

CRITIQUE OF LINGUISTIC REASON II: STRUCTURE AND PRAGMATICS, SYNCHRONY AND DIACHRONY, AND LANGUAGE AND METALANGUAGE

by
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In this paper, I shall try to argue for a theory of *general* linguistics: i.e., a kind of linguistic theory that can consistently and coherently range across structure, referential pragmatics, and social-indexical pragmatics, both in the synchronic and diachronic dimensions. First, I shall try to articulate the methodological problems of specialized sciences and autonomous theories. Second, I shall succinctly describe the analytical interdependence and causal interactions between (1) structure and referential pragmatics on the synchronic axis, and (2) on the diachronic axis; then, (3) structure and social-indexical pragmatics on the diachronic axis, and (4) on the synchronic axis. Each topic will be given illustrative examples and theoretical accounts, which will lead to the problematics of 'metalanguage' and 'object language'. Finally, I shall try to integrate all these components and suggest an outline of 'structural diachrony' in such a framework.

1. *Theoretical Preliminaries*

If a future historian were to pick one word to describe the late twentieth-century Anglo-American linguistics, she might choose 'progressive specialization'. Already before the mid-century, Sapir's comprehensive theory of language, culture, history, and personality had become eclipsed by neo-Bloomfieldians' autonomous formalism, which deprived linguistics of almost everything except formal distributions (cf. Sapir 1949; Harris 1951). Perhaps we can better appreciate the magnitude of this 'paradigm shift' if we use the epistemological matrix of neo-Kantianism, which divides all kinds of 'sciences' into two ideal types: historical-interpretive *vs.* natural-analytic sciences. That is, the discipline was transformed from 'the historiography of language' into 'the physics of language', as it were. After this 'great paradigm shift', linguists came to be expected to know only about the internal mechanisms of 'language', not about its cultural, historical, or discursive contexts. Furthermore, though we call something 'a (natural) language' only when it is a formal code *which we use to designate, denote, or refer*, the neo-Bloomfieldians

succeeded in cutting off the external criterion, and theoretically essentialized 'language' solely on the basis of the internal criterion, namely, formal distribution. Thus, 'linguistics' became a science specializing in the analysis of formal distributions which 'happen' to be found in what we call 'language'. It became a science of forms.

Originally restricted to phonemics, this reductionist program was first extended to morphophonemics. Then, in the late 1950s, younger formalists expanded it to cover syntax. This expansion of the reductionist program from the signifying to the *signified* side of language, ironically, could not but bring back to linguistics the antithesis of formalistic reductionism: the problematics of 'designation (connotation), denotation, and reference', or 'meaning and context' (cf. Chomsky 1965; Weinreich 1980 [1968]). Although this could have led to the return of 'culture', 'history', and 'personality' to linguistics, they were kept at bay by the 'scientific' ideologies which nicely fit the era of specialization: namely, dogmatic rationalism, *a priori* universalism, methodological individualism, and psychological Idealism. First, dogmatic rationalism served to suppress the social-scientific problematic of how conceptual systems get their possibility, plausibility, and 'verity' from their cultural, socio-historical contexts. That is, unlike critical rationalism, which examines the historical and cultural relativity of various modes of 'rationality', dogmatic rationalism simply assumes the trans-historical and -cultural validity of its own kind of 'rationality', and renders the problematics of history and culture *a priori* irrelevant. Second, similarly, *a priori* universalism suppressed the problematic of cultural and historical ethnocentrism, that is, the uniformitarian projection of culture-specific or time-bound prejudices onto different cultures and historical periods. (I shall illustrate the questionable character of these ideologies below; cf. also Koyama 1999b). Third, methodological individualism sealed off the problematics of the Durkheimian 'collective representation', 'intersubjectivity', and 'culture' (cf. Durkheim 1965 [1915]). Fourth and finally, psychological Idealism eclipsed the problematic of historically- and culturally-contextualized 'personality' or 'unique individuality', which seems more sensitive to empirical contingency than to generic universality. Together, these ideologies prevented linguistics from returning to a historical-interpretive science, which studies specific human beings as embedded in culture and history (see Sections 4, 5, and 6 below). Instead, linguistics became coupled with

another natural, analytical, individualist, and universalist science, namely, 'cognitive psychology'.

In fact, the social force of relentless specialization was such that, even though linguistics nominally became a branch of cognitive psychology, it remained staunchly autonomous. Moreover, even when the expansion of the formalist program brought the problematics of 'designation, denotation, and reference' out of the closet, most formalists soon decided to turn syntax into an autonomous, specialized science, independent of 'meaning' and 'context'. As an index of how much 'linguistics' remained a specialized science, let us recall Newmeyer (1980), who, following Chomsky (cf. Newmeyer 1983:75), was able to name his book on synchronic formalism 'linguistic theory' *tout court*, implicitly declaring not only historical linguistics and anthropological linguistics, but also semantics and pragmatics, 'un-linguistics'. Most of those syntacticians who had moved to such 'un-linguistic' disciplines by 1980 were originally motivated to bring together syntax, semantics, and pragmatics (cf. 'Generative Semantics'); yet, many semanticists quickly started to follow the specializing path of autonomous syntacticians, constructing 'formal semantics', independently of pragmatics. Even pragmaticists often succumbed to the temptation to construct autonomous pragmatic theories, independently of syntax and semantics, not to mention history and culture. In fact, it could be argued that pragmatics has become *the* sub-discipline which is a veritable hotbed of minutely specialized, mutually independent 'sub-sub-disciplines': speech act theory, relevance theory, conversation analysis, discourse analysis, the ethnography of communication, variation analysis, cognitive linguistics, schema theory, text grammar, etc. (cf. Schiffrin 1994). In short, specialization is clearly *la règle du jeu* in our professional culture. Consequently, some have come to argue that the phenomenon that is studied by such specialized sciences must be 'modular' *in itself*. Thus, as comparative sociologists say, social relations (disciplinary specialization) are 'totemically' projected onto things (language) as their inherent properties (cf. Durkheim 1965 [1915]; Lévi-Strauss 1963, 1967; Silverstein 1992; Koyama 1997c, 1999b).

Such may be the *fin-de-siècle* state of our arts. Indeed, our epistemological consciousness has become so analytical and specialized that we have lost much of our comprehensive vision of history and

culture, and hence sensitivity to our own historical and cultural relativity; so much so that many have come to equate specialization with epistemic evolution (cf. Levinson 1983:371). Specialization has made our epistemic visions so myopic that we cannot see non-specialized sciences as 'sciences' anymore. Yet, once we stop uncritically accepting the culture-specific values that arise from our social and historical conditions, and start to note the circularity of epistemic evolutionism, we quickly realize that specialization is filled with epistemological problems. First, specialization plays havoc with the idea of epistemological 'totality', in that it has no methodological principle guaranteeing inter(sub)disciplinary coherence, consistency, or even compatibility. Notwithstanding, the fact of the matter is that each specialized science cannot but study an area which is embedded in the larger area, the rest of which are studied by other specialized sciences. Since it is completely unrealistic to assume that there is no interaction between these areas, a specialized science has to make substantial assumptions about the neighboring areas, however implicit they may be. Obviously, then, the more specialized a science is, the more likely it is to make bizarre and gratuitous assumptions about its neighbors. Thus, to the extent that a science is specialized, it lacks realistic views of the phenomena a specific part of which it is supposedly studying. Moreover, in order to systematically study the area of its own specialization, a specialized science must identify and control the external variables which interact with the variables that internally belong to the area it studies. For example, in order to study autonomously syntactic phenomena, one must identify and control the semantic, pragmatic, morphological, and lexical variables which interact with syntactic variables. That is, a special science must have not only realistic assumptions, but also systematic knowledge about the neighboring sciences. A special science without such knowledge is unable to control those interacting variables, and thus something less than a 'science', as we know it (see Section 2; cf. also Koyama 1999b).

Further, even strictly within its province, a specialized science is beset with various problems. First, it is likely to generate a host of alternative theories, each operating with its own distinct postulates. Empirical 'data' covered by a specialized science, of course, underdetermine the choice among the theories of the specialized science; and, without having externally, independently motivated criteria to evaluate which theories are more justifiable than others,

the specialized science degenerates into a nihilistically relativistic condition (cf. today's formal theories of syntax). Also, deliberately cut away from external determinants, special-scientific theories must, on their own, come up with basic assumptions about the area they study, and carry out their studies on the basis of such externally unmotivated, arbitrary assumptions ('conventional postulates'). Naturally, such assumptions, which are originally mere hypotheses, start to assume an independent reality of their own, and dictate developmental courses of the special-scientific theories. In particular, the data which fit the assumptions come to be considered 'theoretically significant' or 'interesting', and the data which do not, 'irrelevant' or 'uninteresting'. There is, clearly, vicious circularity in this process.

In our critical understanding of the socio-historical condition of relentless specialization, we must remember two fundamental truths of post-Boasian and post-Saussurean linguistics: namely, first, all sub-disciplines of linguistics are interdependent (to varying degrees; see below); and, second, linguistics is part of, and thus interdependent with, cultural and historical studies (cf. Saussure's 'semiology'; Barthes 1967; cf. also Boas 1887; Stocking 1982, 1996). As the first thesis has been dealt with earlier (Koyama 1996), let me focus here on the second. First of all, it should be fairly clear that even formal-distributions do not exist in 'nature', but immanently obtain in 'human communication', just like 'history' and 'culture', *pace* Newmeyer (1983; see Section 2). Further, just like 'history' and 'culture', formal distributions are created by human communication; and once created, they constrain it (see Section 3). This strongly suggests that, as Sapir (1949) maintained, formal distributions are cultural and historical entities. However, if it is as straightforward as this, the question arises why many have treated formal distributions as if they were ahistorical entities which had nothing to do with culture (cf. Newmeyer 1980, 1983). To be sure, the social condition of specialization, as described above, must have contributed to the plausibility of this linguistic Platonism; yet, there is, I think, something about formal distributions which invites such naturalization. That is, formal distributions are characteristics of linguistic-structural types (*langue*), which are *irreducible* to their token-occurrences, i.e., their areal and historical (spatio-temporal) localizations, which appear in the extensional universe of phonetics and pragmatics (*parole*). From this, many seem to have inferred that

structural types are Platonic entities which exist independently of the dimensions of time (history) and space (cultural locality). Yet, irreducibility is one thing; independence quite another. Indeed, most phonologists assume – justifiably, in my view – that such *structural* types as phonemes and morphophonemes are not reducible, *but systematically related*, to their phonetic *extensions*. To be more precise, linguistic-structural elements are systematically related to the extensional universe of phonetics or pragmatics (*parole*) which is *synchronous* with them; in other words, there are no *achronic*, *ahistoric* structures, but only *synchronic*, *historic* ones. To use the jargon of semiotics, the symbolic is unmotivated (arbitrary), decontextualized, and atemporal, *relative to* the indexical phenomena that are (historically) *synchronous* with it (cf. Koyama 2000).

Let us, then, move on to focus on indexical (i.e., pragmatic) phenomena. First, clearly, indexical phenomena are spatio-temporalized and socio-historically localized; they robustly take place in socio-historical contexts (cf. Putnam 1975). Moreover, as 'performative utterances' most clearly illustrate, they also *create* socio-historical contexts (see Koyama 1997a, c, for more precise statements). In other words, pragmatic phenomena are not just related to, but integral part of, cultural and historical processes. Indeed, the 'causal theory of reference' has made clear that synchronic pragmatics is inextricably interlocked with historical, diachronic pragmatics; the diachronic dimension of synchronic speech acts – such as involving proper names – partially determines their values (cf. Kripke 1972; Putnam 1975). Thus, pragmatic universes are causally linked with one another, and constitute a diachronic series. Since each structure is linked with the pragmatic universe synchronous with it, this means that structures, too, constitute a diachronic series, via their linkage with the pragmatic universes. Structural diachrony is anchored in pragmatic diachrony. Hence, diachronic changes in structure are anchored in diachronic changes in pragmatics. In other words, structure changes through its interaction with pragmatics, not by itself, as if it were a mysterious organism. Hence, too formal distributions are irreducibly historical products of human communication.

In this paper, I shall fill out the theoretical and empirical details of this line of reasoning. In the second and third sections, I shall deal with the interdependence between structure and referential

pragmatics in the synchronic and diachronic dimensions, respectively. In the fourth and fifth sections, I shall discuss the interdependence between structure and social-indexical pragmatics in the diachronic and synchronic dimensions, respectively. In the sixth section, I shall provide a brief outline of 'structural diachrony' partially on the basis of the arguments elaborated in these sections.

2. Interdependence of Structure and Referential Pragmatics (1): Synchrony

Though haphazardly treated by 'autonomous formalists', the interdependence of structure and referential pragmatics has been systematically investigated by functionalists (cf. Nichols 1984). The fundamental functionalist insight is, roughly, as follows: just as various (morpho)phonological 'rules', 'representations', etc., interact with one another to 'create' phonetic representations which conform to 'surface constraints' (cf. 'conspiracy'), various morphological and syntactic forms 'cooperate' with one another to achieve referential functions (cf. 'functional unity'; see below). To understand the epistemological plausibility of this project, we must recall that phonetics and referential pragmatics both belong to the *extensional* universe, whereas (morpho)phonemics and morphosyntax both belong to the *intensional* universe. What 'phonology' does is, of course, to systematically relate (morpho)phonemic intensions with phonetic extensions. Similarly, functionalists have tried to systematically relate morphosyntactic intensions with pragmatic extensions, and they have shown that various morphosyntactic formal characteristics interact with one another to serve referential functions. For example, it has been demonstrated that such formally distinct entities as topic-markers, 'Equi-NP deletion rules', noun classes (gender), etc., serve the same function of reference maintenance (co-reference), as will be explicated shortly. Furthermore, it has been shown that, in general, a structure which has an elaborately developed system of one of those functionally equivalent mechanisms does not have an elaborately developed system of the other mechanisms (see below). Clearly, then, structural organizations are constrained by the referential functions they serve. In short, there is interdependence between structure and referential pragmatics (cf.

Heath 1975; Foley and Van Valin 1984; Koyama 1997b, 1999a, b, 2000).

One major breakthrough in this area of research is Jakobson's (1957) analysis of what Jespersen (1922) had named 'shifters'. Shifters are the structural forms which require, for their denotational characterizations, such *pragmatic* categories as '(addresser/addressee) role' (first and second persons), 'epistemic relation between the speech and narrated events' (evidentials and epistemic modals), etc. They are to be contrasted with non-shifters, whose denotational characterizations do not seem to require pragmatic categories. Prototypical examples of non-shifters are 'abstract nouns', the denotata (not referents) of which do not change depending on the context. Clearly, shifters are located at the intersection of morphosyntax and pragmatics. In 'autonomous linguistics', however, shifters have not been given the theoretical significance they deserve, perhaps because they appear peripheral or 'unimportant' from the theoretical perspectives which focus on the autonomy of structure (see Section 6).

But, such a theoretical perspective can be shown to be highly problematic. Jakobson (1957) may be understood as arguing that grammatical categories, such as 'person', 'tense', 'mood', 'evidential', etc., are the analogues of distinctive features in the domain of morphosyntax, semantics, and referential pragmatics. Recall that phonetics and pragmatics are extensional, and (morpho)phonology and morphosyntax are intensional. Now, note that distinctive features are phonetically characterized (e.g., [voice]) and structurally differentiate phonemes one from another (e.g., /p, t, k/ *vs.* /b, d, g/). Similarly, Jakobson's grammatical categories are pragmatically characterized (e.g., person, or 'speech-event participant'; cf. Benveniste 1971), and structurally differentiate morphosyntactic form-classes one from another (e.g., first-person forms *vs.* second-person forms *vs.* all other NP types). Moreover, if we realize that (1) what differentiates shifters from non-shifters is indexicality (see Section 4), and (2) 'indexicality' allows gradience (i.e., it is a 'degree' notion), it becomes obvious that we can subdivide shifters and non-shifters into smaller classes on the basis of their degrees of indexicality. Thus, we can serially arrange nominal forms, from the maximum to the minimum degree of indexicality, roughly as follows: first person pronouns, second person pronouns, anaphors and demonstratives, personal proper names, kin-terms and status terms,

animate terms, discrete entity terms, non-discrete entity terms, and abstract terms. Thus, (1) the morphosyntactic types of nominals are differentiated from one another on the basis of the grammatical categories they encode (i.e., various degrees of indexicality); and (2) they constitute a hierarchy, which is called 'NP hierarchy' in the functionalist literature (cf. Silverstein 1976; Koyama 1997b, 1999a, b).

Now, if the NP hierarchy is a genuine analogue of the hierarchy of distinctive features, it must display the structural characteristics the latter shows. For instance, the feature hierarchy [+vocalic \supset +sonorant \supset +voice] captures the structural characteristic about the distributions of phonemes in the syllable-peak position: i.e., a segment's 'privilege of occurrence' in that position gradually decreases, roughly, from (1) vocalic phonemes, to (2) consonantal sonorant phonemes, to (3) voiced sibilant and plosive phonemes, and finally to (4) unvoiced ones; and inversely for the privilege of occurrence in the syllable-slope position (cf. Jakobson and Halle 1956). Here, we may say that vocalic phonemes (1) are the prototypical occupants of the syllable-peak position, and unvoiced plosive phonemes (4) are the prototypical occupants of the syllable-slope position. Similarly, consider the hierarchy of vocalic features, where (1) the features [compact/diffuse] (i.e., [low/high]) and [acute/grave] (i.e., [front/back]) are located higher than [nasal/oral], [tense/lax], [(non)flat] (or their equivalents), and (2) the [acute/grave] distinction starts from [-compact] and then moves to [+compact]. This generates the three most unmarked, prototypical vocalic phonemes of /a, i, u/, which typically constitute the phonemic inventory of a structure which has only three vocalic phonemes. More important, structures which have more than these three vocalic phonemes often employ various lexical specifications and (morpho)phonological rules to change non-prototypical phonemes (such as /e, o/, etc.) to these prototypical ones, when such non-prototypical ones occur in neutralizing, 'non-prominent' environments (e.g., unstressed syllables, non-initial syllables, etc.; cf. Trubetzkoy 1969 [1939]). This has been demonstrated by Haiman (1972) *vis-à-vis* Turkish, Russian, Romantsch, and Greek, and I shall show the same *vis-à-vis* Japanese in Sections 5 and 6. Thus, if the NP hierarchy is exactly like the hierarchy of distinctive features, it must show such a structured prototype effect (cf. Silverstein 1993 [1980]).

And indeed it does. As is widely known in the 'functionalist' literature since Silverstein (1976), the grammatical-categorial ordering of NPs is systematically interrelated with case-marking or, to be more precise, nominative-accusative *vs.* ergative-absolutive systems; and this interrelationship between the NP grammatical categories and case-marking shows a clear prototype effect. To begin with, case-marking is a morphosyntactic phenomenon which is primarily correlated with (semantic) case-relations, which obtain between predicates and their arguments. For example, the nominative case-marking is correlated with the (semantic) 'S(ubject)' of atransitive or intransitive predicates and the 'A(gent)' of transitive predicates, while the accusative case-marking is correlated with the 'P(atient)' of transitive predicates; on the other hand, the ergative case-marking is correlated with 'A', the absolutive with 'S' and 'P' (cf. Dixon 1979; Comrie 1989). Here, note that the nominative/accusative system treats 'A' as unmarked, and 'P' as marked categories, whereas the ergative/absolutive system treats 'P' as unmarked, and 'A' as marked. Now, since morphosyntax, semantics, and pragmatics are *structurally interdependent*, case-marking is sensitive not only to case-relations, but also to predicate types, tenses/aspects, reference maintenance categories, interclausal linkage types, and, most pertinent to our discussion, the NP hierarchy. That is, *ceteris paribus*, the nominative-accusative case-marking universally 'starts from' the NPs whose denotata are speech-event participants (personal pronouns), while the ergative-absolutive case-marking starts from the NPs whose denotata are least indexical (e.g., 'abstract nouns'); particular structures may select certain NP grammatical categories that fall in between, such as 'proper name' and 'animate term' – serially arranged on the basis of the degrees of indexicality – as 'endpoints' of such case-marking systems (see Silverstein (1976, 1981a, 1987), Dixon (1979), Comrie (1989), Tsunoda (1991), Koyama (1999a) for more exact statements). Then, since the nominative/accusative system treats 'A' as unmarked and the ergative/absolutive treats 'P' as unmarked, we can say that personal-pronominal forms are the prototypical 'A(gent)', and 'abstract' NPs are the prototypical 'P(atient)', *just as* vocalic phonemes are the prototypical occupants of the syllabic-peak position and unvoiced plosive phonemes are those of the syllabic-slope position (cf. Koyama 1997b).

Next, let us see how the grammatical category of 'nominal', of which the NP grammatical categories are subcategories, interacts with other superordinate grammatical categories. First, 'nominal' is obviously a paradigmatic (*vs.* syntagmatic) grammatical category which is pragmatically characterized by reference (*vs.* predication). Thus, 'nominal' (paradigmatic and referential) belongs to the same level of grammatical-categorial hierarchy as 'verbal' (paradigmatic and predicative), 'reference maintenance' (syntagmatic and referential), and 'interclausal linkage' (syntagmatic and predicative). Case-relations, which we have dealt with above, concern the interrelationship between 'nominal' and 'verbal', and we have seen that case-marking is sensitive not only to case-relations, but also to the NP grammatical categories, which belong to 'nominal'. This strongly suggests that there must be similarly systematic interdependence between, say, 'nominal' and 'reference maintenance'. Then, we note the following cross-linguistically valid regularity: a referent which has been referred to by a 'full NP' form (i.e., a NP which is less indexical than pronominals) may be felicitously referred to by an anaphoric form (cf. Halliday and Hasan (1976) for more details). Thus, the atemporally serial organization of the NP grammatical categories, on the one hand, and the temporally serial organization of reference maintenance mechanisms ('first mention', 'second mention', etc.), on the other, are systematically interrelated – ultimately because both are based on the same principle: the degrees of the indexical linkage of referents to the speech event. Moreover, note that various 'full' NP types are neutralized into anaphoric forms when they occur in non-prominent environments (e.g., second mention), *just as* various non-prototypical phonemes are neutralized into prototypical vocalic phonemes when they occur in non-prominent environments (e.g., unstressed or non-initial syllables). The parallelism stands (cf. Silverstein 1986; Koyama 1997b).

Second, as Jakobson (1957) noted, 'nominal' is subdivided not only by the NP grammatical categories, but also by noun class (e.g., gender) and number categories, which cross-cut the NP grammatical categories and each other. Thus, the class of anaphors may be subdivided by gender categories. Now, the referent of an anaphoric form is, *ceteris paribus*, easier to identify if the form is marked for a gender category, as this helps the speech participants to differentiate the discourse referents of the anaphoric NPs marked by different

genders, say, (generally) a human male (masculine) from a female (feminine), (in German) a dog (*Hund* masculine) from a cat (*Katze* feminine), or (in French) an armchair (*fauteuil* masculine) from a table (*table* feminine; cf. Koyama 1999a). Thus, noun class categories, which belong to 'nominal', contribute to 'reference maintenance'. On the other hand, 'reference maintenance' has formal categories which belong to itself, such as syntactically conditioned pronominalization, reflexivization, deletion: e.g., [[*I_i promised him_j [Ø_i to go]*], [*I_i wanted him_j [Ø_j to go]*], etc. Significantly, Heath's (1975) cross-linguistic investigation into Choctaw, Turkish, Basque, English, Arabic, and Nunggubuyu has found that, roughly, if a language has an elaborate system of noun classes, then it does not have an 'elaborate' (strict, extensive) system of syntactically conditioned reference maintenance mechanisms (e.g., Equi-NP Deletion), and inversely, since the two formal categories share, or 'conspire' to achieve, the same *pragmatic* function of co-reference. That is, they have, to use another term of the phonological trade, 'functional unity' (cf. Kisseberth 1970; cf. also Foley and Van Valin 1984; Koyama 1997b, 1999a, b). Thus, structural organization is constrained by referential pragmatics. Obviously, such interdependence between structure and pragmatics cannot be observed by an autonomous theory of syntax.

In fact, 'autonomous syntax' cannot even identify autonomously syntactic phenomena, as it does not know how to identify and control semantic and pragmatic variables which interact with autonomously syntactic phenomena. For example, it fails to see that *reference* maintenance is primarily exercised by discursive, *pragmatic* phenomena which operate across sentence-boundaries, and to which not only syntagmatic categories, but also other grammatical categories, cultural stereotypes (roughly, beliefs about the world), and pragmatics contribute, as they are all integratively involved in referential pragmatics (cf. Halliday and Hasan 1976; Silverstein 1976, 1981a; Bolinger 1979; Koyama 1999a, b). The interdependence of syntactic categories, cultural stereotypes, and pragmatics in reference maintenance can be illustrated by Bolinger (1979:290), who noted that the autonomous linguist Lasnik had wrongly attributed the 'ungrammaticality' of *[sic] *It surprises him_i that John_i is so well liked* to the command relationship, though the sentence is, in truth, just pragmatically 'abnormal', because it suggests that the speaker can read John's mind, an implicature which is incompatible with our

common belief about 'mind reading' (cf. the 'normalcy' of *It surprised him_i that John_i was so well liked; It obviously surprises him_i that John_i is so well liked; It surprises me that I am so well liked; etc.*)

Thus, we conclude that, *just as* (morpho)phonemics is systematically interrelated and interdependent with phonetics, morphosyntax is systematically interrelated and interdependent with pragmatics. More specifically, (1) *just as* distinctive features can systematically express the former interdependence, grammatical categories can systematically express the latter interdependence; (2) in particular, *just as* distinctive features are hierarchically organized and show prototype effects, grammatical categories are hierarchically organized and show prototype effects; (3) *just as* various (morpho)phonological formal-categories show 'conspiracy' and 'functional unity', various morphosyntactic formal-categories show 'conspiracy' and 'functional unity'; and (4) *just as* morphophonemic analysis will produce dubious results if it is carried out independently of phonemics and phonetics, morphosyntactic analysis will produce dubious results if it is carried out independently of semantics and pragmatics, since there are, clearly, interactions between them.

3. Interdependence of Structure and Referential Pragmatics (2): *Diachrony*

Having shown how structure and referential pragmatics are interdependent in the synchronic dimension, we now turn to diachrony. In this area, 'autonomous linguistics', which does not cover pragmatics, has scored rather poorly, compared with 'functionalism', which covers it. This indicates that pragmatics is, as argued earlier, the anchoring point of diachrony. Also, let us note that a synchronic theory which has difficulty relating to the diachronic dimension does not seem to capture the 'reality' of language, which seems to smoothly integrate the synchronic and diachronic dimensions – so much so that we needed the genius of Saussure (1987 [1916]) to clearly separate them out.

To illustrate how a general theory of linguistics, which encompasses both structure and pragmatics, can capture the integration of synchrony and diachrony, let us try to see how the several cases of interdependence between structure and referential pragmatics that we have seen in the synchronic dimension are also

observed in the diachronic dimension. Recall (1) Silverstein's (1976) synchronic universal of 'NP hierarchy', which implies that the nominative-accusative case-marking starts from the most indexical nominal forms and serially proceeds to the least indexical forms, and (2) Heath's (1975) synchronic universal, which states the functional unity of the morphological categories of noun class, on the one hand, and the syntactically-conditioned mechanisms of pronominalization, deletion, etc., on the other, with regard to reference maintenance. If we apply these synchronic universals to diachrony, they will imply that, among other things, (1a) if a structure that has an extensive nominative/accusative morphological case-marking system starts to lose it, the last NP types to lose the explicit morphological case-marking will be the most indexical forms: i.e., first person, second person, and 'third person' pronominals; (1b) if such a structure does not develop an ergative/absolutive case-marking system, it may develop a more extensive *syntagmatic* case-marking system – e.g., the one utilizing the syntagmatic ordering of morphological units (i.e., 'word-order') – for the less indexical forms (e.g., proper names, animate terms, abstract terms, etc.), given the 'functional unity' of the morphological and syntagmatic marking of case-relations; and (2) if a structure that has an elaborate system of morphological gender-marking starts to lose it, it will develop a more elaborate system of syntagmatic reference maintenance mechanisms, such as the one utilizing 'word-order'.

Now, as is well known, in the course of its diachronic development, English has lost the *morphological* markings of *gender* and *case* for the NP types which are less indexical than anaphors, and developed a more strict system of *syntagmatic* arrangements of morphological units ('word-order'), which is, obviously, positively correlated with *syntactically-fixed* co-referential mechanisms, as well as syntactic case-marking. Thus, quite clearly, this diachronic change conformed to the synchronically universal patterns of the interdependence between structure and referential pragmatics. In other words, the diachronic changes in the formal organization of English seem to have been constrained by the referential functions which the formal units serve. This illustrates, I believe, the interdependence between structure and referential pragmatics not only in the synchronic dimension, but also in the diachronic one. In fact, this particular case shows that the same types of interdependence

are observed across these two dimensions, and thus are probably 'universal' (panchronic), in a real sense.

But, I have not chosen this diachronic change just because it nicely illustrates the integration between structural synchrony and structural diachrony through their interdependence with referential pragmatics. That is, it points to another problem of 'general linguistics', which will be of some importance for our discussions below. First, note that, through diachronic change, English has become a language where the grammatical categories of case-relation and reference maintenance are encoded more heavily in syntactic forms than in morphological ones. Thus, an empirical, socio-historical condition – though neither necessary or sufficient – has been set for the plausibility and dominance of the morphosyntactic theories which, though allegedly 'universal', crucially rely on data from Modern English, and which treat morphology as if it were an epiphenomenon dependent on 'underlying' syntactic mechanisms (cf. Chomsky 1965). Contrast 'Classic' or 'Standard' Transformational Grammar, which tries to reduce morphology to 'phonology' and 'syntax', with European and American Structuralism, which primarily analyzes various languages of the Old and the New World, respectively, and which treats morphology as a variable clearly distinct from syntax. Here, we might observe the partial dependency of linguistic theories (metalanguage) on linguistic data (object language), the partial dependency of the conceptual on the empirical, and the relativity of 'universal' theories to their socio-historical contexts (see Section 1). We shall more fully deal with the issue of the interdependence between metalanguage and object language in Sections 5 and 6.

4. *Interdependence of Structure and Social-Indexical Pragmatics (1): Diachrony*

In the functionalist program, 'pragmatics' is usually understood as *referential* pragmatics. In fact, there is another kind of pragmatics, 'social-indexical pragmatics', which concerns the interrelationship between language use, on the one hand, and the power-relations and group-identities of language users, on the other. Thus, honorific, gender, class, generation, dialectal, standard, and other varieties are

primarily covered in this domain, though they are interrelated with structural (in)variants, too (see below).

Since social-indexical pragmatics has been treated as a residual category from the perspective of mainstream Anglo-American linguistics (see Section 1), there has not been much rigorous theorizing on the interrelationships between social-indexical pragmatics, on the one hand, and structure and referential pragmatics, on the other. Let us, then, try to sketch out an outline of such interrelationships. To begin with, it is imperative to realize that structural forms are primarily segmented on the basis of designation, denotation, and reference (i.e., 'referential function'), and not on the basis of the emotive, aesthetic, or (other) social-indexical values that users may ascribe to them. Linguistic-structural segments are distinguished from one another on the basis of referential categories such as 'animate', 'number', 'gender', etc. (see above), not of non-referential categories such as 'the degrees of the speaker's emotive involvement', 'the aesthetic refinement of structural types', 'the social status of the speaker', etc. (with the partial exception of augmentatives, diminutives, honorifics, and the like; for which, see below). Thus, linguistic structures are, in principle, free of social-indexicality; accordingly, structural variants and invariants, which are parts of structure, are both free of social-indexicality. Hence, structural variants are categorically distinct from linguistic varieties (i.e., sociolects and dialects), which are *social-indexically* characterized: e.g., socio-economic class, gender, regionality, etc. The former belong to structure (i.e., they are part of 'a calculus of possibilities'), while the latter are mapping relationships between structural (in)variants (or their tokens in referential pragmatics) and social-indexical categories (see Section 5 for details).

Now, if structure is *referentially* regimented, it follows that the interdependence between linguistic structure and *social-indexical* pragmatics must be much less 'transparent' than the one between structure and *referential* pragmatics. On the other hand, since referential pragmatics and social-indexical pragmatics take place in the same pragmatic universe, there must be relatively 'transparent' interdependence between these two domains. Thus, note that the tokens of *referentially indexical* structural forms – personal pronouns, proper names, kin-terms, or social status-terms (cf. Section 2) – are often obviously indexical of the speech participants' *social* relations with their referents (cf. Brown and Gilman 1960; Friedrich 1966;

Kripke 1972; Koyama 1997a). This indicates that social-indexical pragmatics is interrelated with structure primarily through referential pragmatics. In other words, the interdependence between structure and social-indexical pragmatics is mediated by referential pragmatics. Thus, the correlation between structural and social-indexical units must be generally opaque; but, when one kind of referents (or a referential 'value') is correlated with a few structural units, on the one hand, and a few social-indexical units, on the other, each structural unit may become uniquely mapped onto one of the social-indexical units. That is, when the referential values of a few structural units are identical – i.e., when they are referentially equivalent –, these structural units may be differentially and determinately associated with the distinct social-indexical correlates of the referential value. Thus, note how the allophonic variants of the phoneme, which are referentially equivalent, have been widely recognized as the privileged loci of the relatively transparent correspondence between structural variants and social-indexical variants (cf. Labov 1972). Similarly, the allomorphic variants *indices* and *indexes*, which are referentially equivalent, may be associated with the social-indexical variants 'learned' and 'common', respectively. And similarly, again, for cultural-stereotypic equivalents such as *ophthalmologist* and *eye doctor* (cf. Putnam 1975). In all this, however, we are still at the level of linguistic varieties (sociolects and dialects), which concern mere correlation between structural (in)variants (or their tokens) and social-indexical categories.

Clearly, such mere correlation is of contingent character, as it only deals with regular co-occurrences of, on the one hand, the tokens of structural (in)variants and, on the other hand, social-indexical categories, in the same referential contexts. This is to be strictly distinguished from a logically posterior development, in which the regular co-occurrences between structural forms and social-indexical categories 'invite' language users to ascribe 'social-indexical illocutionary forces' to the surface forms as their inherent, essential, 'necessary' properties. For example, language users may come to perceive *indices* (*vs. indexes*) and *ophthalmologist* (*vs. eye doctor*) as having the social-indexical property of 'learnedness' or 'refinement' in themselves. After this second-order process – which Boas (1911) called 'secondary rationalization' –, the *social-indexical* categories become decontextualized from the *pragmatic (indexical) contexts* in which they occur, and turn into 'essential' properties of the

linguistic-structural (*symbolic*) forms. As a result, these forms may regularly, albeit defeasibly, signal their social-indexical 'forces' *independently of* the specific *contexts* in which they are used. Ultimately, this process may lead to the emergence of *registers* (*vs.* linguistic varieties), where linguistic structure appears, from the users' points of view, to be subdivided into the denotationally quasi-equivalent formal classes that have distinct social-indexical 'forces' in themselves (see Section 6; cf. Silverstein 1979, 1992, 1995a; Koyama 1997c).

In the following, we shall briefly deal with a system of honorific register, which seems to give an empirical support for this 'genetico-causal' account: namely, the verbal honorifics in Japanese, which I have extensively analyzed elsewhere (Koyama 1997c). To begin with, (1) 'referent honorifics' systematically (albeit defeasibly) map some linguistic structural variants onto the power-relational and group-identity characteristics between speaker-role incumbents and referents¹, while (2) 'addressee honorifics' involve addressee-role incumbents instead of referents (Comrie 1976). Now, Japanese has not only both of them, but also two sub-categories of referent honorifics: (1a) *son-kei* 'respectful' types, which index the speaker-role incumbent's deference towards the referent(s) of the 'subject' NP; and (1b) *ken-zyou* 'humble' types, which index the speaker-role incumbent's evaluation that the referent(s) of subject NP (and often the speaker-role incumbent, inferentially) owes deference to another referent(s), often of 'Dative' ('Experiencer', 'Recipient') or 'Object' ('Patient', 'Stimulus', 'Theme') non-subject NPs. Note that (1a) *son-kei*, (1b) *ken-zyou*, and (2) addressee honorifics are social-indexically, as opposed to structurally, characterized categories.

Now, recall that our genetico-causal account of 'honorific register', as described above, was predicated upon the hypothesis that there is analytical 'independence' between structural (in)variants and social-indexical categories: they are conceptualized as 'independent variables' that *happen* to transparently correspond to each other in 'honorific registers'. This implies that the three kinds of honorifics in Japanese may have irregular and diverse structural characteristics. And, indeed, all three kinds have (α) suppletive types: morphologically irregular types paradigmatically opposed to referentially equivalent, non-honorific forms. Further, though (2) addressee honorifics have only (α) suppletive types, (1a) *son-kei* and (1b) *ken-zyou* types also have (β) regular (syntactically productive) types, and (γ)

regular donatory types (verbs of giving and receiving); these three kinds of structural types are obviously diverse in terms of both forms and referential functions (see Kuno (1987) and Koyama (1997b) for details). This indicates the contingent character of the interrelationships between structural (in)variants and social-indexical categories, as hypothesized in our account. Yet, in conformity to our account again, the native users of the language seem to interpret the honorific forms as having 'deferential illocutionary forces' in themselves, i.e., social-indexical categories as their inherent properties, as demonstrated by, e.g., Harada's (1975) 'grammatical analysis' of honorifics, where the 'honorific' structural forms are analyzed as having 'deferential forces' in themselves, independent of the contexts of their use.

Before proceeding further, let me elaborate on the notion of 'indexicality'. In Sections 2 and 3, the term 'indexicality' is used in a narrow, specific sense, namely, 'the indexical presupposability of denotata in the speech event'. For instance, in the speech event, the speech participants are, as a rule, more presupposable than the persons referred to by proper names (cf. 'causal *chain* of reference'; note the indirectness of indexicality). Similarly, the latter are more presupposable than the entities denoted by abstract nouns. Now, even though the entities which do not exist or have not been referred to in the speech event are generally not as referable as the entities within the context of speech, we *can*, of course, refer to them, especially if their existence 'outside' the speech event can be presupposed: e.g., we can refer to a (specific) dog even if it has not been referred to in the speech event, or it does not exist in the speech event, insofar as it is 'known' to the speech participants. In such a case, we may say that the entity is presupposable 'independently' of the speech event, whereas a speech participant can be described as indexically presupposable 'within' the speech event. Obviously, the same distinction can be drawn *vis-à-vis* social indexicality. That is, we can differentiate the group identities and power relations indexed *within* the speech event from those presupposable *independently* of the speech event. For instance, as classically studied by Friedrich (1966), the social-indexical degree of 'solidarity' between the speech participants can be dynamically determined and re-determined *within* the speech event, by strategically using, e.g., 'T/V' forms (cf. the transition from *vous* to *tu*; Brown and Gilman 1960), while the class, gender, and regionality values of the speech participants may be

presupposable relatively *independently* of the speech event itself. Further, by utilizing the standard sociological distinction between 'micro-' and 'macro-social' phenomena, we may say that the entities or social-relations indexed within the speech event are *micro-socially* presupposable, while those presupposable independently of the speech event may be characterized as *macro-socially* presupposable (cf. Koyama 1999b).

Having thus elaborated on 'indexicality', we are now in a position to further explore the interdependence of structure and social-indexical pragmatics in the diachronic dimension. Now, recall that, in *referential* pragmatics, (1') ('non-participant') referents are, *ceteris paribus*, more presupposable *independently* of the speech event in which they are indexed, than (2') addressees. Similarly, in *social-indexical* pragmatics involving the use of honorifics, (1) the power-relational and group identity characteristics obtaining between the speaker-role incumbents and (non-participant) referents must be, *ceteris paribus*, more presupposable independently of the speech event in which they are indexed, than (2) those between the speaker- and addressee-role incumbents. Then, it must be obvious that referent (*vs.* addressee) honorifics and honorification are analytically correlated with 'macro-social determinism', which interprets the social-indexical value of the micro-social event as primarily determined by macro-social variables presupposable independently of the micro-social event (e.g., socio-economic class; cf. 'vulgar Marxism', Labovian 'socio-linguistics', etc.), whereas addressee honorifics and honorification are analytically correlated with 'individual agentivism' (cf. the Gricean theories of agentive intention, the Gumperzian theory of metaphorical code-switching, etc.), which interprets agentive actions within the micro-social event as primary determinants of its value (cf. Koyama 1997a, c, 1999b).

Now, as I have elaborated in Koyama (1997c), this analytic scheme can be used as part of the explanation for a complex of specific historical changes involving honorifics and honorification in (a) the linguistic structure of Japanese, (b) the language use, and (c) the general 'culture' in which the structure is used and the social categories are indexed. Clearly, this is such a complex process – involving multi-dimensional interactions among various structural, pragmatic, and 'cultural' variables – that it is impossible to provide even a succinct summary here. Suffice it to say that, as the cultural transformation from a 'caste'-like society to a modern capitalist,

'egalitarian' society has proceeded in Japan, (c') individual agentivism has become, expectably, more dominant, relative to social determinism; (b') addressee honorification has become more dominant, relative to referent honorification; and (a') even addressee *honorifics* have become, in a sense, more 'dominant', relative to referent honorifics, in terms of categorial elaboration and 'functional specialization': in particular, suppletive and relatively non-productive regular referent honorifics seem to have been undergoing categorial reduction (see Koyama (1997c) and the references there). That is, in a nutshell, if we control various interacting variables, we can see that there is diachronic correlation between (a') addressee honorifics, (b') addressee honorification, and (c') individual agentivism. This kind of correlation, obviously, has been poorly explored in modern linguistics, not only because it is very difficult to find, due to the large number of interacting variables, but also because it requires a kind of 'universal' (*general-linguistic*) categories that can range across structure, referential pragmatics, social-indexical pragmatics, and 'culture', such as 'indexical presupposability', 'speech event', etc. However, as we have seen, structure and referential pragmatics are interdependent, and the latter and social-indexical pragmatics obviously take place in the same extensional universe; hence, there must be investigable interactions between structure and social-indexical pragmatics. In fact, the very inability of 'autonomous linguistics' – which does not theorize social-indexical pragmatics at all – to account for diachrony suggests that there are such interactions, though the failure of 'autonomous linguistics' to theorize even referential pragmatics makes the case less clear (see Sections 2 and 3). At least, however, it suggests that, as I have been arguing, pragmatics, be it referential or social-indexical, is the anchoring point of history (see Sections 1 and 3).

Finally, let me note that, as described in Koyama (1997c), the native grammatical theories of Japanese – especially Tokieda Grammar and Watanabe Grammar (cf. Watanabe 1974) – have paid much theoretical attention to honorifics, partly because, obviously enough, Japanese has 'grammaticalized honorifics'. Contrast this with Anglo-American 'autonomous syntactic' theories, which have been found plausible and even cogent by many inhabitants of a culture where the primary language does not have 'grammaticalized honorifics'. Once again, this indicates the partial dependency of linguistic theories on data, the partial dependency of the conceptual

on the empirical, and the partial dependency of dogmatic rationalism on the socio-historical context (see Sections 1 and 3). In the next section, we shall see how the interdependence between 'linguistics' and its socio-historical context strikes at the heart of linguistic theories.

5. *Interdependence of Structure and Social Indexical Pragmatics (2): Synchrony*

Thus, we begin this section with theoretically sketching the interdependence between object language and metalanguage, or: 'natural language' and 'linguistic theory'. First of all, an analytic property of 'metalanguage' is its dependency on 'object language', since it does not exist unless there is an object language to which it refers. Thus, for example, linguistic theories are obviously dependent on linguistic data; if only 'Standard Average European' languages are known to linguists, their linguistic theories may reflect this bias (cf. Boas 1911; Stocking 1982, 1996; see Sections 3 and 4 for more recent examples). Similarly, linguistic *theorizing* is dependent on language *use*; if linguists live in a standardized speech community and have a standardizing 'fashion of speaking', they might privilege standard varieties over other varieties, or invariance over variance (cf. Milroy and Milroy 1991; see below).

Metalanguage, however, is not only dependent on object language, but it is a second-order language which describes, regiment, and imposes an organization on a first-order language (cf. Koyama 1997a). For example, what 'language' is, and what language users do, is partially determined by what linguists say 'language' is, and what they do with it, to the extent that they have the social authority and power to do so. Language planning, linguistic standardization authorized or administered by linguists, and the international currency of 'artificial language' as well as the communications model it presupposes, are obvious examples of this (cf. Joseph 1987; Koyama 1997c); but there are subtler, and epistemologically more 'interesting', cases.

To begin, we know that most language users have pragmatically-centered views of 'language'. That is, not being trained linguists, they do not see linguistic structures, but linguistic varieties (i.e., sociolects and dialects), which are the social-indexical correlates of structural

(in)variants (see Section 4). However, linguists have been successful in institutionalizing, at least in some academic quarters, a different notion of 'language', namely, linguistic structure (*langue*), which is defined as non-pragmatic (i.e., 'context-free'). Thus, our culture has two 'ideal-typical' notions of 'language': (1) the pragmatic one, which is 'experientially' based on micro-social agents' 'holistic', 'phenomenological' perceptions of both structural and pragmatic aspects of 'language'; and (2) the structural one, which is 'scientifically' based on analysts' de-agentivized, de-contextualizing, macro-social perceptions of 'language' (cf. Bourdieu 1977).² Note that ordinary language philosophers, speech act theorists, 'functionalists', and others who focus on language use, users' agentive intention and understanding, and communication, generally conceptualize 'language' in the first ('pragmatic', 'empiricist') sense, while analytic philosophers, formalists, and others who focus on the formal, autonomous, decontextualizable, conventional properties of 'language', generally conceptualize 'language' in the second ('structural', 'rationalist') sense. The actual situation, of course, is more complicated, as there are many 'mixed' types: e.g., (1) variationists, who *pragmatically* analyze linguistic structure in terms of varieties (cf. variable rules), yet *macro-socially* analyze language use in terms of such variables as 'socio-economic class' and 'regionality' (cf. Labov 1972); and (2) language *users* who advocate or implement 'linguistic standardization', i.e., the national, *macro-social* construction of linguistic norms which purports to reduce the social-*indexicality* of dialects and sociolects (cf. Koyama 1997c). Thus, what linguists say about 'language' and what they do with it takes place in the very cultural universe in which language users use and think about their 'language'; indeed, there is an obvious parallelism between them: linguistic rationalists : linguistic empiricists :: the macro-social engineers of linguistic standardization : the micro-social agentive users of linguistic varieties (cf. Koyama 1997a).

That is, linguistic rationalists may be the 'scientific' analogues of the engineers of linguistic standardization. Thus, linguistic rationalists – who are, moreover, asocial in their fundamental orientation and do not know how to control socio-cultural variables (see Section 1 and Koyama (1999b) for a historical explanation) – seem often to mistake 'standard variety' for 'language' as such, despite the Pragueans' warnings that standard varieties have very peculiar structural characteristics due to their socio-culturally

'artificial', 'superposed' character, and that they are not representative of linguistic structures in any straightforward sense (cf. Havránek 1964; also Gumperz 1968). That is, linguistic standardization and 'linguistics' *qua* social activity are interrelated, in terms not only of 'linguistic engineering' (e.g., language planning), but also of grammatical analysis (cf. Bloomfield 1927; Joseph 1987; Crowley 1989; Silverstein 1996; Koyama 1997c, 1999b). As a specific exemplar, I shall consider a few formalist – neo-Bloomfieldian and generativist – analyses of the segmental (non-tonological)³ phonological grammar of Japanese. Briefly, ever since Bloch (1946), they have usually concentrated on the standard varieties or the Tōkyō dialect, often mistaking them for the Japanese language as such, even though the Tōkyō dialect belongs to the eastern dialectal branch, which has structurally distinct characteristics from the central and western dialects, and the standard varieties have been constructed largely on the basis of certain upper-middle class sociolects of the Tōkyō dialect (cf. Sanada 1991).

To illustrate how problematical this practice is, let us focus on a case involving 'u' *on-bin*, which may be roughly characterized as 'sound change across morphemic boundary ('Sandhi'), producing a syllable containing *ou* (which may become (a) [ow]; (b) [oo], through assimilation; or (c) [o], through shortening)', though space restrictions do not permit me to present all relevant details (cf. Vance 1987). Suffice it to say that, from data concerning the verbal allomorphy of a class of verb stems such as [kat-ta] ('buy'-Past), [kau-ana-i] ('buy'-Negative-Nonpast), and [ka-eba] ('buy'-Conditional), in the Tōkyō dialect and standard varieties, Bloch (1946) came to treat the verb stems as consonant-final, and McCawley (1968)⁴ posited //kap// as the 'systemic-phonemic' ('underlying') representation of the morpheme 'buy'. What they failed to note is that the Kyōto, Ōsaka, and other central and western dialects have, by the 'u' *on-bin* rule, [kou-ta] or [koo-ta] ('buy'-Past), as well as [kau-a(he)n-Ø] ('buy'-Negative-Nonpast), and [ka-eba] ('buy'-Conditional); and some other dialects have [kaa-ta] for 'buy'-Past (see below). This fact, hitherto suppressed by the standardizing perspective of 'autonomous linguistics', indicates that the grammar of Modern Japanese – including the Tōkyō dialect and standard varieties – has //kaw// as the morphophonemic form of the verbal stem, as explicated in the following.

Let us start with noting two relevant conditions. First, (1) *[ɥV], where V is non-low (i.e., [i], [ɯ], [e], or [o], but not [a])⁵, generally stands as a surface phonotactic constraint applying to the relevant 'lexical domains' (cf. Vance 1987; Itō and Mester 1995).⁶ Second, (2) phonotactically, the syllable-final position after the vocalic peak (or after its first segment, if the peak is associated with more than one V) cannot be occupied except by the following three kinds of phonemes: (a) V which shares [αback, βlow, γhigh] with the first V, or [αback, βlow] if the first V is [-low, -high] (i.e., [σ..ii], [σ..ei], [σ..ee], [σ..uu], [σ..ow], [σ..oo], and [σ..aa]; *[σ..ie], *[σ..iu], *[σ..ai], etc.)⁷; (b) N (i.e., [m], [n], [ŋ], etc.); and (c) 'Q' (consonantal moraic segment that gets geminated with the immediately following consonant).

Now, I shall show that, if we stipulate (3) [σkaw] as the morphophonemic form, we can deduce the data covering all three varieties. First, (3a) when the suffix morphophonemically starts with a [-low] V, //w// becomes Ø, as argued by McCawley (1968), to satisfy (1)⁸. Second, (3b) when it starts with a [+low] V, [σkaw]-[σa...] obviously becomes [σka][σwa...]. And, third, (3c) when it starts with an (obstruent) C, we can see that there are three robust solutions to satisfy (2). First, note that /w/ is opposed *both* to '(true) syllabic' segments, which may appear in the syllable-peak position by themselves, *and* to '(true) consonantal' segments, as it is 'vocalic' (or 'non-consonantal' in some formalisms). Now, since //w// does not appear intervocalically here (*vs.* 3a), its deletion is disfavored. Then, one robust way to satisfy (2) is to delete its V-like characteristics and reduce it to a C, which gets its P-of-A and M-of-A features from the adjacently following C by assimilation (i.e., 'Q'; see above), as such gemination is quite common in Japanese (cf. Vance 1987). Another way is to delete its consonantal characteristics and change it to /u/, in which case the preceding //a// is to be raised to /o/, given (2). Then, this becomes [ow] or [oo]. The other way is to delete its consonantal *and* P-of-A characteristics, leaving behind [+vocalic] (or its equivalent) only, and assimilate it to the adjacently preceding V, //a//.

As the perceptive reader must have noted, these three *structurally deducible* possibilities of the specific handling of this 'problem' are indeed found in the three kinds of varieties: //kaw+ta// → (α) [katta] via the C gemination rule (in the Tōkyō dialect and standard varieties)⁹, (β) [kouta] or [koota] via the 'u' *on-bin* rule (in the central-to-western dialects), and (γ) [kaata] via the progressive V assimilation

rule (in the dialects between Naoetsu and Itoigawa in Niigata Prefecture, and between the western part of Tango Peninsula in Kyôto Prefecture and Izumo City in Shimane Prefecture on the Sea of Japan; cf. Sibata 1958:59).

Given the assumption, shared by most formalists, that cross-lectal variations within a linguistic structure should be characterized in phonological (*vs.* morphophonemic or lexical-suppletive) terms, if they are phonologically explicable and predictable, the structural analysis which posits //kaw// as the morphophonemic representation of the morpheme ('buy') in the lects under discussion, seems superior to the structural analyses which must posit distinct morphophonemic forms for the same morpheme. This indicates, then, that an important part of the Japanese grammar has been analyzed erroneously due to the socio-historically naïve assumption that standard varieties straightforwardly represent the language of which they are varieties, and more generally, due to the theoretical perspective which fails to see the relevance of 'cultural' and social-indexical phenomena to structural analysis (see Section 1). Indeed, I cannot think of any indication that this particular case is not the tip of the iceberg (cf. Hymes and Fought 1975:1111-1112; Milroy and Milroy 1991:26, 61, *et passim*).¹⁰

Note, moreover, that this example also points to the methodological thesis that cross-lectal 'triangulation' – i.e., the identification of structure through cross-lectal comparisons – is a *sine qua non* of adequate structural analysis, since a language cannot but appear in lectally specified forms at the empirically observable level (i.e., the level of pragmatics). Clearly, we need a proper theoretical perspective on 'dialect' and 'sociolect', which have both linguistic-structural and social-indexical elements, before proceeding to give specific descriptions of linguistic structure. As empirical scientists, we cannot but see linguistic structure through the 'looking glass' of lectal variations. Of course, from the perspective of structural description, many, if not most, variations are peripherally located, near phonetic and pragmatic (i.e., extensional) 'surface' levels: e.g., allophones and surface lexical segments (see Section 6). Yet, this does not mean that one can do a structural analysis without taking them into consideration; in fact, one can arrive at adequate structural analysis only after studying them and specifying their exact locations in a structural description (see above).

If many linguists who live in a standardized modern culture and who do not recognize the relevance of socio-cultural phenomena to structural analysis have misrecognized standard varieties as the language of which they are varieties, and presented inadequate structural analyses on the basis of this misrecognition, we should not interpret this phenomenon as idiosyncratically unique, but as symptomatic of the general pattern that any explicit or implicit linguistic theories cannot avoid being articulated in particular socio-historical contexts, which must be 'objectively' analyzed by a general-linguistic theory (see Section 6). Clearly, this calls for a comparative-sociological analysis of the native linguistics of various cultures, including our own (cf. Silverstein 1979; Koyama 1997c, 1999b). Also, let me note in passing that, if we go back from the synchronic to the diachronic dimension of the problem, we will see that the interrelationships between (1) linguistic structures, (2) the linguistic theories which construe them, and (3) their socio-historical contexts – e.g., (1') linguistic structures affected by standardization, (2') the theories which misrecognize standard varieties as languages, and (3') standardized cultures – do not mean that what native users think about 'their' language ('linguistic theory') merely reflects, but does not *create*, historical changes in their cultures and, albeit more indirectly, the linguistic structure. As Silverstein (1979, 1985b), Romaine (1984), Cameron (1990), and Koyama (1997c), among others, have shown, it does create structural changes. I shall elaborate on this in the next section.

6. Outline of General Linguistics

In this paper, I have been arguing for a comprehensive general theory of language which can bring together (1) structure and pragmatics, (2) synchrony and diachrony, and (3) object language and linguistic theorization, and ultimately, combine these three into one coherent unity. By way of conclusion, I shall sketch out an outline of such a theory, focusing on the question of 'structural diachrony', partially on the basis of the argument and evidence provided thus far.

First, however, let me explicitly state that I fully subscribe to, and my argument in this paper assumes, the thesis that linguistic theorization, structure, and synchrony are 'irreducible' to object language, pragmatics, and diachrony, respectively. In particular,

synchronic structure is irreducible to – that is, not completely calculable, even in theory, from – diachrony *or* pragmatics (where the disjunct is exclusive; see below). However, it does not follow from this that synchronic-structural universals must be innately given. Such an inference is not only invalid (which is not objectionable in itself), but unreasonable. First of all, as we have seen in Section 2, at least some of the most robust synchronic-structural universals are universals precisely because they are pragmatically motivated. For example, the universally valid pattern of case-marking is partially determined by the universal ordering of NP grammatical categories, which is transparently motivated by the degrees of the presupposability of denotata in the speech event. Second, the aspects of synchronic-structural universals at time t_n which are not synchronic-pragmatically motivated, may be 'genetico-causally' motivated by the synchronic structure *and* pragmatics at time t_{n-1} , which have interacted diachronically to create the emergent conditions of the synchronic structure and pragmatics at time t_n (see Section 3 on the syntactic marking of case-relations and reference maintenance in Modern English). In such a case, all we have to attribute to the 'innate mind' of the 'child' who will become a native user of the structure at time t_n is merely the 'disposition' to occupy the incumbency of participant roles in the historically constrained pragmatic contexts where the models compatible with the historically given structure are interpersonally constructed (typically as unintended consequences of social-indexical and referential speech acts; cf. Silverstein 1985a). Only after investigating the reducibility of the universal characteristics of a synchronic structure to pragmatic and diachronic factors can we discern which (putatively) universal characteristics of the synchronic structure are likely to be innately given. Indeed, given what we know from historical-comparative linguistics, historical dialectology, pragmatics, and functional linguistics, it is likely that much of synchronic structure is determined by the interactions of diachrony *and* pragmatics (see Sections 2, 3, 4, and 5). From what we have seen, the exclusive interpretation of the disjunct in 'the irreducibility of synchronic structure to diachrony or pragmatics' seems to be motivated by the rationalists' anti-historical and anti-empirical ideologies (see Section 1), as well as by the folk-theoretical 'literalization' of the implicature (cf. Silverstein 1985b).

If we find it desirable to construct a *general*-linguistic theory which can bring together the dimension of (1) structure and (2) pragmatics, and that of (a) synchrony and (b) diachrony, we should aspire to construct a model in which one of the four 'cells' generated by crossing these two dimensions can be completely calculable, at least in theory, if we know the values of the remaining three cells. Let us try to sketch out such a theory, focusing on structural diachrony (i.e., '1 x b'), on the basis of what we know about 'language' in general, as described thus far. To begin, despite its variability, structure is made up of denotational regularities alone (unifunctional), and thus is obviously more unified and invariable than pragmatics, which is pluri-functional (referential and social-indexical) and includes historically unique, 'irregular happenings' (cf. Hacking 1990; Koyama 1997a; see Sections 2, 3, 4, and 5). Accordingly, structural variations seem to obtain primarily in the structurally peripheral domains, located near phonetic or pragmatic extensions: e.g., 'free' allophonic variations and 'free' allomorphic variations: cf. [katta] *vs.* [kouwa] *vs.* [kaata], described above).

Also, secondarily, structural variations appear to obtain in or near the 'lexicon'. To be sure, the lexicon is located at the arbitrary, maximally non-indexical 'core' (not 'periphery') of synchronic structure as the irreducibly 'irregular' structural elements in relation to which morphophonological and morphosyntactic 'rules' or regularities can be stated (cf. Saussure 1987 [1916]; Bloomfield 1933; Koyama 2000). Yet, it is very difficult, not only for users but also for linguists, to differentiate the lexicon from *surface* lexical segments¹¹ (cf. Silverstein 1981b)¹². Given the universal characteristic of synchronic structure that it diachronically undergoes change, we must infer, once again (see Section 1), that synchronic structure starts to undergo diversifying changes at its peripheries through the interaction with synchronic pragmatics¹³. Let us explore this.

First, as noted earlier, it is indisputable that language users, i.e., the agents of language use, perceive linguistic phenomena 'holistically', without clearly differentiating the symbolic (structural) and indexical (pragmatic) aspects of 'language' (cf. Koyama 1997a, 1999b, 2000). Moreover, from the micro-socially contextualized, agentive, and *pragmatic* perspectives of linguistic agents (*vs.* the macro-socially de-contextualizing, 'sociocentric', and 'theoretical' perspectives of linguists), symbolic-structural aspects of 'language' must be predominantly seen through its *indexical* aspects, rather than

the inverse (see Section 5). In particular, surface lexical forms, which are only opaquely related to the lexicon through complex interactions of 'rules', are folk-interpreted as 'language' (see Section 5 and note 11); and the *semantic* equation among surface lexical forms is calculated on the basis of their typical *referents* and the 'cultural stereotypes' associated with them (see Sections 2 and 4; cf. Putnam 1975; Koyama 2000). When some surface lexical forms are *referentially* equivalent (cf. allophonic variants; allomorphic variants such as *indexes* and *indices*, or [katta], [kouuta], and [kaata]; and cultural stereotypic equivalents such as *eye doctor* and *ophthalmologist*), they are often ascribed differential social-indexical values (e.g., 'low' and 'high'; 'vulgar', 'plain', and 'learned'; and various regional identities) on the basis of the social-indexical characteristics of the contexts in which such surface forms typically occur (see Section 4). In such circumstances, the surface forms may be folk-interpreted by the users as having 'social-indexical illocutionary forces' as their inherent properties, so that they can regularly, albeit defeasibly, signal their social-indexical 'forces' independently of the specific contexts in which they are used. Ultimately, this process may lead to the emergence of registers, where linguistic structure appears, *from the users' pragmatic point of view*, to be subdivided into denotationally equivalent components which have distinctive social-indexical 'forces' in themselves (see Section 4 and note 11). That is, we can now see the phenomenon of 'register' as a theoretically predictable endpoint of a more general phenomenon: the pragmatically-centered 'collapsing' of the two analytically distinct levels of 'linguistic structure' and 'social indexicality'.

Indeed, agentive users live in a specific '*speech* (dialectal, sociolectal) community' the extension of which, as a rule, does not exhaustively cover the extension of the *linguistic* community (which shares the linguistic structure; cf. Gumperz 1968).¹⁴ Thus, they cannot but see the linguistic structure from the agentive, spatio-temporalized, indexical perspective of the lectal variety. Hence, the lect shared by the particular speech community seems to restrict the members' agentive folk-interpretations of the structure. That is, the lect of the speech community may be the group's 'ethnocentric' prototype of the linguistic structure, a *prototype* which seems to indexically motivate, and empirically validate, the group's ethnocentric *stereotypes* of the structure (cf. Putnam 1975). Of course, such metalinguistic stereotypes are, in principle, 'incorrect'

from the 'scientific', macro-social perspective of the structural analysis of the whole language (see Section 5). Yet, this does not mean that such agentive stereotypes do not affect 'structure' (cf. Silverstein 1979, 1985b; Romaine 1984; Cameron 1990; Koyama 1997c). It is likely that the structure is differently construed on the basis of different lects, and the different groups of linguistic agents will differently speak or act on the basis of their distinct metalinguistic percepts and concepts, with a diachronic consequence of structural diversification, if not the gradual transition of linguistic varieties into distinct structures (cf. note 11).

Here, note the perspectival similarity of the linguistic agents of lectal varieties with 'dialectologists' and 'variationists', whose determinedly experiential, empirical, and indexical (*vs.* theoretical, conceptual, and symbolic) perspectives make 'language' appear more varied and less unified than its structural descriptions, where linguistic variations are perceived as either 'merely' pragmatic or 'at best' structurally conditioned and peripheral. From the former perspectives, the structure comes close to a mere aggregate of its varieties, each of which is more or less individuated and 'atomic'¹⁵, whereas, from the latter perspectives, linguistic varieties are mere collections of structural invariants and haphazardly gathered bits and pieces of structural variants (see note 11). In the *general-linguistic* theory we are exploring here, we can theorize the latter as the macro-social, symbolic interpretations of the synchronic structure at time t_n , and the former as its agentive, pragmatic interpretations which may validly obtain at the level of synchronic *pragmatics* at time t_n , and which may be causally (pragmatically) effective in the diachronic transition of the structure and pragmatics at time t_n to those at time t_{n+1} .

Turning now to generally 'centripetal' mechanisms, which serve to preserve or heighten the unity of linguistic structure, we might consider 'exclusion', 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic integration', and 'assimilation'. First, obviously, when diverging linguistic varieties become structurally so different that even the macro-social structural-linguist cannot write a grammar in which the varieties can be shown to belong to one structure despite their surface(y) differences, we have at least two structures each of which is, as a rule, more unified than the structure before the analytic 'breaking point'. Of course, the identification of this threshold is a typological matter of comparative-structural linguistics, in terms of which we can state

the structure-differentiating characteristics pertaining to the (morpho)phonological encoding of distinctive features, the morphosyntactic encoding of grammatical categories, and their implicational and complementary patterns (see Sections 2, 3, and 5; cf. Sapir 1921; Whorf 1945; Heath 1975; Silverstein 1976, 1981a, 1987, 1995b; Foley and Van Valin 1984; Comrie 1989; Koyama 1997b, 1999a). We cannot explore this issue further here.

The pragmatically-motivated diversification of synchronic structure, however, does not have to lead to such 'language splitting', since structural diversification operates, until it reaches the threshold, only *within* the structure, which is made of complexly yet cohesively interacting patterns of regularities (i.e., *un système où tout se tient*; cf. Saussure 1987 [1916]; the phrase is Meillet's). Thus, for instance, the structure may gradually relinquish one kind of the formal marking of a grammatical category when a different kind of the formal marking of the category starts developing (e.g., morphological *vs.* syntactic marking of case-relations), or when another grammatical category which is equivalent with it for a given referential function starts being formally marked (e.g., gender *vs.* syntactic co-reference mechanisms; cf. OE > ME > ModE; see Section 3). As we saw in that example, the coherence of each linguistic structure is theoretically interpretable and empirically demonstrable in terms of the coherence of the cross-linguistically generalizing universal grammar which comprehensively integrates formal marking, grammatical categories, and *referential* functions. In this way, *pragmatic regularities* unify structures.

Another potentially structure-unifying mechanism is not structural or referential, but social-indexical. Note that linguistic agents do not *have to* take agentive perspectives on 'language', as witnessed, for example, by the historical fact that some social agents, such as linguists, have developed 'scientific' linguistic theories which are determinedly macro-social. In modern societies, such macro-social perspectives have been typically manifested in linguistic standardization, which is historically associated with modern nationalism (cf. Joseph 1987; Crowley 1989; Koyama 1997c; see Section 5). This process is obviously oriented towards the elimination of dialectal variations and, in this respect, provides an impetus to structural unification. Yet, given the complexity of social processes (cf. 'covert prestige', mini-nationalistic linguistic regionalism, etc.) and the structurally (*vs.* lectally) non-individuated character of standard

varieties (see notes 9 and 11), linguistic standardization may actually lead to structural diversification, despite the macro-social ideologies of the agents of standardization. See Koyama (1997c) for the complexity of the process.

Yet another potentially structure-unifying mechanism is referentially pragmatic, and related to agentive ethnocentrism. Since linguistic agents are the users of not only (decisively empirical) linguistic varieties, but also (symbolic) linguistic structure, they may be 'rationalistically' ethnocentric, and *apperceive* only those indexical variations which fit their *a priori* symbolic scheme (see Sections 1, 3, 4, and 5; cf. 'categorical perception', which projects phonemic categories onto phonetic extension, and 'Whorfianism', which projects morphosyntactic categories onto referential extension; Silverstein 1979). Thus, for example, in such a typically structure-diversifying context as the extensional overlapping of more than one linguistic community ('multi-lingualism'), foreign sounds may be borrowed into the peripheries of the structure only insofar as the structure allows its users to apperceive them as distinct units. For instance, several consonants of 'Standard Average European' (SAE) languages, *inter alia* English, which are identical with, or very similar to, certain allophones of the consonantal phonemes in the Japanese standard varieties have been 'phonemicized' in the least 'nativized' lexical domain of these varieties: e.g., the English phone [f], which is not in the phonetic inventory of these varieties, is similar to [ϕ]; and [ϕ], which was formerly an allophone of /h/ (/hi, hu, he, ho, ha/ → [çi, φu, he, ho, ha]), may now occur immediately before any vowel, contrasting with [h] and [ç] except before [u], where only [ϕ] occurs (cf. Itô and Mester (1995) for details). However, to my knowledge, no vowel of 'SAE' languages has been added to the phonemic inventory of the varieties (/i, u, e, o, a/)¹⁶, as the allophonic variations of these phonemes (e.g., devoiced allophones of the high Vs) do not clearly match them (cf. Vance 1987)¹⁷.

Very roughly, this might be an outline of an admittedly programmatic general-linguistic theory, integrating structure and pragmatics, synchrony and diachrony, and natural language and metalinguistics. In such an account, we try to identify the problem of 'structural diachrony' not as a self-enclosed, pseudo-'biological' evolution, but as a historical product of '(meta)linguistic communication', indexically 'anchored' in pragmatics, entrenched in the human universe of 'culture' and 'history', and encompassing both

language users and linguists. It is only by articulating such a theory in sufficient detail that we may account for the obvious facts (1) that all sub-disciplines of 'linguistics', and all the components of 'language' separately studied by these sub-disciplines, are interdependent with one another, and (2) that 'language' immanently obtains in 'human communication', just like 'culture' and 'history'. That is, only the *general*-linguistic theory can do justice to the fact that 'language' constitutes a 'totality' which is an integral part of the larger totalities we call 'culture' and 'history'. If such a theory does not nicely fit the (sub)disciplinary niches that have been created by the historically contingent formations of (sub)disciplinary boundaries, our critical rationality – our 'transcendental reason', our spirit of 'universal science' – demands that we transcend what Max Weber once called the 'iron cage' of specialized sciences, towards the ideal of totality, generality, and universality. As the interaction among the various components of 'language' is a necessary condition for the life and growth of language, the various sub-disciplines of 'linguistics' must interact with one another to achieve a 'harmonic whole', i.e., a *general* theory of language. After all, as Benveniste said, *Das Wahre ist das Ganze*, and that is a truth of 'structural linguistics', *où tout se tient*, from grammar to culture and history.

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Notes

1. The referent(s) indexed by a 'referent honorific' may *coincide* with a speech participant(s) (i.e., incumbent(s) of the speaker- or addressee-role).
2. The Chomskyan's de-contextualizing 'idealization' of individual speakers makes their linguistic analyses macro-social, notwithstanding their methodological individualism (cf. Koyama 2000 for details).
3. Here, we note another empirical constraint on linguistic theorizing. Namely, the linguistic varieties of Japanese have clearly distinct tonological systems (cf. Okuda 1975); so much so that few students of Japanese tonology would misrepresent the standard varieties as the Japanese language. Indeed,

notwithstanding the Chomskyan doctrine that lectal variations are structurally merely peripheral, the generative phonologist Haraguchi (1977) speaks of the tonologically distinct lects as separate *languages*. This suggests that generativism does not give much practical significance to the question of the interrelationships between linguistic variety, structural variability, and structure (cf. Koyama 2000). Consequently, it has failed to note the theoretically explicable connection between the facts (1) that pitch-accents ('tones') are denotationally distinctive ('meaning'-differential) only marginally in all varieties of the language (cf. Okumura 1956), and (2) that the distinct pitch-accentual ('tonological') systems can be relatively transparently mapped onto distinct regional identities ('social indexical'). That is, despite their formal regularities, the pitch-accentual patterns are like allophonic rules and located at the peripheries of the structure (denotational code) near the level of (referential or social-indexical) pragmatics/indexicality (see below).

4. This was a revised version of his MIT dissertation. His more mature practice concerning the question of 'variability and grammatical description' is given in Koyama (2000). In fact, he was fond of characterizing McCawley (1968) as a 'Mickey Mouse dissertation' (*p. c.*).
5. For simplicity's sake, I disregard those varieties which do not have the typical five-vowel phonemic inventory of /i, u, e, o, a/, since (1) the relevant lects generally share it, and (2) it is not clear how the point I am making could be affected by this exclusion.
6. For an extensional motivation for (1), where only [a] occurs after [u], see Jakobson and Halle (1956) on the prototypicality of /a/ among vocalic phonemes (see also Sections 2 and 6; cf. note 7). Also, we may note the following: Given that phonotactic constraints obtain at the surface level of phonetic extension (*vs.* (morpho)phonological intension), *it is theoretically expected* that we can find more robustly 'functional', *extensional* motivations for them than for (morpho)phonological regularities. In this connection, see Koyama (1997b) for an argument that 'Optimality Theory' is a reductionistic functionalism, on the basis of the general-linguistic theory explicated in this paper (cf. also Koyama 1999a).
7. Cf. Trubetzkoy (1969) [1939] and Koyama (1997c) for a vowel-triangular (/A, I, U/) extensional motivation for (2a), where the second (non-prominent) segment of the long mid-vowel loses its distinctiveness from the high vowel, while the second segment of the long high vowel does not – e.g., [σ ..ee]-[σ ..ei], but *not* [σ ..ii]-[σ ..ie] – a distributional fact that shows a prototype effect. Also, see Sections 2 and 6.
8. Note the intervocalic, lenition-inducing environment.

9. As noted earlier, 'lects' ('varieties') are construed as mapping relations between structural (in)variants and social-indexical categories. Hence, (1) lects have *structural* characteristics that must be, in principle, properly included in the structural description of the language of which they are mere varieties; and (2) they also have *pragmatic, indexical* characteristics, such as regional identities, which are *not* part of their *structural* descriptions. Thus, e.g., the C gemination rule that changes //kaw+ta// to [katta] is unspecified for its dialectal, regionality-indexical identity at the ('first-order') level of structural description, but it may be specified at the (higher-order) level of the mapping between structure and social indexicality. This is important for separating structural variations from linguistic varieties (see Sections 4 and 6). In particular, note that the structural characteristics of a lect (especially a sociolect or an idiolect) may consist of 'bits and pieces' of structural (in)variants, not showing much 'structural integrity' (cf. Section 4 on honorifics), while structural (in)variants, taken as a whole, exhibit such integrity, as in the verbal allomorphy case described here. That native speakers perceive a lect as an integrated, individuated system is an 'interesting' and important fact that seems to have some bearing on structural diachrony (see Section 6).
10. As a terminological practice indicating this, note that non-standard varieties are usually specified ('marked') for their dialectal or sociolectal identities (e.g., 'Quebec French'), while the standard varieties are generally unspecified ('unmarked') for their sociolectal identities (e.g., 'French').
11. Thus, my fieldwork shows that native users ascribe the surface phonetic variations of //kaw// in the Japanese lects, described in Section 5, not to distinct phonological rules, but to distinct morphophonemic forms in the lexicon. For example, //kaw+ta// is typically 'folk-interpreted' as //kou+ta// in Kyôto, and //kat+ta// in Tôkyô, on the basis of the surface representations (see Section 5).

Now, independently of this, we can state, at the level of the mapping between structure and social indexicality (cf. note 9), that a class of morphophonemes such as //jok+u// ('good'-Adverbial) undergoes a velar C deletion rule such that //jok+u// surfaces as [jou] in the Kyôto dialect, but not in the Tôkyô dialect, where it surfaces as [joku] (except in a certain kind of honorific construction, apparently a borrowing from the Kyôto or other central and western dialects; cf. Inoue 1999:114, 130-131). Morphophonemes such as //jok+i// (-i = Adjectival Non-past), however, undergo a velar C deletion rule in *both* dialects (and may eventually surface as [ii] in the Tôkyô dialect and [ee] or [ei] in the Kyôto dialect, partially due to the phonotactic condition (2a) noted in Section 5). Also, those

morphophonemes such as //kak+u// ('write'-Nonpast) do not undergo the deletion, and //kak+ta// ('write'-Past) undergoes a *i*-insertion (→ /kakita/) and then a velar C deletion (→ [kaita]), in *both* dialects (cf. Okuda 1975; Vance 1987). In short, for these morphophonemes, velar C deletion rules seem to apply to /ki/, but not to /ku/, *except for* the set including //jok+u// (→ [jou]) in the Kyôto dialect. This suggests that the application of the morphophonological velar C deletion rule to //jok+u// (and the like) in the Kyôto dialect is synchronically motivated by the 'analogical pressure' exercised conjointly by (1) the //jok+i// → /joi/ rule *and* (2) the *folk-interpreted* //kou+ta// (vs. the structurally correct //kaw+ta//, which *turns into* [kouuta] via the 'u' *on-bin* rule, *structurally distinct* from the velar C deletion rule), and the others of the same morphophonological class: //ou+ta// (vs. //aw+ta// 'met'), //harou+ta// (vs. //haraw+ta// 'paid'), //morou+ta// (vs. //moraw+ta// 'received'), etc.

Here, a dialect-specific, *yet* morphophonological rule seems to be partly motivated by the native interpretation which (1) projects dialectal variations in the phonetic forms 'produced' by lectally distinct surfacey (structurally peripheral) rules onto different morphophonemic forms in the lexicon, and (2) essentializingly identifies such a form, *ou*, as a distinctive mark (social-indexical emblem) of the Kyôto dialect, as opposed to the 'more consonantal Tôkyô', which extensively utilizes C gemination rules rather than 'u' *on-bin* rules (see Umegaki (1950) for an explicit statement of this essentialization). Thus, we may conjecture, structurally peripheral variations leak into structurally more central rules through folk-interpretations and essentializations, with a possible consequence of the gradual drift of such folk-interpreted, 'registered' lects towards distinct structures (see Section 4 and below; cf. also Sapir 1921).

12. Assuming that, in general, structurally-central elements diachronically persist longer than structurally-peripheral elements as the latter directly interact with pragmatics, the thesis that the lexicon has this dual – structurally (1) central *and* (2) peripheral – characteristics can be seen in the following: (1a) its interpretability as 'input' upon which grammatical 'rules' operate, (1b) its synchronically unmotivated character, and (1c) its oft-found diachronic characterizability as the 'débris' of past morphosyntactic 'rules' (e.g., syntactic noun incorporation > lexical suppletion); and (2a) its transparency to the (pragmatic) consciousness of users, relative to that of structural regularities ('rules'), (2b) its generally high susceptibility to lectal variation, diachronic change, and borrowing, and (2c) its relatively transparent correspondence to social-indexical categories (cf. registers; see Section 4 and note 11). This 'Janus-faced' character of the lexicon is nicely

illustrated by the famous Kupwar (Kannada, Marathi, and Urdu) case noted by Gumperz and Wilson (1971), where the distinct lexicons of the morphosyntactically converging local varieties of these languages function as the linguistic emblems of users' group-identities (transparency to pragmatics), *and* point to the structural past before the convergence (formal-structural core).

13. I put aside the structure-unifying characteristics of pragmatics for the moment.
14. For the sake of simplicity, the speech community is unrealistically assumed not to extensionally overlap with other speech communities, as this does not affect the point I am making: linguistic agents are acquainted with only a subset of all the varieties of a linguistic structure.
15. One might go further and eliminate the whole concept of (relational) 'structure' (cf. 'isogloss' of the 'wave theory'). Needless to say, this ultra-extensionalist approach forgets what it is that warrants in the first place the identity of a *linguistic* feature the variants of which it investigates (cf. Saussure 1987 [1916]).
16. To be sure, some allophonic variants of 'long vowels', such as [ou] and [oo] (← /ou/), are fairly similar to contrastive sounds in English: e.g., [ou] (or [ow]) and [ɔ(:)], respectively. Indeed, my fieldwork shows that many speakers of the varieties can sense the distinction between [ou] and [oo], especially when their attention is focused on phonetic forms. Yet, such allophonic variations have not been phonemicized, partially because, I think, the locus of distinctiveness ([σ...V̄V]) is a Trubetzkoyan 'non-prominent position', where finer phonemic distinctions disappear (cf. the neutralization of various phonemes to [ə] in unstressed, non-prominent positions in English; see Section 2 and note 7).
17. And similarly for morphosyntactic borrowing (cf. Silverstein 1995b).

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