The Egyptian Revolution

Imaginaries of the good life during the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square in 2011

PhD-dissertation
by Line Mex-Jørgensen
Centre for contemporary Middle East studies
2020
Supervised by Professor Dietrich Jung

Content

FOREWORD

When the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square took place in 2011, I was pregnant with my first child. I remember walking back and forth across the floor in front of the television, watching in awe the images from the square and listening to reporters and participants telling about the unfolding of events and life at the square. I knew that history was made in that moment, and I wished I could have been there. But the little child in my belly – and my fear of risking my life – wished otherwise, so I stayed put in front of the screen until Mubarak resigned on February 11. I could not believe it. The people overthrew the regime!

Two years later, I got the opportunity to delve into the Egyptian Revolution academically. I am deeply grateful for the opportunity, and even more grateful that I can now see the final result of my work in the form of this dissertation. As my PhD is part of the collective research project, Modern Muslim Subjectivities Project, I want to extend my gratitude for the opportunity to the Independent Research Fund Denmark which has funded the collective project and, hence, my research.

The years in which I have worked as a PhD fellow have been tumultuous, and I have many individuals to thank for encouraging me to continue and for supporting me practically. First of all, I want to thank my supervisor, Professor Dietrich Jung, who is also the leader of the Modern Muslim Subjectivities Project. Your fine academic supervision of my work, your many critical comments, and your insistence on linguistic precision has made me a better scholar. For that I thank you. But perhaps even more important, I thank you for your understanding of my life situation and your help with restructuring the frames of my PhD after my cancer diagnosis. I would not have finished my dissertation without that understanding and I am truly grateful. A thank you also goes out to Ala' Ikhmaes, my longtime friend from Jordan, who has read through and commented on all of my translations from Arabic. I can always count on your help! And to Emmett Tinley, who has raised the level of my academic English. It has been a pleasure working with you.

I also want to thank my colleagues at the Center for Contemporary Middle East Studies and on the PhD corridor. I could not have had better colleagues. A special thank you goes out to Tine Kondrup for many cups of coffee, trips to the nearest supermarket, and valuable discussions during long evenings at the University of Southern Denmark. An equally special thank you goes out to Aske Hennelund Nielsen for enriching my life with weird conversations about how to define a concept like lunch, to Maria Østerby Elleby for bringing some magic into my life (or at least into our shared office), and to Mie Nedergaard Fredenslund for always bringing the keys.

Privately, I want to thank my mother, father and sister for always helping me out, supporting me in numerous ways during my years as a PhD fellow, and taking care of my children whenever I needed it. A thank you also goes out to my husband for supporting my academic endeavors all along the way, for enriching academic discussions, and for taking on an extra responsibility for our children in the final phase of my writing. Finally, a big thank you to my three daughters who were all born after the Egyptian Revolution. Your inherent sense of justice has made it possible for me to tell you about my project, and of that I am proud. Your mere existence has encouraged me to continue.

Odense, April 2020, Line Mex-Jørgensen

To all those individuals
all over the world
who fight for their ideals
and strive to make the world a better place

INTRODUCTION

On February 11, 2011, after 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square/ميدان التحرير in downtown Cairo, President Hosni Mubarak/حسني مبارك finally stepped down. It was the culmination of 18 days of protests and occupation of the square, and the end of 30 years of Mubarak's dictatorship. Egyptians chanted, danced, cried, lit fireworks, hugged and celebrated. They did it! The people overthrew the regime! The overarching revolutionary goal was achieved. But the next day, Egyptians were back at Tahrir Square. However, this time it was not to protest or celebrate, but to clean up the square. In a country and a region where garbage is routinely thrown in the streets and where street cleaning and garbage collection is insufficient, the image is striking: Egyptians in large numbers collectively collecting garbage, sweeping the square with brooms and even painting the curbs, leaving Tahrir Square in a better state than before the revolution started (Winegar 2011b). Something had changed.

The cleaning of the square was only one out of several episodes indicating a change. During the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square, Egyptians told of no harassment of women, no religious divides, cooperation across the usual class divides, trust in strangers, spontaneous organization of pharmacies, medical aid, kindergarten and many other things; things that were truly extraordinary in an Egyptian context.[1] Although using different vocabularies, several scholars point to the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square as an extraordinary time and place where imaginaries of another Egypt were possible.[2] A headline in a revolutionary newspaper proclaiming, "January 25. Tahrir Square. Republic of possible dreams/25 يناير. ميدان التحرير. جمهرية الاحلام الممكنة" (The Popular Committee To Defend the Revolution 2011) captures this understanding of the revolution. Something had changed and something new had emerged. A different kind of life was created. How did these Egyptians at Tahrir Square imagine this new Egypt?

In my dissertation, I explore and interpret the kind of life that was created at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution between January 25 and February 11 in 2011. To avoid the repetitive use of a lengthy phrase, I use the terms "revolution", "18 days of revolution", "revolution at Tahrir Square", "revolution in 2011" or any combination of these terms to refer to this time and place. When referring to the 18 days of revolution, I write the number "18" in numerals because this seems the dominant academic way of referring to this period, but apart from that, I follow standard academic conventions for when to write numbers in numerals and letters.

[1] See e.g., Abaza 2011, Aswat Masriya 2011, Rashed and El Azzazi 2011, Shokr 2011.
[2] See e.g., Gregory 2013, Moll 2012, Rashed and El Azzazi 2011, Sabea 2012, Shokr 2011.

I set up two overall lines of argumentation. One line of argumentation revolves around how the kind of life created during the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square in 2011 constituted a primary way of contesting the regime; and hence, that it should not simply be seen as a "container" for formal political demands but explored in its own right ("container" in this sense is borrowed from Gunning and Baron 2014, p. 242). I use the concept of "imaginaries of the good life" to explore the kind of life created and to argue that life at the square did indeed constitute a principal way of contesting the regime. Another line of argumentation revolves around how the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life can be seen as a contestation over specifically modern imaginaries of the good life. Drawing on concepts from selected theories of modernity, I discuss and interpret the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life in light of these theoretical concepts as specifically modern. These two lines of argumentation are interwoven throughout the dissertation.

In the following, I present the theoretical framework supporting these two elements of the dissertation. First, I introduce the concept of imaginaries of the good life, and I then I present my use of theories of modernity. Following that, I describe how I transform my conceptual and theoretical framework into an analytical approach. Finally, I present the dissertation's contribution to the field and the overall structure of the dissertation.

Imaginaries of the good life

As mentioned above, one core element of the dissertation centers on exploring the kind of life that was created during the revolution in 2011. To do so, I use the concept of imaginaries of the good life. The concept is coupled with an understanding of revolution as prefiguration. Therefore, before moving on to defining what I mean by imaginaries of the good life, I introduce my understanding of the term revolution.

Revolution as prefiguration

Many terms have been used to describe what happened between January 25 and February 11 at Tahrir Square in 2011. "Revolution", "uprising", "revolt", "demonstrations", "sit-in", "occupation" and "protests" are some of the terms used by academics and commentators alike. In the present dissertation I use the term revolution, first and foremost because this is the term used most frequently in my sources. Conceptually, I also look at what happened between January 25 and February 11 at Tahrir Square in 2011 as revolution, but in the specific sense of revolution as prefiguration. Looking at the revolution as prefiguration allows me to look at the process of what

happened during the 18 days of revolution instead of looking at the outcome of the revolutionary efforts.

De Smet distinguishes between conceptualizations of revolution that focus on outcome and conceptualizations of revolution that focus on process (De Smet 2016, p. 72-83). Outcome-oriented conceptualizations are interested in the transformation of the formal political system. In this perspective, protest activities are defined as a revolution "*post factum* by their outcomes" (De Smet 2016, p. 180, italics as given). That is, only if a transformation of the formal political system takes place are protest activities conceptualized as a revolution. This is an etic perspective. According to De Smet and van de Sande, defeatist evaluations of the Egyptian Revolution as "failed" or "unsuccessful" because of the return of a repressive regime under president Al-Sisi/السيسي (see e.g., Ashour 2016, Hamzawy 2017) are based on a conceptualization of revolution as outcome (De Smet 2014, p. 284-287, De Smet 2016, p. 72-74, Van de Sande 2013, p. 223-228). Furthermore, what usually sneaks into such evaluations is the normative notion that, for protest activities to constitute a successful revolution, they must not just lead to some transformation of the formal political system, but also to a specifically democratic transformation (El Houri 2018). That is, evaluating the Egyptian Revolution as failed or unsuccessful entails a highly normative political evaluation based on a set of externally defined criteria on the state level. In this way, conceptualizing revolution as outcome fails to grasp the signification ascribed to the actual protest activities by the participants themselves. It overlooks what all the extraordinary events at Tahrir Square during the revolution can tell us about the aims of the revolution. Here, De Smet's conceptualization of revolution as process is interesting. This conceptualization of revolution focuses on what is going on during a revolution *regardless* of the outcome. De Smet uses the terms "prefigurative activity of a new society" and "prefiguration" (De Smet 2016, p. 74 and p. 196-200) to grasp the political importance of this process. Prefiguration refers to:

> a political action, practice, movement, moment or development in which certain political ideals are experimentally actualized in the 'here and now' rather than hoped to be realized in a distant future. Thus, in prefigurative practices, the means applied are deemed to embody or 'mirror' the ends one strives to realise.
> (Van de Sande 2013, p. 230)

Prefiguration is thus about imagining and practicing certain political ideals here and now *and* proffering them as an ideal for the future. To do so, a "free space" outside the control of the authorities, such as Tahrir Square during the revolution, is necessary (Rennick 2015, p. 170-171). In this way, conceptualizing revolution as prefiguration means focusing on what happened during the revolution as seen from the participants' perspective. This is an emic perspective that sidelines formal politics and outsiders' outcome-focused evaluations. Conceptualizing revolution as prefiguration thus invites us to take the creation of a new kind of life at Tahrir Square seriously instead of characterizing it as carnivalesque, as some scholars do (see e.g., Aboelezz 2014, p. 609-610, El Chazli 2012, p. 99, Keraitim and Mehrez 2012, p. 44-48). The carnival-metaphor suggests that life at Tahrir Square is fun, fleeting and will eventually return to its normal state. However, the revolutionary appraisal of life at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution indicates that it should be taken as an ideal for a future Egypt. Moreover, as Shalaby implies, the carnival metaphor suggests that the usual social boundaries are radically undone or turned upside-down (Shalaby 2015, p. 193), thus privileging disruption over continuity. The carnival metaphor thus hides the many continuities and distinct social rules that were part of life at Tahrir Square. Therefore, by conceptualizing revolution as prefiguration, I make life at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution an object of analysis in itself. It enables me to look at what all the extraordinary practices and understandings expressed can tell us about the kind of life imagined as desirable from a revolutionary perspective.

Revolutionary imaginaries of the good life

I call the kind of life imagined as desirable from the participants' perspective "imaginaries of the good life" (hereafter without quotation marks), a concept I use throughout the dissertation. The concept is intimately related to the understanding of revolution as prefiguration in so far as the two concepts both "zoom in" (hereafter without quotation marks) on what a revolutionary moment in itself can tell us about the kinds of ideals or imaginaries hoped to be realized in the future. Like prefiguration, the concept of imaginaries of the good life is based on an emic perspective. However, the two concepts differ in two important ways. First, the concept imaginaries of the good life is less overtly political. It draws attention to how revolutionary practices and understandings are not necessarily articulated in a political vocabulary or related to specifically political ideals. In relation to the Egyptian Revolution at Tahrir Square, they were often articulated in terms of ordinary life and in relation to, I argue, *modern* imaginaries rather than to specific political ideals. Second, the concept of imaginaries of the good life is focused on exploring the content of what is prefigured or

imagined and not on the process as such. I thus see imaginaries of the good life as the substantial result of doing prefigurative politics.

I define imaginaries of the good life as *understandings and practices of a desirable life on an individual and collective level*. I use the concept as an analytical tool to guide my observations about life at Tahrir Square. In the rather broad framework given by this concept, my aim is to explore and provide in-depth descriptions of the imaginaries of the good life that have characterized the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square. In the following, I elaborate on each part of this definition. The term "imaginaries" covers both *understandings and practices*. It is a term I have borrowed from Charles Taylor's concept of modern social imaginaries. Taylor writes that a modern social imaginary is "that common *understanding* that makes possible common *practices* and a widely shared sense of legitimacy" and a few pages later he writes that the "relation between *practices* and the background *understanding* behind them is therefore not one-sided. If the *understanding* makes the *practice* possible, it is also true that it is the *practice* that largely carries the *understanding*" (Taylor 2004, p. 23 and 25, my emphasis). In this way, Taylor blurs the distinction between understandings and practices and proposes a non-causal intimate relationship between the two. It is this blurring of the distinction between understandings and practices that I want to capture by using the term "imaginaries". Such a blurring of the distinction between understandings and practices is also contained in the conceptualization of revolution as prefiguration. And just as important, it was evident at Tahrir Square during the revolution, for example when people held up signs with slogans about freedom while practicing the freedom to hold up a sign. I use the term "imaginaries" not only as part of the concept, "imaginaries of the good life", but also about other sorts of imaginaries, such as imaginaries of the individual and imaginaries of the collective. Regardless of the context, it refers to both understandings and practices. The next part, "the good life", refers to *a desirable life on both an individual and collective level*. By *desirable life* I mean a life that is worth striving for, attractive, evaluated positively, good, and so on. It does not refer to a specific content of a "good life" but can be seen as an empty template to be filled out by individuals evaluating a specific kind of life as good. It is highly normative and alludes to ideals striven for, but it also includes the possibility that these ideals are not (fully) realized. Finally, the words *on both an individual and collective level* refer to two things. First, that imaginaries of the good life entail both imaginaries of the good *individual* life and imaginaries of the good *collective* life. That is, *individual* refers to imaginaries of what being an individual means: Imaginaries of the ontology of the individual, demands on or expectations of the

individual, and imaginaries of the individual's place in a given social order. And *collective* refers to imaginaries of specific categories of individuals and the relationship between these in a given social order. Second, the words *on both an individual and collective level* refer to how the individual and collective levels are intertwined. That is, on the one hand I see individual practices and understandings as a reflection of collective practices and understandings, and on the other hand I see collective practices and understanding as upheld by the individual.

To sum up, I use the concept of imaginaries of the good life to explore the kind of life that was created through prefiguration at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution in 2011. I contend that the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life constitute a primary way of contesting the regime, and hence, that life at Tahrir Square deserves attention in its own right and not simply as a container for formal politics. Exploring these imaginaries forms one main line of argumentation in the dissertation.

The Egyptian Revolution as a contestation over modern imaginaries of the good life

The second main line of argumentation in the dissertation centers on how to interpret the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. In this line of argumentation, I move my attention away from openly exploring life at the square to discussing and interpreting this kind of life. In doing so, I use some etic concepts from the theories of modernity that provide the analytical apparatus of the Modern Muslim Subjectivities Project. While the Egyptian Revolution and the Arab Revolutions around 2011 in general are often *en passant* labelled or assumed to be democratic (see e.g., Alexander 2011b, the headline, Barbato 2012, the abstract, Saouli 2015, p. 16), I maintain that the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life can be equally interpreted through more general analytical lenses of theories of modernity. I thus implicitly assert that one should not equate modernity with democracy as is sometimes done. In fact, the term "democracy" – which admittedly fits easily into a catchy slogan – is seldom mentioned in my sources. Not least because of the surprising absence of this term, it makes sense to discuss whether the revolutionary endeavors can be interpreted through another conceptual framework than that of building democratic institutions. Moreover, while formal political demands such as those on a huge banner adorning a ten-story high building at Tahrir Square (Khalil 2011, p. 51) may certainly be interpreted as a call for democracy, such an interpretation does not take into account all the numerous revolutionary expressions that do not fit into the democracy category. This is not to say that the revolutionary expressions were anti-democratic or that one cannot interpret the revolution through a conceptual framework related to

democracy, but simply to suggest that a democratic form of government was not necessarily the main purpose of contestation. I therefore suggest an alternative interpretative framework, namely an interpretative framework revolving around modern ideals of the good life.

Looking at the revolutionary endeavor through the more general lenses of theories of modernity is not an arbitrary choice. Rather, it is based on a fascination with how the contestation of the regime through the creation of a different kind of life at Tahrir Square seems underpinned by the modern understanding of the contingent nature of social life. Contingency is the notion that social order is human-made and changeable or that "nothing is impossible and nothing is necessary" (Jung and Sinclair 2015, p. 25). During the revolution, the message sent from Tahrir Square was exactly that nothing is impossible, and nothing is necessary: The kind of life being lived under the reign of Mubarak is not necessary, and it is indeed possible to create another kind of life. Because of the apparent centrality of the modern notion of contingency, I suggest looking at the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life through the lens of theories of modernity that relate to the attempt of social actors to deal with modern contingency.

As my PhD is part of a collective research project, the Modern Muslim Subjectivity Project, in which the involved scholars work within a specific analytical framework of modernity, my point of departure is largely based on the understanding of modernity proposed in this research project (See Jung 2016, Jung 2017a for a presentation of the project). [3] However, for the purpose of my study, I emphasize some aspects of our shared framework and deemphasize others. More specifically, my interpretative framework revolves around the notions of contingency and agency, the political in ordinary life and the importance of ordinary life in modernity, and the interplay between the global and the local. I use these notions in different parts of the dissertation to interpret the revolutionary imaginaries as specifically modern. In the following, I present these notions. Moreover, these notions form the background for my main interpretative tool, namely the distinction between three ideal typical concepts of ways of creating social order in modernity. I present this distinction in the next section.

Contingency, agency and the modern condition

In line with the broader Modern Muslim Subjectivity Project of which this dissertation is a part, I characterize modernity by "an all-penetrating experience of social contingency" (Jung and Sinclair

[3] Moreover, information about the project can be found on the project's webpage (SDU 2018)

2015, p. 25) in which "the transformation of contingency into necessity [is] a central inner-worldly, heavily contested and autonomous task for collectives and individuals" (Jung, Juul Petersen and Lei Sparre 2014, p. 12).[4] The notion that contingency is an all-penetrating experience means that it is impossible to get away from. The task of transforming contingency into (temporary) order is inner-worldly, meaning that individuals must choose themselves, and even if one wants to place one's faith in God, it is an inner-worldly choice. It is also a heavily contested and autonomous task, because it is an unending process of constant choices. The experience of contingency is particularly pervasive on the micro level of modernity; that is, on the individual level (Jung 2017b, p. 55-63).

The experience of contingency in modern times means that the question of creating social order – and what *kind* of order – is at the center of attention. It also means that the notion of agency is at the center of attention, as agency is needed to transform contingency to order. I see agency as "the cultural construction of the capacity and authority [for an entity] to act for itself" (Meyer and Jepperson 2000, p. 105), or "the possibility to make choices between alternatives with some degree of freedom" (Jørgensen 2006, p. 76, my translation). In other words, the notion of agency is about being free to choose and the ability to realize these choices. Meyer and Jepperson contend that the ascription of agency to human beings is a specifically modern idea – in earlier times, agency was ascribed to God or nature (Meyer and Jepperson 2000). Following this line of thinking, I interpret the enactment of agency as a modern *demand* or a social expectation of human beings. In this way, I do not focus on whether human beings "truly" hold agency or not, and neither do I go into discussions about agency versus structure. Indeed, according to Jørgensen, it is not possible to make a final decision on the relation between agency and structure in the modern world. She writes that "the question is not *what* agency is and *what* structure is, but rather how these questions are constantly negotiated and answered in concrete discursive practices" (Jørgensen 2006, p. 73, her emphasis). Based on Jørgensen, and Meyer and Jepperson's take on the notion of agency, I simply note that there is a demand on human beings to enact agency in modernity.

Because of the centrality of contingency and agency in modernity, it is not possible to believe that a given social order is unconditionally necessary or impossible to change in the modern world. Even those individuals who believe that one should not contest a certain understanding of a God-given divine order are aware that other individuals live their lives in contrast to such beliefs. It is a choice

[4] The second quote is actually a quote about modernization, not modernity. However, by replacing "became" with "is", I am able to connect a short definition of modernity (the first quote) with an elaborated description of how social order is fixed temporarily (the second quote).

to live one's life in accordance with a certain understanding of God's order, not a necessity. That is, it is up to the individual and the collective to transform the all-penetrating experience of contingency into order.

The political in ordinary life and the importance of ordinary life in modernity

Because of the all-penetrating experience of contingency, creating order is not something that is relegated to specific areas like formal politics and the establishment of democratic institutions. On the contrary, creating order is an ongoing everyday life activity in modernity. Ordinary life with its focus on things such as work, marriage and home thus takes up a central place in modern life (Reckwitz 2006, p. 55-62, Taylor 1989, p. 2011-2014). Indeed, Taylor holds that ordinary life is the locus of the good life in modernity (Taylor 1989, p. 213). The modern understanding of ordinary life also entails the idea of a (relatively) non-stratified mass-society in which rigid hierarchical distinctions and the belief in God-given differences in individuals' status which characterized previous times are gone (Taylor 2004, chapter 1). And during the revolution, it was ordinary things that made participants describe life at Tahrir Square as extraordinary – or to paraphrase Sabea, life at Tahrir Square during the revolution was extraordinary in its ordinariness (Sabea 2012). The creation of this extraordinary ordinary life was used to question the necessity of the kind of life Egyptians were offered during the reign of Mubarak. It was a way of imagining that another life was indeed possible. In this way, ordinary life at Tahrir Square was *in itself* highly political. And according to Foucault, politics in modernity is precisely about ordinary life. In modernity, "one no longer aspired toward the coming of the emperor of the poor, or the kingdom of the latter days, or even the restoration of our imagined ancestral rights; what was demanded and what served as an objective was life, understood as the basic needs, man's concrete essence, the realization of his potential, a plenitude of the possible" (Foucault 1978, p 145). Power in modernity is thus about the ability to control life (Foucault 1978, p. 133-145), in the sense of being master of one's own or others' everyday life.

To distinguish between, on the one hand, the sphere of formal politics dealing with party politics, elections, constitutions, laws and so on, and on the other hand, the kind of practices and understandings that deal with creating a different kind of ordinary life, I employ Mouffe's distinction between politics and the political. Mouffe understands politics as "the manifold practices of conventional politics" and the political as "the very way in which society is instituted" (Mouffe 2005, p. 8-9). Using this distinction, I understand ordinary life at Tahrir as dealing with the

polit*ical*, whereas for example the subsequent debates about the amendments of the constitution or the role of Islam in a new government in the transition period deal with polit*ics*. My study thus focuses on the political, not on politics.

The global and the local – or how to make the Arab world modern

By interpreting the Egyptian Revolution through the lenses of the above-mentioned theories of modernity, I consider Egypt an inherent part of the modern world. This is not a trivial point, since leading scholars in social theory like Zygmunt Baumann, Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Michel Foucault and Charles Taylor *a priori* reserve their theories of modernity to Western societies (Jung 2017a, p. 14). However, one of the main aims of the collective research project of which my PhD is a part is to show the fruitful applicability of its general analytical framework to an Arab context. The project contends that modern, global templates of how to create order on an individual and collective level exist, but that such templates are always interpreted locally. Our shared argument is thus not an argument about global convergence or westernization, but an argument about an interplay between the global and the local. I use the above presented concepts of modernity as global templates with the help of which to discuss the revolutionary imaginaries of Tahrir Square. In chapter three, I present the local context within which these global templates are interpreted. Throughout the dissertation I show examples of the interplay between global templates and local interpretations of these. For example, while the modern global understanding of the importance of enacting agency certainly forms an important element in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life, it does so in a specifically Egyptian understanding where God is sometimes mentioned as a provider of human agency and as a helper to those who do enact agency.

Three ideal typical ways of creating order in modernity

The notions introduced above function as both the background for my understanding of modernity and as a set of interpretative tools which I use during the analyses. However, the main interpretative tool I use to discuss the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life as specifically modern is the distinction between three ideal typical ways of creating social order in modernity. These three ways of creating modern social orders are derived from Western historical experiences but are in this dissertation applied as ideal types. Ideal types are mental constructs aimed at expressing general tendencies (Weber 1949, p. 90-91), in this case, of specific ways of creating order in modern times. Ideal types are not hypotheses to be tested, and the construction of ideal types is thus not an end in itself. Rather, they are means to understanding "historically unique configurations or their

individual components" (Weber 1949, p. 93) or "to make clearly explicit not the class or average character, but rather the unique individual character of cultural phenomena" (Weber 1949, p. 101).

The aim is thus not to deductively assess which (if any) of these ideal types fits best the revolutionary imaginaries that I observe. If this was the aim, more attention to detailed descriptions in the ideal types would be necessary. In such a perspective, my ideal types are rather coarse. Rather, I use the ideal types as a kind of discussion partner to make visible and discuss specific aspects of the revolutionary imaginaries at Tahrir. Neither is the aim to inductively construct a globally relevant model to apply in different settings. If this was the aim, it would make sense to improve the model by incorporating historical experiences from many different countries, among these from Egypt. Instead, the aim is to open up for nuanced discussions *precisely* by taking the point of departure in broad, general tendencies.

To ensure that I use ideal types to open up for discussions and not as a rigid categorization scheme, I combine my analytical use of ideal types with a reading of contemporary Egyptian history (chapter three) and also include additional historical or contemporary sources throughout the analyses. At the same time, I keep a sharp eye out for features and details that are unique to the 18 days by using a text-near approach to my sources. By combining the use of ideal types with historical and social contextualization, I find that the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life are hybrids and carry within them elements of all three ideal types but in specifically local versions.

My understanding of the three ideal typical ways of creating order is primarily based on the work of Jung, either alone or in collaboration with other scholars.[5] Jung brings together Wagner's theory of successive modernities (Wagner 2002) and Reckwitz's theory of three modern cultural types (Reckwitz 2006). He combines the two by arguing that Wagner's tripartition of modernity largely corresponds to Reckwitz's three cultural types (e.g., Jung 2017b, p. 68). Jung uses the resulting three forms of modern social order and "collectively acknowledged imaginaries of meaningful selves" (Jung 2017b, p. 68) as heuristic instruments or, in my words, as ideal typical ways of creating order in modernity. These three ideal typical ways of creating order focus on order on both the individual and the collective level. They describe a dominant ideal type of the individual (the individual level) in a specific ideal type of social order (the collective level). More specifically, they center on the classical bourgeois in restricted liberal modernity, the peer-group oriented cultural

[5] See Jung 2017b, Jung and Sinclair 2014, Jung and Sinclair 2015, Jung, Juul Petersen and Lei Sparre 2014.

type of the salaried masses in organized modernity, and the post-modern creative entrepreneur in extended liberal modernity.

My rendition of the three ideal typical ways of creating order in modernity is interpreted through an explicit focus on agency (see Meyer 2010, Meyer and Jepperson 2000) and on the interpersonal aspects of social order. When I started exploring my sources, I found that questions of agency and the relationship between different categories of individuals were referred to repeatedly. I therefore assessed that my discussion of these questions would benefit from an expansion of the ideal types with regard to agency and interpersonal aspects of social order. In this way, I do not see the three ideal types as rigid or static boxes but as an analytical tool that can be developed in a dialogue with one's sources.

The classical bourgeois subject in restricted liberal modernity

The classical bourgeois subject lives in a social order where social inequalities are numerous and vast and where a basic distinction between minority and majority exists. Only the minority – imagined as essentially different from the majority – takes part in liberal modernity. The majority, the "other", is outside the scope of this liberal order and is considered uncivilized, irrational, (too) emotional, wild, and other similar terms used to delegitimize the majority as accountable actors (Wagner 2002, p. 38-42). As Wagner points out, this characterization of the "other" is "largely a sociological construct that was developed as a tool of comparison when trying to grasp the present" (Wagner 2002, p. 38). The negative understanding of the majority has consequences for those not considered modern: It legitimizes the minority's hegemony over the majority whose wildness must be controlled, steered, tamed, confined or managed. It also implies that agency is ascribed only to the minority while the masses are considered incapable of acting rationally and directing themselves, let alone participate in decision-making for the benefit of the greater good.

The classical bourgeois – that is, the minority considered part of liberal modernity – is a subject of disciplined work. In contrast to the rest of the population, the bourgeois subject is a moral sovereign being capable of thinking moral thoughts and living by them. The family is the core institution for the development of personal relations, and social relations with others are characterized by ascribed duties. Writing letters and diaries, and reading newspapers, letters and books are the dominant ways of expressing oneself and constructing oneself as a person (Jung 2017b, p. 68-70). The bourgeois individual is expected to transform contingency into order through disciplined, individual work and to strive persistently to be an educated, cultured and moral person.

As a brief example of how I use the ideal type of restricted liberal modernity as an analytical instrument, I argue that in the revolutionary imaginaries the minority-majority distinction described above is consistently rejected. At the same time, some of the values of the classical bourgeois subject are embraced.

The peer-group oriented cultural type of the salaried masses in organized modernity

In organized modernity, the pervasive minority-majority distinction within restricted liberal modernity is dissolved. Forms of agency are distributed to the whole of the population. However, the primary entities ascribed agency are not individuals but *categories* of individuals, namely homogeneous categories of individuals as a group. Collective agency thus takes precedence over individual agency in this form of social order. Because of the emphasis on belonging to supposedly homogeneous categories of individuals, social relations are primarily characterized by interrelations among one's own peer-group. On a broader scale, social relations are characterized by a maneuvering between different categories of individuals. In organized modernity there is a "collectively shared belief in linear progress, instrumental rationality and the management of society" (Jung, Juul Petersen and Lei Sparre 2014, p. 14). That is, the social order is permeated by the idea that it is possible to manage and steer society in a given desirable direction through united, collective efforts. Unlike in restricted liberal modernity, it is not an elite of an essentially different nature that steers the irrational masses. Rather, an avant-garde that shares the rationality of the majority leads the way for everybody, or society is guided via rules such as in a representative democracy.

The classical peer-group oriented cultural type is a working subject of the salaried masses. That is, in this form of social order, individuals work within "collectively binding practices of efficient working coordination" (Jung 2017b, p. 71). Status and characteristics are ascribed to individuals according to their place in such well-defined and supposedly homogeneous categories as class, occupation, gender and age. This categorization of individuals is "accompanied by expectations about behavior opportunities and actual behavior" (Wagner 2002, p. 98). That is, a "large scale generalization of behavior" (Jung 2017b, p. 71) and "standardization of practices and homogenization of life courses" (Wagner as quoted in Jung and Sinclair 2015) takes place. For example, it is expected that working-class men behave in a certain way, share the same basic interests, vote for the same party, work in the same kind of workplace, go through the stages of life in the same way, and so on. Social adaption plays an important role in this kind of social order, and,

as explained above, agency thus rests not so much in the individual as in the collective. The peer-group oriented cultural type enjoys the mass-oriented audiovisual media and engages in extrovert mass consumption.

An example of how I interpret the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life through the lens of organized modernity is the question of leadership. In the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life the notion of avant-gardist leadership from organized modernity is at one and the same time rejected and embraced. Mubarak's leadership of the Egyptian people is rejected and so is the beforehand quite popular potential presidential candidate Mohammed ElBaradei's offer to lead the transition period. I interpret both of these suggestions of leadership as examples of avant-gardist kinds of leadership. But at the same time, the revolutionary admiration for the young participants of the revolution seems to embrace the idea of an avant-gardist kind of leadership.

The post-modern creative entrepreneur in extended liberal modernity

In extended liberal modernity, social order is believed to be atomized into self-reliant individuals. The categorization of individuals into relatively homogeneous groups from organized modernity is seen as restrictive, and the minority-majority distinction from restricted liberal modernity is rejected. Instead, agency is ascribed to each individual who is considered individually responsible for transforming contingency into order. Collectively binding agreements like union strikes are looked upon with suspicion and as a confinement of individuals' freedom. Instead, structures to support individuals' agency are set up. Social relations are first and foremost a question of individuals voluntarily coming together with whoever they chose to. It is a social order in which plurality is valued (Kim 2002, p. 5-8). Relations are not necessarily long-lasting, as individuals in this kind of social order are "constantly engaged in a number of shifting projects" (Jung 2017b, p 73). The result is a pluralist social order in which diversity, individual agency and creativity are celebrated.

The post-modern subject is a self-reliant and creative entrepreneur type. Voluntary relations, not family relations, are the primary way of seeking intimate relations (Jung 2017b, p. 73-75). Since the experience of contingency must be managed on an individual basis, the modern demand on individuals to enact agency is substantial. The post-modern subject is expected to narrate how he or she on an individual basis decides to do something and follows through on this. It is not legitimate to justify one's actions with reference to one's family's wishes or expectations to a category of individuals to whom one belongs, such as the category of women or the category of Muslims. The

individual should thus be free to choose or un-choose, including family relationships and religious membership (Meyer 2010, p. 8). Enacting and showing agency even becomes a goal in itself (Meyer and Jepperson 2000, p. 107). And consequently, not enacting agency is devalued: "Helplessness, ignorance, and passivity may be very natural human properties, but they are not the properties of the proper effective agent" (Meyer and Jepperson 2000, p. 107). Social media, individual and customized consumption, and creative ways of expressing one's individuality are preferred modes of self-expression.

As an example, the many creative expressions at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution can be seen as a celebration of individual agency of the kind dominant in extended liberal modernity. Everybody was invited to express him- or herself, for example by producing a slogan, by performing something, by making a speech on stage or by doing artwork out of stones or plastic cups.

To sum up, I use the three ideal typical ways of creating order in modernity as globally relevant modern templates that help me to structure my discussion of the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. The other elements from selected theories of modernity, namely contingency and agency, the political in ordinary life, the importance of ordinary life in itself, and the interplay between the global and the local form the background of the three ideal types but are also conceptual notions on which I draw in particular parts of the dissertation.

A discourse-based analytical approach

I have now presented the theoretical framework of my dissertation focusing on the concept of imaginaries of the good life and on a number of concepts from the analytical framework of the Modern Muslim Subjectivity Project. In the present section, I show how I transform this overall framework into a viable analytical approach for my own study.

On an overall level, my analytical approach is discursive. This choice of approach is appropriate for exploring imaginaries and for exploring the normative evaluations inherent in the imaginaries of the *good* life. It is also possible to combine this approach with my focus on discussing the revolutionary imaginaries as specifically modern. My understanding of discourse follows Laclau's as quoted here:

> By discourse, as I have attempted to make clear several times, I do not mean something that is essentially restricted to the areas of speech and writing, but any complex of

> elements in which *relations* play the constitutive role. This means that elements do not pre-exist the relational complex but are constituted through it.
> (Laclau 2005, p. 68, italics as given)

Here, Laclau emphasizes three things. First, that discourse is not restricted to words. This is in line with my definition of imaginaries as both understandings *and* practices. Hereby I allow for the inclusion of non-linguistic elements. However, even though I agree with Laclau that discourse is not restricted to words, only language has a reflexive capacity. In this way, language occupies a privileged position in any semiotic practice (Sewell Jr 2005, p. 344-345). This is certainly so in my analyses. Because I rely on sources already constructed by others and available online, language takes up a central position in most of these sources. And because I focus on imaginaries of the *good* life, I am interested in normative evaluations that usually come in words. Therefore, in practice, linguistic expressions do hold a privileged position in my analyses. Second, Laclau emphasizes that relations play the constitutive role in discourse. My analytical approach therefore is on the one hand centered on negative or oppositional relations in the form of distinctions, and on the other hand, positive or connective relations in the form of characteristics ascribed to one side in a distinction. Third, Laclau emphasizes that all understandings of one side in a distinction are constituted through the *concrete* positive and negative relations they form part of. In this perspective, meaning is always only partially fixed, as other characterizations with other connections and distinctions are always possible (Laclau 2001, p. 110-114). Practically speaking, it means that I look at language *in use* (Gee 2014, p. 1) – the word "language" here used metaphorically to include non-linguistic expressions. Looking at language in use entails focusing on the actual distinctions and connections made in a specific expression, and not on claims or assumptions of logic distinctions and connections. For instance, I do not simply assume that the word "man" stands in opposition to the word "woman" and I do not assume that the word "rights" is necessarily connected to the idea of human rights or to notions of democracy. Instead, in each instance I look at which distinctions and connections are actually made in a particular expression. I present my analyses in a text-near fashion to allow the reader to follow my discursive, language-in-use approach. In doing so, I am particularly inspired by the two books, "Translating Egypt's revolution. The language of Tahrir Square" edited by Samia Mehrez (Mehrez 2012) and "Language and identity in modern Egypt" by Reem Bassiouney (Bassiouney 2015).

My analyses are thus centered on exploring and characterizing actual distinctions and connections in the revolutionary expressions. Because I have defined imaginaries of the good life as related to both the individual and collective level, my analytical gaze follows in these two directions. That is, I look for expressions about the *individual* in order to analyze imaginaries of the good life on an individual level, and for expressions about *categories of individuals and the relationship between these* to analyze imaginaries of the good life on a collective level. While this two-sided analytical focus is consistent with my definition of the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life, it also shows that expressions that cannot tell us something about these two aspects of the revolution are not of importance in my analyses. A good example of these is slogans that address Mubarak directly, such as those telling Mubarak that Hitler committed suicide and that "you can do it", those showing an expired bar code with Mubarak's name above, and those using the title of a well-known movie, "Fly away/طير أنت" to tell Mubarak to leave (Ghaleb 2015, image 28, quote originally in English, Khalil 2011, p. 105 and 109). It is this kind of information in my sources that does not play an important role for my specific research interest.

Throughout the dissertation, I use the word "expression" to cover any instance of communication in a source, such as a sentence in a text, a Facebook post, a specific part of a picture, or a few seconds of a music video. I find that "expression" captures the creativity inherent in many of my sources better than words such as "quote" and "image". It arguably also better captures the revolutionary emphasis on the importance of expressing oneself freely. In this way I use the word "expression" as a catch-all phrase that includes all kinds of communication, whether written word, spoken word, still image, moving image, and so on.

Analyzing expressions about the individual

I analyze expressions about the individual in five steps. These steps are my attempt at turning Laclau's definition of discourse into a concrete analytical approach useable in my project. I present my analytical approach in five fairly logical subsequent steps, but in practice I have not conducted the analyses in a strict step-by-step fashion. The steps thus represent different elements or aspects I always interrogate but not a structured procedure.

First, I find references to individuals. That is, references to personal pronouns in the singular ("I", "you", "he" and "she"), to names of iconic figures and to what I call "the generic individual", a sort of generalized, prototypical individual. In Arabic, references to the generic individual may be expressed grammatically through nouns in the singular masculine, for example "the human (male)"

or “the Egyptian (male)”. Sentences with such references point to generalized, generic, or common characteristics of individuals belonging to a certain category of individuals, for example the categories of human beings or Egyptians. At the same time, references to the generic individual may also be expressed through collective nouns such as “people” or “we”. Collective nouns may speak of either common characteristics of individuals belonging to a certain category of individuals or of collective characteristics of a group. Expressions with collective nouns which I evaluate as referring to common characteristics of individuals are included in the analyses of the individual, while those referring to collective characteristics of a group are included in the analyses of the collectives.

Second, I look *inwards* at how the individual is characterized through distinctions and connections in a specific expression. The second step is thus a text-near focus on language and the relations set up here. I look at what Bassiouney calls structural resources (Bassiouney 2015, p. 71-74) or the structure of language through grammar and choice of words. Distinctions and connections can be made using many different types of words. In expressions from the revolution, a participant in the revolution may be presented as an individual who will “go down into the streets” and “act” (verbs), who is “brave” and “strong” (adjectives) and who is related to “Tahrir Square” and “streets” (nouns). The same participant may, explicitly or implicitly, be presented in opposition to “watching television” (verb), being “apathetic” or “indifferent” (adjectives) and who is related to “home” or “house” (nouns). I also sometimes reflect counterfactually upon the discursive consequence of expressing something differently, for example by considering how expressions about the generic Egyptian would have conveyed a different meaning had “Egyptian” been substituted with for example “Muslim” or “citizen” or “revolutionary”.

Third, I look *outwards* at how the distinctions and connections set up in a given expression are part of a larger context. I do so in two ways. On the one hand, I look for intertextual references within the revolutionary expressions at Tahrir Square. For example, how “the Egyptian” is characterized in other expressions or how the individual’s ability to construct the future is mentioned in several expressions. On the other hand, I look for intertextual references to the context outside Tahrir Square. For example, how the generic participant in the revolution is in large part presented in opposition to the regime’s discourse about the participants as foreign agents and as fake Egyptians, or how the generic participant is presented as having a good sense of humor in accordance with a local popular perception of Egyptians.

Four, I ask how the characterizations of the generic individual are evaluated. Evaluations are undertaken either explicitly, for example through the use of adjectives such as “bad”, “beautiful” or “important”, or they are undertaken implicitly, through the use of specific words that are inherently evaluated in a certain way, such as “Tahrir Square” which is consistently evaluated positively and “Mubarak” which is consistently evaluated negatively.

Fifth, I look at the imaginaries of the individual in a given revolutionary expression through the lens of the conceptual apparatus of modern social orders I presented above. Here, I compare for example the revolutionary preoccupation with presenting the generic individual as capable of leading him- or herself with the modern demand on the individual to take responsibility and enact agency. Through such comparisons and discussions, it is my argument that the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life can be interpreted as specifically modern.

The first four steps are thus related to the concept of imaginaries of the good life, while the fifth step is related to the discussion of the revolutionary imaginaries in light of different forms of modernity. The first four steps aim at providing in-depth descriptions by carrying out a thematic and text-near analysis of how the individual is presented in the revolutionary expressions. These steps thus contain an emic perspective on my sources. Only in the fifth step do I draw on etic categories related to my ideal typical conceptualization of modernity. In general, I aim at presenting my analyses in a text-near fashion, but my sources have not provided me with emic terms which I could use in the headings about the individual. The headings and the sub-headings in the analyses of the individual are therefore based on my assessment of dominant themes in the sources (see Patton 2002, p. 458-462 for an introduction to analyst-constructed typologies). The question of which terms to use has caused me a great deal of trouble. For example, chapter four, entitled “The valuable individual”, has also during the process been called “The rights-bearing individual” and “The dignified individual”. Each time I changed the heading, a slight change of focus in my analyses occurred. It shows that qualitative analyses like mine do not contain neutral descriptions even if they aim at remaining loyal to their sources. As Patton argues, the important thing is “to avoid creating things that are not really in the data” (Patton 2002, p. 459). I have experimented with different headings as a way of assessing which words most adequately covered emerging themes.

Analyzing expressions about the collective

I analyze expressions about the collective or about categories of individuals and the relationship between these in five similar steps.

First, I have found references to categories of individuals. That is, references to personal pronouns in the plural ("we", "you", they") and to collective nouns ("The people", "participants", "women", "Muslims" and so on). Here, expressions with collective nouns referring to collective characteristics of a group are included.

Second, I look *inwards* at how a given category of individuals is characterized through distinctions and connections in a specific expression. At the same time, I look at the connections and distinctions set up between different categories of individuals such as between Muslims and Christians or between men and women. Looking not just at how each category of individuals is characterized but also at the relationship between categories of individuals is a consequence of taking a discursive approach. This approach stresses that "*relations* play the constitutive role" and that elements cannot "pre-exist the relational complex but are constituted through it" (Laclau 2005 as quoted earlier in the chapter).

Third, I look *outwards* at how the distinctions and connections set up in a given expression are part of a larger context. Again, I look for intertextual references within the revolutionary expressions at Tahrir Square on the one hand, and on the other for intertextual references to the local context outside Tahrir Square. For example, how the unity of the collective category of the Egyptian people is connected to the diversity of the Egyptian people or how the participants in the revolution are dissociated from the regime's imaginaries of the Egyptian people.

Fourth, I ask how the characterization of a specific category of individuals is evaluated. As with expressions about the individual, such evaluations are undertaken explicitly or implicitly. They include explicit evaluations through adjectives such as "amazing", "chaotic" and "great" and implicit evaluations through words inherently containing a specific evaluation, such as how the collection of garbage is evaluated positively or how matters related to the sphere of formal politics are usually evaluated negatively.

Fifth, I look at the revolutionary expressions through the conceptual apparatus of modern social orders presented above. Here, I reflect for example on how the regime's imaginaries of the Egyptian people usually resemble the understanding of the non-modern majority from restricted liberal modernity. Through such comparisons and discussions, I argue that the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective can be interpreted as specifically modern with regard to different ideal types.

As with my analyses of expressions about the individual, the first four steps are related to the concept of imaginaries of the good life, while the fifth step is related to the discussion of the revolutionary imaginaries in light of different forms of modernity. In my analyses of the collective – of categories of individuals and the relationship between these – I have been guided much more by terms and categories inherent in my sources than was possible in the analyses of the individual. This is particularly clear in chapter eight where I analyze how different sub-groups of the participants are presented. Here I use such categories as class, occupation, age and gender, simply because these categories emerge quite clearly in my sources. These categories are rather coarse and cannot tell us about such things as identity construction on an individual level. However, they can tell us about how the suggested relationship between these categories of individuals were used as part of the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life to contest the regime's understanding of Egyptians at large.

Summing up my analytical approach, it is discursive and centers around distinctions and connections between words or other elements in a given expression. Because imaginaries of the good life are defined in relation to both an individual and a collective level, my analytical gaze points in these two directions. Within these two levels, I have furthermore divided my analytical approach into five non-rigid steps that cover both my exploration of the imaginaries of the good life and the discussion and interpretation of these in light of different specifically modern forms of identities and social orders.

As a final note on my analytical approach, the presentation of my analyses is carried by an extensive use of quotes. By using quotes as the recurrent point of departure in my analyses, I aim at making my analyses transparent and easy to follow. It reflects my text-near focus described in my five-step analytical process. The quotes presented are selected as the best examples of a given theme, for example of how the individual is presented as just an ordinary Egyptian (chapter six) or how the sub-category of youth is presented as leading the way ideologically (chapter eight).

Having now presented the theoretical, conceptual and analytical framework of my dissertation, I move on to consider my contribution to the field as well as the overall structure of the dissertation.

Contribution to the field

My contributions to the field are at least threefold. First, I contribute to the field of scholarship that, in different vocabularies, argues that what happened at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of

revolution should not just be seen as a "container" of demands within the sphere of formal politics or as a parenthesis in a series of events leading to a specific outcome. I use the concept of imaginaries of the good life to analyze life at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution; a concept that can also be used in other contexts to analyze the content of prefigurative practices in ordinary life. Second, I provide a unique perspective on life at Tahrir Square during those 18 days by interpreting it within the analytical framework of the "Modern Muslim Subjectivity Project" as a contestation over specifically *modern* imaginaries. By using selected theories of modernity to analyze the revolutionary imaginaries in the Egyptian Revolution, I follow the general purpose of the overarching project to demonstrate the validity of its conceptualization of modernity to historical contexts outside the so-called West. Third, to the best of my knowledge I provide an analysis of parts of previously un-analyzed Arabic sources such as some of the slogans, posts from the We Are All Khaled Said page, and diaries. In this way, I also contribute to making previously untranslated Arabic sources available for a broader readership. Moreover, I provide an alternative approach to the use of Arabic in academic English texts; an approach I characterize in the coming chapter.

Overall structure of the dissertation

The dissertation is structured in nine chapters, including the present introduction. These chapters fall into three major parts and a conclusion.

The first part is the introductory part and includes the introduction as well as chapters one, two, and three. Here, I set the overall frame for the dissertation. In the introduction, I have presented the theoretical and analytical framework. My theoretical framework focuses on the concept of imaginaries of the good life and on elements of theories of modernity. The distinction between three ideal typical ways of creating order in modernity forms a particularly important interpretative tool as I use these three ideal types as modern, global templates to discuss the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life as specifically modern. In "Chapter one: Sources, methodological reflections and use of Arabic", I go into detail with the design of the study. I present how and why my sources are selected, which sources are included and excluded in the collection as a whole, and how I treat sources from many different genres in one comprehensive analysis. I describe my use of Arabic and parallel translations, I discuss questions of credibility, transparency and ethics, and I reflect upon the cogency of my sources and thus of my study. In "Chapter two: Zooming in on life at Tahrir Square", I review literature of interest for my project. Following the brief introduction of examples

of literature that view revolution as outcome, I devote the main part of the chapter to a review of literature that zooms in on life at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution and views revolution as process or prefiguration. Literature that zooms in on life at Tahrir Square is dispersed across a variety of fields and does not display any major theoretical fault lines or disagreements. Therefore, the kind of review that I undertake is not a critical review where I outline different theoretical positions. Rather, it is a summative kind of review in which I focus on providing the reader with an overview of which aspects of life at the square scholars have so far focused on. I divide this literature into two sections related to what the texts can tell us about the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual and the collective. I add to that a section about literature that can in some way tell us something about the "free space" at Tahrir Square created during the revolution. In "Chapter three: Imaginaries of the good life in an Egyptian, historical context", I present a reading of Egyptian history in the twentieth century focusing on parts of the history that can tell us something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. I look at dominant imaginaries of three periods, namely the partially liberal imaginaries in the beginning of the twentieth century, the collectivist imaginaries around the time of Nasser's rule (1952/1956-1970), and the neoliberal, individualist oriented imaginaries of Sadat and Mubarak (1970-1980 and 1980-2011). The chapter forms the main historical framework used to put my findings in a local, historical perspective.

The second part of my dissertation includes chapters four, five and six, and encompasses my analysis of the the revolutionary imaginaries of the *individual*. In "Chapter four: The valuable individual", I show how the revolutionary expressions present the participants in the revolution as valuable in a variety of ways. I contrast it to the pre-revolutionary imaginaries of the individual and liken it to the distinction between modernity and "the other" in restricted liberal modernity. I argue that the revolutionary preoccupation with ascribing value to the individual is a modern preoccupation. I set my findings in perspective by continuously discussing them in light of local and global understandings of the value of the individual through concepts such as dignity and rights. In "Chapter five: The importance of individual agency", I show how the revolutionary expressions ascribe agency to the participants and how they posit that the regime has deprived the individual of its "natural" agency. I compare the revolutionary focus on individual agency to the overriding modern demand on individuals to enact agency. I assert that the preoccupation with individual agency can be seen through notions from extended liberal modernity and that it situates the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual in the modern world. In "Chapter six: The ordinary individual", I show how the revolutionary expressions situate the revolutionary endeavor in

ordinary life and how they present the participants as ordinary individuals. I contend that the contestation of the regime's legitimacy through the creation of a different kind of ordinary life is only possible in the modern world in which ordinary life is seen as the locus of the good life.

The third part of my dissertation includes chapters seven and eight, and encompasses my analysis of the revolutionary imaginaries of the *collective*. In "Chapter seven: The collective of the Egyptian people", I show how the revolutionary expressions present the Egyptian people as the dominant collective category of individuals. I argue that the revolutionary imaginaries of the Egyptian people present the people as united, agentic and "leaderful" by drawing on both the idea of a unified, agentic collective from organized modernity and on the idea of individual agency from extended liberal modernity. In "Chapter eight: The heterogeneous Egyptian people", I show how the collective of the Egyptian people is presented as consisting of specific sub-categories of individuals, and I characterize the desirable relationship between these as complementary and based on respect for differences. I argue that the revolutionary imaginaries of a heterogeneous people resemble dominant notions from organized modernity in a particularly Egyptian interpretation, including historical notions of a corporatist social order and the rejection of distinctions related to the sphere of formal politics.

Finally, "Conclusion: The revolution continues?" constitutes the conclusive chapter. Here, I sum up my main findings, discuss some limitations of my study and consider how the continuous revolution can be studied.

Throughout the dissertation I use in-text citations. However, where I need to reference more than four or five sources, or where in-text citations otherwise disturb the reading, I place these references in a foot note. Quotes are indented wherever they exceed three lines or where they constitute a primary part of my analyses.

CHAPTER ONE: SOURCES, METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS AND USE OF ARABIC

In this chapter I explain how I have selected sources for my study, I characterize them and make some methodological reflections, and I introduce my use of Arabic. The chapter consists of seven sections. In the first section, I present the design of my study, and in section two, I explain how I have selected sources. Using purposive sampling, I describe my two selection criteria and a cross-cutting parameter of variety in genre. In section three, I present the result of my selection process, namely the sources included in and excluded from my collection of sources as a whole. In section four, I take a closer look at the analytical implications of the variety in genre, and in section five, I explain how I have dealt with the question of Arabic, translation and transliteration. In section six, I discuss the credibility and transparency of my study and offer some ethical considerations. Finally, I sum up on the chapter by considering the cogency of my sources.

Design of the study

To briefly recap the aim of my study, it is centered around exploring and interpreting the kind of life that was created at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution. It revolves around two lines of argumentation; an explorative line in which I go into depth with understanding and making sense of the kind of life created during 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square in central Cairo in 2011, and an interpretative line in which I discuss the imaginaries of this kind of life in the light of three ideal typical ways of creating order in modernity.

Methodologically speaking, my study is designed as a qualitative case study of a historical event. According to Merriam and Tisdell, a qualitative case study is “an in-depth description and analysis of a bounded system” (Merriam and Tisdell 2015, p. 37). It focuses on a unit of analysis, not a topic of investigation. The case is a “unit around which there are boundaries. You can “fence in” what you are going to study” (Merriam and Tisdell 2015, p. 38, citation marks in original). This is certainly so in my case: As I study a historical event that happened during 18 days at Tahrir Square, my unit of analysis is chronologically bounded by a start and end date, and it is geographically bounded to a specific square in central Cairo. The case is chosen for its unique character: In a dictatorial setting such as Egypt, the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square present us with a unique chance of gaining insight into the kind of life some Egyptians dreamed of. To gain insight into such a case, qualitative methods focusing on understanding, meaning, and sense-making are appropriate

(For an introduction to the qualities of qualitative research, see e.g. Merriam and Tisdell 2015, p. 37, Taylor, Bogdan and Devault 2015, p. 8-11).

Selection of sources

Because my study is a qualitative case study of a historical event, I am interested in information-rich sources about life at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution. All sources from this time and place are therefore relevant to consider. Other potential sources include sources that are not from this specific time and place but which in other ways shed light on life at the square during the revolution.

To narrow down the number of sources to an amount that I can meaningfully analyze qualitatively, I use purposive sampling. Purposive or purposeful sampling is a source selection method typically used in qualitative studies. It emphasizes that the selection of sources in a qualitative study is done with the purpose of the study in mind and with the intent of getting access to information-rich or in-depth sources (Merriam and Tisdell 2015, p. 95-97, Patton 2002, p. 230). This method distinguishes qualitative studies from quantitative studies in which selection of sources are typically randomized, and it underlines that my study is centered around exploration and interpretation, not around causal relationships or generalizable explanations.

To do purposive sampling, certain selection criteria are necessary (Merriam and Tisdell 2015, p. 96-97). Because I use the concept of imaginaries of the good life as my analytical tool to explore life at the square, my selection criteria are guided by this concept as well as by the related understanding of revolution as prefiguration. In this way, my selection criteria are related to the explorative line of argumentation in my study while leaving open the interpretative line related to questions of modernity. Based on these two concepts, my selection criteria focus on 1) whether a given source is produced and/or consumed at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution or in other ways recollects the kind of life created at this specific time and place, and 2) whether a given source is popular in the sense of being produced and/or consumed by “many” or a wide spectrum of individuals, and whether the language used is “popular”.

The design of the study as a case study of a historical event as well as these two selection criteria does not make fieldwork (interviews) the obvious choice. I have therefore chosen to focus on existing sources. Moreover, since the military took power in the summer of 2013, positive interest in the revolution of 2011 seemed increasingly unwelcome. And in 2015, the Italian Ph.D. Fellow Giulio Regeni was killed, most likely by the security apparatus, while doing fieldwork in Cairo.

Together with my supervisor, I therefore deemed it unethical, on behalf of both my potential interviewees and myself, to base my dissertation on fieldwork on site in Cairo.[6]

First criterion: Time and place

The first criterion demarcates relevant sources to sources produced and/or consumed during the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square as well as sources that in other ways recollect the kind of life created at this specific time and place. This criterion is a consequence of my interest in revolution as prefiguration, where the *process* rather than the outcome of revolution is at the center of attention (De Smet 2016, p. 72-83). In a prefigurative understanding, the process of revolution is defined by the existence of a "free space" outside the control of the authorities, such as Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution (Rennick 2015, p. 170-171). Therefore, sources from this time and place are suited to exploring the prefigurative understandings and practices at the square and the inherent revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. An example of such a source is slogans. Slogans are the kind of source that best fulfill both of my selection criteria, and therefore, images of individuals holding slogans form a substantial part of my collection of sources.

When I refer to sources from the 18 days of revolution at the square, I do not solely mean sources that were *produced* by the participants but rather more broadly sources that in some way became a "part of life" at the square. The focus on whether a source can be seen as "part of life" at the square reflects the fact that the relevant sources in my study are largely defined by the case itself. I therefore also include sources that were produced by non-participants if these sources were related to the revolution and in all probability *consumed* at the square. An example of such a source is the poem "Oh Egypt, we are so close/يا مصر هانت وبانت" by Tamim Al-Barghouti/تميم البرغوثي (Al-Barghouti 2011). Al-Barghouti did not participate in the revolution, but the poem was written for the occasion and distributed on paper at Tahrir Square as well as recited by the author himself on the large screen at the square during the revolution (El Alaoui 2011). Because such a source was most likely *consumed* by "many" or by "a wide spectrum of individuals" (see the second selection criterion), I assume it was "part of life" at the square as much as for example sources produced by the participants. In this way, I do not distinguish between sources produced by participants vs. non-participants, but rather between sources produced *or* consumed during the revolution at Tahrir Square vs. those that were not produced or consumed at this specific time and place. As a practical

[6] Moreover, personal circumstances including three small children, a cancer diagnosis and regular visits to the hospital made it difficult to find extended periods of time to conduct fieldwork.

consequence, my focus on sources that were "part of life" at the square opens up to also including social media sources used at the square.

Apart from sources produced and/or consumed during the revolution at Tahrir Square, sources that *recollect* aspects of life at the square from the revolution are relevant to consider – even though they represent a retrospective view on the revolution. In such cases, I carefully consider what the retrospective view entails and whether such a source significantly enriches my collection of sources as a whole. Two of my sources fall into this category, namely diaries[7] and the online Dictionary of the Revolution (Qamosalthawra 2015). These two sources significantly enrich my data collection as they give me access to descriptive and evaluative prose texts in a way that my other sources do not. With regard to the diaries, I find that they represent the best available elaborated first-hand accounts of the revolution. All the diaries I use were originally published during the transition period (2011-2012) when much of the enthusiasm over the revolution still lived on. Perhaps for this reason, I have not found any post-revolutionary bitterness in them. With regard to the dictionary, it is funded by the Arab Fund for Arts and Culture (Qamosalthawra 2015, see the "About" section)[8] and contains definitions of some of the terms related to the revolution. It is not a scholarly dictionary, but a dictionary based on interviews with around 200 Egyptians about terms related to the revolution and the years after. The definitions are presented as a bricolage of multiple perspectives on the same terms, including expressions such as "one hand/إيد واحدة", "go out/إنزل", and "dignity/كرامة". They provide me with interesting nuances on some of the understandings and practices that developed in relation to the revolution. The interviews were conducted in 2014, so even more so than the diaries, the dictionary represents a retrospective view on the revolution. Because of the temporal distance from the 18 days of revolution, and because I only have superficial access to how the dictionary was constructed, I mainly use the dictionary as a reference to qualify and provide perspective on other sources.

I have critically assessed whether the sources I found fulfill the first criteria of time and place. In some cases, it is relatively easy. For example, in the case of a dated YouTube clip where you can see the contours of parts of Tahrir Square such as the Egyptian Museum, I assess that the clip does indeed fulfill the first inclusion criteria. In other cases, I have had to rely on my background

[7] See Al-Shamaa 2011, Al-Qudaimy 2012, Ghonim 2012, Kamal El Deen 2012, Nabil Omar 2011, Prince 2014, Soueif 2014, Yusuf 2011.

[8] The "About" section can be found by first clicking on a term on the circular diagram at the frontpage. Having done that, click on the words "A dictionary of the revolution" in grey in the right lower corner on the English version or on the words "عن قاموس الثورة" in grey in the lower left corner in the Arabic version.

knowledge and can only make informed assessments. For example, it is not easy to ascertain whether images on an unknown website are indeed from the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square as the website claims. In such cases I rely on my background knowledge about which events, themes and persons might realistically be mentioned at this particular time and place, on my knowledge about landmarks, buildings and shops around the square, and on descriptions of specific events in academic and journalistic articles. To take just one example of how I do so, some images portray individuals holding flatbread or bread rolls to the camera (e.g. Gröndahl 2011, p. 55, Paldf 2011j). Without background knowledge, a piece of bread does not help assessing whether such an image is indeed from the revolution at Tahrir Square. However, I know that the regime accused the participants at Tahrir Square of receiving free Kentucky Meals from foreigners to protest (For this rumour, see e.g. Abdulla 2016, Amr 2011). I also know that the participants humorously responded to the accusations by showing what they did indeed eat, namely bread. Therefore, the depiction of bread does indeed provide relevant information. It places such images with high probability at Tahrir Square at the time of the 18 days of revolution.

Second criterion: Popular nature of the sources

While my first criterion demarcates my selection of sources in time and place, the second demarcates relevant sources by their nature, namely whether a given source is "popular". By "popular" sources I mean sources that were produced and/or consumed by a wide spectrum of individuals or simply by many. I also mean that the content of these sources was mostly expressed in popular terms belonging to the sphere of ordinary life more than to the sphere of formal politics.

My interest in popular sources is a consequence of my analytical focus on imaginaries. Earlier in the introduction, I mentioned that I have borrowed the term "imaginaries" from Taylor's concept of "social imaginaries". In his book, Taylor relates the term "imaginary" to ordinary people, social surroundings, images, stories and legends, and large groups of people. At the same time, he contrasts "imaginary" to theory, theoretical terms and small minorities of individuals (Taylor 2004, p. 23). In the context of the revolution, theoretical language was particularly used in expressions related to the formal political sphere, such as slogans calling for ending the state of emergency or prosecuting the president. Seen in the perspective of source selection, I interpret Taylor's description as a suggestion of using what I term popular sources.

I have critically assessed whether potential sources fulfill the second criteria of popularity. Even more so than with the first selection criteria I have had to rely on qualitative considerations to do so.

The wording in my definition of popular sources as sources that were produced and/or consumed by a "wide spectrum of individuals" or by "many" is vague simply because a precise demarcation is not possible. I cannot know exactly how many individuals did indeed see a particular slogan or which social stratum these people represent, who listened to the reading of Al-Barghouti's poem on the big screen at the square and so on. I thus rely on my background knowledge from academic and journalistic articles, diaries and images, for example of how slogans were considered an important part of life at Tahrir Square[9], that artistic creativity and self-expression were highly valued during the revolution[10], and that in Arab culture there exists a general tendency to value poetry.[11] In this way, my assessment of which sources count as popular are pieced together from information in other texts. It is also not possible to make a precise demarcation of which words count as popular terms. Here, my assessment is in practice mainly based on the absence of (too many) terms related to the sphere of formal politics.

Cross-cutting parameter: Variety in genre

To further guide my selection of sources, I use a cross-cutting parameter of variety in genre. Because life at Tahrir Square during the revolution was characterized by a great deal of creativity, many different kinds of sources were produced and consumed. To a high degree, the inclusion of a variety of sources is therefore simply necessary to reflect my case adequately. But at the same time, I use the variety in genre purposely and as a way of ensuring that I look at my case from as many angles as possible and include as many nuances as possible. By doing so, I am inspired by the idea of maximum variation as a specific example of a purposive sampling method (Patton 2002, p. 234-235). While the variation referred to in this sampling method is often related to the participants

[9] The volume of images of slogans in itself speaks of the importance of slogans at the square. The presence of slogans is also mentioned in diaries. For example, Prince regularly quotes slogans she sees (see e.g. Prince 2014, p. 15, 90, 108, 135-136) and also tells the reader about the production of slogans in a nearby publishing house (Prince 2014, p. 89 and101). And in Gröndahl's book with images from the revolution, she mentions that scribes were ready to help write slogans on behalf of those who could not write (Gröndahl 2011, p. 102), thus also substantiating the popular nature of slogan production.

[10] Several scholars analyze various parts of the artistic creativity at the square, thus substantiating that this was an important part of the revolution (e.g. El Hamamsy and Mounira 2013, Gribbon and Hawas 2012, Makar 2011, Salem and Taira 2012, Sanders IV and Visona 2012, Taha and Combs 2012). Artistic creativity and self-expression is also mentioned in the diaries. For example, Soueif tells us about performances, stages and bands (see e.g. Soueif 2014, p. 46), Yusuf mentions two hours "open microphone" when the radio was set up (Yusuf 2011, p. 39) and Al Qudaimy celebrates the youth's artistic abilities during an evening at the square (Al Qudaimy 2012, p. 41).

[11] The best example of the popularity of poetry in the Arab world is perhaps the two Dubai-based competitions "Prince of Poets/أمير الشعراء" and "Million's poet/شاعر المليون". These two competitions can in format and popularity be compared to the American song competition "American Idol". Millions of Arabs from all over the region watch the TV shows with prices ranging up to 1.3 million USD (Hassan 2012, Kurpershoek 2013)

selected for a study, Patton's argument for variation seems plausible in the context of genres as well. Patton writes that "[a]ny common patterns that emerge from great variation are of particular interest and value in capturing the core experiences and central, shared dimensions of a setting or phenomenon" (Patton 2002, p. 235). Translating this quote into my context, by ensuring variety within my sources, I aim at capturing the central, shared dimensions of the kind of life created at the square during the revolution in 2011.

Variety in genre also enables me to look at "the same thing" from different perspectives. In this way, I use the variety in genre as a triangulation mechanism. Triangulation means combining different methods, sources, analysts or theories in the same study with the aim of ensuring credibility and thus quality in qualitative studies (Merriam and Tisdell 2015, p. 244-246, Patton 2002, p. 247-248, p. 555-562). Patton argues that it "is in data analysis that the strategy of triangulation really pays off, not only in providing diverse ways of looking at the same phenomenon but in adding to credibility by strengthening confidence in whatever conclusions are drawn" (Patton 2002, p. 556). By combining sources of different genres in all my analytical chapters, I thus aim at substantiating that my findings are not arbitrarily derived from one single quote in one single source but are based on analyses of a broad spectrum of different sources. A good example of how I use multiple genres to shed light on the "same thing" is presented in chapter four where I look at the revolutionary use of the terms "dignity" and "humiliation" from the perspective of three different sources, namely Asma Mahfouz' video, the dictionary of the revolution and some of the slogans. Often, slogans play a pivotal role in my use of different genres to qualify my analyses. Because the production of slogans was accessible for all participants and because of the many images of different-looking individuals holding slogans, slogans are arguably the most "representative" source I have access to. Slogans thus function as a kind of litmus test against which I can triangulate other sources.

The collection as a whole

To ensure that I have found as many relevant sources as possible, I have used various online documentation efforts as a guideline. Several online initiatives have been established to document the revolution, either by collecting materials from the revolution and/or by linking to other documentation efforts. Among such documentation efforts are the American University in Cairo's "University at the Square" (AmericanUniversityInCairo 2011), "Tahrir Documents" (Tahrirdocuments.org, which is still there but no longer functions properly), "I am January 25"

(IamJan25.com, which no longer contains information about the revolution but seems to be a news site in Thai), Archive-it by the American University in Cairo (Archive-it 2014) and Tahrir Archives/Vox Populi (Baladi 2011). I have spent a considerable amount of time snow-balling my way through such resources to find as many sources as possible.

At the same time, I have searched for terms I have found in these online documentation efforts or in texts. For example, knowing that slogans were part of life at the square, I searched for terms such as "slogans/شعارات", "signs/لافتات" and "chants/هتافات" in combination with terms for the revolution such as "January 25 Revolution/ثورة 25 يناير", "Egyptian Revolution/ثورة مصر" and "Arab Spring Egypt/الربيع العربي مصر". Some terms work better in one language than the other. For example, the expression "Arab Spring" seems to be mainly used in English and has not yielded many relevant results in Arabic. In Arabic, the terms "January 25 Revolution/ثورة 25 يناير" and "Egyptian Revolution/ثورة مصر" work much better. I therefore adjusted my searches along the way to use some terms more than others.

My use of purposive sampling with maximum variation guides the question of when I have enough sources to adequately reflect my case. As already mentioned, I have aimed at including a variety of genres. Within some of these genres, I have selected popular or paradigmatic examples, and within other genres, I have continued my search until a point of saturation or redundancy occurred. I have selected popular or paradigmatic examples within genres where I assessed that a given source fulfills my second selection criteria and was consumed by a "wide spectrum" of individuals or simply by "many". This is the case with the songs, the poems and the video by Mahfouz. And I have used saturation as a guideline within genres where the assessment of whether a source fulfills the criteria of popularity is more complex and where it does not make sense to search for popular or paradigmatic examples. Saturation or redundancy means that the same kind of information begins popping up, and therefore, that no new information is added by including more sources (Merriam and Tisdell 2015, p. 101-102, Patton 2002, p. 242-246). I have used saturation as a guideline in the cases of the slogans and the diaries. While the slogans as a collective material were certainly consumed by many, it is impossible to know which specific slogans were popular and which were not. It is therefore not possible to select paradigmatic examples. And while the diaries regularly use the pronoun "we" instead of "I", they reflect individual experiences, not necessarily collective. In this case, too, saturation is the better quality criterion. In between the two ends of paradigmatic selection and saturation are the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook Page, the tweets and the dictionary. Here, a "moderate" number of examples are included.

Sources included

In practical terms, my collection of sources includes three books with around 500 images of slogans and participants from the revolution,[12] around 300 additional images of slogans and participants from various websites,[13] two songs on YouTube including video footage,[14] a video by Asma Mahfouz/أسماء محفوظ,[15] around 60 posts with text and image from the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook Page,[16] a book with tweets covering the evolution of events in 21 themes,[17] three poems,[18] eight diaries,[19] and the online Dictionary of the Revolution/قاموس الثورة containing around 120 entries.[20] I have already commented on some of these sources in the present chapter. In the analytical chapters I introduce the different sources individually when they occur for the first time.

Apart from my primary sources, my study includes what may be termed auxiliary sources. Auxiliary sources are sources that "supplement a research project or some other practical undertaking but [they] are neither the main focus of investigation nor the primary source of data for understanding the topic" (Altheide and Schneider 2013, p. 7). I use such sources to provide further perspective on various aspects of my analyses of primary sources. These auxiliary sources include YouTube clips,[21] Mubarak's three official speeches,[22] a document with information about the revolution produced shortly before the revolution,[23] some participant accounts written by scholars,[24] and a map of Tahrir Square.[25]

---

[12] Assaf et al. 2011, Gröndahl 2011, Khalil 2011.
[13] Adlat 2011, Al-Youm 2015, Al Aswad 2011, Alwatanvoice.com 2011, EgyptianHumour.blogspot.com 2011e, Egyptphotos.revolution25january.com 2011e, Galal 2014, Ghaleb 2015, Husni 2016, KarmaMole 2011-2017, Mobile.farfeshplus.com 2011c, Muhammed 2011, Paldf.net 2011l, Swishschool.com 2012, Wadmani.com 2011.
[14] Khalid 2011, Shaat 2011.
[15] El-Baghdadi 2011.
[16] WeAreAllKhaledSaid 2010. Around 50 of these posts are from the 18 days of revolution while 12 are from the week leading up to January 25.
[17] Idle and Nunns 2011. As many of these tweets are primarily related to the sphere of formal politics, only a small part of the around 1800 tweets is relevant for my purpose. I have not counted these in exact numbers.
[18] Al-Barghouti 2011, Madeyemoody7 2011, Yallatubey 2011. I do, however, not quote from the poem by Al-Gakh.
[19] Al-Shamaa 2011, Al Qudaimy 2012, Ghonim 2012, Kamal El Deen 2012, Nabil Omar 2011, Prince 2014, Soueif 2014, Yusuf 2011. As I found the diaries of El Deen and Al-Shamaa late in the process and as the last part of my efforts to obtain saturation, they are not used very much.

[20] Qamosalthawra 2015.
[21] AswatMasriya 2011, Bardis2009 2011, MFMAegy 2011, TheNewYorkTimes 2011, ZoDeBest 2011.
[22] DhakiratMaspero 2015a, DhakiratMaspero 2015b, DhakiratMaspero 2015c.
[23] Anonymous 2011.
[24] Abaza 2011, Rashed and El Azzazi 2011, Shokr 2011.
[25] BBC 2011.

All of my sources are existing sources. They are thus not produced with my research in mind but reflect what others deemed relevant to recollect or document from the revolution. A clear limitation of this aspect of my sources is obviously that I have not had the opportunity to delve deeper into subjects of particular interest for my study or subjects that are underexposed (see Merriam and Tisdell 2015, p. 189-183 for such limitations and strenght of using existing sources). For example, I would have liked to treat the question of the built environment of the tent camp in more detail than what was possible from my sources. I would also have liked to gain more insight into the performances at the square. However, should I have conducted interviews, I would not have been able to do so before 2017. The question of whether such interviews would simply represent a retrospective view on the revolution would be even more critical than when assessing the sources that are included in my collection of sources as it is now. In that perspective, I prefer to simply see my use of existing sources as a way of studying a historical event, and as I am interested in life at the square, sources closer to this time and period are preferred over distant sources.

Sources excluded

Because I have used purposive sampling, I have set up selection criteria. However, as selection criteria also entail de-selection criteria, some sources are excluded.

As a consequence of my first selection criteria focusing on revolution as *process*, sources related to revolution as *outcome* are excluded. That is, sources focusing on the results of the revolution in the form of the transition process, the writing of a new constitution, elections, the presidency of Mohamed Morsi/محمد مرسي, the coup in the summer of 2013, and the return to military rule and repression under president Al-Sisi/السيسي are excluded. These exclusions underline that my study does not address questions related to the time after the 18 days of the revolution and that the imaginaries of the good life I analyze are exclusively related to the initial heady days at the square. They also underline that my study stands in contrast to political science studies taking an interest in the post-revolutionary development within the formal political sphere.

As a consequence of my second selection criteria focusing on the popular nature of sources, sources expressed in formal political terms are excluded. This criterion is not simply an additional way of emphasizing that outcome-oriented sources are excluded: It also applies to sources from the 18 days of revolution at the square. Even though the logic of formal politics was to a high degree sidelined at Tahrir Square during the revolution, some sources were of course expressed in formal political terms. The huge banner with seven demands hung from a building at Tahrir Square is perhaps the

best example. Focusing on such things as the "dissolution of the People's Assembly and the Shura Council/حل مجلسي الشعب والشورى" and the "end of the state of emergency/إنهاء حالة الطوارى فورا" (Khalil 2011, p. 51, translation as given), these demands are clearly expressed in terms related to the formal political sphere. Such sources are excluded from this study. However, in most of my sources the distinction between political and popular terms is rather blurred. Therefore, I often had to assess my sources with respect to their predominant conceptual meaning in relationship to these two distinct fields. For example, some slogans express their desire to see Mubarak leave in humorous terms such as, "Leave, my shoulder hurts/إرحل كتفى وجعنى " (Egyptphotos.revolution25january.com 2011b). While the question of making the president leave is related to the sphere of formal politics, the reason given here is not. It humorously tells us that the man carrying the sign is tired of demonstrating as he is carrying his child on his shoulders. In practice, I have pragmatically excluded sources that contained (too many) terms related to the sphere of formal politics, leaving those with "fewer".

Apart from sources excluded on the basis of my two selection criteria, some pragmatic considerations have played a part in the final selection. Pragmatic considerations have led me to exclude two sources that I was initially thinking of including. The first of these sources is a number of interviews with 17 participants conducted by the American University in Cairo between 2011 and 2014 (AmericanUniversityinCairo 2011-2014). The interviews seem mainly focused on documenting specific aspects of the revolution, such as the non-political history of most of the participants and their resistance to using violence. They are not very detailed or information-rich. Because the obtainment of information-rich sources is the overarching goal in purposive sampling (Patton 2002, p. 230), I have not used them. Initially, I actually viewed these interviews as part of my sources, but in practice I always found another source that did a better job at shedding light on a certain aspect of the revolution. The second source excluded on pragmatic grounds is the documentaries produced about the revolution (See e.g. the list on Anwar 2014). I have not included these movies because I assume they went through a complex editing process that I am academically not well-equipped to analyze. The analysis of such material would moreover have necessitated a more multimodal and less text-near approach to my sources, and as a consequence I could not have gone as much into depth with the other sources. During my time as a Ph.D. Fellow I have several times reconsidered my choice of not including documentaries but ended up deciding that I should put my main focus on what I do best, namely text-near analysis.

Change in access to sources

My access to individual sources has changed during the time I have worked on my project. Some sources have disappeared while the Dictionary of the Revolution has been expanded to also include an English translation. Online sources are by their nature organic and fleeting, so these changes are not surprising. Moreover, the political nature of the revolution means that some actors may have intentionally removed some information. However, seen from a scholarly perspective, the disappearance of sources is bothersome and sad. At the same time, it underlines the usefulness of a study like mine where I not only analyze but also document some of these sources. The first source that has disappeared is a collection of images of individuals holding slogans on a webpage called The Palestinian Network for Dialogue (Paldf.net 2011l). The images disappeared somewhere between November 2017, and January 2019. I have used this source several times in my study. The references to this source in the analytical chapters are thus "empty", but copies can be obtained from me. Other websites with images have also disappeared, but in these cases I have been able to find the disappeared images in other sources. Thus, to the best of my knowledge, I do not refer to other empty websites in my analyses. The second source that has disappeared is the original We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page in Arabic (WeAreAllKhaledSaid 2010). It disappeared at the end of 2019 or the beginning of 2020. As the page played a tremendous role in the mobilization efforts before and during the revolution, the disappearance of this Facebook page is particularly regrettable. I have copies of all posts used from this page.

Analytical implications of the variety in genre

As is hopefully clear by now, my collection reflects a myriad of different sources in multiple genres. They include written words in the form of prose, poetry, short punch lines in slogans and tweets, Facebook posts and descriptive-evaluative definitions. They include still images in the form of photographs in books and on web sites, and they include video clips – which by their nature combine both oral words and live images. Moreover, to add one more layer of complexity, my sources are produced in English, Standard Arabic and Egyptian Arabic. This variety in genre presents me with the question of how to treat so many different kinds of sources in one comprehensive analysis.

As explained in the introduction, language takes up a privileged position in my analyses. I therefore, as a point of departure, treat all sources as texts to analyze discursively through my five-step analytical approach. I have read background literature about the social context of different genres,

but I have not delved into theoretical questions related to these genres. For example, I have read texts about protest music and the intimate relation between this and poetry, in particular from the time of Nasser and until the revolution in 2011,[26] but I have not delved into theoretical questions of typical Arabic metrics and music styles. While such theoretical questions might have added an interesting layer to my analyses, I am trained in textual analysis, not in musicology. Moreover, I find that the use of many different analytical approaches to my sources would have made my analyses less coherent and less focused. To nevertheless account for the different genres, I provide some *social* context to the different sources individually when they occur for the first time. For example, when analyzing poetry and songs, it is highly relevant to explain that Arabic poetry has often occupied a political role and that the revolutionary poetry and songs should be seen in this context.

In some of my sources, text and image form a whole. It is therefore not possible to analyze the text without considering the image. In such cases, I let the text guide my view and describe what I see on the image – in a sense, I transform the image to text – and interpret the two elements together. I thus do not aim at capturing what the photographer thought was important (Merriam and Tisdell 2015, p. 170), but what the author of the associated text had in mind. The interplay between texts and images is particularly relevant to consider on the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page. In several posts, images are used as proof of what the texts tell us. As an example, in chapter four, I analyze a post where an image of individuals praying in orderly lines is presented as proof that the government-spread rumors of the lawless and chaotic nature of the participants are false. The interplay between image and text thus necessitates that I treat both in my analyses.

Use of Arabic

Because most of my sources are in Arabic, some thoughts on my use of Arabic are also appropriate. In many academic journals, quotes in Arabic are not allowed to be presented in Arabic script but must be transliterated into Latin script. Journals devoted to the study of the Middle East and the Arab world have developed elaborate transliteration systems for the purpose of rendering Arabic readable for a non-Arabic readership. Many books on the Arab world use the same kinds of

[26] Apart from texts directly related to protest music and poetry from the Egyptian Revolution in 2011 (e.g. Colla 2011, LeVine 2012, LeVine 2014, Saad 2012, Sanders IV and Visonà 2012, Shalaby 2015, Swedenburg 2012a, Valassopoulos and Mostafa 2014, Vicente 2013), I have read background texts about the role of protest music and poetry in a historical and contemporary context in Egypt (Aboubakr 2015, Mossallam 2012, Radwan 2012, Schielke 2016).

transliteration charts. In my view, the widespread reliance on transliterations is problematic and I therefore use an alternative approach in my dissertation. Transliterations hide the vast amount of information about stems and roots present in Arabic words written *in* Arabic script. It arguably makes it harder for the Arabic-speaking readership to read Arabic quotes in a given text – it certainly does for me as a non-native speaker. Moreover, for someone not familiar with Arabic, the use of dots, lines, apostrophes and so on hardly makes transliterated Arabic words more easily accessible or pronounceable in any case. Rather, it makes Arabic look strange and foreign. In this way, transliterations exoticize Arabic and *re*-present instead of present the sources used. In other words, transliterations, for me, have a tendency to imply connotations of orientalist thought in which the Arab world is considered exotic and foreign, where Arabs are *re*-presented by Westerners and where a basic distinction between the West and the Arab world is set up (see Said 2003 for his well-known critique of orientalism). I want to contest this approach to Arabic by suggesting an alternative and equally transparent approach that treats Arabic as a language alongside English and as a natural part of academic texts dealing with the Arabic world. In this way, my use of Arabic can be seen as an extension of my theoretical interest in making the Arab world less exotic and more an intrinsic part of the modern world. Practically speaking, it simply means that I write quotes from Arabic sources in Arabic script. Alongside these quotes in Arabic I provide a translation in English. Only in the body text do I transliterate names and a few terms. Below, I expand on my use of Arabic, translation and transliteration.

Arabic

As noted above, all quotes from Arabic sources are presented in Arabic script. I write the quotes as they appear in the original source. Therefore, Standard Arabic and Egyptian Arabic both appear in the dissertation. I also write down the punctuation as it appears in the original, including punctuation that differs from English usage, such as parentheses to indicate direct speech and commas with spaces on both sides. Furthermore, in Egyptian Arabic, the letter "yaa/ي" in its final form is sometimes written as "alif maqsura/ى", which in such instances I do as well. With regard to writing down *oral* Egyptian Arabic, I use as a guide Badawi's rendition of how to transcribe Egyptian Arabic sounds into letters in his dictionary of Egyptian Arabic (Badawi and Hinds 1986).

Translation

All quotes from Arabic sources are accompanied by an English translation. The translations are intended to give non-Arabic readers access to the sources and to help them understand my analyses,

but the actual analyses are always based on the original Arabic. In one case, Prince's diary (Prince 2014), I have not had access to the original Arabic version of the book. In this particular case, I therefore use the available English translation in my analyses. Where available, I have consulted existing translations, and because I am a non-native speaker of Arabic, I have also discussed specific expressions with native- or near-native speakers of Arabic. A well-educated native-speaker of Arabic has also critically read through and commented on all my translations. However, unless otherwise stated, the exact wording in the translations is my own.

I translate as literally as possible because I want to convey the original meaning of an expression, including metaphors or sayings not used in English. In the subsequent analyses of such expressions, I explain how I understand these metaphors, sayings and so on. My translations are thus not aimed at being beautiful or capable of standing alone. I also translate punctuation that differs from English usage. In the in-text citations as well as in the literature list, I write Arabic sources both in Arabic script and in English translation or transliteration. Without the Arabic script, finding a given reference can be a complicated matter, at least for non-native speakers. To ease the setting up of the reference list in alphabetical order, the English translation/transliteration appears before the Arabic.

Transliteration

As already noted, I generally avoid transliterations. Nevertheless, names, place names, and a few terms are transliterated in the dissertation. I do of course also maintain transliterations in quotes. In such cases, I add a footnote with the transliterated word in Arabic script and, if necessary, a translation. Because many words related to the Egyptian Revolution are well known, a high degree of online consensus on how to transliterate these exists. I have therefore transliterated Arabic words into Latin script as these words are typically found online on sites such as Google, Wikipedia, Facebook and YouTube. Using such "loose" and unsystematic transliterations helps interested readers in finding additional material online in a way that academic transliteration charts do not do. They also, I find, ease the reading of the text, particularly for non-Arabic speaking readers. Furthermore, the first time I use a transliterated Arabic word, I write the word in Arabic script alongside the English transliteration like this: Khaled Said/خالد سعيد. In some cases I repeat the parallel English/Arabic presentation of a word, for example if the same word is repeated in another chapter. In this way, the interested Arabic-speaking reader is able to find additional material in Arabic about a given subject or term.

Credibility, transparency and ethics

When assessing the quality of a qualitative study, terms such as credibility, trustworthiness, consistency, transparency, reflexivity, and communicative validity are often used (Dahler-Larsen 2008, p. 75-89, Merriam and Tisdell 2015, p. 237-265, Patton 2002, p. 541-587, Phillips 2010, p. 283-284). Many of these terms overlap, but on an overall level, the shared main point seems to be that a qualitative study must "provide the reader with a depiction in enough detail to show that the author's conclusion 'makes sense'" (Firestone as quoted in Merriam and Tisdell 2015, p. 238). Phillips moreover emphasizes that in studies taking a discursive approach – such as mine – the question of transparency and consistency is particularly important (Phillips 2010).

For the purpose of the present study, I distinguish on the one hand between concrete tools I use to enhance credibility and on the other hand the overall "craftmanship" of a qualitative study where consistency and transparency are at the center of attention. The present chapter functions as the main avenue through which I present the concrete tools I have used, whereas questions of consistency and transparency are related to the dissertation in its entirety. Moreover, the introduction, with its focus on my use of analytical and theoretical concepts as well as a description of my five-step analytical approach, feeds into the present chapter.

Merriam and Tisdell mention four concrete tools to enhance credibility, namely triangulation, member check, adequate engagement in data collection and researcher's position (Merriam and Tisdell 2015, p. 242-250). I use these tools in different ways in my study. As previously mentioned, I use triangulation in my analyses by constantly ensuring that I use sources from different genres. Triangulation enhances credibility by substantiating that my findings are not based on arbitrary cherry-picking of quotes, but rather are founded upon a broad foundation of well-selected sources. My use of the sampling method of maximum variety can also be seen as a triangulation, only now in the initial selection of sources. Merriam and Tisdell also suggests using member check. Member check, also known as communicative validity (Dahler-Larsen 2008, p. 83-85), involves asking participants in a study if they "recognize" themselves in the analyses. While this tool is only directly useable in studies based on fieldwork, I can nevertheless reflect on whether I have remained loyal to my sources. Dahler-Larsen emphasizes that member check is only relevant for the part of a study that deals with the participants' own understandings (emic categories) and not the scholar's interpretations of these (etic categories) (Dahler-Larsen 2008, p. 83). For my study it means that the participants in the revolution should recognize "their" revolution in the part of my study revolving

around exploring the kind of life created at the square (my first line of argumentation). In contrast, they do not need to agree with my interpretation of the imaginaries of this life through concepts belonging to specific theories of modernity (my second line of argumentation). While I have not been able to conduct such a member check, I have aimed at remaining loyal to my sources by using quotes and describing my understanding of these quotes in detail. The third tool mentioned by Merriam and Tisdell is adequate engagement in data collection. Merriam and Tisdell mentions saturation as the best rule of thumb to ensure adequate engagement in the data collection. This is also one of the principles I have used. Moreover, I have used a principle of selecting popular or paradigmatic examples form different genres. The ability to select popular examples also shows engagement in the data collection, as it implies knowledge of a broad spectrum of possible sources as well as knowledge of popularity within this spectrum. For the purpose of my case-study, I assess that this combination of principles functions well. The fourth tool, namely the position of the scholar, I return to when I reflect on ethical questions later in this section.

Apart from these concrete tools used to enhance credibility, I aim at making my analyses and the design of my study as transparent and consistent as possible. In this way, I make my interpretation of the sources intersubjectively accessible. In the present chapter, I have explained on a step-by-step basis how and why I have designed my study in the way I have done. I have also shown how the two selection criteria in the design of the study are related to the analytical concepts of prefiguration and imaginaries presented in the introduction. The aim of such a depiction is precisely to ensure transparency and insight into how I have conducted my research, and to show that the methods used are consistent with the aim of my study. A “depiction in enough detail” enhances the credibility of the findings and the study in its entirety as it allows the reader to follow the analytical process in detail.

I also aim at making my analyses transparent and consistent throughout the analyses in the subsequent chapters. In the analyses, my extensive use of quotes gives the reader a thorough foundation for critically assessing how I conduct the analyses. Phillips argues that the use of long excerpts and transcriptions in their raw form is a way of maintaining transparency and allowing the reader to assess the internal consistency of a study (Phillips 2010, p. 283-284). While her suggestion is related to interviews, her point of allowing as much insight into the data material analyzed is relevant for me too. In my study, I aim at providing insight into the raw or most original form of my sources by presenting all quotes in the original Arabic alongside an English translation. By doing so, the reader is able to critically assess the very foundation of my analyses, including

linguistic rigor and knowledge of Arabic. Moreover, my use of a text-near approach to my sources where I regularly analyze the quotes on a word-to-word basis also enhances transparency as it allows the reader to follow my analytical thinking.

In this way, both by using concrete tools explained in the present chapter and by ensuring transparency and consistency throughout the study, I aim at enhancing the credibility of my analysis and the trustworthiness of my findings and the study in general.

Finally, some ethical reflections are in order when discussions of credibility and trustworthiness arise. As explained, my sources have been collected online or through books. I have thus not interacted with other human beings to collect sources. However, the lack of social interaction does not mean that it is not relevant to consider some ethical questions. Brinkmann mentions four ethical rules of thumb to be considered in qualitative studies, namely informed consent, confidentiality or anonymity, consequences and the role of the researcher (Brinkmann 2010). The first three are mainly related to the participants in the study while the last is related to the researcher. Regarding the first three rules of thumb, my sources can be divided into sources produced by named individuals and sources produced by unnamed individuals. In my dissertation, I mention names of individuals when these individuals are publicly known. As public persons, they have potentially already suffered negative consequences for participating in the revolution. My study likely makes no difference for them. In contrast, unnamed individuals shown in various images online are not public persons. They may have consented to having their picture taken during the revolution, but they have not consented to participating in my study. I cannot ask them, so I must consider ethical questions related to consent, anonymity and potential negative consequences on their behalf. Therefore, to ensure some level of anonymity to these individuals, I have not included images in my dissertation. However, as it is possible – regardless of my study –to find these unnamed individuals' pictures online, I have used direct links to these sources. If I wrote a book instead of a dissertation, I would reconsider doing so. Regarding the fourth rule of thumb about the role of the researcher, I have chosen to delve into the Egyptian Revolution out of fascination with it. I do not have any personal interests in the revolution, but as an observer, I vigorously rooted for the participants at Tahrir Square and crossed my fingers for a post-revolutionary democratic transition. On a personal level, I am thus positively invested in the revolution, but as a scholar, it is my job to not let personal interests overshadow my research. I do not see my personal interest as a big problem in the present case, as my study is a study of the pro-revolutionary discourse about life at the square during the revolution. Had I instead interviewed both proponents and opponents of the revolution, I would to a

much higher degree have had to assess my own ability to maintain a scholarly distanced perspective. In the present study, it is my job to analyze the pro-revolutionary discourse *loyally*. My text-near analyses help me do so, and hopefully, the transparency presented through the methodological reflections in the present chapter substantiate this matter.

Cogency of my sources

To sum up, I want to reflect on the cogency of my sources, based on the design and characterization of my study presented in this and the previous chapter.

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, my study is a case-study of a historical event. As a qualitative case-study, the primary aim is to make sense of and provide in-depth insights into the case. In the present study, the aim is to explore and interpret the kind of life created during the revolution at Tahrir Square. Moreover, my case is selected for its unique features: In a dictatorial setting, one seldom gets a chance to gain insight into the kind of life some Egyptians imagine as desirable. The 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square provides a rare opportunity to do so. On an overall level, the cogency of my study thus lies in its ability to provide detailed analyses of the kind of life imagined as desirable in this brief period of time and specific place. Moreover, my use of maximum variety as a purposive sampling method shows that the kind of detailed analyses my study is capable of providing is analyses of *shared* imaginaries. As already mentioned, this sampling method is good at capturing "central, shared dimensions of a setting or phenomenon" (Patton 2002, p. 235).

Because of the uniqueness of the case, it is intriguing to speculate on how far the cogency of the study goes. Can the imaginaries of the good life analyzed in my study in some way be seen as representative of (parts of) the Egyptian population beyond this limited time and place? As I argue in chapter eight, this is certainly the claim in several of my sources. In that chapter, I show examples of expressions that tell of how individuals from different segments of the population participated in the revolution. Such expressions contain implicit claims of representativity. However, in a methodological perspective, my study is not representative. My sources are not selected to ensure representation of different segments of the population, but rather to reflect how life at the square was "spoken about" or presented on a discursive level. By looking for variety in genre, my collection of sources aims at reflecting the many nuances and angles of the revolutionary discourse about life at Tahrir Square, not of different segments of the population.

Yet another aspect of my sources shows that the strength of my study lies in its ability to tell us something about a discourse. As mentioned earlier, my study is based on existing sources. These sources are not saved by disinterested parties. On the contrary, with the partial exception of the Dictionary of the revolution, my sources are unambiguously positive towards the revolution. Hence, they are likely interested in supporting a specific image of the revolution. It is therefore possible that expressions questioning well-known celebrated revolutionary principles such as unity and non-violence are suppressed in the available sources. My sources are also mediated by others. That is, others have chosen which aspects of the revolution to emphasize and deemphasize in my sources. Consequently, my collection of slogans may include a higher percentage of humorous slogans than what was indeed present at the square simply because humorous slogans are funny to publish. The authors of the diaries obviously have had to choose between many situations to narrate – and after that, their stories have likely been edited by a professional editor. And the footage to the video "Voice of Freedom/صوت الحرية" is not chosen at random, but rather to support the message in the song. The likely political interest in supporting a specific image of the revolution and the mediated-ness of my sources underline that my study is a study of the consensus-oriented pro-revolutionary discourse.

These reflections on my sources' interest in promoting a specific image of the revolution also show that sources from the revolution not only reflect but also *create* the revolutionary discourse. One of the basic assumptions in discourse-based analytical approaches is that "reality is not available for us through our categories – and our knowledge and worldview are not a mirror image of the reality 'out there', but a product of the ways we categorize the world" (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999, p. 13, my translation from Danish, quotation marks in the original).[27] In this perspective, my sources present us with a specific way of categorizing the world, thereby creating a revolutionary "reality" that I explore through my concept of imaginaries of the good life. It emphasizes that the strength of my collection of sources does not lie in its representative cogency, but in its ability to tell us something about how the discursive contestation of a regime can take place through the creation of a specific set of imaginaries of the good life.

[27] The quote here is about social constructionism. However, I argue that the basic assumption about how reality is a product of the way we categorize the world is valid in any discourse-based analytical approach based on the broadly defined fields of social constructivism, social constructionism and post structuralism.

CHAPTER TWO: ZOOMING IN ON LIFE AT TAHRIR SQUARE

In this chapter I review literature of interest for my study. The chapter forms the background of the present study and functions as a point of reference in my discussions throughout the dissertation. The chapter consists of six sections. In the first section I demarcate the field of relevant literature by dividing literature on the Egyptian Revolution into two overall groupings, namely literature that views revolution as outcome and literature that views revolution as process. I briefly characterize literature on the Egyptian Revolution that views revolution as outcome, but the main part of the chapter is devoted to literature on the Egyptian Revolution that views revolution as process. In the second section I describe how I have searched for literature on the Egyptian Revolution that views revolution as process and zoom in on life at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution in 2011. In the third section I present literature that can tell us something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual, in the fourth section I present literature that can tell us something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective, and in the fifth section I present literature that can tell us something about Tahrir Square as a "free space". While the first two of these clusters of literature correspond to my analytical interest in imaginaries of the individual respectively the collective, the third cluster of literature can tell us something about the frame of these imaginaries. Finally, in the concluding section I sum up and reflect on how I position my study within existing literature on the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square in 2011; a vaguely defined field that lacks shared theoretical approaches and terminology

Literature on the Egyptian Revolution as outcome vs. process

The scholarship on the Egyptian Revolution in 2011, let alone on the Arab Revolutions in general, is vast. It comprises books and articles ranging from political science-oriented macro-perspectives seeking explanations for what caused the revolution (e.g., Gause III 2011) to interpretative micro-perspectives exploring one specific phenomenon such as the revolutionary use of poetry (e.g., Saad 2012). Regardless of the variety, most of the literature on the Egyptian Revolution focuses on explaining why the revolution happened or why it happened in the way it did. I argue that such causality-oriented approaches are based on a view of revolution as *outcome* in De Smet's understanding of the term (see the introduction). In an outcome-oriented perspective the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square is a means to explaining the outcome, not an object of analysis in itself. In such a perspective the 18 days of revolution may simply be treated as a parenthesis in the wider

context of background factors and events that eventually led to Mubarak's resignation or as a container for demands related to the sphere of formal politics.

Literature based on the view of revolution as outcome can roughly be divided into two clusters. The first of these clusters of literature focuses on various background factors related to economy, formal politics, social problems, demographics, and regime-type (e.g., Lesch 2012, Nagarajan 2013, Roccu 2013). The focus on background factors can hardly come as a surprise as the field of Middle East studies is predominantly represented by the two disciplines of political science and history (Turam 2011), and in the context of the Egyptian Revolution a study from 2015 shows that 40 % of the most influential scholars writing about the Arab Revolutions from December 2010 to December 2012 were American political scientists (Almaghlouth et al. 2015). These scholars are interested in questions of authoritarianism, democratization, political reform, and the relationship to the United States (Almaghlouth et al. 2015, p. 432 and 436). But according to the study, they provide "little sense of the internal dynamics and the ways in which they relate to the local population" (Almaghlouth et al. 2015, p. 432). The high percentage of political scientists writing on the Arab Revolutions says something about dominant ways of looking at the Egyptian Revolution, and implicitly they also say something about neglected ways of looking at the revolution. The second of the clusters of literature based on the view of revolution as outcome looks at the lead-up to the revolution in terms of the organizational and mobilizational efforts by various protest movements during the 2000s. This cluster of literature is generally either characterized by a sociological interest in understanding the development of protest movements in Egypt, often by using some version of social movement theory (e.g., Abdelrahman 2014, Beinin 2012, Ezbawy 2012), or by a communicative interest in understanding the mobilizing and organizational role of specific online sites in the revolutionary efforts (e.g., El-Nawawy and Khamis 2016, Herrera 2014, Khamis and Vaughn 2012). Like the political science-oriented literature, it focuses mainly on explaining why the revolution happened or why it happened in the way it did. To conclude, whether political science oriented, sociologically oriented, or communicatively oriented, we do not learn much about life at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution from outcome-oriented literature focusing on explaining why the revolution happened or why it happened in the way it did.

Therefore, in order to gain insight into how scholarly literature has so far portrayed and interpreted life at the square, I look beyond dominant outcome-oriented approaches. I look instead at literature that zooms in on life at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution between January 25th and February 11th, 2011. What I mean by literature that zooms in on life at the square is texts that in

some way make life at Tahrir Square an object of analysis in itself. It is my argument that texts within this body of literature are based on a view of revolution as *process*. As noted in the introduction a few studies explicitly look at the Egyptian Revolution as process through the analytical lens of prefiguration (De Smet 2014, De Smet 2016, Van de Sande 2013), but in my perception a much larger number of studies do so implicitly. For example, Saouli maintains that what happened in Tahrir Square can be seen as a performance of "the alternative society" (Saouli 2015, p. 16), Colla asserts that poetry was not just an "ornament" to the revolution but composed "a significant part of the action itself" (Colla 2011, p. 77), and Gunning and Baron argue that we must "investigate the new practices and meanings that were inscribed onto Tahrir Square and its environs" (Gunning and Baron 2014, p. 241). In this way, in a variety of vocabularies, quite a number of the studies reviewed in the present chapter contend that the revolution at Tahrir Square can be seen as an object of analysis in itself. That is, these studies are implicitly based on a view of revolution as process. The kind of scholarship that takes an interest in revolution as process defies discipline-specific categorization but may be characterized as interpretative, discursive, and culturally oriented. I inscribe my dissertation within studies that, in different vocabularies, look at the Egyptian Revolution as process, zoom in on life at Tahrir Square during the revolution and see it as an object of analysis in itself.

Search strategies

Because I do not take my point of departure in a widely used analytical approach with well-known concepts, I cannot simply search for terms like "democracy" or "constitution" in combination with one or more words referring to the Egyptian Revolution. There is no field of scholarship on life at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution in the sense of a relatively well-defined and broadly shared interest in a particular subject using roughly the same concepts and approaches. Instead, studies zooming in on life at Tahrir Square are dispersed within a variety of fields using different concepts and different approaches. This makes the search for relevant literature difficult. In practice I have searched for literature in three overall ways. As an entry into the field I have used the term "Tahrir Square" in combination with terms referring to the Egyptian Revolution in 2011 and confined to the years 2011-2019. Some texts zooming in on life at Tahrir Square mention Tahrir Square in the headline or in initial paragraphs, and in this way it is an important search word. At the same time, "Tahrir Square" is just a place name mentioned in numerous articles, and moreover, it has become a metonym for the Egyptian Revolution. Therefore, searching for literature that includes "Tahrir Square" can be used as an entry into the field, but does not sufficiently demarcate

relevant literature. Second, I have used terms related to participants' descriptions of life at Tahrir Square during the revolution. Because one part of the overall argument in the dissertation revolves around exploring the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life, searching for terms related to participants' descriptions of life at the square is important. For example, because of descriptions of a new role for women, I have searched for terms such as "gender" and "women" in combination with terms referring to the Egyptian Revolution in 2011. Such searches yield texts on specific parts of life at the square deemed significant by the participants. Third, I have used chain search strategies in four different ways: A) by finding references cited in a relevant text, B) by using the "cited by" function in Google Scholar or the "Web of Science" and "Scopus" functions in the University of Southern Denmark's library, C) by exploring theoretical or descriptive terms used in a given text, and D) by using suggestions of related searches in Google Scholar. I have conducted most of my searches on Google Scholar, Academic Search Premier, and the University of Southern Denmark's library.

In these searches I have found a body of literature which in different ways zooms in on life at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution in 2011. It includes texts about a wide variety of subjects such as slogans, music, iconic figures, women, the hospital, the use of humor, diaries, Tahrir Square as space, the use of social media, flat organization, non-violence, youth, and the people. There are no theoretical fault lines within this body of literature. This may be attributed to the relative scarcity of texts on the same subject, the lack of a well-defined field of scholarship on life at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution or simply that many of these texts are more interested in exploring and understanding than in critiquing. My presentation of existing literature on life at Tahrir Square is thus not a critical review where I line up different theoretical positions in relation to which I position my study. Rather, it is a summative kind of review in which I focus on which aspects of life at the square other scholars have focused on so far, how they have interpreted these aspects, and what their studies can tell us about the imaginaries of the good life.

I have structured the reviewed literature in three clusters. Two of these clusters correspond directly to my interest in imaginaries of the individual and the collective, while the third cluster is related to the prefigurative concept of free space, a space outside the control of the authorities, as briefly introduced in the introduction. The third cluster of literature can thus tell us something about the frame for the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. The categorization of literature into these three clusters is my own, not a categorization inherent in the texts. The lines separating these texts into the various clusters are therefore porous. Often, the included texts explore and interpret

revolutionary practices at Tahrir Square and do not focus specifically on whether these practices say something about the individual, the collective, or the overall frame. I nevertheless attempt to make distinctions between these three aspects as they frame my subsequent analyses. In the following I present and review existing literature within these three clusters. In each cluster I first present the focus of the texts themselves, and subsequently comment on what these texts in my perspective can tell us.

Literature telling us something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual

The first cluster consists of literature that can tell us something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual. I have divided the texts within this cluster into six sub-clusters, namely texts about the necessary creation of a new self, about peacefulness and self-restraint, about equality and civilizedness, about historical awareness, about participation, agency and creativity, and about humor, indirect critique and breaking the fear barrier.

The necessary creation of a new self

A group of texts focuses directly on the revolution as a transformative experience, often by directly pointing to the transformation of the individual.[28] For example, ElMarsafy argues that an important element of the revolution was the remaking of the self, among others inherent in the widespread use of birth-metaphors in oral testimonies and diaries (Elmarsafy 2015). The interpretation of the revolution at Tahrir Square as a "mulid/مولد" – literally "birth" – a popular religious saint-celebration (Keraitim and Mehrez 2012) also speaks of the importance of the coming into existence of something new. Along the same lines, Wall and El Zahed's analysis of Asma Mahfouz's famous online call for action (Wall and El Zahed 2011) shows that Mahfouz advocated for a deliberate creation of a new self. Finally, Heshmat and Mazloum both note how a collective sense of self was created through the revolution (Heshmat 2015, Mazloum 2015). These texts in different ways point to the importance of the transformation of the individual as an integral part of the revolutionary efforts, and not as a side-effect. In my perspective, they tell us of a revolutionary demand of the individual to actively rebirth and transform him- or herself in accordance with revolutionary understanding and practices. The modern belief in individual agency thus seems to underpin such texts.

[28] Elmarsafy 2015, Galán 2012, Hanafi 2012, Heshmat 2015, Mazloum 2015, Wahdan 2014.

Peacefulness and self-restraint in the relation to the regime's representatives

Some texts focus on the participants' relationship to the regime's representatives through the proposition of unity, "one hand/إيد واحد", and through the revolutionary principle of non-violence or peacefulness, "silmiyya/سلمية".[29] For example, Ketchley suggests that the one hand principle was used to create a new understanding of the Egyptian people that included the foot soldiers of the army (Ketchley 2014, the article was later included as chapter 3 in Ketchley's book from 2017, "Egypt in a time of revolution") while Khosrokhavar maintains that the principle of non-violence is coupled with the notions of dignity and responsible citizenship (Khosrokhavar 2018). In my perspective such texts explore how a new set of normative demands were placed on the individual during the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square. The individual was now expected to act peacefully, disciplined, civilized, and self-restrained, even in the face of a violent enemy. The deliberate coopting of the regime's foot soldiers also suggests that the individual is ascribed the ability to critically reflect upon and reject regime-imposed distinctions between friend and enemy. The high degree of individual self-discipline and rationality underpinning these characteristics is reminiscent of the bourgeois subject in restricted liberal modernity.

On a side note, several scholars note that the principle of non-violence is inspired by the Serbian movement Otpor! and a book by the American scholar Gene Sharp (see e.g., Abul-Magd 2012, p. 568-569, Bauer and Schweitzer 2013, p. 8). The principle of non-violence thus situates the Egyptian Revolution in a wider, global environment of modern, peaceful protest movements.

Equality and civilizedness in the internal self-organization

Another group of texts focuses on the self-organization inherent in the revolutionary practices such as garbage collection, standing in line, the medical practices at the hospital at the square and the rejection of formal hierarchies.[30] For example, Winegar argues that the revolutionary practices of garbage collection and standing in line present the participants as clean, well-behaved, civilized, responsible, and productive. She furthermore contends that such ideals are in line with middle-class understandings of dignity and ideals of the neoliberal individualist consumer (Winegar 2011b, Winegar 2016). In my theoretical perspective, Winegar's analysis of the revolutionary practices can also be understood as a combination of ideals of civilized-ness from restricted liberal modernity and

[29] Abul-Magd 2012, Bauer and Schweitzer 2013, Ghannam 2012, Hamdy and Gomaa 2012, Ketchley 2014, Ketchley 2017, chapter 2, Khosrokhavar 2018, Saouli 2015.
[30] Bamyeh 2012, Bayoumi 2016, Chalcraft 2012, El-Sharnouby 2015, p. 183-184, Gunning and Baron 2014, chapter 5, Hamdy and Bayoumi 2016, Roborgh 2018, Tufekci 2017, chapter 3, Winegar 2011b, Winegar 2016.

the belief in individual agency from extended liberal modernity in a neoliberal consumerist version. El Sharnouby also touches upon the question of standing in line. She notes that the practice of indiscriminately checking IDs of those standing in line to enter Tahrir Square endorses the idea of equality between all individuals (El-Sharnouby 2015, p. 183-184), thus contesting the pre-revolutionary differential treatment of Egyptians depending on such things as class and connections. Other texts focus on the medical practices at the hospital at the square (Bayoumi 2016, Hamdy and Bayoumi 2016, Roborgh 2018). These texts are particularly interested in how the medical practices at the square are underpinned by the principle of medical neutrality; the modern humanitarian principle proponed in the Geneva Conventions that medical staff shall indiscriminately provide medical treatment to the wounded in times of armed conflict. For example, Hamdy and Bayoumi maintain that practicing the principle of medical neutrality was in itself a revolutionary act in Mubarak's Egypt where the regime was the sole authority on who should live and die (Hamdy and Bayoumi 2016). Interestingly, the reference to medical neutrality was made by the doctors themselves (Bayoumi 2016, p. 14, Roborgh 2018, p. 325), in this way actively aligning local revolutionary practices with modern global understandings. Yet another group of texts focuses on the rejection of formal hierarchies.[31] While the conceptual lenses differ, these contributions all focus on the revolutionary rejection of hierarchical forms of organization and the embracement of egalitarian and participatory forms of organizations. In my perspective, they tell us of imaginaries of the individual as disciplined, civilized and embracing a set of collectively defined rules. They place a moral demand on the individual of fulfilling certain social expectations in the right way, here exemplified by the act of standing in line and participating in keeping the city clean. The principle of the equal worth of all individuals seems to underpin the analyses in these texts.

Historical awareness

Another group of texts focuses on the historical and cultural context of specific popular expressions. By popular expressions I mean all sorts of communication that are produced or consumed by a broad spectrum of individuals. Here, texts about revolutionary protest music dominate, although texts about revolutionary poetry and slogans also exist.[32] Such texts situate popular expressions from the Egyptian Revolution in a broader historical context, emphasizing continuity and a long

[31] Bamyeh 2012, Chalcraft 2012, Gunning and Baron 2014, chapter 5, Tufekci 2017, chapter 3.
[32] Texts on revolutionary protest music include LeVine 2012, LeVine 2014, Sanders IV and Visonà 2012, Swedenburg 2011, Swedenburg 2012a, Valassopoulos and Mostafa 2014, Vicente 2013. Texts on revolutionary poetry include Colla 2011, Colla 2012, Sanders IV and Visonà 2012. And texts on slogans include Aboelezz 2012, Clarke 2013, Ghanem 2017, Gribbon and Hawas 2012.

tradition of using poetic expressions in a political context in the Arab world. In my perspective these texts historicize the individual, making him or her a part of an ongoing, broader social struggle to create a better society. They suggest that continuity, not just rupture, is part of the revolutionary imaginaries. However, it is unclear to what extent these texts explain the historical connections solely from an outside etic perspective. In the analytical chapters I show how history was in fact used actively by the participants (an emic level) to create a new kind of individual in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life.

Participation, agency and creativity

Some texts focus on how the use of popular expressions propone a more participatory social order.[33] For example, El Hamamsy and Soliman argue that the spontaneous production of slogans by all sorts of individuals and the assimilation of the audience into the artistic production contributed to motivating individuals to participate in and build community around the revolutionary efforts (El Hamamsy and Soliman 2013). Colla shows a similar interest in the participatory function of popular expressions, in this case in relation to chants. He maintains that the collective performance of such chants was as important as the actual words in the chants. Furthermore, he asserts that the chants did not reflect but rather create collective will (Colla 2013). Elsewhere, Shalaby contends that Cairokee's song, "Voice of Freedom/" presents the participants in the revolution as agentic subjects, although primarily focusing on male agency (Shalaby 2015). In my perspective, these scholars point to how the use of popular expressions sets up a vision of a more participatory and inclusive social order in which everybody is equally encouraged to use their creativity to express themselves and participate in the collective efforts of creating another kind of society

Humor, indirect critique, and breaking the fear barrier

Finally, a group of texts looks at how humorous popular expressions or art in general function as a political protest weapon against repressive regimes.[34] Many of these texts focus on how humor can be used to break the so-called fear barrier that prevents individuals from protesting, while others note that political protests in dictatorial settings must necessarily be expressed indirectly, such as through artistic and creative expressions. The apolitical character of social media users' engagement

[33] Al-Sowaidi, Banda and Mansour 2015, Colla 2013, El Hamamsy and Soliman 2013, Shalaby 2015, Wall and El Zahed 2011.
[34] Anagondahalli and Khamis 2014, Ettmüller 2012, Hassan 2013, Helmy and Frerichs 2013, Makar 2011, Salem and Taira 2012, Zack 2012, LeVine 2015.

on the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page (Woltering at al. 2015) may also be explained by the dictatorial context that necessitates a reliance on indirect critique. By emphasizing the dictatorial context of the Egyptian Revolution these scholars bring forth an explanation for why popular expressions containing humor or other sorts of indirect critique were an important part of the revolution. However, the link between the use of humor and breaking the so-called fear barrier is based on an etic perspective and cannot be found in my sources. Therefore, in my analyses, particularly in chapter six concerning the ordinary individual, I provide an alternative view of the use of humor, namely an emic interpretation focusing on how humor was used to present the participants in the revolution as authentic Egyptians.

To sum up on the cluster of literature that can tell us something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual, they point to how the individual is transformed through the 18 days of revolution, and they point to a number of possible characteristics of this transformed individual. These characteristics include peacefulness, discipline, self-restraint, civilized-ness, historical awareness, agency, creativity, and humor. The texts also seem to place a moral demand on the individual to live up to these possible characteristics. In my theoretical perspective, these characteristics trace a connection to understandings of the individual in both restricted liberal modernity and extended liberal modernity.

In chapters four, five and six concerning the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual, I take my point of departure in the contours of the individual presented in my interpretations of these texts. I substantiate and elaborate on how the possible characteristics described above can indeed be seen as characteristics of the individual in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. In some cases, I also provide alternative explanations. In this way I do not aim at filling a gap, but rather at gathering dispersed understandings of the individual, interpreting them in a new way and placing them into a comprehensive frame through the concept of imaginaries of the good life and my interpretation of these through elements from theories of modernity.

Literature telling us something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective

The second cluster of literature about life at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution consists of texts that can tell us something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective, sub-categories of individuals, and the relationship between these. The literature I review in this section focuses directly on the categories of individuals presented in the headlines. This is in contrast to the literature reviewed in the previous section, where the characteristics ascribed to the individual are

largely based on my interpretation of the texts. The texts on the collective and sub-categories of individuals thus deal much more directly with the same subject as I do. More specifically, they include texts that can tell us something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective of the Egyptian people as a whole, and about youth, women, the relationships between Muslims and Christians, and new hierarchies.

As mentioned earlier, the line between texts that can tell us something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual and the collective is porous. I therefore in some cases mention previously reviewed texts or clusters of literature again.

The people

Some texts can tell us something about the imaginaries of the collective of the Egyptian people as a whole. These texts focus on the constitution of the category of "the people", the nationalist collective and unity between all Egyptians.[35] For example, Colla argues that the category of the people came into existence as a collective actor during the 18 days of revolution by stating demands in the name of the people (Colla 2012). Along fairly similar lines, Sabea asserts that is was the rhetorical overthrow of the regime that created the category of the people (Sabea 2014). The previously mentioned texts of Heshmat and Mazloum on how a collective sense of self was created through the revolution also speaks of the importance of collective imaginaries (Heshmat 2015, Mazloum 2015). The nationalist notions in the imaginaries of the collective of the Egyptian people are underlined by Sanders and Visonà. They contend that the people, not the land, is the focal point in the kind of nationalism proponed during the 18 days of revolution (Sanders IV and Visonà 2012). Elsewhere, Khatib argues that the broad demands in the slogans embraced Egyptians from all walks of life, thereby creating unity (Khatib 2015). Previously mentioned texts about "one hand" between the participants and the foot-soldiers of the army and the Central Security Forces (Ketchley 2014, Khalil 2012, Saouli 2015) also tell us something about the unity proposed during the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square. Likewise, texts dealing with the increased participation of women and the relationship between Muslims and Christians (e.g., Agrama 2012, Hafez 2012, but reviewed more extensively later) can tell us something about how previously excluded categories of individuals were allowed to become (fuller) members of the people; thus also creating unity in this way. In my perspective, these texts emphasize the revolutionary belief in the collective's ability to

[35] Texts on the constitution of the category "the people include Chalcraft 2015, p. 2 and 9, Challand 2013, p. 169, Colla 2012, Sabea 2014. Texts on the nationalist collective include Abulof 2015, Sanders IV and Visonà 2012. And texts on unity between all Egyptians include Khalil 2012 and Khatib 2015.

bring about change. This belief makes a connection to notions of collective agency in organized modernity. At the same time, these texts show that the Egyptian people is the dominant – indeed the only – category used to express the revolutionary imaginaries of a collective embracing everybody.

Youth

Texts on youth generally agree that the category of youth not only refers to age but to a whole set of practices and understandings.[36] In this way, these texts set up a distinction between youth and the other participants and ascribe particular characteristics to the category of youth. For example, El-Sharnouby maintains that the understanding of youth was transformed during the 18 days of revolution from youth as a problem to youth as agents of change (El-Sharnouby 2012, El-Sharnouby 2015), and Rennick contends that the young activists saw themselves as the vanguard of the revolution (Rennick 2015, chapter 4). El-Sharnouby and Rennick thereby ascribe agency and leadership to youth in a way that resembles the notion of an avant-gardist kind of leadership in organized modernity. Both scholars also note that alongside a new understanding of youth came a new understanding of how to bring about change (El-Sharnouby 2017, Rennick 2015, chapter 4-5); an understanding that views traditional politics and ideological affiliations as inherently corrupting. Instead, they privilege inclusionary practices and collective decision-making. At the same time, Mellor and El-Sharnouby argue that the way youth is characterized shows that they are depicted specifically as liberal, well-educated middle-class youth (El-Sharnouby 2015, Mellor 2014) and even specifically as male (El-Sharnouby 2015), thus significantly circumscribing who may be considered a member of the sub-category of youth. In my perspective, these texts on the one hand tell us something about the characteristics ascribed to the category of youth; characteristics including agency and some sort of leadership. On the other hand, they tell us something about a continuation of pre-revolutionary middle-class and gendered perspectives on who is typically ascribed agency.

Women

Texts on women focus on the contestation of the patriarchal nature of the Egyptian society (Al-Ali 2012, Hafez 2012, Kadry 2015, Wahba 2016). These texts maintain that practices of equal participation and the voices of assertive women directly contested the pre-revolutionary understanding of Mubarak as the nation's patriarchal father-figure. They thus questioned the

[36] El-Sharnouby 2012, El-Sharnouby 2015, El-Sharnouby 2017, Lei Sparre 2013, chapter 7, Rennick 2015, chapter 1, Shahine 2011, Sullivan 2013.

legitimacy of the very structure of the pre-revolutionary hierarchical social order in which masculinity and seniority were signs of status and in which women and youth were consequently subdued. At the same time, as Allam writes, practices of equal participation, greater freedom to choose, and respect for women's opinions were not articulated through a gendered vocabulary but subsumed under headings of national unity and a general heightened degree of solidarity and equality (Allam 2016, chapter 3 and 4). The contestation of the patriarchal nature of the Egyptian society was thereby integrated into the greater struggle and did not form an independent point of contestation. Finally, Winegar notes that because the revolution took place in public space, a traditionally male dominated area, pre-revolutionary gender understandings and practices of who should first and foremost take part in public life were continued. Therefore, many women were confined to sitting at home with their children during the 18 days while men took to the streets (Winegar 2012). In my perspective, these texts can tell us something about how the revolutionary imaginaries of the relationship between men and women are based on a contestation of the existing patriarchal order, while at the same time showing that at least some gendered expectations were continued.

The relationship between Muslims and Christians

Texts on the relationship between Muslims and Christians point to how the participants in the revolution took great effort to show that members of the two faiths were not only capable of co-existing peacefully but also of helping and protecting each other (Abou El Fadl 2014, Abou El Fadl 2011, Aslam 2017, Hirschkind 2012). These texts agree that the religious practice of mass prayer played a significant role during the revolution as a way of building solidarity and mobilizing people. They also agree that this practice never turned into religious demands in the sense of demands about a specifically religious character of a future state. This has led some scholars to interpret the Egyptian Revolution or the Arab Revolutions in general as asecular, postsecular or post-islamist.[37] Because of my interest in the *relationship* between Muslims and Christians, the term postsecularism is of particular interest. While the extent to which these texts focus on the Egyptian Revolution and life at Tahrir Square differ, such conceptual lenses nevertheless provide insight into the revolutionary imaginaries of the role of religion. They show that there is something new that requires explanation. In my perspective, such texts point on the one hand to how religious differences were not important during the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square. On the other hand

[37] Agrama 2011, Agrama 2012, Barbato 2012, Bayat 2011, Mavelli 2012.

however, they do so precisely by emphasizing the existence of the two sub-categories of Muslims and Christians.

New hierarchies

As mentioned in the section on equality and civilizedness in the internal organization of the square, some texts examine the rejection of formal hierarchies.[38] I noted at that point how this way of organizing the square can tell us something about the imaginaries of a more egalitarian and participatory social order in which all individuals are considered equals. However, such texts can also tell us something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the relationship between different categories of individuals. Because of the rejection of a distinction between leadership and majority, as well as the emphasis on individual participation, the conceptual lenses offered in these texts seem to hold an atomized view of social order in which no permanent categories of individuals exist. Thus, only temporary hierarchies relevant in a given situation exist, and any sort of hierarchical distinction between leadership and masses is rejected. Other texts hold an opposing view. For example, some of the texts on youth seem to suggest that the revolutionary youth in some way did indeed hold a privileged position as the leaders of the revolution (El-Sharnouby 2015, Rennick 2015, chapter 4). And texts on the relationship between administrator and followers on the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page likewise suggest that some sort of leadership style was indeed part of the revolutionary imaginaries. The leadership style on the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page is interpreted in two different ways. On the one hand, Alaimo sees the relationship as a hierarchical relationship where the followers of the page uncritically echo whatever the administrators post (Alaimo 2015). On the other hand, the Dutch/Egyptian research group of Poell, Abdulla, Rieder, Woltering and Zack see it as a participatory relationship where the administrators strive to promote free debate and respect for opposing views (Abdulla et al. 2018, Poell et al. 2016). They propose characterizing the kind of leadership practiced at the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page as "connective leadership"; a kind of leadership focusing on influence by connecting followers and ideas, but not by exerting formal hierarchical power. In my perspective, these texts can tell us something about an ambivalence towards hierarchical minority-majority relationships of the kind in restricted liberal modernity, yet also suggest that perhaps a new kind of leadership style was concomitantly proponed.

[38] Bamyeh 2012, Chalcraft 2012, Gunning and Baron 2014, chapter 5, Tufekci 2017, chapter 3.

To sum up, literature on the people, youth, women, the relationship between Muslims and Christians, and new hierarchies show how the revolutionary practices created a whole new understanding of these categories of individuals or the relationship between them. In this regard, the revolutionary imaginaries contest pre-revolutionary understandings and suggest a more egalitarian and participatory social order in which hierarchies are either absent or re-imagined. Unlike the literature reviewed in the section concerning the individual, these texts do focus on the categories of individuals used as headlines in the present section. For example, the ascription of a specifically nationalist character to the category of the Egyptian people is not my interpretation but the focus in the reviewed texts themselves. Likewise, characteristics ascribed to other categories of individuals are proposed in the texts themselves and not by me. In this way literature about the collective, categories of individuals, and the relationship between these speaks much more directly to my study than literature reviewed in the section about the individual.

In chapters seven and eight on the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective, I engage with the literature reviewed in this section. I elaborate on the characteristics ascribed to the collective of the Egyptian people, expand on the number of sub-categories of individuals and propose widening the perspective to also include an analysis of the proposed relationship between different sub-categories of individuals. As with the literature that can tell us something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual, I do not aim at filling a gap. Rather, I aim at providing a more comprehensive and in-depth understanding of how the Egyptian people as a collective consisting of specific sub-categories of individuals are viewed in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life.

Literature telling us something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the free space of Tahrir Square

The third cluster of literature consists of texts that can tell us something about the imaginaries of the free space of Tahrir Square. In the introduction I noted that a free space outside the control of the authorities is necessary to do prefigurative politics, and I argued that Tahrir Square functioned as such a free space during the revolution. The texts within this section can tell us something about this free space. In doing so, they do not directly tell us something about imaginaries of the individual or the collective but do set the frame for these imaginaries. Within this cluster of literature, texts using the concept of space dominate, although the term in some instances seems to be used loosely as a way of presenting overall interpretations of life at the square during the 18 days of revolution. I have divided the literature into three sections, namely a section about the creation of a free space, a

section about the history of Tahrir Square, and a section about the creation of a public space at Tahrir Square.

The creation of a free space

Some texts mainly focus on establishing the argument that life at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution can and should be seen as a contestation of the regime.[39] For example, Bar'el maintains that Tahrir Square was transformed from a place of regime domination to a space representing revolutionary ideals or principles. Other texts elaborate on certain ideals or principles espoused during the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square.[40] For example, Swanson asserts that the occupation of Tahrir Square contained demands for a more inclusive and meaningful citizenship based on equality, freedom, social justice, and political participation (Swanson 2016, p. 305). Gunning and Baron contend that political life at Tahrir Square was dominated by the principles of self-organizing political entities, a multiplicity of political authorities and self-government (Gunning and Baron 2014, chapter 7). And Rennick argues that life at Tahrir Square was dominated by a communitarian ideal of redistributive social welfare that has dominated Egyptian thought and politics since at least the time of the late President Nasser (Rennick 2013b). The characteristics ascribed to the space of Tahrir Square vary quite a lot but seem to reflect different theoretical perspectives more than substantial disagreements. In my perspective, these texts can tell us something about how certain ideals and principles set the frame for the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual and the collective as well as establish connections between the two levels.

The history of Tahrir Square

Some texts look at Tahrir Square in a historical light, pointing out Tahrir Square's immense symbolic significance in Egypt's modern history.[41] These scholars point out Tahrir Square's symbolic role as the people's square (Ziada 2015), as a symbol of liberation from colonial powers (Rabbat 2011) as well as a site for protests against unpopular politics of the ruling regime (Said 2014, Said 2015). Moreover, Said points out that the ascription of symbolic significance to Tahrir Square is not just an external observer's evaluation, but a participant's evaluation. He argues that participants in the revolution "just knew to head there" because they thought of Tahrir Square as a place where important protests took place (Said 2014, p. 52). In my perspective, these texts can tell us something about Tahrir Square's symbolic relationship to the people, liberation, and protests

[39] Bar'el 2017, El-Khatib 2013, ElHalawani 2016, Kamel 2012, Ramadan 2013, Said 2014, chapter 3.
[40] Aboelezz 2014, Elsayed 2013, Gunning and Baron 2014, chapter 7, Rennick 2013b, Swanson 2016.
[41] Rabbat 2011, Said 2014, chapter 2, Said 2015, Ziada 2015.

against the ruling regime. The rich, historical symbolism of the square made it a good site of assembly during the Egyptian Revolution in 2011. Moreover, participants' evaluation of Tahrir Square as the appropriate place for the revolution contains an active reworking of the history of the square. It shows that the space of Tahrir Square was deliberately used as a solid symbolic basis for the creation of another kind of life during the 18 days of revolution in 2011, and it legitimated the revolutionary efforts by placing them positively in Egyptian history.

Public space

Other texts take an interest in the creation of a public space in Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution.[42] Before the revolution, the regime had gone to great lengths to prevent Egyptians from assembling in public. For example, Salama contends that average Egyptians conceived of the non-private realm as the property of the government (Salama 2013, p. 128), and Attia maintains that the non-private realm had become nothing more than a passing-through space (Attia 2011, p. 12). Therefore, occupying Tahrir Square and turning it into a space for the public was in itself an accomplishment that contested the pre-revolutionary social order.[43] By doing what was previously forbidden, namely assembling and debating, a public space in Tahrir Square was created (Butler 2011, no pagination). Such texts thus also point out the importance of assembling physically during the revolution. In my perspective these texts can tell us something about a revolutionary desire to create a social order in which a public space exists and in which Egyptians can meet, hang out and debate with friends, family, and strangers, where the non-private realm is the property of all Egyptians and where assembling in public is not seen as a threat to this social order.

To sum up, the literature telling us something about the free space of Tahrir Square shows how certain principles and ideas set the overall frame for the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. The literature reviewed focuses on the importance of occupying a physical space in a dictatorial context, how Tahrir Square was turned into a public space and how new practices and understandings were proponed during the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square. As such, these texts provide important overall interpretations of the revolutionary free space used to imagine another kind of life during the 18 days of revolution. However, the literature on Tahrir Square as a free space in one way or another all focuses on the *public* aspect of this space. It obscures the view that life at Tahrir Square also encompassed a private space in the form of the tent city erected.

[42] Attia 2011, Butler 2011, Elshahed 2011, Gregory 2013, Salama 2013, Tawil-Souri 2012.
[43] Attia 2011, Elshahed 2011, Gregory 2013, Salama 2013, Tawil-Souri 2012.

Slogans referring to Tahrir Square as one's address or one's place of birth point out that the significance of the space of Tahrir Square goes beyond the public aspects of the square.[44] Gunning and Baron briefly touch upon the public-private distinction by noticing that "the protesters subverted the sharp distinction between public (prohibited) and private (secluded) space by publicly enacting lived practices that had hitherto been typically confined to the private home" (Gunning and Baron 2014, p. 251, parentheses as given), but they do not unpack this aspect analytically.

In my perspective, the texts reviewed in the present section mark Tahrir Square as a social site in which it is possible to observe how Egyptians imagine a better life and a different kind of society. Through my focus on imaginaries of the good life I aim at overcoming the implicit focus on the public aspects of space in the literature reviewed. Because these texts only indirectly tell us something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual and the collective, they form a frame more so than an active resource of literature. Nevertheless, I engage selectively with some of the interpretations in these texts throughout the dissertation.

Conclusion

To conclude, in the present chapter I have reviewed literature of relevance for my study. I have begun by dividing literature on the Egyptian Revolution into two groupings according to whether they are based on either a view of revolution as outcome or a view of revolution as process. I have provided a brief overview of literature that views revolution as outcome, but the main part of the chapter is devoted to literature that views revolution as process. I have divided the body of literature that views revolution as process into three clusters that can tell us something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual, the collective and the free space of Tahrir Square. The literature within these three clusters supports my contention that life at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution deserves attention as an analytical object in itself and not just as a means to an outcome. In this way, my dissertation stands in contrast to – and complements – political science, sociological, and communicative outcome-oriented studies that focus on explaining why the revolution happened or why it happened in the way it did.

Texts that can tell us something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual are the least informative, as most of them do not actually focus on the individual. As mentioned in the section covering those texts, they only provide the contours of the imaginaries of the individual through my

[44] See Khalil 2011, p. 2 and 72, Mobile.farfeshplus.com 2011a, Mobile.farfeshplus.com 2011b.

interpretation. In contrast, texts that can tell us something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective focus on specific categories of individuals but only sporadically look at the relationship between these categories of individuals. And finally, texts that can tell us something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the free space of Tahrir Square focus on the importance of occupying a physical space in a dictatorial setting, but focus rather exclusively on the public aspect of the space of Tahrir Square. Seen together, these texts provide insight into different aspects of life at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution, but they do not provide a comprehensive picture. Rather, they are dispersed through a variety of fields, interests, and theoretical and analytical approaches. Therefore, I cannot position my study within the reviewed literature in the sense of arguing for one theoretical position over another. Rather, my contribution to the body of existing literature on (elements of) life at the square lies in an attempt at engaging this literature in a discussion of "the whole" and providing a comprehensive picture of life at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution in 2011.

In the next chapter, I present a reading of Egyptian history in the twentieth century. Here, I present the local historical context within which the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life are situated. I thus move away from studies focusing specifically on life at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution towards literature that can tell us something about the broader historical context of the revolution. The next chapter is the final of the four introductory chapters (including the introduction) in which I present the overall frame of my study.

CHAPTER THREE: IMAGINARIES OF THE GOOD LIFE IN AN EGYPTIAN, HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In chapter three I present a reading of Egyptian history in the twentieth century up until 2011. I focus on parts of Egyptian history that can tell us something about dominant imaginaries of the individual and the collective throughout that period. I have divided Egyptian history in the twentieth century into three major periods. The imaginaries in these three periods can be interpreted as the local, Egyptian versions of the three ideal typical ways of creating order in modernity, as presented in the introduction. The present chapter thus forms the basis for my discussions about local interpretations of modern global templates. As my focus is not on formal political rule but on dominant imaginaries, the three periods are loosely defined. The first period begins around the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 and ends around Gamal Abdel Nasser's/جمال عبد النصر accession to power through the 1952 Revolution. In this period, partially liberal imaginaries dominate. The second period begins with the 1952 Revolution, although the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood/الإخوان المسلمون in 1928 can be seen as an early development of this period. In this sense, the periods overlap. The second period is characterized by collective imaginaries and continues until the devastating defeat in the 1967 war. The third period was launched by the defeat in 1967 and manifested in President Anwar Sadat's/أنوار السادات "Corrective Revolution/ثورة التصحيح" in 1971 and in his economic reform program in 1974, "Al-infitah/الانفتاح". The third period continues after Sadat's death in 1981 throughout the rule of Mubarak until 2011. In this period, neoliberal imaginaries dominate. As an addition, the roughly ten years of oppositional lead-up to the Egyptian Revolution is treated in a separate and fourth section. Chronologically speaking, these years are part of the third period defined by the dominance of neoliberal imaginaries, but in order to show how the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life can be seen as a continuation of recent protest imaginaries, I treat the oppositional lead-up to the revolution in a separate section.

The chapter is structured around the imaginaries of these three periods as well as the addition of the protest imaginaries in the years leading up to the revolution. Here, the contours of the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life are created. In each section, I look at what the historical developments can tell us about the imaginaries of the individual and the collective in a given era. In some sections I present imaginaries of the individual first, while in others I present those of the collective first. I attempt to introduce the more dominant of the two first. A brief conclusion ends the chapter.

Partially liberal imaginaries at the beginning of the twentieth century

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Egypt was under British rule. Various British de-facto leaders believed that Egyptians were a subject race not fit to rule, a nation of submissive slaves, or that Egyptians were too irrational and emotional to lead themselves (Al-Sayyid Marsot 2007, p. 90-92 and 101, Marfleet 2016, p. 5, Thompson 2000, p. 254). Successive Egyptian governments shared this perception of the Egyptians (Marfleet 2016, p. 6). In 1922, Egypt obtained (at least some level of) formal independence, only to see King Fuad/فؤاد continue the colonial and patriarchal kind of leadership that had dominated Egyptian political life for decades. The king was unwilling to accept a new constitution that diminished his powers in any substantial way (Al-Sayyid Marsot 2007, p. 98-100), and he saw no need to consult the parliament which, in the words of Al-Sayyid Marsot, he considered "a flock of sheep fit only to be led" (Al-Sayyid Marsot 2007, p. 100). However, Egyptians contested British rule as well as the condescending colonial legitimation of the rule. In fact, dissatisfaction smoldered even before the British occupation in 1882. And after the British occupation, a nationalist movement centered around Mustafa Kamil/مصطفى كامل and later Saad Zaghloul/سعد زغلول continued the struggle for Egyptian self-rule and independence (Al-Sayyid Marsot 2007, p. 65-98, Hourani 1983, p. 193-221). These developments introduced liberal ideas such as the recognition of the individual as a basic entity in society, the levelling of (some) hierarchies, and the expansion of individuals' participation in various decision-making processes. At the same time these liberal ideas were never invoked for the whole of the population but only considered relevant for a small segment thereof. I therefore assert that the imaginaries of the individual and the collective in Egypt at the beginning of the twentieth century resemble the ideal typical way of creating order in restricted liberal modernity.

The semantic creation of the individual

The recognition of the individual as a basic entity in political life was a foreign idea until the twentieth century. Ayalon tells us that,

> [u]ntil the 20th century there had been one Arabic expression to indicate the political status of the ruled: *raʿiyya, pl. raʿāyā*[45]. Initially a name for a herd or flock of livestock tended to by their keeper, the term had been metaphorically extended to denote people, subjects of a ruler.
> (Ayalon 1987, p. 44, Italics as given).

[45] In Arabic, رعية ج رعايا.

Metaphorically explaining the relationship between ruler and the ruled as a relationship between a shepherd and his sheep indicates that the ruled are expected to submissively obey the ruler upon whom they depend. The shepherd is assumed to know what is best for his herd and has a moral duty to provide for their needs in a compassionate way. But regardless of whether the shepherd lives up to his moral duty or not, the herd must obey. Moreover, the Arabic term "raʿiyya/رعية", refers to a collective, to the flock. At that time, there was

> no name for a personal political entity comparable to "citizen," *citoyen* or *cittadino*. Nor was such an entity recognized by the region's political tradition. A man was a member of the community, that is, an anonymous part of the only legally sanctioned political corpus. His political fate was accordingly determined by that of the collective. (Ayalon 1987, p. 51-52).

In this light, neither the British colonial attitude nor that of king Fuad is surprising. However, around the turn of the century an individually-based new term for the ruled was introduced: "Citizen/مواطن" (Ayalon 1987, p. 52). While the term was probably only introduced semantically (Challand 2013, p. 175), the introduction of a new political language nevertheless tells us something about the spread of liberal ideas. The word "citizen/مواطن" is derived from "homeland" or "nation", "وطن", and denotes a single entity and its relation to the ruler; a relationship that is no longer based on the ruler's moral duty to treat his subjects compassionately but on each citizen's right to be treated justly. The shift from the use of the term "flock" to the use of the term "citizen" contains a radical new understanding of the individual. Indeed, regarding political status, only through this shift did the individual come into existence. In parallel with the introduction of the idea of citizenship, Egypt was now to be governed through a representative parliamentary system (Al-Sayyid Marsot 2007, p. 94-106). The idea of representation, popular rule, and elections – in contrast to both divine rule and autocratic rule – was thus introduced. The modern principle of citizenship also contested old notions of identification and belonging, in particular religious forms of identification. But even though religious forms of identification were no longer considered the sole overall form of identification, they still played an important role as a normative foundation for the formation of "the good individual". For example, according to Jung, the well-known Islamic intellectual Muhammed Abduh/محمد عبده,

> advocated the prescriptive authoritative role of religion in the construction of the modern self of modern Muslim subjects" and "aimed at the formation of self-disciplined, orderly, productive, rational and fundamentally moral Muslim subjects whose intimate relationships were anchored in marriage, family life, and religious community.
> (Jung 2017b, p. 69).

In this way, imaginaries of the individual at the beginning of the twentieth century can be seen as a combination of liberal notions of equality, citizenship, and levelling of hierarchies and of local religious ideas.

However, new understandings and practices were not necessarily diffused through society unhindered. For example, Al-Sayyid Marsot mentions how a group of pashas around the Urabi Revolt in 1881-1882 proponed a constitutional form of government allowing the pashas to participate in governing the country, yet at the same time acted as autocrats towards the peasants on their own land (Al-Sayyid Marsot 2007, p. 85). The pashas had no intention of extending the liberal principle of equality in decision-making to all segments of the Egyptian population. History repeated itself in the 1920s when wealthy landowners fought for national independence while refusing to give up an autocratic leadership-style over their "own" peasants (Al-Sayyid Marsot 2007, p. 109). That is, as in many other countries at the turn of the twentieth century, liberal imaginaries often only comprised an elite. Likewise, the parliamentary system was deeply flawed, and disillusion with the parliament and the political parties was widespread in the 1930s. In Arabic, the disillusion is captured in the term "hizbiyya/حزبية", meaning partyism, multi-partyism, or factionalism. The term was used to criticize the malfunctioning parliament and the political parties participating therein. The parliament was viewed as a "corrupt, unrepresentative, and self-serving body concerned only with promoting the interests of its members and the class which they represented" (Gershoni and Jankowski 2002, p. 3). The 1930s skepticism towards "hizbiyya" was shared by political leaders as diverse as Hassan Al-Banna/حسن البنا, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Gamal Abdul Nasser, the future president of Egypt (Gershoni and Jankowski 2002, p. 3, Hamid 2014, p. 138-139).

Notions of peoplehood and the partial levelling of hierarchies

Along with the notion of citizenship and the introduction of a parliamentary system came other new terms such as "party/حزب", "freedom/حرية", "voice/صوت" and "people/شعب", including modern connotations of equality and the importance of the individual (Ayalon 1987, chapter 3, Challand 2013, p. 172-173). The term "people" became increasingly viewed as the collective term for citizens who had rights, a voice, and a will (Ayalon 1987, p. 48-51). In this way, hierarchical distinctions between the ruler and the ruled were semantically dismantled. Now the ruler was not only morally obliged to listen to the people, but expected to implement its will. Indeed, Al Shabbi's/الشابي (1909-1934) poem "The will to live/إرادة الحيات", which is often quoted as the inspiration for the slogan "The people wants to overthrow the regime/الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام", is written during this period (e.g., Colla 2012). In the poem Al Shabbi explicitly links "the people" to having a will that should be obeyed (Raphael 2011). Throughout the dissertation, I translate this slogan into "The people wants…", treating 'The people' grammatically as third person singular in order to make explicit the collective actor inherent in the slogan in Arabic – I elaborate further on this aspect of the slogan in chapter seven.

New imaginaries of the collective also included a strong nationalist element. Speaking of the 1919 Revolution, the nationalist leader Zaghloul said that "[t]he present movement in Egypt is not a religious movement, for Muslims and Christians demonstrate together, and neither is it a xenophobic movement or a movement calling for Arab unity" (as quoted in Bassiouney 2015, p. 87). The modern notion of the nation-state and the concomitant notion of a national collective identity are thus at the heart of the kind of nationalism espoused by Zaghloul. The symbol of the cross and the crescent, used to denote unity between Muslims and Christians in the Egyptian Revolution in 2011, is said to date back to the 1919 Revolution (Makar 2011, p. 309).

It was not only new understandings of the collective as a whole that were introduced. New understandings of categories of individuals also flourished, such as those of the category of women. For example, the debate on the so-called "woman question" shows how liberal ideas contested existing social expectations of women and the ascription of opposing traits to men and women. The debate included questions about female education, gender segregation, veiling, arranged marriages, and women's participation in public life (see e.g., Baron 2005, p. 31-39). In many ways, the liberal ideas of the time entailed that women should be included into the category of individuals capable of thinking rationally, making choices and steering themselves. New understandings of women also

included new imaginaries of the relationship between men and women. For example, Qasim Amin/قاسم أمين asserts in his famous book, "The liberation of woman/تحرير المرأة" (1899), that expanding female education will lead to better marriages because a man "wishes to converse with others and to be a companion/يودُّ أن يجد بجانبه إنسانًا آخر فيشرح له ما يشعر به ويتسامر معه" (Amin 2005, p. 17, translation as given in English version of the book, Amin 2011, p. 22). In the original Arabic version, the quote does not speak of the man as the companion but of how a man wants to find at his side "another human being/إنسانًا آخر" that he can talk to. Nevertheless, in both the original Arabic version and in the English translation, the focus is on equality and partnership between husband and wife.

Just as with the new liberal ideas about the individual, however, new understandings of the collective and of categories of individuals were not practiced consistently or were not spread out to the whole of the population. For example, while women were indeed allowed increased participation in public life, patriarchal norms maintained the upper hand in family matters, as exemplified in the personal status laws of the 1920s. In contrast to Amin's vision of marriage based on companionship between husband and wife, the law "defined marriage largely as a financial arrangement which should be liquidated if male support is lacking" (Hatem 1986, p. 27). Furthermore, even those who did support new and (more) liberal understandings of women did not conceive of a new role for all women, rather only for a small segment of the female population. Amin explicitly proposed expanding female education only for middle and upper-class families, because "[r]ural women know everything that rural men know. Their mental faculties are equal, on almost the same intellectual level/ المرأة الفلاحة تعرف كلَّ ما يعرفه الرجل الفلاح، مداركهم في مستوى واحد لايزيد أحدهما عن الآخر تقريبًا" (Amin 2005, p. 17, translation as given in English version of the book, Amin 2011, p. 22). Indeed, Baron explicitly argues that Amin's vision of the family is a bourgeois vision centered around "a conjugal marriage based on love, a mother dedicated to raising her children, a wife frugally managing her household, and an attentive father" (Baron 2005, p. 33). In the same way, the previously mentioned Abduh's suggestions of reform were "restricted to a well-educated bourgeois class which should rule over a non-autonomous population" (Jung and Sinclair 2015, p. 32). That is, both self-proclaimed liberals such as Qasim Amin, and Islamic intellectuals such as Muhammed Abduh confined their ideas of reform to the bourgeois elite while largely adjudging the masses to be outside the scope of modernity.

To sum up, both in practice and in ideals the promotion of liberal ideas was partial and never truly imagined as something that should be extended to the whole of the population. In addition, local

experiences with liberal ideas and practices were not always good, such as the experience with representative parliamentarism, or else they were viewed with suspicion in some circles, such as the response to the promotion of increased female participation in public life.

Collectivist imaginaries under Nasser

The establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 contested the liberal ideas that were partially introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century and can be seen as an early development of the second period. The Muslim Brotherhood espoused a collectivist vision based on the use of Islamic law or Sharia/شريعة as a "collectively binding set of norms and laws according to which society has to be organized" (Jung and Sinclair 2015, p. 33). The individual was expected to internalize and act in accord with this collectively binding set of norms and laws. The individual was also assumed to share certain characteristics, opinions, beliefs and so on with all other Muslims qua their Muslimness. In this way, the individual was first and foremost imagined as part of a homogeneous Muslim collective. The Brotherhood actively aimed at creating a shared sense of Muslimness and group-oriented collective by using badges, dress codes, and public ceremonies and prayer as part of their mobilization efforts (Jung and Sinclair 2015, p. 34).

However, with Nasser's accession to power after the July 23 Revolution in 1952 and the subsequent decades of severe repression of the group, the Brotherhood's religiously oriented collectivist imaginaries were supplanted by Nasser's socialist oriented collectivist imaginaries. Although very different in substance, they both proponed a unified vision of identity with a strong role for a centrist state (Challand 2013, p. 173). In this way, they both point to the dominance of collective imaginaries in the middle of the twentieth century as theorized in the ideal type of organized modernity.

Unity, collective agency, and the inclusion of previously excluded segments of the population

As with the establishment of the Brotherhood, the vision of a new kind of society proposed by Nasser contested the liberal imaginaries from the beginning of the twentieth century. Nasser, an Arab nationalist with a socialist orientation, brought with him new understandings centered on collective visions of society. For example, in Nasser's speeches previously excluded segments of the population such as workers, peasants, soldiers, and students were now addressed as part of a positively evaluated collective working for the good of the society (Mossallam 2012, p. 65, p. 69-70). Women were also considered part of this collective as the National Charter of 1962 shows (Hatem 1986). Moreover, in Nasser's speeches and in nationalist songs of the time, Nasser was

presented as one of the Egyptian people instead of as in opposition to it (Mossallam 2012, p. 64, 74 and 80). For example, he was associated with the local conception of a "son of the country/ibn balad/ابن بلد" (Mossallam 2012, p. 269-271). This term has strong connotations of authenticity and being a "common man" (see Messiri 1978 for an elaborated account of the term). A radical break with the dominant hierarchical distinction from restricted liberal modernity between an enlightened minority and an irrational majority thus took place. Indeed, class distinctions were "greatly narrowed" (Bill and Springborg 1994), and the broad population was instead allowed to play a positive role. Nasser's vision of the organization of the society is sometimes called corporatist. In corporatism, society is metaphorically likened to a body "with many parts functioning harmoniously together but having different tasks" (Ehteshami and Murphy 1996, p. 755). In this perspective, Nasser was considered the head while different segments of society should be seen as the various body parts that were all contributing to making the body as a whole move in a given direction. Looking at Nasser's vision of society through a corporatist lens, it is clear not only why previously excluded segments of the society were now evaluated positively, but also how Nasser could at one and the same time be part of the people and the leader.

As part of the reimagining of the Egyptians and the relationship between people and leader, the collective of the Egyptian people was ascribed agency. For example, in radio broadcasts Egyptians were addressed as "active subjects of the revolution" (Elseewi 2011, p. 1198), that is, as *agents* of their own history instead of as a flock of sheep. By doing so, a belief in both the positive power of the collective and in each individual's ability to contribute to the collective efforts was embraced. In Egypt at the time, this collective was led by Nasser, who was at one and the same time the leader and one of the people. The positive understanding of the agentic collective and the corporatist relationship between collective and leader resemble the organizational model from organized modernity. Because of the close relationship between leader and the people in this organizational model, the leader's decisions are imagined to reflect popular will. In this perspective, the highly state-led and authoritarian policies under Nasser were not a problem and can simply be seen as a reflection of popular will. Other policies, such as the redistributive welfare policies, can also be seen as a reflection of popular will. These welfare policies included income redistribution, minimum wage, top tax rate at 90 percent, land reform, expansion of public education at all levels, job guarantee for university students, and subsidized housing, health care and pension schemes for civil servants (Goldschmidt Jr 2008, p. 170-171). They contributed to reducing the vast inequalities in Egyptian society and weakened or broke the domination of the bourgeoisie and the wealthy

landowners in Egyptian society. Rennick notes that in Egypt, as well as in other North African countries, the socio-economic model is based on "a communitarian ideal of redistributive social welfare, to be upheld by the government or ruling authority" (Rennick 2013b). In this perspective, Nasser's welfare policies can be seen as a continuation of a long-standing local idea of how to protect the vulnerable.

Moreover, Nasser's reforms proposed a fairly homogeneous and uniform vision of the collective of the Egyptian people; a vision of a collective identity all Egyptians were expected to align with. Potential spaces for the creation of alternative collective identities, such as independent syndicates, trade unions, voluntary organizations, university campuses, and social movements were either appropriated by the state or repressed (Al-Awadi 2004, p. 32). As early as 1954, existing political parties were abolished, political leaders imprisoned, and the opposition press closed (Thompson 2000, p. 294). And in 1956, the constitution introduced a one-party system and an assembly that was only consultative, not legislative (Thompson 2000, p. 301). Furthermore, the intrusion of the infamous Egyptian secret service into ordinary life was pervasive to the point that "*bawwabs*, or doormen, were required to report on activities of people within their buildings" (Thompson 2000, p. 307, italics as given). Imaginaries of a homogeneous collective working in unison at all costs thus permeated the social fabric under Nasser.

Homogeneity and uniformity, it was believed, made the collective strong and agentic, and with Nasser as the avant-gardist leader, national sentiments and pride flourished. During the Nasser era, the nation-state-based kind of nationalism espoused by Zaghloul and others at the beginning of the twentieth century was challenged by Nasser's pan-Arab ambitions. This was apparent, for example, in the unification with Syria and Yemen in the United Arabic Republic (Milton-Edwards 2000, p. 57-59, Thompson 2000, p. 304-306) or through the establishment of the radio channel, "Voice of the Arabs/صوت العرب" (Elseewi 2011, p. 1198-1199). Such policies speak of Nasser's pan-Arab ambitions and the forging of bonds beyond the borders of the nation state. But at the same time, policies such as the nationalization of the Suez Canal or the above-mentioned redistributive policies addressed Egyptians in the national context specifically. Nasser thus proposed two overall collective identities, namely an Arab and an Egyptian identity. Of importance in both cases was the ascription to the people of agency and an active role in building a new Egypt. Indeed, Mossallam argues that one of the reasons for Nasser's popularity was his ability to provide a vision for the future in which Egyptians would be more in control of their fate (Mossallam 2012, p. 267-269).

The common Egyptian working for a shared nationalist project

The dominance of collectivist imaginaries under Nasser does not mean that imaginaries of the individual did not exist. The individual Egyptian of the masses was not simply excluded, as in the ideal type of restricted liberal modernity, but did indeed play an active role. However, the imaginaries of the individual were tightly bound up with the collective efforts of working for Nasser's nationalist project. Mossallam describes what she terms "the new man" that was imagined as an "independent socialist Egyptian, unafraid of defying imperialism, who fought or dug or built, persevering for his own freedom" (Mossallam 2012, p. 253). The focus on fighting, digging and building characterizes the new man as a common man – a soldier, a peasant or a worker. Moreover, the new man is a nationalist participating in the greater struggle for the liberation of Egypt from all kinds of imperialist influence. Mossallam also characterizes "the new woman" who is bound up with Nasser's promise of liberating women and ensuring their participation in society on an equal footing with men (Mossallam 2012, p. 254-256). Women too were thus expected to fulfill a role as part of a united collective working for one cause. Concrete policies resulted in substantial benefits for women in areas such as education, employment, and political decision-making, but as official policies exclusively focused on women's participation in public life, gender inequalities within the family and informal discrimination in the job market persisted (Hatem 1986, p. 28-31).

To sum up, the imaginaries of the collective and the individual in the middle of the twentieth century were circumscribed by strong collectivist sentiments. The previous hierarchical distinction between minority and majority was dissolved, and imaginaries of an agentic and homogeneous collective were instead created. The collective was led by Nasser, imagined as both leader and member of the people. Together, Nasser and (the rest of) the people fought for an independent Egypt taking leadership of the Arab world, while at the same time maintaining its Egyptian character. Nation-state nationalism and pan-Arabism thus merged in this period. The individual Egyptian was primarily imagined as part of the collective working in unison with the rest of the people for a shared vision of Egypt.

Neoliberal imaginaries under Sadat and Mubarak

During the presidency of Sadat and Mubarak, a neoliberal recalibration of Egypt took place. This recalibration reflected the general spread of global neoliberalism based on the Washington Consensus. It included reduction or removal of subsidies on basic necessities, privatization of state-run companies, state withdrawal from social services, and the opening of the Egyptian market to

foreign competition.[46] Some of these policies were carried out under pressure from international banks and donors such as the International Monetary Fund and the United States, while others were seemingly carried out based on a local desire to restructure society. In any case, a clear break with the state capitalism, protectionism, and import substitution prevalent in the Nasser era took place (Al-Sayyid Marsot 2007, p. 159). The rather fundamental break with the Nasser era policies contained new imaginaries of the individual and the collective. As with the ideal type of extended liberal modernity, the self-reliant individual was the central focus, though in the Egyptian version combined with a repressive environment.

The neoliberal economic actor

The change in the overall political direction of the country contained an understanding of the individual as a self-reliant economic actor, eager to grasp the opportunity to prosper in a free market. While structural and authoritarian constraints in reality made this ideal unattainable for the vast majority of Egyptians, continuing neoliberal reforms nevertheless encapsulated an ideal of the individual as an economic actor from the 1970s onward. The reforms introduced awarded the successful economic actor while neglecting or even punishing the non-successful economic actor. For example, in 1974 the Nasser regime's sequestration of land was declared illegal, and land sequestered by the government and rented to landless peasants was returned to the previous landlords (Lachine 1977, p. 4). In 1992, land covered by the agrarian reforms of 1952 was also returned to the previous landlords, and in 1997 the New Tenancy Law gave the landlords even greater power to accumulate capital from landless peasants renting their land or evict them from the same land (De Smet 2015, p. 207). Landlords were thus prioritized over those with no record of economic success. In the cities, successful private economic actors were prioritized as well. Here, a widespread privatization of public sector companies was carried out with the intent of increasing productivity (De Smet 2015, p. 208-209). Nasser's job guarantee for all university graduates was also rolled back. The social consequences of these reforms were not considered the responsibility of the regime. Only when riots erupted, such as the famous Bread Riots in 1977 (see e.g., Goldschmidt Jr 2008, p. 200-201), did the regime take an interest in social questions. The message to the individual Egyptian was clear: You are the master of your own fate, and it is up to you yourself to transform whatever conditions you are born under into (economic) success. The collectivist thinking of the Nasser era was broken, and ideals of self-reliance and individual responsibility were

[46] De Smet 2015, chapter 14 and 16, Galal 2011, chapter 3, Goldschmidt Jr 2008, p. 196-199, Joya 2011, p. 370-374, Thompson 2000, p. 325-328.

instead championed. Such ideals connect to the understanding of the highly agentic individual in the ideal type of extended liberal modernity, while at the same time they reflect the global spread of neoliberal ideas focusing on economic drive and self-reliance. Collectivist notions of religiosity were also supplanted by individualist notions. New Islamic preachers, most famously Amr Khaled who began preaching in the early 1990s, proposed an individualist oriented Islam where personal piety was combined with ordinary life-matters of the modern world. This kind of religiosity entails "a certain fusion of the image of the creative entrepreneur with Islamic traditions" (Jung 2017b, p. 73). It fitted well with the regime's neoliberal ideals of the economic actor as the foundation of society, and added only a small measure of non-threatening Islamic morality.

The reintroduction of hierarchical distinctions and the dispossession of the majority

While neoliberal ideals form one aspect of the new imaginaries of the social order and the individual from the 1970s and forward, the authoritarian desire for control forms the other. This desire is certainly not a break with previous times but rather a constant in modern Egyptian history. Under Sadat and Mubarak, the authoritarian desire for control resulted in the reintroduction of a clear distinction between the elite and the masses. Already under Sadat, class distinctions deepened (Bill and Springborg 1994, p. 222). Concomitantly, two sets of rules were set up; rules for the elite and rules for the masses. For example, state property was privatized by selling off public companies at favorable terms to individuals with close ties to the regime (Arafat 2011, p. 37, Heiss 2012, p. 10). In this way, the regime formally adhered to the neoliberal doctrine of the benefits of privatization while in reality maintained strict control over the country's economic resources. In fact, business men and the well-of landed gentry has formed a key constituency in the regime's National Democratic Party since Sadat established the party in 1978 (Arafat 2011, p. 23). And during the time of Mubarak, the conflation of the country's economic and political elite has become increasingly clear (Heiss 2012, p. 11-12). In this way, the elite prospered at the expense of the broad population. In addition to economically related benefits such as access to good quality health care, education and jobs, the elite-rules also included the institutionalized ability to transgress the laws and get away with it. In relation to the Egyptian Revolution, the pivotal example of the impunity of the regime's representatives is of course the case of the young Khaled Said who was beaten to death in broad daylight in 2010 by two plain-cloth police officers (see Olesen 2013 for a thorough analysis of the case of Khaled Said). Comparing Egypt to neoliberal regimes throughout the world, Armbrust contends that "elites become "masters of the universe," using force to defend their

prerogatives, and manipulating the economy to their advantage, but never living in anything resembling the heavily marketized worlds that are imposed on the poor" (Armbrust 2012, p. 117).

The combination of neoliberal reforms and the authoritarian desire for control institutionally deprived the individual the ability to live up to the neoliberal ideal of the successful economic actor. Yet at the same time, the individual was evaluated exactly by these standards and punished for not living up to them. For example, the individual's access to good health care depended on their success as economic an actor. Those with money and connections were able to afford private health care, while those without had to rely on public health care. In this regard, Tadros asserts that the privatization of health has resulted in a deliberate erosion of the quality of public hospitals, including shortage of drugs, the withholding of drugs from the poorest and a demand on patients to pay for basic yet expensive materials like plaster and bandages. The chance of receiving good treatment also increased with having good connections to the doctors; something that poor Egyptians usually lack (Tadros 2006, p. 247-251). By institutionalizing individuals' access to good health care depending on their success as economic actors, the lives of poor Egyptians were considered less worth than the lives of rich Egyptians. The institutionalized differentiation between individuals depending on their economic success and proximity to the regime is a consistent trait in the period from the 1970s and forward. It permeates the social order including areas such as economy, education, employment, political participation, access to a fair trial, and daily encounters with the police (see e.g., Ibrahim 2011, Ismail 2011a, Tadros 2006). In this way, the distinction from restricted liberal modernity between an elitist minority and a dispossessed and disenfranchised majority was reintroduced, only now in a neoliberal-authoritarian form. The associated notion of the masses as irrational, uncivilized, and immature was also reintroduced. Paradoxically, as Bassiouney notes, such colonial perceptions of the Egyptians were even continued in the speeches of Mubarak and his vice president Omar Suleiman/عمر سليمان *during* the 18 days of revolution in 2011 (Bassiouney 2015, p. 154).

While the regime-led differential treatment devalued the majority of Egyptians, they were nevertheless expected to fulfil an individual role as part of a nationalist Egyptian people. There is no doubt that Egypt is at the center within the kind of nationalism being espoused in this period. Since the 1980s, school books have taught Egyptian children that their primary affiliation is to Egypt, then to the Arab nation, and thirdly to their religion (Bassiouney 2015, p. 98). It is a kind of nationalism focusing on the prospering of the nation, not its inhabitants; a conception challenged during the revolution in 2011 (Challand 2013, p. 170, Sanders IV and Visonà 2012, p. 222-226).

Moreover, according to Sobhy, the kind of nationalism proffered in this period is comprised of neoliberalist ideals of the entrepreneurial economic actor contributing to the nation through work, of anti-Western sentiments and pride in Egypt's history, and of Islam as the main legitimizing force of the existing nationalist order (Sobhy 2015, p. 812-815). For example, in secondary school textbooks from 2009/2010, Egyptians are ascribed a role in "elevating the nation through sacrifice, charity and entrepreneurship" (Sobhy 2015, p. 814). The collective notions in working together for a greater cause are reminiscent of the imaginaries of the collective from organized modernity, and the promotion of Mubarak as "the inspired president defending the Arab causes" (Sobhy 2015, p. 815) resemble the idea of the avant-gardist leadership in organized modernity. Official regime discourse thus seemed to attempt a maintenance of the popular and collectivist foundation in Nasser's nationalism, only now without a charismatic leader as its foundation.

To sum up, the imaginaries of the collective and the individual under Sadat and Mubarak were in large part outlined by the neoliberal policies introduced by the regime and aligned with the modern global tendencies since the 1970s. In the neoliberal imaginaries of Sadat and Mubarak, the individual was first and foremost imagined as an economic actor, regardless of the fact that structural and authoritarian constraints made it impossible for the majority of Egyptians to live up to this ideal. The distinction between elite and masses from restricted liberal modernity was reintroduced, and two sets of rules were set up. As a consequence, the elite prospered while the majority of Egyptians struggled to make ends meet. Moreover, the majority was devalued. It is only in relation to the kind of nationalism proponed that the majority is ascribed an active role. However, as this nationalism was a nation-centered kind of nationalism, Egyptians were expected to love Egypt and sacrifice themselves for the nation without gaining anything in return.

Protest imaginaries in the years leading up to the Egyptian Revolution

In the above sections I have characterized dominant Egyptian imaginaries of the individual and the collective during three periods throughout the long twentieth century. As Egypt is an authoritarian country, the dominant imaginaries presented in the above sections are largely regime-led imaginaries. However, this is not to say that no dissenting voices existed. Therefore, to show how the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life in large part can be seen as a continuation of recent protest imaginaries, in the present section I present the contours of the protest imaginaries in the late Mubarak period.

In the roughly ten years leading up to the Egyptian Revolution in 2011, a number of oppositional forces and dissenting voices emerged in Egypt. Organizations like Kefaya/كفاية (or the Egyptian Movement for Change/الحركة المصرية من أجل التغيير as it is officially called), The April 6 Youth Movement/ شباب 6 أبريل حركة and the Revolutionary Socialists/الاشتراكيون الثوريون promoted new practices and understandings (Browers 2009, chapter 4, Hafez 2013, Lim 2012). Bloggers such as Wael Abbas/وائل عباس, Abdel Moneim Mahmoud/عبد المنعن محمود and Nawara Negm/نوارة نجم disclosed the Egyptian regime's brutal treatment of the population and provided a new space for open discussions (El-Nawawy and Khamis 2014, Hirschkind 2016, Radsch 2008). Later, Facebook pages such as We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد took over the role of providing a space for open discussions, out-reach to non-politically active individuals, and anti-torture debates (Alaimo 2015, Lim 2012, p. 241, Naraghi 2013, Olesen 2013). The Muslim Brotherhood asserted their presence, including a younger and more political reform-oriented generation (Al-Anani 2009, Lynch 2007). Leftist and Islamist oppositional groups increasingly found common ground, a tendency that had begun decades earlier (Browers 2009, chapter 1-3, Hirschkind 2012). And ordinary Egyptians arguably contested the Mubarak rule through what Bayat calls the quiet encroachment of ordinary life (Bayat 2010). The practices and understandings of these very different oppositional forces point to a largely shared set of imaginaries of the individual and the collective. These protest imaginaries contested the dominant imaginaries of the Mubarak regime and formed the contours of what was later epitomized during the 18 days of revolution.

Heterogeneity, unity and innovative approaches

On a collective level, the protest activities and the understandings espoused in them focused on shared characteristics of the heterogeneous collective of the Egyptian people. In these imaginaries, the diversity of the Egyptian people was acknowledged, yet unity and the bridging of the usual divides were emphasized. The notion of a diverse yet united collective is nothing new in an Egyptian context. In fact, celebrating diversity while emphasizing unity was quite common in public discourse in Egypt throughout the twentieth century as can be seen for example in patriotic songs (Bassiouney 2015, see the examples of patriotic songs throughout the book, for example on p. 88, p. 173 and p. 208-209). However, what was indeed new during the 2000s was that the rhetoric of national unity was turned into concrete suggestions and practices. For example, the protest movement Kefaya worked actively at building bridges and settling disagreements between previously polarized political factions (Lim 2012, p. 237). The founders of the movement came from diverse areas across the political spectrum (Mansour 2009, p. 206-208, Shorbagy 2007, p. 46),

thus showing in practice that cooperation and unity was indeed possible. The founders and members of Kefaya also included both Muslims and Christians. In a country in which outbursts of sectarian violence increased in the years leading up to the revolution (Humanrightsfirst.org 2011), practicing inter-religious cooperation was important. Here, the attempts by Islamic intellectuals and the Revolutionary Socialists at bridging the often posited divide between Islamist and secular thought also played a vital role (Browers 2009, p. 125-127, Hirschkind 2012). In this way, new bonds were created and national unity was emphasized, thus bringing forward the proposition of a heterogeneous yet unified Egyptian people capable of working together for the greater good of Egypt and Egyptians. Moreover, Kefaya directly called for the resignation of Mubarak, for example through the slogan "Down, down, Hosni Mubarak/يسقط يسقط حسني مبارك". This and other Kefaya-slogans were also used during the 18 days of revolution in 2011(Clarke 2013, p. 203, Shorbagy 2007, p. 53). The call for Mubarak's resignation was something new (Lim 2012, p. 235). Earlier protest movements in the Mubarak era were usually directed against foreign influence, Egyptian foreign policy, or unpopular policies within a specific sector.

The introduction of new and creative protest approaches during the 2000s also tells us something about new imaginaries of the collective. The use of non-violent means of protest, participatory approaches reaching out to non-activists, and the focus on creative ways of contesting the regime without actually breaking the law formed an important part of the environment of the time. For example, after the regime-backed attack on demonstrators protesting constitutional amendments in 2005, Kefaya organized a protest in a mosque in central Cairo in which the participants in the protest swept the mosque and the area outside with brooms. For an outsider, the act of sweeping may seem like an ordinary act, but for a local this act represents the rejection of injustice or the chasing away of evil spirits (Keraitim and Mehrez 2012, p. 41, Mansour 2009, p. 208-209). By drawing on a local cultural symbol, the participants in the protest thus managed to protest non-violently and without breaking the law. To take another example of Kefaya's innovative approach, in 2007 they promoted a "Stay at home/خليك في البيت"-campaign (see Khalekfelbeet.blogspot.com 2007 for the "Stay at home"-webpage). The campaign encouraged Egyptians to refrain from participating in the annual celebration of the 1952 Revolution and to instead stay at home and simply display an Egyptian flag from a window or balcony. As a coordinated act, staying at home and displaying a flag represented a protest. According to the influential pseudonymous blog, Baheyya, "[a]nything that smacks of coordination and aims to enlist the latent energies of millions of citizens is a nightmare for [the regime]". The writer furthermore argues that the initiative

"attempts to normalise dissent by weaving into the rhythm of everyday life, whittling it down to a simple, doable, and above-all risk-free act of staying at home" (Baheyya.blogspot.com 2007, both quotes). As with the sweeping-protest, the "Stay at home"-campaign was peaceful, creative and legal. Furthermore, it reached out to the broad population by suggesting a way of protesting without any risk. A third example of the use of new and creative approaches to protesting includes the silent stands in 2010 organized by the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page. In these silent stands, thousands of Egyptians dressed in black stood in long rows along the corniche in Alexandria and Cairo. They silently read the Qur'an or the Bible or listened to something on headphones with just enough distance between them to not violate the anti-assembly laws (Ghonim 2012, p. 70-81, Olesen 2013, p. 12). The silent stands were also a minimal-risk and accessible form of protest in which the participants circumvented the law without really breaking it. Together, these new protest approaches significantly contested the regime's treatment of the Egyptians as an irrational mass, exposing the regime's use of violence and suppression as ungrounded. They suggested that the Egyptians were in fact civilized, orderly, rational, innovative, and law-abiding citizens capable of participating in decision-making processes. In this way, they implicitly replaced negative understandings of the collective from restricted liberal modernity with notions of unity, cooperation and collective agency from organized modernity.

Individual agency, choice and responsibility

At the same time, the new protest approaches in the late Mubarak era ascribed agency, choice and responsibility to the individual, characteristics largely denied the individual in the regime's imaginaries. Indeed, many of the protest activities described above contested the regime's negative imaginaries of the collective by placing individual agency at the center. For example, the "Stay at home"-campaign spoke to the Egyptians at the individual level. The individual Egyptian did not have to coordinate the display of a flag with others. This was an individual gesture. It was only because of Kefaya's coordination of the event that the cumulative effect of individual acts could constitute a protest. The forging of bonds between activists and ordinary Egyptians through participatory approaches and the use of low-risk ordinary life activities significantly expanded Egyptians' possibility of voicing and practicing dissent. And because of highly accessible and low-risk activities, it was no longer possible to refrain from protesting out of fear of repercussion. To protest or not became a *choice*.

The political use of Facebook also constituted an important development in the late Mubarak era. Various fora on Facebook provided Egyptians with the possibility of participating in open discussions, contributing to decision-making and actively voicing dissent. The April 6 Movement is credited with having introduced Facebook as a means to induce non-activist Egyptians to voice their dissent to the regime, if through no other means than by simply clicking "like" (Lim 2012, p. 239-241). And two years later, in 2010, the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page was created as a participatory instrument in finding common ground and seeking justice for the brutally murdered Khaled Said (Abdulla et al. 2018). In this way, Egyptians were no longer confined to the regime-controlled space in which the individual of the majority was treated with contempt. Online, the individual was ascribed agency and value. Such online experiences also contributed to the re-imagining of the individual as agentic, as having a choice and, hence, as capable of taking responsibility.

Because of the emphasis on individual agency and the highly innovative protest approaches, the protest imaginaries of the individual resemble the ideal type of the entrepreneurial individual in extended liberal modernity. This may seem paradoxical, as I have also argued that the regime-led imaginaries of the individual resemble the ideal type of the individual in extended liberal modernity. However, ideal types can be interpreted in multiple ways. I thus assert that both the regime-led imaginaries and the protest imaginaries in the late Mubarak era can be interpreted through the ideal type of the entrepreneurial individual from extended liberal modernity, but that this ideal type takes different forms. The regime-led imaginaries are underpinned by the ideal of the entrepreneurial individual combined with the global neoliberal ideal of the self-reliant economic actor in a local authoritarian setting. And the protest imaginaries in the late Mubarak era are underpinned by the ideal of the entrepreneurial individual in its post-modern form emphasizing individual agency and participation. The result is two quite different imaginaries of the individual.

To sum up, in the protest imaginaries of the individual and the collective in the years leading up to the revolution in 2011, the focus is on overcoming differences, on creating unity and participation, and on collective and individual agency. These protest imaginaries form the contours of what was epitomized during the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square, and this I aim to show in the remainder of the dissertation. In this way, the imaginaries of the good life during the 18 days of revolution at Tahir Square can be seen as a continuation of a set of practices and understandings championed by various protest forces before the revolution.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented a reading of Egyptian history in the "long" twentieth century beginning around 1882 and ending in 2011. I have focused on parts of Egyptian history that can tell us something about dominant imaginaries. I have divided Egyptian history in the twentieth century into three interlacing periods, largely corresponding to changes in political regimes, and I have characterized the dominant imaginaries of these three periods and compared them to the three ideal types of social order and the individual's place therein. To also provide the reader with a view of the immediate context of the revolution, I have added a section about the protest imaginaries in the broadly ten years leading up to the revolution in 2011. In the revolutionary imaginaries, elements of all of these historical periods can be detected, either because they are embraced or rejected.

While my presentation of the historical context in the present chapter may indicate that I focus on breaks and ruptures, I want to emphasize that I focus equally on continuities. For example, nationalist calls for independence and self-determination constitute a constant in the local Egyptian imaginaries of the individual and the collective. Distinctively authoritarian interpretations of the three ideal types of social order and the individual's place therein also make up a continuous part of the imaginaries in the twentieth century. Rupture and continuity thus exist side by side.

In the remainder of the dissertation I draw on the present chapter as the overall historical frame used to place the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life in a local historical perspective. The present chapter thus constitutes "the local" of the global-local interplay inherent in my theoretical perspective whereas the three ideal typical ways of creating order presented in the introduction constitute "the global" of this interplay. The present chapter also finalizes the introductory part of my dissertation in which I have introduced my analytical and theoretical framework (the introduction), presented my sources and reflected upon methodological choices (chapter one) reviewed existing literature (chapter two), and presented a reading of the historical context (chapter three). Therefore, I now move on to part one of my dissertation in which I analyze the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE VALUABLE INDIVIDUAL

This chapter is the first of three chapters in which I analyze the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual. These three chapters make up one major analytical part of the dissertation while the two subsequent chapters on imaginaries of the collective make up the other major part.

The present chapter focuses on how the individual is constructed as valuable in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. I contend that the individual is constructed as valuable through modern understandings of what it means to be an individual. The distinction from restricted liberal modernity between minority and majority is particularly important in this regard although other notions also form part of the picture.

In the local context of Mubarak's Egypt, the individual of the majority was devalued. As I argued in chapter three, neoliberal policies and the authoritarian desire for control set up a distinction between minority and majority in which individuals of the majority were deprived of the ability to live up to dominant neoliberal expectations. Moreover, because of the elite's institutionalized ability to transgress the laws and get away with it, the individual of the majority was arbitrarily treated with contempt. In this context, it is not surprising that some revolutionary expressions in different ways focus on ascribing value to the individual. Here and throughout the dissertation, please recall that I use the word "expression" as a catch-all phrase that includes all kinds of communication. The revolutionary expressions that ascribe vale to the individual often do not contain demands related to the sphere of formal politics but focus on questions of what being human means, which traits the participants possess, and how the individual is entitled to rights. If one only sees life at Tahrir Square as a container for formal politics or if one views revolution purely as outcome, such expressions do not make sense. But in my perspective, they express something important about the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual.

I interpret many of the expressions quoted in the present chapter through the distinction set up in restricted liberal modernity between minority and majority. I therefore briefly elaborate on this part of my theoretical framework before moving on to the analyses. In restricted liberal modernity only the minority is considered modern. The majority is considered essentially different from the minority and outside the scope of modernity. The distinction draws on Wagner's characterization of modernity and "the other" as a basic classificatory distinction in modern discourses:

> In the modern discourses, the basic classificatory distinction is made between reason and civilization, on the one side, and its inversion on the other: wildness, tradition, disorder, emotion, insanity. A main theme of modern reasoning is the creation of order, by the imposition of order on wildness or, if that is impossible, by the separation of the disorderly from the orderly. This theme is obviously related to the idea of rational mastery; disorder defies prediction and control.
> (Wagner 2002, p. 40-41)

Here, Wagner connects modernity to reason, civilization, order, rational mastery, prediction and control. He distinguishes these traits of modernity from "the other" through the words wildness, tradition, disorder, emotion, insanity and disorder. "The other" is described in a way that *a priori* defines it as inferior. Wagner furthermore tells us that a main theme of modern reasoning is the creation of order, and he mentions two ways of doing so: Either by *transforming* wildness into reason and civility or by *separating* disorder from order. In restricted liberal modernity, order is created by separating those imagined as disorderly from those imagined as orderly. Only the orderly minority is considered modern. As I will show, in the revolutionary perspective the regime treated the majority of the Egyptians as Wagner's "the other". Therefore, many revolutionary expressions make a point of contesting this understanding by ascribing value to all Egyptians indiscriminately.

The chapter consists of three sections and a conclusion. In the first section, I argue that the individual was constructed as valuable by categorizing it as a human being. I show how some expressions tell of a desire to be treated as human beings, thus setting up a distinction between the category of human beings and the category of non-human beings. I assert that this distinction resembles the distinction between minority and majority in restricted liberal modernity. The revolutionary expressions reject this distinction and insist that all Egyptians should be considered human beings and equally valuable. In the second section I assert that the individual is constructed as valuable by ascribing to it characteristics related to the ideal type of the bourgeois individual. I show how some expressions present the participants as civilized, orderly, well-mannered, caring for others, and capable of rising above their own immediate concerns. This characterization is distinguished from an understanding of the individual as wild, barbaric, uncontrolled, as in a state of nature, egoistic, and morally corrupt. The distinction between minority and majority from restricted liberal modernity thus underpins these expressions as well. In the third section I argue that the individual is constructed as valuable by ascribing rights to it. Central in expressions about rights is

the claim that rights constitute an inherent and thus non-negotiable part of each individual, and consequently, that all individuals are equal in rights. I contend that the presentation of the individual as someone with rights draws on the modern human rights discourse stressing the equal value of all individuals simply qua their humanness. However, it is noteworthy that the word "right" is usually preferred over the word "human rights". I assert that local negative connotations of the term "human rights" make the term unattractive, while the modern idea of the individual's value remains attractive. The global rights-discourse is thus interpreted in a specifically local way. Finally, in the last section I sum up and draw some conclusions.

"We are human beings!"

In the revolutionary expressions, the individual is ascribed value by categorizing and characterizing the participants in the revolution as human beings. It is my argument that expressions focusing on the humanness of the Egyptians ascribe value to the individual and reject the pre-revolutionary social order by drawing on Wagner's basic classificatory distinction between modernity and "the other".

On January 18, 2011, a young woman uploaded a video of herself to her Facebook page. The woman, Asmaa Mahfouz/أسماء محفوظ, was a member and co-founder of the protest movement April 6 Youth Movement/حركة شباب 6 أبريل, but the video was posted by her as an individual, not as an April 6-member. The video can be seen as an "early start" of the revolution. As I show in chapter five, anonymous individuals posted images of themselves replicating the final message in Mahfouz' video. In that way, her video played an important role in the mobilization efforts, and the message became part of the shared revolutionary discourse. The video was soon uploaded to YouTube in several versions – one of which has more than 500,000 views (see El-Baghdadi 2011 for the video). It is therefore highly probable that the video was also consumed at Tahrir Square during the revolution. In the video she urges her fellow Egyptians to participate in the revolution on January 25. Among others, she suggests that Egyptians take to the streets and simply yell "We are human beings/احنا بني أدمين" (El-Baghdadi 2011, 3:04 min). Looking at revolution as outcome, this is perhaps an odd thing to yell during a revolution. It is not a demand related to the sphere of formal politics. Indeed, it is not even a demand, but rather a claim or a statement. In a slogan, a similar message is sent, only now in the form of a wish: "I want to live like a human being/عاوز أعيش إنسان" (Therevolutionfiles.com 2011b). But looking at revolution as prefiguration, such expressions provide valuable insight into the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual. They tell us that

Egyptians were not considered human beings in the pre-revolutionary social order, but that they are indeed human beings and should be allowed to live as such. In the following I elaborate on what such very basic demands or statements can tell us about the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual.

Dignity

The basic demand and statement in the above quotes tell us of the urgency of being considered a human being. Other expressions elaborate on what is entailed in such expressions. For example, looking closer at Mahfouz's video, the above quote is not the only time she uses the term "human being". Earlier in her video she also tells of her desire to live in a society in which the individual is considered a human being:

> Perhaps we can have a free country, a country in which there is justice, a country in which there is dignity, a country in which human beings are truly human beings and do not live like animals
> (El-Baghdadi 2011, 0:17 min)

يمكن نكون بلدة حرة، بلد فيها عدل، بلد فيها كرامة، بلد الإنسان فيها إنسان بجد مش يعيش كحيوان

In the expression, Mahfouz set up a distinction between human being and animal. The distinction between "truly human beings/إنسان بجد" and "live like animalsيعيش كحيوان/" points to a difference in kind, not just in degree. The difference is emphasized by Mahfouz's use of a nominal sentence to tell us that she longs for a country "in which human beings *are* truly human beings/ الإنسان فيها إنسان بجد" (emphasis in English added). In Arabic, nominal sentences are used to make assertive statements or express factuality (Bassiouney 2015, p. 68 and 71), thus underlining her point. Relegating a human being to live like an animal, a non-human, is thus deplorable. In the first part of this expression, Mahfouz connects truly human to freedom, justice, and dignity; three positively evaluated words commonly used during the revolution. The relationship between human being and dignity is particularly interesting as it was repeated in other instances, for example in the slogan "bread, freedom, human dignity/عيش حرية كرامة إنسانية" (e.g., Assaf et al. 2011, p. 15) which was planned even before the start of the revolution (Anonymous 2011, the section about chants. The document was uploaded on the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook Page on January 23).

The call for dignity was a consistent theme in the Egyptian Revolution and indeed in the Arab Revolutions in general (Eyadat 2012). In the Dictionary of the Revolution, "dignityكرامة/" is distinguished from words like "humiliation/إهانة", "to shame/هزّأ", and being treated like "an animal/حيوان" (Qamos Al-Thawra 2015, entry "Dignity/كرامة"); thus basically repeating the same distinction as Mahfouz set up. The Dictionary of the Revolution is an online dictionary containing terms associated with the Egyptian Revolution. The terms are defined through interviews with around 200 Egyptians from various backgrounds and presented in curated form on the website (Qamos Al-Thawra 2015, "About"). As mentioned in chapter one, the interviews were conducted between 2011 and 2014, and the dictionary thus contains a retrospective perspective on the revolution. Mahfouz's understanding of dignity therefore not only seems relevant during the revolution but also beyond the 18 days. At the same time, it seems to echo an understanding shared by other Egyptians. Moreover, her understanding of the relation between "human being" and "dignity" is not only coupled to a local understanding of these terms, but arguably also to modern understandings of dignity and the inherent value of the individual human being. For example, according to Misztal, the dominant modern use of the word "dignity" refers to an inherent value of every human being qua their human-ness. Referencing Kant's categorical imperative, she states that in the modern understanding of dignity, a human being must not be used solely as a means, but should always be considered an end in him- or herself (Misztal 2013, p. 101-104). Along the same lines, Kateb writes that "the dignity of each individual is equal to that of every other" (Kateb 2011, p. 5), thus stressing that dignity is a concept divested of social status or other differences ascribed by humans. At the same time, dignity is the sole property of humans, as no other species is equal to human beings (Kateb 2011, p. 3-10). Hence, when Mahfouz distinguishes "truly human" from "living like animals" and connects it to "dignity", she seems to imply that all human beings have an inherent value; a value that is unique for humans. In this perspective, her distinction draws on the modern global notion of the value of the individual.

In relation to the Egyptian Revolution, Singerman asserts that dignity implies that "the state must respect the integrity, safety, and autonomy of the body" (Singerman 2013, p. 20). The focus on bodily autonomy seems an important addition to the notion of dignity in an Egyptian context where state abuse, abductions, and disappearances were part of ordinary life before the revolution. Indeed, the case of Khaled Said can easily be understood as a violation of dignity (see e.g., Clarke 2013, p. 207-209) Interpreting Mahfouz's distinction in this perspective, living like animals means being subject to the state's arbitrary violence against one's body, while dignity is related to the non-

interference of the state. Consequently, the way to regain the individual's dignity is by removing the violent regime.

Humiliation

While the positive associations between "human being" and "dignity" stand out in the expression above, other expressions elaborate on the negative opposition to "human being". As Laclau holds, relations play the constitutive role in a discourse (Laclau 2005, p. 68), and the distinction from "human being", therefore, can also tell us something about how the category of human beings is constructed and how the individual is ascribed value.

Mahfouz is not the only one who describes the opposition to "human being" as "animal". For example, one expression in the Dictionary of the Revolution says that "we" – Egyptians – are animals. Another expression says that Egyptians will always be slaves (Qamos Al-Thawra 2015, entry حقوق الإنسان/Human rights, both references). Both of these expressions set up an insurmountable distinction between human and something non-human. They tell us that Egyptians live like subdued non-humans. Furthermore, the category of animals or slaves implies the existence of another category of individuals, namely the category of master or owner. A distinction reminiscent of the minority-majority distinction from restricted liberal modernity is thereby set up. Only the individuals of the minority are truly considered human beings, while the majority are treated as animals or slaves and do not have value at the individual level. They only have value as part of the masses. In this perspective, the minority's relationship to the majority becomes a question of managing the mass. Should an entity of the masses protest this categorization, it is reasonable to discipline or simply kill off the disobedient entity – just as in the case of Khaled Said.

In slogans, the distinction between human being and something else is also mentioned. Slogans on signs or other materials account for a considerable portion of my sources as they constituted an important part of life at Tahrir Square. They can be seen as the pivotal example of popular expressions at the square, as the slogans were both produced and consumed by the populace. Even the illiterate had access to producing a slogan, as "scribes" were ready to help write slogans on signs (Gröndahl 2011, p. 102). The very *production* of slogans thus tells of the revolutionary ideals of participation and levelling of hierarchies. At least three coffee table-like books document some of the slogans in images (Assaf et al. 2011, Gröndahl 2011, Khalil 2011). In my analyses I use these books, as well as a collection of around 300 additional slogans I have found online on various sites through searches in both English and Arabic.

In a slogan, “human being/إنسان” is distinguished from “poor soul/غلبان”, and the categorization of the individual Egyptian as a “poor soul” is explicitly evaluated negatively through the word “humiliated/أتهان”. The question of humiliation is a recurrent theme in the revolutionary expressions and is often set in juxtaposition to dignity (Mex-Jørgensen 2017, p. 52-53, Mex-Jørgensen 2020, p. 220-225). In this way, the quote below forms a link to the section above on dignity:

I am not a poor soul	أنا مش غلبان
I am a human being	أنا إنسان
I do not want to be humiliated	مش عايز أتهان
I want to live in safety	عايز أعيش في آمان
Is that so much to ask for, men?	ده كتير يا جدعان؟
(Egyptianhumour.blogspot.com 2011a, my translation)	

The slogan points out that it is humiliating to be treated as a poor soul when one is, in fact, a human being. Human beings should be able to live in security and should not be humiliated. Here, “humiliated/أتهان” is distinguished from “live in safety/أعيش في آمان”. The word “safety/amaan/آمان” and the related word “security/aman/أمن” is often associated in an Egyptian context to the kind of safety and security brought by the state in the form of security forces and police (see e.g., many of the descriptions in Qamos Al-Thawra 2015, entry "Safety & security/أمن وأمان). The question of security was regularly used by the regime to defend the lack of democracy and legitimize the security forces’ interference in all spheres of life before the revolution. However, I find that this is not the kind of safety referred to in the quote above. The kind of safety referred to seems closer to the dictionary translation of the term “amaan/آمان” as “safety”, “security”, “peace”, “shelter”, “protection” and “clemency” (Badawi and Hinds 1986, p. 38, Wehr 1980, p. 28). Here, notions of being able to live peacefully without interference or intrusion from others are added to safety and security of the kind that the state provides through security forces and police. In this way, the safety referred to above seems to stand in contrast to the regime’s interference in ordinary Egyptians’ lives. I argue that it refers to being able to live in safety *from* the regime. In this way, it is connected to Singermans’s notion of dignity as the state’s respect for “the integrity, safety, and autonomy of the body”, as referred in the above section on dignity. Consequently, humiliation is related to the state’s interference in ordinary life and the lack of respect for the integrity, safety and bodily autonomy of individual Egyptians which it displays in encounters with the population.

In Ismail's studies of young Egyptian men's encounters with the government before the revolution, she relates that humiliation was the main term used by young men to describe such encounters (e.g., Ismail 2011b, p. 991). Her studies underline the relation between humiliation and state interference, and they support the understanding of dignity as related to bodily autonomy and freedom from the state's interference. Moreover, her studies underline that humiliation is not only related to the regime's disrespect for bodily autonomy, but also to the disrespect for the individual's self-esteem by, for example, scorning, yelling and using derogative terms (Ismail 2006, Ismail 2011a, Ismail 2012). The slogan ends satirically by saying, "Is that so much to ask for, men?/ده كتير يا جدعان؟", thereby implying that it is the regime in the form of Mubarak's "men/جدعان" who are responsible for the humiliation of the individual. It also implies that the demand of living in safety like a human being is indeed a very basic and humble demand. The term "gidaan/جدعان" which I have simply translated as "men" entails something more than a reference to the non-value laden category of males. It is a term used to denote such qualities as manliness, chivalry, integrity and the opposition to injustice (Bassiouney 2015, p. 201, Ghannam 2012, p. 33-34, Messiri 1978, p. 82-83). Therefore, by sarcastically calling Mubarak's men "gidaan/جدعان", the slogan also draws attention to how the men of the regime ought to be the ones opposing injustice, not the ones implementing it.

Summing up, the individual is constructed as a valuable individual by characterizing it as a human being. The revolutionary characterization of "human being" is connected to the modern understanding of the inherent and equal value of all individuals through the modern concept of dignity, including both global and local aspects. The term "human being" is opposed to terms such as "animal", "slave" and "poor soul", thus setting up a sharp and insurmountable distinction between the two sides. The two sides are evaluated through the terms dignity and humiliation. The distinction set up resembles the distinction from restricted liberal modernity between minority and majority, where only the minority is considered modern. The majority is ascribed animal-like traits such as wildness and disorder, thus legitimating the minority's management of the majority as a mass among which the single individual has no value. The revolutionary expressions contest this understanding and suggest that the individual Egyptian is in fact an individual and a human being worthy of respect and bodily autonomy. Therefore, being treated like an animal, slave, or poor soul is humiliating. In this way, by drawing on modern understandings of what being human means, the individual is presented as valuable in the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual.

Positive characteristics of the individual

The individual is also presented as valuable in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life by ascribing certain characteristics to the participants in the revolution. In the present section, I contend that the positively evaluated characteristics ascribed to the individual in large part resemble those of the classical bourgeois in restricted liberal modernity or those related to Wagner's description of the modern side of his distinction between modernity and "the other".

These characteristics are in contrast to the characteristics ascribed to the majority of the Egyptians before the revolution. To get a sense of the contrast, let us look at one example of how Egyptians in pre-revolutionary Egypt are described in my sources. The quote here is from the diary of Mona Prince/منى برنس, "My name is revolution/اسمي ثورة" (Prince 2014). Prince, an associate professor and writer of fiction, participated in the revolution at Tahrir Square. She surrounded herself with controversy after Mubarak's resignation. For example, she was suspended from her position at Suez University for "glorifying Satan" after teaching her students John Milton's "Paradise Lost", she has posted a YouTube video of herself belly dancing, and she announced her candidacy for the 2018 presidential elections with a beer bottle in her hand (EgyptianStreets 2018, El-Saket 2012). Prince belongs to the so-called 1990s-generation of writers whose writings are often characterized by feelings of alienation, reluctance to engage with the ideological, and disillusion with collective political performances (Heshmat 2015, p. 64-65, Zanelli 2017, p. 36). While her diary recounting the 18 days of revolution in general do not display many feelings of alienation or disillusion, the quote here from the beginning of the book does. As I noted in the introduction, I have not been able to gain access to her diary in the original Arabic and I therefore, for once, rely solely on the official English translation. In the quote below, Prince describes the miserable state of the Egyptians before the revolution:

> It seemed that the only thing that mattered to Egyptians was to put food on the table and to, somehow, have enough money to pay for their children's education. The state had left it up to the citizens to resolve their own financial problems, whichever way they could, in other words, through bribery in every sector, whether overt or covert (…). Most people seemed engaged in ripping each other off when it came to the prices of commodities, transportation, public service, and not to mention the widespread swindling that went on in the sale of basic necessities like dairy products, car parts, and so on.

(Prince 2014, p. 8)

In the expression here, Egyptians are characterized as being preoccupied with providing for themselves or their families. In this way, the generic individual is presented as self-centered and incapable of (or unwilling to) think about matters outside their immediate concerns. The state is of no help. Because of these dire circumstances, the individual is engaged in bribing, ripping others off and swindling. The individual is thus not only presented as self-centered and egoistic, but also as morally corrupt. In my reading of Prince's quote above, the neoliberal recalibration of Egypt under Sadat and Mubarak form the frame of the negative characterization of the Egyptians (see chapter three). Through extensive neoliberal reforms, the individual was ascribed sole responsibility for their own (economic) success, but at the same time, neoliberal-authoritarian structures made it impossible for the majority of Egyptians to live up to these ideals. Therefore, the individual struggles to make ends meet and even takes to bribing and swindling.

A fairly similar description of the Egyptians before the revolution is written by the poet and activist Abdel Rahman Yusuf/عبد الرحمن يوسف in his "Diary of the revolution of the cactus/يوميات ثورة الصبار" (Yusuf 2011, p. 64). The title contains a play on the word "صبار" which can be translated as either "cactus" or "patient" (as in someone who has patience). An alternative translation of the title is therefore "Diary of the revolution of the patient". While it is easy to understand why the revolution can be seen as a revolution of the patient, Yusuf explicitly refers to the cactus plant in his diary (see Yusuf 2011, p. 113-114 and 121-122). I therefore translate "صبار" as "cactus". In an Arab context, a cactus can be seen as a symbol of surviving in difficult circumstances with very little sustenance. In this way, Yusuf seems to characterize himself or the Egyptians in general as patiently enduring a miserable kind of life. Yusuf was active in the organized opposition to Mubarak before the revolution and was, among others, a campaign leader in the efforts to support Muhammed ElBaradei as president in the upcoming presidential elections in 2011. Under Mubaraks' rule, he was banned from publishing as a journalist, and after the revolution he supported the former and now deceased president Mohamed Morsi/محمد مرسي while criticizing the military's violent take-over of power in the summer of 2013. He is also a son of the well-known scholar Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (Yusuf ND, the videos on the front page and the "نبذة عن الشاعر"-section).

While Prince and Yusuf are both members of the well-educated elite, they differ on other parameters such as gender, religious views and political outlook. It is therefore interesting that Yusuf's and Prince's descriptions of the miserable state of the Egyptians before the revolution are

so similar. It indicates that Egyptians from different walks of life not only united strategically, but actually agreed on a number of important issues in relation to the revolution – in this case on how to understand a specific aspect of the pre-revolutionary social order. It is also interesting that both Prince and Yusuf blame the Egyptians for the miserable state of affairs. They do not blame the regime for the creation of an unjust social order or for promoting impossible ideals, and by not doing so their descriptions implicitly ascribe responsibility and agency to the individual. On a similar note, Galán comments on the number of blogs that before the revolution held ordinary Egyptians responsible for their dire situation, (Galán 2012, p. 20). These accounts thus contest the neoliberal-authoritarian ascription of sole responsibility to the individual, while sharing the belief in individual agency dominant in extended liberal modernity.

While the quote above characterizes the generic individual in pre-revolutionary Egypt negatively, in expressions about the participants at Tahrir Square during the revolution the individual is considered in a completely different light. As noted in the literature review in chapter two, a transformation of the self is imagined. The many descriptions and positive evaluations of the participants during the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square substantiate the proposition that the transformation of the self was an important element of the revolution. In contrast to Prince's negative characterization of the Egyptians before the revolution, the participants were presented during the revolution as civilized, peaceful, well-mannered, caring for others, and capable of rising above their own immediate concerns.

The civilized, orderly and peaceful individual

One of the sources that tells of new imaginaries of the individual is the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page (We Are All Khaled Said 2010). The page was set up on June 10, 2010 by a young Egyptian, Wael Ghonim (at that time anonymous), to demand justice for Khaled Said who was brutally beaten to death by two plain-clothes police officers a few days earlier (Abdulla et al. 2018, p. 142). As noted in chapter three, the page formed part of the oppositional forces in the years leading up to the revolution. And in January 2011, after the Tunisian president fled Tunisia, the page posted an event under the title "Day of revolution against torture, poverty, corruption, and unemployment/يوم الثورة على التعذيب والفقر والفساد والبطالة". The event itself was removed from the page during the initial days of the revolution (see Ghonim's own explanation for doing so in Ghonim 2012, p. 190), but an image of the original event can be found in an article by Abdulla, Poell, Rieder, Woltering and Zack (Abdulla et al. 2018, p. 145). No new posts were posted after the

military takeover of Egypt in the summer of 2013, but until around December 2019 or February 2020, older posts, pictures, events and comments were still there. In February 2020 I discovered to my regret that the page in its entirety was deleted. In this perspective, my dissertation contributes to documenting at least some of the posts from this highly influential Facebook page. An English version of the Facebook page still exists, but the contents of the two pages were never coordinated. In the present dissertation I only include posts from the Arabic page. I found these in the photo albums on the page. Therefore, all of the included Facebook posts combine text and image. For technical reasons, it was not possible to simply scroll back in time and get access to all of the posts from the revolution. I therefore searched in the photo albums, finding around 50 posts from the 18 days of revolution.

In the posts on the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, the participants are presented as civilized and peaceful. For example, in one post an image shows five orderly lines of men praying. In the background, three women form their own line. Around the lines, other individuals are walking, maintaining a distance of about a meter or two as if to let those praying pray undisturbed. The text accompanying the picture reads:

هما دول اللي الحكومة قالت عليهم فوضويون ومثيري شغب وقلة مندسة .. على فكرة الناس كانت في منتهى التحضر والرقي .. بس انت عارف لما تلاقي قنابل مسيلة للدموع ورصاص مطاطي ومدافع مياه بتترش عليك بدون حتى تحذير .. كان لازم فيه ناس كتير تخرج عن شعورها ولكن نفسي نمسك أعصابنا ونحارب أعداءنا الحقيقيين ..بس برضه لسه هاعذر كل واحد خرج عن شعوره لأني شفت المعاملة السيئة اللي حصلت لنا

These are the people that the government calls lawless, troublemakers, and the infiltrating few. By the way, people were extremely cultured and civilized. But you know, when you are met with tear gas and rubber bullets and water cannons without even a warning, then some people are going to lose their temper. But let us get hold of our nerves and fight the real enemies. Nevertheless, I want to excuse everyone who lost their temper, because I saw the terrible treatment we were exposed to
(We Are All Khaled Said 2011s)

In this post, the interplay between text and picture is important. The picture is used to counter the regime's claim that the protesters are lawless troublemakers and are led by "the infiltrating few/ قلة مندسة", a term used by the regime during the revolution (Sabea 2014, p. 79). Throughout the revolution, the regime continued the pre-revolutionary understanding of the Egyptians as a mass of irrational, uncivilized and immature entities. The participants in the revolution contested this image to legitimize the revolution. By showing Egyptians praying in orderly lines, the post "proves" that the participants are neither lawless troublemakers nor infiltrators. They are simply ordinary Egyptians observing their religious duties in an orderly and civilized fashion. This image of the participants is reminiscent of the ideal type of the classical bourgeois who values individual disciplined work and strives to be an educated, cultured and moral person.

The post also presents the participants in the revolution as peaceful, although the administrator hesitantly admits that a few participants lost their tempers. The call for peacefulness was a persistent call during the 18 days of revolution. The document "Everything you need to know about the demonstrations of the revolution of the 25th/25 يوم ثورة مظاهرات عن تعرفه أن تريد ما كل", distributed before January 25, shows that peacefulness was part of the planned frames of the revolution (Anonymous 2011). And during the 18 days of revolution, the participants regularly chanted "peaceful, peaceful/silmiyya, silmiyya/سلمية سلمية" during confrontations with the security forces or the army to show that they were peaceful (Saouli 2015, p. 12-14), or held up signs emblazoned with those words (Assaf et al. 2011, p. 36). In this way, they contested the regime's understanding of the participants as wild and animal-like. At the same time, by chanting "peaceful" exactly when they confronted the heavily armed soldiers, they turned the picture upside-down and suggested that, in fact, the regime's representatives were the violent ones. In my theoretical perspective, the call for peacefulness draws on the distinction between minority and majority in restricted liberal modernity where peacefulness is related to the self-restrained and civilized individual of the modern minority while violence is related to the wild and uncontrollable masses of the majority. By presenting the participants as peaceful and the regime's representatives as violent, the participants are constructed as modern, self-restrained, and civilized individuals, while the regime is thus implicitly presented as unmodern and brutal. To add a local perspective to the question of peacefulness, Khosrokhavar posits a relation between non-violence and dignity. He compares practices related to dignity/كرامة and practices related to honor/شرف and explains that while honor is traditionally restored through

violent revenge, dignity is related to peaceful practices (Khosrokhavar 2018, p. 168-171). In this perspective, peacefulness is necessary to obtain the dignity strived for during the revolution.

Finally, it is noteworthy that even though the picture shows a religious ritual, the text contains no reference to anything religious. Had the men praying been wearing Muslim Brotherhood-like suits or traditional long garments, the image would have brought connotations of a specifically religious social order. But in its present form, the picture and the text tell us that the participants are civilized, orderly and peaceful in a local, authentic way. In this way, the use of religion to create order constitutes a local interpretation of the three ideal typical ways of creating order in modernity. I touch upon the role of religion in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life several times throughout the dissertation and briefly summarize it in the concluding chapter.

Good manners

The participants in the revolution are not just presented as civilized in the sense of not being wild, or animal-like, or incapable of controlling oneself. They are also presented as civilized in the sense of being well-mannered and behaving respectfully towards each other. For example, in a quote from the diary of Mona Prince, she tells of an encounter with two young men in which the question of swearing is the topic of focus:

> I saw an armored vehicle turn around in Abdel Khalaq Street so as to block Ramsis Street and face the demonstration. I overheard a young man say, “Look, they’re going to hose them with water, those sons of ….”
> I looked at him and his friend; they were really shady. These are the kids I’m scared to come near. I put my hand on the young man’s shoulder and gently said, “Please don’t swear.”
> The young man was taken by surprise.
> “I’m sorry,” he said, laughing. “But can’t you see what they’re doing?”
> “Yes, I can see, but that doesn’t mean that I have to hear swearing on the street.”
> “Okay, sorry. Don’t use dirty words again, man,” his friend said.
> (Prince 2014, p. 36)

This quote can be seen as an example of how the prefigurative practice of actively re-imagining another kind of being functions. Prince overhears a young man about to swear. She describes the

young man and his friend as “shady” and as “kids I’m scared to come near”. In this way, she sets up a distinction between these young men and herself. Prince implies that she would have walked away from such shady young men before the revolution but in this specific circumstance she interrupts the usual scenario. By treating the young man respectfully and by asking him not to swear, she breaks down the distinction between her and the shady and swearing young men. In place of this distinction, Prince suggests that everybody should behave respectfully and well-mannered towards each other. The young man is taken by surprise. He apologizes but legitimates his attempt at swearing by referring to the actions of the Central Security Forces. He thus, on the one hand, accepts Prince’s suggestion of breaking down the pre-revolutionary distinction between them and her, but on the other hand asks if swearing is perhaps not permissible in specific circumstances after all. Prince insists that one should not swear, and the other young man accepts on behalf of both men. Prince and the two young men thus dissolve one pre-revolutionary distinction and jointly construct a shared category of non-swearing, civilized and well-mannered individuals. In my theoretical perspective, Prince’s suggestion that the individual should display good manners – even in the midst of a revolution – draws on gentlemanly ideals of the classical bourgeois who behaves respectfully towards others in all circumstances.

Moreover, the quote underlines my point regarding how the revolution was not only about formal politics but can also be seen as containing imaginaries of a different kind of life. If one views revolution as outcome, swearing or not is utterly unimportant. But the fact that Prince included the above episode in her diary indicates that not only the outcome of the revolution but also the process of creating a new kind of individual was important.

Caring for others and rising above one’s own immediate concerns

The participants in the revolution are also presented as caring for others and as capable of rising above their own immediate concerns. The numerous descriptions of small and large gestures between the participants in the revolution show that caring for others and rising above one’s own immediate concerns form part of the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. Such gestures include giving out food, handing a bottle of water to someone, bringing medical supplies to the hospital at the square, protecting praying individuals, and sharing a seat (see e.g., the participant accounts in Abaza 2011, Aswat Masriya 2011, Rashed and El Azzazi 2011, Shokr 2011). In the expression below, two examples of caring for others occur:

كان هناك بائع (سميط) في المظاهرة ، يبيع وهو يصرخ : (بنص جنيه) ، وحين انتصرت الجموع على الأمن بدأ هذا البائع يصرخ فرحًا : ((ببلاش ببلاش ببلاش)) !
وبدأ الناس يأخذون بضاعته مجانًا ، ويقبلون عليها من شدة التعب وهو راضٍ بذلك ، فجاء شاب ثلاثيني سمح الوجه ، وقال للبائع : ((بتتكلم جد ؟)) .
فأجاب البائع ب : ((أيوه ... اتفضل)) ، فما كان من الشاب إلا أن خرج من جيبه ورقة نقدية بمئتي جنيه ، وأعطاها للبائع في يده ، قائلًا له : ((برافو عليك)) !...
كان هذا الموقف وما شابهه إرهاصة لما سوف يحدث في الميدان ، أعني ظهور أخلاق جديدة ، وسلوك مختلفة من المصريين ، بسبب اللحظة التارخية التي يعيشونها

There was a bread seller in the demonstration yelling, “Half a pound!”. But when the crowd gained the upper hand over the Central Security Forces, the seller started yelling, “For free, for free, for free!” in great joy. So, the exhausted crowd approached him and took his products for free. The bread seller was satisfied with this. Then a young man in his thirties came by and asked the bread seller, “Is this for real??”. The bread seller replied with certainty, “Yes, please have some”. Then the young man took out a brand new 200 pound note from his pocket and put it in the bread seller’s hand. “Well done!”, he said.
This and similar situations were glimpses of what happened at Tahrir Square later. I mean, the appearance of a new morality and a new kind of behavior among the Egyptians because of the historical moment they lived in
(Yusuf 2011, p. 68)

In this expression, the bread seller spontaneously decides to give his bread away for free out of joy over the protesters getting the upper hand over the Central Security Forces. A change in behavior thus occurs: From a focus on making a living and providing for his own needs, to rising above these needs and focusing on caring for the tired crowd. A young man sees the situation and evaluates the

bread seller's action positively by giving him a brand new 200 pound note. In a country where the official minimum wage for public employees was 700 pounds a month in 2011 (Countryeconomy.com 2011) and where a bread seller in the street probably earned considerably less than that, 200 pounds is a lot. Consequently, it is reasonable to think that the young man is quite well-off compared to the bread seller. There are thus two instances of caring for others in this quote: The bread seller giving out free bread and the young man giving the bread seller money. In the first instance, caring for others might ruin the bread seller's chance for putting food on the table that day. In this way, this kind of caring for others includes an element of self-sacrifice. In the second instance, caring for others will likely not ruin the young man's chances of putting food on the table. Therefore, this kind of caring for others does not include an element of self-sacrifice, but functions more like giving out a prize for good behavior. It seems that Yusuf evaluates both of these instances equally positively through his comment about how "this and similar situations/ كان هذا الموقف وما شابهه" show the appearance of "a new morality and a new kind of behavior/ ، أخلاق جديدة وسلوك مختلفة". The underlying principle in these two instances is thus a principle of "giving what you can in the circumstance you are in".

Tufecki notes that the act of giving is typical for protest camps in contemporary protest movements. She argues that,

> many people are drawn to protest camps because of the alienation they feel in their ordinary lives as consumers […] in protest camps, the conspicuous lack of money is less about resources than about taking a stance regarding the worth of human beings outside monetary considerations.
> (Tufekci 2017, p. 92)

Seen in this light, the act of giving in the above quote by Yusuf can be seen as a protest against the global dominance of neoliberal ideals of the individual as an economic actor; an ideal also proponed by the Mubarak regime. By giving out bread for free, the bread seller is transformed from an economic actor to a considerate member of a group of protesters. At the same time, the individuals of the exhausted crowd are now ascribed value as human beings outside economic considerations. And even though the well-off young man reintroduces money into the relationship, it does not function as a payment but as a prize. This and other examples of caring for others outside monetary relations at Tahrir Square can perhaps also be seen in the light of the local tradition of state

involvement in redistribution of resources. As mentioned in chapter three, Rennick contends that the social contract and the basis for the ruler's legitimacy in Egypt is based on a communitarian ideal of redistributive social justice (Rennick 2013b). While the ideal has its origins in Islamic principles of social justice, it has formed an important part of both Islamist and secular visions for Egypt. Most well-known is probably Nasser's state-led redistributive welfare policies. Examples of caring for others outside monetary relations at Tahrir Square can in this light be seen as a protest against the Mubarak regime's withdrawal from such economic redistribution and as a protest against evaluating individuals' worth solely according to their economic abilities.

In other expressions, caring for others is extended not only to other participants in the revolution, but also to the regime's representatives in the form of the foot soldiers of the Central Security Forces and the military. Several expressions emphasize that the foot soldiers fighting the revolutionaries in the streets are mostly just conscripts obeying orders and, hence, not really the enemy. Consequently, they should be treated nicely (Soueif 2014, p. 120-121, We Are All Khaled Said 2011k, Yusuf 2011, p. 28, 67-68). For example, in a post on the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, an image shows a group of young men, including an individual in the characteristic uniform of the Central Security Forces, carrying another man. His head is bent backwards as if it is dangling. His eyes seem closed and his mouth is open. The young men carrying him look serious and determined, as though the situation is urgent. One individual points as if to indicate that they should walk this way. Two seem to be yelling. The text reads:

> مجموع من الشباب المتظاهرين شايلين عسكري أمن مركزي مصاب وبينادي على الإسعاف لنقله للمستشفى .. اوعي حد يضحك عليكم ويقولكم إننا كنا همج أو دعاة فوضى.
>
> A group of young demonstrators carrying a wounded Central Security Force officer calling for an ambulance to help him to the hospital... Do not let anybody laugh at you and tell you that we are barbaric or inciting chaos.
> (We Are All Khaled Said 2011g)

This post tells us that caring for others includes caring for the enemy. It uses the scenario in the image as proof that the participants in the revolution are not barbaric or inciting chaos. In this way, the individual is presented as helping those in need, even if those in need were attacking him or her right before. The post thus characterizes the individual as caring for others and as capable of rising

above their own immediate concerns. Implicitly, it also tells us of how the participants' moral standards were higher than those of the regime.

As several participant accounts relate, the regime did not care for the participants during the revolution. Wounded participants who were brought to regular hospitals did not receive help until they were chained to the bed – or were simply handed over to the authorities without receiving help (Nabil Omar 2011, Prince 2014). Regime representatives also confiscated medical supplies outside Tahrir Square to prevent the participants from providing medical care inside the square (Yusuf 2011, p. 118). Nor did the regime, in the revolutionary perspective, care for the majority of the Egyptians before the revolution. As I explained in chapter three, part of the pre-revolutionary mobilization of the Egyptians revolved around exposing the regime's arbitrary torture and mistreatment of ordinary Egyptians, for example through blogs or the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page. A post like the one above implicitly draws on this understanding of the regime's practices. That is, it not only tells us that the regime's presentation of the participants in the revolution as barbaric or inciting chaos is wrong. It also tells us that, in fact, it is the regime that was barbaric and inciting chaos, and hence that the participants' moral standards were higher than the regime's. The moral obligation to care for one's enemy in a combat situation demands a certain level of self-restraint and reflective ability. These characteristics are typical of the classical bourgeois who dutifully strives at fulfilling their moral obligations towards others in a charitable way, thus reaching outside their own social circles. The post above of course also contributes to the characterization of the individual as disciplined and peaceful, but adds the trait of caring for others beyond friend-enemy distinctions by focusing on all individuals' shared humanity.

Summing up, these expressions present the individual as civilized, peaceful, well-mannered, caring for others, and capable of rising above one's own immediate concerns. This characterization is distinguished from the regime's understanding of the Egyptians as wild, disorderly, as being in a state of nature, egoistic, and morally corrupt. Paradoxically, at least some participants in the revolution present the Egyptians in pre-revolutionary Egypt in a similar way. The distinction set up corresponds quite well to the distinction between the modern minority and the wild majority from restricted liberal modernity. Furthermore, the positive characteristics ascribed to the individual in this section draw on the ideal type of the classical bourgeois and underline the disciplined and dutiful nature of the individual in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life.

Individual rights

Finally, the individual is presented as valuable by ascribing rights to him or her. I argue that the expressions in this section of the chapter draw on a human rights discourse emphasizing the value of the individual while displaying ambivalence towards the term "human rights". The ambivalence can be seen as a consequence of local, negative connotations attached to the term, but not necessarily to the idea of human rights. In this way, I assert that the revolutionary understanding of the individual is situated in modernity through a specifically local interpretation of the global human-rights discourse.

The rights-bearing individual

The term "right, rights/حق، حقوق" is mentioned in many revolutionary expressions and is often taken for granted. Such expressions are interesting because they say something about what is considered basic, natural or given in the imaginaries of the good life. In the following two expressions, the word "right/حق" is mentioned casually as if it is clear to everybody what is meant by the word:

> The most important thing is our rights — أهم حاجه حقنا
> (Shaat 2011, 1:30 min)
>
> We want our rights in the future — عايزين حقنا في المستقبل
> (Egyptianhumour.blogspot.com 2011c)

The first expression is from the song "Voice of Freedom//صوت الحرية" by the band Cairokee/كايروكي and the singer Hany Adel/هاني عادل from the band Wust El-Balad/وسط البلد (Shaat 2011). Cairokee, a local Cairo-based band playing pop-rock songs in a Western style, gained both local and international attention because of their song "Voice of Freedom" released on YouTube just one day before Mubarak stepped down. The video depicts Egyptians from all walks of life and, therefore, "our" in the above quote seems to refer to Egyptians in general or to the generic individual. The second expression is a slogan on a sign held by a man. Alongside the words on the sign is attached an image of two children as it they are the ones uttering these words. In the context of the revolution it seems that the two children in the image are used as an example of children in general. I therefore argue that both of these expressions refer to the generic individual. In these expressions, the individual is thus ascribed rights in a matter-of-fact way. Apparently, the content of these rights and the individual's entitlement to these rights are self-explanatory.

It is noteworthy that these and other expressions refer to rights as something that the individual is entitled to, or as an inherent property of the individual, while refraining from using the actual term *human* rights/حقوق الإنسان. Indeed, with one exception, the expressions related in the present section only speak of "right/حق" in the singular, thus further questioning whether they should be seen in relation to the notion of human rights in the modern, convention-based sense of the term. As I noted in the introduction, I strive to conduct my analyses in a text-near fashion based on actual distinctions and connections in the revolutionary expressions, not on assumptions of logical distinctions and connections. The text-near focus helps me avoid assuming that the use of the term "right" is necessarily connected to human rights.

In another expression, the theme of rights as an inherent property of the individual is repeated, but this time connected to the verb "demand/طالب":

> Go down, Egyptian, and demand your rights
> (Khalil 2011, p. 5, Arabic partly based on guessing since the sentence is not visible in its entirety)
>
> إنزل يا مصري وطالب بحقك

In this expression, rights (in the singular again) are ascribed to the individual Egyptian. As in the two expressions above, these rights are described as the inherent property of the individual through the use of the words "*your* rights/بحقك" (my emphasis). But whereas the two children in the example above politely asked for their rights, the present slogan tells the Egyptians to demand their rights. By using the word "demand", the claim that rights are an inherent property of the individual is thus strengthened.

The desire to emphasize that the individual is entitled to rights should be seen in the pre-revolutionary context. As explained in chapter three, under Sadat and Mubarak, the re-introduction of the minority-majority distinction from restricted liberal modernity and the creation of two distinct sets of rules tell of how the individual of the majority had no rights vis-à-vis the regime. At the same time, most Egyptians were probably aware that individuals in other parts of the world did have such rights. Therefore, during the revolution, the stating of individual rights became one way of contesting the regime. The stating of rights can furthermore be related to the century-old semantic introduction of such rights. In chapter three, I described how the notion of the individual

citizen's rights vis-à-vis the ruler was introduced semantically in Arabic at the end of the nineteenth century. But as Challand notes, the semantic introduction of citizenship was never implemented and only reintroduced during the Egyptian Revolution in 2011 (Challand 2013, p. 175). While the above quotes are not clear about whether the desired rights are citizenship rights vis-à-vis the ruler, universal human rights or something else, the importance of having rights is quite clear.

Non-political rights

In the above quotes, rights are presented as an inherent property of the individual. As such, they are supposed to be outside the sphere of formal politics. That is, individual rights are presented as non-political. In one expression, a distinction is explicitly made between rights belonging to the sphere of formal politics and rights belonging to the sphere of being human. According to this quote from Mahfouz's video, the revolution is about Egyptians' rights as human beings, not about political rights:

> We will go down and demand our rights, our rights as human beings. I am not talking about our rights as political beings, we do not want it, or rights of the people or the president or any of that nonsense. We just want our rights and nothing else.
> (El-Baghdadi 2011, 1:41 min)

هننزل ونطالب بحقنا، بحقنا كبني أدمين. مش حقولكم حقنا كسياسيين ولا عايزين ولاحق الشعب ولا رئيس ولا اي زفت من الكلام دا كله. عايزين حقنا، مش عايزين اي حاجة تانية.

In this expression, Mahfouz sets up a distinction between our rights (again, in the singular) as human beings and our rights as political beings. The second is dismissed as unimportant. The revolution is thus not about political rights but about Egyptians' rights as human beings. In this way, Mahfouz underlines that the individual's rights are something basic and inherent and should not be subject to the whims of the regime. She also underlines that the demands of the revolution are not related to politics as "we just want our rights and nothing else/ عايزين حقنا، مش عايزين اي حاجة تانية". Indeed, she seems to legitimate the revolutionary demands exactly by opposing them to formal politics. In chapter eight, I return to how the revolution is often dissociated from things related to formal politics.

Although Mahfouz talks about rights as human beings, it is worth noting that she does not use the term “human rights/حقوق الإنسان”. Moreover, the word she uses for “human being” in this sentence is not the word used in the term “human rights”, but instead the phrase “children of Adam/بني أدمين”. And similar to the above-mentioned quotes, Mahfouz prefers using the word “right” in the singular over “rights” in the plural. That is, even though she refers to rights as human beings, the construction of the sentence distances the expression from the term “human rights”.

In general, the term “human rights” is often used hesitantly in my sources. For example, in the Dictionary of the revolution human rights are predominantly described in negative terms, either as a critique of the concept in itself or as a disillusioned denial of the existence of human rights in Egypt (Qamos Al-Thawra 2015, entry "Human rights/حقوق الإنسان"). The negative depiction in this precise source may of course also be related to a post-revolutionary bitterness, but the term “human rights” seems to be avoided in general. In contrast, the term “right/حق” is used positively throughout the sources I have seen. Paradoxically, the way “right” is used in the expressions analyzed in the present section resembles the notion of human rights with its emphasis on each individual’s inherent value. The avoidance of the term “human rights” begs the question of why the term “right” was often preferred over the term “human rights”. I argue that the positive use of rights-language with few explicit references to the term human rights reflects an interplay between a local skepticism towards foreign domination and the attraction of the global human rights discourse. In a region with a century-long struggle for independence and self-rule, where nationalist sentiments are strong and where accusations of being under foreign influence are regularly used to delegitimize one’s opponent, thinking originating from the West is not always received positively (see e.g., Behnam 2002, p. 188-195, Sabry 2010, p. 106-112). And human rights are considered by some to be a specifically Western concept (Bielefeldt 2000, p. 90-92). In such a context, conveying authenticity and independence from foreign influence is important. Wael Ghonim, the founder of the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page touches upon the issue in his diary when he tells us that he deliberately wrote in Egyptian Arabic and “avoided expressions that were not commonly used by the average Egyptian” (Ghonim 2012, p. 61). Ghonim thus makes a strategic argument about avoiding non-locally acceptable terms. At the same time, the global human rights discourse is attractive because it is a modern and globally acknowledged way of ascribing value to the individual. In this way, the preference of the term “right” over “human rights” may point to a specifically local interpretation of the modern global notion of human rights; an interpretation

focusing on the inherent value of each individual while avoiding the local negative connotations attached to foreign ideas.

Rights and dignity

In the revolutionary imaginaries, rights as an inherent property of the individual are also related to the ability to live a dignified and ordinary life. In an expression from the Dictionary of the Revolution, the connection between rights, dignity, ordinary life, and being considered a human being is presented. For once, the expression below is specifically about human rights/حقوق الإنسان, and for once, human rights are evaluated positively. I am aware that my use of this expression as a source that "carries" my analyses is to stretch what the dictionary of the revolution can tell us about. As mentioned in chapter one, the dictionary is based on interviews conducted between 2011 and 2014. And even though it presents us with interesting and nuanced perspectives on important terms from the revolution, it must be seen as a retrospective view on these terms. In general, I therefore only use the dictionary to substantiate, rather than form the main part of my analyses. However, in this particular example, I have chosen to include the quote below in the main part of an analysis as it is a rare example of a descriptive quote about rights. It expands on some of the connections that other sources also present, namely the connection between rights, dignity and being considered a human being. In that sense, it simply substantiates the analyses in the previous sections. But it also connects these terms to ordinary life; a connection that I have not previously established. This is part of what makes the quote interesting, but it is also here that I stretch my use of the dictionary:

> People spend their days doing errands, getting around the city and stuff, which is far from living a productive life or a dignified life, what I think is natural. That people feel that they are human, they go out in the streets and feel their dignity, I mean, that they have dignity, you know? That is what I think human rights are, that each person feels that he or she has a dignified life. That you wake up in the morning and you are in charge of your
>
> يعني الناس مقضية يومها في مشاوير وفي مواصلات وحاجات، أبعد مما يكون إن هما يبتدوا حياة فيها إنتاج أو فيها أي نوع من أنواع الحياة الكريمة، الطبيعية يعني، الناس تحس إن هي بني آدم يعني، الشخص نازل في الشارع حاسس بكرامته كده، عنده كرامة يعني، فاهم؟ أنا بالنسبالي دي حقوق الإنسان، إن الواحد يحس إن عنده حياة كريمة. أول ما تحصى من الصبح، إنت متحكم في مسار يومك، يعني فاهم؟ بتأخد قراراتك وإنت مسئول عنها، بيحترم غيره وغيره بيحترمه, وأساسيات الحياة موجودة

> day, you know? You are responsible for your own decisions, respect others and they respect you, and the basic necessities are there.
> (Qamos Al-Thawra 2015, entry حقوق الإنسان/Human rights, my translation)

After a short description of a life that is not good, the expression here tells us that human rights are related to dignity and the ability to live a productive and ordinary life. The interviewee evaluates such a life as "natural/طبيعية". As with other expressions about rights, rights are not related to politics. Rather, the word "naturally" points to an understanding of rights as an inherent part of the individual and as something that should neither be subject to political negotiations nor dependent on one's social status. The expression also tells us that rights and dignity are related to ordinary life. In the introduction, I noted that ordinary life takes up a central place in modernity – a question I elaborate on in chapter six. In this perspective, the coupling of individual rights, dignity and ordinary life situates the understanding of the individual in this expression in modernity.

Summing up on the section about individual rights, these expressions tell us that the individual in the imaginaries of the good life is someone who has rights. Often these rights are presented in a taken-for-granted way and characterized as the inherent and non-negotiable property of the individual. As such, they are presented as situated outside the sphere of formal politics. Moreover, they are related to dignity and ordinary life. In my interpretation, the notion of the rights-bearing individual draws on the modern, global human rights discourse, but often without using the specific term "human rights". By ascribing rights to the individual – to all individuals equally – the individual in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life is constructed as valuable.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown how the individual in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life is constructed as valuable in three different ways. First, I have shown how the individual is categorized as a human being by setting up a distinction between human and non-human, and dignity and humiliation. I have argued that this distinction is reminiscent of the minority-majority distinction in restricted liberal modernity; a distinction the revolutionary expressions reject. Instead,

the revolutionary expressions propose that all individuals should be considered valuable human beings. Second, I have shown how the individual is ascribed specific positive characteristics resembling characteristics of the classical bourgeois in restricted liberal modernity. The characteristics ascribed to the individual in the revolutionary imaginaries include civilizedness, the ability to act orderly, peacefulness, good manners, caring for others, and the ability to rise above one's own needs. Third, I have shown how the individual is ascribed rights in a way resembling the modern human rights discourse but often without using the specific term "human rights". I have characterized the revolutionary understanding of such rights; an understanding focusing on rights as an inherent property of the individual, as non-political, and as related to dignity. And I have explained the ambivalence towards the term "human rights" as a consequence of negative local connotations associated with the term. In each of the three sections I have thus argued that the individual is constructed as valuable by drawing on modern understandings of what being an individual means. Consequently, I contend that the individual in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life is constructed as a valuable *and* modern human being.

Looking at the terms used in the expressions analyzed in this chapter, the lack of words related to the sphere of formal politics is striking: Terms related to political ideologies are almost non-existent, the single individual is usually called "human being" and not for example citizen or comrade, the call for freedom and justice in one expression is too vague to refer to either liberalism or socialism, and the term "right" is preferred over "human rights". It seems as though a deliberate effort was made to distance the revolutionary endeavors from the sphere of formal politics – a question I return to in chapter eight. Instead, many of the terms used make sense in the perspective of theories of modernity emphasizing the individual's inherent value through "fluffy" notions such as dignity, the importance of ordinary life, and the ascription of specific characteristics to the individual such as being peaceful and civilized. In this way, the individual is constructed as valuable in a specifically modern understanding.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUAL AGENCY

Chapter five is the second of three chapters focusing on the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual. In the chapter I analyze how the individual is ascribed agency in the revolutionary expressions. I contend that the individual in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life is constructed as an agentic individual through modern understandings of the importance of individual agency. Theoretically, I combine Meyer and Jepperson's understanding of agency with my continual use of the three ideal typical ways of creating order in modernity. The focus on individual agency in extended liberal modernity, and to some degree in restricted liberal modernity, forms the natural frame for the analyses. I take up notions of collective agency from organized modernity in chapters seven and eight.

As I argued in chapter three, the social order before the revolution was characterized by neoliberal policies and an authoritarian desire for control which set up a minority-majority distinction resembling the one from restricted liberal modernity. It meant that the individual of the majority, on the one hand, was expected to act as a self-reliant economic actor, while on the other hand, he or she was structurally deprived of the possibility to do so. In theoretical terms, the Egyptians were expected to live up to the modern demand of enacting agency individually regardless of the circumstances. In chapter four I argued that some revolutionary expressions accept these impossible expectations and blame the individual Egyptian for not living up to them. Other expressions, like the one I present below, do not accept these expectations and blame the regime for depriving the individual of agency. Regardless of who is blamed, these expressions share the modern belief in the importance of individual agency. In an uncharacteristically long slogan, a man tells us what life before the revolution was like. Simultaneously, he tells us of how the individual was deprived of agency:

> Why, oh President, have we had enough? Did anybody from the police insult you or beat you or give you electric shocks? Did your son die in a public hospital because of neglect? Did you not have money for private tutoring for your offspring? Can you not find a job, and now you are sitting
>
> ليه يا ريس فاض بيك الكيل؟ في حد أهانك أو ضربك أو كهربك من الشرطة؟ في مستشفى حكومي مات فيه ابنك من الإهمال؟ مش لاقي حق الدروس الخصوصية لعيالك؟ مش لاقي شغل وقاعد على القهوة عشان ماعندكش واسطة؟ ابنك مش عارف يحوش قرشين يلاقي بيهم شقة يتجوز فيها؟ فاض بيك الكيل ليه يا ريس؟

> in a café because you do not have any connections? Is your son not able to save up the last two cents to buy an apartment and get married? Why have we had enough, oh President? (Egyptianhumour.blogspot.com 2011d, my translation)

In the slogan, the man addresses the president and scornfully asks him why the Egyptians have had enough. The man then describes a humiliating and brutal police system, a horrible public health system, bad and expensive education, unemployment due to the lack of connections, low wages and the impossibility of marriage without money. The man ends his address to the president by rhetorically repeating the first question, "Why have we had enough, oh President?/ فاض بيك الكيل ليه يا ريس؟". The problems in the slogan are all presented as something that the single individual cannot do anything about. That is, the individual is not ascribed agency to change these things. The man blames Mubarak for the construction of this social order. Because Mubarak is blamed, the slogan not only tells us that the individual is not ascribed agency but that the individual is *deprived* of agency. Implicitly then, we are also told that agency is in fact an inherent property of the individual – only someone has stolen it.

On a side note, notice also that the slogan does not posit that Mubarak should leave because he is suppressing Egyptians in the sphere of formal politics, but because he is preventing Egyptians from living ordinary lives. Looking at this aspect of the slogan through Taylor's argument about ordinary life as the locus of the good life in modernity, the man here tells us that he is eager to live up to the modern demand of enacting agency and creating a good, ordinary life centering on such things as work and family. Throughout the dissertation, I show examples of how the revolutionary demands are articulated in an ordinary life vocabulary or how they focus on ordinary life subjects. I contend that one risks missing out on important aspects of the revolution if one looks solely at revolution as outcome. In chapter six, I go into detail with such expressions and the centrality of ordinary life in the revolutionary expressions.

However, to return to the question of agency, expressions such as the above show that the ascription of agency to the individual was important during the revolution. To provide a better theoretical

perspective on the revolutionary preoccupation with individual agency, I briefly expand on my theoretical understanding of agency. As explained in the introduction, Meyer and Jepperson hold that the ascription of agency to human beings is a specifically modern idea. In previous times, agency was ascribed to God or to nature, but not to human beings (Meyer and Jepperson 2000). The ascription of agency to human beings is moreover a companion to the modern belief in the contingent nature of social order. Notions of contingency and agency are inseparable. And because the social order in modernity is not believed to be pre-given or legitimated by divine decree, human beings are not only free to create the kind of social order and the kind of life they desire, they are expected to do so. In this perspective, the anger and underlying frustration in the slogan above can be interpreted as an expression of the man's desire to fulfill the modern demand of enacting agency without being able to do so. Meyer and Jepperson mention four different kinds of agency that constitute modern actors, namely agency for the self, for other actors (including nations), for non-actor entities (for example for dispossessed and disenfranchised categories of individuals) and for principle (for example for the principle of having rights) (Meyer and Jepperson 2000, p. 106-108, examples in the parentheses are mine). In the present chapter, I use these four kinds of agency as an additional conceptual lens through which I analyze the revolutionary expressions. At the same time, I draw as usual on the three ideal typical ways of creating order in modernity. In the present context, the ideal type of the individual in extended liberal modernity is particularly important. As explained in the introduction, in extended liberal modernity, the individual is imagined as highly agentic, extrovert, self-reliant and creative. To a lesser degree, the revolutionary expressions also display aspects of individual agency that resemble the idea of the dutiful bourgeois in restricted liberal modernity. By showing how the participants are ascribed agency in different ways, I argue that the individual in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life is constructed as a modern, agentic individual.

The chapter consists of four sections and a conclusion. In the first section, I argue that the individual is ascribed the ability and duty to take responsibility for different entities. I show how some expressions negatively evaluate individuals who are unwilling to take responsibility for the unfolding of the revolution while positively evaluating those who are willing to do so. I interpret such expressions through bourgeois notions of duty and a quite far-reaching understanding of agency. In the second section, I maintain that the individual is presented as determined. I show how Egyptians online stated their firm will to participate in the revolution and how an anonymous man became an icon by standing his ground in an attack. In different ways these examples characterize

the individual as determined and as capable of following through on this determination. Here, it is my argument that notions of individual agency from restricted liberal modernity merge with those from extended liberal modernity. In the third section I assert that the individual is presented as capable of contributing to building a better society. I show how some expressions state that Egyptians are capable of building a new kind of Egypt, while other expressions present the setting up of the tent camp at Tahrir Square as based on individual initiative. The theoretical claim of the contingent nature of modern life seems to underpin these expressions. In this way, individuals are ascribed agency to create social order. In the fourth section I argue that the individual is characterized as expressing him- or herself creatively. The expressions within this section in particular draw on the ideal type of the post-modern creative entrepreneur from extended liberal modernity. Finally, I sum up and draw some conclusions.

Taking responsibility

In the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life, the pre-revolutionary, un-agentic individual is gone. Instead, the individual is ascribed agency in multiple ways. While the revolutionary situation necessitates that Egyptians are ascribed agency to change the miserable pre-revolutionary social order, it does not necessitate that the *individual* is ascribed agency. It also does not necessitate the ways in which the individual (or the collective for that matter) is ascribed agency. In the present section I show how the individual is ascribed agency, namely by positing that the individual is capable of taking responsibility.

The duty of responsibility

To improve the chance for success, it was important to get as many Egyptians as possible to participate in the revolution. Therefore, many revolutionary expressions revolve around the question of making people "go down/نزل", a word that became synonymous with participating in the revolution (Qamos Al-Thawra 2015, Entry "Go out/إنزل"). I contend that going down or not was often presented as a question of taking individual responsibility.

One of the expressions revolving around this question is from the poem "Oh Egypt, we are so close/يا مصر هانت وبانت" by Tamim Al-Barghouti/تميم البرغوثي. Poetry in the Arab world has gained a political function on account of its ability to criticize those in power in an indirect way. In Egypt, poets such as Fouad Haddad/فؤاد حداد, Abdul Rahman al-Abnudi/عبد الرحمن الأبنودي, Ahmed Fouad Negm/أحمد فؤاد نجم – in particular through his cooperation with the singer Sheikh Imam/الشيخ إمام – and Zayn Al-Abidin Fuad/زين العابدين فؤاد are well-known for their critique of shifting regimes. All of

these poets have been imprisoned because of their critique of the regimes in power (Aboubakr 2015). Moreover, in Egypt and throughout the Arab world, poetry is part of popular culture. A good example of the status of poetry in the Arab world is the two Abu Dhabi-based competitions "Prince of Poets/أمير الشعراء" and "Million's poet/شاعر المليون". In both of these competitions, Arab poets compete on a big stage in a way quite similar to the American song competition "American Idol". Millions of Arabs watch the shows on satellite television and prizes range from around 270,000 USD to 1.3 million USD (Hassan 2010, Kurpershoek 2013). During the Egyptian Revolution in 2011, poetry also played an important role. Old and popular poetry was recited or sung at the square, and new poetry was composed for the occasion (El Hamamsy and Soliman 2013, Swedenburg 2012b). Al-Barghouti was one of the poets who composed a poem for the occasion. Al-Barghouti was well-known before the revolution, but mostly for his involvement in the Palestinian cause. Now he emerged on the Egyptian stage as well. Although he was not part of life at Tahrir Square himself, his poem certainly was. The poem was published in an Egyptian newspaper during the revolution and then photocopied and distributed in paper on the square. His recitation of the poem was also recorded and aired on the big screen on the square several times during the 18 days of revolution (El Alaoui 2011). Finally, the poem was put to music by a young singer, Mustafa Said/مصطفى سعيد, and sung at the square during the revolution (BBCNews عربي 2011). In a part of the poem, the poet touches upon the question of staying at home or going down to participate in the revolution. Or in my perspective, he touches upon the question of taking responsibility and enacting agency:

يا ناس مفيش حاكم إلا من خيال محكوم
واللي حيقعد في بيته بعدها خاين
اللي حيقعد كأنه سلم التانيين للأمن بأيديه وقاله هم
ساكنين فين
(...)
فاللي حيقعد في بيته يبقي مش مفهوم
واللي حينزل إالهى حارسه وصاين

Oh, people! There is no ruler except
in the imagination of the ruled
And those who stay at home after this
are traitors
Those who stay at home, it is like they
hand over the others to the security
forces and tell them where they live
(…)
So those who stay at home are un-
understandable
And those who go down are protected
and guarded by God

(Al-Barghouti 2011, line 6-7 and
11-12, my translation)

Al-Barghouti begins the quote here by telling his readers or listeners that the ruler only exists if the ruled believe so. He rejects the idea that the social order is pre-given and unchangeable. In this way, the first lines are underpinned by the modern belief in the contingent nature of the social order. In the rest of this part of the poem, Al-Barghouti emphasizes individual choice, responsibility, and agency by setting up a distinction between those who go down and those who stay at home. He strongly condemns those who stay at home "after this/بعدها "; that is, after the outbreak of the revolution. He tells us that "those who stay at home, it is like they hand over the others to the security forces and tell them where they live/اللي حيقعد كأنه سلم التانيين للأمن بأيديه وقاله هم ساكنين فين". In this way, he indicates that those who stay at home are responsible for those who do go down. Even if absent, those who stay at home cannot escape their responsibility or using Meyer and Jepperson's words, he ascribes agency for other actors to the individual. The word "traitor/خاين" presents the act of taking responsibility as a duty towards the nation or the Egyptians, not just a choice. In the last lines of the quote, Al-Barghouti assures us that those who do go down are protected by God. Al-Barghouti thus legitimates participation in the revolution on religious grounds.

It is noteworthy that God only functions as a helper: God protects and guards the protesters, but it is not God who decides the outcome of the revolution. He is not ascribed agency to change the course of Egypt, only to help those who will. In this way, humans are ascribed more responsibility and agency than God. As mentioned in the introduction, in modernity, God is imagined as less capable of intervening in the human world than in earlier times. The amount of agency ascribed to God in modern times is "greatly reduced" (Meyer and Jepperson 2000, p. 105) and agency is instead primarily ascribed to human beings. Looking at Al-Barghouti's poem in this perspective, the distribution of a small amount of agency to God and a larger amount of agency to human beings places Al-Barghouti's conception of both God and human beings in modernity.

In the previously mentioned video by Mahfouz, the young woman delivers a strikingly similar message emphasizing all individuals' responsibility for the course of the revolution:

If you stay at home, then you deserve	لو فضلت قاعد في البيت، فبتستحق بكل ما جا ومش
all that is being done to you. And not	أنت لوحدك، أنت تبقى مدان، أنت تبقى مسؤول وأنت
you alone. You will be guilty, you	عليك زنب كبير قوي زنب ببلد دي وزنب بكل واحد

will be responsible and commit a great sin, a sin for the country and a sin for everybody who lives in it. And you will be responsible for everybody who goes down into the streets and demands their rights while you stay at home.
(El-Baghdadi 2011, 3:20 min)

يعيش فيها وأنت تبقى شاين مسؤولين لكل واحد ينزل بالشارع وطالب بحق وأنت قاعد في بيتك

Mahfouz tells us that the individual who stays at home and does not participate in the revolution "deserves/بتستحق" what is done to him or her, that he or she is "guilty/مدان", "responsible/مسؤول " and commits a "sin/زنب". All of these words ascribe responsibility to the individual. The expression shows a quite far-reaching understanding of the individual's ability to take responsibility. The individual is ascribed responsibility for him- or herself, for the country, for Egyptians in general, and for the protesters. He or she is even ascribed responsibility for "all that is done to you/بكل ما جا "; that is, for the regime's actions. In Mahfouz's understanding, there is simply no way out of taking responsibility. Looking at this quote through Meyer and Jepperson's four different kinds of agency, it draws on agency for the self, for other actors (including the country) and perhaps also for principle (the principle of taking responsibility). Only agency for non-actor entities is not mentioned in this quote. As such, Mahfouz presents the individual as highly agentic. Wall and El Zahed maintain that Mahfouz advocated for a deliberate creation of a new self through this video (Wall and El Zahed 2011). And in the review of literature in chapter two, I mentioned how other scholars also argue that the revolution entails a transformation of the individual. Seen in this perspective, both Mahfouz and Al-Barghouti invite individuals to actively transform themselves by taking responsibility upon themselves and participating in the revolution. Moreover, the moral undertones in both Mahfouz's and Al-Barghouti's condemnation of those who do not go down implies that the individual has a moral duty to take responsibility.

In a theoretical perspective, the quote displays elements of both restricted liberal modernity and extended liberal modernity. The idea that individuals have a moral duty to take responsibility draws on bourgeois ideals of ascribed duties from restricted liberal modernity. And the insistent ascription of agency to all individuals in Mahfouz's video draws on the high degree of belief in individual agency from extended liberal modernity. Moreover, the emphasis on taking responsibility and the

moral undertones in these expressions are reminiscent of what Jung, Juul Petersen and Lei Sparre call “the Muslim Professional”, a normative ideal type of a self-disciplined and morally upright Muslim who acts as a role model by dutifully and persistently striving to change society and him- or herself (Jung, Juul Petersen and Lei Sparre 2014, p. 137-144). The field work for Jung, Juul Petersen and Lei Sparre’s study was conducted in 2007, thus indicating that some of the ideals at Tahrir Square existed also outside of the protest circles that I characterized in chapter three.

The positive outcome of taking responsibility

Taking responsibility is also presented as resulting in positive outcomes for the individual. In a quote from Yusuf’s book, he describes how the individual is changed by taking responsibility. In this way, as in several other expressions, the revolutionary endeavors contain much more than merely demands related to the sphere of formal politics:

> They have extracted the best in themselves after they decided to become their own leaders
> (Yusuf 2011, p. 64, my translation)
>
> هاهم يستخرجون أفضل ما في أنفسهم بعد أن قرروا أن يكونوا قادة أنفسهم

The expression tells us that the decision to become one’s own leader leads to “extracting/يستخرجون” the best in oneself. The focus here is thus solely on agency for the self. By taking responsibility and becoming one’s own leader, the individual is imagined as actively transforming him- or herself into something better. That is, in this expression too, the revolution is imagined as transforming the individual. Perhaps the positive characteristics of the individual mentioned in chapter four, such as peacefulness and caring for others, are the outcome of taking responsibility. Taking responsibility and becoming one’s own leader is presented as easy since all it takes is a decision. No structural constraints and no God-given static perception of the individual are implied. The high degree of belief in the individual’s ability to decide and follow through on this decision is reminiscent of the ideal type of the post-modern individual in extended liberal modernity. In this perspective, the above quote situates the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual in global modernity.

To sum up the expressions about taking responsibility, they show how the individual is constructed as agentic. The individual is not only ascribed the ability to take responsibility for him- or herself, but also for others, for Egypt, and for the revolution – even for the regime’s bad treatment of the majority of the Egyptians. Taking responsibility furthermore leads to positive outcome and changes

the individual. The repeated insistence on the importance of taking individual responsibility seems underpinned by the strong belief in individual agency dominant in extended liberal modernity. In this way, these expressions present the individual as a modern individual. This understanding of the individual is far from the description of a passive individual deprived of agency in the social order before the revolution. By ascribing agency to the individual, the revolutionary imaginaries contest the pre-revolutionary social order. In one expression, the individual is even presented as more agentic than God. The modern demand on individuals to take fate into their own hands and actively create their own life is thereby taken seriously. At the same time, the use of God to legitimate participation in the revolution can be seen as an example of how the modern, globally shared notion of individual agency is expressed in local terms.

Showing determination

The individual in the imaginaries of the good life is also presented as determined. I use the term determination to cover descriptions of individuals stating their will firmly and standing their ground. Determination is related to agency through the question of choosing between alternatives and striving to obtain that choice.

"I am going down on January 25"

In a series of at least twelve images on the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, Egyptians firmly state their will or decision to participate in the revolution.[47] Unlike the other posts I analyze from the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, these images are from the week leading up to the revolution. They are interesting because they form a link between Asmaa Mahfouz's previously mentioned video and the 18 days at the square. As with Mahfouz's video, they can be seen as an "early start" of the revolution. Each image portrays an individual staring directly and seriously into the camera. The individual is always alone and usually photographed inside. Most of the individuals in the images are young males, but images of women and children also exist. Each image shows an individual holding a homemade sign with the words "I am going down on January 25/ 25 نازل يوم يناير"[48], usually followed by a reason to do so, for example "No to corruption/لا للفساد" (We Are All Khaled Said 2011p) or "to take back the rights of my country/علشان اخذ حق بلدى مصر" (We Are All

[47] We Are All Khaled Said 2011a, We Are All Khaled Said 2011b, We Are All Khaled Said 2011c, We Are All Khaled Said 2011d, We Are All Khaled Said 2011f, We Are All Khaled Said 2011h, We Are All Khaled Said 2011i, We Are All Khaled Said 2011j, We Are All Khaled Said 2011o, We Are All Khaled Said 2011p, We Are All Khaled Said 2011t, We Are All Khaled Said 2011v.

[48] Slight differences in the wording of this sentence occur but they always include the word "to go down" in the first person.

Khaled Said 2011t). As noted earlier, in the context of the Egyptian Revolution, the term "to go down/نزل" became synonymous with participating in the revolution. The idea of posting such images took hold following Mahfouz's video in which she urges her fellow Egyptians to participate in the revolution (El-Naggar 2011). In Mahfouz's video, she ends her message by holding up a sign with the words "I am going down on January 25th. For my dignity as an Egyptian/ 25 أنا نازلة يوم علشان كرامتي كمصرية" (El-Baghdadi 2011, min 4:31). The images on the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page thus use Mahfouz's sign to pattern their own message after. At the same time, they arguably draw on Mahfouz's determination in the video as a whole to present themselves as equally determined to go down. The seriousness of the faces, the eyes staring directly into the camera, and the patterned reference to Mahfouz tell the viewer that they *will*, in fact, go down. In this way, they are ascribed agency simply by stating their will firmly.

Using Meyer and Jepperson's vocabulary, the individuals in these images enact agency for the principles or actor they mention, for example for the principle of "no corruption" and "dignity as Egyptian" and for the actor "Egypt". But they also enact agency for themselves. By stating their will to go down, they are transformed from passive individuals deprived of agency into agentic participants in the revolution. My analysis of these posts thus supports the argument in some texts that the revolution can be seen as a transformative experience (see the review of literature in chapter two). Looking at the transformation through the perspective of the three ideal typical ways of creating order, these images protest the regime's treatment of the Egyptians as animal-like, wild, and incapable of taking part in rational decision-making, as with the majority in restricted liberal modernity. These images suggest that this is not true. Because the principles and actors they enact agency for in these images are evaluated positively in the modern world, they moreover suggest that they are rational and modern individuals who can be trusted with leading themselves and setting the course of their country.

In the local Egyptian context, it is not surprising that simply stating one's will can be seen as a way of transforming oneself. As I explained at the beginning of the chapter, Egyptians were deprived of agency before the revolution. One of the ways in which this happened was by silencing the majority. Obviously, the lack of free elections constituted one way of silencing the majority, but the regime's interference into ordinary life matters and the fear of what might happen if one protested the police's humiliating treatment or arbitrary detention of random Egyptians constituted a perhaps more fundamental way. In such a context, speaking up and stating one's will becomes in itself a defiant and transformative act. Revolutionary expressions focusing on silence and voice substantiate

such an interpretation. For example, a slogan like, “Forgive me Lord, I was afraid and silent/ سامحني يا رب أنا كنت خايف وساكت” (Khalil 2011, p. 71) or the metaphor of the revolution as voice in Cairokee’s song “Voice of freedom/صوت الحرية” (Shaat 2011). In contrast to the reviewed texts in chapter two on how humor was used in breaking down the fear barrier, I argue that speaking up and stating one’s will firmly and seriously was how the fear barrier was overcome. I return to and elaborate on the question of the breaking of the fear barrier in chapter six in the section on the humorous Egyptian soul.

Standing one’s ground

In the expressions mentioned in the section above, the individual is presented as determined and agentic by stating their will firmly through words written on paper. In the expression in this section, the individual is presented as determined and agentic through the defiant act of standing still in front of an armored car. That is, I argue that both words and acts were used to present the individual as determined

The picture from the expression I analyze in the present section has gained somewhat iconic status as the Egyptian version of the so-called Tank Man at Tiananmen Square in China in 1989. The section here is an adapted and expanded version of my analysis of the same expression in a chapter of the edited book “Muslim Subjectivities in Global Modernity. Islamic Traditions and the Construction of Modern Muslim Identities” (Mex-Jørgensen 2020, p. 229-230). In the following post from the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, a young man is portrayed in a picture. He is standing face-to-face with an armored car. One can only see his back. The car is splashing water out of a water cannon, but without a lot of intensity, and it does not hit him. Behind the car, several lines of Central Security Force soldiers, dressed in black, with helmets and shields, are standing or moving forward. The young man in front of the car is standing with his hands on his hips and both feet on the ground, as if he has no intention of moving. He is quite literally standing his ground. The text accompanying the image reads:

I wish I could see him, and salute him, and kiss him, and say that I am proud that you are my Egyptian brother, oh you, one of the best soldiers on earth. As a further explanation, there is a video showing	نفسي أشوفه وأسلم عليه وأبوسه وأقوله أنا فخور إنك أخويا المصري يا واحد من خير جند الأرض .. للتوضيح فيه فيديو بيوضح إن الشاب ده وقف قدام المدرعة وهي بتمشي بسرعة متوسطة وأجبرهم على الوقوف ومنعهم من التقدم وعرض حياته للخطر بشكل يحسد عليه .. ده شاب مصري

> that the young man stopped in front of the armored car while it was driving at medium speed. He forced them to stop and prevented them from going any further. He was willing to sacrifice his life in the most enviable way. This is a young Egyptian man. (We Are All Khaled Said 2011l)

The post praises the young man's brave and successful attempt at stopping the police by telling us that the young man single-handedly "forced/أجبر", "prevented/منع", and was willing to "sacrifice his life/وعرض حياته للخطر". These words present the young man as determined and agentic, even in the face of the superior force of an armored car and several lines of police officers. The action of the young man is an individual's action. It is uncoordinated, seemingly impulsive, and only after some moments of hesitation do a few others join him. In the post on the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, the young man's action is also evaluated positively. Through the evaluations inherent in words like "proud/فخور", "one of the best soldiers on earth/واحد من خير جند الأرض", and "most enviable way/بشكل يحسد عليه", we learn that this kind of individual is an ideal for others to follow. In my perspective, the post celebrates individual agency in the extrovert form dominant in extended liberal modernity.

The young man's action can also be seen as a way of practicing the revolutionary call for peacefulness in the exact moment of confrontation (see chapter four). That is, while the young man is presented as a soldier, he is a soldier of a quite unusual kind, namely a peaceful soldier without arms. The presentation of the young man is thus not a presentation of a traditional soldier hero such as William Wallace, but a presentation of a modern peaceful icon like the so-called tank man at Tiananmen Square in China in 1989. The image thus represents a modern understanding of how to protest peacefully and in a civilized manner against a superior force. It also draws a parallel with local pre-revolutionary protest activities where violent confrontation was largely avoided (see chapter three).

The phrase "one of the best soldiers on earth/واحد من خير جند الأرض" stands out in this Facebook post. The phrase refers to a prophetic saying stating that "If God allows you to conquer Egypt, then take

many soldiers, because these soldiers are the best soldiers on earth/ إذا فتح الله عليكم مصر فاتخذوا فيها جندا كثيفا ، فذلك الجند خير أجناد الأرض” (Islamqa.info 2013). The saying seems to be weak (Islamqa.info 2013, Mishal 2015); that is, according to the way prophetic sayings are usually verified, it probably cannot be attributed to the Prophet Muhammed. The reference to this hadith thus does not work as a way of legitimizing the young man's actions in strictly Islamic terms. Rather, the reference works as a way of legitimizing the young man's action in local popular-religious terms.

The post is a good example of how the revolutionary expressions contain both global and local aspects. It also supports my theoretical contention that modern, global templates always appear in local forms. Global aspects include the presentation of the young man as another example of the Chinese tank man, the modern ideal of peaceful protests, and the modern focus on individual agency, while local aspects include the reference to a prophetic saying, the positive evaluation of the young man's action through words such as “brother/أخو”, “I kiss him/أبوسه”, and – again – peaceful protests linking the situation to the pre-revolutionary innovative protest activities. Both global and local aspects are important, and both are used to positively evaluate the young man's action.

However, there is an ambiguity in my analysis of this post. I have used the post to say something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual, but the young man's action is evaluated positively through the use of words with specifically male connotations. The physical confrontation with the Central Security Soldiers, the use of words such as “soldier/جند ” and “brother/أخو”, and the gendered conclusion stating that “this is a young Egyptian man/ده شاب مصري”; such words imply that this way of showing determination and standing one's ground is perhaps mostly an ideal for men. A video documenting the entire episode supports such an interpretation. The video is shot from an apartment window in a nearby building. When the young man rushes in front of the armored car, you can hear a man and woman from the apartment screaming “gada, gada!/جدع جدع” in excited shrill voices (MFMAegy 2011, from 1:25 min and onwards). The word “gada/جدع” is the singular of the word “gidaan/جدعان” which I in chapter four translated simply as “man”. There, I explained that it refers to qualities of manliness, chivalry, integrity and the opposition to injustice. Although Ghannam insists that the term “gada/جدع” can be used for females as well (Ghannam 2012, p. 34), in the present video the term does seem to hold specifically male connotations. The man and the woman in the apartment seem to confer on him the status of a “real man” in a specifically local understanding. In this perspective, the post can be seen as a continuation of pre-revolutionary gendered expectations of men and women (see Winegar 2012 for an analysis of the

revolutionary continuation of such expectations). At the same time, practices of equal participation during the revolution (e.g., Hafez 2012, Kadry 2015) tell us that the young man's action may perhaps also be seen as an ideal for women. It is thus my argument that there is an element of both gendered expectations and shared ideals in this post. In chapter eight, I return to the question of gendered expectations of men and women.

Summing up the section concerning determination, in the expressions analyzed here the individual is presented as determined. In the images of individuals holding "going down" signs, the words on the signs, the seriousness of the images, and the patterned reference to Mahfouz's video present these individuals as determined. And in the example with the Egyptian tank man, his act and the global-local aspects of the positive evaluation present him as determined. Together, both expressions in words and in actions thus contribute to constructing the individual as agentic in the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual. And because these expressions arguably draw on the modern belief in individual agency and on modern, globally relevant templates, the individual is also presented as modern.

Building a better society

In the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life, the individual is also imagined as capable of contributing to building a better society. Some expressions ascribe to the participants the ability to build, construct, and change Egypt while other expressions describe individual initiatives in relation to the physical construction of the tent camp at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution. I contend that such expressions present the participants in the revolution as capable of building a better society. In this way, the individual in the imaginaries of the good life is ascribed agency in a particularly modern way. Moreover, the presentation of the individual as capable of contributing to building a better society also contests the regime's rejection of allowing the majority of the Egyptians to participate in decision making on the national level.

"In my blood, I write a new life for my country"

Some revolutionary expressions use words related to construction and creation of something new. Below, I present five such expressions. The expressions are all quite short and may not seem significant or analyzable one by one. But because of the use of similar words, I maintain that they together constitute a "dialogue" about the individual's ability to contribute to building a better society. To underline the connections between these expressions, I present them in a figure where repeated words are highlighted and connected by lines. One line is dotted so as to represent a

"weak" link because the two words in Arabic are not exactly the same. Under each expression I have also written the category of expressions it belongs to. By presenting the expressions in this way, I aim at making the "dialogue" between these expressions explicit. Other scholars also take an interest in how single expressions form part of a whole. For example, Aboelezz argues that the revolutionary slogans display a high degree of intertextuality (Aboelezz 2012) while Heshmat asserts that the narratives in diaries transcend each individual author's experience and "reflect the collective consciousness" of the participants at Tahrir Square (Heshmat 2015, p. 71). In my analysis below, I support arguments about how single expressions form part of a whole. Implicitly, I also suggest that perhaps the revolution as a *whole* – not just specific kinds of expressions – constitutes one "dialogue":



Figure 1: The individual contributing to building a better society.

All of the expressions in the figure use words that can be related to human hands constructing something – by writing/كتب, building/صنع/بنى or simply changing/غيّر. What is to be constructed is history, Egypt, or a new life for the country. Using my theoretical vocabulary, the individual is ascribed agency for other actors (Egypt) here. At the same time, the modern notion of the

contingent nature of social life is underlined. In this way, these expressions insist that the individual is in fact capable of participating in decision-making on a national level. They reject the regime's imaginaries of the individual as just a part of the uncivilized masses or solely as an economic actor (see chapter three). The many ways of saying broadly the same thing indicate that the notion that the individual is capable of contributing to building a better society was important.

Moreover, the idea that the individual is capable of building a better society was dispersed widely during the revolution through the expression furthest to the right, "In my blood, I write a new life for my country". This is a line from a poem by the renowned Egyptian poet Abdel Rahman El-Abnudi/عبد الرحمن الأبنودي, who was famous for criticizing Sadat's and Mubarak's regimes in his poetry (Radwan 2012, chpater 5). I mentioned him briefly when I introduced the political role of poetry in Egypt earlier in this chapter. During the revolution he wrote a new poem, "The Square/الميدان" as a tribute to the revolutionaries at Tahrir Square. The line "In my blood, I write another life for my country" is from this poem. The poem in its entirety was recited by El-Abnudi himself on February 4 on the popular television show Al-Hayat Al-Youm/الحياة اليوم and uploaded to YouTube the same day (Youm7.com 2011). It was also recited on the radio during the 18 days of revolution (Prince 2014, p. 176). A quote from the poem, including this line, was incorporated in Cairokee's revolutionary song "Voice of Freedom/صوت الحرية" word-for-word, as well as slightly altered in one of the verses. The altered version is also part of the five expressions about how the individual is capable of participating in building a better society. The line from Al-Abnudi's poem has also been used as a slogan, photographed in at least two different contexts (Khalil 2011, p. 86, Paldf 2011c). The line is thus dispersed in various sources and presumably among various audiences, ranging from families in front of the television at home to young Egyptians watching YouTube clips online and Egyptians physically participating in the revolution at Tahrir Square. The wide dispersion of this exact line further adds to the importance of the notion of the individual's ability to construct the future. At the same time, the link to El-Abnudi situates the present revolutionary struggle in the historical context of protesting against those in power. The idea that the individual is capable of contributing to building a better society is thus presented as a continuation rather than a break with a local historical struggle and is legitimized in local terms.

Setting up the tent camp at Tahrir Square

The setting up of the mini-society at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution is another example of how the individual is presented as capable of contributing to building a better society.

Many enthusiastic participant accounts describe the well-functioning social order set up during this brief period. And because life at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution was praised through terms such as "The ideal city/المدينة الفاضلة" (Yusuf 2011, p. 83), the construction of the tent camp at Tahrir Square not only tells us of the setting up of a temporary social order, but of an ideal of a future social order. Such comments show that my view on revolution as prefiguration is not just speculative. It is supported by participants' own perception of the revolution. It also shows that life at Tahrir Square was not just perceived as a container of demands related to the sphere of formal politics and that the revolution was not just about the outcome. On the contrary, life at Tahrir Square was proposed as an ideal and functioned as a demonstration of how life could be. Seen in my perspective, life at Tahrir Square was as a prefigurative "weapon". Therefore, individuals participating in setting up tents, "institutions", and rules at Tahrir Square during the revolution symbolically participated in building a better society. Some participant accounts characterize a somewhat organized and coordinated effort to set up parts of this mini-society, like the hospital at the square or the radio (Nabil Omar 2011, Yusuf 2011, p. 37-42), but most revolutionary expressions stress the organic character of the setting up of the tent camp. In such expressions, notions of individual agency are often interwoven into the organic character of the efforts:

> There was an art exhibit in front of the KFC and a young man with a laptop and two loudspeakers playing Abdel Halim Hafez's revolutionary songs of the 1960s (…)"
> (Prince 2014, p. 101)

> Plumbers brilliantly converted a few of the now dysfunctional armored vehicles into public bathrooms for those taking part in the sit-in. Other people created a lost and found desk to help people locate their missing belongings. One guy rigged up a power-charging unit using a light pole in the square to help people recharge their cell phones and laptops"
> (Ghonim 2012, p. 225)

In these expressions, individual initiative is what created the "institutions" at Tahrir Square. No formal organization is mentioned or implied. In this way, the individual is ascribed agency and the ability to construct the future. The organic character and the importance of individual initiative in the setting up of the tent camp tells us of the construction of a social order resembling that in

extended liberal modernity. In extended liberal modernity, plurality, individual initiative, and voluntary relationships are emphasized. At Tahrir Square, even in the setting up of "institutions" such as the hospital or the radio that no doubt needed some sort of organization to function, participant accounts tell of how individual initiative played an important role. For example, Yusuf tells of the establishment of an open microphone on the radio "for anyone who wants to recite a poem, sing a song or deliver a speech/لمن يريد أن يلقي قصيدة أو أغنية أو كلمة" (Yusuf 2011, p. 39) and how he successfully found an electrician to help tap electricity from a light pole to the radio simply by shouting "Hey everybody, we need an electrician/يا جماعة ... عايزين كهربائي" (Yusuf 2011, p. 37). Elsewhere, in her account of the revolution seen through a doctor's eyes, Nabil Amr/نبيل عمر tells us of how individual doctors helped provide medical instruments by calling other individual doctors (Nabil Omar 2011, p. 109). In this way, individual initiative was encouraged.

This is not to say that no formal organization existed. For example, in their book on the Egyptian Revolution, Gunning and Baron describe the planned timing of the revolution, the role of activist networks in the revolution, tactics used, and the organizational structure of the square (Gunning and Baron 2014, p. 166-182). However, the logic of organic organization based on individual initiative seems to have taken over the square at some point. This is probably at least partially due to the sheer number of participants who were not used to participating in coordinated protest activities. For example, a survey found that among those who participated in the 18 days of revolution, around two thirds had not been involved in previous protests (Tufekci and Wilson 2012, p. 369). But huge numbers of participants do not necessarily lead to organic organization and individual initiative. Life at the square could have remained within a logic of formal organization, but it did not. In this way, the organic organization and the celebration of individual initiative align the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual with extended liberal modernity with its celebration of individual agency and its ideal of a pluralistic social order. I return to the question of the organic organization in chapter seven where I discuss the rejection of traditional notions of leadership and the adoption of an organic and context-bound kind of leadership based on individual initiative.

To sum up, these expressions present the individual as capable of constructing a desirable future. That is, the individual is ascribed agency for other actors. By setting up a well-functioning mini-society and by emphasizing the individual's ability to construct the future, the participants communicated to the regime that Egyptians are indeed qualified to participate in decision-making on a national level. The participants thereby also take upon themselves the modern demand on

human beings of handling the contingency of the social order. By doing so (largely) in an organic way, they set up an ideal for the future resembling the social order in extended liberal modernity.

Expressing oneself in creative ways

Finally, in the imaginaries of the good life, the individual is imagined as creatively expressing him- or herself. Expressing oneself creatively is related to individual agency for the self and to the ideal type of the post-modern creative entrepreneur in extended liberal modernity. Furthermore, it is related to the innovative protest approaches before the revolution, thus contributing to showing continuity between a movement such as Keyafa and the revolutionary efforts at Tahrir Square in 2011.

Creative words

The easiest and most accessible way of expressing oneself individually was through slogans on signs. The diversity of these slogans was enormous. Some slogans were particularly popular and thus used repeatedly in the exact same form, such as "leave/إرحل", "The people wants to overthrow the regime/الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام" and "Down with Mubarak/يسقط مبارك".[49] Some slogans were patterned after existing slogans, such as those urging Mubarak to leave, but with a humorous and quite ordinary reason attached, for example "Go, I want to shower/امشي بقي عايزة استحمي", "Hurry up, we have general exams/إنجز عندنا ثانوية عامة" and "Hurry up, so I can shave/انجز عشان أحلق".[50] Other slogans were unique in form, for example "I am revolutionary, therefore I am/أنا ثوري, إذن أنا موجود" or "I am breathing freedom/أنا أتنفس حرية".[51] Together such slogans tell of how the participants expressed themselves in an extrovert and creative fashion. In my theoretical perspective, the positive evaluation of this diversity of slogans shows that the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual is reminiscent of the ideal type of the post-modern creative entrepreneur in extended liberal modernity. Pre-revolutionary attempts at streamlining the messages and adhering to pre-selected themes of unemployment and poverty "because these are subjects that concern all Egyptians/لأن دي القضايا اللي بتهم المصريين كلهم" (Anonymous 2011) did not work. In theoretical terms, a

[49] For "leave/إرحل" see Gröndahl 2011, p. 39 and 71, Khalil 2011, p. 53, 57, 68, 130 and 135. For "The people wants to overthrow the regime/الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام" see Al-Sharqawi and Muhsin 2011, Khalil 2011, p. 76). And for "Down with Mubarak/يسقط مبارك" see Assaf et al. 2011, p. 82, Khalil 2011, p. 65 and 77.

[50] For "Go, I want to shower/امشي بقي عايزة استحمي" see Al-Sharq Al-Awsat 2011). For "Hurry up, we have general exams/إنجز عندنا ثانوية عامة" see Adlat/2011 عدلات. And for "Hurry up, so I can shave/انجز عشان أحلق" see Ghaleb 2015, image no 35.

[51] For "I am revolutionary, therefore I am/أنا ثوري, إذن أنا موجود" see Khalil 2011, p. 73. For "I am breathing freedom/ أنا أتنفس حرية" see Paldf.net 2011b.

streamlined model for producing messages related to organized modernity was rejected in favor of an individualized model related to extended liberal modernity.

At the same time, the production of slogans entails a social levelling function. As the examples of slogans here show, some participants simply repeated other slogans, some tailored their slogans after existing patterns, and some participants produced unique slogans. That is, although the slogans as a collection display an immense diversity, the individual did not need to possess a particularly high level of creativity to produce a slogan. Therefore, the production of slogans was accessible to everybody. Even the illiterate could produce a slogan, as scribes were ready to help write down a message for anybody who desired one (Gröndahl 2011, p. 102). Expressing oneself in an extrovert and creative fashion thus came within the reach of all participants, and in this way the production of slogans also had a social levelling function. Social levelling is, according to Taylor, a dominant trait in modernity (Taylor 2004, chapter 1). The production of slogans thus not only ascribes agency, creativity, and the desire to express oneself extrovertly to the individual – and to all individuals indiscriminately –, it also emphasizes the revolutionary endorsement of such modern ideas as equality, participation, and levelling of hierarchies.

Creative performances

To add to the picture, the participants in the revolution not only used pen and paper to produce messages, they used also bodies, walls, the ground, drawings, photos, clothing, artifacts, speech and performance. The celebration of individual creativity of the kind dominant in extended liberal modernity is thereby further underlined.

Some individuals used their bodies to express themselves without words. One example is a man dressed like a football referee, showing the red card to dismiss Mubarak and with a sign on his shirt declaring that “the people are the judge” (Assaf et al. 2011, p. 77). Another example is a man carrying a huge clay pot which he was ready to break when Mubarak resigned, indicating a traditional local ritual to ensure that an unwelcome guest does not come back (Khalil 2011, p. 110). Yet another example is a man doing a Nazi salute with one hand and holding a poster up in front of his head with the other hand; on the poster is a photo of Mubarak’s face with a Hitler hair-do and Hitler moustache (Paldf.net 2011f). Some individuals produced messages with whatever was at hand, such as art pieces in stone, words on the ground written in plastic cups or a chess board with

the king checkmated and fallen.[52] Other individuals spoke or performed at the square, such as the actor Muhammed Ramadan/محمد رمضان who held a speech at the stage during the revolution, the young singer Ramy Essam/رامي عصام who sang his way to fame during the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square, or an Egyptian man dressed up as the Indian expert Mr. Nana, giving humorous advice in gibberish Indian on how to solve the problems in Egypt – he even brought his own "interpreter.[53]

Together, such messages display an immense diversity, creativity, and humor. They emphasize the theoretical point about the revolutionary endorsement of such modern ideas as equality, participation and levelling of hierarchies, and they espouse an ideal of a tolerant, pluralistic social order. Furthermore, they provide some easily understandable examples of how the revolutionary expressions draw on both global and local references, such as the globally understandable references to Hitler, chess, and the football referee, or the locally understandable reference to breaking a clay pot.

Structures supporting individual creativity

The structures set up at the square also encouraged everybody to produce a message. I have already mentioned how scribes were ready to help write down a message for those who could not write. Other examples include how the nearby, progressive Merit Publishing House was transformed into a workshop for producing messages, how an area of Tahrir was reserved for people's messages on paper, how another wall was reserved for cartoons, and how the stage was open for anyone who wanted to say or perform something.[54] While some of the artistic expressions no doubt did require some talent to do successfully, such as singing and performing, the structures allowed and encouraged everyone to express themselves creatively and individually. In this way, the structures set up supported individual agency, creativity, and extrovert individual expressions, and they championed a pluralistic social order, just as in the ideal type of extended liberal modernity.

[52] For art pieces in stone see Adlat/2011 عدلات, Assaf et al. 2011, p. 74, Khalil 2011, p. 130. For words on the ground written in plastic cups see Ghaleb 2015, image no 18. And for a chess board with the king checkmated and fallen see Assaf et al. 2011, p. 77.

[53] For the speech by the actor Muhammed Ramadan see Bardis2009 2011. For the singer Ramy Essam see Lynskey 2011. And for Mr. Nana see El Hamamsy and Soliman 2013, p. 253-254, ZoDeBest 2011.

[54] For Merit Publishing House transformed into a workshop see Prince 2014, p. 101. For an area reserved for people's messages on paper see Ghaleb 2015, images no 56, Gröndahl 2011, p. 62-63, 103. For a wall for cartoons see Gröndahl 2011, p. 98. And for the open stage see BBC 2011, click on "Main stage".

To sum up the section on expressing oneself in creative ways, through the many creative expressions the participants in the revolution were presented as modern, agentic individuals. Slogans, creative performances and the very set-up of the square encouraged creative self-expression. The space set up in this way was supportive of an ideal of the individual resembling the post-modern creative entrepreneur. As noted in the introduction, such creative expressions have led some scholars to metaphorically compare life at Tahrir Square to a carnival. I find it very plausible that the plethora of creative expressions may at times have given life at Tahrir Square an air of something carnivalesque, but the metaphor risks hiding the prefigurative practice of these creative performances. By looking at these expressions through my theoretical perspective, they tell us instead of how the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life endorse individual agency in the extrovert and creative form of the post-modern creative entrepreneur. The carnival metaphor with its implicit idea of a radical break with ordinary life also risks hiding the continuities between creative expressions at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution and the innovative protest approaches dominating the years leading up to the revolution. Instead, in my theoretical perspective the creative expressions present the individual in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life as a modern, agentic individual.

Conclusion

The contrast between the pre-revolutionary understanding of the individual and the understanding of the individual in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life is stark. It is a contrast between an inactive and passive individual deprived of agency and an individual capable of enacting agency in different ways and for different entities. In the imaginaries of the good life, the individual is constructed as capable of taking responsibility, of showing determination, of contributing to building a better society, and of expressing oneself in creative ways. In the first section I have argued that the individual is presented as capable of taking responsibility. I have shown how the individual is not only presented as capable of taking individual responsibility in a quite far-reaching sense, but also how the taking of that responsibility leads to a positive transformation of the individual. I have compared the revolutionary understanding of the responsible individual to bourgeois notions of duty and to the strong belief in individual agency in extended liberal modernity. Drawing also on Meyer and Jepperson's understanding of agency, the individual is presented as capable of taking responsibility for him- or herself, for others, and for principle. In the second section of the chapter, it was my argument that the individual is presented as determined, both by stating their will firmly through words and by standing their ground against the regime. I

have asserted that the understanding of the determined individual is reminiscent of the agentic individual in extended liberal modernity. In the third section I have argued that the individual is presented as capable of contributing to building a better society. This is in contrast to the regime's treatment of the majority of Egyptians as a wild mass in need of management as in restricted liberal modernity. Both in words and in prefigurative practices inherent in the setting up of the tent camp at Tahrir Square, the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual contest the regime and the pre-revolutionary social order. In the fourth section I have contended that the individual is presented as expressing him- or herself in creative ways. I have shown how all sorts of creative expressions were used and evaluated positively and how the structures set up at the square supported such creativity. I have drawn on the understanding of the extrovert, creative individual in extended liberal modernity to interpret this aspect of the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual.

By drawing on my usual tripartition of modern social order, as well as on Meyer and Jepperson's understanding of agency, I have argued that the individual is presented as agentic in a particularly modern way. In the expressions analyzed in chapter five, the focus is on individual agency. Even in expressions about the creation of a desirable social order, individual agency plays an important role. In chapter seven I return to the question of agency, this time in the collective form.

CHAPTER SIX: THE ORDINARY INDIVIDUAL

In this chapter I analyze how the individual in the imaginaries of the good life is constructed as ordinary. This chapter completes the part of my dissertation in which I analyze the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual. In the chapter I show how the revolutionary expressions present the participants in the revolution as ordinary individuals by drawing on both global and local understandings of what constitutes an ordinary individual. The construction of the individual as ordinary is used to contest the legitimacy of the regime. I maintain that the contestation of the regime's legitimacy through ordinary life is only possible in the modern world.

In this chapter I draw in particular on the part of my theoretical framework that focuses on the importance of ordinary life in modernity. The modern belief in the importance of ordinary life cuts across the three ideal typical ways of creating order in modernity. In this instance, therefore, I do not use that part of my theoretical framework to any great degree, rather only referring to it sporadically. In the introduction, I explained that ordinary life with its focus on matters such as work, marriage, and home takes center stage in modernity (Reckwitz 2006, p. 55-62, Taylor 1989, p. 211-214). Indeed, according to Taylor, ordinary life is the locus of the good life in modernity (Taylor 1989, p. 213). In contrast, Taylor mentions that at the time of Aristotle, theoretical contemplation and participation in the polity as a citizen out-ranked ordinary life (Taylor 1989, p. 212). Because of the importance of ordinary life, the modern individual is expected to undertake specific ordinary life activities evaluated as meaningful in modernity. For example, on an everyday basis the individual is expected to concern him- or herself with ordinary life activities such as working, studying, taking care of house chores, and shopping for groceries. And over a life span, the individual is expected to go through certain ordinary life stages such as getting an education, finding a job, getting married and having children. Through these ordinary life activities and stages, the modern individual is expected to transform contingency into order and create a good life. To be able to do so, the individual must have a large degree of control over their ordinary life. Therefore, politics in modernity is related to the ability to control ordinary life or, in Foucault's words, politics is related to "power over life" (Foucault 1978, p. 133-145). Moreover, the modern belief in the importance of ordinary life includes a focus on equality and the levelling out of hierarchies. Insurmountable distinctions in times past between some individuals based on postulated inherent and "natural" differences are largely considered void in modernity. Consequently, the good life is in principle available to everybody. It is not only monks engaged in theoretical contemplation or

politicians involved in the polity that can pursue the good life. Everybody can (Taylor 1989, chapter 13, Taylor 2004, chapter 1).

However, in the local pre-revolutionary context, many Egyptians did not have access to creating the kind of good, ordinary life described above. As I argued in chapter five, many Egyptians in pre-revolutionary Egypt were deprived of agency and control over their own lives. The slogan at the beginning of chapter five substantiates the argument that lack of control over ordinary life matters constituted an important complaint towards the regime. In that slogan, a man rhetorically asks the president questions such as "Can you not find a job, and now you are sitting in a café because you do not have any connections? Is your son not able to save up the last two cents to buy an apartment and get married?/ مش لاقي شغل وقاعد على القهوة عشان ماعندكش واسطة؟ ابنك مش عارف يحوش قرشين يلاقي بيهم شقة يتجوز فيها؟" (Egyptianhumour.blogspot.com 2011d). Problems such as high rates of unemployment, low wages, expensive education, lack of affordable housing and unequal access to health care (Barsoum, Ramadan and Mostafa 2014, Ibrahim 2011, Tadros 2006) meant that most Egyptians were deprived the ability to create a good, ordinary life. In pre-revolutionary Egypt, only those with close ties to the regime were capable of living such a life. But at the same time, because of the modern global interconnectedness many Egyptians were well aware that other individuals in other parts of the globe did live such lives. Therefore, as a contestation of the pre-revolutionary social order, some of the revolutionary expressions focus on ordinary life and on how the participants in the revolution are just ordinary individuals longing to live good, ordinary lives.

The chapter consists of three sections and a conclusion. In the first section I assert that the social order set up at Tahrir Square revolved around ordinary life and ordinary individuals. I use the social practices at the hospital at the square to argue that the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life are based on ordinary life ideals of equality and levelling of hierarchies. These practices contest the regime's differential treatment of Egyptians dependent on their proximity to the regime. In the second section I show how some of the concerns of the participants in the revolution can be interpreted as globally shared ordinary concerns. I focus on expressions related to work and marriage, two of the cornerstones of modern, ordinary life. From that I argue that the individual in the imaginaries of the good life is constructed as a modern ordinary individual similar to everybody else on a global level. While the second section focuses on how the individual in the revolutionary imaginaries is constructed as ordinary in a global sense, the third section focuses on how the individual is constructed as ordinary in a local sense. In the third section I show how the participants in the revolution are ascribed specifically Egyptian traits. It is my argument that the

expressions in this section were used to contest negative rumors claiming that the participants in the revolution were fake Egyptians working for a foreign agenda. Together, the second and third section underline the interplay between the global and the local. Finally, I sum up and draw some conclusions.

Ordinary life at Tahrir Square

In the first section of the chapter, I look at how the social order at Tahrir Square was set up. I argue that it revolved around ordinary life and ordinary individuals, first by showing how life at Tahrir Square was used as a model of and for the good ordinary life, and second, how the social practices at the square were based on ordinary life ideals of equality and levelling of hierarchies.

It is not self-evident that life at Tahrir Square had to be imagined as ordinary life. It could have been imagined differently, for example as a battlefield and with social practices structured along military lines. It could have been only young male fighters occupying the square, the experienced activists could have functioned as battalion leaders, other Egyptians could have participated only behind the lines, those staying overnight could have slept in barrack-like tents, and bringing food to the square could have been organized as military supply lines. Taking the military's central position in Egyptian society into consideration, it is not at all implausible to imagine the setup of the square along military lines. That life at Tahrir Square was imagined as ordinary life and not something else therefore contain information about the kind of social order seen as desirable from a revolutionary perspective.

Tahrir Square as a model of and for the good, ordinary life

Life at Tahrir Square functioned both as a model of and for ordinary life. Indeed, according to Sabea, it was the ordinariness of life at Tahrir Square that made it extraordinary (Sabea 2012). At Tahrir Square, men, women, young and old were welcome. Even families with little children were welcome. Egyptians staying overnight slept in house-like tents with family or friends. All sorts of individuals brought food and other supplies with them in an organic and non-organized way. Distinctions between individuals did not revolve around activism, politics or religion, but were drawn from ordinary life. Some protesters metaphorically suggested that Tahrir Square was their new home, for example: "My new address is Tahrir Square/(ميدان التحرير) عنواني الجديد" or "My home address is Tahrir Square until you leave/عنوان بيتي ميدان التحرير حتى ترحل" (Al Aswad 2011, Mobile.farfeshplus.com 2011b). On BBC's excellent clickable map of Tahrir Square during the revolution, one can take a tour of the square and see a number of ordinary life "institutions" (BBC

2011). This and other sources tell of a barber, a kindergarten, a place to charge laptops and mobile phones, street vendors, a radio, a newspaper wall, toilets and running water, a hospital, a clinic and a pharmacy.[55] In many different ways the social order set up proposed that the individuals participating in the revolution were ordinary individuals living ordinary lives. In my theoretical perspective, it is not surprising that life at Tahrir Square was imagined as ordinary life. It is also not surprising that ordinary life at Tahrir Square was imagined as an ideal. It simply shows that the revolutionary imaginaries draw on modern global templates of how to create a good life. In this way, ordinary life at Tahrir Square was not just a model *of* but also *for* ordinary life. Ordinary life activities thus had an important prefigurative function. As Sabea writes, the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square constituted "the ordinariness of another world that was imagined as possible" (Sabea 2014, p. 74).

In the review of literature in chapter two, I mentioned a cluster of literature looking at Tahrir Square as public space.[56] These texts focus on how the occupation of Tahrir Square created a public space in which the participants were capable of assembling and debating publicly – something that was not possible in pre-revolutionary Egypt. While I do not disagree that a public space was created, the many examples of ordinary life practices, understandings, and even "institutions" indicate that the space created encompassed something broader than what is contained in the term public space. It is therefore my argument that Tahrir Square was not solely a public space, but a space encompassing a model of and for a good, ordinary life.

Equality and the levelling of hierarchies

At the same time, the practices espoused at the square were underpinned by the principles of equality and the levelling of hierarchies. At the beginning of this chapter, I noted that these principles are part of the modern belief in the importance of ordinary life. The social practices of the medical staff at the hospital of the square is one example of how a specific set of social practices supported equality and the levelling out of hierarchies. In this way, these practices support the argument that life at the square was imagined as ordinary life. At the same time, they contested the pre-revolutionary social order that was based on inequality and hierarchies. I focus on the practices of the medical staff at the hospital of the square simply because they are better described than other practices at the square: A few academic texts focus specifically on health and the hospital at the

[55] BBC 2011, Ghonim 2012, p. 17, Idle and Nunns 2011, p. 170, Yusuf 2011, p. 37-39.
[56] Attia 2011, Butler 2011, Elshahed 2011, Gregory 2013, Salama 2013, Tawil-Souri 2012.

square during the revolution, a number of online journalistic articles describe some aspects of the hospital or interview some of the medical staff, and a participant account is dedicated to telling the story of the revolution through the eyes of a volunteer doctor. These texts provide an insight into how a specific set of social practices supported a social order revolving around equality, levelling of hierarchies, and ordinary life during the revolution.

The hospital at the square was initially set up because wounded participants brought to regular hospitals were denied help, chained to the hospital bed or simply handed over to the authorities (Hamdy and Bayoumi 2016, p. 226, Nabil Omar 2011, p. 105, Prince 2014, p. 93). To ensure that wounded participants did indeed receive help, voluntary medical staff began treating the wounded at the square, and step by step the hospital was set up. The hospital thus fulfilled a practical task of treating wounded anti-Mubarak protesters. But at the same time, specific ideals contesting the social order imposed by the regime were employed. I have already touched upon these ideals in chapter four where I analyzed a post from the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page. In the post, an image shows a group of young men carrying a wounded Central Security Force soldier. The accompanying text tells us that the image can be seen as proof that the participants were not barbaric or causing chaos. At that point I argued that the post can be interpreted as a proposition of the revolutionary principle of caring for each other, including for one's enemy, and of the participants' superior moral standards. But the post is also a good example of the ideals embraced in the social practices of the medical staff at the square. One of these ideals was the principle of medical neutrality as stipulated in the Geneva Conventions (United Nations 1949). Medical neutrality means that doctors must not discriminate between friend and enemy in their treatment of the wounded in times of war and conflict. In contrast to the regime's preferential treatment of the wounded, doctors volunteering at the hospital relate that they treated wounded protesters and regime representatives alike and without discrimination (Al-Ghazawy 2011, Macintyre 2011). That is, they practiced the principle of medical neutrality. By drawing on a modern non-discriminatory and egalitarian principle of how to practice medicine, the medical practices at Tahrir Square supported equality and the levelling out of hierarchies. In this way, they embraced a modern social order in which all individuals are equally valuable. In contrast, the regime practiced medicine as if it was "the only and ultimate sovereign authority to determinate who can live and who can die" (Hamdy and Bayoumi 2016, p. 225).

The alignment of revolutionary ideals with modern international conventions is not just a scholarly interpretation. Hamdy and Bayoumi tell us that the medical staff themselves interpreted their

practices through the principle of medical neutrality (Hamdy and Bayoumi 2016, p. 236). Likewise, in her account of the revolution from inside the hospital of the square, the voluntary doctor Nagham Nabil Omar refers to international conventions as a normative standard that both parts of a conflict ought to respect. Omar is a doctor, scholar, writer, and activist. During the revolution, she was in charge of sustenance and psychological aid at the hospital at the square (AsyutUniversity 2016, Nabil Omar 2011, p. 103). She writes that the regime targeted the doctors directly "in violation of all international agreements/حرق لكل المواثيق والعهود الدولية" (Nabil Omar 2011, p. 112) and that many journalists were also targeted "even though they wore press jackets/رغم ارتدائهم سترات الإعلام" (Nabil Omar 2011, p. 116). Omar is outraged because the regime does not respect international standards of doctors' and journalists' neutral status in times of conflict. Implicitly, she aligns her own practices to such global standards and replaces the regime's logic of a friend-enemy distinction with the modern principle of equal value of all individuals. In this way, the social practices support equality and the levelling out of hierarchies.

The explicit reference to international conventions here is interesting. In chapter three I explained that thoughts originating from the West are not always received positively in Egypt. I asserted that this is due to the century-long struggle for independence and to the dominance of strong nationalist sentiments. I used this argument to explain why the term "human rights" was only used hesitantly. However, modern human rights are convention-based just as much as the principle of medical neutrality is. Why then is one term only used hesitantly while the other is embraced? Perhaps the notion of human rights simply touches upon more sensitive subjects in local eyes, such as the relationship between men and women. Perhaps the principle of medical neutrality was not widely used among Western supported NGOs before the revolution – the term is usually only used in times of war. It is also possible that the medical staff referring to the principle of medical neutrality were often well-educated and embraced thinking originating in the West to a higher degree than the general public. Whatever the reason, the hesitant use of one term and the embracement of the other indicates that the revolutionary imaginaries are neither in opposition to nor in agreement with Western thinking. Rather, the global and the local merge to form locally relevant imaginaries. It also indicates why it does not make sense to *a priori* reserve theories of modernity to Western societies. Such a reservation seems based on the assumption that different parts of the world are isolated from each other or that individuals are immune to influence from across the globe. But in our contemporary world with internet, satellite television, and social media, it is hard to imagine that the assumption holds.

When events calmed down a bit, medical staff at the hospital also treated local residents, poor families and protesters with chronic diseases (Al-Ghazawy 2011). They provided free medical care and advice for everyone (Soueif 2014, p. 133). By taking upon themselves a social responsibility extending beyond the immediate revolutionary needs of the wounded, the medical staff at the hospital actively participated in setting up a new kind of social order embracing the principle of equality and levelling of hierarchies. These social practices also contested the pre-revolutionary distinction between the minority of individuals who could afford good health care and the majority of individuals who could not. In this quote, Omar describes some of the medical staff's social practices that reach beyond the immediate revolutionary needs:

> The hospital took upon itself the responsibility of spreading awareness about health and social matters. Through tours on the square, the doctors explained to the protesters how to protect themselves from the winter's diseases, they told of the most appropriate food for the sit-in and of the right way to keep clean to prevent infectious diseases. They provided them with juice and free medicine for common diseases, and they told them that chronic diseases were treated for free and, if possible, with medicine. And a radio show by doctor Umayma Kamil, teacher of public health at the Medical Faculty at Kasr El-Aini, was prepared.
> (Nabil Omar 2011, p. 125)

> المستشفى كان يقوم بدور توعوي صحي واجتماعي، من خلال الجولات الميدانية الصحية التي كان الأطباء يشرحون فيها المعتصمين طرق الوقاية من أمراض الشتاء، وأنسب الأطعمة في الاعتصام، وطرق النظافة السليمة لتقادي الأوبئة وتزويدهم ببعض العصائر، والأدوية المجانية للأمراض الشائعة وإعلام بأن علاج الأمراض المزمنة يقدم مجانا، بالإضافة لما تيسر من أدوية، وكانت تعد النشرة أ. د. أميمة كامل أستاذ الصحة العامة بكلية طب القصر العيني.

Here, two overall health principles are referred to. One is awareness-raising and the other is free access to health care. None of these principles are related to the immediate revolutionary needs but tell us of how the social practices of the medical staff contribute to setting up a social order based on equality and the levelling of hierarchies. Foucault argues that modern individuals expect to have good health (Foucault 1978, p. 145). The provision of free access to decent health care supports such an expectation. However, as I explained in chapter three, access to decent health care in pre-revolutionary Egypt was unequally distributed and not at all free. Several revolutionary expressions comment on the unequal access to decent health care in pre-revolutionary Egypt (e.g., Khalil 2011, p. 109, We Are All Khaled Said 2011m). Looking at the pre-revolutionary unequal access to decent health care through Foucault's lens, the majority of Egyptians were treated as un-modern and unvalued. In this perspective, the provision of free access to health care at Tahrir Square during the revolution functioned as more than a contestation of the health care system specifically. It also functioned as a contestation of the pre-revolutionary social order based on the overriding distinction between individuals of the valuable minority– valuable enough to deserve good health – and the individuals of the unvalued majority. Instead, the social practices of the medical staff at the square supported the principles of equality and levelling of hierarchies inherent in the modern understanding of the importance of ordinary life.

To sum up the first section of chapter six, life at Tahrir Square during the revolution revolved around ordinary life. The setup of life at the square during the 18 days of revolution resembled ordinary life more than anything else and functioned as a model for a future ordinary life. It thus had an important prefigurative function. Moreover, the social practices at the square, exemplified through the social practices of the medical staff at the hospital at the square, supported the ordinary life principles of equality and levelling of hierarchies. Simultaneously, they contested the pre-revolutionary social order based on inequality and hierarchies.

Individuals with ordinary concerns

As I argued in the previous section, the way life at Tahrir Square was set up shows that ordinary life was the central focus. In this way, it also suggests that the participants were ordinary individuals. Other expressions present some of the ordinary life concerns of the participants. In such expressions, ordinary life concerns are used to contest the legitimacy of the regime and demand that Mubarak leave. Simultaneously, they tell us of the centrality of ordinary life in the imaginaries of the good life.

The expressions I look at in this section are all related to globally shared ordinary life concerns. They place importance on what may be considered trivialities of ordinary life as well as on marriage and work – two areas constitutive of modern ordinary life (Reckwitz 2006, p. 55-62, Taylor 1989, p. 213). The ordinary life concerns ascribed to the participants in such expressions present these individuals as ordinary and connect them to all other individuals on a global level across distinctions based on such parameters as borders, culture, faith and class. By focusing on globally shared concerns and by simultaneously proclaiming that the Mubarak regime did nothing to address these concerns, these expressions assert that Mubarak must leave: He must leave, not because of his lack of ability to ensure democratic participation in the country, but because he does not manage to provide the Egyptians with the possibility of living good, ordinary lives. Such expressions tell us that not only demands related to the sphere of formal politics, but also ordinary life concerns were used to contest the regime.

The trivialities of ordinary life

In a series of slogans, what may be considered trivialities of ordinary life are used to demand that Mubarak must leave. The slogans all begin with the word "Leave" or an equivalent to that word, and then present an ordinary life reason for why Mubarak should leave. I mentioned the existence of these slogans in chapter five where I used them to show how some expressions are tailored versions of existing slogans. These slogans are usually noted for their humorous aspect,[57] but here I focus on what we can learn if we take them seriously. I assert that these expressions can tell us something about the importance of ordinary life in modernity. In the following three examples of "Leave"-slogans, three different words urging Mubarak to leave are combined with what may be considered trivial ordinary life concerns:

> Leave, my shoulder hurts — إرحل كتفى وجعنى
> (Egyptphotos.revolution25january.com 2011b, a sign held my a man with a sleeping child on his shoulders)

> Go, I want to watch cartoons — امشى بقى أنا عاوزة أتفرج على الكرتون
> (Paldf.net 2011d, held by a little girl)

[57] See e.g., Anagondahalli and Khamis 2014, Helmy and Frerichs 2013, Srage 2013, Zack 2012.

Hurry up, so I can shave انجز عشان أحلق

(Ghaleb 2015, no. 35)

The triviality of these concerns presents the participants in the revolution as ordinary individuals. These concerns are not the concerns of experienced political activists promoting a particular ideological agenda or of opportunistic individuals striving to grasp power. In fact, the signs tell us that the individuals holding these signs have no desire to protest and cannot wait for Mubarak to leave so they can resume their ordinary lives. These concerns are also not particularly Egyptian, Arab, or Muslim. They are trivial ordinary concerns recognizable all over the world. In previous times where the good life, as Taylor holds, revolved for example around theoretical contemplation or participation in the polity (Taylor 1989, p. 211-212), it would not be possible to contest the regime in power by referring to trivial ordinary life concerns. It is only possible in the modern world. In this way, the use of ordinary life concerns to contest the regime politically shows that the revolution takes place in global modernity where the legitimacy of a regime rests on the ruler's ability to provide individuals with the opportunity to create good, ordinary lives.

"Now I can get married and have kids"

Other expressions tell of marriage and family life as concerns of the participants in the revolution. As Reckwitz and Taylor hold, intimate relations, for example through marriage, constitute a cornerstone of modern ordinary life (Reckwitz 2006, p. 55-62, Taylor 1989, p. 213). While Reckwitz notes that such intimate relations do not have to be fulfilled through marriage (Reckwitz 2006, p. 57), Taylor takes a particular interest in explaining why marriage and family life became such an important part of modern ordinary life (Taylor 1989, p. 289-294). What they agree upon, it seems, is the *importance* placed on intimate relationships in modernity. In Taylor's words, "[w]hat changes is not that people begin loving their children or feeling affection for their spouses, but that these dispositions come to be seen as a crucial part of what makes life worthy and significant" (Taylor 1989, p. 292). Of the three ideal types of modern social order, marriage is particularly important in restricted liberal modernity with its bourgeois ideals of family life. In the local Egyptian context, marriage is also the main sphere for the development of intimate relations.

The emphasis on the bourgeois ideal of marriage and family can be seen in the two slogans below. By drawing on the importance of ordinary life in modernity, the slogans delegitimize Mubarak's lack of willingness to step down. They implicitly claim that Mubarak subverts not a specific

political order, but the modern social order in general. At the same time, they present the individuals holding these signs as modern, ordinary individuals with modern ordinary concerns. These slogans are also part of the series of "Leave"-slogans coupling the desire to see Mubarak leave with ordinary life concerns:

Leave, I want to marry إرحل عاوز أتجوز
(Egyptianhumour.blogspot.com 2011b)

Go, I want to raise my children إمشى بقى عايز أربى أولادى
(Therevolutionfiles.com 2011a)

The first of these slogans is concerned with the desire to marry. While previously analyzed "Leave"-slogans are concerned with the fulfilment of an immediate desire such as watching cartoons or shaving, the slogan about marriage do not necessarily refer to a specific marriage that is already planned and about to take place. Rather, I argue, it refers to an unfulfilled desire to marry. That is, it tells of the difficulty of getting married and starting a family in the pre-revolutionary social order under Mubarak. In chapter three I told of how the state under Sadat and Mubarak to a large extent had withdrawn from providing social services. As a result, the responsibility for getting an education, finding a job, finding adequate housing, providing for one's children, and such was increasingly thought of as an individual responsibility. But at the same time, structural constraints related to neoliberal policies and the authoritarian desire for control made it difficult for the individual to actually do so. These difficult circumstances were a particularly hard burden on young Egyptians. In the ten years leading up to the revolution, youth unemployment in Egypt ranged between 25 and 31 percent (Statista.com 2019), and among those who did have a job, many did not earn enough money to get married and start a family (Assad and Barsoum 2007, p. 26-28). Therefore, the young man urging Mubarak to leave because he wants to get married does not just make a humorous statement. He refers to a quite serious and widespread problem among young Egyptians. In my theoretical perspective, the centrality of marriage and family in ordinary life in modernity means that the young man is deprived of the opportunity to pursue a good modern life. In a similar vein I contend that the second slogan about the desire to raise one's children is not just a humorous slogan, but tells us of the hardship endured by many Egyptian families who struggled to make ends meet economically, provide decent education and health care for their children to ensure that their children would be able to live good, ordinary lives. Theoretically, the importance placed

on child rearing in the slogan places the slogan and the man holding the slogan in a modern context, as child rearing is an integral part of family life in the modern world (Taylor 1989, p. 291).

In a quote from Prince's diary, she also mentions the desire to get married. Here, she tells us of how the revolution has opened a door to a future in which marriage and having children has become possible:

> I took a sheet of paper and wrote, "Now I Can Get Married and Have Kids. There is Hope in the Future. Yes, There is Hope." My friends laughed at what I had written.
> "It is not going to work for you, Mona, no matter what you do!"
> "It doesn't really have to happen, but it's important that I feel this way. Before January 25, I would have never thought about it. Have kids and raise them on the street or go beg for their food or steal? I wouldn't want my kids to grow up in this corrupt environment."
> I took my sign and went off to the midan[58]. I discovered that some of the young protesters were holding signs that were similar to mine: "I Want to Get Married," "I Want to Get Married and Have Kids". I greeted them and we laughed together as they proposed to me.
> "Sorry, I'm a bit old for you guys."
> (Prince 2014, p. 101)

In this quote, Prince tells us of a sign she created in which she states that now she can get married and have children. Her friends make fun of her and say that it will never happen, but she insists that it is not important whether she will actually get married and have children. The important thing is that she feels like this is possible now. In this way, she tells us that the revolution constitutes a radical break with the past. Interestingly, the radical break is not related to the outcome of the revolution but to the initiation of the revolution on January 25. That is, it is because of life at Tahrir Square that she feels as though marriage is possible, and not because a new political order has been established on the national level. In my perspective, her words speak of the importance of ordinary life at Tahrir Square as a set of prefigurative practices promising a different kind of future. Part of this future is related to the modern ordinary life desire of getting married.

[58] "Midan/ميدان" means "square", i.e., Tahrir Square.

Work

Other expressions are concerned with yet another cornerstone of modern ordinary life, namely work (Reckwitz 2006, p. 55-62, Taylor 1989, p. 213). According to Reckwitz, "work" is not restricted to formal, paid work, but consists of "socially recognized "outputs for others"/sozial anerkannte "Leistungen für andere"" (Reckwitz 2006, p. 55). In this light, "work" includes unpaid household management, school, kindergarten, and other socially recognized ways of spending one's day productively.

During the revolution, the question of work was raised in relation to unemployment, insecure working conditions and low salaries. In the expression below, a slogan is pinned to the chest of a little girl. The picture only shows the girl, but her right hand is reaching upwards and outside the image frame as if she is holding the hand of someone, presumably her father. The slogan complains of insecure working conditions:

> Daddy graduated and has now been working as a teacher on temporary contracts for 11 years. Who would be content with that? May God bring justice, Hosni Mubarak.
> Signed, Basmala Abd Al-Haleem
> (Paldf.net 2011a)

> بابا متخرج بقاله 11 سنة وشغال مدرس بس بالعقد ولسه متعينش. يرضي مين الكلام دا. منه لله حسني مبارك.
> إمضاء بسملة عبد الحليم

The sign on the little girl explains that her father has been working on temporary contracts for 11 years. "Who would be content with that?/يرضي مين الكلام دا", she rhetorically asks the reader. The rhetorical question implies that no one agrees with such insecure working conditions. In this way, the slogan characterizes the little girl's father as just an ordinary individual with ordinary concerns such as work. All he wants is to have a decent job with decent job conditions, we are told. He protests against living in a social order that structurally deprives him of that opportunity. In my theoretical perspective, the slogan tells us that the father is keen on fulfilling the modern demand on individuals to be productive and to work, and in doing so constitute himself as a modern working individual.

As with the expressions about marriage, the slogan here points to the social consequences of the neoliberal reforms under Sadat and Mubarak – in this case, insecure working-conditions. As

explained in chapter three, Sadat and Mubarak dismantled Nasser's social safety net including the job guarantee for university graduates, minimum wages, and subsidized housing and pension schemes for civil servants. Neoliberal logics emphasizing free market mechanisms took over the labor market, and consequently, insecure working conditions increased. These insecure working conditions are what the girl and her father complain about. Because Nasser's social safety net is so well-known – and perhaps in particular the job guarantee for university graduates – I assert that the slogan contains an implicit comparison to the working conditions at the time of Nasser. In this comparison, Mubarak is tried and found wanting.

It is noteworthy that even though labor market structures, neoliberal reforms and insecure working conditions can be seen as highly political questions, the sign does not present the father's prolonged period of temporary contracts as a political question. By asking God to bring justice, the sign asserts that it is a moral question, not a political one. Decent working conditions are thus presented as something that the president has a moral obligation to provide, and indeed, has no right to withhold.

It is not only grown-ups who are presented as committed to fulfilling the modern demand to work. Young Egyptians and children are also presented as being committed to working in Reckwitz's sense of the term. The following two slogans tell of two participants' desire to go to kindergarten and to study, respectively. The two slogans also continue and finalize the series of "Leave"-slogans I present in this chapter:

ارحل بقى .. أنا عندى حضانة

Leave, I have kindergarten
(Alwatanvoice.com 2011, sign held by a little boy)

إنجز عندنا ثانوية عامة

Hurry up, we have final exams
(Adlat/2011 عدلات, sign held by a young man)

These concerns are examples of ordinary life activities undertaken by children and youth outside the home. They are presented as social expectations similar to the grown-up activity of work. In modernity, the activities of going to kindergarten and taking exams are generic ordinary life activities for specific age groups globally. The signs here thus present the child and the young man holding the signs as generic, ordinary individuals. Moreover, the second slogan contains an

important local reference. In an Egyptian context, the "final exams/ثانوية عامة" are of utmost importance. These exams are the final high school exams taken to obtain permission to enter university. The grades young Egyptians receive in these exams determine which faculty they can enter and which courses they can take (Zack 2012, p. 717). Therefore, missing out on these exams or not studying extensively for them has long-term consequences. The young man holding the sign with the second slogan urges Mubarak to leave so that he can fulfil the social expectation of studying hard and, hopefully, do well on these exams. In this way, the slogan tells us that the young man is not out to subvert the existing social order. Rather, he wants to live up to the local social expectation to do well in these exams.

To sum up, in the expressions presented in this section, the individual is presented as ordinary through descriptions of the ordinary life concerns that preoccupy the participants in the revolution. These descriptions revolve around trivialities of ordinary life, marriage, and work. In my perspective, the insistence on the importance of ordinary life concerns and the contestation of Mubarak and the regime through these concerns support the theoretical contention that ordinary life is the locus of the good life in modernity, not only in the West but globally. The revolutionary insistence on the importance of ordinary life concerns therefore functions as a way of showing that the participants in the revolution are modern ordinary individuals. Furthermore, although the local context puts these ordinary life concerns into perspective, there is nothing particularly Egyptian about them. They are generic ordinary life concerns of individuals all over the world. In this way, these expressions align the participants in the revolution with ordinary individuals all over the world and not exclusively with Egyptians. In the next section, I show how expressions of such global ordinary concerns are combined with presentations of the participants in the revolution as specifically Egyptian in an authentic, ordinary way.

Just an Egyptian…

The participants in the revolution are not just characterized as generic ordinary individuals on a global level but also as specifically Egyptian. These two ways of presenting the participants in the revolution, the global and the local, are not in opposition to each other, but simply emphasize the ordinariness of the participants in the revolution in two different ways. Together, they exemplify the interplay between global templates and local versions of these in the theoretical framework of the dissertation. And by underlining the importance of ordinary life, these expressions align the

revolutionary imaginaries with a modern worldview in which, according to Taylor, ordinary life is at the center.

In the present section I show how the participants in the revolution are ascribed allegedly specifically Egyptian character traits. These character traits are used to present the participants in the revolution as both ordinary and authentic Egyptians. They contest regime-led rumors accusing the participants in the revolution of supporting a foreign led subversion of the Egyptian society. Such rumors were promulgated in Egyptian media and included allegations that the participants received free meals from Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) or money to protest, that they supported foreign agendas, that the protesters were themselves foreigners or even Israeli spies, and that they took drugs and had sexual intercourse on the square (see e.g., Abdulla 2016, Amr 2011, Rada 2017). On a scholarly level, Hamdy and Gomaa furthermore maintain that the state-controlled media presented the participants as causing chaos (Hamdy and Gomaa 2012). In Mubarak's speeches to the nation during the 18 days of revolution, he bolstered such allegations by blaming the participants for destroying Egypt, thus continuing the regime-led understanding of the Egyptians as a wild and chaotic mass.[59] The revolutionary expressions contest and ridicule such rumors and understandings of the participants by presenting the participants as ordinary and authentic Egyptians. In this way, these expressions align the participants in the revolution with all other Egyptians, implicitly making claims of representativity.

Eating flatbread

The first allegedly Egyptian character trait ascribed to the participants in the revolution is eating Egyptian flatbread and other stock food of a traditional Egyptian household. This trait is used to counter the rumor that the participants received free KFC meals to protest. In the media, receiving KFC meals was proposed as a proof that the participants in the revolution were either foreigners or supported foreign agendas. In other words, that they were not true Egyptians and did not have Egypt's best interest in mind. For example, in one image, a young man is holding a sign and a piece of flatbread in his hand. The sign humorously tells us that:

> This is our Kentucky meal هو ده كنتاكى بتاعنا
> (Paldf.net 2011j)

[59] For the speeches see Dhakirat Maspero 2015a, Dhakirat Maspero 2015b, Dhakirat Maspero 2015c.

Flatbread is rich in symbolism in an Egyptian context. It has been subsidized since the Second World War to ensure that all Egyptians can put food on the table, and reducing the subsidies has proven a delicate matter (Salevurakis and Abdel-Haleim 2008). Flatbread is even called "life/عيش" in Egyptian Arabic, thus indicating its cultural significance as the main source of sustenance for many Egyptians. The word "bread/life/عيش" is also the first word in the two slogans "Bread, freedom, social justice/عيش حرية عدالة أجتماعية" and "Bread, freedom, human dignity/ عيش حرية كرامة إنسانية". In this context, some scholars have commented on the connotations of the word "bread/life/عيش" (Clarke 2013, Khatib 2015, Rennick 2013a). These scholars agree that "bread/life/عيش" is related to socio-economic questions of poverty and being able to put food on the table. Rennick sets the slogan as a whole in the broad context of a long Egyptian tradition of basing the social contract between ruler and the ruled on redistributive social welfare (Rennick 2013a, pagination unclear). Clarke relates the word "bread/life/عيش" to labor demands and the work of the 6 April movement in the years leading up to the revolution (Clarke 2013, p. 204-207). Elsewhere, Khatib says that bread "represents the daily life of Egyptians" (Khatib 2015, no pagination). These scholars thus present bread as an important symbol in both local imaginaries of the good ordinary life and in concrete political struggles. In contrast to the local connotations of bread, Kentucky meals are a foreign luxury that not everyone can afford (Zack 2012, p. 713). Therefore, by setting up a distinction between Kentucky meals and Egyptian flatbread, the slogan draws on oppositions such as rich vs. poor, elitist vs. popular, ordinary vs. luxury, foreign vs. Egyptian, and fake vs. authentic. Seen in this context, the slogan tells us that the participants were authentic, ordinary Egyptians who ate popular Egyptian food available to all Egyptians. It draws on local notions of what constitutes an ordinary individual and it creates an imagined link between the participants in the revolution and all other Egyptian.

Humble origin

The second character trait ascribed to the participants in the revolution is a humble origin. Here, I understand "humble origin" as a matter of coming "from a family that [does] not have high social status or much money" (Merriam-Webster 2019). This trait is ascribed to the participants in the revolution to counter the rumor that they received Euros to protest or that they were foreign agents themselves. Accusing dissident voices of being under foreign influence was an oft-heard accusation in Egypt before the revolution (Bauer and Schweitzer 2013, p. 5-6). Indeed, according to Abulof, anti-foreign sentiments dominate in the kind of nationalism promoted in the Arab world before the revolution (Abulof 2015). Abulof's argument seems plausible in an Egyptian context. As I related

in chapter three, at the beginning of the century Egyptians struggled to gain formal independence from British rule. In the middle of the century under Nasser, they struggled to gain true independence. By the end of the century under Sadat and Mubarak, they struggled to get rid of foreign imposed requirements to the Egyptian economy. The rumors discrediting the participants on anti-foreign grounds can thus be seen as a continuation of a long tradition of putting anti-foreign sentiments at the center of what it means to be a true (patriotic) Egyptian. In the slogan below, the accusation of being under foreign influence and receiving Euros to protest is countered by the following sarcastic comment:

> Perhaps someone will show me a currency exchange store??? I want to change Euro
> (Paldf.net 2011h)

ممكن حد يشوفلى صرافة ؟؟؟ عايز أغير اليورو

The man holding the sign with the slogan also has a wrinkled ½ pound note in his hand. He ridicules the idea that the participants in the revolution received Euros by showing that the kind of money they possess is not Euros but Egyptian pounds. Moreover, the amounts they possess are small amounts like ½ pound, and they only have access to old wrinkled notes. In my perspective, their lack of access to Euros, to large amounts, and to new notes shows that the participants in the revolution come from humble origins. They do not have any foreign connections at all and are just ordinary Egyptians. An Egyptian who comes from humble origins is also the kind of individual whose main source of sustenance is flatbread, and in this way there is a link between not eating Kentucky meals and not possessing Euros. Messages like these show how negative rumors questioning the participants' true identities were countered by presenting them as ordinary, authentic Egyptians.

The humorous Egyptian soul

The third specifically Egyptian character trait used to present the participants as ordinary Egyptians is humor. The etic scholarly explanation of how humor was used to break the so-called fear barrier, as presented in the review of literature in chapter two, is thus not shared by the participants in my sources. This is not because the question of overcoming one's fear to participate was not articulated. But as I briefly argued in chapter five, in my sources they do not relate the overcoming of one's fear to humor but rather to daring to speak up in a serious way. For example, In Prince's diary, Prince's

sister explicitly tells of how she overcame her fear in the moment she started chanting “Down with, down with Hosni Mubarak” in a crowd (Prince 2014, p. 76). This is a serious chant, not a humorous one. In my sources, humor is instead presented as an inherent character trait of the generic Egyptian.

Popular perceptions among Egyptians and other Arabs hold that a good sense of humor is a defining character trait of Egyptians (see e.g., Bassiouney 2015, chapter 4, Shehata 1992). This perception is often presented in essentialist terms, for instance in an article by Abdel Latif El Menawy, Head of the News at the Egyptian Radio and Television Union/إتحاد الإذاعة والتلفزيون المصري during the revolution. He writes that “from the beginning of our civilization, a laugh has been engraved on the face of the authentic Egyptian/الضحكة على وجه المصري الأصيل تبدو وكأنها محفورة عمرها من عمر حضارتهم” (El-Menawy 2017). That is, according to this author, humor is and always has been at the core of what it means to be a true, authentic Egyptian. Moreover, because humor belongs to the sphere of ordinary life, it is my argument that humor is not only related to authenticity but also to ordinariness. A good sense of humor is thus a character trait of the authentic *and* ordinary Egyptian.

During the Egyptian Revolution, the participants themselves explain the many humorous expressions at the square with reference to the humorous Egyptian soul. In this way, it is related to authenticity and being just an ordinary Egyptian. For example, Al Qudaimy writes in his diary that “many of the chants are full of the well-known Egyptian humor/ كثيرٌ من هذه الهتافات مُحملّة بالظَرَافة المِصرية المعهودة” and that “the Egyptians are exceptionally skilled in joke-making/ المصريين يملكون مهارة استثنائية في النُكتة” (Al Qudaimy 2012, p. 25 and 39). Nawaf Al Qudaimy/نواف القديمي is a Saudi writer and scholar who participated in the Egyptian revolution at Tahrir Square. In his diary, “Diary of the revolution. From Tahrir Square to Sidi Bouzid and to Change Square/ يوميات الثورة. من ميدان التحرير.. إلى سيدي بوزيد.. حتى ساحة التغيير” (Al Qudaimy 2012), he writes about the Egyptian, Tunisian, and Yemeni Revolution, but in my dissertation I only include the part about his participation in the Egyptian Revolution. In the two quotes above, he presents the use of humor as an Egyptian character trait. The previously mentioned slogans about KFC and Euros are also good examples of the use of humor at the square. As I explained in the previous sections, these expressions draw on allegedly specifically Egyptian character traits such as eating flatbread and not having foreign connections. But at the same time, they draw on the notion of the humorous Egyptian soul. That is, the use of humor *in itself* counters the regime’s accusations and presents the participants as authentic and ordinary Egyptians.

On the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, the use of humor at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution is also noted:

> There is an important but underappreciated aspect of the revolution of Egypt's youth. The humorous aspect. The amount of humor at Tahrir Square is abnormal. Even when we are protesting and fighting and being threatened, our blood is light.
> (We Are All Khaled Said 2011u)

> في جانب مهم قوي مهضوم حقه في ثورة شباب مصر. جانب الكوميديا. كمية الكوميديا اللي في ميدان التحرير غير طبيعية. حتى واحنا بنثور وبنكافح وبنتهدد برده دمنا خفيف.

The post tells us that the amount of jokes at Tahrir Square is abnormal. The administrator states that this is because "we" – the Egyptians and the participants seem to merge in the use of the pronoun "we" here – have "light blood/دم خفيف". Having light blood is a local expression denoting that someone has a good sense of humor. The post thus draws on a dominant local way of expressing the idea that humor is a particularly Egyptian character trait. The abundance of jokes and the participants' ability to make fun of things, even during hardship, proves that the participants in the revolution must be authentic, ordinary Egyptians. The comments to the Facebook post support the notion that humor is an Egyptian character trait through comments such as "The Egyptian is known for the light blood and a beautiful soul even in the greatest crises/ المصرى معروف بخفة دمه و روحة الحلوة حتى فى عز الازمة" and "We are the people of the joke, and the most beautiful part of us is our light blood/احنا شعب النكته و اجمل ما فينا هو خفة دمنا". In the second of these comments, yet another phrase denoting a good sense of humor is used, namely, "people of the joke/شعب النكته". This is a rewriting of the more common phrase "son of a joke/ابن نكتة". In this way, the idea that Egyptians are particularly funny is supported in a matter-of-fact way by many different individuals. That is, the widespread use of humor at the square presents the participants as authentic and ordinary Egyptians just like other Egyptians all over the country.

The religious Egyptian

The fourth allegedly Egyptian character trait used to present the participants in the revolution as ordinary Egyptians is religion. I have commented on the use of religion before, for example on how

prayer was used to present the participants in the revolution as civilized and orderly (see chapter four), on how God was ascribed agency as a helper but not as an independent agent, and on how a prophetic saying was used to legitimize a young man's action in local popular-religious terms (see chapter five). Here, I will show how religious expressions were also used to present the participants in the revolution as ordinary and authentic Egyptians.

A post from the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page offers an example of religion being used to counter accusations of Israeli presence at Tahrir Square. In the image attached to the post, a bird's eye view of Tahrir Square is portrayed. The central island in the roundabout of the square can be seen, and almost all the way around it participants are praying in neat lines. The text accompanying the image sarcastically reads:

> More than two million Mossad elements attend Friday prayers today at Tahrir Square.
> (We Are All Khaled Said 2011n)
>
> أكتر من 2 مليون عناصر الموساد صلوا الجمعة النهارده في ميدان التحرير

The rumors of Israeli presence in the form of the Israeli Secret Intelligence Service Mossad are ridiculed by showing a large crowd of Muslims praying in an orderly and civilized way. Clearly, the image tells us, this is not what Mossad would do if they had been at the square. The post thus uses prayer as a way of making claims about the participants' identity. It supports the interpretation in chapter four of how prayer was used to construct the participants in the revolution as civilized and orderly but adds an element of authenticity by opposing the participants to Mossad. The post plays on distinctions such as foreign vs. local, Israeli vs. Egyptian, subversion vs. religion, and fake Egyptians vs. authentic Egyptians. In this way, it presents the participants in the revolution as authentic Egyptians performing the ordinary and non-subversive ritual of public prayer.

What is particularly interesting in this post is the use of Islam. Usually in public discourse in Egypt, religion as an identity marker is presented as an "essential inclusive and holistic concept that brings all Egyptians together" by using general and non-specific references to God (Bassiouney 2015, p. 183). Alternatively, it is downplayed as being not important in identity formation by stressing similarities and unity between Muslims and Christians (Bassiouney 2015, p. 183, Iskander 2012, p. 32). In the above post, neither happens. Somehow, public prayer of one denomination is used as a shared identity marker. Importantly, the post is received positively by the followers. In 2011

Facebook did not have the option of disliking a post, so to gain an insight into the reception of the post it is necessary to look at the comments. Skimming through around 100 of the 3811 comments to the post (as per 07-01-2019), I have not come across negative comments other than those who do not get the sarcasm in the text. It is as if the Muslim aspect of the public prayer portrayed is simply sidelined, and what is emphasized instead is a shared positive view on religion. The religiousness of ordinary Egyptians keen on observing their daily religious obligations is thus used to show that the participants in the revolution are indeed authentic, ordinary Egyptians.

Hirshkind argues that an inclusive conception of Islam as a foundation for a shared national identity among Egyptians was espoused by intellectuals in the years leading up to the revolution, for example by the judge and intellectual Tariq Al-Bishri/Tarek El-Bishry/طارق البشري (Hirschkind 2012)[60]. His text "I call upon you to disobey/أضعوكم إلى العصيان", often translated as "A call for civil disobedience", was adopted as the manifesto of the opposition movement Kefaya (Hirschkind 2012, see IstiqlalParty 2015 for Al-Bishri's text). In this perspective, the understanding of Islam in the above post continues a pre-revolutionary tradition put forward in the protest imaginaries in the years leading up to the revolution. It tells us of the importance of religion in an Egyptian context, and it tells us of how Muslim public prayer can be used to make claims of authenticity and a shared Egyptian identity.

The use of Egyptian Arabic

The fifth and final specifically Egyptian character trait used to present the participants as ordinary Egyptians is the use of Egyptian Arabic, also referred to as Egyptian colloquial Arabic or the vernacular. During the revolution, the use of Egyptian Arabic was widespread. While it is of course no surprise that Egyptians at Tahrir Square spoke Egyptian Arabic among themselves, the extensive use of Egyptian Arabic in written revolutionary expressions, such as in slogans and on the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, can tell us something about how the revolutionary imaginaries can be seen as related to ordinary life and notions of authenticity.

In Egypt and in all other Arab countries, two overall variants of Arabic exist alongside each other. These variants are (Modern) Standard Arabic, the shared and official language of all Arab countries, and a local variety such as Egyptian Arabic. These two variants of the language are associated with different spheres and traits. Standard Arabic is associated with formal occasions such as sermons, political speeches, literature, news, and lectures, and with authority, legitimacy, and a connection to

[60] Both of these ways of transliterating the judge's name are widely used.

the divine (Bassiouney 2015, p. 110-127, Ferguson 1959, p. 329-331, Khalil 2012, p. 11). It dominates in written communication. In contrast, the local variant, such as Egyptian Arabic, is associated with informal occasions such as conversations with friends, family, and colleagues – that is, ordinary life situations – and with authenticity and pride in being Egyptian (Bassiouney 2015, p. 128-143, Ferguson 1959, p. 329-331). It dominates in oral communication. Furthermore, in the years leading up to the revolution, Egyptian Arabic also became associated with opposition and renewal through an increase in the use of Egyptian Arabic in oppositional newspapers, the startup of a private satellite channel using exclusively Egyptian Arabic, and the flourishing of oppositional voices in Egyptian Arabic in blogs (Bassiouney 2015, p. 137, Hirschkind 2010, p. 145-148, Ibrahim 2010).

Taking these associations into consideration, the widespread use of Egyptian Arabic in written revolutionary expressions is telling. For example, going through the 300 or so different slogans I have found online, around 55% of them are in Egyptian Arabic or in a combination of Egyptian Arabic and Standard Arabic, around 30% are exclusively in Standard Arabic, and around 15% are in English, in a variety of languages or mostly just an image. The deliberate choice of using Egyptian Arabic in a written form of communication thus aligns the participants in the revolution with Egyptian Arabic associations such as authenticity, ordinariness, innovative opposition, and renewal. It also dissociates the participants from at least some attributes associated with Standard Arabic. Here, I want to extend an argument made by Hirshkind. Writing about the widespread use of Egyptian Arabic in the Egyptian blogosphere in 2008, Hirshkind contends that,

> its distance from the writing styles of other textual media signals a judgement on the illegitimacy of Egypt's political institutions, not simply those of the state but also the organizations of political opposition which, from the standpoint of many Egyptians, have long been overcome by corruption and bureaucratic inertia
> (Hirschkind 2010).

Arguing in support of Hirshkind, the widespread use of Egyptian Arabic in the revolutionary expressions can be seen as a continuation of the pre-revolutionary disillusion with Egypt's political institutions, including those of the established political opposition. In this way, the many slogans using Egyptian Arabic dissociate the participants from the sphere of formal politics. Instead of presenting the participants as political beings who make demands related to the sphere of formal

politics, they are presented as ordinary Egyptians who prefer Egyptian Arabic over Standard Arabic. At the same time, the widespread use of Egyptian Arabic associates the participants' way of doing things with those of the innovative protest movements in the years leading up to the revolution.

The posts on the influential Facebook page We Are All Khaled Said are also written in Egyptian Arabic. In his diary, Ghonim, the founder and renowned administrator of the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page reflects upon his language choice, including his use of Egyptian Arabic. In my perspective, he tells us of how through choice of language and specific words he aimed at levelling the hierarchy between himself and the page's followers and presenting both parts as just ordinary Egyptians:

> Even though I am proficient at classical Arabic (*al-FusHa*)[61] from my years in Saudi Arabia, I chose to write my posts on "*Kullna Khaled Said*"[62] in the colloquial Egyptian dialect that is closer to the hearts of young Egyptians. For the generation born in the eighties and nineties, classical Arabic is a language read in the newspapers or heard during news reports on television and comes across as quite formal. By using colloquial Egyptian, I aimed to overcome any barriers between supporters of the cause and myself. I also deliberately avoided expressions that were not commonly used by the average Egyptian or that were regularly used by activists, like *nizaam*[63], the Arabic word for "regime". I was keen to convey to page members the sense that I was one of them, that I was not different in any way. Using the pronoun *I* was critical to establishing the fact that the page was not managed by an organization, political party, or movement of any kind. On the contrary, the writer was an ordinary Egyptian devastated by the brutality inflicted on Khaled Said and motivated to seek justice. This informality contributed to the page's popularity and people's acceptance of its posts.
> (Ghonim 2012, p. 61, italics in original)

In the quote, Ghonim associates Egyptian Arabic with ordinary life through terms such as "closer to the hearts", "overcome any barriers", "the average Egyptian", "ordinary Egyptian" and "informality". In contrast, he associates Standard Arabic with the media and the sphere of formal

[61] In Arabic, "الفصحى". This is what I have termed Standard Arabic in my text.
[62] That is, the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page.
[63] In Arabic, "نظام".

politics through terms such as “newspapers”, news reports”, “quite formal”, “activists”, “regime”, “organization, political party, or movement of any kind”. In my interpretation, he uses Egyptian Arabic to level hierarchies and present himself and the readers as just ordinary Egyptians. In this way, the modern emphasis on the importance of ordinary life underpins the quote. At the same time, he distances the page from the sphere of formal politics and frames the goal of seeking justice for Khaled Said as a caring for their common humanity.

Summing up, the five character traits ascribed to the participants in the present section present the participants as just ordinary Egyptians: Ordinary Egyptians who eat ordinary and authentic Egyptian food, come from humble origins, have a good sense of humor, who are religious, and who speak Egyptian Arabic. The characterization of the participants as just ordinary Egyptians is used to counter rumors that accuse the participants in the revolution of working for foreigner powers intent on destroying Egypt. In doing so, an accusation with clear political undertones is countered by showing that the participants are just ordinary Egyptians. The trumping of political accusations with ordinary life identities tells of the importance of ordinary life in modernity. In the local Egyptian context, it also points to the widespread skepticism towards the sphere of formal politics – a question I return to in chapter eight. The modern notion of the importance of ordinary life is thus emphasized and enacted in a specifically Egyptian way. In this way, these expressions substantiate my theoretical claim of an interplay between the global and the local. Within that frame, they also substantiate the claim in our shared collective research project that it is possible to use theories of modernity in an Arab context. Finally, by drawing on character traits considered typical of ordinary and authentic Egyptians, the revolutionary expressions create an imagined link of similarity between the participants in the revolution and all other Egyptians. An implicit claim of representativeness on behalf of (all?) other Egyptians is thus made, and consequently, the revolution is legitimated on local grounds.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown three ways in which the participants in the revolution are presented as ordinary individuals. In the first section of the chapter, I have shown how the social order at Tahrir Square revolves around ordinary life and how this social order makes room for the individual as ordinary. I have focused on how some revolutionary expressions emphasize the importance of equality and the levelling of hierarchies, and I have argued that this emphasis shows the importance of ordinary life in modernity. In the second section of the chapter, I have shown how the concerns

of the participants are presented as ordinary concerns similar to the concerns of other ordinary individuals all over the globe. The expressions used in this section of the chapter thus draw on global templates of what constitutes a good ordinary life in modernity. In the third section of the chapter, I have shown how the participants in the revolution are characterized as specifically Egyptian by drawing on allegedly typical character traits of the authentic, ordinary Egyptian. In this way, the participants are presented as ordinary and authentic individuals. Together, the second and third sections of the chapter underline the global-local interplay in my theoretical perspective. Moreover, by presenting the participants as just ordinary Egyptians similar to all other Egyptians, the expressions put forward an implicit claim of representativeness and legitimate the revolution on local grounds.

The chapter as a whole situates the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life in modernity. Only in modernity is it possible to contest a regime politically through expressions about ordinary life. By drawing attention to how Mubarak did not provide Egyptians with the possibility to create good, ordinary lives and by simultaneously showing that the participants in the revolution were indeed capable of setting up a good ordinary life on their own, life at Tahrir Square was used as a prefigurative "weapon" to contest the legitimacy of the regime. In this way, Taylor's notion of the importance of ordinary life in modernity can explain why life at Tahrir Square was constructed as ordinary life and why it was possible to contest the regime through life at the square. It moreover underlines that theories of modernity should not *a priori* be reserved to Western societies but can indeed be used fruitfully in an Arab context.

This chapter concludes the part of my dissertation that analyzes the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual. Through an analysis of many different kinds of revolutionary expression, I have argued that the individual in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life is presented as valuable, agentic and ordinary. I have also maintained that the way these characteristics are ascribed to the individual shows that the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual are specifically modern. In the next part of my dissertation, I move on to analyzing the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective.

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE COLLECTIVE OF THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE

Chapter seven is the first chapter in the third part of my dissertation. Together with chapter eight, it analyzes the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective, analyzing first the imaginaries of the collective of the Egyptian people as a whole (chapter seven) and then the relationship between dominant sub-categories of individuals within this collective (chapter eight).

In chapter seven I focus on how the collective of the Egyptian people as a whole is constructed in the imaginaries of the good life. I show how this collective is constructed by ascribing specific traits to it. I contend that the understanding of the Egyptian people in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life is reminiscent of understandings of the collective related to organized modernity and understandings of individual agency related to extended liberal modernity but in a particularly Egyptian nationalist context.

As I explained in chapter three, the social order under Sadat and Mubarak was based on ideals of individual self-reliance, responsibility, and (economic) drive while at the same time the neoliberal-authoritarian structures made the attainment of such ideals impossible. A distinction between minority and majority resembling that from restricted liberal modernity was reintroduced. Only those with close ties to the regime were considered valuable agentic individuals, while the majority was seen as an irrational, disorderly mass incapable of leading itself. During the revolution, regime representatives carried on this negative understanding of the majority of Egyptians, for example when newly appointed vice president Omar Suleiman/عمر سليمان in an interview said that he did not believe Egyptians were ready for democracy (Onlinedocument 2011, min 4:45) or when Mubarak in his speeches during the revolution accused the participants in the revolution of "spreading chaos, violence, and confrontation/اشاعة الفوضى واللجوء إلى العنف والمواجهة" (Dhakirat Maspero 2015c, 0:45 min). In such an environment, there was little room for a positive conception of the collective category of the Egyptian people as a whole. At the same time, the collectivist legacy of the Nasser era still lived on. Many of the opposition activities before the revolution were centered on building bridges and turning the atomized collection of Egyptians into a positively evaluated collective. During the revolution itself, collectivist notions of a united agentic Egyptian people flourished.

To show how the regime-led understanding of the Egyptians was contested and how a new understanding of the collective of the Egyptian people was proposed, I draw in particular on the understanding of the collective and on the idea of a shared rationality in organized modernity. To a lesser extent, I also draw on the notion of individual agency in extended liberal modernity. As I

explained in the introduction, in organized modernity the primary entities ascribed agency are homogeneous collectives. By uniting with peers around a common cause, the collective is imagined as strong and capable of steering society in a given desirable direction. Unlike in restricted liberal modernity, there is no external elite steering the majority. Rather, leadership is in the hands of a vanguard imagined to share the rationality of the (rest of the) collective, such as at the time of Nasser. Alternatively, it is managed through rules as in a representative democracy. In contrast, in extended liberal modernity the primary entities ascribed agency are individuals. In this kind of social order the individual is expected to turn contingency into order individually, not as part of a group. Each individual is thus imagined as capable of leading him- or herself and creating the kind of life they desire through individual choice and action. While individuals may come together to form groups, the belief in the heterogeneous nature of human beings means that such groups are imagined as fleeting, temporary, and voluntary. These two understandings of collectives, groups, and individuals thus differ substantially, but I nevertheless argue that they merge in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. Here, it is important to recall that I view the three forms of modern social order as ideal types, not as models to be tested. The present chapter is therefore also a good example of how ideal types can be used to interpret and explain local understandings of social phenomena.

The chapter consists of four sections and a conclusion. In the first section I contend that the Egyptian people is proposed as the dominant collective category in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. I note that this is not a given in a region where both pan-Arab and Islamist ideologies continuously challenge existing nation-state boundaries, and I relate it to the dominance of the modern global system of nation states. In the second section it is my argument that the Egyptian people is presented as united. I show how the unity proposed entails a transformation from a dispersed collection of individuals to a united collective, and I argue that the unity proposed draws on both new and old symbols of national unity. I compare the imaginaries of unity to notions from organized modernity. In the third section I contend that the collective of the Egyptian people is ascribed agency. I dissect the perhaps most well-known slogan from the Arab Revolutions, namely "The people wants to overthrow the regime/الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام" to show how notions of collective agency form a central part of the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life and of the contestation of the regime. Theoretically, notions of collective agency from organized modernity dominate here. In the fourth section I assert that the collective of the Egyptian people is presented as "leaderful", a term used by Chalcraft and others to describe how the participants steered themselves organically

towards some shared goals without a formal leader guiding the way. I show how local, traditional understandings of leadership are rejected and how they are replaced with notions of individual initiative and a context-bound, organic kind of leadership. Here, the belief in individual agency from extended liberal modernity merges with understandings of a shared rationality from organized modernity. The chapter finishes with a summing up and some conclusions are drawn.

The Egyptian people as the dominant collective category

In chapters four through six, I analyzed the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual. In these chapters I looked for expressions referring to single human entities, the analytical object thus being self-evident. However, in chapters seven and eight on the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective, the analytical object is not self-evident in the same way. Expressions about collectives may refer to a variety of collectives such as "Egyptians", "workers", "the people" and "Muslims". The present section therefore addresses the question of how to define the dominant collective category of individuals in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life.

I contend that the dominant collective category in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life is the Egyptian people. As noted in the review in chapter two, other scholars have also taken an interest in the category of the Egyptian people, sometimes only in a segment of a text and sometimes in a whole text (e.g., Chalcraft 2015, Challand 2013, Colla 2012, Sabea 2014). These texts seem to take the category of the people for granted but as Laclau notes, "people" is not a naturally given category, but a designation of a specific type of relation between individuals (Laclau 2005, p. 73). I therefore want to substantiate that the dominant collective category in the revolutionary imaginaries is indeed the Egyptian people.

At least three different kinds of expressions substantiate this claim. First, the widespread use of the word "people/شعب" points to "people" as an important collective category. This is apparent for example in the slogan "The people wants to overthrow the regime/الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام". Because the Arabic word "people/شعب" is typically used within a national or patriotic context (Ayalon 1987, p. 48-57), it implies that the "people" referred to is the Egyptian people. I return to the use of the word "people/شعب" as a collective actor in the section about collective agency. Second, formal political demands were expressed within a national context, such as "End of the state of emergency/ إنهاء حالة الطوارئ فورا" and "Formation of a national unity transitional government/تشكيل حكومة وحدة وطنية إنتقالية" (Khalil 2011, p. 51, translation as given). And third, the widespread use of the Egyptian flag during the revolution tells of nationalist sentiments centered on the Egyptian people as a collective. The

dominance of these three kinds of expressions signifies that the Egyptian people is the dominant collective category in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life.

Moreover, not only in the revolutionary imaginaries but also in the regime-led imaginaries is the category of the Egyptian people the dominant collective category. Looking at Mubarak's speeches during the revolution, he generally addresses the Egyptian people in a national Egyptian context, for example through words like "citizens/مواطنون", "Egyptians/مصريون", "Egypt and its children/ مصر وأبنائها", "the Egyptian people/الشعب المصري" and "the people/الشعب".[64] Therefore, both in the revolutionary imaginaries and in the regime-led imaginaries, a world view is set up in which the world consists of nation-states and in which national collective categories are the dominant collective categories.

In an Egyptian and Arab context, the dominance of nationalist collective categories is not given. During the twentieth century, several actors have contested partitioning the Arab world and the Middle East into nation states. In an Egyptian context, Nasser's pan-Arab attempt at transgressing national boundaries to form a pan-Arab union (Mellon 2002, p. 3-7) questioned the relevance of national collective categories such as "Syrians" and "Egyptians". In this way, Nasser challenged the colonial division of the Arab world into nation states. And in the broader Middle Eastern context, Islamist movements such as the renowned Islamic State also transgress existing national boundaries by promoting the idea that religious affiliation, not national affiliation, should be the primary collective identity marker (see e.g., Hashim 2014). That is, whether or not geographical boundaries in the Arab world are an artificial colonial imposition, Egyptians have embraced these boundaries and the concomitant modern idea of belonging to a nation state.

In the context of theories of modernity, the emphasis on the importance of a nationalist collective is also notable. According to Malešević, in theories of modernity emphasizing a linear development of modern social orders, the decline of strong national collective identities is implied (Malešević 2019, p. 65-70. Malešević mentions Beck, Bauman and Giddens as examples of scholars of such theories). As I explained in the introduction, Jung's rendition of the three forms of modern social order is based on Wagner's theory of successive modernities – and consequently, so is my theoretical framework. In Wagner's original version, the distinction between restricted liberal modernity, organized modernity, and extended liberal modernity is also based on the idea of linear development (Jung and Sinclair 2015, p. 28). By implication, it includes a postulate about the

[64] For the speeches see Dhakirat Maspero 2015a, Dhakirat Maspero 2015b, Dhakirat Maspero 2015c.

decline of strong nationalist collective identities from organized modernity to extended liberal modernity. However, such a displacement of collective identities and replacement with individual identities is not detectable in the expressions from the Egyptian Revolution. Rather, in the revolutionary imaginaries, notions of collective identity (this chapter and chapter eight) coexist with notions of individual identity (chapter four to six). In Jung's and my adapted versions of Wagner's original distinction, this is not puzzling. Because we both view the three forms of modern social order as heuristic instruments and ideal types, we avoid the developmental either-or implication and maintain interpretatively useful distinctions such as collective identity vs. individual identity. In my theoretical perspective, individual and collective identities can thus exist side by side. Malešević provides an explanation for why this might be so. He maintains that globalization in fact reinforces nationalism by producing highly standardized nation states (Malešević 2019, p. 79-81). Therefore, national collective identities are not in decline. At the same time, he argues that the modern nation state is the primary upholder of the idea of the equal value of all its citizens (Malešević 2019, p. 72). Seen in this perspective, the revolutionary emphasis on the importance of the individual's value and agency alsongside the emphasis on the importance of a strong, nationalist collective makes perfect sense.

To sum up, the revolutionary expressions show that the Egyptian people is the dominant collective category in the revolutionary imaginaries – as well as in the regime-led imaginaries. My short theoretical discussion substantiates that there is nothing puzzling about the proposition of a strong national collective identity alongside the emphasis on the importance of individual identity.

In the following, I turn my attention to which characteristics are more specifically ascribed to the collective of the Egyptian people in the revolutionary imaginaries. On this level, the revolutionary imaginaries of the Egyptian people no longer correspond to the regime-led imaginaries but are used to contest them. Indeed, in the revolutionary perspective, the regime's understanding of the Egyptian people as an irrational, disorderly mass incapable of leading itself is patronizing, humiliating, and untrue. Using my theoretical vocabulary to understand this complex, I assert that in the revolutionary perspective the regime's understanding of the Egyptian people is interpreted solely through the lens of restricted liberal modernity. That is, in the revolutionary perspective the regime's treatment of the Egyptians can be compared to the management of a wild mass as in restricted liberal modernity: The regime treats the Egyptians as if they have no value on an individual level, as I explained in chapter three. The revolutionary imaginaries of the collective

contest this understanding by ascribing the characteristics of unity, agency and leaderfulness to the Egyptian people.

Unity

In the present section I argue that the Egyptian people is characterized as united. In response to the existing dominant conception of the Egyptians as an atomized collection of entities incapable of working together, the revolutionary expressions focus on unity and the creation of a shared collective identity. In this way, they can be seen as a continuation of the pre-revolutionary protest movements' endeavors to overcome boundaries and create bonds of solidarity across the usual divides. Theoretically, expressions about unity draw in particular on collective notions from organized modernity.

The creation of a united collective

Some expressions tell of how a transformation of the Egyptians from an atomized collection of entities into the collective of the Egyptian people is imagined. This is apparent, for example, in Yusuf's diary. In the quote below, he does not really see it as a transformation, but as a discovery of the true nature of the Egyptian people. Simultaneously, he tells us of the pre-revolutionary understanding of the Egyptians as an atomized collection of entities:

> We must not forget that the Egyptians had reached a point of total despair in which they had lost faith in everything beautiful and in a bright future. And most of all, they had lost their faith in themselves. They had come to look at themselves as if they were just a group of "inhabitants" amassed together because of common circumstances and not a great, ancient people sailing on the sea of life on one ship for thousands of years, and anybody who cuts through it threatens everybody with drowning.
> (Yusuf 2011, p. 25)

> لا ننسى أن المصريين كانوا قد وصلوا إلى درجة من درجات اليأس المطبق ، وفقدوا الثقة في كل شيء جميل ، وفي أي غد مشرق ، والأهم من ذلك أنهم فقدوا الثقة في أنفسهم ، فأصبحوا ينظرون إلى أنفسهم على أنهم مجموع من ((السكان)) ، جمعتهم الظروف في مكان واحد ، وليسوا شعبًا عريقًا عظيمًا ، يركب منذ آلاف السنين سفينة واحدة تبحر في بحر الحياة ، وكل من يخرم فيها يهدد الجميع بالغرق !

In the quote, Yusuf sets up a distinction between ”inhabitants/سكان” and “people/شعب”, and between false and true. The word “inhabitants/سكان” is related to the false pre-revolutionary understanding of the Egyptian people. The word is usually used to count a population and is, to the best of my knowledge, devoid of notions of collectivity. Yusuf tells us that the Egyptians had come to look at themselves as if they were just “a group of inhabitants amassed together because of common circumstances/مجموع من ((السكان)) ، جمعتهم الظروف في مكان واحد”. That is, the Egyptians had come to see themselves not as a united collective, but as an atomized collection of entities who had only presumably negative circumstances in common. This self-perception caused feelings of “total despair/درجة من درجات اليأس المطبق”, loss of faith “in everything beautiful and in a bright future/ في كل شيء جميل ، وفي أي غد مشرق” and in themselves. Or in other words, the Egyptians had given up.

The negative understanding of the Egyptians as an atomized collection of entities corresponds quite well with the revolutionary imaginaries of the pre-revolutionary *individual*. I argue from this that the imaginaries of a united collective not only contest another understanding of the Egyptians on a collective level, but also on an individual level. That is, the pre-revolutionary individual is not only imagined as transformed into a valuable and agentic individual as presented in chapters four and five, but also into a member of a united collective. Because there was no real collective before the revolution, the only way to describe the pre-revolutionary atomized collection of individuals is through the characterization of the pre-revolutionary individual. The words “على أن” which I in this context have translated into “as if” tell us that this understanding of the Egyptians is false. In fact, Yusuf tells us, the Egyptians are really a “great, ancient people sailing on the sea of life on one ship for thousands of years, and anybody who cuts through it threatens everybody with drowning/ شعبًا عريقًا عظيمًا ، يركب منذ آلاف السنين سفينة واحدة تبحر في بحر الحياة ، وكل من يخرم فيها يهدد الجميع بالغرق”. This is the Egyptian people’s true nature, according to this quote. Here, the central word is “people/شعب”. This word evokes the collective sensibilities of unity absent in the word ”inhabitants/سكان”. In the sentence here, the people is sailing on one ship; that is, it is united. It has done so for thousands of years, meaning that it has proved capable of steering itself as a collective and does not need a captain to do so. In my perspective, the quote thus draws on notions of collective agency and cooperation from organized modernity while rejecting the related idea that someone leads this collective.

Yusuf's positive characterization of the Egyptian people's true nature is in large part legitimated through history. According to Bassiouney, history is often used in public discourse in Egypt to legitimate claims of a shared Egyptian identity (Bassiouney 2015, p. 152-153). In this perspective, Yusuf draws on a local legitimization strategy to convince his readers that it is in fact the Egyptian people's true nature to unite in a collective and steer themselves.

A diverse yet united people

In the slogans at Tahrir Square, unity was also an important theme. One of the ways in which unity was proposed was by displaying Christian and Muslim symbols together, such as the Quran and the Bible or the crescent and the cross.[65] The crescent and cross-symbol was particularly widespread, sometimes standing alone and sometimes accompanied by words, as for example in this slogan:

> One hand, one people أيد واحدة شعب واحدة
> (Egyptphotos.revolution25january.com 2011c, next to the slogan is a drawing of the crescent and a cross)

The symbol of the crescent and the cross is here combined with two statements of unity, namely "one hand/أيد واحدة" and "one people/شعب واحدة". These statements indicate that what mattered in the revolutionary context was national unity and the ability to act in unison. Indeed, the phrase "one hand" as an expression of unity between Muslims and Christians was regularly employed during the 18 days of revolution. By simultaneously displaying the crescent and cross next to these words, both unity and diversity are underlined. Diversity and unity are thus presented alongside each other – an issue which I return to in chapter eight.

As noted in chapter three, the symbol of the crescent and the cross is said to date back to the 1919 Revolution. At that time, it was used in relation to the nation-based kind of nationalism espoused by the nationalist leader Zaghloul. The use of this symbol therefore situates the revolutionary endeavors in a continuous struggle to ensure that the nationalist collective of the Egyptian people embraces both Muslims and Christians. The explicit inclusion of both Muslims and Christians into the nationalist collective can also be seen as a continuation of Kefaya's pre-revolutionary attempts at uniting Egyptians around the shared desire to see Mubarak leave. In this way, the creation of

[65] See e.g., Assaf et al. 2011, p. 76 and 78, Egyptphotos.revolution25january.com 2011c, Gröndahl 2011, frontpage and p. 128-129, Khalil 2011, p. 74, 79 and 90.

unity in the above slogan is aligned with a long tradition of how to create unity in a local, Egyptian context. It tells of the local importance of ensuring national unity and religious diversity at one and the same time, and it contests the pre-revolutionary social order in which unity between Muslims and Christians sometimes existed mostly on a rhetorical level. Theoretically, this and similar slogans draw on the belief in the strength of a united collective of the kind dominant in organized modernity.

To sum up, in the expressions about unity, a transformation or perhaps a realization of a postulated existent trait of the Egyptian people is imagined. The proposition of unity is probably not surprising in a revolutionary context. Here, it is important to recall that my aim is not to describe generic features of revolutions but to understand the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective during the Egyptian Revolution in 2011. In this perspective, the ways in which unity is proposed, the local context, and the contestation of the regime through the ascription of unity can tell us something about how the Egyptian people is imagined in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. For example, it tells us of the importance of uniting in a nationalist collective despite religious diversity and of how unity is legitimated through history. In this way, the belief in the strength of a united collective dominating in organized modernity is expressed in specifically local terms. Furthermore, in my perspective, the proposition of unity during the revolution contested the pre-revolutionary social order in which sectarian outbursts of violence increased in the years leading up to the revolution. In this way, the collective efforts of the participants in the revolution showed that they were capable of doing what the Mubarak regime was not capable of, namely uniting the Egyptians around a common nationalist cause. The participants' ability to act in unity precisely in the absence of the hegemony of the regime thus seriously contested the legitimacy of the regime. It prefigured another way of living in the "free space" of Tahrir Square.

Collective agency

The unity of the Egyptian people proposed in the expressions above can be seen as the basis of collective agency. In this section I therefore move on to explore how collective agency was ascribed to the Egyptian people. As with the proposition of unity, it is not surprising that notions of collective agency are important in a revolutionary context, but again, the aim is not to describe generic features of revolutions but to understand the specific imaginaries entailed in the revolutionary expressions. I contend that the Egyptian people is imagined as agentic in a way

resembling the understanding of collectives in organized modernity and in Nasser's Egypt, but without the idea that the collective is led by someone or something external to its own will.

I focus on what is possibly the clearest example of the ascription of collective agency to the people in the revolutionary imaginaries, namely the slogan "The people wants to overthrow the regime/الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام", both alone and in the context of Ramy Essam's/رامي عصام song "Leave/إرحل".

Stating collective demands

Ramy Essam was a young unknown singer who came to Tahrir Square to participate in the revolution. Essam's song, "Leave" gained a somewhat iconic status, and some commentators even dubbed him "singer of the revolution" or "voice of the uprising" (Inskeep 2011, Lynskey 2011). The story of how this unknown singer sang himself to fame at Tahrir Square can be seen as the prototypical example of the kind of entrepreneurial, individual agency dominant in extended liberal modernity. However, the content of his song does not emphasize individual agency but collective agency of the kind dominant in organized modernity. In my perspective, the performance of the song shows how propositions of individual and collective agency can exist side-by-side. It underlines the fruitfulness of viewing the three forms of modern social order as ideal types to be used heuristically instead of viewing the belief in collective and individual agency as oppositions.

Essam performed his song titled "Leave/إرحل" on February 1 after Mubarak's second speech. In that speech, Mubarak said he would stay in office until the elections in September and then resign (Lynskey 2011). While some participants did have some sympathy for Mubarak's promise to leave in September, many participants did not trust him or were concerned that his son, Gamal Mubarak, would simply take over – a concern founded on the regime's pre-revolutionary attempts at grooming Mubarak junior as the future president. Ramy Essam's song can be seen as an answer to Mubarak's speech.

The song is composed of slogans and chants Essam overheard at Tahrir Square during the revolution (Swedenburg 2012a, p. 41). El Hamamsy and Soliman propose that the composition of the song can be seen as an example of what they call artistic street assimilation in which the line between performer and audience is blurred (El Hamamsy and Soliman 2013, p. 254-255). Or, in my words, the composition of the song can be seen as the result of a collective effort. By including this song, I stretch my source selection criterion related to popularity. In chapter one I explained that I include sources produced and/or consumed by many or a wide spectrum of individuals *and*

expressed in popular terms. Essam's song, however, is not mainly expressed in popular terms but in terms related to the sphere of formal politics. I have included this song even though it only fulfills one part of the popularity criterion because it is a fascinating example of how collective – and thus popular – efforts can play a role in the production of a song. As the song is at the same time a paradigmatic example of the genre of songs, it made sense to include it. Looking at the content of the song, the slogans and chants incorporated emphasize collective agency. Here is the entire text:

All of us, one hand, demand one thing	كلنا إيد واحدة طلبنا حجة وحدة
Leave, leave, leave, leave	إرحل إرحل إرحل إرحل
Down, down with Hosni Mubarak	يسقط يسقط حسني مبارك
The people wants to overthrow the regime	الشعب يريد اسقاط النظام
He shall go, we will not go	هو يمشي مش هنمشي
(Khalid 2011)	

The song focuses on the demand that Mubarak shall leave. In my theoretical perspective, it also tells us of the construction of the people as a collective actor. In the first line, the united nature of the Egyptian people is emphasized in three ways, thus substantiating that the unity of the Egyptian people was important. First, the word "all of us/كلنا" stresses that everybody wants the same thing. It underlines the unanimity in a way that a simple "we" would not do. Perhaps it is also a reference to the title of the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page as the first part "We are all/كلنا" in Arabic corresponds to words "all of us/كلنا" in the song here. Second, the phrase "one hand/إيد واحدة" presents the collective as united and capable of acting as such. As mentioned previously, the phrase was used during the revolution to denote national unity between Muslims and Christians. Moreover, the phrase was used about unity between the people and the Egyptian army in the slogan "The people and the army are one hand/الشعب والجيش إيد واحدة" (Ketchley 2014, Khalil 2012, see also the review of literature in chapter two). In both cases, national unity is suggested to replace divisive categorizations. Although neither religious diversity nor the army is mentioned in Essam's song, the underlying theme of diversity-unity within an overall nationalist frame is implied and probably noticed by the participants. Third, the last part of the first line about demanding "one thing/ حجة وحدة" emphasizes unity by telling us that the people is in fact capable of demanding in unison. Theoretically, the thorough emphasis on the unity of the collective is reminiscent of the belief in the strength of a united, homogeneous collective in organized modernity. In the local, Egyptian context,

it was used to contest Mubarak's claim that a strong leader such as himself was needed to unite and steer the unruly masses.

In the subsequent lines, the Egyptian people is presented as determined and capable of stating collective demands as the rest of the song basically repeats the same message in different ways: Leave! The second line repeats the exact word "leave/إرحل" several times, thus insistently telling Mubarak that his suggestion to stay in office until September is not accepted. Here, the word "leave" seems related to the sphere of formal politics. Looking at the context of the song, it is circumscribed by a singer singing a statement-like song on a stage as a response to a political speech, and it is connected to other words urging Mubarak to leave. Therefore, the word "leave" seems related to the idea of causing change on a societal level, and perhaps specifically to the sphere of formal politics. This is in contrast to the use of the word "leave" in the slogans analyzed in chapter six. In that context I argued that the word was related to the sphere of ordinary life because Mubarak was asked to leave to enable Egyptians to live ordinary lives. The contrast in connotations of the word "leave" underlines one of my analytical points adopted from Laclau regarding how "elements do not pre-exist the relational complex but are constituted by it" (Laclau 2005, see also the section about a discourse-based analytical approach in the introduction). That is, the word "leave" must be seen in relation to the context and the concrete connections and distinctions it forms part of. The use of the word "leave" in Essam's song therefore adds political reasons to the ordinary life reasons for why Mubarak should leave. And it presents the people as agentic and capable of stating collective demands.

The third line repeats the desire to see Mubarak leave through the line "Down, down with Hosni Mubarak/يسقط يسقط حسني مبارك" while the fifth line repeats it by stating that "He shall go, we will not go/هو يمشي مش هنمشي". The "Down with Mubarak"-slogan is adopted from Kefaya (Clarke 2013, p. 203), thus tracing a line back to the pre-revolutionary struggle to cause Mubarak to leave. And the fifth line "He shall go, we will not go" underlines that it is not the participants that shall leave, but Mubarak. This fifth line seems related to the regime's repeated calls for the participants to leave Tahrir Square and "save the economy of the country", as vice president Suleiman said in the earlier mentioned interview (Onlinedocument 2011, 5:10 min).

In my perspective, notions of unity and collective agency merge in the slogans incorporated in Essam's song: Through the creation of unity, the people is imagined as strong and capable of stating collective demands. The belief in the power of a united collective resembles notions of collective

agency in organized modernity. At the same time, in the local context, it contests the regime's understanding of the Egyptians as an irrational mass that needs a strong leader to manage their inherent wildness.

"The people wants to overthrow the regime"

The fourth line, "The people wants to overthrow the regime/الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام", demands particular attention as it is arguably the most famous slogan from the Egyptian Revolution and from the Arab Revolutions in general. In my perspective, it is perhaps also the best example of how the Egyptian people is ascribed collective agency. I therefore analyze it in detail.

The slogan was initially used during the revolution in Tunisia and is allegedly an adaption of the opening line of the Tunisian poet Abu Al-Qasim Al-Shabbi's poem "The will to live/إرادة الحياة" (Colla 2012, no pagination) written during the time of French colonialization in Tunisia (Elbousty 2013). Colla asserts that the opening lines of the poem are known "by any educated person anywhere in the Arab world" (Colla 2012, no pagination). The slogan was used by the participants in the Egyptian Revolution and throughout the region during the Arab Revolutions, either word-for-word or adapted (Abulof 2015, p. 673-674, Colla 2012, no pagination). Following the Egyptian Revolution, it was further adapted in numerous forms to reflect the new local context, for example in the Choir Project's song "The people wants the life of the square/الشعب يريد حياة الميدان" (TheChoirProjectEgypt 2011).

While the adapted opening lines of Al-Shabbi's poem were used in the political context of a revolution in 2011, the poem itself is not a political poem. According to Hanssen and Weiss, the poem is in fact existentialist. They relate the use of the poem in the Arab Revolutions to a desire to revive the "Nahda/نهضة" project, the cultural and humanist awakening or renaissance around the beginning of the twentieth century (Hanssen and Weiss 2016, p. 7-8). In a similar vein, Sanders and Visonà argue that the poem ascribes agency to the people and "presents the choice between action and apathy as a life-or-death struggle" (Sanders IV and Visonà 2012). In my perspective, the use of this non-political poem is interesting. It supports my contention that the revolutionary aims were much broader than being merely related to the sphere of formal politics. It would have been quite easy to draw on local political poetry directly related to the contestation of those in power. As I explained in chapter five, poetry in the Arab world has gained a political function for its ability to criticize those in power in an indirect way. The participants could have drawn on some of that poetry, for example on some of Sheikh Imam/الشيخ إمام and Ahmed Fouad Negm/أحمد فؤاد نجم popular

protest songs, but instead, the opening lines of an existentialist poem were transformed into a revolutionary message. It suggests that the revolutionary endeavors should not only be related to the desire to cause change within the sphere of formal politics but also within a broader defined sphere.

According to Colla, the slogan entails a directness that other slogans did not. He asserts that this is one of the reasons for the slogan's popularity (Colla 2011, p. 80). Colla's scholarly assessment seems to be shared by some of the participants as well. For example, upon hearing the slogan for the first time, Prince exclaims "Just like that!" (Prince 2014, p. 23), as if the directness of the slogan is liberating. In a similar vein the writer and political commentator Ahdaf Soueif/أهداف سويف in her diary "Cairo. Memoir of a city transformed" (Soueif 2014) says "There it was, no lead-up, no half-measures" (Soueif 2014, p. 23). Elsewhere, the journalist Kamal El Deen in his diary "The night where the president fell/ليلة سقوط الرئيس" (Kamal El Deen 2012) writes that the use of the word "wants/يريد" gives the slogan an air of "evident truth/حقيقة جلية" (Kamal El Deen 2012, no pagination). In different ways, these three authors evaluate the directness of the slogan positively. The attractiveness of the direct nature of the slogan should probably be seen in the local Egyptian authoritarian context where direct critique, let alone demands of regime change, was unusual and indeed dangerous. As I argued in chapter five, in such an environment speaking up and stating one's will becomes a defiant and transformative act. In this way, the slogan "The people wants…" can be seen as the collective equivalent to individualized attempts at stating one's will. It is thus my argument that by stating the people's will, the Egyptians are symbolically transformed from an atomized collection of entities into the agentic collective of the Egyptian people.

The slogan itself begins with the word "people/الشعب". That is, in contrast to the other lines in Essam's song, the slogan here explicitly states who the sender of the message is, namely the people. Laclau maintains that it is in the moment of naming and demanding in the name of a people that the people comes into existence (Laclau 2005, chapter 4). In this perspective, the significance of the slogan "The people wants…" cannot be overestimated. Drawing on Laclau's theoretical point, Colla underlines that the slogan only "performs", as he calls it, when it is "possible to imagine that the number of individuals speaking the slogan represents society in its entirety" (Colla 2012, no pagination). That is, according to Colla "the people" only comes into existence as a collective actor if it is possible to imagine that those speaking and acting in the name of the people represent the population at large. In chapter eight I show how some revolutionary expressions contain claims of representativity, thus substantiating that is was indeed possible to imagine that the participants represented the Egyptian people at large. And in chapter six, the expressions in the section "Just an

Egyptian" drawing on stereotypical Egyptian character traits can also be interpreted as claims of representativity. I therefore assert that it was indeed possible to imagine that those stating demands in the name of the people represented the people.

Abulof notes that the word "people" is in the singular, and therefore, that the second word in the slogan, "يريد", should be translated into "wants" and not "want" as is often done (Abulof 2015, p. 673). This is an important point as the reference to a united collective is somewhat lost if the slogan is translated into "The people *want* to bring down the regime". Grammatically then, the inclusion of this slogan in Essam's song supports the notion of unity in the first line of the song and it presents the Egyptian people as a collective actor. The active verb "wants/يريد" is surprisingly polite, taking the context into consideration. Using a more forceful word like "demands" or "insists" would have made sense (point adapted from Subyraman.com No date). However, the two words "people" and "wants" are the only two words linking the slogan to Al-Shabbi's poem "The will to live", so without it the alleged historical reference seems lost. Regardless of the politeness, the active verb "wants" ascribes agency to the collective of the Egyptian people. As I explained in the introduction, the ascription of agency to human beings is a specifically modern idea – in earlier times, agency was ascribed to God or to nature (Meyer and Jepperson 2000, see also the introduction). Indeed, according to Taylor the modern social order is founded upon popular sovereignty (Taylor 2004, chapter 8), a concept which I see as being closely related to collective agency. In this regard, the mere will of the people is central. Taylor mentions the American constitution as an example of "the will of a people that had no need of some preexisting law to act as a people *but could see itself as the source of law*" (Taylor 2004, p. 111-112, my emphasis). This seems equivalent to what is expressed in the slogan "The people wants…": No preexisting, God-given or natural law was needed to legitimate the overthrow of the regime. The mere will of the people was enough. The slogan thus ascribes agency to the people as a collective actor and embraces a modern world view based on popular sovereignty. Moreover, the politeness in the word "wants" presents the people as civilized and peaceful. In this way, it contests the regime-led understanding of the Egyptians as a wild, uncivilized mass that should be managed and confined as in restricted liberal modernity. That is, in my perspective, the ascription of agency to a human collective and the legitimization of the collective's desire solely with reference to its own will show that the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective are modern.

The next part of the sentence, "to overthrow/إسقاط" is one word in Arabic and may also be translated to "overthrowing". Grammatically, the conjugation of the verb "saqata/سقط" in the fourth stem (IV

أَسقَطَ) denotes that someone is actively causing the overthrow of somebody or something else. In contrast, in the slogan and third line of Essam's song, "Down, down with Hosni Mubarak/ يسقط يسقط حسني مبارك", the same root is conjugated in the first stem (I سَقَطَ، يَسقُط) whereby we do not know who is to cause the downfall of Mubarak. But in the slogan "The people wants…", the people actively causes the downfall of the regime. That is, the people is ascribed agency. Translating the slogan into "The people want(s) *the fall* of the regime", as is sometimes done, misses this subtle nuance as the people is not explicitly ascribed agency in this case.

Finally, the last word in the slogan, "the regime/النظام", refers to the object of what the people wants to overthrow. The word "regime/نظام" is a broad term. Lexically, it is related to the creation of order and may also be translated into "system", "organization", or "order" (Wehr 1980, p. 978). It does not necessarily only refer to those in power, whether these are Mubarak and his family, the government, the National Democratic Party, or the business elite. It may also refer to a whole way of doing things, to "a *sociopolitical* order" or to a "regime of knowledge, or *régime de savoir*" (Challand 2013, p. 169, italics as given, Subyraman.com No date, italics as given). Regardless of what exactly the term comprises, it seems to refer to some sort of order on a social level. The people is ascribed collective agency to overthrow this order. Sabea contends that "[t]he 'system' and the people who rose to dismantle it are two sides of the same coin; the making of one was premised on the destruction of the other" (Sabea 2014, p. 71). That is, as broad and vague as the term "regime" may be, the *de*struction of the regime was necessary for the *con*struction of the people. Therefore, the term fulfills an important task in the symbolic creation of the people and in the ascription of collective agency to it. The broad meaning of "the regime" and other terms contributed to uniting Egyptians during the 18 days of revolution, but according to some scholars it also contributed to dividing them afterwards (El-Mahdi 2012, Khatib 2015, Rennick 2013a). Regarding the understanding of the term "regime", after the revolution disagreements reemerged between those who wanted to overthrow specific individuals in power and those who wanted to change the sociopolitical system as a whole. For example, Rennick argues that the fault line between the Muslim Brotherhood and what she calls the revolutionary forces can be seen in this light (Rennick 2013a, paragraph 23-24), while El Mahdi contends rather that the disagreement reflected class-based differences between the working class and the privileged middle to upper classes (El-Mahdi 2012, p. 144-145).

As a whole, the slogan "The people wants…" ascribes agency to the collective of the Egyptian people. It presents the participants as representative of the Egyptian people as a whole, it tells us that the people as a collective has a will that should be obeyed, and it tells us that this will centers on causing change on a societal level. In this way, it is my argument that the slogan not only contests the regime by calling for the fall of the regime, but also by creating a new understanding of the people.

To sum up and discuss the section about collective agency in its entirety, the revolutionary expressions ascribe agency to the collective of the Egyptian people. By doing so, they trace lines both to the understanding of the people during the time of Nasser and to the understanding of the collective in the ideal type of organized modernity. As I explained in chapter three, at the time of Nasser a unified and homogeneous vision of the people was put forth. The united and homogeneous people was imagined as highly agentic and capable of building a new Egypt under the leadership of Nasser. Although Nasser took on a clear role as leader, the belief in a shared rationality between people and leader presented his leadership as a mere extension of the people's will. The 2011 revolutionary preoccupation with collective agency, unity of the people, collective will, and collective demands is reminiscent of the understanding of the people during Nasser's time. Because of the continuous nostalgic admiration for at least parts of Nasser's visions, I argue that expressions of collective agency probably remind Egyptians of a period when the broad majority of Egyptians had conferred on them a positive role in society and where Egypt as a nation was considered a leader in the Arab world. In this way, the revolutionary imaginaries of an agentic collective are legitimized on local ground. At the same time, the revolutionary preoccupation with collective agency, unity, will, and demands resembles the understanding of the collective in the ideal type of organized modernity. As explained in the introduction, in organized modernity, notions of collective agency take precedence over individual agency. Through collective efforts, it is believed that it is possible to manage and steer society in a desirable direction. During the revolution, notions of collective agency were endorsed through expressions like those treated in the present section. In this way, local and global understandings of collective agency merge in such expressions.

However, while the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective of the Egyptian people resemble the understanding of the collective in Nasser's vision as well as in organized modernity, the idea that someone or something leads the collective is absent in the expressions treated here. I contend that this is not merely a coincidence or due to the statement-like character of slogans as a genre. Rather, it is due to a rejection of the idea of formal leadership. In the next section I look into this rejection

and investigate what steers or "moves" the collective in the revolutionary imaginaries of the Egyptian people.

The leaderful collective

Because of the absence of formal leaders, the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective cannot simply be seen as a dream of returning to the time of Nasser. Nor can they be seen a copy of the organizational model in organized modernity. As Chalcraft notes, the Arab Revolutions "were new in that for the first time since independence the domestic regime of an Arab state or at least the real head of the regime was brought down by a mass popular uprising" (Chalcraft 2015). That is, Chalcraft tells us that a large group of individuals acted as a collective and somehow steered itself against those in power. In this section I assert that traditional notions of leadership were rejected and that what replaced them was an understanding of an organic and context-bound kind of leadership based on individual initiative. In this way, the collective was imagined as leaderful, not leaderless. In my theoretical perspective, the idea of a leaderful collective contains notions of collective agency and a shared rationality from organized modernity combined with notions of individual agency from extended liberal modernity.

The rejection of traditional notions of leadership

The revolutionary rejection of ElBaradei's offer to lead the transition can be seen as an example of the newfound belief in people power and the rejection of traditional notions of leadership. Before the revolution, Mohamed ElBaradei was a rather popular opposition figure, and some Egyptians even saw him as a potential presidential candidate for the upcoming elections in 2011 (EgyptIndependent 2010). Among my sources, both Yusuf and Ghonim participated in the campaign to support ElBaradei's presidency (Ghonim 2012, p. 39-57, Yusuf 2011, p. 26). ElBaradei was also the former head of the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency and was awarded the Nobel prize in that position. At the time of the revolution, he had been living in Austria for a number of years. Because of his popularity both within and outside of activist circles, the revolutionary rejection of ElBaradei may seem surprising. However, when looking at life at Tahrir Square as a set of prefigurative practices, the rejection of ElBaradei's offer can be seen as a consequence of the revolutionary desire to create a new kind of life and a new social order in Egypt. It can, on the one hand, tell us of the newfound belief in unity, collective agency, and the strength of the Egyptian people, and on the other hand, of the rejection of traditional Arab notions of leadership based on the idea of an external vanguard leading the way for the masses.

A number of tweets tell of the rejection. Tweets are short posts on the social network Twitter used by some of the activists during the Egyptian Revolution. The tweets I have included in my collection of sources are from a book, "Tweets from Tahrir", an edited book that contains tweets from prominent activists tweeting in English (Idle and Nunns 2011). The tweets in the book thus probably reflect an elitist and politically oriented perspective. However, even though the tweets below clearly comment on the unfolding of events related to the sphere of formal politics, they also contain a broader perspective. It is this aspect of the tweets that I focus on here. The tweets are both from January 27, the day ElBaradei returned to Egypt and declared his willingness to lead the transition if the people so willed (Memmott 2011). In these tweets, the rejection of ElBaradei's offer is clear:

> Screw this. We don't need leaders! "Al Arabiya: Elbaradei says ready to 'lead the transition' in Egypt http://bit.ly/dWMcwO #jan25"
>
> One of the best things about this uprising is that it's from and for the people, not the parties, not ElBaradei. Keep it that way. #Jan25
> (Idle and Nunns 2011, p. 54 and 56)

The first tweet vehemently rejects ElBaradei's offer by saying, "Screw this. We don't need leaders!". While the statement is a response to ElBaradei's offer to lead the transition, it is stated in general terms, and as such it may tell of a rejection of leaders more generally. Seeing the tweet in isolation, it is unclear whether the "we" refers to the participants or to Egyptians in general, but because of the numerous other efforts to present the participants in the revolution as representative of all Egyptians – I elaborate on this in chapter eight – the statement may tell us that Egyptians in general do not need leaders. Interpreted in this way, it contributes to the understanding of the Egyptians as a people capable of stating collective demands and acting in unison without someone leading the way. The second tweet tells us that the revolution is from the people and for the people – and therefore without ElBaradei as leader. The tweet thus presents ElBaradei as not one of the people or as external to the people. The understanding of ElBaradei as external to the people was presented on more than one occasion. For example, in a television interview from January 31 when ElBaradei held a speech at Tahrir Square, a participant in the revolution is upset that ElBaradei left the square because he ought to be there with the (other) participants. Another participant discredits ElBaradei because he spent most of his life outside Egypt and did not know what was going on

locally (The New York Times 2011, 1:30 min and 1:10 min). In such comments, ElBaradei is also presented as not one of the people. Furthermore, he does not know the people or what is going on locally. Both of these comments function as a way of delegitimizing ElBaradei as a leader of the transition. Together, such expressions present the people as self-contained and capable of leading itself: The people does not need a leader, let alone an external leader who does not know the people.

Theoretically, these expressions can be interpreted as statements of belief in the collective abilities of the people, as analyzed in the two previous sections. But taken together they can also be interpreted as a rejection of the idea that the people needed a leader to steer it. That is, in these expressions, the vanguard organizational model from organized modernity is rejected. In the ideal type of organized modernity, a vanguard may lead the way for the majority. Such a vanguard is part of the collective and shares its rationality but is for some reason imagined as better at leading the way. As explained earlier, in an Egyptian context the prime example of such a vanguard is Nasser who was at one and the same time imagined as part of the people and as its leader. After Nasser's death, the vanguard organizational model turned into a facade. In Bamyeh's words, at the turn of the century the Arab regimes' "vanguardism was transformed into pure paternalism: Distance from the people became *lack of interest* in knowing the people" (Bamyeh 2013, p. 199, italics as given). That is, in the local Egyptian context Nasser's vanguardism turned into a kind of facade vanguardism where Mubarak and the rest of the self-proclaimed vanguard was in reality external to the people and did not care for them. Therefore, Bamyeh asserts, out of fear of ending up with yet another external vanguard who did not know the people and did not care for them, the Arab Revolutions were "intuitively suspicious of a method whereby a revolution produces leadership that is immediately prepared to take over when the head of the regime falls" (Bamyeh 2013, p. 200). Seen in this perspective, the revolutionary rejection of ElBaradei was not only unsurprising, it was necessary. The perception that ElBaradei was external to the people made the participants fear that he might continue the kind of facade vanguardism they had become accustomed to during the reign of Mubarak. Only by rejecting his offer was it possible to ensure the complete overthrow of the kind of leadership enacted before the revolution. The new-found belief in unity, collective agency and the strength of the Egyptian people provided an alternative to the pre-revolutionary organizational model.

An organic and context-bound kind of leadership based on individual initiative

What took the place of the vanguard organizational model was a conception of the collective of the Egyptian people as capable of leading itself *without* formal leaders. The lack of formal leaders of the revolution has led commentators and scholars alike to refer to the revolution as leaderless (e.g., Ashour 2011, Diab 2014, Ottaway and Ottaway 2015, Tuğal 2014). Writers referring to the revolution as leaderless tend to focus on the failure of the revolution in formal political terms, not on the revolutionary perspective on what happened during the 18 days of revolution. I contend that such texts are based on an outcome-oriented conceptualization of revolution. They use the lack of formal leadership as an (etic) explanatory factor for why a transition towards democracy was not established. While I agree that there were no clear leaders in the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, the term "leaderless" seems to imply that the rejection of formal leadership was naïve instead of trying to understand what was put in place of formal leadership. It overlooks the fact that it is indeed possible to carve out a conception of leadership in the revolutionary expressions. Some of my analyses in previous sections and chapters offer a glimpse of what was put in place of formal leadership. For example, expressions about how individual participants took responsibility upon themselves, participated in different ways and contexts, and acted as "one hand" can tell us something about the kind of leadership proposed in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. In such expressions, I argue, it is possible to see the contours of an organic and context-bound kind of leadership based on individual initiative.

In the review of literature in chapter two, I noted that other scholars have suggested various terms to conceptually grasp what was put in place of formal leadership during the revolution. These scholars interpret the lack of clear leaders and hierarchy through notions such as anarchist self-organization (Bamyeh 2012), horizontalism and leaderfulness (Chalcraft 2012), adhocracy (Tufekci 2017, chapter 3) and leaderlessness (Gunning and Baron 2014, chapter 5). While their conceptual lenses differ, these scholars share my interest in understanding the informal organization of the revolution. Among the terms suggested, the term leaderfulness is particularly compelling in my perspective. Chalcraft defines leaderful movements as movements in which "[e]veryone participates – each of his or her own accord and in any way that counts at the time" (Chalcraft 2012, p. 8). Leaderfulness thus implies that all individuals work towards the same goal, according to abilities and context, and without anybody formally telling him or her how to do so. In my perspective, it combines notions of collective agency and a shared rationality from organized modernity with notions of individual agency from extended liberal modernity. The result is collective action without formal leadership.

Wael Ghonim, the administrator of the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, seemed to hint at such an understanding of the collective in an interview with an American television station. According to El-Khatib, he compared the Egyptian Revolution to Wikipedia because both were created through nameless individuals' collective efforts (El-Khatib 2013, note 16).

Life at Tahrir Square was full of examples of leaderfulness. One such example is the many descriptions of how individuals on their own initiative brought basic supplies like blankets, medicine and food into Tahrir Square and shared them with others. Descriptions of such activities were always evaluated positively. For example, Prince tells of how she and her friends were offered bread, cookies, chocolate, Coca-Cola, tangerines, oranges, sandwiches, and blankets at Tahrir Square by a diversity of individuals, including a "middle-aged man with gray hair and modest clothes", "[t]wo unveiled young women", "[t]wo young men" and others that she does not describe (Prince 2014, p. 26-27). In my perspective, she tells of how different individuals on their own initiative contributed to creating the kind of organic collective agency that dominated life at the square: On the one hand, such activities were based on individual initiative and happened organically without anybody telling others to undertake a specific activity. In this sense, they tell of the revolutionary belief in individual agency. And on the other hand, such activities were carried out by many individuals at the same time and in a fairly similar way. In this sense they tell of a shared rationality and of how many individuals' similar activities together add up to some kind of collective agency. Such activities substantiate that the collective can be seen as leaderful and that the kind of leadership espoused at the square was an organic and context-bound kind of leadership based on individual initiative.

The garbage collection and cleaning of the square is another example of how the collective is imagined as leaderful. During the revolution, the regime was regularly connected to filth and trash, for example by throwing cardboard with names of hated regime figures on trash piles. Or by writing "Headquarter of the National Democratic Party/مقر الحزب الوطنى" on the wall of the interim toilets, thus enabling the participants in the revolution the opportunity to symbolically defecate on the regime (BBC 2011, click on "Toilets", Paldf.net 2011e). In this way, acts combatting uncleanliness gained symbolic significance. The act of sweeping is particularly rich in symbolic significance in an Egyptian context. In popular culture, sweeping is used as a symbolic act to exorcise evil spirits or reject injustice (Keraitim and Mehrez 2012, p. 41-42, Mansour 2009, p. 208-209). As noted in chapter three, Keyafa made political use of this popular belief in a protest outside a mosque in

central Cairo in 2005. In this context, I propose that acts combatting uncleanliness can be seen as examples of how the collective is imagined as leaderful in a particularly local, authentic way. To take an example, Prince tells us of how she herself participated in the garbage collection of the square after she saw two children doing so:

> Two ten-year-olds came by with plastic bags to collect garbage. I was suddenly propelled out of the stupefying ambience in the midan.[66]
> "Where are you kids from?"
> "We're from Saft al-Laban[67]."
> "Who did you come with?"
> "With our parents."
> "Bravo! I'm going to collect garbage with you."
> (Prince 2014, p. 27)

In this quote, Prince relates an exchange of words between her and two children collecting garbage. Looking at their act as an example of leaderfulness, they participated on their own initiative and in a way that counts in the specific context they are in. They are from Saft al-Laban, an informal quarter of Cairo, while Prince, an educated grown-up woman, most likely lives in a well-off neighborhood. The diversity of the participants is thus underlined as if to tell us that regardless of one's background, everybody is a leader. Prince applauds the children's action and gets up to collect garbage with them. She is now no longer only a passive recipient but an active participant co-leading the revolution. A few lines later, Prince adds that "Others were doing the same. Everyone was helping to clean the midan" (Prince 2014, p. 27). Prince's description of how a diversity of individuals, "others", and "everyone" participated is a way of substantiating that all participants in the revolution acted in this way. In my theoretical perspective, her words can be interpreted as a celebration of a shared rationality and as a support to the idea that each individual is a leader. Seen together, the many individual acts of garbage collection present the collective as leaderful.

The famous cleaning of the square after Mubarak stepped down can also be seen as an example of how the Egyptian people is imagined as leaderful. On February 12, Egyptians returned to the streets to clean up and repair Tahrir Square and surrounding quarters of the city on what was called "Tahrir

[66] "Midan/ميدان" means "Square"
[67] In Arabic, صفط اللبن

Beautification Day/تجميل ميدان التحرير" (Winegar 2011b). Some of the cleaners had participated in the 18 days of revolution, while others had not (Hadiya 2011). They collected garbage, swept, painted the curbs, and took down banners with slogans in a collective effort to beautify Tahrir Square (Ikhwanonline.com 2011, Winegar 2011b, p. 32-33). No-one coordinated the cleaning, but through many individuals' similar activities, the square was nevertheless cleaned and beautified. In my perspective, these many similar activities can be interpreted as the result of a shared rationality of the kind posited in organized modernity. But at the same time, it was the result of individual initiative and agency. In this way, the collective is imagined as being capable of acting united without a formal leader or a set of rules to guide their actions: Each individual is presented as a leader and the collective is presented as leaderful. Winegar analyzes the rich symbolic significance of the cleaning and notes that it contrasted the regime's ability to keep Cairo clean with the revolutionary participants' ability to do the same. At the same time, it underlined the desire to symbolically clean up after the regime's mismanagement of the country (Winegar 2011b, p. 33). And Challand contends that the cleaning "erased the past sense of collective inertia in front of the filthiness of Cairo streets. If people's voices are eventually heard, they are willing to take up some collective burden" (Challand 2011, p. 272). In my interpretation, the cleaning of the square thus indicates that by replacing the regime with a leaderful collective, the country would be better off.

To sum up, traditional notions of leadership were rejected and, instead, a conception of the people as leaderful was proposed. Looking at the rejection of ElBaradei's proposition to lead the transition through the lens of prefigurative practices, it tells us of a fear of ending up with yet another Mubarak. To avoid this, the idea of external leaders was rejected more generally. As a replacement, the people was imagined as leaderful. Because each individual was ascribed agency and the ability to act as a leader, the Egyptian people as a collective was imagined as leaderful. In contrast to the term "leaderless", the notion of leaderfulness constitutes an emic interpretation of how the collective is lead in the revolutionary imaginaries. Indeed, according to Chalcraft some of the educated activists in the revolution used this term explicitly (Chalcraft 2012, p. 8). Leaderfulness ties together notions of individual agency from extended liberal modernity with notions of collective agency and a shared rationality from organized modernity.

In the revolutionary imaginaries, there is no conflict in championing individual agency alongside collective agency. Rather, it forms two sides of the same coin. On an analytical note, my interpretation of the collective as leaderful provides an example of the fruitfulness of my theoretical approach. By understanding the three forms of modern social order as heuristic ideal types instead

of as a description of a linear development, I can make use of elements from both organized modernity and extended liberal modernity to understand the kind of leadership espoused during the revolution.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown how the collective of the Egyptian people is constructed in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. First, I have shown that the dominant collective category of individuals in the revolutionary imaginaries is indeed the Egyptian people. In a region where collective identities based on religion or language constitute viable alternatives, a nationalist frame cannot be seen as self-evident. I have therefore shown how the revolutionary imaginaries – and the regime-led imaginaries – are situated within a nationalist framework and in a global system consisting of nation states. Theoretically, I have argued against the idea that strong collective identities are in decline in the modern world and instead proposed that strong individual and collective identities can exist side-by-side. Second, I have shown how the Egyptian people is presented as united. While the revolutionary context seems to necessitate expressions of unity, the way unity is proposed can nevertheless tell us something about the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective. I have shown how unity is, on the one hand, proposed alongside diversity, and how on the other hand it is legitimized through history. Both of these ways of proposing unity draw on dominant local ways of presenting unity and characterizing the Egyptian people. Third, I have shown how the Egyptian people is ascribed collective agency. The collective agency ascribed to the people traces connections to the understanding of collectives in the ideal type of organized modernity as well as to the understanding of the Egyptian people during the time of Nasser. In both its ideal typical and local variant, there is a strong belief in the collective's ability to steer society in a given direction. By drawing on this understanding, the Egyptian people is constituted as a united and agentic collective capable of acting on its own. This characterization of the people contests the regime's understanding of the Egyptians as an irrational mass in need of management and containment. Fourth, I have shown how the collective of the Egyptian people is presented as leaderful. In the revolutionary expressions, the idea of some kind of leadership of the people is absent, and the people is instead imagined as leading itself. I have used the notion of leaderfulness to explain this self-leadership, arguing that it combines notions of collective agency and a shared rationality from organized modernity with notions of individual agency from extended liberal modernity.

On a theoretical note, the chapter exemplifies particularly well the fruitfulness of using ideal types. Because I view the three forms of modern social order as ideal types instead of as a characterization of a linear development, I analytically use notions of individual and collective agency interchangeably to interpret the same cluster of expressions. Moreover, my interpretations do not contain any implicit evaluation of the "progress" of the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective. Rather, I understand expressions in which individual and collective agency seem to appear side by side as examples of different ways of handling the modern demand of enacting agency and transforming contingency into order.

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE HETEROGENEOUS EGYPTIAN PEOPLE

Chapter eight is the second chapter in the third part of my dissertation. Together with chapter seven, it analyzes the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective. While in chapter seven I focused on the imaginaries of the collective as a whole, in the present chapter I focus on the imaginaries of dominant sub-categories of individuals within this collective.

I contend that at an overall level the revolutionary imaginaries continue the pre-revolutionary imaginaries of the Egyptian people as a heterogeneous collective consisting of different sub-categories of individuals that co-exist in peaceful harmony. However, in the revolutionary imaginaries some sub-categories, and the relationship between these, are re-imagined, either slightly or radically. I characterize dominant sub-categories and the imaginaries of a desirable relationship between these. I argue that the revolutionary imaginaries of the heterogeneous Egyptian people trace connections, on the one hand, to the notion of a pluralist social order from extended liberal modernity, and on the other, to notions of complementarity and respect between pre-defined and relatively homogeneous categories of individuals from organized modernity, including in its local corporatist version under Nasser.

In public discourse before the revolution, the Egyptians were often presented as a heterogeneous collective consisting of different sub-categories of individuals co-existing in peaceful harmony. For example, Bassiouney explains that “the images that usually accompany patriotic songs show different Egyptians, with different skin colors, mostly with black to brownish hair, but always from different parts of Egypt, including the urban, rural, rich, poor, educated, and illiterate” (Bassiouney 2015, p. 165). In this way, the Egyptians are presented as diverse with regard to ethnicity, locality, land-city distinctions, wealth, and education. Bassiouney tells us that this perception of the Egyptians was advanced in patriotic songs throughout the twentieth century. This perception is valid across my tripartition of Egyptian history and constitutes a constant in the local (self-) perception of the Egyptians. Later in her book, Bassiouney adds yet another dominant trait of the Egyptians in public discourse, namely that Egyptians are religious (Bassiouney 2015, p. 183-213). The heterogeneity of the Egyptian people is consistently celebrated. During the revolution, the celebration of the diverse nature of the Egyptian people was continued, although some categories of individuals were re-imagined, either slightly or radically. I show examples of both. In this way, the chapter underlines how parts of the revolutionary imaginaries display more continuities than breaks

with pre-revolutionary understandings. It also underlines that even pre-revolutionary understandings shared by the regime were used to contest the regime.

To understand how the Egyptian people is imagined as heterogeneous, I draw on the notion of a pluralist social order from extended liberal modernity and on notions of complementarity and respect between pre-defined and relatively homogeneous categories of individuals from organized modernity, including in its local corporatist version under Nasser. As I explained in the introduction, in the ideal type of extended liberal modernity, the social order is made up of individuals believed to be individually unique and self-reliant. Because of the belief in the unique and self-reliant nature of each individual, individuals are expected to use their own unique traits and desires to transform contingency into order on an individual level. The result is a pluralist social order in which diversity, individual agency and creativity are celebrated. In contrast, in the ideal type of organized modernity, individuals are believed to belong to pre-defined categories of individuals with whom they share certain traits and desires. Shared traits and desires may be based on attributes such as class, gender, occupation, and age. In its local corporatist version, different categories of individuals such as soldiers, peasants, and builders contributed to the shared nationalist struggle in different but equally important ways. The result is a group-based social order in which complementarity and respect between categories of individuals and differential treatment of individuals according to the category one belongs to are celebrated.

The chapter consists of four sections and a conclusion. In the first section, I argue that the Egyptian people is presented as diverse – a diversity that is consistently evaluated positively. I show examples of how the participants are presented as diverse with regard to class, occupation, age, and geography, and I assert that such diversity is used to present the participants as representative of the Egyptian people as a whole. Moreover, it is used to espouse a pluralist social order in a way reminiscent of the kind of pluralism espoused (rhetorically) before the revolution. Theoretically, the analysis in the section draws on the celebration of pluralism in extended liberal modernity and the group-based thinking in organized modernity. In the second section it is may argument that complementary relationships based on respect for differences between pre-defined categories of individuals are the central focus. I explore the proposed relationship between the categories of men and women, Muslims and Christians, arguing that it entails a somewhat new understanding of these categories of individuals while also continuing a complementary understanding of them. I argue that one should not mistake the proposition of a new understanding of these categories of individuals for an endorsement of a social order based on equal rights or religious plurality and tolerance for all

faiths. Rather, it speaks of a continuation of the corporatist-inspired idea that individuals should be treated according to the pre-defined category he or she belongs to. In the third section, I assert that the heterogeneity and diversity proposed does not include political distinctions. Distinctions related to the sphere of formal politics are in fact often evaluated negatively. In the revolutionary imaginaries they represent undesirable divisions, whereas the distinctions treated in the previous sections represent positive diversity. I maintain that the distaste for distinctions related to the sphere of formal politics is based on pre-revolutionary negative local experiences with formal politics. In this rejection, some broad global tendencies are visible. In the fourth section I look at the one sub-category of individuals that is radically reimagined during the revolution, namely youth. I argue that the category of youth is presented as a vanguard, both ideologically and practically, and I trace a connection to the understanding of the vanguard elite in organized modernity. Finally, in the fifth section I sum up and draw some conclusions.

Positive diversity

In descriptions of life at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of revolution, the presence of different sub-categories of individuals is underlined and celebrated. In this section I show how diversity based on class, occupation, age, and geography is presented. It is my argument that by showing diversity, the revolutionary expressions present the participants in the revolution as representative of Egyptians in general. Such implicit representational claims contest the Mubarak regime by sending the message that the demands of the participants at the square are indeed the demands of the Egyptian people in its entirety. It this way, expressions about diversity sometimes also contain statements about unity, as mentioned in chapter seven. Moreover, it sets up an ideal of a pluralistic social order that embraces different categories of individuals. Theoretically, I contend that the kind of pluralist social order created in such expressions can be interpreted as drawing on the celebration of pluralism in extended liberal modernity and on the group-based thinking in organized modernity.

This section is a good example of how the understandings used to contest the regime were not necessarily new and did not necessarily constitute a break with the past. Rather, the positive diversity of the Egyptian people presented in the section here draws on a well-established and shared understanding of the make-up of the Egyptian.

Class

In the revolutionary expressions, class-based distinctions are mentioned or shown regularly. Such expressions do not contest a class-based social order, but rather present class-differences as given

and even complementary. For example, we can see how the existence of classes is taken for granted in the previously treated examples of the street vendor giving out bread for free and the young man applauding his act by giving him money (chapter four), or the two children from an informal quarter collecting garbage and the presumably well-off Prince joining them (chapter seven).

The video to Cairokee's song "Voice of Freedom/صوت الحرية" (Shaat 2011) provides a particularly good example of how the revolutionary expressions depict class differences. The video to the song is shot at Tahrir Square and is mainly made up of short clips of participants lip-synching the words or holding signs displaying the lyrics. The video goes to great lengths to show diversity of all sorts, including class differences. Shalaby tells us that Cairokee aimed at dissipating the state-led rumors of foreign infiltration by portraying the participants in this way (Shalaby 2015, p. 178). For example, in the video, the lower classes are arguably presented by an image of a dark-skinned old man with a white skullcap and a set of brownish teeth and a street vendor selling sweet potatoes, while the middle or upper class is represented by images of young men and women in so-called Western clothing. The many smiling faces and the relaxed mood in the video tell us that the diversity portrayed is evaluated positively. The presentation of the participants as diverse continues the local tradition of how to present Egyptians in public discourse. As mentioned above, Bassiouney explains that patriotic songs during the twentieth century often celebrate the diversity of the Egyptian people (Bassiouney 2015, p. 165). In this way, by depicting the participants in the revolution like Egyptians are often presented in patriotic songs, the song "Voice of Freedom" depicts the participants as both patriotic and representative of the Egyptians in general.

Theoretically, I interpret the kind of social order promoted in this way through notions from both organized modernity and extended liberal modernity: On the one hand, the idea from organized modernity that society consists of relatively homogeneous categories of individuals, such as classes. And on the other hand, the celebration of diversity and the positive evaluation of a pluralistic social order from extended liberal modernity. However, I contend that in the revolutionary imaginaries, the celebration of individual diversity from extended liberal modernity is replaced with a celebration of group-based diversity. In this way, the revolutionary imaginaries embrace both the idea of relatively homogeneous class-based categories, and the celebration of diversity and the idea of a pluralist social order.

In a revolutionary context, it is notable that the existence of class-based distinctions is not questioned. The revolution is thus not presented as a proletarian revolution of a Marxist or Nasserist

kind in which the working class is elevated as particularly important. Some revolutionary expressions explicitly mention that this is not a revolution of the poor or the hungry (Al Qudaimy 2012, p. 50, Paldf.net 2011i), while an email related in Prince's diary sarcastically states that all those who are well off should stay at home (Prince 2014, p. 10-11). In this way, the revolution is furthermore not presented as a 2011 version of the famous bread riots in 1977 in which poor Egyptians protested the decrease in state-financed bread subsidies. Partial solutions for the poor are not acceptable. Rather, expressions about class tell us that the revolution is for all classes of Egyptians in all their diversity. Such expressions endorse a pluralistic social order in which class-based distinctions are seen as a "natural" part of what makes up the collective of the Egyptian people and in which different classes cooperate and contribute positively in whichever way they can. Such expressions can thereby be interpreted as endorsing an expanded version of Nasser's corporatist social order. As explained in chapter three, corporatism likens society to a body where different body-parts are equally important in making the body function but fulfill different tasks. In Nasser's version, the body was imagined as consisting mainly of working-class categories of individuals, but in the expanded revolutionary version it is imagined as consisting of all classes from the pre-revolutionary social order. The revolutionary imaginaries of positive class diversity thus draw on a locally well-known historical model, while expanding it to include all classes of the pre-revolutionary class-based social order.

Occupation

The revolutionary expressions also mention occupational diversity. Occupational differences can often be related to class, and as such, these expressions support my argument above that the revolutionary expressions embrace a pluralistic social order that takes existing class-based distinctions as given. Nevertheless, expressions about occupations also provide an independent aspect of the diversity of the participants and therefore support the idea that the participants are representative of Egyptians in general. Some expressions about occupations reference only one occupation (e.g., Ghaleb 2015, image 91, Gröndahl 2011, p. 70 and 86, Khalil 2011, p. 82) while an expression such as the one below more directly mentions occupational diversity. At the same time, it contains implicit representative claims:

> Students, business-men, waiters, academics, farmers, civil servants, unemployed – we are all here together, all doing what we've not been able to do for decades: each and every one is speaking, acting, expressing themselves and insisting on being counted.

(Soueif 2014, p. 45)

This quote emphasizes the diversity of occupations at the square. The words, "we are *all* here together" (my emphasis), give the impression that these occupations are just examples of all the different occupations present at Tahrir Square, as though the "we" refers to the collective of the Egyptian people in its entirety. The above expression is thus an example of how diversity and unity are presented as two sides of the same coin. Moreover, the expression contains implicit claims of representativity, as though the students, business-men, and so on represent all individuals of these professions just as heads of unions formally represent all members of a given profession. In this way, Soueif seems to imply that the participants on the square speak on behalf of the Egyptian people as a whole. The final words about "being counted" show that individuals of all these occupations matter – including the unemployed who in the pre-revolutionary neoliberal-authoritarian environment were devalued because of their lack of success as economic actors.

Age

The revolutionary expressions also tell us that Egyptians of all ages participated in the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square. A considerable number of visual expressions make a point of showing children participating in the revolution (e.g., Egyptphotos.revolution25january.com 2011a, Therevolutionfiles.com 2011c), while written expressions such as the below quote describe the presence of Egyptians of all ages. Expressions about age support the notion of the positive diversity of the participants, and at the same time they underline the participatory and peaceful character of the revolution. Here is a quote from Yusuf's diary emphasizing diversity in more than one way, but with the main focus on age:

> One of the most impressive things I saw was a man and his pregnant wife throwing themselves into the battle with the protesters. I saw little children no older than 10 years participating in the battle, I saw old women and young girls. I saw Muslims and Christians. But the
>
> وكان من المشاهد المؤثرة التي شاهدتها رجل مع امرأته الحامل يخوضون المعركة مع المتظاهرين! شاهدت أطفالاً صغارًا لا تتجاوز أعمارهم العاشرة يشاركون في المعركة ، وشاهدت سيدات كبيرات ، وفتيات صغيرات.
> شاهدت مسلمين ومسيحيين.
> وقد كان الغالبية العظمى من الشباب الذين لم يتموا الثلاثين.

overwhelming majority was youth
under the age of 30.
(Yusuf 2011, p. 64-65)

The quote starts with the author's positive evaluation of the scene as "impressive/مؤثرة". After that, he mentions how Egyptians of all ages participated in the revolution, ranging from an unborn baby in a mother's womb to old women. Even though he acknowledges that most of the participants are young, he confers a positive role for all of these age groups in the revolution. Furthermore, the quote by Yusuf portrays the revolution as peaceful enough – even during what Yusuf describes as a "battle/معركة" – that both pregnant women and children could participate. It thus underlines the peaceful character of the revolutionary approach as analyzed in chapter four. In this way, the presence of different age groups is celebrated as a revolutionary accomplishment that testifies to the positive character of the revolution.

In her article published on February 21, 2011, Winegar says that the revolution was a "multi-generational revolt", not just a youth revolution, and that "the participation of Egyptians of all ages [was] giving it its true force". She asserts that the characterization of the revolution solely as a youth revolution made it easier for the transitional government to brush aside the demands of the people as just demands of the youth "in a familiar paternalistic way" (Winegar 2011a, no pagination). Winegar thus provides an explanation for why revolutionary expressions such as Yusuf's make a point of showing age diversity, and she underlines my point about how diversity of all sorts contributed to making representative claims.

Geography

Finally, the revolutionary expressions tell of the geographical diversity of the participants (e.g., Ghaleb 2015, image 63, Gröndahl 2011, p. 55, 74, 87, Khalil 2011, p. 137-141). Because expressions about geography focus on places within the borders of Egypt, a national context is implied. In my perspective, such expressions show the diversity of the participants and suggest that the revolution is representative of Egyptians from all parts of Egypt. Gunning and Baron note that part of the tent camp was organized according to place of origin and that "delegations", as they call them, from different parts of the country made their presence clear by flying flags and banners. Gunning and Baron use this observation to assert that the normal spatial divisions of Egypt were reproduced at Tahrir (Gunning and Baron 2014, p. 252). Moreover, in my perspective, their

observation of the revolutionary practices also contains representational claims. As a very concrete expression of geographical representativity, one image depicts an interim desk with a wooden sign above. The sign reads:

> Embassy of North Sinai in the capital of Tahrir
> (Paldf.net 2011g)
>
> سفارة شمال سيناء بعاصمة التحرير

In this image, the sign makes representational claims by drawing on the model of the modern, global diplomatic system. It places Tahrir Square at the center, but simultaneously sets up a link to North Sinai and, implicitly, to other parts of the country. Malešević's argument that globalization and individualism are not in contrast to strong, nationalist identities proves useful in this context. I used the argument in chapter seven to argue that expressions of the individual's value and agency can exist side by side with expressions about the importance of a strong, nationalist collective. In the present context, I draw on the part of Malešević argument in which he emphasizes the linkage between globalization, nationalism, and nation states. In this regard, Malešević contends that globalization is not in contrast to nationalism but in fact reinforces it by producing highly standardized nation states (Malešević 2019, p. 79-81). The above slogan can be seen as an example of the entwinement of globalization and nation states. The word "embassy/سفارة" refers to the model of the modern, global diplomatic system based on nation states and is used to symbolically make representational claims. The global and the national are thus part of the selfsame system.

Summing up, expressions about class, occupation, age, and geography present the participants as diverse in a variety of parameters. Together, I maintain, such expressions tell of the interplay between diversity and unity and they present the participants in the revolution at Tahrir Square as representative of Egyptians in general. Because diversity is always evaluated positively, the revolutionary expressions about class, occupation, age, and geography tell of an ideal of a pluralist social order in which different categories of individuals coexist peacefully. However, in contrast to the understanding of pluralism in the ideal type of extended liberal modernity, the kind of pluralist social order embraced in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life is not based on individual pluralism, but on group-based pluralism. In this way, group-based thinking from organized modernity merges with the celebration of pluralism in extended liberal modernity. Moreover, according to Tufekci, ideals of diversity and pluralism are typical traits of contemporary protest

movements. In her study of movements, such as the Egyptian Revolution at Tahrir Square in 2011, The Occupy Wall Street in New York in 2011 and the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul in 2013, she explains that many contemporary protest movements value diversity and pluralism (Tufekci 2017). In this way, the insistence on displaying diversity during the Egyptian Revolution makes the revolution part of a global movement of how to protest in the modern world.

Complementary relationships based on respect for differences

In the above section I argued that the revolutionary expressions present the participants as diverse and as representative of Egyptians in general. The positively evaluated diversity sets up an ideal of a pluralist social order in which different categories of individuals co-exist peacefully. In the present section I expand my focus on the revolutionary imaginaries of sub-categories of individuals to also include the desirable relationship between such sub-categories. To do so, I look at expressions about the categories of men and women, and Muslims and Christians. As in expressions about class, occupation, age, and geography, diversity between the sub-categories of men and women, and Muslims and Christians, is evaluated positively. In this way, expressions about these four categories of individuals contribute to showing the diversity of the Egyptian people. Likewise, they contain claims in which representativity is implicit. But expressions about men and women, and Muslims and Christians, also tell of the relationship between these categories of individuals. It is my argument that the desirable relationship between these categories of individuals can be characterized as complementary and based on respect for pre-defined and unquestioned differences. Theoretically, this characterization of a desirable relationship between various sub-categories of individuals can be interpreted through the group-based thinking in organized modernity and through ideas of complementarity in corporatism.

Men and women

In the media, the Arab Revolutions have been hailed for women's contributions to the events and for the widened space for women's participation (see e.g., Cole and Cole 2011, Rice et al. 2011, Tell Me More 2011). This aspect has also been dealt with in academic texts. As noted in the review in chapter two, academic literature on women and the revolution focuses for example on how the revolutionary practices can be interpreted as a contestation of the patriarchal nature of the pre-revolutionary Egyptian society (Al-Ali 2012, Hafez 2012, Kadry 2015, Wahba 2016). In a patriarchal country like Egypt where opportunities for and expectations of men and women differ significantly (see e.g., El-Feki, Heilmann and Barker 2017), it is easy to jump to the conclusion that

new gender practices during the revolution point to a desire for greater gender equality in the sense of un-gendering social expectations of men and women. However, the revolutionary expressions do not necessarily support such an interpretation. In several revolutionary expressions, women's increased participation is championed *alongside* traditional gendered expectations of men and women. That is, while a somewhat new understanding of women's role is proposed, the idea that men and women are different and thus occupy different roles in society is maintained. Therefore, I propose viewing the revolutionary imaginaries of a desirable relationship between men and women as a relationship based on complementarity and respect for pre-given differences.

Asma Mahfouz' video-call for action can be seen as an example of the proposition of relationships based on complementarity. On the one hand, Mahfouz challenges traditional patriarchal understandings of gender roles and proposes a new, more active and public role for women in quite a number of ways: She speaks out and calls for civil disobedience in public, she looks directly into the camera, her body language is assertive, her language is cynical, she states that she has gone and will go to Tahrir Square on her own regardless of whether others will join, and she mentions that she has offered her phone number freely to the public (Kadry 2015, p. 201, Taha and Combs 2012, p. 76). In this way, she challenges the Egyptian patriarchal norm that men should take care of public concerns while women take care of domestic concerns. If any males have a problem with that, Mahfouz seems to tell us, then they should join and "spare females the hassle and potential public disapproval" (Taha and Combs 2012, p. 77). But on the other hand, she draws on traditional notions of manhood to urge men to join the protests, as can be seen in these two quotes:

> Anybody in this country who considers himself a man should come down, and anybody in this country who says that girls who participate in a demonstration will be maltreated and that it is inappropriate and haram, let him have a sense of honor and manhood and come down on January 25th
> (El-Baghdadi 2011, 2:20 min)

> وكل واحد في البلد ده شايف نفسه راجل يبقى ينزل
> وكل واحد في البلد ده بيقول البنات اللي تنزل
> المظاهرة تتبهدل وما يصحش إنها تنزل وحرام
> يخلي عنده النخوى ورجولة وبينزل يوم 25
>
> لو إنت عندك كرامة وإنت إنسان وراجل في البلد ده
> يتقي تنزل، تنزل وتحميني وتحمي أي بنت تنزل

> If you have dignity and if you are a
> human being and a man in this country,
> come down. Come down and protect me
> and any other girl who comes down.
> (El-Baghdadi 2011, 3:12 min)

In these two quotes from Mahfouz's video, she tells us that men and women are different. She ascribes different traits and roles to these two categories of individuals; traits and roles that are presented as pre-given or "natural". She connects the word "man" to dignity, honor, manhood, courage, and the ability to protect women, while she connects the word "girl" to the need for protection. Her attempt at motivating men to join the revolution on January 25 is based on having men live up to these traits and expectations, not to question them. Some scholars argue that because of the patriarchal nature of Egyptian society, this way of motivating men – or shaming them, as some scholars call it – into joining the revolution worked (El-Sharnouby 2012, p. 47, Gunning and Baron 2014, p. 227, Taha and Combs 2012, p. 76). El-Sharnouby mentions a young man who explicitly referred to Mahfouz's call for action as a motivational factor for him to join the protests, while Gunning and Baron tell us that several of their interviewees "mentioned people appealing to the male sense of honour" during the revolution (Gunning and Baron 2014, p. 228). This way of getting men to join the protests was not a revolutionary innovation. For example, in December 2006 at a strike at Misr Spinning and Weaving Company/شركة مصر للغزل والنسيج in El Mahalla El Kubra/المحلة الكبرى, the female workers called upon the male workers to join by shouting "'Where are the men? The women are here!" (El-Mahdi 2011). At one and the same time, Mahfouz thus proposes an increased active and public role for women and supports a patriarchal understanding of an inherent, pre-given difference between men and women. In this way, she does not call for a relationship between men and women based on gender equality in the sense of ungendered social expectations but rather for a relationship based on complementarity and respect for differences.

Mahfouz's video is not the only revolutionary expression supporting a complementary relationship between men and women. Both Prince and Soueif seem to do the same in their diaries. For example, Prince repeatedly accuses policemen and thugs of not being "manly" enough (Prince 2014, p. 35-37) and Soueif describes how she and others hold back a boy who wants to join the fight against the thugs by telling him to "*[s]tay here and be a man. Protect your mother!*" (Soueif 2014, p. 66, italics as given). At the same time, both Prince and Soueif clearly carve out an active and public role for

themselves and other women. The result is, as in Mahfouz's video, a suggestion of a somewhat new role for women, yet a simultaneously continuation of the idea that men and women occupy different roles in society.

Taking the difference between these three women into consideration, it is striking that they seem to agree on proposing a complementary relationship between men and women. While it is perhaps not surprising that the veiled Mahfouz sees men and women as different, Prince's use of a patriarchal vocabulary in particular is surprising. As mentioned in chapter four, Prince has repeatedly caused controversy for challenging social norms for what is appropriate in Egypt. While her provocative acts have challenged social norms far beyond those related to gender, they also contest patriarchal expectations of women. Bearing this in mind, Prince's accusation of the policemen and thugs of not being manly enough is surprising. The three women's similar use of traditional notions of manhood may thus tell us something about the dominance of the idea of relationships based on complementarity and respect for difference, at least when it comes to gender issues. In this way, the revolutionary expressions about gender do not aim at dissolving pre-revolutionary gender categorizations, but only at proposing an improved version of the local pre-existing expectations of men and women.

Muslims and Christians

The proposed relationship between Muslims and Christians is another example of how relationships based on complementarity and respect for differences are embraced in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. During the revolution, many expressions about Muslims and Christians were displayed. I have analyzed several of these expressions in previous chapters. Of particular relevance for the present section is my analysis in chapter seven of how images of crescent and cross or chants of "one hand" between Muslims and Christians were used to show unity and diversity at the same time. Such expressions also tell of a specific understanding of the desirable relationship between Muslims and Christians. Just as with the relationship between men and women, I contend that the revolutionary imaginaries of a desirable relationship between Muslims and Christians can be characterized as a relationship of complementarity and respect for differences and as an improved version of the pre-revolutionary understanding of this relationship. To show this, I return to the revolutionary understanding of public prayer previously analyzed in chapters four and six as expressions of order and authenticity. In the present context, I look at what the revolutionary practices of public prayer can tell us about the relationship between Muslims and Christians.

Throughout the revolution, public prayer was an important part of life at Tahrir Square. The square witnessed Muslim public prayer, Christian public prayer, and shared Muslim-Christian prayer. Moreover, images and stories of how members of one denomination formed protecting circles around praying members of the other denomination circulated (see e.g., Alexander 2011a, DailyMail Reporter 2011). Such scenes are consistently evaluated positively in the revolutionary expressions. Viewing practices of public prayer as a way of prefiguring the relationship between Muslims and Christians, they tell us that in the revolutionary imaginaries both Muslims and Christians are part of the social fabric and that cooperation and peaceful coexistence between members of the two faiths is possible. Some sort of equality and tolerance seems implied. But at the same time, public prayer at Tahrir Square emphasizes the difference between Muslims and Christians. Practices of Muslims protecting Christians and Christians protecting Muslims uphold a distinction between members of the two faiths; a distinction that is not questioned but seen as pre-given and "natural". I therefore assert that what is proposed is not a relationship based on individual equality and religious tolerance of the sort celebrated in extended liberal modernity. Rather, it is a relationship based on complementarity and respect for differences as in organized modernity and corporatism.

Such an understanding of the relationship between Muslims and Christians is a continuation of the official pre-revolutionary narrative espoused for example in patriotic songs, by the Coptic pope, and by the state-owned media (Bassiouney 2015, p. 206-214, Galal 2012, Iskander 2012). However, on a practical level, recurrent outbursts of religious conflict showed a discrepancy between the official narrative and the reality. As late as January 1st, 2011, a Coptic church was attacked during midnight prayer service resulting in more than 20 dead and subsequent clashes between Copts, Muslims, and the police (see e.g., BBCNews 2011). By showing in practice that Muslims and Christians can indeed coexist peacefully, the revolutionary practices of public prayer challenged the social order under Mubarak in which religious conflicts happened regularly. It also continued the attempts by pre-revolutionary protest forces such as Kefaya at bridging divides between different groups in Egyptian society (see e.g., Mansour 2009, Shorbagy 2007). Symbolically, expressions of "one hand" between Muslims and Christians added to that picture. In this way, both practices of public prayer and symbolic gestures contested the legitimacy of Mubarak's regime by showing that the participants in the revolution were capable of setting up a more harmonious society than the regime.

I suggest that the proposed relationship between Muslims and Christians can be seen as a relationship of complementarity and respect for differences along the lines of a long local tradition

of how to perceive the religious diversity of the Egyptians. In this way, I provide an alternative to other scholars' interpretations of the role of religion. As related in the review in chapter two, some scholars contend that the secular-religious binary was transcended during the revolution and that a post-secular conception of society was proposed (e.g., Barbato 2012, Mavelli 2012). Although different scholars' specific definitions of the post-secular differ, they are all largely in accordance with Taylor's understanding of the secular, namely the idea that the "belief in a God, or in the transcendent in any form, is contested; it is an option among many" (Taylor 2011, p. 49)[68]. That is, the concept of the post-secular – or the secular in Taylor's words – entails an inclusive understanding of the social order in which religious tolerance, including tolerance for atheist world views, are valued. However, the kind of diversity embraced in the revolutionary expressions analyzed here does not entail a proposition of religious tolerance in general or a proposition of a multi-religious public sphere, let alone one including atheist perspectives. While religious and non-religious expressions were both used during the revolution, I have not found expressions that transcend the Muslim-Christian binary or that propose non-belief as an option. Therefore, I hesitate to interpret the revolutionary imaginaries of the relationship between Muslims and Christians through the concept of the post-secular. I interpret it instead as an improved version of the pre-revolutionary local understanding of a group-based pluralistic social order based on complementarity and respect for differences between Muslims and Christians.

Summing up the section on men and women, and Muslims and Christians, it is my argument that the relationship between these categories of individuals can be seen as complementary and based on respect for pre-defined and unquestioned differences. Theoretically, this kind of group-based thinking is reminiscent of organized modernity where individuals are believed to belong to relatively homogeneous categories based on pre-defined traits such as class, gender, and occupation. Moreover, the positive conception of group-based differences expressed through the idea of complementarity makes a connection to corporatist thinking of the kind proponed by Nasser. In this interpretation, the increased active and public role for women and the religious tolerance suggested in various revolutionary expressions should not be seen a proposition of individual equality and religious tolerance of the kind endorsed in extended liberal modernity. Rather, in my

[68] Taylor does not use the term "post-secular" himself. Rather, he speaks about Western modernity as "secular" without a "post-". However, as Spohn for example notes, Taylor's use of the term "secular" corresponds to others scholars' use of the term "post-secular" (see Spohn 2015, note 2)

interpretation it should be seen as a continuation of a well-known group-based pluralism where relationships based on complementarity and respect for differences dominate.

In the present section I have only looked at the relationship between men and women, and Muslims and Christians. But tentatively, I want to suggest that relationships based on complementarity and respect for differences may dominate in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life in general. The positively evaluated diversity between classes, occupation, age, and geography indicate this. Here, the celebration of diversity without questioning the very visible differences in life opportunities between rich and poor, street vendors and the business elite, young and mature, and city dwellers and farmers indicates that the revolutionary imaginaries of desirable relationships are based more on ideas of complementarity and respect for differences between categories, than on equality on an individual level. The example from chapter four of the street vendor giving out free bread and the young (and presumably rich) man giving him money for his deed is another example. At that point I argued that both instances of giving were evaluated equally positively and that a principle of "giving what you can in the circumstance you are in" was espoused. Such an unquestioned celebration of difference and such a principle may also be interpreted as an embracement of relationships based on complementarity and respect for differences.

A non-politicized social order

Whereas the previously treated distinctions are evaluated positively, distinctions related to the sphere of formal politics are viewed in a much more ambivalent light. In some expressions, distinctions related to the sphere of formal politics are used to show diversity, but in the main such distinctions are evaluated negatively. I argue that the ambivalence towards the sphere of formal politics can be seen both as a consequence of local negative experiences with the sphere of formal politics in Egypt and as part of some broad, global tendencies among contemporary protest movements. It sets up an ideal of a social order in which the imagined diversity of the Egyptian people either partially or completely excludes political distinctions.

Political distinctions showing diversity

Positive expressions about distinctions related to the sphere of formal politics focus on how such distinctions contribute to showing diversity and a pluralistic social order. In this way, they simply add yet another layer to the previously discussed diversity based on class, occupation, age, geography, gender, and religion. A good example is the quote here from Soueif's diary:

> In the Midan[69], every shade of the political spectrum is represented. The Left is here, and the Liberals. The Muslim Brotherhood, the Gama3at Islameyya[70], and the Salafis are officially not joining, but their shabab[71] have rebelled, and they're with us, too, making up an estimated 10 percent of the people in the Midan. Our society is rich and complex and varied, and we revel in it.
> (Soueif 2014, p. 118)

Soueif tells us that the whole of the political spectrum is represented. To substantiate her claim, she mentions the left, the liberals, and individuals from various Islamist groups. Leftism/socialism, liberalism, and Islamism are considered three of the main ideological trends in the Arab world (Haugbølle 2012). The fourth main ideological trend, nationalism, is not mentioned in the quote from Soueif's diary, but nationalist expressions were such an apparent part of life at the square that nationalism nevertheless forms part of the picture. By mentioning main ideological trends in the Arab world instead of names of political parties, Soueif not only portrays political diversity but also wholeness. Soueif concludes that the Egyptian society is "rich and complex and varied, and we revel in it", thus unmistakably celebrating the political diversity at the square.

But while Soueif evaluates the political diversity at the square positively, she also emphasizes that individuals related to the sphere of formal politics make up only a small percentage of the participants. She estimates that about ten percent of the participants belonged to an Islamic movement. Even though she does not estimate how many individuals belong to the other shades of the political spectrum, she seems to indicate that the overwhelming majority of participants did not belong to organized political factions. In this way, she carefully presents political diversity as part of diversity in general. Yusuf and Al Qudaimi take the same kind of careful approach to presenting political diversity. Yusuf also estimates that ten percent of the participants belonged to an Islamic movement – he only mentions the Muslim Brotherhood – and adds that around five percent of the participants were activists. Like Soueif, he uses the estimates to evidence political diversity at the square, but he also uses the estimates to celebrate that around 80 percent of those present were *not* related to the sphere of formal politics but were simply "humans…! individuals…! people…!/ ... بشر! ناس ...! شعب ...!" (Yusuf 2011, p. 97). Elsewhere, Al Qudaimy in his diary identifies political

[69] "The square/الميدان"
[70] More often transliterated as Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya or Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya, sometimes also without the apostrophe. In Arabic, the group is called "الجماعة الإسلامية".
[71] "the youth/الشباب"

diversity at the square by mentioning the presence of well-known individuals related to politics alongside individuals from other spheres, as if to stress diversity in general (Al Qudaimy 2012, p. 29-30 and 37-38). In this way, political diversity is acknowledged but arguably downplayed as if there is something dangerous about political distinctions.

Dissociation of the revolution from the sphere of formal politics

But most expressions evaluate political distinctions negatively and make a point of dissociating the revolution and its participants from anything related to the sphere of formal politics. While many of these expressions mention the lack of affiliation to the sphere of formal politics in a purely descriptive and matter-of-fact way, the repeated insistence on dissociating participants in the revolution from the sphere of formal politics contributes to evaluating the sphere of formal politics negatively. In this way, the kind of diversity proponed in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life only hesitantly includes political diversity.

In the example below, the journalist Mohamed Al-Shamaa/محمد الشماع, "Days of Freedom at Tahrir Square/أيام الحرية في ميدان التحرير" (Al-Shamaa 2011) describes a participant in the revolution by, amongst other devices, distancing her from existing political currents and earlier demonstrations. In the quote, the woman's lack of affiliation with the sphere of formal politics is evaluated positively:

> ووسط عشرات المعتصمات في الميدان تقف سيدة أخرى ماسكة "مقشة" وتحاول تنظيف ما أرض الميدان فتتحرك يمينًا ويسارًا بـ "مقشتها" وبين حين وآخر تطلق هتافات تنادي بإسقاط النظام، بالتأكيد هي لا تنتمي لأي تيار سياسي ولم تكن تفكر يومًا بأن تخرج للتظاهر وتفعل ما تفعله وكانت تقول "أنا سبت ابني مع والدتي في بنها وجئت لأطلب بالتغيير".

> And in the middle of tens of protesters in the square, another woman is holding a broom, trying to clean the ground of the square. She is moving to the right and to the left with her broom, occasionally shouting chants crying for the fall of the regime. She obviously does not belong to any political current and has never thought about participating in a demonstration doing what she is doing now. She said: "I left my son with my mother in Banha to come ask for change". (Al-Shamaa 2011, p. 38)

The woman is described through the act of sweeping. Her attempt at cleaning the ground leads the writer to conclude that she obviously has no relation to any political current and that she has never thought about joining a demonstration before. Logically speaking, this is an odd conclusion, as the act of sweeping is neither associated with nor dissociated from formal politics. Moreover, the sentence could simply have been left out, as it does not contribute to the storyline. But it is precisely because of the oddity of the sentence that it stands out. In chapter three I explained that the act of sweeping in an Egyptian context can be seen as an act of exorcising evil spirits; a symbolic act used politically by Kefaya in 2005. And in chapter seven I argued that some revolutionary expressions present the participants as leaderful in a particularly local way by drawing on such acts of combatting uncleanliness. The description of the sweeping woman should be seen in the same context. That is, as another example of how the revolutionary expressions continue the pre-revolutionary political use of sweeping to express the desire to get rid of the regime.

At the same time, Al-Shamaa's description of the sweeping woman and her lack of affiliation with the sphere of formal politics aligns the revolutionary efforts with the pre-revolutionary understanding of how to change Egypt from outside the sphere of formal politics. The writer's ascription to the woman of the words "to come ask for *change*/*بالتغيير* جئت لأطلب" (my emphasis) also suggests placing his description of her in continuation of the non-politicized pre-revolutionary understanding of how to change Egypt. The word "change/التغيير" was incorporated into the names of several pre-revolutionary protest movements after Kefaya was established in 2004 – Kefaya is officially called "The Egyptian movement for change/الحركة المصرية من أجل التغيير". These movements include "Journalists for change/صحفيون من أجل التغيير", Youth for change/شباب من أجل التغيير", "Workers for change/عمال من أجل التغيير" and several others (El-Mahdi 2009, p. 1012-1013, Workers For Change 2005). In this perspective also, Al-Shamaa's description of how the woman has come to ask for "change/التغيير" presents the situation as a continuation of pre-revolutionary protest activities from outside the sphere of formal politics. Descriptions like these subtly contribute to dissociating the revolution from all things related to the sphere of formal politics and present the desirable kind of diversity of the Egyptian people as a non-politicized diversity.

Other expressions tell us that the dissociation of the revolution from the sphere of formal politics may not only be a rejection of the Mubarak regime's way of doing politics, but a disillusion with formal politics more generally. In this way, the Egyptian Revolution resembles other modern protest movements which share a disillusion with representative democracy and the idea of delegating formal power to specific individuals (Tufekci 2017, p. 101). In the quote below, Soueif

elaborates on her perception of "what you might call the establishment political opposition to the regime of Hosni Mubarak" through a meeting she attends (Soueif 2014, p. 38). Importantly, this is not a description of a meeting between enemies of the revolution but between friends of the revolution. Therefore, her negative evaluation of these individuals cannot merely be seen as a rejection of the Mubarak regime's way of doing politics but indicates a broader discontent with the way the sphere of formal politics functions:

> Most are over sixty-five. They sit in a big circle, and the buffet man goes round with coffee. They talk above each other and listen only long enough to pick up a line and go with it themselves. An unkind thought crosses my mind: *This is the political leadership that failed*. They talk about the necessity of creating a patriotic front to fill the vacuum created by the fall of the National Democratic Party, about the need to call for the election of a founding committee to write the constitution – and the conversation/argument has the same theoretical feel as the ones we've been listening to for thirty years: lists of things we need to do.
> (Soueif 2014, p. 38, emphasis and slash mark as given)

In this quote, individuals of the establishment political opposition are characterized as old and traditional. They sit comfortably in a circle, drink coffee and talk, but without actually doing anything. Soueif's description of how they talk above each other without really listening to each other tells us that these individuals are either not truly interested in or incapable of finding solutions together. The scene is described in a ritual-like way where everyone knows which role to perform, and where everyone knows the outcome in advance: A list of things to do. Soueif evaluates the scene negatively by stating that this is the political leadership that failed. The negative evaluation of the established political opposition in this quote indicates that the revolutionary distaste with the sphere of formal politics may not solely be related to a rejection of the Mubarak regime's way of doing politics, but to a rejection of the way of causing change in the sphere of formal politics more generally.

In texts based on outcome-oriented conceptualizations of revolution, the revolutionary distaste for all things related to the sphere of formal politics is presented as problematic. As I noted in the introduction, such approaches are interested in the transformation of the formal political system. That is, they take the organizational model in formal political systems for granted – political parties, a parliament, leaders, elections and so on – and seek explanations for why a revolution failed or

succeeded in such terms. For example, in chapter seven I noted that some scholars use the lack of formal leadership during the revolution as an explanatory factor for why a transition towards democracy never happened. In the present context, it is my argument that not only formal leaders, but associations to the sphere of formal politics more generally were rejected. Perhaps the revolutionary disillusion with formal politics in general, not just the lack of clear leaders, was the reason why the revolution failed in formal political terms.

However, looking at revolution as prefiguration, this revolutionary distaste for the sphere of formal politics is not a strategic mistake, but can be seen as an endorsement of a non-politicized social order in which relationships based on complementarity make political distinctions undesirable. Taking the local negative experiences with the Mubarak regime's way of doing politics into consideration, the dissociation of the revolution from things related to the sphere of formal politics may even be seen as necessary. Only in this way is it possible to ensure a clear break. The pre-revolutionary innovative protest approaches offered a new way of causing change, thus making it possible to imagine a non-politicized social order where diversity based on complementarity, not divisions, was the ideal.

Summing up, expressions about political distinctions embrace political diversity hesitantly, and usually by presenting it as part of diversity in general. More often, expressions about political distinctions display a distaste for things related to the sphere of formal politics; a distaste that can be related both to shared traits among modern protest movements and to local negative experiences with formal politics.

"The marvelous youth"

During the revolution, youth is the one sub-category of individuals that is radically reimagined. The positive diversity described previously, the embracement of relationships based on complementarity and respect for difference, and the ambivalence towards the formal political sphere, these characteristics can to varying degrees be seen as a continuation of pre-revolutionary tendencies. But the way youth is presented in the revolutionary expressions is new. In the review in chapter two, I described how other scholars have looked at the understanding of youth during the revolution. For example, El-Sharnouby argues that the understanding of youth was transformed during the 18 days of revolution from youth as a problem to youth as agents of change (El-Sharnouby 2012, El-Sharnouby 2015). And Rennick asserts that the young activists saw themselves as the vanguard of the revolution (Rennick 2015, chapter 4).

By looking at how youth is presented as leading the way both ideologically and practically, my analysis in the present section supports the arguments in the works of these scholars. As leaders, youth is characterized as a true vanguard that is no different from the rest of the people yet dons a particular role in leading the way. I contend that the presentation of "the marvelous youth" in my sources resembles the understanding of the avant-garde kind of leadership in organized modernity.

Leading the way ideologically

In the revolutionary expressions, youth is presented as leading the way ideologically. Here, I use the term ideology loosely to refer to a way of thinking about the constitution of social order, but not to any specific political ideological framework such as leftism, liberalism, Islamism, or nationalism. In my perspective, the "ideology" espoused during the revolution corresponds to the imaginaries of the good life analyzed in the present dissertation and to an approach to change building on the kind of inclusive, consensus-oriented, and non-divisive protest activities used in the years leading up to the revolution.

The youth's ideological leadership is evaluated positively. For example, Yusuf praises the young participants and calls them "the marvelous Egyptian youth/الشباب المصري البديع" (Yusuf 2011, p. 81). He does not include himself in the category of youth. He says that:

> They see what others do not see, they hold the dream in their hands, and they see a waterhole in what others deem a mirage.
> (Yusuf 2011, p. 96)
>
> يرون ما لا يراه الآخرون ، كانوا يلمسون الحلم بأيديهم ، ويبصرون عين الماء التي يحسبها الآخرون سربًا !

These words indicate that the young participants are ahead of the rest of the participants, that they know the direction to take and the goal to reach for. In this way, they are presented as "natural" ideological leaders. Sections in Prince's and Soueif's diaries also present the young participants as leaders (e.g., Prince 2014, p. 22-23, Soueif 2014, p. 19, 37-38). Looking at the sections on youth leadership in Prince's and Soueif's diaries, they set up a distinction between an old way of doing things represented by the old(er) generation of activists, and a new way of doing things represented by the young participants in the revolution. As also mentioned in the review in chapter two, youth is thus not simply a question of age, but of a whole set of ideas and practices. In Soueif's diary, her

description of the youth's new way of doing things follows immediately after her description of the established political opposition presented in the previous section. She contrasts the established political opposition to "some of the young leadership of the revolution" who join the meeting. She characterizes them as working together "like a football team", as "concise, self-deprecating, firm and courteous" and as actually having accomplished something (Soueif 2014, p. 38). She ends her description of the scene by telling the reader that someone of the old guard turns to the youth and says, "Whatever you want us to do, we'll do" (Soueif 2014, p. 39). Such descriptions of youth, a new way of doing things, and the admiration that shines through, present youth as some kind of ideological vanguard suited to leading the way for everybody.

The idea that youth leads the way ideologically is reminiscent of the idea of an avant-gardist kind of leadership in organized modernity. In organized modernity, the belief in a shared rationality and the possibility of steering society through united, collective efforts dominates. A vanguard may lead the way in this organizational model. Such a vanguard is not an external elite as in restricted liberal modernity, but one of the people. The vanguard shares the rationality of the rest of the people but is for some reason just better at leading the way. This is the way the youth is presented in the revolutionary expressions: They are not essentially different from the rest of the Egyptians, but because they "see what others do not see", "hold the dream in their hands" and "see a waterhole in what others deem a mirage", they are capable of leading the way ideologically for everybody.

The present argument about how youth is imagined as an ideological vanguard is somewhat in contrast to my argument in chapter seven about the leaderful collective. At that point I asserted that the revolutionary rejection of traditional notions of leadership can be seen as a rejection of the idea of a vanguard kind of leadership. I exemplified the argument with the rejection of ElBaradei's offer to lead the transition. I also argued that what replaced the idea of a vanguard kind of leadership was the idea of a leaderful collective. The present analysis suggests that this replacement is not as clear-cut after all. It indicates that the notion of vanguardism is indeed part of the revolutionary imaginaries, only not in the version offered by ElBaradei. As I argued in chapter seven, some revolutionary expressions present ElBaradei as external to the people. Therefore, he could not function as a true avant-gardist leader who is simultaneously a leader and part of the people. Moreover, ElBaradei can be seen as a representative of the old way of doing things related to the sphere of formal politics. In this way too, he could not function as a true ideological avant-gardist leader. In the revolutionary imaginaries, only the sub-category of youth can function as a true

ideological vanguard. In this way, the idea that youth leads the way ideologically coexisted and merged with notions of leaderfulness.

Leading the way in the confrontations with the regime

Youth is not only imagined as leading the way ideologically, but also physically in the confrontations with the regime. In a number of images on the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, young participants are shown in physical fights with the Central Security Forces.[72] Three of these images show one young participant forcefully jumping or pushing against a large group of Central Security Forces while the fourth shows three young participants surrounded by Central Security Forces who are beating them with batons. In all the images, the young participants are unarmed and dressed in civilian clothes whereas the Central Security Forces are armed with batons and clubs, protected by large shields and dressed in black uniforms and helmets with face shields. By showing that youth is at the frontline of the physical confrontations with the regime, youth is presented as part of the people. That is, they are not only ideologically leading the way, but in a very practical way participating alongside everybody else in combatting the Central Security Forces. In this way, they are presented as a true vanguard of the kind in organized modernity.

In my sources, the revolutionary expressions about how youth is leading the way in the physical confrontations with the regime are gendered. With a few exceptions (e.g., Yusuf 2011, p. 64-65), they are not about young men and women, but about young men exclusively. This is not surprising, as women participating in physical battles are still a rare phenomenon globally. And as I argued earlier in the chapter, even though the space for women's active participation was widened during the revolution, gendered expectations of men and women continued. It is therefore not unlikely that the youth leading the way in the physical confrontations with the regime is imagined as solely or predominantly male.

However, it brings up the question of whether the gendered imaginaries of youth leadership in the physical confrontations "spill over" into the imaginaries of the youth's ideological leadership? In her article about youth practices during the revolution, El-Sharnouby explains that "the image of those who could bring about change was gendered". She also mentions that most of her interviewees expected men more than women to bring about change (El-Sharnouby 2015, p. 184-185). El-Sharnouby does not define what she means by bringing about change, but her use of the

[72] We Are All Khaled Said 2011q, We Are All Khaled Said 2011r, We Are All Khaled Said 2011w, We Are All Khaled Said 2011x.

expression seems to include both an ideological sense of direction and the practical implementation of that direction. In this perspective, "the marvelous youth" may be imagined primarily as male. My sources display a silence or an ambiguity towards the subject. While some revolutionary expressions are specifically about either males or females, in Arabic, nouns referring to both men and women are grammatically male. Therefore, it is not possible to decide whether such nouns refer solely to men or to both men *and* women. The quote by Yusuf in the above section about how youth "hold the dream in their hands" is an example of such a use of the term "youth/شباب". My previous argument about how gendered expectations were continued during the revolution supports the interpretation that the referred to youth is imagined as male. But my argument about the widened space for women supports the interpretation that the referred to youth is both male and female. That is, the youth imagined leading the way both ideologically and practically may be primarily male, but at the same time includes the possibility of female participation in some areas.

To sum up, in the revolutionary expressions, youth is characterized as leading the way both ideologically and practically. They are characterized as a vanguard that is part of the people yet takes on a particular role in leading the way. The characterization of youth thus resembles the understanding of a vanguard kind of leadership in organized modernity. In the revolutionary expressions, it is unclear whether the sub-category of youth is primarily imagined as male. But at least in some areas, the vanguard kind of youth leadership suggested in my sources does include the possibility of female participation.

Conclusion

In chapter eight I have shown how the Egyptian people is imagined as a heterogeneous people consisting of various sub-categories of individuals. First, I have shown how diversity within the participants based on class, occupation, age, and geography is presented. I have argued that such diversity is evaluated positively and that it is used to present the participants as representative of the Egyptian people as a whole. At the same time, it sets up an ideal of a pluralist social order in which different sub-categories of individuals co-exist in harmony. Theoretically, this conception of society draws on the celebration of pluralism in extended liberal modernity combined with group-based thinking reminiscent of that in organized modernity. Second, I have expanded my focus to not only look at specific sub-categories of individuals but also at the imaginaries of a desirable relationship between these. By analyzing selected expressions about men and women, and Muslims and Christians, I have argued that the desirable relationship between these sub-categories of individuals

can be characterized as complementary and based on respect for pre-defined and unquestioned differences. I have suggested that relationships of complementarity and respect for differences may be seen as an ideal in general, and not only between men and women, and Muslims and Christians. Theoretically, this characterization of a desirable relationship between various sub-categories of individuals can be interpreted through the group-based thinking in organized modernity and through ideas of complementarity in corporatism. Third, I have asserted that distinctions related to the sphere of formal politics are viewed in a much more ambivalent light than the distinctions presented so far in the chapter. I have explained how the ambivalence towards the sphere of formal politics can be seen both as a consequence of local negative experiences with the sphere of formal politics in Egypt and as part of some broad, global tendencies. And fourth, I have argued that the sub-category of youth occupies a special place in the revolutionary imaginaries. Youth is portrayed as a vanguard, both ideologically and practically. Theoretically, this conception of the youth's avant-gardist leadership traces a connection to the understanding of a vanguard in organized modernity. But at the same time, the revolutionary expressions about youth may tell us of a gendered perception of this leadership.

This chapter concludes the part of my dissertation that analyzes the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective. Through an analysis of a broad selection of revolutionary expressions, I have contended that the collective in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life is presented as a homogeneous, united, and agentic people on the one hand, and on the other as a heterogeneous people consisting of specific sub-categories of individuals. I have also asserted that the imaginaries of the collective can be interpreted as specifically modern in a particularly Egyptian way. In the conclusion, I sum up on the main findings from both the part on the individual and the part on the collective.

CONCLUSION: THE REVOLUTION CONTINUES?

In my dissertation, I have explored and interpreted the kind of life that was created during the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square in 2011. As explained in the introduction, I have done so by setting up two different lines of argumentation that run side by side through the dissertation.

One line of argumentation revolved around how the kind of life created during the revolution at Tahrir Square constituted a primary way of contesting the regime, and how this life should hence be analyzed in its own right. I have used the concept of prefiguration to set up this argument (De Smet 2016, Van de Sande 2013), and applied my own concept of imaginaries of the good life to explore the kind of life created in this way. I consider my argument as complementary to studies exploring the Egyptian Revolution through what De Smet calls outcome-oriented conceptualizations of revolution (De Smet 2016, p. 72-83). Such studies are interested in the transformation of the formal political system and often only treat the 18 days at Tahrir Square as a parenthesis. They include political science oriented studies looking at various background factors related to, for example, economy and formal politics (e.g., Lesch 2012, Nagarajan 2013, Roccu 2013), sociologically oriented studies looking at the development of pre-revolutionary protest movements (e.g., Abdelrahman 2014, Beinin 2012, Ezbawy 2012), and communicatively oriented studies interested in explaining the mobilizational and organizational role of cyber activism and social media in the years leading up to the revolution (e.g., El-Nawawy and Khamis 2016, Herrera 2014, Khamis and Vaughn 2012). By approaching the Egyptian Revolution in terms that are not related to the sphere of formal politics, I have provided an innovative approach for the study of revolutions or modern protest movements. By taking this approach I have been able to include in my analyses the vast spectrum of popular expressions that were part of life at Tahrir Square during the revolution. Many of these expressions tell of "fluffy" matters such as the desire to live like human beings (chapter four), the importance of having good manners (chapter four), or the urge to shower (chapter six). The meaning of such expressions is not necessarily easy to grasp in terms of formal politics. I have also avoided making the assumption that the Egyptian Revolution and the Arab Revolutions in general were democratic, as some scholars do (see e.g., Alexander 2011b, the headline, Barbato 2012, the abstract, Saouli 2015, p. 16) – indeed, in the sources analyzed in my dissertation the term "democracy" (or derivates of it) is seldom used.

This does not mean that my study is not political or that it cannot say something about questions related to the sphere of formal politics. Drawing on Mouffe's distinction between politics and the

political, I understand ordinary life at Tahrir as dealing with the politi*cal*, but it also of course informs formal politics in some instances. For example, in chapters seven and eight I have provided a possible explanation for why the revolution failed in formal political terms: Not because of the lack of formal leaders, but because of a general distaste for the sphere of formal politics. There, I argued that the revolutionary expressions tend to dissociate the revolution from matters related to the sphere of formal politics for fear of ending up with yet another Mubarak. The developments in Egypt in the years after the revolution proved this fear justified.

My other line of argumentation revolved around how the kind of life imagined as desirable can be seen as a specifically modern interpretation of what constitutes a good life. I have used selected theories of modernity to set up this argument. My primary conceptual tool is the ideal-typical distinction between three ways of creating order in modernity, originally presented in Wagner's theory of successive modernities (Wagner 2002). In doing so, I follow the analytical strategy of the larger Modern Muslim Subjectivity Project in applying them as ideal types for understanding the ways in which social actors imagine modern social orders (Jung 2017b, Jung and Sinclair 2014, Jung and Sinclair 2015, Jung, Juul Petersen and Lei Sparre 2014). In Jung's rendition of the three ideal typical ways of creating order in modernity, he moreover brings in Reckwitz's theory of three cultural types of modern subjectivity formation (Reckwitz 2006). Jung's conceptual framework allows me to discuss the creation of order in the modern world both on an individual and collective level; the two levels that constitute the two overall analytical parts of the dissertation. In my use of Jung's framework, I place a particular emphasis on the importance of agency and the relevance of ordinary life in modernity by drawing on Meyer and Jepperson, and Taylor, respectively (Meyer and Jepperson 2000, Taylor 1989, p. 211-214).

By interpreting the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life with the help of these analytical tools, I have contributed to the overall aim of the collective research project of which my PhD is part. In our collective research project, we argue that theories of modernity deriving their conceptual apparatus from European history can be fruitfully used in understanding social phenomena in the Arab world (Jung 2017a). In different ways, the individual scholars participating in the project contend that we can observe the Arab world from the perspective of the evolution of global modernity with its modern global templates adopted in localized forms. By showing how my rendition of Jung's theoretical framework can be used to interpret the revolutionary imaginaries, I have contributed to substantiating our shared proposition.

In support of these two arguments, the dissertation used primary sources in Arabic that, thus far, have not yet been used comprehensively to analyze the Egyptian Revolution. Previously un-analyzed sources include, to the best of my knowledge, most of the included posts from the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, the diaries of Abdel Rahman Yusuf and Nagham Nabil Omar, and probably a good number of the slogans. Sadly, some of the slogans and the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page in its entirety have disappeared from the internet since the beginning of my study. In this perspective, my use of Arabic quotes in Arabic also contributes to the documentation of the revolution.

Main findings

Through the two different lines of argumentation presented above, my study has shown how the individual in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life is presented as valuable, agentic, and ordinary (chapters four, five and six), and how the collective is presented as agentic, united, and heterogeneous (chapters seven and eight). Moreover, a number of cross-cutting or general findings stand out. These findings are the importance of agency, historical continuity, and the interplay between the global and the local in understanding forms of social order on both a collective and individual level.

First, my analyses show that the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life in many ways revolve around the question of agency, both on an individual and collective level. For example, in chapter five I showed how the individual was presented as capable of taking responsibility, of showing determination, of building a better society, and of expressing him- or herself in creative ways. Theoretically, these characteristics of the individual can all be interpreted as examples of individual agency, primarily of the kind endorsed in extended liberal modernity. Looking at the revolutionary understanding of the individual through Meyer and Jepperson's lens (Meyer and Jepperson 2000), it tells us of how the individual is ascribed agency for the self, for others, and for principles. According to Meyer and Jepperson, these three kinds of agency are dominant in the modern world. And as I also argued in chapter five, sometimes human beings were even ascribed more agency than God. According to Meyer and Jepperson, the ascription of more agency to human beings than to God is yet another dominant characteristic of the modern world. In numerous ways, the individual is thus ascribed agency in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. But at the same time, the revolutionary imaginaries revolve around collective forms of agency. This is particularly apparent in chapter seven, where I showed how the revolutionary expressions present the Egyptian people as

united, agentic, and leaderful. The strongest statement of collective agency is perhaps the slogan "The people wants to overthrow the regime" which I analyzed in detail. Meyer and Jepperson's argument that human beings in the modern world are ascribed more agency than God is also relevant in this context. Combined with the notion of collective agency from organized modernity and Taylor's argument about how the modern social order is founded upon popular sovereignty (Taylor 2004, chapter 8), my analysis in chapter seven showed how collective agency makes up an important part of the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. In this way, both on an individual and a collective level, the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life revolve around modern actorhood.

In my theoretical perspective, there is no contradiction in positing a strong belief in individual and collective agency at the same time. Had I instead interpreted the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life through theories of democracy, a confusion might have arisen: A strong belief in collective agency is often related to socialist versions of democracy while a strong belief in individual agency is often related to liberal versions of democracy. But in my perspective, because both individual and collective agency constitute important traits of the modern world, I simply see the revolutionary preoccupation with agency as an indication that the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life belong to the modern world. And I see the way in which notions of individual and collective agency are combined in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life as a specifically local interpretation of some global modern trends.

The question of agency is also a good example of how the two analytical parts of my study are interrelated. By arguing that imaginaries of individual and collective agency are equally important in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life, I implicitly contend that human beings are imagined both as individuals and as part of a collective. In the same way, the individual is simultaneously imagined as bearer of inalienable individual rights (chapter four), as part of different pre-defined categories of individuals (chapter eight), and as part of the national collective of the Egyptian people (chapter seven).

Second, my analyses show that continuity of pre-revolutionary understandings and practices constitute a large part of the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. As I explained in the opening pages of the dissertation, both participants and scholars often present the 18 days of revolution as extraordinary in an Egyptian context.[73] This is also my own point of departure. In this

[73] See e.g., Gregory 2013, Moll 2012, Rashed and El Azzazi 2011, Sabea 2012, Shokr 2011.

way, an implicit argument about a break with the past is set up. However, as I have shown throughout the dissertation, the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life do not only represent a break but also a high degree of continuity with the past. Indeed, many aspects of the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life can be seen as a continuation of pre-revolutionary practices and understandings. For example, in chapter four I showed that the participants were presented as peaceful, orderly, and civilized. Such an understanding of the individual was arguably also contained in the silent stands in 2010 arranged by the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page. And in chapter five, I asserted that the structures at the square encouraged creativity and participation. Such ideals were also apparent in Kefaya's innovative protest approaches before the revolution in 2005 (Mansour 2009). In this way, many of the pre-revolutionary protest approaches and the specific understanding of the individual and the collective contained therein found their continuation during the revolution. Even the highly celebrated example of cooperation and peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Christians (see e.g., Agrama 2011, Barbato 2012, Hirschkind 2012), as analyzed in chapter eight, must be seen in the light of continuation rather than as a break with the past. As I explained in chapter three, in the years leading up to the revolution Islamic intellectuals and the Revolutionary Socialists aimed at bridging the oft-posited divide between Islamist and secular thought (Browers 2009, p. 125-127, Hirschkind 2012). At the same time, on a practical level the composition of Kefaya's members showed that all kinds of divides were possible to surmount (Mansour 2009, Shorbagy 2007). And while recurrent outbursts of sectarian violence did challenge such attempts at bridging divides, the ground for cooperation and peaceful coexistence was paved both intellectually and practically before the revolution.

In this perspective, I suggest that the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life should not be seen as a radical break with the past. Rather, they should be seen as the quintessence of some already existing understandings and practices that were difficult to detect in the authoritarian political environment of the Mubarak regime.

Third, my analyses show how global and local perspectives merge. In my dissertation the theoretical framework makes up the global perspective while specifically Egyptian historical experiences make up the local perspective. Through this framework I have maintained that the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life display some of the same tendencies that are dominant on a global level, yet that they are altered by social actors in a specifically Egyptian way. For example, in chapter six I showed that the participants are presented as ordinary individuals in both global and local terms: On the one hand, they are presented as ordinary individuals by the recounting of their

generic, globally relevant ordinary concerns revolving around such things as marriage, children, and work. Both Taylor and Reckwitz point to the importance of these precise aspects of ordinary life in the modern world (Reckwitz 2006, p. 55-62, Taylor 1989, p. 213 and 289-294). On the other hand, they are presented as ordinary individuals by ascribing to them prototypical, local Egyptian character traits such as humor and a basic sense of religiosity (Bassiouney 2015, chapter 4). In my perspective, the revolutionary preoccupation with ordinary life is thus a good example of how global templates and their local interpretations merge. Throughout the dissertation, many other examples appear. The many examples of this merger of the global and the local show that it makes sense to analyze the revolutionary events and the concomitant imaginaries of the good life through those analytical ideal types that originate from historical observations of the Western world. Consequently, Egyptian interpretations of global templates are no less modern than, for example, Danish interpretations of such templates. In this way, my analyses contribute to substantiating the proposition in our shared collective research project of how certain theories of modernity can fruitfully be used in a non-Western context.

Limitations of my study

While my study can provide new insights and perspectives on the Egyptian Revolution, it also has its limitations. Three limitations are particularly worth mentioning.

First, my findings are not representative. As I have shown in the dissertation, many revolutionary expressions contain claims of representativity. For example, in chapter eight I showed how expressions about the diversity of the participants present them as representative of Egyptians in general. And in chapter six, I showed how some revolutionary expressions present the participants as just ordinary Egyptians by ascribing prototypical Egyptian character traits to them. Such expressions also contain claims of representativity. Claims of representativity were arguably an important part of the contestation of the regime, as they presented the demands at Tahrir Square as representative of the Egyptian people in its entirety. However, while such expressions provide insight into *imaginaries* of representativity, it cannot say anything about whether these imaginaries are indeed shared by the population at large.

My study is therefore not designed to provide insights into questions of representativity, but to shed light on a specific discourse at a specific point in time. This discourse is admittedly largely carried by the well-educated elite, at least if you look solely at the production-side of my sources. It does not come as a surprise that a well-educated elite is better versed and more productive in presenting

their thoughts in words than other parts of the population. And while I have aimed at securing nuances and different angles in my analyses through the use of a variety in genre, and while slogans produced by a "wide spectrum of individuals" have played a particularly important role in these efforts, the discourse may nevertheless primarily reflect a rather elitist perspective. As Mellor, for example, argues, liberal sources from the revolution present the participants in the revolution as "liberal middle-class, well-educated and media-savvy youth" (Mellor 2014, p. 84) – or in other words, as the well-educated elite. However, the aim of my study is not to discern the social origin of a discourse, but to look at the kind of life this discourse at the square itself expressed. Or in other words, the strength of my study thus does not lie in its representative cogency, but in its ability to show how the discursive contestation of a regime can take place.

Second, my study focuses on shared imaginaries, and cannot say anything about differences of opinion. I have not looked at what members of different groupings expressed in contrast to each other. Had I chosen to enquire further into differences in opinion, a greater focus on the background of the individuals in my sources would have been required. While I have indeed presented the background of named individuals, I have mainly done so to provide context, not to use it as a way of categorizing the opinions of these individuals into specific groups. Moreover, my collection of sources includes sources that are unidentifiable on an individual level, such as the slogans and the Dictionary of the Revolution. And most importantly, my sources themselves seldom express differences in opinion, but focus on shared opinions, ideas and demands, and on feelings of solidarity, sameness and unity. In this sense, my study aims at understanding and interpreting the shared spirit that was arguably the essential part of life at Tahrir Square during the revolution, and not at unfolding the differences in opinion that lurked beneath the surface.

This is not to say that is it not possible to speculate about differences beneath the surface. Rennick, for example, argues that the use of broad yet unprecise slogans contributed to uniting the participants during the revolution, but that ingrained differences in interpretations emerged afterwards and caused divisions among the participants (Rennick 2013a). I certainly find her analysis plausible, yet it takes a post-revolutionary perspective to pinpoint what such differences consisted of. Moreover, it does not render the question of what actually united the participants during the revolution at Tahrir Square less interesting.

Finally, my adoption of an ideal typical conceptualization of modernity from our collective research project sets up an externally defined framework for my study. As such, it may be considered a

limitation. Other conceptualizations of modernity could have been used to discuss my findings, just as conceptualizations of democracy could have been used if one applied an institutional perspective. However, the point in my dissertation was not to discuss different conceptualizations of modernity – or of democracy – in light of the revolution, but to apply this specific framework as an analytical tool to help me in making sense of life at Tahrir Square during the revolution. In this way, my study supports the overall aim of the collective research project in searching for similarities in the ways in which we try to make sense of modernity.

To address these limitations, other sources, analytical approaches and theories would be required. In this sense they, amongst others, indicate areas for future research.

The revolution continues? Fields for future research

Looking at the revolution in formal political terms, many commentators assert that the revolution has failed (see e.g., Ashour 2016, Hamzawy 2017). President Al-Sisi has a stern grip over society, democratic dreams are long gone, and the daily oppression is arguably more severe than under Mubarak. But looking at the revolution in my perspective – looking at revolution as process, at life at Tahrir Square as prefiguration, and at the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life – what has then become of the revolution? A motto from the transition period stated that "The revolution continues"/"الثورة مستمرة", thus indicating that the revolution did not end with Mubarak's resignation. So, in my perspective, does the revolution continue?

The famous Egyptian writer, Alaa Al-Aswany/علاء الأسواني seems to make this point. In an article from 2019 in the Danish newspaper Politiken, he writes that a revolution is not about a change in (formal) politics but in awareness or consciousness. He continues by stating that,

> [t]he wrong people are in power, and the oppression continues. But a new generation exists; a generation that will never forget what happened in 2011. Look at what is happening right now in Lebanon, Sudan, Iraq and Algeria. The revolution has only just begun, if you look at it in a historical perspective.
> (Pedersen 2019, section Bøger, p. 4. My translation from Danish)

In Al-Aswany's perspective, the revolution smolders beneath the surface. Because revolutions are about a change in awareness of consciousness, they live on. In this perspective, the Egyptian Revolution simply cannot but continue, at least so long as the present generation is alive. Al-

Aswany's emphasis on how a revolution is not about a change in (formal) politics, but about a change in awareness or consciousness echoes my perspective. Therefore, his argument that the revolution lives on is worth investigating from my perspective. If the revolution lives on, how can we as scholars study the continuous revolution? Where should we look if we want to explore what happened with the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life?

It is a core argument of my dissertation that to trace the continuation of the revolution we should focus on a sphere outside of formal politics. This is an advantage in dictatorial settings. Because the Sisi regime keeps tight control on the sphere of formal politics, it is difficult to assess what kind of life the population dreams of by looking at such things as election results, public debates, and the functioning of the parliament. In such a context, my approach provides one way of studying the political from outside the sphere of formal politics.

Looking at the findings in my dissertation, three areas of study seem particularly promising if we want to explore what happened with the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life.

First, my study points to ordinary life as a sphere of particular interest if we want to explore what happened with the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. Ordinary life is the central focus in chapter six, but it also forms the natural background of many of the revolutionary expressions in other parts of the dissertation. For example, in chapter four the expressions about rights link these rights to the ability to live ordinary lives, and in chapter eight the expressions about positive diversity present the participants as ordinary Egyptians. Because of the role ordinary life seems to play as the background for the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life, the exploration of understandings and practices in ordinary life constitute a promising area if we want to trace the (possible) continuation of the revolution. Within this context, one may conduct a study among former participants in the revolution and explore how the revolution has affected their lives. Relevant research questions include the following: How do former participants practice or not practice some of the ideals inherent in the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life? In which areas do they do so, and why? In which areas do they not do so, and why? How do they understand these ideals? Do their understandings correspond to my findings? What may explain the correspondence or difference? The answers to such questions can tell us something about how specific individuals practice and understand some of the revolutionary ideals, and the extent to which there is room to do so in present-day Egypt.

Second, my study points towards the importance of youth practices and understandings. Because I have found that youth functioned as both an ideological and practical vanguard, youth must also be expected to play a leading role in continuing or discontinuing the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life. Therefore, the exploration of youth's involvement in various fora after the revolution constitutes another promising area of study. These fora do not have to be overtly political but may be any site of social involvement where youth is welcome, including online sites. Relevant research questions include the following: How is Egyptian youth involved in various organizations, networks, movements, and other sites of social involvement? Which kinds of understandings and practices do they espouse at such social sites? Do they practice some of the revolutionary ideals? Does youth function as a vanguard at any of these sites? If yes, how? How do non-youth at such sites view the role of youth? The answer to such questions can tell us whether youth is still imagined as a vanguard at some sites, and if so, which practices and understandings they support. By comparing these to the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life, such a study can tell us whether the revolutionary imaginaries are continuing, have changed, or have disappeared.

Third, my study points towards how religious language and practices are used to express non-religious matters. This is an interesting avenue of study, not just with regard to tracing the possible continuation of the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life, but also in a broader sense. In all of the analytical chapters, a reference to something religious appears. In my analyses of these examples I have showed how public prayer was used to present the participants as orderly individuals (chapter four), how participation in the revolution was legitimated on religious grounds (chapter five), how religiosity was used to present the participants as ordinary and authentic individuals (chapter six), and how religious diversity between Muslims and Christians was used to depict national unity (chapter seven). In all of these examples, religion was not used to insist on the creation of a specifically religious social order. Only in chapter eight where I analyzed the desirable relationship between Muslims and Christians does my analysis tell us something specific about a desired religious element in the social order – that the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life allow room for both Muslims and Christians, and that the desirable relationship between members of the two faiths is one of complementarity and respect for differences. But the many examples of how something religious may point to something non-religious are worth exploring further. In my perspective, the following research questions are of particular relevance: In which ways does public prayer express something about the social order more generally? In which ways do Muslims and Christians cooperate and not cooperate? How is religious language used in non-religious settings,

and what is it used to express or legitimate? Is it possible to detect some of the revolutionary ideals in these understandings and practices? If so, how? The answer to such questions can tell us something about whether religious language and practices carry non-religious significance today. If so, the imaginaries contained in religious understandings and practices can be compared to the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life.

These three areas of study can of course be readily combined. For example, former participants' practices and understandings can be compared to present-day youth's practices and understandings, both in ordinary life and at various social sites of involvement. Religious understandings and practices can readily form part of such a study. Other combinations are also possible. All of the suggested questions and areas of study can be interpreted within the analytical frame suggested in the present study. Because my approach brings forward an analytical and interpretative frame that is political yet outside the sphere of formal politics, it is particularly useful in dictatorial settings such as Egypt. Here, it can contribute to the exploration of the kind of life Egyptians might dream of, were they able to speak up and decide on their own.

LITERATURE

Abaza, Mona (2011): Mona Abaza on Egypt, public space and media, *Theory, Culture and Society,* 22.

Abdelrahman, Maha (2014): *Egypt's long revolution: Protest movements and uprisings*, Routledge.

Abdulla, Muhammed/عبدالله، محمد (2016). *The five most famous rumors about the January 25 Revolution/*أشهر 5 شائعات لثورة 25 يناير. Sout Al-Omma/صوت الأمة, https://bit.ly/2xwVofO, last date of access 19-04-2020.

Abdulla, Rasha; Poell, Thomas; Rieder, Bernhard; Woltering, Robbert; Zack, Liesbeth (2018): Facebook polls as proto-democratic instruments in the Egyptian revolution: The 'We Are All Khaled Said'Facebook page, *Global Media and Communication,* 14 (1).

Aboelezz, Mariam (2014): The geosemiotics of Tahrir Square: A study of the relationship between discourse and space, *Journal of Language and Politics,* 13 (4).

Aboelezz, Mariam (2012). 1001 images for Tahrir Square: A study of intertextuality and dialogicality in protest messages. *BRISMES Annual Conference*.

Abou El Fadl, Bassma (2014): *A performative space: Socio-spatial practices in Tahrir Square during the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 (PhD dissertation)*, IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca.

Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2011): The language of the age: Shari'a and natural justice in the Egyptian Revolution, *Harvard International Law Journal,* 52.

Aboubakr, Randa (2015): The Egyptian colloquial poet as popular intellectual: A differentiated manifestation of commitment. in*:* Pannewick, Friederike; Khalil, George, Albers, Yvonne (ed.) *Commitment and beyond: Reflections on/of the political in Arabic literature sinde the 1940s.* Reichert Verlag Wiesbaden: 29.

Abul-Magd, Zeinab (2012): Occupying Tahrir Square: The myths and the realities of the Egyptian revolution, *South Atlantic Quarterly,* 111 (3).

Abulof, Uriel (2015): 'The people want(s) to bring down the regime': (Positive) nationalism as the Arab Spring's revolution, *Nations and Nationalism,* 21 (4).

Adlat/عدلات. (2011). *A collection of images from the events of the January 25 Revolution/* صور مجمعه من أحداث ثورة 25 يناير. Adlat/عدلات, https://vb.3dlat.com/showthread.php?t=34521&page=2, last date of access 19-04-2020.

Agrama, Hussein Ali (2011): Asecular revolution, *The Immanent Frame,* 11.

Agrama, Hussein Ali (2012): Reflections on secularism, democracy, and politics in Egypt, *American Ethnologist,* 39 (1).

Al-Ali, Nadje (2012): Gendering the Arab Spring, *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication,* 5 (1).

Al-Anani, Khalil (2009): The young Brotherhood in search of a new path, *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology,* 9.

Al-Awadi, Hesham (2004): *In Pursuit of Legitimacy. The Muslim Brotherhood and Mubarak. 1982-2000*, Library of Modern Middle East Studies 46. Taurus Academic Studies.

Al-Barghouti, Tamim/تميم البرغوتي (2011): *Oh Egypt, we are so close/*يا مصر هانت وبانت, Dar Al-Shorouk/ دار الشورق.

Al-Ghazawy, Ola. (2011). *Tahrir field hospital saves hundreds of lives*. https://www.natureasia.com/en/nmiddleeast/article/10.1038/nmiddleeast.2011.18, last date of access 26-11-2018.

Al-Sayyid Marsot, Afaf Lutfi (2007): *A history of Egypt: From the Arab conquest to the present*, Cambridge University Press.

Al-Shamaa, Mohamed/الشماع، محمد (2011): *Days of freedom at Tahrir Square/*أيام الحرية في ميدان التحرير, Shams for publishing and distribution/ شمس للنشر والتوزيع.

Al-Sharqawi, Haytham; Muhsin, Samika/الشرقاوي، هيثم؛ محسن، سميكة. (2011). *"The people want to overthrow the regime". The ringtone of the protesters' mobile phones/* "الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام" نغمة لـ"موبايلات" المتظاهرين. Egypt Independent/المصري اليوم, https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/112693, last date of access 19-04-2020.

Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. (2011). *The January 25 Revolution restores the humorous spirit of the Egyptians/"* ثورة 25 يناير" تستعيد روح الدعابة عند المصريين. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat/الشرق الأوسط, http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=607359&issueno=11760#.W-QQaSBRfct, last date of access 08-11-2018.

Al-Sowaidi, Belqes; Banda, Felix; Mansour, Arwa (2015): Doing politics in the recent Arab uprisings: towards a political discourse analysis of the Arab Spring slogans, *Journal of Asian and African Studies*.

Al-Youm, Al-Masry. (2015). *Dairy of the January Revolution (February 8): Week of resilience/* يوميات ثورة يناير (8 فبراير): أسبوع الصمود. Al-Masry Al-Youm/المصري اليوم, https://www.almasryalyoum.com/galleries/details/8377#, last date of access 20-11-2020.

Al Aswad, Maha. (2011). *My home adress is Tahrir Square/*عنوان بيتي ميدان التحرير. Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/mahaalaswad/5414047517/in/photostream/, last date of access 19-10-2019.

Al Qudaimy, Nawwaf/القديمي، نواف (2012): *Memoires of the revolution. From Tahrir Square to Sidi Bouzid and to Change Square/*يوميات الثورة. من ميدان التحرير.. إلى سيدي بوزيد.. وحتى ساحة التغيير, Arab Network for Research and Publishing/الشبكة العربية للأبحاث والنشر.

Alaimo, Kara (2015): How the Facebook Arabic page "We are all Khaled Said" helped promote the Egyptian revolution, *Social Media + Society,* 1 (2).

Alexander, Anne. (2011a). *Egypt's Muslims and Christians join hands in protest*. BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12407793, last date of access 25-06-2018.

Alexander, Anne (2011b): The growing social soul of Egypt's democratic revolution, *International Socialism,* 131.

Allam, Nermin (2016): Whose rights? Understanding women's engagement in the 2011 Egyptian uprising.

Almaghlouth, Nada; Arvanitis, Rigas; Cointet, Jean-Philippe; Hanafi, Sari (2015): Who frames the debate on the Arab uprisings? Analysis of Arabic, English, and French academic scholarship, *International sociology,* 30 (4).

Alwatanvoice.Com. (2011). *In images: Youth innovations in the Egyptian Revolution. Poetry, songs, jokes and banners/*بالصور:إبداعات شبابية في الثورة المصرية..أشعار وأغان ونكات ولافتات. Donia Al-watan/دنيا الوطن, https://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/content/print/176385.html, last date of access 20-04-2020.

Americanuniversityincairo. (2011). *University on the Square: Documenting Egypt's 21st Century Revolution*. http://digitalcollections.aucegypt.edu/cdm/landingpage/collection/p15795coll7, last date of access 16-20-2017 2017.

Americanuniversityincairo. (2011-2014). *Oral histories*. American University in Cairo, https://bit.ly/380huFB, last date of access 30-11-2020.

Amin, Qasim (2005): *The liberation of women & The new woman. Two documents in the history of Egyptian feminism*, American University in Cairo Press.

Amin, Qasim/أمين، قاسم (2011): *The liberation of women/*المرأة تحرير, Hindawi foundation for education and culture/مؤسسة هنداوي للتعليم والثقافة.

Amr, Tarek. (2011). *Egypt: Kentucky Chicken Revolution/*مصر: ثورة دجاج كنتاكي. https://ar.globalvoices.org/2011/02/08/9311/, last date of access 24-04-2019.

Anagondahalli, Deepa; Khamis, Sahar (2014): Mubarak framed! Humor and political activism before and during the Egyptian Revolution, *Arab Media & Society,* (19).

Anonymous. (2011). *Everything you need to know about the demonstrations of the revolution of the 25th/*ما كل 25 يوم ثورة مظاهرات عن تعرفه أن تريد. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1qU3TnumUD5ZzZN9CEBbDRIzNvcjbOtJX5CkcBcC9OjI/edit#heading=h.kxmx93-pjebby or through the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.104265636289976.2684.104224996294040/160095677373638/?type=3&theater last date of access 13-03-2018.

Anwar, Salah. (2014). *Films about the Egyptian revolution*. IMDb, https://www.imdb.com/list/ls059284625/, last date of access 30-11-2020.

Arafat, Alaa Al-Din (2011): *Hosni Mubarak and the future of democracy in Egypt*, Springer.

Archive-It. (2014). *Egypt Revolution and politics*. Archive-it, https://archive-it.org/collections/2358, last date of access 01-12-2014.
Armbrust, Walter (2012): The revolution against neoliberalism in*:* Haddad, Bassam; Bsheer, Rosie; Abu-Rish, Ziad (ed.) *Dawn of the Arab uprisings.* Pluto Press.
Ashour, Omar. (2011). *Egypt's leaderless revolution*. The Philadelphia Inquirer, https://www.inquirer.com/philly/opinion/currents/20111127_Egypt_s_leaderless_revolution.html, last date of access 23-01-2020.
Ashour, Omar. (2016). *The Egyptian revolution: What went wrong?* Aljazeera.com, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/01/egyptian-revolution-wrong-160125102046174.html, last date of access 28-11-2019.
Aslam, Ali (2017): Salat-al-Juma: Organizing the public in Tahrir Square, *Social Movement Studies,* 16 (3).
Assad, Ragui; Barsoum, Ghada (2007): Youth exclusion in Egypt: In search of 'second chances', *Middle East Youth Initiative Working Paper,* (2).
Assaf, Sherif; Attia, Omar; El Dalil, Rehab K; Kaldas, Timothy; Mo, Zee; El-Shazly, Monir (2011): *The road to Tahrir. Front line images by six young Egyptian photographers,* Cairo, The American University in Cairo Press.
Aswat Masriya. (2011). *Sally Moore: Egyptian activist describes life in "Republic of Tahrir"*. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3L-ue1e3x3c, last date of access 13-07-2018.
Asyutuniversity. (2016). *Doctor Nagham Nabil Mahmoud Omar*. Asyut University/جامعة أسيوط, http://www.aun.edu.eg/arabic/membercv.php?M_ID=1933, last date of access 11-12-2019.
Attia, Sahar (2011): Rethinking public space in Cairo: The appropriated Tahrir Square, *Trialog,* 109.
Ayalon, Ami (1987): *Language and change in the Arab Middle East: The evolution of modern Arabic political discourse*, Oxford University Press.
Badawi, El-Said; Hinds, Martin (1986): *A dictionary of Egyptian Arabic. Arabic-English,* Beirut, Librairie du Liban.
Baheyya.Blogspot.Com. (2007). *The civil disobedience project*. Baheyya, http://baheyya.blogspot.com/2007/07/civil-disobedience-project.html, last date of access 09-10-2019.
Baladi, Lara. (2011). *Vox Populi*. Tahrirarchives.com, http://tahrirarchives.com/, last date of access 21-10-2020.
Bamyeh, Mohammed (2012): Anarchist philosophy, civic traditions and the culture of Arab revolutions, *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication,* 5 (1).
Bamyeh, Mohammed (2013): Anarchist method, liberal intention, authoritarian lesson: The Arab Spring between three enlightenments, *Constellations,* 20 (2).
Bardis2009. (2011). *Speech by the actor Mohamed Ramadan at Tahrir Square*. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jkaLfGHENVM, last date of access 18-10-2019.
Bar'el, Zvi (2017): Tahrir Square, from place to space: The geography of representation, *The Middle East Journal,* 71 (1).
Barbato, Mariano (2012): Postsecular revolution: Religion after the end of history, *Review of International Studies,* 38 (05).
Bardis2009. (2011). *Speech by the actor Mohamed Ramadan at Tahrir Square*. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jkaLfGHENVM, last date of access 18-10-2019.
Baron, Beth (2005): *Egypt as a woman: Nationalism, gender, and politics*, University of California Press.
Barsoum, Ghada; Ramadan, Mohamed; Mostafa, Mona (2014): *Labour market transitions of young women and men in Egypt*, International Labour Office.
Bassiouney, Reem (2015): *Language and identity in modern Egypt*, Edinburgh University Press.
Bauer, Patricia; Schweitzer, Bertold 2013. The Egyptian Revolution 2011: mechanisms of violence and non-violence. *State of Peace Conference & Peace Report 2012: "Democracy in crisis: The dynamics of civil protest and civil resistance".*
Bayat, Asef (2010): *Life as politics. How ordinary people vhange the Middle East*, Stanford University Press.

Bayat, Asef (2011): The post-Islamist revolutions, *Foreign Affairs*.
Bayoumi, Soha (2016). Health in the time of revolution: What role for health demands in the Egyptian uprising?. *Conference: After the Uprisings: The Arab world in freefall, fragmentation or reconfiguration?.* Princeton University.
BBC (2011). *Egypt unrest*. BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12434787, last date of access 19-10-2019.
BBCnews (2011). *Egypt bomb kills 21 at Alexandria Coptic church*. BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12101748, last date of access 17-11-2019.
BBCnews عربي (2011). The song "Oh Egypt, we are so close"/اغنية يا مصر هانت وبانت. YouTube.
Behnam, Djamshid (2002): The eastern perception of the West. in*:* Mozaffari, Mehdi (ed.) *Globalization and Civilizations.* Routledge: 178-97.
Beinin, Joel (2012): Egyptian workers and January 25th: A social movement in historical context, *Social Research,* 79 (2).
Bielefeldt, Heiner (2000): "Western" versus "Islamic" human rights conceptions? A critique of cultural essentialism in the discussion on human rights, *Political theory,* 28 (1).
Bill, James; Springborg, Robert (1994): *Politics in the Middle East*, HarperCollins.
Brinkmann, Svend (2010): Etik i en kvalitativ verden. in*:* Brinkmann, Svend & Tanggaard, Lene (Eds) (eds.) *Kvalitative metoder: En grundbog.* Hans Reitzels Forlag: 581-600

Browers, Michaelle (2009): *Political ideology in the Arab world*, Cambridge University Press Cambridge.
Butler, Judith (2011): Bodies in alliance and the politics of the street, *European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies,* 9.
Chalcraft, John (2012): Horizontalism in the Egyptian revolutionary process, *Middle East Report,* (262).
Chalcraft, John (2015): The Arab uprisings of 2011 in historical perspective. in*:* Ghazal, Amal; Hanssen, Jens (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Middle-Eastern and North African History.* Oxford University Press.
Challand, Benoit (2011): The counter-power of civil society and the emergence of a new political imaginary in the Arab world, *Constellations,* 18 (3).
Challand, Benoît (2013): Citizenship against the grain: Locating the spirit of the Arab uprisings in times of counterrevolution, *Constellations,* 20 (2).
Clarke, Killian (2013): Aish, huriyya, karama insaniyya: Framing and the 2011 Egyptian uprising, *European Political Science,* 12 (2).
Cole, Juan; Cole, Shahin. (2011). *An Arab Spring for women*. The Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/arab-spring-women/, last date of access 14-11-2019.
Colla, Elliott (2011): The poetry of revolt. in*:* Haddad, Bassam; Bsheer, Rosie; Abu-Rish, Ziad (ed.) *Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End of an old order.* Pluto Press.
Colla, Elliott (2012): The people want, *Middle East Report,* 263.
Colla, Elliott (2013): In praise of insult: Slogan genres, slogan repertoires and innovation, *Review of Middle East Studies*.
Countryeconomy.Com. (2011). *The minimum wage goes up in Egypt*. Country Economy, https://countryeconomy.com/national-minimum-wage/egypt?year=2011, last date of access 19-09-2018.
Dahler-Larsen, Peter (2008): *At fremstille kvalitative data*, Syddansk Universitetsforlag.
Dailymail Reporter. (2011). *Images of solidarity as Christians join hands to protect Muslims as they pray during Cairo protests*. Daily Mail Reporter, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1353330/Egypt-protests-Christians-join-hands-protect-Muslims-pray-Cairo-protests.html, last date of access 28-02-2019.
De Smet, Brecht (2014): Tahrir: A project (ion) of revolutionary change, *Collaborative Projects. An Interdisciplinary Study*.

De Smet, Brecht (2015): *A dialectical pedagogy of revolt: Gramsci, Vygotsky, and the Egyptian revolution*, Haymarket Books.

De Smet, Brecht (2016): *Gramsci on Tahrir: Revolution and counter-revolution in Egypt*, Pluto Press.

Dhakirat Maspero. (2015a). *28 January 2011: Mubarak's first speech during the revolution/28* :2011 يناير خطاب مبارك الأول أثناء الثورة. Dhakirat Maspero/ ذاكرة ماسبيرو, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L6rMTbxEXvU, last date of access 26-04-2020.

Dhakirat Maspero. (2015b). *Mubarak's final speech - 10 February 2011/* الخطاب الأخير لمبارك *10* 2011 فبراير. Dhakirat Maspero/ ذاكرة ماسبيرو, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9_06qCKV3bE, last date of access 16-04-2019.

Dhakirat Maspero. (2015c). *Mubarak's second speech during the revolution 1 February 2011/* خطاب مبارك الثاني أثناء الثورة .. *1* 2011 فبراير. Dhakirat Maspero/ ذاكرة ماسبيرو, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ITdMvS-JetU, last date of access 26-04-2020.

Diab, Khaled. (2014). *Without a leader, Egypt's revolution was doomed to fail*. Haaretz, https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-a-leaderless-revolution-in-egypt-1.5343499, last date of access 23-01-2020.

Egyptianhumour.Blogspot.Com. (2011a). *I am not a poor soul/*أنا مش غلبان. Egyptian Humour, http://egyptianhumour.blogspot.com/2011/02/revolution-jokes_8901.html, last date of access 26-04-2020.

Egyptianhumour.Blogspot.Com. (2011b). *Leave, I want to marry/*أرحل عاوز اتجوز. Egyptian Humour, http://egyptianhumour.blogspot.com/2011/02/revolution-jokes_1737.html, last date of access 26-04-2020.

Egyptianhumour.Blogspot.Com. (2011c). *We want our rights in the future/*عايزين حقنا في المستقبل. Egyptian Humour, http://egyptianhumour.blogspot.com/2011/02/revolution-jokes_8816.html, last date of access 26-04-2020.

Egyptianhumour.Blogspot.Com. (2011d). *Why, oh President, did we get enough?/*ليه يا ريس فاض بيك الكيل؟. Egyptian Humour, http://egyptianhumour.blogspot.com/2011/02/revolution-jokes_1939.html last date of access 26-04-2020.

Egyptianhumour.Blogspot.Com. (2011e). *Jokes from the January 25 Revolution 2011 in images/* نكت ثورة ٢٥ يناير ٢٠١١ بالصورة. Egyptian Humour, http://egyptianhumour.blogspot.com/2011/02/revolution-jokes_8566.html, last date of access 20-11-2020.

Egyptianstreets. (2018). *Meet Egypt's top presidential candidates in the upcomning elections*. Egyptian Streets, https://egyptianstreets.com/2018/01/22/meet-egypts-top-presidential-candidates-in-the-upcoming-elections/, last date of access.

Egyptindependent. (2010). *Activists rally to support ElBaradei presidential nomination*. Egypt Independent, https://ww.egyptindependent.com/activists-rally-support-elbaradei-presidential-nomination/, last date of access 21-01-2020.

Egyptphotos.Revolution25january.Com. (2011a). *Even the children do not want you/* حتى الأطفال مش عايزينك. Revolution 25 January/ثورة 25 يناير, http://egyptphotos.revolution25january.com/25january-photos.asp?c=4&id=24522, last date of access.

Egyptphotos.Revolution25january.Com. (2011b). *Leave, my shoulder hurts/*إرحل كتفي وجعني. Revolution 25 January/ثورة 25 يناير, http://egyptphotos.revolution25january.com/25january-photos.asp?c=4&id=24519, last date of access 20-10-2019.

Egyptphotos.Revolution25january.Com. (2011c). *One hand, one people/*أيد واحدة شعب واحد. Revolution 25 January/ثورة 25 يناير, http://egyptphotos.revolution25january.com/25january-photos.asp?c=4&id=24529, last date of access 30-10-2019.

Egyptphotos.Revolution25january.Com. (2011d). *We will change with our hands/*نحن سنغير بأيدينا. Revolution 25 January/ثورة 25 يناير, http://egyptphotos.revolution25january.com/25january-photos.asp?c=4&id=24516, last date of access 26-04-2020.

Egyptphotos.Revolution25january.Com. (2011e). *Signs from the January 25 Revolution/*لافتات ثورة 25 يناير. Revolution 25 January/ثورة 25 يناير, last date of access 20-11-2020.

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan; Murphy, Emma C (1996): Transformation of the corporatist state in the Middle East, *Third World Quarterly,* 17 (4).
El-Baghdadi, Iyad. (2011). *Meet Asmaa Mahfouz and the vlog that helped spark the revolution*. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eBg7O48vhLY, last date of access 25-04-2020.
El-Feki, Shereen; Heilmann, Brian; Barker, Gary (Eds) 2017. Understanding masculinities: results from the international Men and Gender Equality Survey. Promundo and UN Women.
El-Khatib, Mohamed Samir (2013): Tahrir Square as spectacle: Some exploratory remarks on place, body and power, *Theatre Research International,* 38 (02).
El-Mahdi, Rabab (2009): Enough! Egypt's quest for democracy, *Comparative political studies,* 42 (8).
El-Mahdi, Rabab (2011): Labour protests in Egypt: Causes and meanings, *Review of African Political Economy,* 38 (129).
El-Mahdi, Rabab (2012): Against marginalization: Workers, youth and class in the 25 January revolution, *Ray Bush and Habib Ayeb: Marginality and Exclusion in Egypt. London/New York: Zed Books*.
El-Menawy, Abdel Latif. (2017). *The "son of a joke" people/*«شعب ابن نكتة». Egypt Independent/المصري اليوم, https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/1069831, last date of access 26-04-2020.
El-Naggar, Mona. (2011). *Equal rights takes to the barricades*. New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/02/world/middleeast/02iht-letter02.html, last date of access 20-08-2018.
El-Nawawy, Mohammed; Khamis, Sahar (2014): Governmental corruption through the Egyptian bloggers' lens: A qualitative study of four Egyptian political blogs, *Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research,* 7 (1).
El-Nawawy, Mohammed; Khamis, Sahar (2016): *Egyptian revolution 2.0: Political blogging, civic engagement, and citizen journalism*, Springer.
El-Saket, Ola. (2012). *Gambling on imagination*. Egypt Independent, https://ww.egyptindependent.com/gambling-imagination/, last date of access 14-10-2019.
El-Sharnouby, Dina. 2012. *Youth and the 25th Revolution in Egypt: Agents of change and its multiple meanings (Master thesis).* The American University in Cairo.
El-Sharnouby, Dina (2015): From state exclusionary politics to youth inclusionary practices: The Tahrir Square experience, *International Journal of Sociology,* 45 (3).
El-Sharnouby, Dina (2017): In absence of a hero figure and an ideology: Understanding new political imaginaries and practices among revolutionary youth in Egypt, *Middle East-Topics & Arguments,* 9.
El Alaoui, Khadija (2011): Chanting tahreer and compassion: People as poetry, *InTensions,* Fall/Winter 2011 (5).
El Chazli, Youssef (2012): On the road to revolution, *Revue française de science politique,* 62 (5).
El Hamamsy, Walid; Soliman, Mounira (2013): The aesthetics of revolution: Popular creativity and the Egyptian spring. in*:* El Hamamsy, Walid; Soliman, Mounira (ed.) *Popular Culture in the Middle East and North Africa: A Postcolonial Outlook.* Routledge: 246-59.
El Houri, Walid (2018): Beyond failure and success. Revolutions and the politics of endurance, *Radical Philosophy,* 2 (2).
Elbousty, Moulay Youness (2013): Abu al-Qasim al-Shabbi's 'The will to live': galvanising the Tunisian revolution, *The Journal of North African Studies,* 18 (1).
Elhalawani, Amina (2016): The dynamic and theatrical worlds of the 'Midan', *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication,* 9 (1).
Elmarsafy, Ziad (2015): Action, imagination, institution, natality, revolution, *Journal for Cultural Research,* 19 (2).
Elsayed, Yomna (2013): Revolutionary media on a budget: Facebook-only social journalism, *Arab Media and Society,* 17.
Elseewi, Tarik Ahmed (2011): A Revolution of the imagination, *International Journal of Communication,* 5.
Elshahed, Mohamed (2011): Tahrir Square: Social media, public space, *Places Journal*.

Ettmüller, Eliane Ursula (2012): Caricature and Egypt's revolution of 25 January 2011, *Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History,* 9 (1).
Eyadat, Zaid (2012): The Arab revolutions of 2011: Revolutions of dignity, *Change and Opportunities in the Emerging Mediterranean*.
Ezbawy, Yusery Ahmed (2012): The role of the youth's new protest movements in the January 25th Revolution, *IDS Bulletin,* 43 (1).
Ferguson, Charles A (1959): Diglossia, *Word,* 15 (2).
Foucault, Michel (1978): *The history of sexuality,* London, Penguin Books Ltd.
Galal, Amin 2011. Egypt in the era of Hosni Mubarak: 1981-2011. The American University in Cairo Press.
Galal, Lise Paulsen (2012): Coptic Christian practices: Formations of sameness and difference, *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations,* 23 (1).
Galal, Shahinaz/جلال، شاهيناز. (2014). *In pictures: Signs that deposed Mubarak in the 18 days of revolution/*بالصور.. لافتات خلعت مبارك في "18 يوم ثورة". Al-Masry Al-Youm/المصري اليوم, https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/380020, last date of access 20-11-2020.
Galán, Susana (2012): "Today I have seen angels in the shape of humans:" An emotional history of the Egyptian Revolution through the narratives of female personal bloggers, *Journal of International Women's Studies,* 13 (5).
Gause Iii, F Gregory (2011): Why Middle East Studies missed the Arab spring: The myth of authoritarian stability, *Foreign Affairs,* 90.
Gee, James Paul (2014): *How to do discourse analysis: A toolkit*, Routledge.
Gershoni, Israel; Jankowski, James P (2002): *Redefining the Egyptian nation, 1930-1945*, Cambridge University Press.
Ghaleb, Ghada/غالب، غادة (2015). *93 funny signs from the January Revolution: "Hurry up, I need to shave .. Leave, the wife has to give birth"/* لافتة كوميدية خلال ثورة يناير: "انجز بقى عايز أحلق.. ارحل الست عايزة تولد". Al-Masry Al-Youm Light/المصري اليوم ليت, https://lite.almasryalyoum.com/lists/38977/, last date of access 18-11-2018.
Ghanem, Hiba (2017): The 2011 Egyptian revolution chants: A romantic-mutazil moral order, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*.
Ghannam, Farha (2012): Meanings and feelings: Local interpretations of the use of violence in the Egyptian revolution, *American Ethnologist,* 39 (1).
Ghonim, Wael (2012): *Revolution 2.0: The power of the people is greater than the people in power: A memoir*, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Goldschmidt Jr, Arthur (2008): *A brief history of Egypt*, Infobase Publishing.
Gregory, Derek (2013): Tahrir: Politics, publics and performances of space, *Middle East Critique,* 22 (3).
Gribbon, Laura; Hawas, Sarah (2012): Signs and signifiers: Visual translations of revolt. in*:* Mehrez, Samia (ed.) *Translating Egypt's revolution: The language of Tahrir.* 103-142.
Gröndahl, Mia (2011): *Tahrir square: The heart of the Egyptian revolution,* Cairo, American University in Cairo Press.
Gunning, Jeroen; Baron, Ilan Zvi (2014): *Why occupy a square?: People, protests and movements in the Egyptian revolution*, Oxford University Press.
Hadiya, Shaaban/هدية، شعبان. (2011). *In images: The spirit of Tahrir transforms itself into a campaign for cleaning the streets and changing the culture and behaviour or the citizens/* بالصور.. روح التحرير تتحول إلى حملة لتنظيف الشوارع وتغيير ثقافة وسلوكيات المواطنين. Youm7/اليوم السابع, https://bit.ly/2Vjl08F, last date of access 04-08-2019.
Hafez, Bassem Nabil (2013): New social movements and the Egyptian Spring: A comparative analysis between the April 6 Movement and the Revolutionary Socialists, *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology,* 12 (1-2).
Hafez, Sherine (2012): No longer a bargain: Women, masculinity, and the Egyptian uprising, *American Ethnologist,* 39 (1).

Hamdy, Naila; Gomaa, Ehab (2012): Framing the Egyptian uprising in Arabic language newspapers and social media, *Journal of Communication,* 62 (2).
Hamdy, Sherine; Bayoumi, Soha (2016): Egypt's popular uprising and the stakes of medical neutrality, *Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry,* 40 (2).
Hamid, Shadi (2014): Political party development before and after the Arab Spring. in*:* Kamrava, Mehran (ed.) *Beyond the Arab Spring: The evolving ruling bargain in the Middle East.* Oxford University Press.
Hamzawy, Amr. (2017). *Seven years on: Why Egypt failed to become a democracy*. Middle East Eye, https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/seven-years-why-egypt-failed-become-democracy, last date of access 26-04-2020.
Hanafi, Sari (2012): The Arab revolutions: The emergence of a new political subjectivity, *Contemporary Arab Affairs,* 5 (2).
Hanssen, Jens; Weiss, Max (2016): Introduction. Language, mind, freedom and time: The modern Arab intellectual tradition in four words. in*:* Hanssen, Jens; Weiss, Max (Eds.) (ed.) *Arabic thought beyond the liberal age: Towards an intellectual history of the nadha.* Cambridge University Press.
Hashim, Ahmed S (2014): The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda affiliate to caliphate, *Middle East Policy,* 21 (4).
Hassan, Bahaa-Eddin Abulhassan (2013): The pragmatics of humor: January 25th Revolution and Occupy Wall Street, *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences,* 4 (2).
Hassan, Hassan. (2010). *Million's poet finalist defies death threaths*. The National, https://web.archive.org/web/20100929212001/http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=%2F20100319%2FNATIONAL%2F703189836%2F1040, last date of access 17-10-2019.
Hatem, Mervat (1986): The enduring alliance of nationalism and patriarchy in Muslim personal status laws: The case of modern Egypt, *Gender Issues,* 6 (1).
Haugbølle, Sune. 2012. Reflections on iIdeology after the Arab Uprisings. Available on: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4764/reflections-on-ideology-after-the-arab-uprisings, last date of access 23-03-2012.
Heiss, Andrew (2012): The failed management of a dying regime: Hosni Mubarak, Egypt's National Democratic Party, and the January 25 revolution, *Journal of Third World Studies,* 29 (1).
Helmy, Mohamed; Frerichs, Sabine (2013): Stripping the boss: the powerful role of humor in the Egyptian revolution 2011, *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science,* 47 (4).
Herrera, Linda (2014): *Revolution in the age of social media: The Egyptian popular insurrection and the internet*, Verso Trade.
Heshmat, Dina (2015): Egyptian narratives of the 2011 Revolution: Diary as a medium of reconciliation with the political. in*:* Pannewick, Friederike; Khalil, George, Albers, Yvonne (ed.) *Commitment and beyond: Reflections on/of the political in Arabic literature since the 1940s.* Reichert Verlag Wiesbaden: 63-75.
Hirschkind, Charles (2010): New media and political dissent in Egypt, *Revista de dialectología y tradiciones populares,* 65 (1).
Hirschkind, Charles (2012): Beyond secular and religious: An intellectual genealogy of Tahrir Square, *American Ethnologist,* 39 (1).
Hirschkind, Charles (2016): The Egyptian blogosphere and the revolution of the 25th of January. in*:* Jayyusi, Lena; Roald, Anne Sofie (ed.) *Media and political contestation in the contemporary Arab world.* Springer: 13-34.
Hourani, Albert (1983): *Arabic thought in the liberal age 1798-1939*, Cambridge University Press.
Humanrightsfirst.Org. (2011). *Sectarian violence in Egypt*. Human Rights First, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Fact_Sheet-Egypt-Sectarian-Violence.pdf, last date of access 09-10-2019.
Husni, Sawsan/حسني، سوزان. (2016). *Video and pictures. Only in Egypt: "The revolution laughs"/* فيديو وصور | في الثورة ضاحكة "مصر فقط". Shbabbek/شبابيك, https://shbabbek.com/show/41117, last date of access 14-11-2017.

Iamjan25.Com. *IamJan25.com*. http://iamjan25.com/, last date of access 10-09-2017.
Ibrahim, Solava (2011): A tale of two Egypts: Contrasting state-reported macro-trends with micro-voices of the poor, *Third World Quarterly,* 32 (7).
Ibrahim, Zeinab (2010): Cases of written code-switching in Egyptian opposition newspapers. in*:* Bassiouney, Reem (ed.) *Arabic and the media: Linguistic analyses and applications.* Brill: 23-46.
Idle, Nadia; Nunns, Alex (Eds) (2011): *Tweets from Tahrir,* New York, OR Books.
Ikhwanonline.Com. (2011). *Beautification of Tahrir Square. The revolutionaries continue the reforms/* تجميل ميدان التحرير.. الثوار يواصلون الإصلاح. https://www.ikhwanonline.com/Section/79033/default.aspx, last date of access 08-04-2019.
Inskeep, Steve. (2011). *Ramy Essam: Singer of the Egyptian Revolution*. NPR, https://www.npr.org/2011/03/15/134538629/ramy-esam-the-singer-of-the-egyptian-revolution, last date of access 27-01-2020.
Iskander, Elizabeth (2012): The 'mediation'of Muslim–Christian relations in Egypt: the strategies and discourses of the official Egyptian press during Mubarak's presidency, *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations,* 23 (1).
Islamqa.Info. (2013). *A collection of profethic sayings about Egypt/* جملة من الأحاديث الواردة في بلاد مصر. Islam Question and Answer/الإسلام سؤال وجواب, https://bit.ly/2VKbvym, last date of access 18-10-2019.
Ismail, Salwa (2006): *Political life in Cairo's new quarters: Encountering the everyday state*, University of Minnesota Press.
Ismail, Salwa (2011a): Authoritarian government, neoliberalism and everyday civilities in Egypt, *Third World Quarterly,* 32 (5).
Ismail, Salwa (2011b): Civilities, subjectivities and collective action: Preliminary reflections in light of the Egyptian Revolution, *Third World Quarterly,* 32 (5).
Ismail, Salwa (2012): The Egyptian revolution against the police, *Social research,* 79 (2).
Istiqlalparty. (2015). *I call upon you to disobey. Article by Tareq Al-Bishri/* أدعوكم إلى العصيان .. مقال د.طارق البشرى. Istiqlal Party/حزب الاستقلال, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ALESTQLAL.PARTY/photos/a.675218702511084.1073741829.658270620872559/961728893860062/?type=1&__tn__=-UK-R, last date of access 30-08-2019.
Joya, Angela (2011): The Egyptian revolution: crisis of neoliberalism and the potential for democratic politics, *Review of African political economy,* 38 (129).
Jung, Dietrich (2016): Modernity, Islamic traditions, and the good life: An outline of the Modern Muslim Subjectivities Project, *Review of Middle East Studies,* 50 (1).
Jung, Dietrich (2017a): The formation of modern Muslim subjectivities: Research project and analytical strategy, *Tidsskrift for Islamforskning,* 11 (1).
Jung, Dietrich (2017b): *Muslim history and social theory: A global sociology of modernity*, Palgrave Macmillan.
Jung, Dietrich; Sinclair, Kirstine (2014): Modernitet og moderniteter: Subjektivitet og social orden i konstruktionen af islamiske moderniteter, *Dansk Sociologi,* 25 (2).
Jung, Dietrich; Sinclair, Kirstine (2015): Multiple modernities, modern subjectivities and social order: Unity and difference in the rise of Islamic modernities, *Thesis Eleven,* 130 (1).
Jung, Dietrich; Juul Petersen, Marie; Lei Sparre, Sara Cathrine (2014): *Politics of modern muslim subjectivities* New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
Jørgensen, Marianne Winther (2006): Den diskursive distribution af struktur og agens, *Dansk Sociologi,* 14 (1).
Kadry, Ahmed (2015): Gender and Tahrir Square: Contesting the state and imagining a new nation, *Journal for Cultural Research,* 19 (2).
Kamal El Deen, Sami/كمال الدين, سامي (2012): *The night where the president fell. A diary from Tahrir/* ليلة سقوط الرئيس. يوميات التحرير, Maktaba Jazeera Al-Ward/مكتبة جزيرة الورد.
Kamel, Nabil (2012): Tahrir Square. The production of insurgent space and eighteen days of utopia, *Progressive Planning,* 191.

Karmamole. (2011-2017). *The Revolution Files*. http://therevolutionfiles.com/, last date of access 29-09-2017.
Kateb, George (2011): *Human dignity*, Harvard University Press.
Keraitim, Sahar; Mehrez, Samia (2012): Mulid al-Tahrir: Semiotics of a revolution. *Translating Egypt's revolution: The language of Tahrir.* The American University in Cairo Press: 25-67.
Ketchley, Neil (2014): "The army and the people are one hand!" Fraternization and the 25th January Egyptian Revolution, *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* 56 (1).
Ketchley, Neil (2017): *Egypt in a time of revolution*, Cambridge University Press.
Khalekfelbeet.Blogspot.Com. (2007). *Stay at home/*خليك في البيت. http://khalekfelbeet.blogspot.com/, last date of access 10-10-2019.
Khalid, Ibrahim. (2011). *The song "Leave" from Tahrir Square by Ramy Essam/* أغنية ارحل من ميدان التحرير - رامي عصام - Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wFTwl-cEnE4, last date of access 26-04-2020.
Khalil, Karima (Ed.) (2011): *Messages from Tahrir*, The American University in Cairo Press.
Khalil, Menna (2012): The people and the army are one hand: Myths and their translations. in*:* Mehrez, Samia (ed.) *Translating Egypt's revolution: The language of Tahrir.* The American University of Cairo Press.
Khalil, Saussan (2012). The evolution of the Arabic language through online writing: the explosion of 2011. *BRISMES 2012 Graduate Conference Papers: Change and Continuity in the Arab world.*
Khamis, Sahar; Vaughn, Katherine (2012): 'We Are All Khaled Said': The potentials and limitations of cyberactivism in triggering public mobilization and promoting political change, *Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research,* 4 (2-3).
Khatib, Hakim (2015): 2011 Tahrir Square demonstrations in Egypt: Semantic structures that unify and divide, *Cyberorient,* 9 (2).
Khosrokhavar, Farhad (2018): Violence, social actors, and subjectivication in the Egyptian Revolution. in*:* Volpi, Frédéric; Jasper, James M (ed.) *Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings: Mapping interactions between regimes and protesters.* Amsterdam University Press.
Kim, Kwang-Ki (2002): *Order and agency in modernity: Talcott Parsons, Erving Goffman, and Harold Garfinkel*, State University of New York Press.
Kurpershoek, Marcel. (2013). *Poetry TV programmes a sign of a new Arab world?* The National, https://www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/art/poetry-tv-programmes-a-sign-of-a-new-arab-world-1.289522, last date of access 17-10-2019.
Lachine, Nadime (1977): Class roots of the Sadat regime: Reflections of an Egyptian leftist, *MERIP Reports,* 56.
Laclau, Ernesto (2005): *On populist reason*, Verso.
Laclau, Ernesto; Mouffe, Chantal (2001): *Hegemony and socialist strategy. Towards a radical democratic politics*, Verso.
Lei Sparre, Sara (2013): *A generation in the making. The Formation of young Muslim volunteers in Cairo (PhD dissertation)*, University of Copenhagen.
Lesch, Ann M (2012): Concentrated power breeds corruption, repression, and resistance. in*:* Korany, Baghat; El-Mahdi, Rabab (ed.) *Arab spring in Egypt: Revolution and beyond.* 17-42.
Levine, Mark (2012): Music and the aura of revolution, *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* 44 (4).
Levine, Mark (2014): Music, protest and rebirth in the Arab world, *Routledge handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking democratization*.
Levine, Mark (2015): When art is the weapon: Culture and resistance confronting violence in the post-uprisings Arab world, *Religions,* 6 (4).
Lim, Merlyna (2012): Clicks, cabs, and coffee houses: Social media and oppositional movements in Egypt, 2004–2011, *Journal of Communication,* 62 (2).
Lynch, Marc (2007): Young brothers in cyberspace, *Middle East Report,* 37 (245).

Lynskey, Dorian. (2011). *Ramy Essam - the voice of the Egyptian Uprising*. The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/music/2011/jul/19/ramy-essam-egypt-uprising-interview, last date of access 31-10-2018.

Macintyre, Donald. (2011). *Blood, bandages and the mosque turned into a field hospital*. Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/donald-macintyre/donald-macintyre-blood-bandages-and-the-mosque-turned-into-a-field-hospital-2203897.html, last date of access 26-04-2020.

Madeyemoody7. (2011). *Abdel Rahman El-Abnudi's latest masterpiece - The Square/* اخر روائع عبد الرحمن الابنودى - الميدان. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kV_q7qlw1gU, last date of access 26-04-2020.

Makar, Farida (2011): 'Let them have some fun': Political and artistic forms of expression in the Egyptian Revolution, *Mediterranean Politics,* 16 (2).

Malešević, Siniša (2019): Globalization and nationalist subjectivities. *Modern subjectivities in world society: Global structures and local practices.* Palgrave Macmillan: 65-83.

Mansour, Sherif (2009): Enough is not enough: Achievements and shortcomings of Kefaya, the Egyptian movement for change. in*:* Stephan, Maria J (ed.) *Civilian jihad. Nonviolent struggle, democratization, and governance in the Middle East.* Springer: 205-218.

Marfleet, Philip (2016): The political subject in the 'Arab Spring', *Contemporary Levant,* 1 (1).

Mavelli, Luca (2012): Postsecular resistance, the body, and the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, *Review of International Studies,* 38 (5).

Mazloum, Sherine Fouad (2015): To write/to revolt: Egyptian women novelists writing the revolution, *Journal for Cultural Research,* 19 (2).

Mehrez, Samia (2012): *Translating Egypt's revolution: The language of Tahrir*, The American University in Cairo Press.

Mellon, James G (2002): Pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism and inter-state relations in the Arab world, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics,* 8 (4).

Mellor, Noha (2014): Who represents the revolutionaries? Examples from the Egyptian Revolution 2011, *Mediterranean Politics,* 19 (1).

Memmott, Mark. (2011). *ElBaradei back in Egypt; says it's time for a new government*. NPR, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2011/01/27/133275390/el-baradei-back-in-egypt-says-its-time-for-a-new-government?t=1531219387380, last date of access 26-04-2020.

Merriam-Webster. (2019). *From humble origins*. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/from%20humble%20origins, last date of access 28-02-2019.

Merriam, Sharan; Tisdell, Elizabeth (2015): *Qualitative research: A guide to design and implementation*, John Wiley & Sons.

Messiri, Sawsan (1978): *Ibn al-balad: A concept of Egyptian identity*, Brill.

Mex-Jørgensen, Line (2017): Den egyptiske revolution 2011 og det gode liv – en analyse af slogans og sange, *Tidsskrift for Islamforskning,* 11 (1).

Mex-Jørgensen, Line (2020): Imaginaries of the good life from the Egyptian Revolution in 2011: Pride and agency. in*:* Jung, Dietrich; Sinclair, Kirstine (ed.) *Muslim subjectivities in global modernity. Islamic traditions and the construction of modern Muslim identities.* Brill.

Meyer, John W (2010): World society, institutional theories, and the actor, *Annual review of sociology,* 36.

Meyer, John W; Jepperson, Ronald L (2000): The 'actors' of modern society: The cultural construction of social agency, *Sociological theory,* 18 (1).

Mfmaegy. (2011). *Egyptian tank man/*فتى المدرعة المصري. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kWr6MypZ-JU, last date of access 17-10-2019.

Milton-Edwards, Beverley (2000): *Contemporary politics in the Middle East*, Polity Press.

Mishal, Talal/مشعل, طلال (2015). *Who are the best soldiers on earth/*من هم خير جند الأرض. Mawdua/موضوع, https://bit.ly/2xG8tTW, last date of access 19-04-2020.

Misztal, Barbara A (2013): The idea of dignity: Its modern significance, *European Journal of Social Theory,* 16 (1).

Mobile.Farfeshplus.Com. (2011a). *False place of birth.../*محل الميلاد الحزيف... Farfeshplus, https://mobile.farfeshplus.com/Read.News.asp?Id=95417, last date of access 02-10-2019.

Mobile.Farfeshplus.Com. (2011b). *My new address.../*عنواني الجديد... Farfeshplus, https://mobile.farfeshplus.com/Read.News.asp?Id=95417, last date of access 02-10-2019.

Mobile.Farfeshplus.Com. (2011c). *In pictures: Funny, funny, hilarious and sad slogans from Tahrir Square /*شعارات ظريفة طريفة مضحكة ومبكية من ميدان التحرير بالصور.. Farfeshplus, https://mobile.farfeshplus.com/Read.News.asp?Id=95417, last date of access 02-10-2019.

Moll, Yasmin (2012): Building the new Egypt: Islamic televangelists, revolutionary ethics, and 'productive'citizenship, *Cultural Anthropology*.

Mossallam, Alia (2012): *Hikāyāt sha`b-stories of peoplehood: Nasserism, popular politics and songs in Egypt, 1956-1973 (PhD dissertation)*, The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).

Mouffe, Chantal (2005): *On the political*, Routledge.

Muhammed, Yunas/محمد, يونس. (2011). *Funniest sights from the January 25 Revolution/* اطرف مشاهد ثورة 25 يناير Misr5/مصر فايف, https://bit.ly/2IInKJx, last date of access 14-11-2017.

Nabil Omar, Nagham/نبيل عمر، نغم (2011): The hospital on the square.. Doctors in the fire line/ المستشفى الميداني.. أطباء على خط النار. in*:* Abd Al-Hamid Hussein, Ahmed/عبد الحميد حسين, أحمد (ed.) *Diaries of the Egyptian Revolution 2011/*يوميات الثورة المصرية 2011*.* Aljazeera Papers 24.

Nagarajan, Kv (2013): Egypt's political economy and the downfall of the Mubarak regime, *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science,* 3 (10).

Naraghi, Ashkan Rezvani (2013): Constructing virtual and material public spaces: The cases of 'We are All Khaled Said' Facebook page and Tahrir Square during the Egypt 2011 Revolution, *Environment, Space, Place,* 5 (2).

Olesen, Thomas (2013): 'We are all Khaled Said': Visual injustice symbols in the Egyptian Revolution, 2010–2011. in*:* Doerr, Nicole; Mattoni, Alice; Teune, Simon (ed.) *Advances in the visual analysis of social movements (vol 35).*

Onlinedocument. (2011). *Omar Soliman with ABCNews*. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XpOsU9YIRz0, last date of access 11-07-2018.

Ottaway, David B; Ottaway, Marina. (2015). *Egypt's leaderless revolution*. The Cairo Review, https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/egypts-leaderless-revolution/, last date of access 12-04-2019.

Paldf.net. (2011a). *Daddy graduated 11 years ago.../*بابا متخرج بقاله 11 سنة. The Palestinian Network For Dialogue/شبكة فلسطين للحوار, https://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=742115, last date of access 14-11-2017.

Paldf.net. (2011b). *I am breathing freedom/*إني اتنفس حرية. The Palestinian Network For Dialogue/ شبكة فلسطين للحوار, https://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=742115, last date of access 14-11-2017.

Paldf.net. (2011c). *In my blood, I am writing another life for my country/*باكتب بدمّي حياة تانية لأوطاني. The Palestinian Network For Dialogue/شبكة فلسطين للحوار, https://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=742115, last date of access 14-11-2017.

Paldf.net. (2011d). *Leave, I want to watch cartoons/*امشى بقى أنا عاوزة أتفرج على الكرتون. The Palestinian Network For Dialogue/شبكة فلسطين للحوار, https://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=736055, last date of access 14-11-2017.

Paldf.net. (2011e). *Mubarak and his government.../*مبارك وحكومته. The Palestinian Network For Dialogue/شبكة فلسطين للحوار, https://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=797041&page=2, last date of access 14-11-2017.

Paldf.net. (2011f). *Mubarak as Hitler*. The Palestinian Network For Dialogue/شبكة فلسطين للحوار, https://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=742115, last date of access 14-11-2017.

Paldf.net. (2011g). *North Sinai's embassy.../*سفارة شمال سيناء. The Palestinian Network For Dialogue/ شبكة فلسطين للحوار, https://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=736055, last date of access 14-11-2017.

Paldf.net. (2011h). *Perhaps someone will show me a currency exchange store??? I want to change euro/*ممكن حد يشوفلى صرافة ؟؟؟ عايز أغير اليورو The Palestinian Network For Dialogue/شبكة فلسطين للحوار, https://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=736055, last date of access 14-11-2017.

Paldf.net. (2011i). *Revolution of the lions.../*ثورة السباع. The Palestinian Network For Dialogue/ شبكة فلسطين للحوار, https://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=736055, last date of access 14-11-2017.

Paldf.net. (2011j). *This is our Kentucky meal/*هو ده كنتاكى بتاعنا. The Palestinian Network For Dialogue/ شبكة فلسطين للحوار, https://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=742115, last date of access 14-11-2017.

Paldf.net. (2011k). *Yesterday I was a protester/*أمس كنت متظاهر. The Palestinian Network For Dialogue/ شبكة فلسطين للحوار, https://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=742115, last date of access 14-11-2017.

Paldf.Net. (2011l). *Album of all images from Egypt's Revolution... 18 days... until victory and liberation/* ألبوم صور كامل /// ثورة مصر ... يـ 18 ـوم .. حتى النصر والتحرير. The Palestinian Network For Dialogue/ شبكة فلسطين للحوار, https://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=742115, last date of access 14-11-2017.

Patton, Michael Quinn (2002): *Qualitative research & evaluation methods*, Sage Publications.

Pedersen, Jes Stein. 2019. Alaa Al-Aswany interview. *Politiken*, 09-11-2019.

Phillips, Louise (2010): Diskursanalyse. in*:* Brinkmann, Svend & Tanggaard, Lene (Eds) (eds.) *Kvalitative metoder: En grundbog.* Hans Reitzels Forlag.

Poell, Thomas; Abdulla, Rasha; Rieder, Bernhard; Woltering, Robbert; Zack, Liesbeth (2016): Protest leadership in the age of social media, *Information, Communication & Society,* 19 (7).

Prince, Mona (2014): *Revolution is my name: An Egyptian woman's diary from eighteen days in Tahrir,* Cairo, The American University in Cairo Press.

Qamos Al-Thawra. (2015). *Qamos al-thawra/*قاموس الثورة. http://qamosalthawra.com/, last date of access 26-04-2020.

Rabbat, Nasser (2011): Circling the square, *Artforum International,* 49 (8).

Rada, Sara/رصا, سارة. (2017). *The most famous of them is "Tamer min Ghamra. 5 failures of Egyptian television during the January Revolution/*أشهرها "تامر من غمرة".. 5 إخفاقات للتليفزيون المصري في "ثورة يناير". Tahrir News/التحرير الجديد, https://bit.ly/34UrIFC, last date of access 19-04-2020.

Radsch, Courtney (2008): Core to commonplace: The evolution of Egypt's blogosphere, *Arab Media & Society,* 6.

Radwan, Noha (2012): *Egyptian colloquial poetry in the modern Arabic canon: New readings of shi'r al-āmmiyya,* New York, Springer.

Ramadan, Adam (2013): From Tahrir to the world: The camp as a political public space, *European Urban and Regional Studies,* 20 (1).

Raphael, Gaelle. (2011). *Abu Al-Qasim Al-Shabbi*. Jadaliyya.com, http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/23935/Al-Shabbi%60s-The-Will-to-Life, last date of access 30-05-2019.

Rashed, Mohammed Abouelleil; El Azzazi, Islam (2011): The Egyptian Revolution: A participant's account from Tahrir Square, January and February 2011, *Anthropology Today,* 27 (2).

Reckwitz, Andreas (2006): *Das hybride Subjekt. Eine Theorie der Subjektkulturen von der bürgelichen Moderne zur Postmoderne,* Weilerswist, Velbrück Wissenschaft.

Rennick, Sarah Anne (2013a): Contested meanings in the Egyptian revolution, *Socio,* (2).

Rennick, Sarah Anne (2013b): Personal grievance sharing, frame alignment, and hybrid organisational structures: The role of social media in North Africa's 2011 uprisings, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies,* 31 (2).

Rennick, Sarah Anne (2015): *The practice of politics and revolution: Egypt's revolutionary youth social movement (PhD dissertation)*, Paris, EHESS.
Rice, Xan; Marsh, Katherine; Finn, Tom, Sherwood, Harriet, Chrisafis, Angelique, Booth, Robert. (2011). *Women have emerged as key players in the Arab Spring*. The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/22/women-arab-spring, last date of access 14-11-2019.
Roborgh, Sophie E (2018): Beyond medical humanitarianism - Politics and humanitarianism in the figure of the Mīdānī physician, *Social Science & Medicine,* 211.
Roccu, Roberto (2013): *The political economy of the Egyptian revolution: Mubarak, economic reforms and failed hegemony*, Springer.
Saad, Reem (2012): The Egyptian revolution: A triumph of poetry, *American Ethnologist,* 39 (1).
Sabea, Hanan (2012): A "Time out of time": Tahrir, the political and the imaginary in the context of the January 25th Revolution in Egypt, *Cultural Anthropology*.
Sabea, Hanan (2014): "I Dreamed of Being a People": Egypt's revolution, the people and critical imagination,'. in*:* Werbner, Phina; Webb, Martin; Spellman-Poots, Kathryn (ed.) *The political aesthetics of global protest: The Arab Spring and beyond.* Edinburgh University Press: 67-92.
Sabry, Tarik (2010): *Cultural encounters in the Arab world: On media, the modern and the everyday*, I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd.
Said, Atef. 2014. *The Tahrir effect: History, space, and protest in the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 (PhD dissertation).* University of Michigan.
Said, Atef (2015): We ought to be here: Historicizing space and mobilization in Tahrir Square, *International Sociology,* 30 (4).
Said, Edward (2003): *Orientalism*, Penguin Books.
Salama, Hussam Hussein (2013): Tahrir Square: A narrative of a public space, *International Journal of Architectural Research,* 7 (1).
Salem, Heba; Taira, Kantaro (2012): Al thawra al-daHika: The challenges of translating revolutionary humor. in*:* Mehrez, Samia (ed.) *Translating Egypt's revolution: The language of Tahrir.* The American University in Cairo Press Cairo: 183-211.
Salevurakis, John William; Abdel-Haleim, Sahar Mohamed (2008): Bread subsidies in Egypt: Choosing social stability or fiscal responsibility, *Review of Radical Political Economics,* 40 (1).
Sanders Iv, Lewis; Visonà, Mark (2012): The soul of Tahrir: Poetics of a revolution. in*:* Mehrez, Samia (ed.) *Translating Egypt's revolution. The language of Tahrir.* The American University in Cairo Press
Saouli, Adham (2015): Performing the Egyptian revolution: Origins of collective restraint action in the Midan, *Political Studies,* 63 (4).
Schielke, Samuli (2016): Can Poetry Change the World? Reading Amal Dunqul in Egypt in 2011. in*:* Van Nieuwkerk, Karin, Levine, Mark & Stokes, Martin (eds.) *Islam and Popular Culture.* Austin: University of Texas Press.
Sdu. (2018). *Modern Muslim Subjectivities Project*. University of Southern Denmark, https://www.sdu.dk/en/om_sdu/institutter_centre/ih/forskning/forskningsprojekter/mmsp, last date of access 04-12-2020.
Sewell Jr, William H. (2005): *Logics of history. Social theory and social transformation*, University of Chicago Press.
Shahine, Selim (2011): Youth and the revolution in Egypt *Anthropology today,* 27 (2).
Shalaby, Nadia (2015): A multimodal analysis of selected Cairokee songs of the Egyptian revolution and their representation of women, *Journal for Cultural Research,* 19 (2).
Shehata, Samer (1992): The politics of laughter: Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarek in Egyptian political jokes, *Folklore,* 103 (1).
Shokr, Ahmad (2011): The 18 days of Tahrir, *Middle East Report,* 258.
Shorbagy, Manar (2007): Understanding Kefaya: The new politics in Egypt, *Arab Studies Quarterly,* 29 (1).

Shaat, Louay. (2011). *Sout al horeya - English subtitles*. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PAEt6QJJi-c, last date of access 26-04-2020.
Singerman, Diane (2013): Youth, gender, and dignity in the Egyptian uprising, *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies,* 9 (3).
Sobhy, Hania (2015): Secular façade, neoliberal Islamisation: Textbook nationalism from Mubarak to Sisi, *Nations and Nationalism,* 21 (4).
Soueif, Ahdaf (2014): *Cairo: Memoir of a city transformed,* New York, Anchor Books.
Spohn, Ulrike (2015): A Difference in Kind? Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor on post-secularism, *The European Legacy,* 20 (2).
Srage, Nader (2013): The Protest discourse: The example of "Irhal"(Go/Get Out/Leave), *Orient-Institut Studies,* 2 (2013).
Statista.Com. (2019). *Egypt: Youth unemployment rate from 1998 to 2018*. Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/811968/youth-unemployment-rate-in-egypt/, last date of access 21-10-2019.
Subyraman.Com. (No date). *What do the people want? Dissection of the Arab Spring slogan*. subyraman.com/what-do-the-people-want-dissection-of-the-arab-apring-slogan/ (no longer available), last date of access 19-04-2012.
Sullivan, Earl (2013): Youth power and the revolution. in*:* Tschirgi, Dan; , Kazziha, Walid; ; Mcmahon, Sean (eds.) *Egypt's Tahrir Revolution.* Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Swanson, Nathan W (2016): Embodying Tahrir: bodies and geopolitics in the 2011 Egyptian uprising, *Area*.
Swedenburg, Ted (2011): Troubadours of revolt, *Middle East Research and Information Project,* 41 (258).
Swedenburg, Ted (2012a): Egypt's music of protest from Sayyid Darwish to DJ Haha, *Middle East Report,* (265).
Swedenburg, Ted (2012b): Traditions of Tahrir, *Middle East Report Online*.
Swishschool.Com. (2012). *Documentation of images from the Egyptian January 25 Revolution/* 25 صور ثوره يناير المصريه لتوثيقها. Swishschool.com, https://www.swishschool.com/vb/showthread.php?t=32827, last date of access 20-11-2020.
Tadros, Mariz (2006): State welfare in Egypt since adjustment: Hegemonic control with a minimalist role, *Review of African Political Economy,* 33 (108).
Taha, Amira; Combs, Christopher (2012): Of drama and performance: Transformative discourses of the revolution. in*:* Mehrez, Samia (ed.) *Translating Egypt's revolution: The language of Tahrir.* The American University in Cairo Press: 69-102.
Tahrirdocuments.Org. *Tahrirdocuments.org*. tahrirdocuments.org, last date of access 15-10-2017.
Tawil-Souri, Helga (2012): It's still about the power of place, *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication,* 5 (1).
Taylor, Charles (1989): *Sources of the self. The making of modern identity*, Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, Charles (2004): *Modern social imaginaries,* Durham, Duke University Press.
Taylor, Charles (2011): Western secularity. in*:* Calhoun, Craig; Juergensmeyer, Mark; Van Antwerpen, Jonathan (ed.) *Rethinking secularism.* Oxford University Press.
Taylor, Steven; Bogdan, Robert; Devault, Marjorie (2015): *Introduction to qualitative research methods: A guidebook and resource*, John Wiley & Sons.
Tell Me More. (2011). *Women play vital role in Egypt's uprising*. NPR News (radio program), https://www.npr.org/2011/02/04/133497422/Women-Play-Vital-Role-In-Egypts-Uprising, last date of access 14-11-2019.
TheChoirProjectEgypt. (2011). مشروع كورال- حياة الميدان *Life of Tahrir - The Choir Project*. The choir project Egypt, Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LCBVwJ4DT10, last date of access 31-10-2019.
The New York Times. (2011). *World: Mixed reactions to ElBaradei - nytimes.com/video,* . YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PD-ur7NOuDg, last date of access 26-04-2020.

The Popular Committee To Defend the Revolution. (2011). *Children of the revolution... Those who take possession of the revolutionary ember/*أبناء الثورة...القابضون على جمر الثورة. The Popular Committee To Defend The Revolution/اللجان الشعبية للدفاع عن الثورة, Revolutionary Egypt, vol 2/2 مصر الثورية, https://wayback.archive-it.org/1475/20150116012148/http://www.tahrirdocuments.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/thawria2.png, last date of access 12-09-2019.

Therevolutionfiles.Com. (2011a). *Go, I want to raise my children/*إمشى بقى عايز أربى أولادى. The Revolution Files, http://therevolutionfiles.com/downloads/go-wanna-raise-kids/, last date of access 21-10-2019.

Therevolutionfiles.Com. (2011b). *I want to live like a human being/*عاوز أعيش إنسان. The Revolution Files, http://therevolutionfiles.com/downloads/protesting-for-egypt/, last date of access 04-12-209.

Therevolutionfiles.Com. (2011c). *Leave, Mubarak/*ارحل يا مبارك. The Revolution Files, http://therevolutionfiles.com/downloads/leave-mubarak/, last date of access 25-04-2020.

Thompson, Jason (2000): *A history of Egypt: From earliest times to the present*, American University in Cairo Press.

Tufekci, Zeynep (2017): *Twitter and tear gas: The power and fragility of networked protest*, Yale University Press.

Tufekci, Zeynep; Wilson, Christopher (2012): Social media and the decision to participate in political protest: Observations from Tahrir Square, *Journal of communication,* 62 (2).

Tuğal, Cihan (2014): End of the leaderless revolution, *Berkeley Journal of Sociology,* 58.

Turam, Berna (2011): Ordinary muslims: Power and space in everyday life, *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* 43 (01).

United Nations. (1949). *Geneva conventions of 12 August, 1949 and protocols additional to the conventions*. United Nations, http://www.un-documents.net/gc.htm, last date of access.

Valassopoulos, Anastasia; Mostafa, Dalia Said (2014): Popular protest music and the 2011 Egyptian revolution, *Popular Music and Society,* 37 (5).

Van De Sande, Mathijs (2013): The prefigurative politics of Tahrir Square – An alternative perspective on the 2011 revolutions, *Res Publica,* 19 (3).

Vicente, Victor A (2013): Viral voices: Revolutionary song, social media, and youth culture in the Arab Spring, *Bilgi,* (2).

Wadmani.Com. (2011). *Funny signs from the Egyptian demonstrations - Tahir Square/* لوحات طريفة من المظاهرات المصرية - ميدان التحرير. Wadmani.com, http://www.wadmadani.com/vb/showthread.php?t=39384&p=573257&viewfull=1&styleid=147, last date of access 14-11-2017.

Wagner, Peter (2002): *A sociology of modernity: Liberty and discipline,* London and New York, Routledge.

Wahba, Dina (2016): Gendering the Egyptian Revolution. in*:* Sadiqi, Fatima (ed.) *Women's movements in post-"Arab Spring" North Africa.* Springer: 61-76.

Wahdan, Dalia (2014): Singing the revolt in Tahrir Square: Euphoria, utopia, and revolution. in*:* Werbner, Phina; Webb, Martin; Spellman-Poots, Kathryn (ed.) *The political aesthetics of global protest: The Arab Spring and beyond.* Edinburgh University Press: 52-66.

Wall, Melissa; El Zahed, Sahar (2011): " I'll be waiting for you guys": A YouTube call to action in the Egyptian Revolution, *International Journal of Communication,* 5.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2010). *We are all Khaled Said Facebook page/*كلنا خالد سعيد. We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/, last date of access 12-10-2017.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011a). *Because I am not a speechless devil/*لأنى مش شيطان أخرس. We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.104265636289976.2684.104224996294040/159816897401516/?type=3&theater, last date of access 09-04-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011b). *Because I love my country/*عشان بحب بلدي. We Are All Khaled Said/ كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook,

https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.104265636289976.2684.104224996294040/159124764137396/?type=3&theater, last date of access 09-04-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011c). *Because the best jihad is a 'word of truth'/* علشان أعظم الجهاد عند االه "كلمة حق". We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.104265636289976.2684.104224996294040/159469464102926/?type=3&theater, last date of access 09-04-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011d). *For better education/*علشان تعليم احسن. We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.157357257647480/159576570758882/?type=3&theater, last date of access 16-11-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011e). *Go down and do not only watch this friday/*انزل يوم الجمعة وإوعى تتفرج بس. We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.104265636289976.2684.104224996294040/161084230608116/?type=3&theater, last date of access 02-03-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011f). *Going down with Daddy/*أنا نازله مع بابا. We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.104265636289976.2684.104224996294040/159535477429658/?type=3&theater, last date of access 01-06-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011g). *A group of young demonstrators carrying a wounded Central Security Force soldier/*مجموعة من الشباب المتظاهرين شايلين عسكري أمن مركزي مصاب. We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.157357257647480/160825317300674/?type=3&theater, last date of access 30-08-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011h). *I am going down for Egypt/*أنا نازل يوم 25 يناير عشان مصر. We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.157357257647480/159612290755310/?type=3&theater, last date of access 16-11-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011i). *I am going down January 25th. Very Egyptian/*أنا نازل 25 يناير مصرى جدًا. We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.104265636289976.2684.104224996294040/159600814089791/?type=3&theater, last date of access 09-04-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011j). *I am going down on January 25th/*أنا نازل يوم 25 يناير. We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.157357257647480/159760477407158/?type=3&theater, last date of access 16-11-2017.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011k). *I have said it many times and I will say it again/*قلتها من زمان ولازم أقولها تاني. We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.157357257647480/161105550605984/?type=3&theater, last date of access 30-08-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011l). *I saw him myself/*نفسي أشوفه We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.104265636289976.2684.104224996294040/161090420607497/?type=3&theater, last date of access 02-03-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011m). *Message from Michael Rashdy on e-mail/*رسالة من مايكل رشدي على الإيميل. We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.104265636289976/159555640760975/?type=3&theater, last date of access 04-12-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011n). *More than two million Mossad agents/*أكتر من 2 مليون من عناصر الموساد We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.157357257647480.28966.104224996294040/163600333689839/?type=3&theater, last date of access 03-01-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011o). *My name is Ahmed/*اسمي أحمد. We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.104265636289976.2684.104224996294040/159546807428525/?type=3&theater, last date of access 09-04-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011p). *My name is Mahmoud/*انا اسمى محمود. We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.104265636289976.2684.104224996294040/159124764137396/?type=3&theater, last date of access 06-04-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011q). *Real men did not die in '73/7*الرجالة مماتتش في *3* We Are All Khaled Said/ كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.157357257647480.28966.104224996294040/161102080606331/?type=3&theater, last date of access 05-07-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011r). *The role of the Egyptian Security Forces/*الأمن المصري دوره We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.104265636289976.2684.104224996294040/160969330619606/?type=3&theater, last date of access 02-03-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011s). *Those are the people that the government called lawless/* هما دول اللي الحكومة قالت عليهم فوضويون We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.157357257647480.28966.104224996294040/161103627272843/?type=3&theater, last date of access 03-01-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011t). *To take back the rights of my country Egypt/*علشان اخذ حق بلدى مصر. We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.104265636289976.2684.104224996294040/159871587396047/?type=3&theater, last date of access 09-04-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011u). *A very important aspect of the revolution/*في جانب مهم أوي We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.104265636289976.2684.104224996294040/163981670318372/?type=3&theater, last date of access 02-03-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011v). *Without hesitation and without consideration/*بدون تردد وبدون تفكير. We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.104265636289976.2684.104224996294040/159735267409679/?type=3&theater, last date of access 09-04-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011w). *Yesterday I discovered that Egypt is full of fearless men/* اكتشفت امبارح إن مصر مليانة رجالة فعلا مش بيخافوا. We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.104265636289976.2684.104224996294040/160905760625963/?type=3&theater, last date of access 02-03-2018.

We Are All Khaled Said. (2011x). *Young people from the National Democratic Party's electronic committee/*شباب اللجنة الإلكترونية في الحزب الوطني. We Are All Khaled Said/كلنا خالد سعيد, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.157357257647480.28966.104224996294040/160874893962383/?type=3&theater, last date of access 05-07-2018.

Weber, Max (1949): "Objectivity" in social science and social policy. in*:* Shills, Edward A.; Finch, Henry A. (ed.) *The methodology of the social sciences.* The Free Press of Glengoe, Illinois.

Wehr, Hans (1980): *A dictionary of modern written Arabic. Arabic - English*, Otto Harrassowitz, reprinted by Libraire du Liban.

Winegar, Jessica. (2011a). *Egypt: A multi-generational revol*t. Jadaliyya, http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/23721/Egypt-A-Multi-Generational-Revolt last date of access 15-05-2019.

Winegar, Jessica (2011b): Taking out the trash: Youth clean up Egypt after Mubarak, *Middle East Report,* (259).

Winegar, Jessica (2012): The privilege of revolution: Gender, class, space, and affect in Egypt, *American Ethnologist,* 39 (1).

Winegar, Jessica (2016): A civilized revolution: Aesthetics and political action in Egypt, *American Ethnologist,* 43 (4).

Woltering, Robbert; Abdulla, Rasha; Poell, Thomas; Rieder, Bernhard; Zack, Liesbeth (2015): A page and its politics: Situating kullina Khalid Said in Egypt's ideological landscape at the time of revolution, *CyberOrient,* 9 (2).

Workers For Change. (2005). *Delaration of establishment - Workers for Change - the workers' campaign against privatization* عمال -من أجل الغيير- الحملة العمالية لمواجهة الخصخصة إعلان تأسيس. Civilized dialogue/الحوار المتمدن, http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=47714&r=0, last date of access 21-11-2019.

Yallatubey. (2011). *Hisham Al-Gakh's poem "A bird eye's perspective of Tahrir Square"/* قصيدة هشام الجخ مشهد رأسي من ميدان التحرير. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jcu0-MMpSI8, last date of access 15-11-2018

Youm7.Com. (2011). *Youm7 publishes Abdul Rahman El-Abnudi's poem to the protesters at Tahrir, "The Square"/"* اليوم السابع/Youm7 ينشر قصيدة عبد الرحمن الأبنودى لثوار التحرير "الميدان" بخط يده", https://bit.ly/2Vnxah7, last date of access 19-04-2020.

Yusuf, Abdel Rahman/يوسف، عبد الرحمن (2011): *Diary of the revolution of the cactus/*يوميات ثورة الصبار, Dar Al-Shair for Publishing and Distribution/دار الشاعر للنشر والتوزيع.

Yusuf, Abdel Rahman/يوسف، عبد الرحمن. (ND). *Homepage of the poet Abdel Rahman Yusuf/* موقع الشاعر عبدالرحمن يوسف. Arahman.net, http://arahman.net/index.php, last date of access 02-12-2019.

Zack, Liesbeth (2012): 'Leave, I want to have a shower!' The use of humour on the signs and banners seen during the demonstrations in Tahrir Square, *Between West and East: Festschrift for Wim Honselaar on the occasion of his 65th birthday (Pegasus Oost-Europese Studies),* 20.

Zanelli, Patrizia (2017): Subversive writing: Mona Prince's 'Laughing revolution' from pre-to post-2011 Egypt, *Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies,* 17.

Ziada, Hazem. (2015). *What brings them there? Reflections on the persisting symbolism of Tahrir Square*. Jadaliyya, https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/31939/What-Brings-them-There-Reflections-on-the-Persisting-Symbolism-of-Tahrir-Square, last date of access.

Zodebest. (2011). *Mr NaNa in Egypt funny*. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4vHEKcf2KVE, last date of access 15-11-2018.

ENGLISH SUMMARY

In my dissertation I explore and interpret the different kind of life that was created at Tahrir Square during the 18 days of the Egyptian Revolution between January 25 and February 11 in 2011. During this short period, the usual ways of doing things were sidelined, and a new kind of life was created, if only temporary. To explore and interpret this life, I put forward two overall arguments.

As one overall argument, I contend that the kind of life created during the 18 days of revolution at Tahrir Square in 2011 constituted a primary way of contesting the regime. I use the concept of prefiguration and my own concept of imaginaries of the good life to explore the kind of life created and to contend that life at the square did indeed constitute a contestation of the regime. By approaching the revolution in terms that are not related to the sphere of formal politics, I provide an innovative approach for the study of revolutions or modern protest movements.

As another overall argument, I contend that the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life can be interpreted as specifically modern. I use selected elements from theories of modernity to set up this argument. My main interpretative tool is the distinction between three ideal typical ways of creating order in the modern world. Here, I draw in particular on Dietrich Jung's synthesis of Peter Wagner's theory of successive modernities and Andreas Reckwitz's theory of three cultural types of modern subjectivity formation. In my rendition of Jung's framework, I place a particular emphasis on agency and ordinary life by including texts by John Meyer and Ronald Jepperson, and by Charles Taylor. Moreover, I draw on elements of Egyptian history to explain how these globally relevant ideal types take on local forms in the context of the revolution. My analytical approach to my sources is discursive and text-near.

By interpreting the revolutionary imaginaries of the good life through selected theories of modernity, I contribute to the overall aim of the collective research project of which my PhD is part. In our collective research project, we posit that theories of modernity can be fruitfully used in understanding social phenomena in the Arab world. By showing how my rendition of Jung's theoretical framework can meaningfully be used to interpret the revolutionary imaginaries, I contribute to substantiating this proposition.

In support of the two overall arguments, the dissertation uses primary sources in Arabic that, so far, have not been used comprehensively to analyze the Egyptian Revolution. Previously un-analyzed sources include, to the best of my knowledge, most of the included posts from the We Are All

Khaled Said Facebook page, diaries in Arabic by some of the participants in the revolution, and probably a good number of the slogans. In this way, the dissertation contributes with an in-depth analysis of new material. Moreover, some of the slogans and the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page in its entirety have disappeared from the internet since the beginning of my study. My use of Arabic quotes in Arabic therefore also contributes to the documentation of the revolution.

My findings are presented in two major analytical parts, namely a part in which I analyze the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual and a part in which I analyze the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective. The two above-mentioned arguments are interwoven throughout the dissertation.

In my analyses of the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual, I contend that the individual is presented as valuable, agentic, and ordinary. In chapter four I assert that the individual is imagined as valuable by presenting the participants in the revolution as human beings (as opposed to, for example, animals), and by ascribing positive characteristics and rights to them. In chapter five I argue that the individual is imagined as agentic by presenting the participants as responsible, determined, capable of building a better society, and creative. And in chapter six I maintain that the individual is imagined as ordinary by presenting the participants as individuals with ordinary concerns and by ascribing to them specific prototypical Egyptian traits. Moreover, I assert that the organization of the square was based on ordinary life ideals such as the leveling of hierarchies. Theoretically, my analyses in this part of the dissertation show how the revolutionary imaginaries of the individual display traits that can meaningfully be interpreted through the lens of theories of modernity. On an overall level, these include the idea that all human beings are equally valuable, that humans, above God, are expected to create order, and that ordinary life is the locus of the good life. At the same time, these modern notions are expressed in specifically local terms: For example, by setting the notion of the valuable individual in opposition to the way Egyptians were treated before the revolution, by drawing on pre-revolutionary creative protest approaches to present the individual as capable of creating order, and by ascribing prototypical traits of ordinary Egyptians to the participants.

In my analyses of the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective, I contend that the collective of the Egyptian people is presented as united, agentic, and heterogeneous. In chapter seven I maintain that the dominant collective entity in the revolutionary imaginaries is the Egyptian people, and that this collective is presented as united, agentic, and “leaderful”. And in chapter eight I assert that the

collective of the Egyptian people is furthermore presented as heterogeneous. I characterize dominant sub-categories of individuals within this collective and argue that imaginaries of positive diversity and complementarity merge. Moreover, I assert that the kind of social order imagined as desirable is non-politicized and that youth is imagined as occupying some sort of leadership position in it. I interpret these imaginaries of the collective as specifically modern. Theoretically, my analyses in this part of the dissertation show how the revolutionary imaginaries of the collective display elements that can meaningfully be interpreted through the lens of theories of modernity. On an overall level, these include the notion of a united, agentic collective, and the celebration of pluralism and a pluralist social order. These elements are expressed in specifically local terms, by drawing, for example, on the local cross and crescent symbol to present the Egyptian people as both diverse and unified, and on the pre-revolutionary public discourse about the positive diversity of the Egyptians.

Together, my analyses substantiate that those heady days at Tahrir Square can tell us something about the dreams of a better society harbored by the participants during the 18 days of the Egyptian Revolution in 2011. They tell us, moreover, that these revolutionary imaginaries of the good life can be interpreted as specifically modern.

DANSK REFERAT

I min afhandling udforsker og fortolker jeg det liv, der blev levet på Tahrir pladsen under de 18 dage af den Egyptiske Revolution mellem den 25. januar og den 11. februar, 2011. I løbet af dette korte tidsrum blev der vendt op og ned på de sædvanlige måder at leve på. En ny form for liv blev skabt, om ikke andet så midlertidigt. For at udforske og fortolke dette liv fremsætter jeg to overordnede argumenter.

Det ene overordnede argument omhandler, hvordan man kan se det liv, som blev skabt under de 18 dages revolution på Tahrir Pladsen i 2011 som en væsentlig del af kampen mod regimet. Jeg bruger begrebet præfiguration samt mit eget begreb ”forestillinger om det gode liv” til at udforske livet på Tahrir Pladsen og til at argumentere for, at livet på pladsen faktisk var en del af kampen mod regimet. Ved at kigge på revolutionen gennem begreber, der ikke er relateret til den formelle politiske sfære, bidrager jeg med en innovativ tilgang til studiet af revolutioner eller moderne protestbevægelser.

Det andet overordnede argument omhandler, hvordan de revolutionære forestillinger om det gode liv kan fortolkes som specifikt moderne. Jeg bruger elementer fra udvalgte modernitetsteorier til at fremsætte dette argument. Mit primære fortolkningsredskab er distinktionen mellem tre idealtypiske måder at skabe orden på i den moderne verden. Jeg trækker især på Dietrich Jung’s syntese af Peter Wagner’s teori om fortløbende moderniteter og Andreas Reckwitz’ teori om tre former for moderne subjektivitetsformation. I min udgave af Jung’s teoretiske remme lægger jeg særlig vægt på agens og hverdagsliv ved at inkludere tekster af John Meyer og Ronald Jepperson, og Charles Taylor. Jeg trækker endvidere på elementer af egyptisk historie for at forklare hvordan disse globalt relevante idealtyper tager lokale former i den revolutionære kontekst. Min analytiske tilgang til mine kilder er diskursiv og tekstnær.

Ved at fortolke de revolutionære forestillinger om det gode liv ved hjælp af udvalgte modernitetsteorier bidrager jeg til det overordnede mål i det kollektive forskningsprojekt, som min Ph.d. er en del af. I vores kollektive forskningsprojekt hævder vi, at modernitetsteorier kan bruges til at forstå sociale fænomener i den arabiske verden. Ved at vise, hvordan min udgave af Jungs teoretiske ramme meningsfuldt kan bruges til at fortolke de revolutionære forestillinger, bidrager jeg til at underbygge denne antagelse.

Til at underbygge de to overordnede argumenter bruges der i afhandlingen primært arabiske kilder, der, så vidt jeg kender til, hidtil ikke er brugt i omfattende analyser af den Egyptiske Revolution. Hidtil ikke-analyserede kilder omfatter de fleste af opslagene fra "Vi er alle Khaled Said"-Facebooksiden, dagbøgerne på arabisk af nogle af deltagerne i revolution og sandsynligvis en god andel af de slogans jeg har brugt. På denne måde bidrager afhandlingen med en dybdegående analyse af nyt materiale. En del af de inkluderede slogans samt hele Facebooksiden "Vi er alle Khaled Said" er forsvundet fra internettet siden begyndelsen på mit studie. Min brug af arabiske citater på arabisk bidrager derfor også til dokumentation af revolutionen.

Mine fund præsenteres i to analytiske hoveddele, nærmere bestemt en del hvori jeg analyserer de revolutionære forestillinger om individet og en del hvori jeg analyserer de revolutionære forestillinger om kollektivet. De to overordnede argumenter er sammenflettet i afhandlingen.

I mine analyser af de revolutionære forestillinger om individet, argumenterer jeg for, at individet præsenteres som værdifuldt, at det tillægges agens og at det opfattes som almindeligt (i forståelsen at leve et almindeligt liv centreret omkring hverdagen). I kapitel fire viser jeg hvordan individet forestilles som værdifuldt ved at præsentere deltagerne i revolutionen som mennesker (i modsætning til eksempelvis dyr) og ved at tillægge dem positive karakteristika og rettigheder. I kapitel fem viser jeg hvordan individet tilskrives agens ved at præsentere deltagerne som ansvarlige, stålsatte, i stand til at bygge et bedre samfund og kreative. Og i kapitel seks viser jeg hvordan individet forestilles som almindeligt ved at præsentere deltagerne som mennesker med almindelige hverdagsbekymringer og ved at tillægge dem prototypiske egyptiske træk. Jeg argumenterer endvidere for, at organiseringen af Tahrir Pladsen var baseret på hverdagsidealer såsom udligning af hierarkier. Teoretisk set viser mine analyser i denne del af afhandlingen hvordan de revolutionære forestillinger om individet indeholder træk, der meningsfuldt kan fortolkes via modernitetsteorier. På et overordnet plan inkluderer disse træk idéen om at alle mennesker er lige værdifulde, at mennesker i højere grad end Gud forventes at skabe orden og at hverdagen er dér hvor det gode liv skal findes. På samme tid udtrykkes disse moderne idéer i lokale termer, eksempelvis ved at sætte idéen om det værdifulde individ i modsætning til regimets behandling af egypterne før revolutionen, ved at trække på præ-revolutionære kreative protesttilgange til at præsentere individet som værende i stand til at skabe orden og ved at tilskrive prototypiske egyptiske træk til deltagerne.

I mine analyser af de revolutionære forestillinger om kollektivet argumenterer jeg for, at det egyptiske folk som kollektiv præsenteres som forenet, at det tilskrives agens og at det præsenteres

som heterogent. I kapitel syv viser jeg hvordan den dominerende kollektive enhed i de revolutionære forestillinger er det egyptiske folk samt at dette kollektiv præsenteres som forenet, handlekraftigt og 'lederfuldt'. Og i kapitel otte viser jeg hvordan det egyptiske folk samtidig præsenteres som heterogent. Jeg karakteriserer dominerende underkategorier af folket og argumenterer for, at forestillinger om positiv diversitet og komplementaritet flettes sammen. Jeg argumenterer endvidere for, at den ønskværdige sociale orden i et revolutionært perspektiv er ikke-politiseret og at unge mennesker indtager en lederposition i den. Jeg fortolker disse forestillinger om kollektivet som specifikt moderne. Teoretisk set viser mine analyser i denne del af afhandlingen hvordan de revolutionære forestillinger om kollektivet udviser træk, der meningsfuldt kan fortolkes via modernitetsteorier. Disse træk inkluderer idéen om et forenet, handlekraftigt kollektiv samt troen på pluralisme og en pluralistisk social orden. Disse idéer udtrykkes i specifikt lokale termer, eksempelvis ved at trække på det lokale kors-og-halvmåne tegn til at præsentere det egyptiske folk som både heterogent og forenet, og på den præ-revolutionære offentlige diskurs om positiv diversitet blandt det egyptiske folk.

Samlet set underbygger mine analyser, at de indledende intense dage på Tahrir Pladsen kan fortælle os om de drømme om et bedre samfund, som deltagerne i den Egyptiske Revolution delte. De fortæller os samtidig, at disse revolutionære forestillinger om det gode liv kan fortolkes som specifikt moderne.