PRAGMATIC PROPERTIES OF CAUSAL CONNECTIVES IN ENGLISH AND JAPANESE DISCOURSE

by

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1. The contribution of speech act theory to the study of discourse

Language can function as a vehicle for communication and also for communicating intentions. Speakers intend to have some effect on the listeners by acting in a linguistic way. Thus, the selection of intention as the unit of speech act analysis is a primary working assumption in discourse analysis. The encoding and decoding of discourse is a pragmatic activity which is goverened by general principles of cooperative action (cf. Kess 1993, Kasher 1985, Guenthner 1989). However, speech act theory has largely neglected its use in discourse analysis. It should be noted that Schiffrin and Allan point out the contribution of speech act theory to discourse as follows:

> By focusing upon the meanings of utterances as acts, speech act theory offers an approach to discourse analysis in which what is said is chunked (or segmented) into units that have communicative functions ...If we want to consider speech act theory as an approach to discourse, we need to consider 1) how speech act function contributes to sequential coherence and 2) how the speech act function of one utterence contributes to that of another. (Schiffrin 1994: 90, 61)

> Future work in speech acts needs to account for the contribution of individual speech acts to a sequential discourse or text, and that leads into the realm of conversational or discourse analysis. (Allan 1994: 4137)

In human communicative behavior there are always expressions of causal relations which play an important role in discursive strategies; they are often used in effective and smooth ways, but touch on 'some of the most difficult and essential aspects of language' (Danlos 1987: 58, Rae 1993: 239). The notion of causality embraces a number of

rather subtle semantic distinctions including not only physical causes and their effects, but also reasons for action, explanations of facts, and inferences or conclusions from premises. Furthermore, causal relations appear in a variety of lexical and grammatical forms and 'their functions are largely to do with the organisation of connected discourse, and with the interpretation of functional categories of speech acts' (cf. van Dijk 1977: 68ff, Stubbs 1983: 77, Altenberg 1984: 20ff). As Schiffrin and Rudolph observe, 'Language use is constrained by syntactic, semantic or pragmatic constraints alone' (Schiffrin 1985: 301). Thus, the situations of natural language are far too complicated to be explained by the application of simple models. In other words, 'it seems impossible to formulate rules (conditions) for connectives, because the different communicative relations are interrelated to such an extent that paraphrase transformation, and substitution are often acceptable within the communicative expressions' (Rudolph 1987: 97). It is assumed, however, that by studying these forms and pragmatic functions we can learn not only about the degree of stylistic and functional variation, but also about the different discursive strategies.[1]

The purpose of the present study is to investigate the functional nature of causal expressions,[2] especially those linked by the English *because* and *since* and the Japanese *kara* and *node* in sentence, text and discourse, and to explore some of the strategies that determine the distribution and usage of each one. In addition, as Maynard aptly suggests, 'the recognition of causal relationship is not totally based on formal logic, but is achieved on the basis of cultural knowledge shared by the participants' (Maynard 1989: 404) and when it comes to conducting a contrastive analysis, we must first 'obtain "equivalent" forms in languages to be contrasted' (Maynard 1986: 1105). The English *because* and *since* are usually assumed to have a high frequency of corrspondence to the Japanese *kara* and *node* among other causal connectives. Thus, in the present study it is of significance to examine the similarities and differences in the patterns of each usage for those connectives and connective particles observed in both English and Japanese through a cross-linguistic contrastive analysis.

2. The significance of pragmatic functions in the domains of causal connectives

Sweetser (1990) argues for the existence of these three domains:

1) the content domain in which a causal conjunction will mark 'real-world' causality of an event

2) the epistemic domain in which a causal conjunction will mark the cause of a belief or a conjunction

3) the speech act domain in which a causal conjunction indicates causal explanation of the speech act being performed. *i.e.* imperative, interrogative (1990: 81)

Sweetser's point is that conjunctions such as *because* may be interpreted as conforming to one of three possible usages. *Because* is used frequently to introduce added on material; and it also introduces background, and motivating or explanatory material. There are a number of linguistic facts which easily exemplify these three different domains (Ford 1993: 93, 103).

A logical and semantic framework form describing and interpreting causal relations is crucial, but connectives in natural language differ from logical ones which are independent of context and essentially truth-functional. That is, the distinction between semantic and pragmatic connectives is not always clear-cut, but the appropriate uses of connectives cannot be given only by semantic connectives; connectives do not only cover logical relations of clauses and sentences, many properties of main clauses and subordinate clauses, but also monitoring of connective acts, *i.e.* the expression of communicative intentions and frequent coherence relations.

In sentences which use *because*[3] between two clauses, the clause after *because* describes an event or state of affairs which causes the event or state of affairs described in the main clause as in example 1:

1. The ice is melting *because* the temperature is rising. (= The reason why the ice is melting is that the temperature is rising.)

2. Alma is probably sick, *because* she didn't show up for work. (= *The reason why Alma is probably sick is that she didn't show up for work.) (Morreall 1979: 231)

Whereas example 2 cannot be paraphrased in the same way as example 1, this shows that the *because*-clause in 2 does not provide an explanation for the event or state of affairs in the main clause, but an inference which the speaker is making on the evidence presented in the *because*-clause. Namely, the *because*-clause presents the speaker's evidence for the judgement which he makes in the main clause. So Morreall (1979) calls this use of *because* its 'eve-idential' use. One feature of a sentence which suggests that its main clauses have a verb of judging in the deep structure is the occurrence in its surface structure of modals like *probably, must, might*, which function as sentence adverbials. So, strong or weak modals may be used to express the relative strength of the speaker's inference.

Thus, we can say the speaker's intention (subjective motive toward the speaker's affirmative attitude in the main clause) has intervened in speech acts as pointed out by Colson (1988) as follows:

The crucial role of language is emphasized and special attention is given to inferences. (1980: abstract)

The choice of a correct interpretation depends not on forms, but on pragmatically motivated choice, between viewing the conjoined clauses as representing content units, logical entailments, and speech acts. Accordingly, the choice of a domain for the interpretation of a conjunction is essentially a pragmatic one. That is, causal relation is a pragmatic matter (Frey 1980: 4, 79). So our concern is not with the formal operation on the causal connectives' function in the context of language use as Heinämäki states in the following:

...But the very fact that a context is needed shows that some kind of relevance is necessary: that is exactly what the context creates. (1978: 117)

3. He has left *because* his wife's not here.

Syntactically speaking, *because* in sentence 3 is a subordinate conjunction. However, an utterance like 3 can be interpreted either as

stating the cause of his departure or as providing evidence for the belief that he has left. In the latter interpretation *because* is expressing a relation of dependent relevance. That is, it indicates how the proposition it introduces is relevant with respect to the first proposition. In inferential connectives between the two propositions the effect of using one of the expressions in an utterance is to constrain the hearer's choice of context for its interpretation. Blakemore (1987)'s treatment of the small range of expression within the framework of Relevance Theory provided the basis for promising work in English and in other languages such as French and Japanese.[4]

3. Contrastive analysis of the English causal connectives because, since *and the Japanese causal connectives* kara, node

3.1. Analysis of English causal connectives *because* and *since*

3.1.1. Multiple functions of *because*

Because, overwhelmingly the most common causal connective (link) in modern English, shows the widest distribution.[5] Some examples may illustrate its pragmatic functions:

4. a. He was drowned *because* he fell off the pier.
   b. He was drunk, *because* he fell off the pier
   c. He must have been drunk, *because* he fell off the pier.
   (Stubbs 1984: 29)

5. a. Theo was exausted *because* he had run to the university.
   b. Theo was exhausted, *because* he was gasping for breath.
   (Sanders 1992: 50)

The example 4a has the structure 'effect' plus 'cause', while 4b has 'assertion' plus 'justification' being used pragmatically. The sequence of discourse segments in 5a is coherent because of the locutionary meaning while that in 5b is pragmatic because of the illocutionary meaning of one or both of their segments. 'In pragmatic relations the coherence relation concerns the speech act status of the segments; the state of affairs in the second segment is ... the justification for

making utterance' (Sanders 1992: 50). The pragmatic use is often signalled by epistemic *must* as in 4c. From this observation a condition will be given:

> Pragmatic functions of *because* that are not possible with other types do not allow 1) reversal of the clause sequence,[6] 2) clefting of the *because*-clause, or 3) *yes-no* interrogation of the whole sentence. (Stubbs *op.cit.*: 29)

The following are some examples:

6. **Because he fell off the pier, he was drunk.
7. **It is *because* he fell off the pier that he was drunk.
8. **Was he drunk *because* he fell off the pier?

Pragmatic functions will vary according to the positional tendencies of the mobile variants of *because* and *since* as illustrated in section 3.1.3.

3.1.2. Multiple functions of *since*

Sweetser (1990) also shows its multiple usage as in

9. a. *Since* John wasn't there, we decided to leave a note for him.
   b. *Since* John isn't here, he has (evidently) gone home.
   c. *Since* you're so smart, when was George Washington born?

The 9a example is the case of content conjunction which means 'his absence caused our decision in the real world': 9b is an epistemic conjunction which means 'the knowledge of his absence causes my conclusion that he has gone home'; 9c is a speech-act conjunction which means 'I ask you *because* you're so smart – the fact that we're on the subject, for example, enables my act of asking the question'. (1990: 78)

3.1.3. Differences between *because* and *since*

As we have observed, the differences between *because* and *since* may be marginal, but they are obvious and significant. They differ from each other in several ways (cf. Heinämäki 1973, Townsend & Bever 1977):

1) The *because*-clause shows subjective judgements; it gives subjective motivation toward the speaker's affirmative attitude in the main clause, while the *since*-clause shows objective judgements; it shows what the speaker presupposes or assumes to be true.[7]

2) When the *because*-clause is postposed, there are two usages: a comma must be used only in case it has the meaning of motivation alone. The *since*-clause, on the other hand, presents the appropriate condition in the main clause and shows objective facts whether it is located in front or back (like an afterthought).

10. a. Come in, *because/since* it's raining.
    b. **Come in/*because* it's raining.

11. ***Because/Since* it's raining, come in. (Frey 1980: 74)

As can be seen in the 10 and 11 examples, in the case of the *because*-clause, it is acceptable in the post position which shows new information, while there is usually old information in the preposed position and the motivation which shows new information is not acceptable (cf. *Ibid.*)

3) Negation, question, and modal can have two scopes in the *because*-clause, but only one in sentences containing the *since*-clause.

12. a. John did not go home *because/since* he was tired.
    b. *Because/since* John was tired, he did not go home. (narrow scope)
    c. John went home, not *because/*since* he was tired, but *because*...(wide scope)   (Heinämäki *op.cit.*: 50)

If the connective is *because*, the example 12a can have the reading of either 12b or 12c, but if the connective is *since*, only 12b is possible. In other words, the connective *since* cannot be in the scope of negation, question or modal operator. *Since*-clauses, unlike *because*-clauses, cannot be an answer to why-questions as in

13. a. Why did John leave?
    b. Because/*Since he was tired. (*Ibid.*: 73)

3.1.4. Causal text and discourse strategies

In order to investigate the pragmatic-connective functions which form the relationship between the sequences in a discourse, explanations must be sought in the particular utterances within the discourse and their interrelationship. Connectives relate sequences of propositions which constitute a discourse. One proposition has various entailments. Speakers usually constitute their discourse by associating one proposition with others. The appropriate explanation is impossible except in the larger situational context. It is necessary for us, therefore, to judge the context in which we form utterances apppropriately and communicate our intentions to hearers. Speakers and writers plan and organize larger causal discourse or text strategies, so we need to study these strategies (cf. Altenberg 1984). Some other data from English and Japanese presented below would argue against a purely syntactic and semantic explanation of the two types. What should be emphasized here is that we attempt to explore some functional properties (constraints) which exclusively account for some mechanism which underlies their multiple functions in the wider discourse context. Hence, this framework will support the view that 'the wider discourse environment of a sentence is relevant to the interpretation of intersentential phenomena.' (McTear 1979).

It seems reasonable that Schleppegrell (1991) as well as Sweetser (1990) have tried to show clearly the three possible usages of words such as *because* in English spoken discourse as interactional and textual functions that are not captured by the designation 'subordinate conjunction.' Schleppegrell demonstrates that three types of meaning, that is, external (propositional), internal (textual), expressive – are reflected in the present-day use of *because*, ranging from causal (external/propositional) discourse-reflexive (internal

/textual) to interactional (expressive). Further, she emphasizes that an adequate description of *because* must recognize its paratactic roles, not only in previously described discourse reflexive uses, but also in indicating elaboration and continuation in non-embedded and non-causal contexts, where it provides broad textual links in discourse (cf. Ford 1993: 93). Here are some examples from Schleppegrell (1991):

a) the *because*-sequence as an independent assertion

14. Matthew: a. Well like I have a partner that hardly anybody likes
             b. *Because* they make fun of her name
             c. *Because* it's Halley like Halley's comet. (1991: 326)

In the example 14 Matthew's first *because* (b) is a discourse-reflexive, non-subordinating *because* which introduces a statement about how Matthew knows that the other children don't like his partner, not a statement about why they don't like her. His second *because* (c), on the other hand, is a subordinating *because*. Such use of *because* can be exemplified in final causal clauses as in

15. a. I'm gonna have breakfast now, *because* am I ever hungry!
    b. *I'm gonna have breakfast now, if am I ever hungry!!

16. a. The Knicks are going to win, *because* who on earth can stop Bernard?
    b. *The knicks are going to win, if who on earth can stop Bernard?

According to Lakoff (1984) and Ford (1993)'s observation, final causal clauses may take a wider range of constructions than their final conditionals and temporals. Final causal clauses may involve sentence types usually associated with the main clauses, such as inverted exclamations and rhetorical questions. This indicates the fact that *because*-clauses are more independent from their main clauses than are conditional and temporal clauses.

b) the *because*-sequence as justification

17. Boyd: a. I think mainly teachers look uh...for your, the- the
               things you're good at, and then the work on the
               things you aren't so good at,
          b. *Because* I'm not real good in
  Justin: c.   Math
  Boyd: d. No, I'm okay in math, but for instance in subjects
          like
          (continues)
(Schleppegrell 1991: 326, 327)

18. 'Well, I think it's terrible,' Lorraine persisted. 'Girls chased a
boy for a date or sat in a parked car with a boy...' What a dull
childhood, Mary thought. '*Because* when you behave like
that, boys won't respect you, Linda. They'll think you're
cheap.'
(Gipe 1985: 38)

In the examples 17, 18 the *because*-sequences are a justification for
why he has made that statement, or why he holds that position,
giving an illustration from Boyd and Mary's experiences.

c) the *because*-sequence as further elaboration

In its actual use in discourse, *because* connects sequences which are
not causally related. It reflects a paratactic relationship between the
clauses it introduces and the prior discourse as a coordinate
conjunction as illustrated in the following example:

19. That's really funny, *because* I see so much identity problems
here (in Roger), you know, and yours (Richard's) is in
between, and I had very little.
(Suenaga 1981: 37)

In this discourse the speaker talks of identity of Japanese Americans
(Roger and Richard are also Japanese Americans). The speaker seems
to add the following clauses paratactically after the *because*-clause.

d) interactional role in turn-taking

In this role the speaker intends to continue or further elaborate a
prior statement. One indication of this role of *because* in signalling
speaker continuation is the intonational character of *because*. Pauses
occur after the word to hold the floor for the speaker occasionally
with softening connectives such as *you see* (*know*), *I mean*, etc. as in
the following example:

20. *Because*...you see, they eat their breakfast and then they're
stuffing all morning and you you slave away at. (*Ibid.*: 21)

The continuation effect is reflected in an utterance-final *because* of
the following example:

21. Martin: If you get it mixed up though, like he was saying
          'fact' and he was kind of hesitating '*cause* he was
          trying to say the correct grammar, she might think
          that he really didn't know it or, the teachers might
          think he doesn't know what he's talking about
          Because...
  Interv: So: so you're saying that it's more than just getting
          the answer right, that ... you also have to say it in a
          way that's correct or ... uh: (continues)
          (Schleppegrell 1991: 329, 330)

Interviewer's turn provides evidence that she recognizes Martin's
because indicates continuation and further elaboration.

Because often occurs turn-initially as one speaker responds to
another. These *becauses* mark a response to a previous speaker and
continuation of a discourse topic as illustrated in example 22:

22. David: a.   No. Y- you know it has to do with the
             decorations.
  Deborah: b.   'cause somebody tells you? or you figure it
             out. (*Ibid.*: 331)

Here Deborah's *because* responds to and offers a contribution to
David's assertion.

These turn-initial *becauses* can also play an interactional role when one speaker challenges another's assertion:

23. Irene: a. (example) ... That's asinine, Henry.
    Henry: b. *Because* you don't understand, (continues)
             (*Ibid.*: 332)

e) the thematic structure of *because* sequences

In the following example Michael's *because* introduces a cohesive thematic link to a statement he has made several clauses previously:

24. Michael: a. yeah it's kind of when um,
              b. like if um you play the champion at the game of war?
              c. and someone bets on the champion but he loses?
              d. you don't really know who's gonna win
              e. *because* war you don't know what cards you get.
              (*Ibid.*: 334)

As can be observed, the function of *because* as a connective varies. Not only is it used as a subordinator, but also as a paratactic discourse marker indicating continuation or elaboration. Accordingly, it has textual and interactional functions.

3.2. Analysis of Japanese causal connectives *kara* [8]

Japanese, like many other languages, has a number of ways in which the concept of causal relationship can be expressed, but two primary causal connectives, namely, *kara* and *node* have been given much more attention by linguists than the other expressions in the same class, presumably because these two share many distributional similarities: they are not distinct from one another in terms of response to a why-question; both can be used in that context and they show cetain semantic differences (cf. Nakada 1976: 1) which are similar to the distinction between *because* and *since* (cf. Frey 1980: 37). However, prior works were concerned merely with showing that there were subtle differences between *kara* and *node* : Tawa (1973) has examined the syntactic differences between these two causal

connectives, while Nakada (1976) has made an attempt to further explore their usage and has shown that they had different assumptions associated with their respective semantics involving assertion and presupposition in spite of the similarity in superficial distribution.

Here in this paper, then, we aim at exploring their pragmatic functions (solution) in discursive environments in order to explain phenomena not adequately accounted for or not dealt with in the treatment of the same subject by Nagano and others (cf. Nakada 1976: 27).

However, Nagano's observations, which are still insightful, have been summarized as follows:

1) The connective S_1 *kara* S_2 is used by the speaker to introduce the first clause (S_1) subjectively as the cause/reason for the second clause (S_2).

2) The connective S_1 *node* S_2 is a device which describes a cause-effect/reason-consequent relationship between S_1 and S_2 as it exists antecedently beyond any subjective views of the speaker, without introducing any such subjective view of the speaker into that relationship
    (Nakada 1976: 4ff).

With those findings as a base, the functional nature of *kara* and *node* will be examined and clarified in the following sections.

3.2.1. *kara*

In addition to the function of introducing the first clause subjectively as the cause/reason for the second clause, the speaker uses this connective to introduce subjectively unfinished and indefinite affairs such as order, request, inference, and plan (Morita 1981: 98). Here are some examples:

25. Asita ie de paati o simasu-*kara* kite kudasai.[9]
     (We are having a party tomorrow, so please come.)

26. Koko wa sizuka *dakara* yoku nerare-ru daroo.
(It's quiet here, so one should be able to sleep well.)
(Yokobayashi & Shimomura 1988: 14)

27. Anata wa kansai no hito *dakara* soyuu ajitsuke suki desyoo?
(You are a native of the kansai district, so you like such taste, don't you?)
(H. Murakami 1991: 127)

The speaker makes a subjective judgement expressing the relative strength of the speaker's inference, where an inference is made with confidence, based on what the speaker considers strong evidence, and a strong modal may be used. To express a weaker conjecture, on the other hand, the speaker can use a weak modal or a weak phrase of judging (cf. Morreall's use of *because* as its evidential use). The same is true of Japanese conjunctive particle *kara*.

In spoken Japanese quite a few *kara*-clauses are postposed and used in sentence-final position showing inversion or ellipsis. This usage is almost fixed, but suggests that some other clause or sentence will follow. Accordingly, in order to clarify the function of the sentence final *kara*-clause, we must examine how the use of these causal connectives can be developed in a larger unit of discourse (cf. Schiffrin 1985, Handke 1983, Mizutani 1985).

28. a. (Chotto omachi kudasai.) ocha o iremasu *kara*.
(Please stay for a bit. I'm fixing some tea.)
b. Ocha o iremasu *kara*. (Chotto omachi kudasai.)
(Mizutani 1985:177)

29. Moo kippu o kat-te aru *kara* hayaku nori-masyoo.[10]
(We have already purchased the tickets, so let's get on quickly.)
(Takahara 1984: 110)

30. Aite wa dare? chesu no koma yakara wakai josei towa chigauwa ne?
(Who is the opponent? Judging from this chess piece, she's not a young woman.)
(T. Miyamoto 1991: 17)

Conjunctive particles *kara* and *node* are distinct in some properties; particles such as *wa, koso, tote, niwa* co-occur with *kara*, but not with *node* (Nagano 1959, Nakada 1976: 3).

31. Anohito ga yuu *kara*wa matigai nai yo.
(Since he's saying it, there can be no mistakes about it.)

32. Kagakusha *dakara* koso sekinin ga arun-desu.
(I am responsible for it all the more because I am a (scientist.)
(Nakada 1976: 3)

33. a. Okane ga at-ta *kara* koso sorega deki-ta no desu.
(We managed to do it precisely because we had the money.)
b. *Okane ga at-ta *node* koso sore ga deki-ta no desu.
(same gloss 33a)

3.2.2. *node*

A majority of *node* sentences make objective statements regardless of the speaker. S1 and S2 are connected as facts and are stated definitely. So *node* prohibits the uses of epistemic qualifiers such as *desyoo, daroo*, etc.

34. Yuube wa yoku nemure nakat-ta *node* kyoo wa atama ga itai.
(Since I didn't sleep well last night, I have a headache today.)
(Yokobayashi & Shimomura 1988: 14)

35. Sato san wa kotoshi hachijyuu sai ni naru ga asi ga jyoobu na*node* Fuji san ni noboru soo da.
(Mr. Sato will be eighty this year, but since his legs are still strong, he will climb Mt. Fuji, I hear.)
(Morita 1981: 15)

3.3. Parallels among *because, since* and *kara, node*

In many contexts *kara* and *node* are virtually interchangeable, but there is the difference that *node* emphasizes the reason, *kara* emphasizes the result as in the following examples:

36. Kyonen yama e it-ta *kara*, oyogu koto ga deki-ma-sen desi-ta.
(Last year I went to the mountains, so I couldn't swim.)

37. Kyonen yama e it-ta *node*, oyogu koto ga deki-ma-sen desi-ta.
(Last year I couldn't swim because I went to the mountains.)

In the phrases *kara* desu 'it is that' and *node*su 'it is because' there are interesting parallels with *since* and *because*:

38. Kaze o hikimasi-ta. Ame ni hura-re-te nure-ta *kara* desu.
(I have caught cold. It is *because* I was rained on and drenched.)
(Kuno 1973: 226)

However, the following sentences would be awkward or ungrammatical if *no desu* were to be replaced by *kara desu* which gives a cause per se, and not a reason, since not all explanations give causes.

39. Byooki desu. Taizyuu ga juppondo het-ta no-desu.
(I am sick. The explanation (or evidence) for my being sick is that I have lost ten pounds.)
(*Ibid.*)

In negative sentences the scope would be problematic and ambiguous as illustrated in the following examples:

40. a. He doesn't beat his wife *because* he likes her.
(=It is not because he likes her that he beats his wife.)
b. He doesn't beat his wife, *because* he likes her.
(=It is because he likes her that he doesn't beat his wife.)

Corresponding to 40a, b, we have the Japanese sentence read as follows:

41. a'. Kare ga tsuma o naguru no wa tsuma o aisi-te-iru *kara* to iu wake dewa nai.
b'. *Kare ga tsuma o naguru no wa tsuma o aisi-te-t-iru *node* to iu wake dewa nai.

However, both of the following appear to be acceptable as in the examples given

a". Kare wa tsuma o aisi-te-iru *kara* nagura-nai.
b". Kare wa tsuma o aisi-te-iru *node* nagura-nai.

From the foregoing considerations, it may now be possible to say that semantic and pragmatic functions of causal connectives across English and Japanese exhibit a high degree of similarity and interesting parallels as shown in the table below:

Table 1. *Forms and functions of English & Japanese causal connectives*

English			Japanese
Forms		Functions	Forms
because *since*	comma	objective reason (reason for anyone)	*node*
so			
because *since*	commaless	subjective reason intention, purpose result, assertion	*kara*
because		paratactic, coordinative	

However, the problem is not so simple. The above characteristics do not really tell us what we are communicating when we use them. By close examination of each usage, it was identified that in many ways the respective functions were different in many ways from each other in spite of their similarities.

3.4. No correspondence between the English *because* and the Japanese *kara*

In spoken Japanese *kara* is used. In contrast, *because* is not used by native speakers of English as in the following examples:

42. Doozo okamai naku, sugu siturei simasu-*kara*.
    (Please don't bother, I'll be leaving soon.)

43. Mada sigoto ga nokot-te ima-su *kara*, chotto mat-te-te kuremasen ka
    (a. I just have to finish this up. Could you wait a little while?
    b. Please wait a few minutes while I finish this up.
    c. ? Could you wait a little while because I have to finish this up?)
    (Mizutani 1985: 170, 171)

The speech act intentions of speakers are to motivate hearers showing 'request','permission', or 'invitation'. Regarding 43c, however, native speakers' grammaticality judgements show that Mizutani's findings are relative rather than absolute.
From this observation, the following conditions can be offered on the different use of *because* and *kara*:

1) A subordinate clause with *because* is used to show reason in the main clause. *Because* is used to clarify factive relations and the *because*-clause cannot be directly connected with the main clause which shows 'request' and 'demand' as illustrated in the examples given:

44. a. I can't go out right now *because* I have to finish this up.
    b. ?I can't go out right now. *Because* could you wait for a little while?

Thus, some statements to explain 'reason' and 'request' are required.

2) *kara* can be used in the utterance which denotes factive relations, but it can also be used in the utterances to ask others for 'request' and 'demand' as in the following examples:

45. Samui *kara*, dekakeru no o yame-ta.
    (It's cold. So I decided not to go out after all.)

46.=44. a. Mada sigoto ga nokkot-te iru *kara*, chotto mat-te kuremasu ka.
        b. Chotto mat-te kuremasu ka, mada sigoto ga nokot-te iru *kara*.

3.5. No correspondence between *because* and *de iikara*

47. Kaeri *de iikara*, ringo o kat-te kite kudasai.
    (?*Because* it's all right to get them on your home, will you get me some apples?)
    (Mizutani 1985: 173)

In example 47, the antecedent does not give a reason for the consequence. *Kara* in the utterance is not a reason to ask to get some apples, but only to justify the reason why the speaker was led to ask the hearer to get some apples. In other words, the antecedent shows the speaker's mental atittude. Thus, *kara* shows subjective cause or reason, although no corresponding *because* is used here in this case.

3.6. No correspondence between *because* as subordinate clause conjunction and *kara*

48. A friend who drops you *because* you won't help him cheat represents no great loss.

(Intiki no tedasuke o sinai ?*kara/kara* to it-te zekko suru
youna tomodati nanka, inaku nat-te mo taisita sonsitsu ni wa
narima-sen.)
(*Ibid*: 175)

As we have seen before, *kara* has the similarity with English
coordinative conjunctions 'and' and 'so' contrary to Tawa's view of
node. Thus, it should be noted that the uses of *kara* and *because* in
this section cannot be equivalent even when we take into account
their structural, semantic, and pragmatic functions (Cf. Shirakawa
1995).

4. Conclusion

In the above distinction the functional nature of some causal
connectives was examined on a cross-linguistic basis between English
and Japanese, paying special attention to *because, since* and *kara,
node*. The aim of this study was to examine the similarities and
differences in the patterns of each usage for causal relations and to
explore some of their pragmatic factors. In the course of examining
the causal relations, some significant characteristics of the
relationship between form and function have come to the fore.

Through minute contrastive analysis it was also found out that
some semantic and pragmatic functions of each usage showed a high
degree of similarity and parallels between English and Japanese. On
the other hand, it was also identified that some functions were
different in many ways. Naturally, it will be assumed that each
pattern of usage may differ radically from one language to another.
'Every language has its own set of language specific illocutionary
devices, encoding specific illocutionary meanings' (Wierzbicka 1991:
258). Thus, as Matthiessen & Thompson point out, 'the interesting
cross-linguistic issues is how and to what extent the grammar of
clause-combining in a given language reflects the rhetorical
organization of discourse in that language' (1989: 317).

As a result of the findings of the nature of each type of these
connectives, we may safely say that they have pragmatic functions
which are not illuminated through a sentence-level perspective. In
the case of *because*, some variety of its use was described in view of the
pragmatic function and discursive context. In order to speak about

pragmatic conditions specifically from the complexity of this field of
study, one goal in future research should be to explicate more fully
pragmatic factors of the connectives and to find out their
appropriate conditions. Hopefully, we have shown that the present
study from a cross-linguistic perspective might add an important
dimension to the research which is 'necessary to expand our general
understanding of language use' (Ford 1993: 49).

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Notes

1. There is a very large literature on the relationship between causal expressions
   and various conditioning factors – semantic, pragmatic, cognitive (by
   considering psycholinguistic theories of sentence processing, subordination
   as defined as cognitive domain (Handke 1983), textual factors that constrain
   the choice but different alternatives (cf. Altenberg 1984, Lowe 1984).
2. Causal expressions are termed causal links by Altenberg (1984).
3. Explanations are a functional category of textual structure. Causal clauses are
   especially useful as the vehicles for further explanation when problems arise
   in interaction (van Dijk 1990: 30, Ford 1993: 146). There are, however,
   many explanatory uses of *because* which are not causal and explanations
   offering reasons may concern causality or reasons for belief or reasons for a
   speech act. Thus, *because* can occur not only in explanaions that express cause,
   but also in those that give reasons for belief as in:
   (i) I broke the law *because* I parked on the yellow lines.
   (ii) Mansell must be going to win *because* that's what all the commentators
   say.
   (iii) a. What's the time? *'cos* I've got to dash?
   　　　b. When are you leaving? *Because* I need a lift.
   (Draper 1988: 13, Child 1994: 92, 93)

4. Some scholars like Bartsch deny the relevance of the rather pragmatic criterion, because terms such as 'psychological competence' or 'connective relevance' can hardly be defined (Handke 1983). However, Moeschler attempts to give empirical arguments for a relevance-based approach to the sequencing problem and the interpretive problem based on discursive behavior of 'parce que' ('because' in French). He is concerned with interpretive discourse connectives which have no specific discourse function; the pragmatic function of discourse connective is not sequential, but interpretive and the phenomenon cannot be explained with a theory of discourse (1993: 160, 167). However, as he admits himself, he has not yet given descriptive or theoretical arguments for a general account of pragmatic connectives with relevance theory.

5. *Because* or *cos* made up 74% of all the causal links in a 100,000 word corpus of spoken English (Altenberg 1984: 39).

6. *Because*-clauses are usually postposed, but when they are preposed, speakers will put important information in the clauses showing their involvement in the situation. Cf. note 2.
   (i) *Because* the Japanese like to be left alone they generally leave others alone.

7. Clauses often differ in the types of information they convey. The main clause of a sentence generally contains the assertion which the speaker wishes to convey, while a subordinate clause often conveys information on which the speaker places less importance. As regards the causal relation, the speaker's interest is focused on *because* reflecting the main information and presented in the main clause (Rudolph 1987: 177).

8. This is a conjunctive particle which is attached to informal forms of verbs and adjectives to constitute a subordinative clause expressing cause. It is a grammatically separate element from the conjunction *dakara* (Maynard 1989: 412). Maynard explains the multiplicity of functions of *dakara* on two different levels of discourse; the textual semantic level and the level of interactional move. She has pointed out that *dakara* has two additional pragmatic extended functions; 1) a marker for [reluctant] repetition and 2) a signal for claiming and ending in the turn – similar to Schleppegrell's function of paratactic *because*. Further, she claims that characteristics of *dakara* are perhaps best understood when we view language as a device to realize the speaker's intentions to communicate (*Iid*: 414).

9. *Kara* cooccurs with the request form, but not *node*.
   (i) Mado o sime-te kuda-sai – samui *kara*.
   (Please close the window – because it is cold.)
   (ii) *Mado o sime-te kuda-sai – samui *node*.
   (same gloss as in above)
   (Morita 1981: 105)

10. In spoken (conversational) Japanese present perfect aspect is more often used than tense when we make a request or command in the sense that native speakers of Japanese intuitively know the functional nature that present perfect forms have more communicative effects (Cf. Takahara 1984: 110ff).

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