Because They Were There
Access, Deliberation, and the Mobilization of Networks for Support

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ABSTRACT
When people need help, what is the process through which they decide whom in their network to turn to? Research on social support has described a process that is deliberative in nature: people determine their needs, assess who in their network has the needed attributes—such as skill, trustworthiness, intimacy, and accessibility—and then activate that tie. Nevertheless, research in behavioral economics and other fields has shown that people make many decisions not deliberatively but intuitively. We examine this possibility in the context of social support by focusing on one factor: accessibility. Although researchers have argued that people weigh the accessibility of potential helpers as they do any other attribute, accessibility may be not only an attribute of the helper but also a condition of the situation. We develop a framework to make this question tractable for survey research and evaluate competing hypotheses using original data on an analytically strategic sample of ~2,000 college students, probing concrete instances of social support. We identify and document not one but three decision processes, *reflective, incidental*, and *spontaneous* activation, which differ in the extent to which actors had deliberated on whether to seek help and on whom to approach before activating the tie. We find that while the process was reflective (consistent with existing theory) when skill or trustworthiness played a role, it was significantly less so (consistent with the alternative) when accessibility did. Findings suggest that actors decide whom in their network to mobilize through at least three systematically different processes, two of which are consistent less with either active "mobilization" or explicit "help seeking" than with responsiveness to opportunity and context.

Key words: social support networks; decision-making; deliberation; accessibility; behavioral economics

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INTRODUCTION

When people need help, what is the process through which they decide whom to turn to? Much of the research on the "mobilization of support" has described a process that is deliberative in nature: people determine their needs, assess who in their network has the needed attributes, and then turn to that helper. While researchers have differed in how explicitly they theorize the process and how rational they believe people are, they have largely taken for granted that people follow some version of this process, wherein deliberation precedes action (Perry and Pescosolido 2010, 2015). Rather than question the process, researchers have largely focused on which of the potential helpers' attributes people take into account, attributes such as trustworthiness, skill, intimacy, and accessibility (e.g., Stack 1974; Wellman and Wortley 1989, 1990; Small 2009, 2013; Perry and Pescosolido 2010, 2015).

We examine one attribute that may give reason to reconsider that process—the relative accessibility of the potential helper. Accessibility, also referred to as "availability" or "proximity," is the extent to which a potential helper can be reached without difficulty. Research has shown that accessibility is important to how people get social support (e.g., Pescosolido 1992; Domínguez and Watkins 2003; Small 2009, 2013). Furthermore, researchers have argued that people weigh the accessibility of potential helpers before asking for help as they do with any other attribute (Perry and Pescosolido 2010).

Nevertheless, we see three reasons to believe that in the case of accessibility the process may differ. First, contrary to other attributes of potential helpers, the accessibility of an alter can depend on the situation. While situations cannot make alters more trustworthy or intelligent, they can make alters more accessible, since potential helpers may happen to be present in the context where ego is deciding to ask for help. Thus, to take accessibility into account, people may need to assess not merely their network but also the context of social interaction (Chua 2012; Small 2009; Doreian and Conti 2012). Second, consistent with this notion, recent ethnographic studies have reported cases of people who asked for help from others whom they had run into largely unexpectedly, based on the dynamics of the context and leaving little room for deliberation. For example, in a study of evicted renters in Milwaukee, Desmond (2012) found that people asked for major favors (such as requesting to sleep on another's couch) of near-strangers they had run into at a bus stop or just met at a shelter. In his study of daycare centers in New York, Small (2009) found that mothers often asked for help on highly personal topics from other mothers they barely knew but happened to run into during pick-up and drop-off hours.[1] Third, the cognitive process underlying these actions may bear evidence to recent experimental research in behavioral economics and cognitive psychology. Studies have shown that, while at times people think carefully before making important monetary decisions, they often do not, instead acting intuitively and in ways inconsistent with rational behavior (Stanovich and West 2000; Kahneman 2011; see Simon 1997/1945). People often do not deliberate before acting.

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[1] Research on information-seeking has found similar patterns. Granovetter (1974) showed that job seekers often asked for help from sources they barely knew but whom they happened to run into.

While the ethnographic and experimental research is suggestive, few survey-based studies have examined the extent of deliberation actually involved in social support decisions: When people explain that they have turned to a helper because the latter was accessible, how much deliberation on alternatives was actually involved?

The answer is important because it lies at the heart of the role of agency in network analysis and of actor-based models of network behavior (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). All social network models imply some conception of the individual. Actor-based models rightly emphasize that people are agents, rather than just subject to network forces, agents whose decisions affect the composition of and resources gained from their networks. Many such models assume that actors' behavior results from prior motivations of one or another type, implicitly positing that actors have reflected on their motivations before action (e.g., Lin 1999, 2001; Snijders 2005; cf, McDonald 2010).[2] Nevertheless, at least in the case of social support, we do not actually know whether people consistently assess the attributes of network members before deciding whom to ask for help.

Because accessibility differs from other attributes, examining it provides a critical test. If people do deliberate even when motivated by the helper's accessibility, then the standard view of the process has been justified. If they do not, however, then even the notion that accessibility is a "motivation" tied to the helper rather than a condition tied to the situation needs re-evaluation. It would suggest that the decision-making process is systematically different in different circumstances, calling for research on network mobilization to (a) pay heed to work in behavioral economics that has successfully undermined rational-actor assumptions about how people make decisions that still inform much of network research (see Stanovich and West 2000; Kahneman 2003, 2011; Kroneberg 2014), and (b) take into greater account the growing evidence that situational context, not just network structure, matters for network action (see Mollenhorst et al. 2008, 2011; Small 2009; Chua 2012; Doreian and Conti 2012; Sailer and McCulloh 2012).

The following study examines the question posed above. We do not propose that accessibility is the primary factor in the mobilization decision. Respondents to our survey (described below) reported that accessibility was important in up to 39% of their last support decisions. Accessibility is clearly only one of many attributes playing a role in the decision, and others are often more important. Instead, we focus on accessibility because of the analytical leverage it provides. Furthermore, we note that, based on not laboratory but survey research, our study cannot pretend to describe what goes on in actors' minds. Instead, we aim to push survey data to their limits, to help understand the real-world implications of two competing models of how accessibility shapes actors' behavior, as a tool for theory building.

Specifically, we test whether the relative accessibility of the potential helper is associated with the extent of prior deliberation about whom to ask for help. We develop a framework to make this

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[2] The literature on social capital and jobs has depended on this assumption. Lin defines social capital as "investment in social relations with expected returns" (1999:30), and offers this view of the decision process: "Individuals engage in interactions and networking in order to produce profits" (1999:31). Actors rationally assess what they can get from whom, and thus are acting only after strong deliberation. There are similar assumptions in actor-based models of network evolution. For example, Snijder's (2005) model specifies an objective function wherein people decide which tie to add or drop based on whether it maximizes subjective utility. "The basic idea of the actor-oriented model is that, when actor *i* has the occasion to make a change in his or her outgoing tie variables…, this actor selects the change that gives the greatest increase in the so-called objective function plus a random term" (Snijders 2005:225). Again, there is deliberation before network action.

question tractable, and evaluate competing hypotheses using original data on an analytically strategic sample of ~2,000 college students, probing concrete instances of social support. We first document that, for the three kinds of help examined, students reported being driven primarily by the accessibility, skill, or trustworthiness of the helper between 86% and 90% of the time, depending on the kind of help. We find that decisions differed in their degree of deliberation, and that respondents did not appear to weigh accessibility as they did other factors when seeking or getting help, instead engaging in a different decision-making process altogether. Findings suggest that actors decide whom in their network to mobilize through not one but at least three systematically different processes, two of which are consistent less with active "mobilization" or explicit "help seeking" than with responsiveness to opportunity and context. We begin by reviewing the literature on accessibility and the mobilization of support.

ACCESSIBILITY
Scope
Before reviewing the literature, we clarify our scope. The potentially relevant research is vast, capturing elements of the separate literatures on "help-seeking decisions," on the "activation of social ties," and on the "mobilization of social capital" (Granovetter 1973; Stack 1974; Wellman and Wortley 1990; Bearman and Parigi 2004; Smith 2007; Small 2009; Lin 2001). Furthermore, it is likely that actors practice different decision-making processes for different modalities of support. For example, how people seek help when venting about personal matters may differ from how they seek help when dealing with an illness. We cannot hope to address all of them in one study or even to propose a model that would claim to encompass all situations. Instead, we narrow our focus in three ways.

First, we focus empirically on social support involving everyday short-term problems that can be addressed over the course of a single interaction. Thus, we do not address support involving long-term or recurring conditions such as chronic illnesses (see Pescosolido 1991; Perry and Pescosolido 2010), or support around problems rarely addressed over a single interaction, such as unemployment (see Granovetter 1973; Smith 2005, 2007). Second, our study cannot cover all aspects of the decision to ask for help, including the role of prior obligations (Stack 1974), of embeddedness in a network structure (Chua 2012; also Granovetter 1985), or of embeddedness in organizational context (Small 2009). Instead, its focus is narrowly on the accessibility of potential helpers. Third, our main concern is not frequency but process. We specifically sought a study population in which we theorized that decisions of this kind should occur in sufficient numbers to test our model about *how* such decisions occur. College campuses are institutional contexts that bring together actors with common interests and concerns—in Feld's (1981) language, "foci" of activity—thus creating multiple potential helpers for certain kinds of problems. We expect more actors to report potential helpers to be highly accessible than would be the case in other kinds of contexts; what remains uncertain is how they will decide to approach those helpers when taking advantage of high accessibility.

Accessibility
A long literature has examined the attributes of potential helpers that play a role in whom people ask for everyday support. Consider two commonly studied attributes to which we pay attention in our analysis. One is closeness. Since strong ties are likely to be interconnected, they are expected to be mutually reinforcing and highly trustworthy (Granovetter 1973, 1983; see also Burt 1984; Marsden 1987; McPherson et al. 2006). Another commonly studied attribute is skill in or otherwise relevance to the particular need. As Wellman and Wortley (1990) argued, personal networks are

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heterogeneous, such that different members are likely to be helpful in different ways, prompting people to focus on those most relevant to their problems—"different strokes from different folks" (see also Bearman and Parigi 2004; Small 2013). Later we show that both trustworthiness and skill were important alter attributes to respondents in our survey.

The works on accessibility do not amount to a comprehensive theoretical perspective; however, they share the theme that accessibility or proximity matters to help seekers. Some have conceptualized accessibility under the broad umbrella of opportunity (Pescosolido 1992, Small 2013). In an article proposing a "social organization of support" theory of help-seeking behavior around medical issues, Pescosolido (1992) argued that people were not motivated strictly by rational considerations (such as which network member was best qualified to address a given illness) and instead made decisions based on the opportunities they had available given the structure of their total personal networks. Based on national survey data, she examined which network option (doctors, nurses, friends, family, self-care, etc.) people pursued when faced with a medical need. She found that accessibility mattered, as people responded to opportunities from those around them: "People who are working are more likely to use co-workers (in addition to the family and physicians) or friends (in addition to physicians)… Married individuals report medical care contacts that rely heavily on the family" (Pescosolido 1992:1124). In a related vein, Small (2013) argued that when people seek others with whom to discuss important issues they will at times seek relevant people, but at other times seek readily available ones, a process he referred to as "opportune mobilization." In his national survey, respondents who had more memberships in organizations and associations—and therefore more opportunities to interact with weak ties—were more likely to discuss important matters with those to whom they were not close, suggesting that respondents often reacted to who was easily accessible (Small 2013:480).

Several researchers have conceived of accessibility explicitly as physical proximity (El-Bassel et al. 1998; Domínguez and Watkins 2003; Kana'Iaupuni et al. 2005). Interestingly, studies that have operationalized physical proximity using large distances have at times failed to find an effect. Landale and Oropsea (2001) studied more than 1,800 Puerto Rican women, operationalizing proximity as whether supporters were reachable within thirty minutes and examining the effects on health measures. They found almost no significant effects of proximity on stress, smoking, low weight gain, or early prenatal care. Kana'Iaupuni et al. (2005) studied over 1,000 women in Mexico, and operationalized proximity as "whether the tie resided in the same village (= 1), another Mexican village (=2), or across the U.S. border (=3)" (2005:1146). They found no statistically significant effects on either emotional or financial support (Kana'Iaupuni et al. 2005:1154-55). Yet studies that examine physical accessibility in a more proximate sense that makes interaction likely have found an effect. El-Bassel et al. (1998) examined 151 women on methadone, probing a number of attributes of 795 network members. They studied which kinds of network members provided which kinds of support, and found that, net of other factors, physical proximity—whether the alter lived with or within walking distance of ego—was associated with receipt of financial aid, drug-related aid, and encouragement to desist from drug use (1998:392; also Domínguez and Watkins 2003).

Collectively, these studies suggest that the accessibility of potential helpers plays a role in who people approach for help. Nevertheless, the decision-making process underlying these activations— e.g., how people who are working choose co-workers (Pescosolido 1992) or how women on methadone choose those who live nearby (El-Bassel et al. 1998)—remains unclear. We consider two theoretical perspectives.

DELIBERATION
Action as deliberative
Many theories across the social sciences propose that people evaluate options before acting. None is more prominent than rational actor theory (Coleman 1990; Becker 1993; Elster 2007; but see Merton 1936; Weber 1978; Kadushin 2002). Rational actor theory has been developed and critiqued extensively, and the majority of that literature is not relevant to our question. For our purposes, the important aspect is the specific belief that deliberation precedes action. As Coleman (1990:14) has written, "different actions… [have] a particular utility for the actor"; "the actor chooses the action which will maximize utility." People determine which choice will maximize subjective utility before acting. Becker (1993:402) has argued: "In human capital theory, people rationally evaluate the benefits and costs of activities." A prime example is the family: "The economic approach to the family assumes that even intimate decisions such as marriage, divorce, and family size are reached through weighing the advantages and disadvantages of alternative actions" (Becker 1993:402). Here, action presupposes that people have weighed alternatives.

In research on social support, many models reject aspects of rational choice theory while still implicitly or explicitly positing that people deliberate before acting. The notion is implicit in models where people select helpers based on their suitability to the service needed (e.g., Wellman and Wortley 1989, 1990; Bearman and Parigi 2004). It is explicit in what Small (2013) calls "targeted mobilization," the notion that, when deciding whom to ask for help, actors at times "will specifically seek those in their network who possess a relevant resource" (2013:472). It is perhaps most explicit in the "functional specificity" hypothesis (Perry and Pescosolido 2010, 2015). The perspective "rests on the assumption that individuals engage in selective and purposive activation of ties" (Perry and Pescosolido 2010:346). For this selection process, people weigh network members to determine their suitability to address a given need: "individuals engage in problem or task-specific activation of social network ties, evaluating who in their networks is most willing and able to fulfill a particular need for support or companionship" (Perry and Pescosolido 2010:356). This evaluation is a precondition for action.[3]

Critiques
Several theorists have questioned the notion that people deliberate in this fashion before acting. Schutz argued that it "is erroneous to assume that consciousness of such alternatives and therefore choice is necessarily given before every human action and that in consequence all acting involves deliberation and preference" (1964:78; see Dewey 2004/1916). He proposed that many acts are better explained by habitual than by purposive action, and that even purposive action often did not involve the weighing of alternatives.[4] Sociologists have explored the implications of these ideas. For example, Esser agreed with Schutz that "there will almost never be such a calculation [of alternatives] in the context of everyday behavior" (Esser 1993:16). Instead, people often follow routine forms of behavior. Esser proposed that rational calculation only happens when ordinary,

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[3] As they have argued elsewhere, "people make decisions about who to talk to from among all possible discussants in the network, and our research indicates that this process is in part systematic, reflecting elements of bounded rationality" (Perry and Pescosolido 2015:126).

[4] A selection of one option over another "does not necessarily involve conscious choice between alternatives which presupposes reflection…. When I walk through a garden discussing a problem with a friend and I turn left or right, I do not choose to do so. I have no alternative in mind" (Schutz 1964:78). On models of action based on habit, routine, and predisposition, see Weber (1968), Schutz (1964), Bourdieu (1977).

non-deliberative decisions fail. "Something like a rational calculation starts only if the usual rules of thumb… no longer yield results that fit the expectations" (Esser 1993a:17).[5]

For the past few decades, cognitive psychologists and behavioral economists have been critiquing many assumptions underlying rational actor models, including the idea that people deliberate before undertaking action. An important insight has been the theory that actors make decisions based on not one but two different systems of thought, one intuitive and one deliberative. As Stanovich and West (2000:658) have argued, "System 1 is characterized as automatic, largely unconscious, and relatively undemanding of computational capacity…. System 2 encompasses the processes of analytic intelligence that have traditionally been studied by information processing theorists trying to uncover the computational components underlying intelligence"(also Kahneman 2003:698). In laboratory experiments, Kahneman and his colleagues have shown that actors repeatedly make decisions through System 1 processes that fail to meet the predictions of rational choice theory—for example, they choose options that do not yield the highest financial payoffs (Kahneman and Tversky 2000; Kahneman 2011). Dual process-theory, as it has come to be known, involves a wide range of predictions, many of which are not relevant to our discussion.[6] The most relevant prediction for us is that actors might make decisions about whom to ask for help deliberately but also intuitively. Indeed, in sociology, Kroneberg (2014) has built on dual-process theory (and on Esser's work) to suggest that there are "spontaneous and deliberate" modes of decision-making when it comes to action (2014:104; also McDonald 2010).[7]

In the social support literature, a few researchers have described processes that appear consistent with spontaneous decision making. Much of this work has been ethnographic, as the aforementioned studies by Small (2009) and Desmond (2012). Indeed, Desmond (2012:1313) explicitly found that "[s]ometimes, decisions about teaming up with a stranger were made in a matter of seconds."

HYPOTHESES
Collectively, the works amount to two competing perspectives. In one actors evaluate alternatives before undertaking actions; in the other, they sometimes do and sometimes do not. To derive testable hypotheses specific to our question, we need an organizing framework.

Framework
We propose that what researchers have called the mobilization of social support is the product of not one but three separate decisions. The *seeking* decision refers to the cognitive resolution to turn to others for help. Both sociological and psychological studies have examined the factors affecting

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[5] Space precludes discussing the works in other fields in sociology that have addressed related issues. For example, in an early paper on how people commit to courses of action, Howard Becker (1960:38) wrote that "commitments are not necessarily made consciously and deliberately. Some commitments do result from conscious decisions, but others arise crescively; the person become aware that he is committed only at some point of change and seems to have made the commitment without realizing it."

[6] Furthermore, we do not presume that all elements categorized by Kahneman as typifying System 1 or System 2 thinking are present in a given System 1 or System 2 decision. For example, a deliberate decision may be made rather quickly.

[7] An important aspect of this work is the idea that deliberation "inevitably causes reflection costs in the form of foregone time and energy," so that, over the course of everyday action, people are likely to make decisions spontaneously unless the latter proves dangerous, costly, ineffective, or otherwise disadvantageous (Kroneberg 2014:104; also Kroneberg et al. 2010). In this sense, the models assume that a great deal of everyday behavior is spontaneous and examine conditions in which it is likely to be deliberative.

whether actors decide to seek help at all (Pescosolido 1992; Bearman and Parigi 2004; Addis and Mahalik 2003).[8] The *selection* decision refers also to a cognitive process, that of choosing one or another alter as a source of support.[9] The *activation* decision, contrary to the other two, is a social process in the sense of requiring interaction between two actors; it refers to the particular act of asking an alter for help.[10]

We do not assess whether all aspects of the process involved deliberation, something probably impossible to determine with survey work. But by unpacking the decision-making process into three elements we can examine the extent of deliberation specifically with respect to whom people approach for help. Activation, unlike the seeking and selection decisions, is an act of social interaction, one that can only take place in the presence of the person whose help was sought. As a result, we can determine whether the seeking or selection decision was made before that interaction. We can therefore make analytic distinctions about the extent of reflection that took place before activation by unraveling the sequencing of these three decisions. Consider Table 1 and Figure 1.

[Table_1]
[Figure_1]

As shown in the top panel of Figure 1, an actor who is highly deliberative with respect to the three decisions will first decide to seek help, then select one helper among the alternatives in the network, and finally approach that person to ask for help. That process is fully deliberative with respect to this particular sequence of decisions, since the seeking and selection decisions were made before activation (Table 1, top left); we refer to the process as *reflective*.

It is possible in theory for the three decisions not to be made in sequence. At the moment of activation, an actor may have decided to seek help but not selected a particular person from whom to seek help. For example, Granovetter (1974) wrote about the case of an unemployed professional turned taxi driver, named Carl Y in the book, who ran into an acquaintance at a train station while on a fare and asked for job on the spot. Though Carl Y was looking for a job, he naturally had not yet selected the old friend he ran into at the train station until that interaction. In this case, the activation decision was *incidental* (Table 1 and Figure 1, middle).[11]

Finally, it is possible that an actor, in need of assistance but not having made the decision to seek help, spontaneously decides to ask a given alter for help over the course of an interaction. A lot of social interaction occurs with no initial instrumental purpose; Simmel (1950) has characterized such

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[8] An example is Smith's (2007) study of black low-income job-seekers' refusal to ask for help from others in their network as a result of "defensive individualism," the sense that people should succeed on their own and should not incur social debts.

[9] Because selection often implies that a seeking decision has been made, most of the literature does not distinguish between the two. However, just as some researchers appear to emphasize the seeking decision, others emphasize selection. For example, as we saw earlier, Bearman and Parigi's (2004) work explains that selection involves a pairing of types of alters with types of topics of discussion. Most of the works in the "different strokes from different folks" (Wellman and Wortley 1990) literature described earlier focus on why actors chose a given network member over another.

[10] Much of the work on the mobilization of social capital is ultimately about activation (Lin 2001). For social capital researchers, two persons embedded in similarly resourced networks may experience different rates of upward mobility if they differ in their willingness to actually mobilize their networks.

[11] Indeed, Granovetter (1974) found that "only 57.4% of [respondents who found job through contacts] report having actively searched" (1974:33).

interaction as sociability. Sociable interaction of this kind is a common aspect of routine, everyday activity: at bus stops, offices, churches, gyms, barbershops, cafes, hair salons, restaurants, and other routine organizations (Oldenburg 1989; Small 2009). These interactions are figurative "park bench" conversations. In some of these, the idea of seeking advice and whom to ask emerge simultaneously. An example may be found in Blau's (1963/1955) classic study of federal and state agencies, where agents often talked to one another over lunch about interesting problems that emerged over the course of their work. These sociable "gab-fests" often produced useful advice, as issues emerged over the course of interaction[12] (Blau 1963/1955:132; see also Pescosolido and Boyer 1999; MacDonald 2010). In such cases, until the time the activation decision was made, neither the selection nor even the seeking decision had been made (Table 1 and Figure 1); the activation decision was *spontaneous*.[13]

Competing hypotheses
These three possible processes are the foundation of our competing hypotheses. In our empirical analysis, deliberation will refer specifically, and only, to whether the action was reflective, incidental, or spontaneous as described above. We cannot assess all aspects of deliberation involved in the decision.[14] There are two perspectives.

The first assumes that accessibility is like any other attribute that actors evaluate before activation, and, thus, one in which deliberation consistently precedes action. As Perry and Pescosolido (2010) argue, using the term "proximity": "Our networks are composed of many different relationships that vary in type of connection, intimacy, frequency of contact, proximity, and other characteristics. …People selectively draw on ties and their diverse resources depending on who is most likely to be useful for a particular purpose at any given point in time" (Perry and Pescosolido 2010:346).[15] The process is reflective: "individuals appear to evaluate support needs, identifying the best possible matches among a larger group of potential health discussants" (2015:116). People approach an easily accessible helper after concluding that, for the given problem, accessibility was important. *H1*: *The extent of deliberation should bear no relationship to whether the accessibility of the alter, as opposed to other attributes, played a role in ego's decision—activation should consistently be reflective.*

The second hypothesis assumes that accessibility differs from other attributes in characterizing not only a person but also a situation. There are two possibilities. In one, an actor who has decided to seek help on a problem goes about their routine, adding that problem to the catalog of unsolved problems people carry in their minds. Over the course of a given interaction, the actor encounters

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[12] As one agent explained to Blau, "'What you're doing is thinking out loud'. Even when no [direct] advice was expected and none was given, these presentations of complex cases assisted the speaker in solving his problems. They were consultations in disguise" (1963/1955:132).

[13] One reviewer suggested a final possibility, which is that a respondent is forced to seek help. This kind of activation, which may be termed "coercive" is important, especially in contexts such as mental health, though beyond scope.

[14] Over the course of regular interaction, there is probably no decision to ask for help that can be unquestioningly described as completely intuitive, because it involves many elements beyond those we have described. For this reason, we will write of actions being more or less deliberative, rather than strictly of one or the other system.

[15] We stress that the authors' overarching approach involves questions far beyond the scope of this paper, and cannot be reduced to the questions above. Indeed, not all of the implications are obvious. For example, the authors argue that "[t]ie activation is not necessarily a rational decision-making process" (Perry and Pescosolido 2015:117). In fact: "Network culture probably plays a significant role in creating a social context that facilitates tie activation." At the same time, however, they propose a process that is highly deliberative, as quoted above. On the other hand, in prior work, Pescosolido has made a strong argument for the importance of social context in different forms (Pescosolido 1992; Pescosolido, Gardner, and Lubell 1998).

someone who appears to be a potential helper and activates the tie incidentally. In the other, an actor simply interacts with others over the course of daily routines and finds herself in interaction where the idea of asking for help emerges, leading to a spontaneous decision. In either case, from this perspective people do not weigh accessibility as they do other attributes; instead, accessibility matters at the moment of activation. Thus, *H2: The extent of reflection will be significantly lower when the accessibility of the alter, as opposed to other attributes, played a role in ego's decision—in these cases, activation should be incidental or spontaneous.*

DATA
Survey
Testing these hypotheses is not easy. It requires data on actors' reported motivations to seek help from particular members of their networks and some way of assessing the extent of predetermination. Unfortunately, most existing surveys will not meet these requirements.

The common approach to capturing social support practices in network surveys has been to ask respondents to report whom they typically turn to in circumstances when support is needed.[16] However, this practice has two problems given our questions. First, if people are asked to think abstractly about what they do regarding social support, their responses are subject to cognitive biases, likely in favor of rational and deliberative behavior. That is, a respondent who is asked whom they normally turn to for help with, say, home renovations may well think of the people in her network who are good at home renovations, even if in practice she instead typically turns to a sibling, because the former answer appears more rational. Bernard, Killworth, and their colleagues have repeatedly found evidence of strong cognitive biases in respondents' reporting about their social ties (Bernard et al. 1984, Killworth et al. 1990). Second, respondents' reasons for seeking a person for help may vary from situation to situation, even for the same kinds of help. For example, a respondent who needed help with renovations twice in the past year—say, with installing a water faucet and with painting a room—might have approached a person out of relevance the first time (e.g., her sister was a plumber) and out of accessibility the second time (her sister was in town). If so, the respondent's typical pattern would depend on the situation, and we would be unable to assess, per the hypotheses, whether the same decision-making process informed the selection at each juncture.

Thus, our hypotheses require a survey that, rather than asking the questions in the abstract, asks respondents to discuss a concrete experience of support, what particular person they turned to during the experience, what attributes helped motivate the decision, and to what extent the decision was reflective.

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[16] Sometimes, the survey includes a name generator that elicits an ego network. For example, the General Social Surveys' "core discussion network" question asks: "From time to time, most people discuss important matters with other people. Looking back over the last six months—who are the people with whom you discussed matters important to you?" (McPherson et al. 2006: 355). The survey produces up to six names of confidants, about whom other questions are asked. Since including name generators is time-consuming, and therefore, costly, other surveys ask about respondents' typical experiences regarding categories of supporters. For example, Wellman et al.'s (2004) "Connected Lives" survey presents respondents with a set of "situations," such as "advice on important matters," "advice about new job opportunities," "help with home renovations," and the like; and a list of categories of potential helpers, such as "neighbors" and "immediate family." Then it asks, "Circle the groups of people who you would receive help from, and who you would give help to" (Wellman et al. 2004:28).

The requirement for concrete experiences introduces an additional complication. The most important concern in a survey based on previous experiences of social support is recall bias, the extent to which respondents will accurately remember whom they turned to and why during a given experience. For example, if a respondent's last experience with renovations was eight years prior, the survey would likely produce little of value. Therefore, the survey required questions on concrete experiences frequent enough in the population of respondents that recall bias is minimized. This need, in turn, calls for a population of respondents in similar enough life circumstances or at similar enough points in the life course that a high proportion will have recently had similar concrete experiences. This solution exploits the structural homophily known to affect who encounters whom over the course of everyday activities (McPherson et al. 2001; Blau and Schwartz 1997/1984).

Our solution was to generate a large, heterogeneous sample of college students and to ask them about concrete instances of social support that college students are likely to experience. We use data from the Resources and Favors among College Students survey (RFCS), an original survey of over 2,000 college students across the U.S. conducted by the principal investigator to test these and other ideas. The survey was administered online by survey firm Qualtrics, which has a panel of hundreds of thousands of respondents, based on criteria provided by the investigators. The survey was based on a quota sample that targeted equal proportions of men and women, and equal proportions of black, white, Latino, and Asian respondents. Panelists were contacted to fill the survey until the quotas in each category were filled.[17]

The survey asked respondents how they sought help around three forms of everyday social support. It asked them consider the last time they sought help with a mathematics or economics problem; with a paper they were writing; and with a roommate problem. Over the previous year, 71.2% had sought help with a mathematics or economics problem; 57.6%, with a paper; 42.1%, with a roommate. The subset of respondents who sought help on at least one of these problems constitutes our analytical sample.[18] Table 2 exhibits characteristics of the final analytic sample. The final sample skewed slightly female, with 55.5% of respondents being women; the proportion of each ethnic group is as expected. Most respondents are U.S. born and the average age is just under twenty-one.

[Table_2]

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[17] The Qualtrics panel includes thousands of respondents. From these, a random sample of roughly ten thousand was approached to take the survey. The target number of completions was 2,000 across our racial and gender groups. Because some racial groups have fewer college students than others in the panel population, a total of 6,393 students had to complete the screening (out of 6,814 who started but did not complete screening) to attain racial parity. Of these, 2,329 properly distributed students completed at least the first substantive question and 2,211 (including those with standard missing data on some questions) completed the survey. This is the sample that was cleaned and prepared for analysis. Technically, the participation rate was rather high, 6,393/~10,000 and the completion rate extremely high, 2,211/2,329. However, we are reluctant to describe the survey in such terms because it was not a probability survey for which inferences may be made about the national population of college students, since panelists are not themselves a random sample of students. Instead, the advantage of the survey is the analytical leverage provided by the large number of students across multiple demographic characteristics who had recently made decisions to seek help.

[18] The sample was cleaned and duplicate IP addresses were removed. The analytical sample is the subset of all respondents who reported both having had the problem and turning to another person to solve it. Of all respondents, 1,364 reported having a math problem and 1,347 reported turning to another person for help. The respective figures for paper problems are 1,103 and 1,102; for roommate problems, 806 and 801. Because of missing data on other variables, we adopted a multiple imputation approach. All subsequent tables report multiply imputed data (see note below for additional details).

For each problem, respondents were asked to recall the last time they sought help. They were then asked, for each instance of support, when it occurred (i.e., which semester of which year), the name of the person they turned to, and the characteristics of the person. Respondents were asked, "Why did you turn to [the person you turned to] for help with [the specific problem]? Check all that apply." We provided four primary possibilities: "someone required that I talk to this person," "s/he is an expert or especially insightful on the topic," "s/he is good to talk to about any topic," and "s/he was around when I needed to discuss the topic." (We added an "other" option, which received few responses.) The first of these responses was common among students required to see tutors for help with assignments; the second is a measure of skill in or relevance to the problem at hand; the third we use as a proxy for trustworthiness with respect to social support; the fourth is our measure of accessibility. Respondents were asked to check all that applied. If they checked more than one response, they were subsequently asked to rank-order these. (The options were derived from on a pilot survey of 180 [separate] college student respondents.)

Attributes
Table 3 exhibits respondents' reported reasons for requesting help from the particular person they called upon during the last time they sought help for each of the three kinds of problems. Respondents were allowed to report more than one reason, and many did so: 59.4%, 65.8%, and 73.6%, respectively, for math, paper, and roommate problems (not shown). The left panel of Table 3 shows the proportion of respondents whose primary or only reported reason for approaching a given alter was accessibility, trustworthiness, skill, or something else. The right panel shows the total proportion of respondents who mentioned one of the three attributes or another reason.

[Table_3]

The right panel makes clear that most respondents take multiple attributes into account, and that accessibility is often one of them. The left panel provides clearer detail. The two kinds of problems which require the most topic-specific skill exhibited a pattern different from that of problems involving roommates. For mathematics and paper help, a majority of respondents asked because the person was good at the topic. For roommate help the majority reported that the alter was generally trustworthy as the primary motivating attribute. This is as expected—respondents would be exercising little judgment if they did not factor in skill when asking for help regarding skill-related problems.

Nevertheless, accessibility was surprisingly often the primary or only attribute reported. As many as 14% of respondents favored accessibility over all other factors, even when asking for help on a math problem; with roommate problems, the figure was 23%. For mathematics help, 8.5% *only* reported accessibility as a factor; for paper and roommate issues the figures were 12.7% and 14.5%, respectively (not shown). Indeed, of those who selected an alter because that person was accessible at the time of need, a majority (63.9% for math, 65.0% for paper, and 75.6% for roommate help) reported accessibility as one of the top two reasons for asking.

Deliberation
To capture the extent of reflection, respondents were asked, "How much were you planning on asking [the person you turned to] for help on [the specific problem]?" Respondents were given three options: "I was planning on asking this person" (reflective); "I was planning on asking

someone, not necessarily this person" (incidental); "I was not necessarily planning on asking someone" (spontaneous).

Table 4 exhibits the proportion of respondents in each category. It shows that while the majority of respondents knew whom they would ask for support when they did, a significant minority had not reflected on the decision fully before activing the tie. For math problems, almost a quarter of respondents did not have a person in mind even after they had decided to seek help; another 5.9% did not know they were going to ask for help at all, making a fully spontaneous decision. For paper problems, the respective figures were 27.9% and 8.1%; for roommate problems, 25.4% and 10.3%. In short, nearly a third of the time respondents approached someone for help whom they did not know they would approach before the interaction. Incidental and spontaneous tie activation are not typical; however, they are quite common among respondents, consistent with what the ethnographic studies reviewed above suggest.

[Table_4]

Our survey has both unique advantages and limitations vis-à-vis our understanding of reflection. We emphasize that no survey can convincingly capture cognitive processes the way controlled experiments can. It is for this reason that cognitive psychologists have done the majority of work in this area (see Kahneman and Tversky 2000). However, laboratory experiments have typically involved small samples. More importantly, experimental studies require manipulation and highly controlled environments, which raise questions about generalizability to real-world experiences. Our survey, which is focused on the recall of actual experiences, has the advantage of addressing those two limitations in experimental work. However, it cannot capture subconscious processes involved in a decision, and it cannot tell us whether a given process was necessarily intuitive. Instead, it can capture the extent to which a given decision was or was not planned by the respondent.

Finally, it should be clear that our experience-based approach cannot capture the entire social support network, in the same way as a survey such as Fischer's (1982) or Wellman et al.'s (2004). As such, the RFCS cannot capture the entire extent of the network opportunity structure as it exists in the broad network of acquaintances. Our survey shares this limitation with the GSS name generator (McPherson et al. 2006) and others (e.g., Pescosolido 1992). However, by focusing on experiences, the RFCS allows us to capture the role of accessibility in the help seeking process.

RESULTS

We estimate models to assess the extent to which, when respondents turned to accessible alters, the decision-making process was reflective (H1) or incidental or spontaneous (H2). Our outcome variable is the respondent's report that accessibility affected the decision to turn to a given alter for a particular kind of help. Given the binary outcome, we estimate logistic regression models (Agresti 2002).[19] Given prior work on social support, we control for ego's race (indicator variables for black, Latino, and Asian—white is the omitted category), gender, and age; we then control for both ego

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[19] Note that we are explicitly examining an association, not a causal relation (cf., Morgan and Winship 2007). We do not propose that intuitive thinking causes people to report accessibility. Instead, we are testing whether, when they turned to accessible alters, they tended to do so less deliberatively than when they turned to trustworthy, skilled, or other kinds of alters. The regressions are strictly associational, given the theoretical motivation of the study.

and alter race (same categories), gender, and age. Tables 5a and 5b exhibit the results. The tables present both logit coefficients and odds ratios.[20]

[Tables_5a_5b]

Table 5a reports whether respondents were more likely to report accessibility as the primary or only factor when they were not planning on asking whom they asked or not planning on asking anyone at all. The first models (left column) show that for all three problems this was in fact the case, consistent with the notion of a different decision-making process when accessibility plays a role. The third models, in the far right column, include full controls for ego and alter characteristics. The top panel shows that, for math problems, when respondents were planning on asking someone, but not necessarily a particular alter (incidental activation), their odds of turning to someone because of accessibility were 184% higher. When they were not planning on asking anyone (spontaneous activation), the odds are more than 321% higher. Both results are statistically significant. The comparable figures for paper problems are 158% and 169%; for roommate problems, a bit over 298% and 212%. The results strongly support H2.

Table 5b reports the results of an alternative specification of the outcome variable—whether respondents mentioned accessibility at all. The results are broadly consistent. Model 3 shows that, for mathematics problems, the odds of reporting accessibility are 51% greater when activation was incidental; they are 81% greater when it is spontaneous. Both results are statistically significant. For paper problems, the comparable figures are 37% and 79%; for roommate problems, 69% and 51%. (In tables 5a and 5b, most of the coefficients for ego and for alter characteristics did not reach statistical significance. The principal exception is that, for the Table 5b regressions, women were more likely than men to be report accessibility as a significant factor for mathematics and for roommate help. In the final models of Table 5a, women were more likely to report accessibility as the primary or only factor for math and paper help. Available upon request.)

As a robustness check, we estimated separate models of the process when respondents reported either skill at the problem or trustworthiness of the helper as either the primary or a factor at all in their decision. If the intuition behind H2 is correct, then not only should activation be more reflective in those cases but also, and more importantly, the extent of reflection should be the same for the two kinds of attributes.

[Tables_6]

Table 6 reports the results. Across all models, regardless of outcome, incidental and spontaneous activation are less likely than reflective activation, contrary to the findings regarding accessibility, confirming that the accessibility of potential helpers as an attribute is distinct from other attributes. Yet there are instructive differences in degree and statistical significance.

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[20] Our sample was missing between 0.27% and 41.1% of responses in the variables used in the analysis. To address the problem, we adopted a multiple imputation approach, which takes into account the uncertainty in imputed values (Rubin 1987). Using a chained questions approach, we performed 10 imputations, resulting in ten datasets identical on observed values but different in the (estimated) imputed values. Results with non-imputed data did not differ materially, except on roommate problems regressions, where, probably due to respondent fatigue there was more missing data. Non-imputed results had similar coefficients, but larger standard errors, as expected. Non-imputed findings available upon request.

We first consider primary attributes of alters (first and third columns). As expected, when respondents were primarily driven by skill or trustworthiness for mathematics help their activation of ties was less likely to be incidental, and a lot less likely to be spontaneous. In addition, the coefficients were remarkably consistent across the two outcomes. For mathematics help, incidental activation is a little under half as likely as reflective activation, regardless of whether the attribute is skill (45% less likely) or trustworthiness (29% less likely, or $e^b=0.71$ as likely). Spontaneous activation was 66% and 62% less likely than reflective activation for skill, or trustworthiness, respectively. For paper help, the coefficients for skill are in the same direction but they differ both in statistical significance and degree. Incidental activation was 26% less likely when skill was the primary attribute; trustworthiness was 2% more likely, though statistically insignificant for incidental activation. Spontaneous activation was 33% and 4% less likely. Neither difference was statistically significant. When students sought help with their writing, their actions were more reflective but not significantly so, suggesting that trustworthiness is something they at times consider explicitly and at times respond to spontaneously. Since paper writing can sometimes be deeply personal and other times largely technical or rote, there may be different processes at play in different circumstances. With roommate help, the coefficients were, again, all substantial and in the same negative direction, suggesting a consistently more reflective process—yet they are estimated with considerable imprecision, and only the coefficient for incidental activation in the trustworthy model (32% less likely or 0.685 as likely) is statistically significant. It is possible that the even broader range of "roommate" problems calls for different processes at different times, even though there is a general tendency toward reflective activation.

When either skill or trustworthiness is one of several attributes, the results are consistent except stronger. For math and roommate help in the trustworthy models, all associations are statistically significant and in the same range. Math and paper help are statistically significant in the skill models. When skill or trust are one of the factors, then even when adjusting for the particular other factors at play, the decision-making is significantly less likely to be either incidental or spontaneous.

Overall, the results are consistent with H2.

CONCLUSION
Past research on social support has suggested that when people need help they reflect on the relative characteristics of potential helpers before deciding whom to approach. More precisely, they describe a process in which actors first decide to seek help, then select an appropriate helper, and finally activate that tie. We have found evidence consistent with this standard process when skill and trustworthiness played a major role in the decision, but inconsistent with it when accessibility did. In the latter circumstances, one of two different processes was at play—either incidental or spontaneous activation, both of which are responsive to context and opportunity. Our study makes several contributions.

First, we have shown that mobilization may be understood as the separate choices of seeking, selection, and activation. Our approach makes possible a careful disaggregation of the separate bodies of work that have informed the literature. For example, our model helps make sense of and brings together findings such as Bearman and Parigi's (2004) report of "topic alter dependency" in the core discussion network—a finding primarily about selection—and Smith's (2007) report of reluctance among poor black job seekers to ask for help—a finding primarily about activation. At the same time, we note that ours is not a comprehensive theory of decision-making, which would require taking into account many additional factors (see, e.g., Simon 1997/1945; Bruch, Lee,

Feinberg Unpublished). Instead, our framework allowed the identification of three different processes: reflective, incidental, and spontaneous activation.

Second, our study has shown that developing richer theories of the decision process is important to understanding mobilization. While sociologists of social support have effectively countered many aspects of the rational actor model (e.g., Pescosolido 1992), the notion of highly deliberative decision-making has lurked in important ways. Recently, Kroneberg (2014), building on Esser (1993), has attempted to identify situations that elicit deliberative vs. spontaneous thinking, an important advance in this respect. Behavioral economists have done the most to undermine the notion that deliberation is common in action (see Kahneman 2001, 2003). Recent findings in that field help expand the catalog of individual conditions under which accessibility is likely to become important. Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) suggest that as people become more resource-poor or time-constrained they are more likely to make decisions that fail to conform to standards of rationality (see Desmond 2012). It is likely that such constraints, which at times result in desperation, contribute to incidental and spontaneous activation of support ties.

Third, our study provides evidence that contexts of interaction are important to network use. Our survey was ideal to unravel our analytical hypotheses because students' context of interaction, the campus, provides many potential helpers with similar characteristics (Feld 1981; Small 2009). Nevertheless, fully capturing the processes discussed requires other methods. Ethnographic perspectives, where actors can be observed in the midst of the decision-making process, are essential (Stack 1974; Evens and Handleman 2006). In addition, the work will benefit from modelling from an agent-based perspective, wherein actors can be hypothesized as responding to not only the attributes of other alters but also accessibility or proximity (see Macy and Willer 2002). In the end, our study adds to the growing body of research demonstrating the importance of context to networks (Mollenhorst et al. 2008, 2011; Small 2009, 2013; Chua 2012; Doreian and Conti 2012; Sailer and McCulloh 2012).

These considerations help identify the limitations of the study and the space for future research. Our study has deliberately focused on actors in a context with high interaction with homophilous alters facing similar kinds of everyday, routine problems. Understanding which contexts elicit which kinds of decision-making around which kinds of problems is needed in future work. In addition, our study only assessed deliberation in the narrow sense of whether activation was planned or not. Whether other forms of deliberation occur even when people are highly responsive to context is a question ripe for investigation. Finally, our study explicitly sets aside, for the sake of analytical focus, the larger network structure in which actors operate. A better understanding of the conjunction of structure and context will be essential in future work.

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Table 1. Types of activation, by whether seeking and selection decisions have been made before activation

		Selection decision	
		Made	*Not made*
Seeking decision			
	Made	Reflective	Incidental
	Not made	N/A	Spontaneous

Figure 1. A model of decision-making about social support networks

Table 2. Sample characteristics

Gender		
	Female	55.5%
Race		
	Non-Hispanic white	24.6%
	Non-Hispanic black	24.7%
	Non-Hispanic Asian	25.0%
	Latino	25.7%
Age		
	Mean	20.95
Year in college		
	First	22.8%
	Second	34.6%
	Third	23.5%
	Fourth	19.1%
Place of birth		
	United States	87.7%
	N	1,664

Table 3. Why did you turn to (the person you turned to) for help with (the given problem)?

| | Primary motivation | | | | | Mentioned motivation | | | | |
	Accessible	Trustworthy	Skilled	Other	Total	Accessible	Trustworthy	Skilled	Other	n
Mathematics	14.4%	27.2%	46.5%	12.0%	100%	31.6%	47.5%	59.1%	20.6%	1,347
Paper	19.2%	31.1%	39.3%	10.4%	100%	36.1%	50.2%	53.1%	18.1%	1,102
Roommate	23.0%	43.0%	19.9%	14.1%	100%	38.7%	60.1%	32.1%	19.1%	801

Note: The "other" category includes "required." Respondents could indicate more than one motivation. Left panel indicates proportion of respondents who indicated the motivation was the only or primary one. Figures may not add to 100 due to rounding. Right panel indicates proportion who mentioned the motivation.

Table 4. How much were you planning on asking (the person you asked) for help with (the given problem)?

Type of activation	Description	Mathematics	Paper	Roommate
Reflective	I was planning on asking this person	71.1%	64.0%	64.4%
Incidental	I was planning on asking someone, not necessarily this person	23.0%	27.9%	25.4%
Spontaneous	I was not necessarily planning on asking anyone	5.9%	8.1%	10.3%
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	n	1,347	1,102	801

Table 5a. Logistic regression predicting odds that respondent reported accessibility as primary or sole attribute

Mathematics help

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b	e^b	b	e^b	b	e^b
Planning on asking someone, not necessarily this person	1.022*** (0.183)	2.779	1.532*** (0.182)	4.627	1.046 *** (0.187)	2.846
Not planning on asking anyone	1.349*** (0.286)	3.857	1.908*** (0.289)	6.740	1.439*** (0.294)	4.216
Controls						
Ego charactersitics	N		Y		Y	
Alter characteristics	N		N		Y	
n	1,347		1,347		1,347	

Paper help

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b	e^b	b	e^b	b	e^b
Planning on asking someone, not necessarily this person	0.770*** (0.176)	2.160	1.618*** (0.173)	5.043	0.949** (0.179)	2.583
Not planning on asking anyone	0.861*** (0.272)	2.366	1.702*** (0.272)	5.485	0.991* (0.277)	2.694
Controls						
Ego charactersitics	N		Y		Y	
Alter characteristics	N		N		Y	
n	1,102		1,102		1,102	

Roommate help

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b	e^b	b	e^b	b	e^b
Planning on asking someone, not necessarily this person	1.180*** (0.207)	3.254	2.505*** (0.204)	12.244	1.382*** (0.224)	3.983
Not planning on asking anyone	0.903*** (0.307)	2.467	2.181*** (0.304)	8.855	1.140 (0.320)	3.127
Controls						
Ego charactersitics	N		Y		Y	
Alter characteristics	N		N		Y	
n	801		801		801	

Figures are unstandardized logit coefficients and odds ratios for the regession of log odds that respondent chose alter because alter was available. Ego controls are age, black, Latino, Asian, and female. Alter controls are age, black, Latino, Asian, and female. The coefficient for female ego in the math help models (0.324 in model 3) and the final paper model (0.4) were the only statistically significant controls. Conrols for blacks, Latinos, Asains, and age failed to reach statistical significance in all models. Regressions include a control for question ordering (respondents were randomly assigned one of two orderings as part of an unrelated survey experiment.) Based on 10 multiply imputed datasets.

Table 5b. Logistic regression predicting odds that respondent reported accessibility as at least one of the attributes

| | Mathematics help | | | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | |
	b	e^b	b	e^b	b	e^b
Planning on asking someone, not necessarily this person	0.404*** (0.137)	1.498	0.414*** (0.139)	1.513	0.412*** (0.139)	1.510
Not planning on asking anyone	0.514** (0.239)	1.672	0.599** (0.242)	1.820	0.597** (0.244)	1.817
Controls						
Ego charactersitics	N		Y		Y	
Alter characteristics	N		N		Y	
n	1,347		1,347		1,347	

| | Paper help | | | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | |
	b	e^b	b	e^b	b	e^b
Planning on asking someone, not necessarily this person	0.326** (0.141)	1.385	0.337** (0.142)	1.401	0.318** (0.144)	1.374
Not planning on asking anyone	0.604*** (0.227)	1.829	0.618*** (0.229)	1.855	0.582** (0.232)	1.790
Controls						
Ego charactersitics	N		Y		Y	
Alter characteristics	N		N		Y	
n	1,102		1,102		1,102	

| | Roommate help | | | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | |
	b	e^b	b	e^b	b	e^b
Planning on asking someone, not necessarily this person	0.466*** (0.175)	1.594	0.526*** (0.179)	1.692	0.526*** (0.184)	1.692
Not planning on asking anyone	0.392 (0.246)	1.480	0.397 (0.250)	1.487	0.411 (0.256)	1.508
Controls						
Ego charactersitics	N		Y		Y	
Alter characteristics	N		N		Y	
n	801		801		801	

Figures are unstandardized logit coefficients and odds ratios for the regession of log odds that respondent chose alter because alter was available. Ego controls are age, black, Latino, Asian, and female. Alter controls are age, black, Latino, Asian, and female. Ego controls are age, black, Latino, Asian, and female. Alter controls are age, black, Latino, Asian, and female. The coefficient for female ego in the math help models (0.344 in model 3) and the final roommate model (0.368) were the only statistically significant controls. Conrols for blacks, Latinos, Asains, and age failed to reach statistical significance in all models. Regressions include a control for question ordering (respondents were randomly assigned one of two orderings as part of an unrelated survey experiment.) Based on 10 multiply imputed datasets.

Table 6. Logistic regression predicting odds that respondent reported skill or trustworthiness as either primary or one of attributes

	Skill				Trustworthiness			
	Primary motivation		One of motivations		Primary motivation		One of motivations	
	Mathematics help		Mathematics help		Mathematics help		Mathematics help	
	b	e^b	b	e^b	b	e^b	b	e^b
Planning on asking someone, not necessarily this person	-0.585*** (0.155)	0.557	-0.591*** (0.136)	0.554	-0.308** (0.173)	0.735	-0.343** (0.134)	0.710
Not planning on asking anyone	-1.078*** (0.279)	0.340	-0.750*** (0.241)	0.472	-0.970*** (0.343)	0.379	-0.912*** (0.257)	0.402
Controls								
Ego charactersitics	Y		Y		Y		Y	
Alter characteristics	Y		Y		Y		Y	
n	1347		1347		1347		1347	
	Paper help		Paper help		Paper help		Paper help	
	b	e^b	b	e^b	b	e^b	b	e^b
Planning on asking someone, not necessarily this person	-0.308** (0.154)	0.735	-0.486*** (0.141)	0.615	0.018 (0.165)	1.018	-0.177 (0.140)	0.838
Not planning on asking anyone	-0.403 (0.274)	0.668	-0.485** (0.231)	0.616	-0.039 (0.293)	0.962	-0.142* (0.234)	0.868
Controls								
Ego charactersitics	Y		Y		Y		Y	
Alter characteristics	Y		Y		Y		Y	
n	1,102		1,102		1,102		1,102	
	Roommate help		Roommate help		Roommate help		Roommate help	
	b	e^b	b	e^b	b	e^b	b	e^b
Planning on asking someone, not necessarily this person	-0.035 (0.231)	0.966	-0.245 (0.192)	0.783	-.378* (0.214)	0.685	-.543*** (0.181)	0.685
Not planning on asking anyone	-0.092 (0.351)	0.912	-0.415 (0.281)	0.660	-0.319 (0.327)	0.727	-0.599** (0.252)	0.549
Controls								
Ego charactersitics	Y		Y		Y		Y	
Alter characteristics	Y		Y		Y		Y	
n	801		801		801		801	

Figures are unstandardized logit coefficients and odds ratios for the regession of log odds that respondent chose alter because alter was available. Ego controls are age, black, Latino, Asian, and female. Alter controls are age, black, Latino, Asian, and female. Regressions include a control for question ordering (respondents were randomly assigned one of two orderings as part of an unrelated survey experiment.) Based on 10 multiply imputed datasets.