



The Rise of NGO Activism

Julien Daubanes, PhD
Centre of Economic Research at ETH Zurich

Time: 13:00 – 14:00
04/03/2016

Place: Room 1a/b
Niels Bohrs Vej 9, 6700 Esbjerg

Abstract

NGOs increasingly manage to oppose industrial projects that are yet approved by public regulators. To understand this recent rise of NGO activism, we develop a theory of optimal regulation where a regulated industry is to undertake a project that may be harmful to society. On the one hand, public regulation is vulnerable to the influence of the industry, and may approve the project even though it is harmful. On the other hand, an NGO may oppose the project. We characterize the circumstances under which NGO opposition occurs, and under which this opposition is socially beneficial. The theory is used to explain the role that NGOs have acquired in the last decades, and has implications for the legal status of NGO activism as well as for the appropriate degree of transparency in regulation.

About the speaker: *Julien Daubanes received his Ph.D. from the Toulouse School of Economics in 2007. His Ph.D. thesis was awarded the Prize of the French Economic Association. Since 2008, he has been a lecturer at the Center of Economic Research of ETH Zurich, the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. His current research revolves around the pricing strategy of OPEC to deter abundant resources that compete with the cartel's oil: Julien specifically studies the implications of this pricing strategy for the design of effective climate policies. Julien also researches on the rising influence of NGO activists on the industry and its regulation; an issue that is particularly salient in the energy sector.*

