
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.840)	(0.968)	(1.030)
$INEQUALITY_{t-5}$	-0.001	-0.000	0.000	-0.059**	-0.053	-0.034
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.037)
$TRADE_{t-5}$	-0.046	-0.064	-0.135**	-1.962	-1.952	-3.268*
	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.055)	(1.238)	(1.315)	(1.757)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time period	Full	Post 1950	1950-2000	Full	Post 1950	1950-2000
Observations	7,419	6,211	4,863	7,366	6,153	4,828
R-squared	0.476	0.390	0.327	0.310	0.318	0.251
Number of countries	127	127	127	127	127	127

Notes: All standard errors, which are reported in paranthesis, are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Real GDP per capita, inequality and trade openness are all lagged five years to avoid any simultaneity issues.

Summary: The table reports results from the estimation of equation (1) with real GDP per capita (log), inequality and trade openness included in the vector of confounders, *x*. Inspection of the table reveals that Vatican II remains a significant predictor of the evolution of post-Conciliar democracy. As the identification assumption of common pre-Conciliar democracy trends appears to be satisfied (cf. Figure 1), and as the results are unchanged after controlling simultaneously for "the modernization hypothesis", "threat of revolution" and "asset mobility", the presumption that the estimated effects can be given a causal interpretation is significantly strengthened.

Table 6: Fixed effects estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Dependent variable:			Polyarchy					Polity		
CATH x I^{1965}	-0.039	-0.013	-0.061	-0.003	-0.014	0.515	0.959	0.768	0.166	-0.111
	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(1.297)	(1.257)	(1.156)	(1.256)	(1.113)
CATH x I^{1970}	-0.040	-0.025	-0.065	-0.007	-0.017	-0.284	0.255	-0.076	-0.258	-0.657
	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(1.327)	(1.344)	(1.288)	(1.340)	(1.257)
CATH x I^{1980}	0.103*	0.140**	0.092	0.155**	0.146**	4.167***	4.685***	4.615***	4.025***	3.749***
	(0.053)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(1.460)	(1.446)	(1.465)	(1.430)	(1.421)
CATH x I^{1990}	0.178***	0.214***	0.172***	0.222***	0.232***	5.047***	5.480***	5.820***	4.651***	5.053***
	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(1.390)	(1.464)	(1.446)	(1.403)	(1.399)
CATH x I^{2000}	0.192***	0.190***	0.164***	0.195***	0.215***	4.743***	4.782***	5.516***	3.937***	4.850***
	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(1.437)	(1.500)	(1.492)	(1.434)	(1.443)
CATH x I^{2010}	0.178***	0.175***	0.153***	0.177***	0.202***	3.620**	3.798**	4.612***	2.880*	4.135***
	(0.042)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(1.526)	(1.544)	(1.592)	(1.476)	(1.552)
log(GDPCAP$_{t-5}$)		0.053**			0.072**		0.692			0.880
		(0.025)			(0.030)		(0.729)			(0.823)
INEQUALITY$_{t-5}$			-0.001*		-0.001			-0.045**		-0.072***
			(0.001)		(0.001)			(0.020)		(0.025)
TRADE$_{t-5}$				-0.039	-0.044				-2.408**	-1.895
				(0.031)	(0.044)				(1.122)	(1.365)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16,102	9,118	10,613	8,303	7,419	11,224	8,859	8,778	8,220	7,366
R-squared	0.550	0.488	0.523	0.490	0.504	0.273	0.304	0.284	0.327	0.332
Number of countries	168	157	135	145	127	162	155	132	144	127

Notes: All standard errors, which are reported in paranthesis, are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Real GDP per capita, inequality and trade openness are all lagged five years to avoid any simultaneity issues.

Summary: The table reports estimates when the impact of Vatican II is allowed to differ across decades. Concretely, we interact dummies for the periods 1965-69, 1970-79, 1980-89, 1990-99, 2000-09, and 2010-15 with the average post-Conciliar share of Catholics, Ci. Two things should be noted upon inspection of the table. First, the Vatican II impulse first becomes visible in the 1980s; in the 1960s and 1970s it is nil, statistically speaking. This is (broadly speaking) the delay from impulse to response that Huntington (1991) expected. Second, the time-varying impact of Vatican II tends to follow an inverted-U shape, which reaches its maximum in the 1990s. These findings are consistent with the presence of both a direct effect of Vatican II (Vatican II --> democracy) and an indirect effect (Vatican II --> snowballing/demonstration effect --> democracy), as also hypothesized by Huntington (1991).

Table 7: Fixed effects estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Dependent variable:					Polyarchy					
CATH x I^{1965}	0.097***	0.142***	0.080**	0.099***	0.079**	0.102***	0.097***	0.099***	0.103***	0.107***
	(0.036)	(0.045)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Excluded region	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	14,421	13,807	14,394	11,056	13,522	15,487	14,904	15,161	15,505	15,365
R-squared	0.540	0.538	0.547	0.499	0.543	0.535	0.540	0.537	0.532	0.530
Number of countries	137	149	152	121	146	163	158	160	164	162

Notes: All standard errors, which are reported in paranthesis, are clustered at the country level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. The different regions are (1) Eastern Europe and Central Asia (post-Communist; including Mongolia), (2) Latin America (including Cuba and the Dominican Republic), (3) Middle East and North Africa (including Israel and Turkey), (4) Sub-Saharan Africa, (5) Western Europe and North America (including Cyprus, Australia and New Zealand), (6) East Asia, (7) South-East Asia, (8) South Asia, (9) the Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand), and (10) the Caribbean (including Belize, Haiti, Guyana and Suriname).

Summary: The table report results from estimations of equation (1) when the vector of confounders, *x*, is excluded. Columns exclude regions one-by-one. Inspection of the table reveals that Vatican II remains a significant predictor of the evolution post-Conciliar democracy, irrespective of which region is excluded. Our identification strategy hinges on the assumption that (conditionally) there are no other changes occurring around the time of Vatican II, which concurrently correlate with countries' (average) share of Catholics and affect democratization. Potentially relevant changes, as per Huntington (1991), are changes in the policies of external actors, such as the US, the USSR and/or the European Community. It appears reasonable that any changes in US policy would influence Latin America comparatively more; it also appears reasonable that any changes in the policies of the USSR (and, post-1991, Russia) would influence Eastern Europe comparatively more; and it appears reasonable that any changes in the policies of the European Community would influence Europe comparatively more. Consequently, the fact that results are robust to the sequential exclusion of regions makes it improbable that the said changes threaten internal validity.

Table 8: Fixed effects estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Dependent variable:					Polity					
CATH x I^{1965}	3.629***	2.289	2.814**	3.037***	2.886**	3.330***	3.291***	3.098***	3.139***	3.324***
	(1.156)	(1.624)	(1.114)	(1.144)	(1.319)	(1.125)	(1.069)	(1.162)	(1.104)	(1.099)
Excluded region	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,796	9,090	10,103	8,876	8,993	10,806	10,651	10,673	11,106	10,922
R-squared	0.231	0.232	0.275	0.244	0.297	0.259	0.272	0.264	0.266	0.263
Number of countries	131	143	146	117	141	157	152	155	159	157

Notes: All standard errors, which are reported in paranthesis, are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The different regions are (1) Eastern Europe and Central Asia (post-Communist; including Mongolia), (2) Latin America (including Cuba and the Dominican Republic), (3) Middle East and North Africa (including Israel and Turkey), (4) Sub-Saharan Africa, (5) Western Europe and North America (including Cyprus, Australia and New Zealand), (6) East Asia, (7) South-East Asia, (8) South Asia, (9) the Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand), and (10) the Caribbean (including Belize, Haiti, Guyana and Suriname).

Summary: The table report results from estimations of equation (1) when the vector of confounders, *x*, is excluded. Columns exclude regions one-by-one. Inspection of the table reveals that Vatican II remains a significant predictor of the evolution post-Conciliar democracy, except when Latin America is excluded (cf. column 2). See also summary assocated with Table 7. As shown in Supplementary Appendix Table S3, the insignificance in column 2 is a consequence of using the continous measure CATH as opposed to the binary indicator 1[CATH>=50%]. When this binary indicator is used significance obtains in all columns, irrespective of which region is excluded.

Table 9: Fixed effects estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable:		Polyarchy			Polity	
$1_{[CATH>=75\%]}$ x I^{1965}	0.095***	0.096***	0.071**	3.237***	3.147***	2.916***
	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.867)	(1.007)	(0.951)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time period	Full	Post 1950	1950-2000	Full	Post 1950	1950-2000
Observations	16,102	9,802	7,544	11,224	8,261	6,333
R-squared	0.539	0.411	0.308	0.266	0.291	0.210
Number of cowcode	168	168	168	162	162	160

Notes: All standard errors, which are reported in paranthesis, are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Summary: This table is identical to Table 1 with the exception that 1[CATH>=75%] has been substituted for CATH. See summary of Table 1.

Table 10: Fixed effects estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable:		Polyarchy			Polity	
$1_{[CATH>=75\%]}$ x I^{1965}	0.122***	0.123***	0.102***	2.681***	3.184***	2.730***
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.877)	(1.039)	(0.998)
$\log(GDPCAP_{t-5})$	0.064**	0.041	0.095**	0.663	-0.121	1.320
	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.820)	(0.949)	(1.000)
$INEQUALITY_{t-5}$	-0.000	-0.000	0.001	-0.052*	-0.045	-0.026
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.037)
$TRADE_{t-5}$	-0.045	-0.064	-0.133**	-1.939	-1.946	-3.228*
	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.054)	(1.236)	(1.303)	(1.734)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time period	Full	Post 1950	1950-2000	Full	Post 1950	1950-2000
Observations	7,419	6,211	4,863	7,366	6,153	4,828
R-squared	0.481	0.392	0.329	0.314	0.320	0.252
Number of countries	127	127	127	127	127	127

Notes: All standard errors, which are reported in paranthesis, are clustered at the country level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Summary: This table is identical to Table 5 with the exception that 1[CATH>=75%] has been substituted for CATH. See summary of Table 5.

Table 11: Random effects estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable:		Polyarchy			Polity	
$1_{[CATH>=75\%]} \times I^{1965}$	0.005***	0.006***	0.007***	0.224***	0.234***	0.295***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.044)
Polyarchy$_{t-1}$	0.987***	0.984***	0.986***			
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)			
Polity$_{t-1}$				0.969***	0.967***	0.964***
				(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Country fixed effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time period	Full	Post 1950	1950-2000	Full	Post 1950	1950-2000
R-squared	0.978	0.975	0.973	0.949	0.951	0.943
Observations	15,901	9,760	7,505	11,019	8,162	6,242
Number of countries	168	168	168	162	162	160

Notes: All standard errors, which are reported in paranthesis, are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Summary: This table is identical to Table 1 with two exceptions: First, 1[CATH>=75%] has been substituted for CATH; and, second, a lagged dependent variable has been substituted for the country fixed effects. See summary of Table 1.

Table 12: Random effects estimation

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Polyarchy			Polity	
$1_{[CATH>=75\%]} \times I^{1965}$	0.005***	0.005***	0.006***	0.138***	0.142***	0.138***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.045)
$Polyarchy_{t-1}$	0.977***	0.977***	0.976***			
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)			
$Polity_{t-1}$				0.953***	0.952***	0.947***
				(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
$\log(GDPCAP_{t-5})$	0.001	0.002	0.002**	0.030	0.029	0.066
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.041)
$INEQUALITY_{t-5}$	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.008***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
$TRADE_{t-5}$	0.000	-0.000	-0.005	-0.026	-0.033	-0.306**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.147)
Country fixed effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time period	Full	Post 1950	1950-2000	Full	Post 1950	1950-2000
R-squared	0.974	0.977	0.975	0.948	0.950	0.946
Observations	7,417	6,210	4,863	7,351	6,146	4,823
Number of countries	127	127	127	127	127	127

Notes: All standard errors, which are reported in paranthesis, are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Summary: This table is identical to Table 5 with two exceptions: First, 1[CATH>=75%] has been substituted for CATH; and, second, a lagged dependent variable has been substituted for the country fixed effects. See summary of Table 5.

Table 13: Fixed effects estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable:		Dichotomous democracy measure			
CATH x I^{1965}	0.250***	0.209**	0.217**	0.177*	0.176*
	(0.081)	(0.091)	(0.086)	(0.095)	(0.090)
log(GDPCAP$_{t-5}$)		0.109**			0.144**
		(0.050)			(0.058)
INEQUALITY$_{t-5}$			-0.003*		-0.004*
			(0.002)		(0.002)
TRADE$_{t-5}$				-0.250***	-0.247***
				(0.071)	(0.083)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,188	8,096	8,018	7,569	6,838
R-squared	0.198	0.179	0.196	0.203	0.210
Number of countries	159	152	132	143	127

Notes: All standard errors, which are reported in paranthesis, are clustered at the country level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Summary: The table reports results from the estimation of equation (1) when the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of democracy. Columns 1 to 5 of the table should be compared to respectively column 1 of each of the Tables 1 to 5. Inspection of the table reveals that Vatican II remains a significant predictor of the evolution post-Conciliar democracy.

Table S1: Fixed effects estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Dependent variable:			Polyarchy					Polity		
CATH x I^{1900}	0.023	0.139*	0.090	0.106	0.322***	2.772	2.940	5.816**	3.527	9.238***
	(0.040)	(0.073)	(0.065)	(0.082)	(0.065)	(2.101)	(2.977)	(2.605)	(3.030)	(3.475)
CATH x I^{1910}	0.037	0.112	0.096	0.072	0.200**	1.471	2.756	4.744**	2.698	6.935**
	(0.040)	(0.079)	(0.062)	(0.075)	(0.093)	(1.999)	(2.682)	(2.143)	(2.570)	(2.710)
CATH x I^{1920}	0.030	-0.021	0.041	-0.088	-0.031	0.644	-1.578	1.303	-0.780	1.811
	(0.036)	(0.071)	(0.048)	(0.062)	(0.059)	(1.882)	(2.449)	(2.061)	(2.240)	(2.287)
CATH x I^{1930}	-0.005	-0.025	0.010	-0.058	-0.013	1.109	0.402	1.798	0.913	1.726
	(0.040)	(0.072)	(0.053)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(1.686)	(2.224)	(1.896)	(2.154)	(2.003)
CATH x I^{1940}	0.009	0.071	0.023	0.072	0.116	-0.634	-0.826	-0.778	-0.025	1.365
	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.042)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(1.004)	(1.484)	(1.258)	(1.478)	(1.417)
CATH x I^{1960}	-0.006	0.028	-0.017	0.027	0.037	1.619*	1.513*	1.990**	1.113	1.362
	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.919)	(0.863)	(0.996)	(0.863)	(0.897)
CATH x I^{1970}	-0.025	0.003	-0.040	0.005	0.026	0.594	0.704	1.158	0.487	0.925
	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(1.377)	(1.384)	(1.482)	(1.416)	(1.476)
CATH x I^{1980}	0.117**	0.168***	0.118*	0.167**	0.189***	5.044***	5.132***	5.862***	4.770***	5.350***
	(0.057)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(1.651)	(1.649)	(1.733)	(1.673)	(1.723)
CATH x I^{1990}	0.193***	0.242***	0.197***	0.235***	0.275***	5.925***	5.930***	7.090***	5.396***	6.679***
	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(1.694)	(1.682)	(1.748)	(1.675)	(1.669)
CATH x I^{2000}	0.207***	0.218***	0.189***	0.208***	0.259***	5.622***	5.231***	6.814***	4.684***	6.505***
	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(1.775)	(1.753)	(1.812)	(1.767)	(1.726)
CATH x I^{2010}	0.192***	0.203***	0.179***	0.189***	0.246***	4.498**	4.247**	5.924***	3.627**	5.804***
	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(1.856)	(1.806)	(1.879)	(1.823)	(1.796)
log(GDPCAP$_{t-5}$)		0.055**			0.075**		0.715			0.882
		(0.025)			(0.030)		(0.733)			(0.820)
INEQUALITY$_{t-5}$			-0.001		-0.001			-0.051***		-0.080***
			(0.001)		(0.001)			(0.019)		(0.024)
TRADE$_{t-5}$				-0.039	-0.046				-2.423**	-1.882
				(0.031)	(0.045)				(1.125)	(1.360)
Constant	0.141***	-0.320*	0.191***	0.101*	-0.483**	-3.301**	-8.491	-1.179	-4.422**	-8.191
	(0.016)	(0.175)	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.216)	(1.313)	(5.431)	(2.282)	(1.970)	(6.297)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16,102	9,118	10,613	8,303	7,419	11,224	8,859	8,778	8,220	7,366
R-squared	0.551	0.491	0.525	0.494	0.511	0.275	0.307	0.291	0.330	0.341
Number of countries	168	157	135	145	127	162	155	132	144	127

Notes: All standard errors, which are reported in paranthesis, are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Real GDP per capita, inequality and trade openness are all lagged five years to avoid any simultaneity issues. See note under Figure S1 for additional information.

Summary: The figure shows that the identification assumption of common pre-intervention trends is also borne out when we estimate a fully flexible model. The trend break in the evolution in democracy in Catholic countries only becomes visible in the 1980s.

Table S2: Fixed effects estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Dependent variable:					Polyarchy					
CATH x I^{1965}	0.101***	0.095***	0.086**	0.071*	0.052	0.023	-0.009	-0.037	-0.046	-0.040
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Cut-off year	Full sample	2010	2005	2000	1995	1990	1985	1980	1975	1970
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16,102	15,493	14,669	13,844	13,025	12,215	11,475	10,745	10,017	9,285
R-squared	0.536	0.515	0.480	0.434	0.372	0.294	0.266	0.259	0.259	0.257
Number of countries	168	168	168	168	167	163	153	153	153	152

Notes: All standard errors, which are reported in paranthesis, are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Summary: The table reports results from estimation of equation (1) with the vector of confounders, *x*, excluded. The table successively shortens the length of the panel by five years. This provides an alternative way - as compared to Table 6 - to explore when the democracy response from the impulse of Vatican II becomes visible. When the cut-off year is 1995 or ealier, we cannot statistically detect the democracy response of the Vatican II impulse.

Table S3: Fixed effects estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Dependent variable:					Polity					
CATH x I^{1965}	3.139***	3.174***	3.119***	2.952***	2.673**	2.289*	1.458	0.709	0.551	0.997
	(1.104)	(1.100)	(1.112)	(1.119)	(1.148)	(1.208)	(1.245)	(1.245)	(1.256)	(1.264)
Cut-off year	Full sample	2010	2005	2000	1995	1990	1985	1980	1975	1970
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	11,224	10,839	10,062	9,296	8,529	7,766	7,088	6,413	5,736	5,086
R-squared	0.259	0.244	0.210	0.167	0.114	0.046	0.034	0.037	0.040	0.038
Number of countries	162	162	161	160	159	142	141	141	139	130

Notes: All standard errors, which are reported in paranthesis, are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Summary: The table reports results from estimation of equation (1) with the vector of confounders, **x**, excluded. The table successively shortens the length of the panel by five years. This provides an alternative way - as compared to Table 6 - to explore when the democracy response from the impulse of Vatican II becomes visible. When the cut-off year is 1985 or ealier, we cannot statistically detect the democracy response of the Vatican II impulse. This shows that response can be detected earlier when we use the polity score as the dependent variable as compared to polyarchy (cf. Table S1).

Table S4: Fixed effects estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Dependent variable:					Polity					
$1_{[CATH>=50\%]}$ x I^{1965}	2.833***	2.254*	2.316**	2.432**	2.393**	2.685***	2.692***	2.517***	2.571***	2.763***
	(0.967)	(1.291)	(0.900)	(0.933)	(1.109)	(0.909)	(0.886)	(0.928)	(0.901)	(0.900)
Excluded region	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,796	9,090	10,103	8,876	8,993	10,806	10,651	10,673	11,106	10,922
R-squared	0.230	0.234	0.276	0.244	0.297	0.259	0.272	0.264	0.267	0.264
Number of cowcode	131	143	146	117	141	157	152	155	159	157

Notes: All standard errors, which are reported in paranthesis, are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The different regions are (1) Eastern Europe and Central Asia (post-Communist; including Mongolia), (2) Latin America (including Cuba and the Dominican Republic), (3) Middle East and North Africa (including Israel and Turkey), (4) Sub-Saharan Africa, (5) Western Europe and North America (including Cyprus, Australia and New Zealand), (6) East Asia, (7) South-East Asia, (8) South Asia, (9) the Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand), and (10) the Caribbean (including Belize, Haiti, Guyana and Suriname).

Summary: The table report results from estimations of equation (1) when the vector of confounders, *x*, is excluded and when CATH is replaced by 1[CATH>=50%]. Columns exclude regions one-by-one. Inspection of the table reveals that Vatican II remains a significant predictor of the evolution post-Conciliar democracy, irrespective of which region is excluded. Our identification strategy hinges on the assumption that (conditionally) there are no other changes occurring around the time of Vatican II, which concurrently correlate with countries' share of Catholics and affect democratization. Potentially relevant changes, as per Huntington (1991), are changes in the policies of external actors, such as the US, the USSR and/or the European Community. It appears reasonable that any changes in US policy would influence Latin America comparatively more; it also appears reasonable that any changes in the policies of the USSR (and, post-1991, Russia) would influence Eastern Europe comparatively more; and it appears reasonable that any changes in the policies of the European Community would influence Europe comparatively more. Consequently, the fact that results are robust to the sequential exclusion of regions makes it improbable that the said changes threaten internal validity.