

CONCEPTUALIZATIONS IN THE DOMAIN OF 'HAPPINESS' IN ENGLISH: THE VALUE OF EXPLICATIONS AND CULTURAL SCRIPTS

by

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0. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to check the claims made by Anna Wierzbicka about the possibility, even the necessity of paraphrasing whatever culturally-specific concept or meaning of a word by means of a universal set of concepts and words. In fact, Wierzbicka's claim also pertains to conceptualizations made in grammar. For the purpose of 'checking' the claim, we will investigate one conceptual domain in lexis, i.e. that of 'happiness'.

The domain of 'happiness' is conceptualized by means of a great many emotion terms in English which may appear as nouns, adjectives or even verbs; these terms are often very close in meaning to one another and therefore they can be expected to be defined in highly circular ways in most current dictionaries¹.

The challenge that this paper intends to take up is to investigate whether the apparatus for a conceptual analysis of single emotion terms and for whole domains, whether of emotions or whatever other domain, offered by Anna Wierzbicka, and known as the 'Natural Semantic Metalanguage' (NSM: see Wierzbicka 1990, 1996) can really meet this requirement of describing each of the concepts in the domain of 'happiness' in English in a non-circular and exhaustive way.

As may be well-known by now, Wierzbicka's NSM only comprises some fifty odd lexical concepts such as *I, people, something, good, bad, think, feel, want, do, say, happen etc.* It further comprises grammatical concepts such as S - V - O relations², negation, cause, condition, counterfactuality, complementation etc., and finally it must also comprise – although Wierzbicka has so far not explicitly stated this – a number of textual relationships such as a whole frame (of thought) for a number of single statements, the coherence relations between these single statements, and causal links that apply, not only between two successive statements, but especially between a set of statements

and a concluding frame (of thought). (We will point this out again when we come to the first example).

By means of this 'lingua mentalis' or set of conceptual primitives, it has become possible – thus Anna Wierzbicka claims – to characterize whatever concept in whatever culture, however culture-specific it may be. The only concepts that are not further analyzable, but given as the universal concepts of all humankind and hence of all ethnic and/or cultural communities in the whole world are those of the NSM, some of which have been listed above.

The implications of the present analysis of 'happiness' concepts by means of the NSM apparatus are therefore far from trivial. If it can be shown that it is possible to characterize in a non-circular and exhaustive way some eleven emotion terms in the domain of 'happiness', which are sometimes near-synonyms but in other cases strongly opposed to one another, then the challenge is double: (1) could any other approach do the same overall job, and (2) is it only by means of universal concepts that we can exhaustively and in a non-circular way define what all non-universal concepts may mean?

As suggested, we will deal in our analysis with eleven 'happiness' concepts, which we have intuitively arranged according to the parameter of intensity, starting with the strongest emotional concept 'bliss' and gradually going down to the weakest happiness concept, i.e. 'glad'. These eleven items are (1) *bliss(ful)*, (2) *delighted*, (3) *thrilled*, (4) *overjoyed*, (5) *jubilant*, (6) *exultant*, (7) *cheerful*, (8) *merry*, (9) *happy*, (10) *pleased*, (11) *glad*.

The procedure followed for the analysis of each item is as follows: first we will enlist a number of contextual uses of the given emotion term, mainly taken from dictionaries; then we will try to set up a full 'explication' of the meaning components of the concept denoted by the term in 'lingua mentalis', which is done again on an intuitive basis, but in interaction with the contextual uses, and finally an explicit justification of the intuitive presentation is offered.

Wierzbicka has not only summed up a small number of lexical and grammatical universals – or semantic primitives –, but also developed a method for the description of the concepts named by culture-specific terms. This is done in the form of little explications containing an initial frame, a (kind of) interior monologue and a concluding frame. For emotion concepts these explications contain, amongst more specific elements to be specified below, the following

more general components, which can be seen as the schematic representation of what is common to all concepts of 'happiness'.

- (0) *X feels something*
1. Sometimes a person thinks something like this:
 2. Something (very) good (can) good happen (_) (to me)
 3. I d_ not know that this w_ happen
 4. I don't want other things
 5. Because of this, this person feels something (very) good
 6. People can know this
 7. X feels like this

The heading of most but not all explications will be *X feels something*, which tacitly assumes that all the concepts to be analysed are emotion concepts. This seems clearly to be the case if we can substitute a given emotion adjective or noun for the slot *something* in *X feels something*. This is certainly possible for *happy* itself and for six other happiness terms: *delighted*, *overjoyed*, *thrilled*, *jubilant*, *exultant*, and *pleased*. It seems less or not possible for four terms: *blissful*, *cheerful*, *merry* and *glad*, which also for other reasons – as will be shown in the analyses – are not good candidates for the category of 'emotion', but may rather be attributed to somewhat different conceptual domains such as behaviour or attitude.

The explication or scenario in (0) is felt to give an exhaustive description of the necessary and the sufficient components³ of a given 'happiness' concept. The first component (01) captures the more or less conscious character of the experience of emotions. The three next components reflect the 'interior monologue' that is taking place in the awareness of the experiencer of the emotion. The second component (02) denotes the cause or stimulus of the emotion and still requires a further time specification for each single 'happiness' concept; the third component (03) is concerned with the expectation factor: either this triggering event was expected or it was unexpected; the fourth component (04) describes the present effect of the experience of something good. After this interior monologue, which reflects an onstage viewpoint, the analyst steps in again and takes an off-stage perspective on the subject's inner state: the fifth component (05) explicitly states the causal link between the event that happened and the experience of something good; the sixth component (06) states whether the inner feeling is also visibly

externalized for the off-stage observer and the last component (07) grounds this statement in present reality. After this general characterization of the semantic structure of 'happiness' concepts, we will now approach the analysis of each of the eleven 'happiness' terms in turn.

1. The concept of 'bliss(ful)'⁴

1.1. Contexts for 'bliss(ful)'

According to CCD, the concept of 'bliss' constitutes the highest degree of intensity within the domain of 'happiness'. 'Bliss' is said to denote 'perfect happiness, serene joy'. 'Bliss' denotes an almost stationary happiness, which can be rather physically based as in the context of the sentences (1 - 3), or more psychologically oriented as in (4 - 7); it may reflect a fairly long unproblematic cognitive state (8 - 11) or even denote a life-long state as in (12 - 15). In all these cases, however, it is clear that *bliss(ful)* denotes the least externalized or the most internalized concept of 'happiness' so that it can even be combined with the far more general concept 'happiness' itself as in *blissfully happy* in (15). This also suggests that there is an important difference between the adjective *blissful*, which can not be used in the *something*-slot of *X feels something*, and the noun *bliss*, which can be combined with the noun *feeling* as the first example (1) shows:

- (1) A feeling of bliss came over him as he fell asleep.
- (2) Lying in the warm sun, listening to the sea – it was sheer bliss.
- (3) She closed her eyes in bliss as the beautiful music played.
- (4) They sat there together in blissful silence.
- (5) They are a young couple in the first blissful days of their marriage.
- (6) He often thought about those blissful days in the south of Italy.
- (7) For a couple of months weekends were bliss.
- (8) After those blissful two years, I began to hate school.
- (9) To be blissfully ignorant.
- (10) Most people remain blissfully unaware of the problem.

- (11) Mr Shallow himself is blissfully ignorant of his responsibility.
- (12) A life of bliss.
- (13) Living in married/wedded bliss.
- (14) What bliss! I don't have to go to work today.
- (15) For years they were blissfully happy.

The fact that *blissfully happy* is possible, but that **happily blissful* is not, clearly suggests that *blissful* is a far more specific concept, whereas *happy* is far more general and can therefore even be considered as the 'basic level term' in this domain⁵, which is also the reason why the domain is named after it.

On the basis of the above contexts we can propose the following explication for 'bliss'.

1.2. Explication of the concept of 'bliss(ful)'

Like all other emotions, also the emotion of "bliss" is consciously experienced, but, as the sentences (9-11) suggest, it may well be the least conscious experience in the domain of "happiness". This is reflected in the component (A5) below "I don't want *to think* of other things", which differs from the component in (04) "I don't want other things" by the addition of the verb *to think of*

(A) Explication of *X feels bliss*

1. Sometimes a person thinks something like this:
 2. Something very good is happening to me
 3. I couldn't want other things for a long time
 4. I don't want to think of other things
5. Because of this, this person feels something very good
6. X feels like this

'Bliss' further differs from the other emotion concepts of happiness in that it does not presuppose the expectation of the good event, referred to in the components of the schematic explication in (03). The high intensity of 'bliss' is explicated by means of the degree concept 'very' in (A2) and (A5). This component will also have to be found in the explication of the items of the next group 'delighted', 'overjoyed' and 'thrilled'. The difference between 'blissful' and the

three other concepts denoting an intensive experience is in the present, continuing experience of the state suggested by the present progressive in (A2). In this respect, it contrasts with most other adjectives, e.g. with 'thrilled' or 'happy', which presuppose either a sudden or an expected fortunate event ('something good happened' which caused the specific emotion). Rather, 'bliss' denotes a present state, which is reflected in the meaning component (A2) 'Something very good is happening' on the spot (music, warm sun). Instances like the above-mentioned ones also account for the component (A3) 'I couldn't want other things', which signals an absolute satisfaction on the part of the one who is in a state of bliss. In addition, situations in which an experiencer of the emotion in question leads a life of bliss or in which a couple sit somewhere together in blissful silence (4) justify the association of the feature of timelessness, i.e. 'for a long time', as suggested in (A3).

Moreover, the psychological effect in (A4) 'I don't want to think of other things' is concluded from the ability of 'bliss' to combine with 'cognitively minimal' states like 'ignorance' and 'unaware'. The oxymoron 'blissfully ignorant' (9; 11) or 'blissfully unaware' (10) raises the question when one may experience the joint presence of these two characteristics. The answer to this question probably is: when people somehow purposively avoid being informed about events or incidents that could force them into any action removing them from the state of bliss and causing them stress. Therefore, they are reluctant to be preoccupied with other issues.

Finally, the absence of components signalling some kind of observable reaction on the part of the experiencer is due to the fact that 'bliss' is a purely internal, mental state, as becomes evident from the above-mentioned instances. What persons who are in a state of bliss feel is purely internal as there are no visible symptoms of happiness in their faces or conduct. Consequently, observers can not distinguish the presence of bliss in such people. It is only when there are outer signs of the emotion that we will need to mark this fact as will be the case with *thrilled*.

Given the fully internalized emotion as conceptualized in 'bliss', it is not astonishing that *bliss* is not used with a number of grammatical constructions reflecting the triggering factor of the emotion such as complement sentences, or causative prepositional phrases introduced by *at*, *with*, *in*, *about*. The only setting that seems compatible with a state of bliss is a time setting evoked by temporal

conjunctions or by present participles or temporal nouns. In this respect, 'bliss(ful)' strongly contrasts with the past participle forms 'delighted', 'overjoyed', and 'thrilled', which very strongly imply a causal setting.

2. The concept of 'delighted'

2.1. Contexts for 'delighted'

Whereas the noun *bliss* has only a derived adjective form *blissful*, the form *delight* can be both noun and verb and consequently has two derived forms *delightful* and *delighted*. Although we will here mainly concentrate on the form *delighted*, we will not disregard the noun *delight*. Both CCD and DCE enlist three senses for the noun *delight*, one of which is the causative sense, i.e. as 'someone or something that gives you great joy or pleasure'. This intuitive characterization⁶ also justifies its being placed high on the scale of intensity – between 'bliss' and 'joy'. What must be explicitly accounted for here, is the contextual evidence for the causal contexts and the corresponding explication of its causal components. Let's look at some contexts first:

- (16) I was four when I discovered the delights of feeding ducks.
- (17) Kate wrote to me of her delight that I was now so happy.
- (18) He takes delight in annoying me.
- (19) Morris delighted in hard manual work.
- (20) He was grinning, delighted with his achievements.
- (21) He delighted at the prospect of leaving home.
- (22) He was delighted to meet them again.
- (23) I'm delighted to hear it.

The most striking contrast between the predominantly temporal settings associated with the concept of 'bliss' and the causal settings of *delighted* is shown by the great variety of causal contexts. These can be an *of* phrase expressing identification i.e. *Feeding ducks is a delight* in (16), a *that*-complement in (17), which in fact is another form of identification, the *in*-phrase in (18 - 19), suggesting the container schema from where the delight originates, a *with*-phrase (20) implying the companionship schema and hence the existence of the event, an *at*-phrase suggesting a present event, i.e. the present

prospect of something in the future and the *to*-infinitive (21 - 22) implying the actual occurrence of an event which must have happened just before or almost simultaneous with the emotional experience.

On the basis of these contexts, the following explication can be proposed.

2.2. Explication of the concept of '*delight(ed)*'

(B) Explication of *X feels delighted*

1. Sometimes a person thinks something like this:
 2. Something very good happened now
 3. I didn't know this would happen
4. Because of this, this person feels something very good
5. X feels like this

Also the other causal contexts in which *delighted* can occur imply that the stimulus triggering off the experience of the emotion can be slightly previous to or simultaneous with the emotion itself. We have therefore incorporated this time notion by means of the combination of a past tense and the adverb *now*.

Prototypically, the 'good event' triggering off the experience of 'delight' emerges unexpectedly catching the experiencer by surprise, which is reflected in the component (B3) 'I didn't know this would happen'. This notion of unexpectedness is typically present in a context like *I'm delighted to hear it* (23), in which the speaker was unaware that the fortunate incident he hears of would occur, and which, thus, involves a element of surprise on his part.

When 'delighted' is compared to the concept of 'bliss', which denotes a receptive and rather permanent state, the concept of 'delight(ed)' may involve more initiative on the part of the experiencer, which is most typically found in expressions with the container schema as in (18, 19), whereby also *take delight in* can be typically used, as DCE remarks especially, with 'things you should not do'. This is even more proof that the experiencer can take a very active part in the triggering cause, which also explains the fact that dictionaries tend to list the 'cause' meaning of '*delight(ed)*' as a special subcategory of this emotion term. Still, we need not build this component into the explication of *delighted*. Since it has to do with

the expression *take delight in*, which is a somewhat different concept, anyway. Still, it remains a fact that the noun *delight* is the only term of 'happiness' which can take a complement, either with *that* as in (17) or with *of* as in (16).

3. The concepts of 'joy' and 'overjoyed'

3.1. Contexts for 'overjoyed'

Although the concepts covered by the noun *joy* and the derived adjective *overjoyed* are not fully identical, they are largely the same.⁷ We will not go into the refined differences here, but mainly concentrate on the form *overjoyed* so that a comparison of the possibilities for complementation and setting elements with the other 'happiness' terms remains possible.

Just like '*delighted*' also '*overjoyed*' occurs in the context of stronger causal settings as is the case in each of the following examples:

- (24) Naturally I was overjoyed when I was offered the part in the play.
- (25) She was overjoyed to get a letter from her son.
- (26) She was overjoyed to hear about the arrival of the baby.
- (27) Frances was overjoyed to see him.
- (28) He'll be overjoyed at your news.
- (29) They were overjoyed at this treatment.

In contrast to the many different causal possibilities found with *delighted*, the range of causes for the emotion concept 'overjoyed' is much narrower and can linguistically only be expressed in two *ways* both expressing the actual, simultaneous occurrence of the stimulus and the emotion event: either a *to*-infinitive, which always denotes an individualized, single event (See Dirven - Radden, to appear) or an *at*-phrase, which is the causal preposition most comparable to the *to*-infinitive (See Dirven, to appear). Even the *when*-phrase in (24) obviously gets a preponderantly causal interpretation and implies a simultaneous occurrence of the causing stimulus event and the emotion event. So with respect to the time dimension, *overjoyed* is more restricted than *delighted*: whereas *delighted* is more time-

variable, i.e. it can be combined with prior or simultaneous causes, *overjoyed* can only be combined with simultaneous causes.

Another important difference between *overjoyed* and the other 'happiness' adjectives is the time-neutral character of the state of *joy* itself, which may be short or very long.

On the basis of the examples in (24 - 29) we propose the following explication for 'overjoyed'.

3.2. Explication of the concept of 'overjoyed'

(C) Explication of *X feels overjoyed*

1. Sometimes a person thinks something like this:
 2. Something very good is happening now
 3. I didn't know this would happen
 4. I don't want other things for some time
5. Because of this, this person feels something very good
6. X feels like this

Whereas the concept of 'bliss(ful)' denotes a permanent state, and whereas the concept of 'joy' may also denote such a longer state (e.g. in Keats's phrase *A thing of beauty is a joy for ever*), the deverbal nature of 'overjoyed' involves an event just taking place now and triggering off a new experience of 'joy'. This cause event is not only seen as simultaneous with the emotion event, suggested by the present progressive in the component (C2), but it also comes unexpectedly (C3). But the satisfaction which follows the experience of joy is seen as more than momentary, suggested by the use of 'for some time' in (C4).

We will further continue the analysis of this concept while contrasting it to the concept of 'thrilled'.

4. The concept of 'thrilled'

The main difference between the two concepts of 'overjoyed' and 'thrilled' may be associated with the time factor in the experience of the emotion. Whereas *overjoyed* is rather duration-neutral and may apply to a shorter or longer duration of the emotion, *thrilled* implies

'a sudden strong feeling of excitement and pleasure' (DCE), as shown in some of the following contexts.

4.1. Contexts for 'thrilled'

The only formal difference between *thrilled* and *overjoyed* is that *thrilled* can not only take temporal / causal settings with *when*, *to-*infinitive, and *at* but that it can also take a *with*-phrase as in (35):

- (30) Julie looked thrilled when she heard that she was going to Paris for a week.
- (31) We were thrilled to bits when our daughter appeared on t.v.
- (32) He was thrilled to be invited.
- (33) I was thrilled to be sitting next to such a distinguished author.
- (34) He was thrilled at the arrival of his son, Julian.
- (35) Pete is thrilled with his new computer. It was a wonderful present.

The *with*-phrase in (35) is the only instance of a cause denoting a concrete object like *a computer*. This possibility may be less prototypical, but on the other hand it may also be an indication for the main distinction between the concepts of 'overjoyed' and 'thrilled', which relates to the type of the cause of emotion. With *overjoyed* these causes are more substantial events such as in (25) *being offered a part in a play*, (27) *the arrival of the baby*, (29) *overjoyed at this treatment*. With *thrilled*, however, the causes are more incidental such as *the daughter's appearance on T.V.* (31), *being invited* (32), or *sitting next to a distinguished author* (33). This suggests that the emotion of feeling 'thrilled' may in distinction with that of 'overjoyed' not only be more sudden and momentary, but also more incidental or less substantial. Still, it is not clear whether this is a 'necessary' component and we would not see a possibility to incorporate it in the explication. Therefore, the following explication is proposed.

4.2. Explication of the concept of 'thrilled'

(D) Explication of *X feels thrilled*

1. Sometimes a person thinks something like this:
 2. Something very good happened
 3. I didn't know this would happen
 4. I don't want other things now
5. Because of this, this person feels something very good
6. Other people can know this
7. X feels like this

Also this emotion is triggered by a 'very good event', suggested in (D3), but it is followed by a less stable effect, than for instance 'happy' or 'pleased' or 'glad'. Therefore *be thrilled* in itself denotes a highly transient emotion. Hence the presence of 'now' in the component (D4). The component (D3) 'I didn't know this would happen' endows the specific emotion concept with an element of surprise. In the situations already stated but especially in a case like (32) *He was thrilled to be invited* it is clear that the experiencer did not anticipate that a pleasant event would take place.

Moreover, experiencing this emotion is usually accompanied by spontaneous non-verbal reactions such as facial expressions and trembling. It is not by accident that English has derived a term such as *thriller films* from *thrill*. As this metaphor suggests, such films are allegedly associated with viewers shaking or trembling. It is these physical reactions that enable someone to observe that someone 'looked' *thrilled when she heard that she was going to Paris* (30) and that justify the incorporation of the component (D6) 'Other people can know this' in the explication of this emotion concept.

As past participle adjectives, the three emotion concepts *delighted*, *overjoyed*, and *thrilled* have in common that they are strongly event-oriented and thus incorporate a strong causal construal and the notion of an unexpected event.

The two next emotion terms are borrowings from Latin, where they were originally present participle forms, implying the notion of action which is to be reflected in the explication as 'this person does something'.

5. The concept of 'jubilant'

5.1. Contexts for 'jubilant'

The two loan concepts 'jubilant' and 'exultant' also denote a high degree of happiness. But they differ from the previous concepts in that they contain some notion of 'competition', usually though not exclusively associated with sports. The Latin present participle *jubilans* has been derived from the verb *jubilare* 'to make a joyful noise' (SOED). The original meaning of 'making a noise for joy' is still present in the English loanword, but it has been very strongly narrowed to making verbal noise only in the context of contest or conflict, as the following examples suggest:

- (36) The climbers were jubilant after reaching the top of Everest.
- (37) They celebrated their unexpected victory with jubilant shouts.
- (38) 'The army 's going to send me home!' Luther announced jubilantly.
- (39) Liverpool were in a jubilant mood after their cup victory.
- (40) A jubilant Labour Party Conference.

The notion of 'shouting' is explicitly present in (37) *jubilant shouts* and (38) *announce jubilantly*, whereas the notion of fighting, either against an obstacle such as reaching the top of Everest (36), or gaining a victory (37-39), or a show-down with the army authority (38), or the atmosphere of political contest (40), is explicit in each of these examples. On this basis, we propose the following explication for the concept of 'jubilant'.

5.2. Explication of the concept of 'jubilant'

(E) Explication of *X feels jubilant*

1. Sometimes a person thinks something like this:
 2. I did something very good
 3. I didn't think I could do this
 4. I wanted this

5. Because of this, this person feels something very good
6. Because of this, this person does something
7. Other people can know this
8. X feels like this

In a prototypical jubilation situation, one experiences this emotion after having succeeded in doing something on his own, and not because something happened. Specifically, in a situation like (36), where some climbers were jubilant after reaching the top of Everest, the climbers had first made an effort to climb the mountain and they were jubilant after attaining their goal (E2: 'I did something very good') rather than after something purely accidental, which would be paraphrased by 'Something very good happened'. The same applies to an instance like (39) *Liverpool were in a jubilant mood after their cup victory*. It is this achievement that the component (E5) 'Because of this, this person feels something very good' tries to express. Additionally, the component (E4) 'I wanted this' suggests a certain degree of difficulty which must be overcome by the potential experiencer of jubilation to achieve this success. In fact, both instances of *victory* (37, 39) mentioned above contain the notion of triumph over an obstacle.

The component (E4) 'I wanted this' also signals a period of time during which the experiencer hoped to gain his objective ('reach the top of Everest', 'cup victory'). A situation like in (37), seems to undermine this argument as the victory stimulating the emotion of 'jubilant' was unexpected, but yet, in spite of not being expected, it may still be strongly wanted and hoped for. Moreover, total lack of hope would also involve lack of initiative on the part of the experiencer.

Another conclusion we can reach by considering examples implying vocal modulations like (37) *with jubilant shouts* and (38) *Luther announced jubilantly*, is that one's feeling jubilant results in some sort of vocal reaction to one's success. Shouts and announcements, as indicated in the examples, are showcases of active reactions (E6: 'This person does something') displayed by the experiencer.

Comparing the two components of 'vocal reaction' (or shouting) and of competition, we see that the latter has in fact superseded the former now. Here we thus witness a very interesting case of a

contextual usage gradually replacing the original context of merely 'shouting for joy' and metonymically extending it to the whole process of 'triumph over an obstacle'.

6. The concept of 'exult(ant)'

6.1. Contexts for 'exult(ant)'

The two forms *to exult* and *exultant* are, just like *jubilant*, 17th century loans from Latin. The verb *exultare* 'to spring or leap up' was in the borrowing process gradually narrowed and shifted into English *to exult* 'to leap up for joy, to rejoice exceedingly, to triumph' (SOED).

Remarkable, however, is that the original sense of 'leap up' is used in the context of the notion of competition as very clearly present in the examples of (41, 42, 44, and 45). This original notion of physical self-expression is also continued in the contexts of non-verbal noise. This strongly physical sense of *exultant* may have constrained the use of settings, which in English can only be realized by means of causal *at* for a simultaneous event (42, 43, 45, 47) or *in* (49) for a more permanent container-source of the exultation.

- (41) He was exultant. 'They've lost the game', he shouted.
- (42) She laughed, exultant at his misfortune.
- (43) The bad news was passed exultantly among the soldiers.
- (44) An exultant shout of victory.
- (45) The tennis-player was exultant at his success.
- (46) Exultantly proud.
- (47) Her tone was loud, exultant.
- (48) I both trembled and exulted at my fortune.
- (49) He exulted in the title of Napoleon of Fleet Street.
- (50) 'I've never played golf like I did last week', he exulted.

6.2. Explication of the concept of 'exult(ant)'

- (F) Explication of *X feels exultant*
 1. Sometimes a person thinks something like this:
 2. I did something very good

3. Other people couldn't do this
4. Because of this, this person feels something very good
5. Because of this, this person does something
6. Other people can know this
7. X feels like this

In a prototypical exultation situation, the emotion is initiated by a success at something that the experiencer accomplished by himself (F3: 'I did something very good'), for instance (44) *An exultant shout of victory*. This notion of accomplishment connects 'exultant' and 'jubilant' as members of the same family. One element that distinguishes the one from the other is the factor pertaining to the cause of the two emotions, i.e. the component of competition as found in (F3) 'Other people couldn't do this', which is absent in the conceptual structure of *jubilant*. Also, in example (49) *He exulted in the title of Napoleon of Fleet Street*, the contextual information that the experiencer won a title after a period of stiff competition with all the other newspapers is highly relevant. Correspondingly, in the example (50) *I've never played golf like I did last week, he exulted*, we have a golf player exultant at the record he obtained in comparison with his previous accomplishments. In fact, the element of competition in the case of 'exultant' is discernible in all contexts in which it occurs: in each instance: *An exultant shout of victory* (44), *The tennis player was exultant at his success* (45), *Exultantly proud* (46) it is explicitly present. In the case of 'jubilant', however, we can have people achieving something entailing no competition with another team, like in (36) *The climbers were jubilant after reaching the top of Everest*, where emphasis is placed on the achievement rather than on success after some kind of competition.

As already pointed out, experiencing this emotion is succeeded by physical reactions such as trembling, shouting, laughter, and so on. Specifically, we can have a case, for instance, where someone laughs, exultant at someone's misfortune or where one trembles and exults at his fortune. These active or physical reactions (F5: 'This person does something') are a necessary component of the concept of exultation and come naturally or spontaneously just as in the case of *jubilant*. This is illustrated in the vocal or other manifestations in examples like (41) *he shouted*, (42) *She laughed*, (44) *An exultant shout*

of victory, and (48) *I trembled*, where the physiological reactions emerge as the immediate consequence of experiencing exultation.

Just as the concepts of 'jubilant' and 'exultant' are closely related to each other by the component of 'doing', also the two next concepts of 'cheerful' and 'merry' are internally related, but not in terms of doing or achieving something, but rather in terms of a form of behaviour.

7. The concept of 'cheerful'

7.1. Contexts for 'cheerful'

In contrast with the various concepts of 'happiness' discussed so far, which all contain the notion of a very high degree of 'happiness', the following concepts lack this superlative notion and just refer to – so to speak – 'ordinary happiness'. But within this conceptual range of 'ordinary happiness', we again find all kinds of important differences in conceptualization.

In two respects, the concepts of 'cheerfulness' and 'merriment' are comparable to that of 'bliss': First of all, these states are not ostensibly caused by external events but rather seem to come from within the person's own nature or from artefacts such as colours or rooms created by people in a cheerful mood or by a bout of inspiration. A second fact, which follows from the first, is that no external, causal settings occur with them. Let's first examine the concept of 'cheerful', which seems to be a more deeply rooted form of behaviour.

- (51) She seemed a typical farmer's wife, cheerful and energetic.
- (52) Thomas was cheerful and good-natured, and we soon became good friends.
- (53) You're very cheerful today.
- (54) A cheerful worker.
- (55) Cheerful smile/ colours/ room.
- (56) She had remained cheerful and energetic throughout the trip.
- (57) She had a naturally cheerful and serene expression.
- (58) She was in a cheerful mood.
- (59) They worked with great energy and cheerfulness.
- (60) He smiled cheerfully at everybody.

Obviously, the absence of causal settings is – just as in the case of 'bliss(ful)' – a result of the rather immanent nature of cheerfulness or of the state of bliss. The difference, however, is that the concept of 'cheerfulness' is associated with a person's character, whereas the state of bliss is a state which, though immanent, was at some phase triggered by something outside the person. Still the person who is cheerful need not be aware of his or her own nature or character, but rather lives in the expectation of 'many good things that can happen' (G2).

7.2. Explication of the concept of 'cheerful'

(G) Explication of *X is cheerful*⁸

1. Sometimes a person thinks something like this:
 2. Many good things can happen now
3. Because of this, this person feels something good
4. Other people can see this
5. X feels like this

From situations like (51) *She seemed a typical farmer's wife, cheerful and energetic* as well as (52) *Thomas was cheerful and good-natured, and we soon became good friends*, we infer that cheerfulness is of a more permanent character. Additionally, a cheerful person externalizes this disposition in his behaviour as in *a cheerful smile* (55), or as *cheerful expression* (57), which are examples of the behavioural component of cheerfulness and necessitate the component (G5) 'Other people can see this'. In this respect, 'cheerful' differs from 'blissful', too. The main difference between 'blissful' and 'cheerful' is first that the former concept is more purely mental in nature (it may be combined with the faculty of knowing) and that the latter is more behavioral, i.e. psychological and physiological. Three times it occurs together with the concept of 'energetic' (51, 56, 59). The basis of 'cheerfulness' can either be the person's character and his deeper nature as becomes manifest in the phrases *cheerful and good-natured* in (52) or *naturally cheerful* in (57) or else, his temporary disposition as in *a cheerful mood* (58), so that the 'cheerfulness' can also be less permanent and even change from day to day as in (53). *You're very cheerful today* or from one moment to the other as (60) *He smiled cheerfully*.

8. The concept of 'merry'

8.1. Contexts for 'merry'

The concept of 'merry' differs from that of 'cheerful' in that the focus of attention is not on deeper rooted or the more or less longer state of cheerfulness, but rather on the momentary mood and its effect on the behaviour of those that are 'merry': they want to share their merriment by transmitting this mood to others. This by and large explains and is explained by the following contexts:

- (61) Merry laugh/party/group.
- (62) Wish somebody a merry Christmas.
- (63) We were already merry after only two glasses of wine.
- (64) The merry month of May.
- (65) Merry England.
- (66) My in-laws, a merry band from Bath, had joined us.
- (67) They were in a very merry mood.
- (68) A man with a merry pink face.
- (69) We were all very merry by the time the party broke up.
- (70) Some of the officers' wives got quite merry celebrating our recent victory.

'Merry' can be compared to both 'bliss' and 'cheerful' in that it does not take any complements nor settings. But unlike 'cheerful', the concept 'merry' does not imply permanence; not even in the attributive slot as in (74). Even an expression like *a merry pink face* (82) may have a temporary reading, i.e. each time you meet this person, this face makes you merry. This also explicates why it is so frequently used in predicative position. Even when used in attributive position it is typically used with temporary events like *laugh, party, Christmas, month, mood*.

8.2. Explication of the concept of 'merry'

(H). Explication of *X is merry*

1. Sometimes a person thinks something like this:
 2. Good things can happen now
3. Because of this, this person feels something good

4. Other people can see this
5. This person wants to feel good for some time
6. X feels like this

The entire set of components synthesizing the concept of 'being merry' suggests that in a prototypical scenario merry behaviour is associated with celebration and often with intoxication. What suggests this association are instances like (63) *We were already merry after only two glasses of wine* and (70) *Some of the officers' wives got quite merry celebrating our recent victory*. In other words, one can become or get 'merry', but we would not tend to say that people become 'cheerful', since this is prototypically something one is by natural disposition.

The component (H2) 'Good things can happen' signals a type of behaviour which is totally different from the state associated with the concept of 'bliss'. A marked difference with 'bliss' is also that someone who is in a merry state most probably sought to render himself merry, either because the spirit of a celebration called for it, or in an attempt to become oblivious of possible problems. This also explicates the component (H5) 'This person wants to feel good for some time'.

9. The concept of 'happy'

9.1. Contexts for 'happy'

Just as the high-intensity concept 'blissful' can be compared and contrasted to the ordinary-intensity concepts of 'cheerful' and 'merry', the concepts of 'delight-(ed)' and 'happy' or 'pleased' can be linked to each other. What the latter concepts have in common, is the strong dependency on the external factor causing the emotion, and more particularly, the many different causal settings such as those framed by the preposition *about* potentially evoking a past stimulus, the prepositions *with* and *in*, and the *to*-infinitive, evoking a simultaneous stimulus.

- (71) My mother was very happy about my exams results.
- (72) She noticed how happy Ernest was to see them.
- (73) They were happy to see Flynn looking so much better.

- (74) I was happy to hear that you passed your exams.
- (75) This will make the children happy.
- (76) A happy marriage/ scene/ memory/ child/ ending.
- (77) I won't be happy until I know she is safe.
- (78) Are you happy in your work / with your life?
- (79) Happy birthday to you!
- (80) I'm happy to be of service.
- (81) He is in the happy position of never having to worry about money.
- (82) to be / to find / to seek a happy medium
- (83) Julia was happy that her friends had come.
- (84) Julia was happy that her friends would come.

Although 'happy' can be most of all compared to 'delighted', the differences stand out clearly, too. *Delight* as a noun or verb can denote a more active participation by the experiencer, especially revealed by the phrase *take delight in*. The more passive character of the experiencer of the state of 'happy' may also explain that 'happy' only takes *about*- or *in*-phrases, but no *at*-phrases, implying a very strong temporal even momentary limitation.

9.2. Explication of the concept of 'happy'

(I) Explication of *X feels happy*

1. Sometimes a person thinks something like this:
 2. Something good happened to me
 3. I wanted this
 4. I don't want anything else now
5. Because of this, this person feels something good
6. X feels like this

As all 'happiness' concepts, also the concept 'happy' itself originates with a 'good event' but one that may be situated either in the past or in the present. In this respect, *happy* strongly differs from its antonym *sad*. Talking about 'sad', the counterpart of 'happy' among the negative emotion terms, Wierzbicka (1990: 358) says 'In a prototypical scenario, the bad event is in the past ('something bad happened', for example, somebody died)'.

Moving to the component (I3) 'I wanted this', the 'wanting' can refer to a period of time preceding the occurrence of the happy event, during which one wishes or hopes for the event to actually take place, as in (71) *My mother was very happy about my exam results*. The mother had apparently been hoping for good results ever since the administration of the examination. Furthermore, the component (I4) 'I don't want anything else now' endows 'happy' with a sense of either a more temporary or a more lasting satisfaction distinguishable in examples like (71) *My mother was very happy about my exam results* and (79) *A happy marriage / a happy child*, respectively. Here the temporary or lasting character of the state of happiness is also framed by the predicative and attributive positions of the adjective, respectively.

The fact that the concept of 'happy' is not contingent on the notion of celebration like 'merry' leads to subtle semantic differences between the two concepts as manifested in a minimal pair like (69) *We were all very merry by the time the party broke up* and *We were all very happy by the time the party broke up*. In the first case, the experiencers were affected by the festive atmosphere, while in the second case they may also have been happy about an extra-party factor. A similar contrast is found in examples like *Merry Christmas* and *Happy New Year*. In the first case, emphasis is placed on the possible time-limited celebration taking place during one day (dancing, drinking, eating, enjoying oneself), whereas in the second case one wishes people constant good luck and general happiness during the whole year. But 'happy', as stated at the outset, also implies that one need not get active as with 'merry': in order to have a 'merry Christmas' one must do certain things, but in order to have 'a happy birthday' things will just come to you.

10. The concept of 'pleased'

10.1. Contexts for 'pleased'

Together with *happy / happiness* the adjective *pleased* and its nominal equivalent, which is rather closer to the concept denoted by *contentment* than by *pleasure*, are the most frequent items used in dictionaries for paraphrasing other terms of happiness. Just like

'delighted', it also has the greatest variety of causal settings and complements, as the following contexts may show:

- (85) Mr Shaw seems very pleased about the arrangement.
- (86) The captain wasn't too pleased about my having seen that.
- (87) He was pleased with my progress.
- (88) They were all very pleased with the news.
- (89) Julia was pleased that her friends had come.
- (90) Amy seemed pleased at the idea.
- (91) If there's anything we can do, we'd be pleased to help.
- (92) I'm so pleased to have seen you.
- (93) 'We'll be on holiday in two days', said Matthew, looking pleased.
- (94) He dared not show that he was pleased.
- (95) Pleased to meet you.

As also discussed in Dirven (1997), the various prepositional phrases and complements, by and large are conceptualizations of factual and non-factual states of affairs. Phrases with *about* and *with* usually denote a factual or actually occurring state of affairs, just like a factive *that*-clause does as in (89). The *at*-phrase in (90) denotes a not (yet) factual state of affairs and this can also be expressed by a *to*-infinitive. But as the perfect infinitive in (92) shows, a *to*-infinitive can also be used in the context of something that has actually occurred.

10.2. Explication of the concept 'pleased'

- (J) Explication of *X feels pleased*
1. Sometimes a person thinks something like this:
 2. Something good happened/can happen
 3. I want(ed) this
 4. Because of this, this person feels something good
 5. X feels like this

As stated above, 'pleased' is an emotion term used for both factual and non-factual states of affairs. The factual state is accounted for by (J2) 'Something good happened'. But one can also be pleased at the possibility, prospect or idea of something, as in (90) *Amy seemed*

pleased at the idea. Because of this second aspect of 'pleased' with its possible future orientation this alternative is captured as (J3) 'Something good can happen'. 'Pleased' is also the weakest form of 'happiness' in that observers are often not sure whether people are really pleased. This uncertainty is made clear by the use of the verbs *seem* and *look* in situations like (85) *Mr Shaw seems very pleased*, (93) *Matthew looking pleased* and (85) *Amy seemed pleased*, where the speaker is uncertain about whether one actually feels pleased or just seems to be pleased but isn't really so. Another example pointing explicitly to the expression of this specific emotion as vague or not clear enough to decode is (94) *He dared not show that he was pleased*, in which case the experiencer does not show any symptoms of being pleased to prevent people from understanding how he felt.

11. The concept of 'glad'

11.1. Contexts for 'glad'

'Glad' represents a concept of 'contentment', which is rather a reaction to something one hears or, perceives and this reaction shows the person's (often the speaker's) attitude towards what happened. Noteworthy are the many examples with the first person 'I' and especially the two examples (99) and (101), where the expression *I am so glad* is used as a second fair part of a conversational pair. All this suggests that *glad* is not really an emotion concept, but rather an 'attitudinal' one, almost shading into a mere politeness term.

Thus not only conceptually 'glad' is a marginal 'happiness' term⁹ but also syntactically this marginal conceptual status is reflected in the fact that in contrast to the other adjectives, *glad* is the only one of the non-verb derived that does not appear in attribution, which suggests that it does not denote a time-stable situation. Of all 'happiness' terms, *glad* is the one with the strongest implication of the factual character of the complement as the many *that* clauses or the progressive of the infinitive in (102) show.

- (96) I'm so glad your niece was able to use the tickets.
 (97) She was glad that the birthday party was a success.
 (98) I'm so glad you've got the job.

- (99) - I passed the test.
 - I'm so glad.
 (100) I'm glad about your passing the test.
 (101) - I've decided to go to college.
 - Oh, I'm glad.
 (102) After all this time Rob was glad to be going home.
 (103) I'm glad to hear he's feeling better.
 (104) Viv was glad to hear/ learn they had reached home safely.
 (105) I'd be glad if you would go away!

It is furthermore highly remarkable that 'glad' is most of all used with complement sentences and far less with prepositional phrases (only *about*, which is conceptually closest to the factual character of a *that*-clause). With 'glad' the factual reading is more dominant and in order to use a non-factual reading, a counterfactual conditional must be used as in (105).

11.2. Explication of the concept 'glad'

- (K) Explication of *X is glad*
1. Sometimes a person thinks something like this:
 2. Something good happened
 3. When this person thinks like this, this person (says s/he) feels something good
 4. X feels like this

In comparison with the other 'emotion' concepts, the concept of 'glad' is a relatively simple concept, with just a single component (K2) ('something good happened'), which establishes a strong connection between 'glad' and 'pleased'. At first glance, thus, in an instance like (96) *I'm so glad that your niece was able to use the tickets* or (97) *She was glad that the birthday party was a success*, the substitution of 'pleased' for 'glad' does not result in a semantic difference. Nevertheless, the two concepts differ in one respect: the component (J3) 'I wanted this' endowing 'pleased' with an element of expectation and ensuing satisfaction, which is absent from the inventory of the 'glad' components; evidently 'being pleased' entails experiencing some sort of satisfaction deriving from the occurrence of the 'good event' after a period of time preceding it in which one hopes for the

materialization of the good event, and which is reflected in 'I wanted this'. In a minimal pair like (98) *I'm glad you've got the job* and *I'm pleased you've got the job*, one is more likely in the case of *pleased* to take the time to 'want something' and thus to be satisfied after its occurrence. The association of the element of satisfaction with 'pleased' rather than with 'glad' is confirmed by CCD's explicit use of this *notion* in its definition of *pleased*: *happy about something or satisfied with something*. On the basis of this 'non-expecting' attitude, 'glad' seems to be more appropriate than 'pleased' when commenting on new information as in (99, 101). One may further wonder here whether the speaker really experiences something 'good' or merely says this as a ritual formula; that is, the comment may not be very deep-rooted, but come as a automatic reaction to the announcement. This is also reflected in the meaning component (K3) 'This person (says s/he) feels something good'. On this account, 'glad' can also be used as an ironic gloss, for example in an expression like (105) *I'd be glad if you would go away!* i.e. Go away! (ALD).

Before coming to the conclusions, we will first summarize the conceptual components reflected in each of the 11 'happiness' concepts in a table incorporating the major distinctions in somewhat different concrete wordings than what was used in each explication. The summary in Table 1 is to be taken as a generalized synthesis of the single explications carried through with an eye on a possible comparison between the various concepts.

Table 1. Summary of 'happiness' concepts

EMOTIONS	INTENSITY	TIME OF STIMULUS	CAUSE OF EMOTION	ANTICIPATION	EFFECT	DURATION OF EFFECT	OBSERVABLE REACTIONS
A. Blissful	+	-	- (immanent state in things)	- (state)	+	+	-
B. Delighted	+	±	+	-	-	-	-
C. Overjoyed	+	-	+	-	+	-	-
D. Thrilled	+	+	+	-	+	-	+
E. Jubilant	+	+	+	+	-	-	+
F. Exultant	+	+	+	+	-	-	+
G. Cheerful	-	-	- (character, deeper nature)	- (state)	-	+	+
H. Merry	-	-	- (temporary mood)	- (state)	+	-	-
I. Happy	-	±	+	+	+	-	-
J. Pleased	-	+	+	+	-	-	-
K. Glad	-	+	+	-	-	-	-

Conclusions

1. The feature-like summary in Table 1 has some advantages if compared with the single specifications of the eleven 'happiness' terms but also some disadvantages. It is especially in the vertical representation of the various components that the summary is particularly helpful. We can now group adjectives according to certain dimensions, such as the distinction between the high intensity adjectives (*very*) vs. the others, or the time of the stimulus which is past time for most, except for the more immanent cases such as *bliss(ful)*, *cheerful*, *merry*. But this feature-like representation does not manage to characterize each of the eleven 'happiness' concepts in themselves; that is, when the features are added horizontally, we can hardly survey these seven features in one compressed synthesis.

In comparison with this unsatisfactory representation, the characterization of each single 'happiness' concept in the explications and the differences between two or more related concepts can be represented with very great exactness by means of the slightly variable 'components' and especially by their contribution to the overall characterization of the concept. Still, the conjunction of the components into a new construct that is somehow more than the component parts is still left implicit and consequently the exact status of this construct is still to receive a firm theoretical basis in the whole of the NSM approach. This criticism is, however, even more applicable to a 'feature-like' representation, which only consists of the mere juxtaposition or addition of features. This may be the very reason why we cannot 'comprehend' them in one global act of synthesising them. The NMS approach has overcome this hindrance, but it has simultaneously revealed a new problem which has always been inherent to a 'preface' approach and which is still to be solved.

2. The strength of NSM is also in its empirical foundation. Each particular component with its specific variables is formulated the way it is while basing oneself on the small battery of examples. Since these examples have been taken from a set of current, partly corpus-based dictionaries, they can be expected to have been chosen as representative samples standing for major trends in the lexicalisation of conceptual distinctions. In spite of this representative character of the small sample for each adjective and the empirically based selection of the components in the explication of each concept, it

becomes also clear that this basis is still too narrow. This is especially the case for the complementation possibilities of each single adjective and the differences between them in this respect. At this point, it seems to us to be very shaky to make decisive generalisations about these complementation possibilities and especially about the relationship between these possibilities for complementation and the components of each concept. From a cognitive point of view it must be possible to give not only a refined characterisation of a concept's components, but also to derive from it the motivation for the complementation possibilities. We have already made an attempt to make some generalisations in this respect, e.g. about the highly factual character of the complements used with *glad* or the absence of complements with half of the items selected, i.e., *bliss(ful)*, *cheerful*, *merry*, *jubilant*, and *exultant*. But the puzzle for the five 'true' emotion concepts *delighted*, *overjoyed*, *thrilled*, *happy* itself, and *pleased* remains.

3. One of the most remarkable results of the application of the NSM to the eleven 'happiness' concepts selected is a very clear delimitation of and distinction between four groups of 'happiness' concepts. These groups are:

- (i) immanent states of happiness: *blissful*, *cheerful*, *merry*
- (ii) 'doing forms' of happiness: *jubilant*, *exultant*
- (iii) event-like forms of happiness: *delighted*, *overjoyed*, *thrilled*
- (iv) transient states of happiness: *happy*, *pleased*, *glad*

Moreover within each of these four groups we find very clear oppositions, laid bare by the NSM analysis.

Thus the immanent states in (i) can first of all be opposed as *bliss* vs. *cheerful/merry*. *Bliss* denotes a very intense state of happiness triggered by some external stimulus whereas *cheerful/merry* do not imply an external stimulus. *Cheerful* contrasts with *merry* in that *being cheerful* follows from a deeper character trait, whereas *being merry* or *getting merry* follows from a temporary mood.

However close the two 'doing' forms of happiness in (ii) may be, they contrast in that *jubilant* implies a strong, self-expressive vocal element, whereas *exultant* implies the factor of competition with other factors.

The event-like concepts of happiness in (iii) differ amongst themselves especially according to the time of the stimulus, which may be both past and present with *delighted*, present with *overjoyed* and merely past with *thrilled*.

Finally, the transient states of *happiness* in (iv) are distinguishable in that *happiness* represents the most neutral concept of 'happiness' and nevertheless still incorporates the idea of 'not wanting anything else', whereas *pleased* and *glad* do not imply this. 'Pleased' differs from 'glad' especially in the fact that *pleased* is open to past or future events, whereas *glad* is past-oriented and each notion of strong satisfaction, which is present in *pleased*. The concepts of 'pleased' and 'glad' also contrast with one another by the feature of 'deliberate expectation', which is present in *pleased* and absent in *glad*.

4. We are fully aware that the analyses and generalisations offered here can only be an interim report on a more general project, which can only be fully realised by taking into account the frequency-based use of emotion terms and, more particularly, of 'happiness' concepts, in spoken language corpora as well as in all possible other sources. Now that the British National Corpus (BNC) has become available as a CD-ROM file, it may become relatively easy to select the required empirical evidence for the analyses we have thus (far) proposed on the basis of relatively limited samples of what really goes on in the minds of speakers.

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Notes

The authors wish to thank Anna Wierzbicka for the helpful and highly refined observations for a number of analyses. Of course, she is not to be held responsible for any flaws the paper might contain.

1. A good example of circularity is given by DCE for the four terms *happy*, *joyful*, *pleased*, and *glad*, which are all defined by using one of the other three adjectives.

2. The grammatical categories may not really be universals, however, but are now more and more claimed to be language-specific realisations of more general universal principles such as trajector and landmark.
3. The requirement of 'necessary and sufficient' features stems from the classical view of objectivism in semantics, assuming that each word can be given such a definition that applies to all members that fall under the category named by it. It has also been shown to be untenable by various cognitive linguists (e.g. Geeraerts 1987). Without adhering to an objectivist view, the requirement of 'necessary and sufficient' features (or rather 'components') can be said to keep its methodological validity since each of the numbered elements in the explication is then 'minimally' necessary, i.e. not redundant, and no element is missing, i.e. this explication contains sufficient elements to characterise each item fully.
4. We do not want to skip the problem of potentially basic differences between adjectives and nouns. But for the present analysis of the 11 'happiness' terms they do not play a substantial role and we will not go into them systematically and concentrate mainly on the adjective forms.
5. Another good indication for the more prototypical term – often also a basic level term – in a conceptual domain is its frequency of use. According to DCE *happy* falls into the class of the 1,000 most frequent words, whereas *joy* falls into the 3,000 frequency class.
6. By the qualification 'intuitive characterization' of the meaning of words given by dictionary authors, we do not imply any negative connotation. On the contrary, dictionary authors have based their explanations on a number of contexts, but they do not make explicit analyses of this material, and arrive at their characterisations in an intuitive, implicit way.
7. What is important is that both *joy* and *overjoyed* denote the emotion itself. In this respect, *joyful* has not been included since it does not apply to persons, but only to the stimulus triggering the emotion as in a *joyful occasion*, *joyful news*, etc.
8. For the non-emotions, but behaviour terms like *cheerful* and *merry*, the verb *feel* cannot be used in the explication of these 'happiness' concepts, but the verb *be* is used.
9. Anna Wierzbicka (personal communication) doubts whether *glad* denotes an emotion concept at all, but speaks of an 'emotional attitude'. But the criteria for the question whether to classify *glad* as an extremely peripheral emotion term or as an attitude term, may still be too fuzzy to decide for the one or the other category. We have 'circumvented' this problem by the use of a component 'say' in the explication of *glad*, but still tend to think of *glad* as an

attitude term rather than an emotion term, just as Wierzbicka suggests. Still, we would like to find more evidence for this view.

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