The Muslim Brotherhood and State Repression:

The Rise of Clandestinity and Militancy in an Islamist Organization

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English Summary

This PhD dissertation examines the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during two periods of repression. More specifically, the focus is on the correlation between state repression and the rise of secrecy and militancy inside the Brotherhood during the periods of 1948-1951 and 1954-1970. My overall contention is that the Brotherhood acquired an ability to survive persecution by transforming its mass organization into an underground existence. This ability was especially constructed during these two periods of harsh repression.

Studies dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood after Hasan al-Banna's death in 1949 have mainly focused on the radicalizing influence of Sayyid Qutb on the *Ikhwan*. In this regard, a particular emphasis was put on the concepts presented by Qutb in his well-known book "Milestones", published in 1964 while he was in prison, as researchers aimed to explain why some young members of the *Ikhwan* left the Brotherhood to form militant organizations in the aftermath of the Nasserite years. Accordingly, most research on this era has predominantly focused on the ideological reactions to repression, and the major part of this research has been on the conceptual world of Sayyid Qutb from his *Maʿālim fil-Tarīq* (Milestones on the Road).

Gamal Abdel Nasser's heavy-handed repression of the *Ikhwan* from October 1954 represented for the organization the toughest and most violent test in its history. Following an abortive attempt on Nasser's life, the regime initiated a widespread and well-structured oppressive campaign against the Brotherhood which would last for the better part of the Nasserite era. The second *miḥna* (tribulation/ordeal), as this persecution has been termed by the *Ikhwan,* witnessed the jailing of some of the most active and well-known members of the Brotherhood, including the *Murshid* (guide/leader) Hasan al-Hudaybi and most of his lieutenants, and the hanging of six well-known Brothers.

As a consequence of this systematic repression of the major Islamist organization in Egypt, and due to its subsequent disappearance from the public scene, most studies dealing with the Brotherhood in this period came to believe that the Brotherhood was nearly exterminated during this era. Numerous authors described the Brotherhood during these years as in a state of shock, despair and crisis. These studies considered the Nasserite years as the "heyday" of secularism and modernity, an era in which a politico-religious organization such as the *Ikhwan* was perceived as archaic and without hope of survival. Accordingly, the contention of this existing literature has

been, that the Brotherhood disappeared as a result of the tough policing it was exposed to during the years of Nasserite rule, and reappeared once the military rule had ended with the death of Nasser in September 1970. This "reappearance" of the *Ikhwan* was considered a result of President Anwar al-Sadat's scheme to restrict the influence of secular Nasserite currents in government and society by allying himself with "traditional religious forces" such as the Brotherhood.

While I agree with the overall contention of these studies, in conceiving the repressive environment of the Nasserite years as triggering a radicalization among some young activists, I maintain that a wider study of the Brotherhood's development during these years of repression is essential to understand the trajectory and history of the *Ikhwan*. Challenging the idea that the Brotherhood disappeared and then re-appeared following the Nasserite years, the main argument of this dissertation is that the Brotherhood continued to exist as an underground organization during the first and second *miḥna*. In so doing, I study the Brotherhood during these years as a secret organization that transformed its existence and activities into secrecy in order to survive the repression it was exposed to. I claim that we can trace a continuation of the *Ikhwan* during the key periods in the history of the organization, thereby bridging the al-Banna-era with the period that followed his death in 1949. Thus, this study is an attempt to move the focus away from being predominantly on the Qutbian ideology and shed much needed light on the historical development of the Brotherhood as a mass organization. Accordingly, the dissertation draws on a conception of secrecy by borrowing the definitions of secrecy put forward by, among others, Georg Simmel and Bonnie Erickson. In this regard, I focus mainly on the correlation between secrecy and repression. Furthermore, to understand the effects of repression on the Brotherhood, I apply Donatella della Porta's causal mechanism framework to grasp how the Brotherhood reacted to the repression it was exposed to. Yet, in so doing, I do not neglect the role of Sayyid Qutb, but the study attempts to put Qutb in the correct context of the *Ikhwan*-history.

In utilizing primary sources such as the extensive field of memoirs authored by Brotherhood members who witnessed these events firsthand, alongside contemporary British and American intelligence sources and documents from their embassies, this dissertation sheds important light on the Brotherhood's activities and development during these years of "invisibility". In this way, I offer a more nuanced examination of the Brotherhood in the years that followed al-Banna's death in 1949, introducing *Ikhwan* actors and events not always studied in the existing field of research.

Taken together, the dissertation contributes to our understanding of the Brotherhood during two decisive periods in its history. On the one hand, the study contributes to the historical field, by

studying the Brotherhood's transformation into secrecy as a result of repression, showing that the Brotherhood was working actively during the Nasserite years. By tracing this secrecy back to the Second World War, I contend that it emerged in the context of global rupture and as a defensive mechanism against repression. Furthermore, the dissertation highlights the *Ikhwan's* development into an anti-colonial force in Egypt and discusses its participation in the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948 and the subsequent war in the Canal Zone in 1951. In this vein, I discuss how the *Ikhwan* developed secret structures in the army and among its civilian members to combat the British and to change the status quo in Egypt. As a result, the study indicates that the radicalization of Brotherhood members had occurred in this context of anti-colonial agitation and came as a result of these circumstances surrounding Egypt. This radicalization, which had occurred in the context of colonized Egypt, was reinforced as a result of the Brotherhood's struggle with Nasser's military regime and the harsh repression it was exposed to during these years. In other words, the radicalization of the *Ikhwan* did not emerge in the prison camps of Nasser but had already been there for years before.

On the other hand, the dissertation challenges the mainstream research that understands Sayyid Qutb as the main radicalizing ideologue of the Brotherhood. In tracing the radicalization of segments of the *Ikhwan* back to the 1940s, I contend that the understanding of Qutb's role in the history of Islamist radicalization might be reconsidered. The study contends that a continuation of radicalization can be observed in the history of the Brotherhood, taking its starting point in the anti-colonial agitation of the 1940s and the struggle between the Brotherhood and the Saadist regime in the late 1940s. This early radicalization, I claim, continued into the Nasserite era. Thus, I show that some Brothers were radicalized long before Qutb's affiliation with the *Ikhwan.*

Dansk referat

Denne Ph.d.-afhandling udforsker det Muslimske Broderskabs historie igennem to perioder med undertrykkelse i Egypten. Mere konkret, vil projektets fokus være på korrelationen mellem stats-undertrykkelse og tilblivelsen af hemmeligholdelse og militarisme i Broderskabet rækker i perioderne 1948-1951 og 1954-1970. Min overordnede påstand er, at det Muslimske Broderskab igennem sin historie, og særligt igennem de to overstående perioder, opbyggede en evne til at overleve undertrykkelse ved at omdanne masseorganisationen til en undergrundseksistens.

Følger man den eksisterende forskning af det Muslimske Broderskab i perioden efter Hasan al-Bannas død i 1949, vil den mere eller mindre omhandle Sayyid Qutbs radikaliserende indflydelse på Broderskabet. I overensstemmelse hermed, har disse studier i særlig grad fremhævet nogle af de koncepter, som blev præsenteret af Qutb i hans velkendte og ofte citerede værk "Milestones". Milestones, som blev publiceret i 1964, mens Qutb stadig afsonede en 15 års dom for politisk konspiration mod Nasser-regimet, er af forskere blevet studeret i et forsøg på at forklare, hvorfor nogle unge medlemmer forlod Broderskabet i kølvandet på Nasser-perioden for at danne militante organisationer. Derfor har et flertal af forskere primært fokuseret på de ideologiske konsekvenser af - og reaktioner på undertrykkelse.

Gamal Abdel Nassers hårdhændede undertrykkelse af Broderskabet fra oktober 1954, repræsenterede for organisationen den hidtil vanskeligste og mest voldelige prøvelse siden Broderskabets grundlæggelse i 1928. Som følge af et mislykket attentatforsøg mod Nasser den 26. oktober 1954, indledte styret en omfattende og tilrettelagt forfølgelse og undertrykkelse af Broderskabet, som ville vare ved i hovedparten af Nasser-æraen (1954-70). Den anden "*miḥna*" (prøvelse/lidelseshistorie), som denne forfølgelse er blevet kaldt af Broderskabets medlemmer, bevidnede fængslingen af nogle af de mest aktive og højtprofilerede medlemmer af organisationen, heriblandt Hasan al-Hudaybi Broderskabets *Murshid* (leder), samt henrettelsen af seks velkendte Brødre.

Som følge af denne systematiske undertrykkelse af den største islamistiske organisation i Egypten og som konsekvens af Broderskabets resulterende forsvinden fra den offentlige politiske scene, opstod en udbredt opfattelse i den eksisterende forskning, af at Broderskabet var næsten udryddet i denne periode. Adskillige forskere beskrev Broderskabet i denne periode som en organisation i chok, fortvivlelse og krise. Nogle forfattere anførte sågar, at *Ikhwan* organisationen var blevet mere eller mindre tilintetgjort af Nassers "sekulære" militærstyre. Disse studier opfattede

Nasser-æraen som sekularismens og modernitetens storhedstid, hvorfor de anså en politisk-religiøs organisation som *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* som arkaisk og uden chancer for at overleve. Som følge heraf, var det hævdvundne argument i den eksisterende litteratur, at Broderskabet forsvandt som resultat af den hårdhændede undertrykkelse af organisationen, og dukkede op igen da militærstyret nåede sin ende med Nassers død i september 1970. Denne "genkomst" af *Ikhwan* organisationen blev betragtet som en konsekvens af præsident Anwar al-Sadats forsøg på at begrænse den politiske og sociale indflydelse fra sekulære Nasseristiske strømninger i regeringsapparatet og samfundet ved at alliere sig med "traditionelle religiøse kræfter" som Broderskabet.

Skønt jeg er enig med den generelle strømning i forskningen, som påstår at de undertrykkende omstændigheder i Nasser-æraen udløste en radikalisering af unge aktivister, fremfører jeg imidlertid, at et bredere studie af Broderskabets udvikling gennem disse repressive år er essentiel for vores forståelse af organisationens virke og historie. Jeg udfordrer den hævdvundne opfattelse som anfører, at *Ikhwan* organisationen forsvandt og derefter dukkede op efter Nasser perioden. Derimod argumenterer jeg, at Broderskabet fortsatte sin eksistens som en undergrundsorganisation i løbet af den første og anden *miḥna* (prøvelse) (1948-1951 og 1954-1970). Derfor studerer jeg det Muslimske Broderskab igennem disse år som en hemmelig organisation, der omdannede sin hidtil synlige eksistens og aktivisme til en hemmelig og skjult undergrundsaktivisme for at modstå den repression, som organisationen blev udsat for. Således argumenterer jeg, at vi kan følge en kontinuitet af Broderskabet igennem disse to nøgleperioder i organisationens historie. Hvordan og hvorfor overlevede Broderskabet den hårdhændede undertrykkelse den blev udsat for igennem disse *miḥan* (prøvelser)? Er de spørgsmål afhandlingen vil forsøge at belyse. På denne måde, forsøger projektet at flytte fokus fra at være i overvejende grad på den Qutbiske ideologi, og agter derimod at belyse den historiske udvikling af Broderskabet som en masseorganisation i perioder med undertrykkelse. Derfor trækker jeg på opfattelsen af "secrecy" som defineret af blandt andre Georg Simmel og Bonnie Erickson. I denne forbindelse fokuserer jeg særligt på korrelationen mellem undertrykkelse og hemmelighed. For at nå til en forståelse af effekterne af undertrykkelse på Broderskabets organisation trækker jeg på Donnatella della Portas kausale mekanisme ramme, hvori hun bl.a. studerer effekten af statsrepression på masseorganisationer, og hvordan sådanne organisationer reagerer på statsvold.

Ved at anvende denne tilgang forsømmer jeg ikke Qutbs centrale rolle, men studerer den som en integreret del af Broderskabets historie og i lyset af den historiske kontekst, hvori disse idéer opstod. Derved forsøger jeg at nuancerer den hævdvundne forståelse af Qutbs rolle, og kaster kritisk

lys på idéen om, at Qutb introducerede radikalisme til Broderskabets rækker. Jeg spørger i den forbindelse, besad Broderskabet ikke en radikal fraktion længe før Qutbs indtræden i organisationen?

Til at besvare afhandlingens overordne spørgsmål, dykker jeg ned i det omfattende felt af erindringsværker og fremstillinger, forfattet af Broderskabets medlemmer og højtstående ledere, som havde førstehåndskendskab til de historiske hændelser. Disse værker, hvoraf kun nogle få er almindeligt kendte i forskningen, er endnu ikke brugt i en omfattende analyse af Broderskabets virke under de to "prøvelser" i organisationens historie. Men da Broderskabets fremstillinger uden tvivl er præget af tendenser og ønsket om at retfærdiggøre egne handlinger, studerer projektet ligeledes britisk og amerikansk arkivmateriale, som jeg har indsamlet gennem ophold i blandt andet National Archives i London og fra CIA's online-database. Ved at triangulere viden fremsat af Broderskabets aktivister med samtidige informationer fra de britiske og amerikanske arkiver, kan projektet nå til en mere kritisk forståelse af disse centrale perioder i Broderskabets og Egyptens historie. Herved belyser afhandlingen en vigtig, men hidtil ikke dybdegående studeret del af organisationens virke gennem disse "usynlige" perioder af dens historie. På den måde bidrager jeg med en mere nuanceret analyse af Broderskabet i de år der fulgte al-Bannas død i 1949.

På den ene side tilføjer denne afhandling ny viden til det historiske felt, ved at undersøge og belyse Broderskabets transformation til hemmelighed som et resultat af undertrykkelse. I den forbindelse, kan afhandlingen belyse en hidtil underbelyst side af Broderskabets historie, særligt perioderne 1948-1951 og i endnu højere grad perioden 1954-70, som i den hævdvundne fortælling er blevet anset som en usynlig og næsten ikke-eksisterende fase i *Ikhwans* historie. Derimod viser afhandlingen, at Broderskabet både eksisterede og arbejdede aktivt under Nasser perioden. Derfor er mit argument, at organisationen indgik i en usynlig 'skyggeboksning' mod det dominerende Nasser-regime. Ved at spore hemmelighed i Broderskabets rækker og strukturer tilbage til Anden Verdens krig, anfører jeg, at de hemmelige aspekter af Broderskabets organisation opstod i en kontekst af verdens-opbrud og som en defensiv mekanisme imod politiske begrænsninger og repression. Dertil påviser afhandlingen Broderskabets udvikling og virke som en anti-kolonial aktør, og diskuterer organisationens deltagelse i den første Arabisk-Israelske krig i 1948 og i den efterfølgende krig i Kanal Zonen imod de britiske styrker i Egypten i 1951. På baggrund af disse fund anfører jeg, at radikaliseringen blandt Broderskabets medlemmer opstod i denne anti-koloniale kontekst og som et direkte resultat af omstændighederne i Egypten. Denne radikalisering, som var opstået i en kontekst af kolonisering, blev sidenhen bestyrket af Broderskabets politiske kamp imod

[7]

Nassers militære styre og den hårde undertrykkelse som organisationen blev udsat for igennem denne periode. Med andre ord: Radikaliseringen af *Ikhwan* opstod ikke i Nassers fængselslejre, men havde allerede eksisteret i det forudgående årti.

På den anden side udfordrer afhandlingen den gængse opfattelse af Qutb som den primære radikaliserende ideolog i Broderskabet. Ved at spore radikaliseringen af en gruppe Brødre tilbage til 1940erne, viser jeg, at Qutbs rolle i den islamistiske radikalisering måske burde genovervejes. Afhandlingen fastslår, at en kontinuitet af radikaliseringen kan iagttages i Broderskabets historie. Denne radikalisering, argumenterer jeg, havde sine rødder i den anti-koloniale kamp fra 1940erne og i Broderskabets politiske og til tider voldelige modstand imod de egyptiske regeringer, særligt Saadist partiet fra slut 1940erne. Derved påviser jeg, at nogle Brødre var blevet radikaliseret længe før Qutb tilsluttede sig Broderskabet.

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Studying Modern Middle Eastern history as a first-year student at the University of Copenhagen opened a whole new world for me. As a young immigrant of Palestinian roots, my identity had since my childhood been shaped by the history of that region. Born to refugee-parents, they unknowingly put me on the path to become a historian, and for that I wholeheartedly thank them. When I entered the lecture room for the first time to commence my History studies, I was full of expectations but also a bit unaware of the magnitude of that decision. As a young man who thought he knew every single detail of the modern history of the Middle East, I very quickly realized that I indeed knew very little. My first lesson at university was to learn how much I did not know, and every single day I enjoy thinking of how much I am gaining from that realization. Mogens Pelt, at that time my first lecturer, and today a friend, once said "you are not born learned" and that statement follows me in my academic life. I will always be thankful to Pelt, who through more than ten years now has supported and encouraged me and been an academic and personal mentor. Mogens, you are a very dear friend.

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Introduction

This dissertation is an attempt to study the history of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, also known as *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin,*[1] during two periods of repression (1948-1951 and 1954-1970). Unlike other studies that tend to concentrate on the ideological outcomes of repression, and more particularly the ideational effects of Sayyid Qutb's prison literature, this dissertation addresses the historical development of the Brotherhood during these periods of repression which forced the organization underground. These two periods of repression and clandestine activity have been described as the first and second *miḥna* (ordeal/tribulation) by the Brotherhood.

On 26 October 1954, an alleged attempt on Gamal Abd al-Nasser's life at al-Manshiyya square in Alexandria marked a watershed in the history of the Brotherhood. According to the official account, Mahmoud Abdel Latif, a tinsmith and a member of the *Ikhwan* and its notorious Special Apparatus since 1942, was captured following the botched attempt. As an immediate reaction, an unyielding wave of persecution was carried out by the security apparatus against the *Ikhwan*. With the organization proscribed, thousands of Brothers were either arrested or had to flee Egypt, while the remaining members were forced into a reality of clandestine adherence to the Brotherhood. On these grounds, contemporary researchers and observers came to believe that the Brotherhood had definitely been exterminated at the hands of a stronger and more modern opponent, i.e. the secular nationalist military regime embodied in Gamal Abdel Nasser.[2] "Another dissolution and the hangings of six Brothers in December 1954 bring our history to its end", were the assessing remarks of Richard P. Mitchell in his seminal book on the Brotherhood, to mention just one example.[3] However, as the Nasserite regime came to an end with Abdel Nasser's death in September 1970, the Muslim Brotherhood reappeared on the Egyptian scene, highlighting the organization's endurance during this repressive period.

The "re-emergence" of the Brotherhood following its dissolution and repression during the

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[1] The Muslim Brotherhood, the Brotherhood, the *Ikhwan,* and the organization, will be applied referring to the Muslim Brotherhood.

[2] Throughout the dissertation I will term the regime as; the Nasserite regime or the Revolutionary regime interchangeably, but both terms refer to the regime that took power in Egypt following the July revolution in 1952.

[3] Mitchell 1993, xxv.

Nasserite era,[4] after what had seemed to be its total extermination during the era of Nasserism,[5] raises the interesting and for the time being actual questions, what happens to the Brotherhood when it is exposed to state repression and dissolution? And how and why does the Brotherhood as a mass organization endure these periods of 'lacking opportunity windows'?

Generally speaking, the existing literature on the Brotherhood during repressive eras, as I will illustrate in more detail below, has been characterized by an actor-based perspective with a particular focus on ideology. A majority of scholars looked into the ways in which Sayyid Qutb's conceptual universe radicalized rank and file of the Brotherhood and other young activists outside the ranks of the *Ikhwan*.[6] The predominant argument is that the Qutbian radicalization evolved from behind the bars of Nasser's prisons.[7] Countering this claim, some scholars on the other side of the scale emphasized the moderating influence of the Brotherhood's second *Murshid*[8] (guide/leader), Hasan al-Hudaybi,[9] on the *Ikhwan's* ideology and members.[10] These approaches account for one crucial aspect of the historical events during the two repressive periods under study, i.e. the radicalizing and/or modernizing turn in the Islamist movement and among Islamist actors.

Whereas the ideological outcomes of repression have been widely studied, especially with regard to the second *miḥna* and the imperative role of Sayyid Qutb, the existence of the Brotherhood as an organized but secret mass organization during these periods of repression has been remarkably understudied. This has resulted in unanswered questions about the history of the Egyptian Brotherhood: What happened to the organization following the dissolution in 1948 and 1954? And how did the Brotherhood continue its existence when the political opportunities were seemingly non-existent in society? It has furthermore left us with an incomplete understanding of the *Ikhwan's* historical development and political role in post-colonial Egypt. This dissertation is an attempt to fill this gap by examining two main lines of questioning. The first deals with the historical development of the organization under repression. How does it react? How does the *Ikhwan* alter its

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[4] The main focus of the dissertation will be on the Nasserite era, as this period represented the chronologically longest and most vital period of 'secrecy' in the history of the Brotherhood.

[5] Nasserism is understood as a political discourse consisting of different visions for state and society. Among its key visions was nationalism, social justice as an idea of eradicating what was seen as an unjust distribution of wealth and in particular the cultivable land, anti-colonialism and the right to self-determination for the colonized, the right to non-alignment in the cold war, etc. Nasserism was personified in Gamal Abdel Nasser and his military regime (1954-70).

[6] cf. Kepel 1985; Toth 2013; Calvert 2010; Moussali 1992; Khatab 2001.

[7] Kepel, 1985: 57.

[8] The title of *Murshid* (guide) was given to Hasan al-Banna in 1932, representing the highest authority in the Brotherhood. We cannot find the title used previously. Since that time, the leader of the Brotherhood has been entitled "*al-Murshid al-ʿām*" (the general guide).

[9] Zollner 2007; 2011; Ashour 2009.

[10] This will be further discussed below.

structures in order to stay active in periods of clandestinity? How does suppression affect the coherence of the Brotherhood? Why did it survive despite the uncompromising persecution it was exposed to in these periods and what negative effects did its turn towards covert activism have on the Brotherhood? The second line relates to the ideological responses to suppression. How did the rank and file of the Brotherhood react to the different waves of repression? Did the radical ideas develop as a result of Sayyid Qutb's influential writings?

In so doing, I intend to concentrate on the development of the Brotherhood as an organization rather than focusing on the Qutbian influence, as has been the main focus of prior research. Thus, the study at hand is an examination of the development of the Brotherhood as an underground organization in periods of repression. This thesis examines the way in which the organizational structures of the Muslim Brotherhood provide it with mechanisms to survive state persecution and enable it to endure as a secret organization inside and outside prison walls.

Theoretical Considerations; a Mass Organization Going Underground

I consider the Muslim Brotherhood during the first and second *miḥna* as a clandestine/underground organization[11] that transformed its prior mass organization into secrecy in order to survive repression. To grasp the development of the Brotherhood following the persecution whereupon they "disappeared", I will outline a heuristic conceptual framework by selectively drawing on organization theory, social movement theory and definitions of secret societies/clandestine organizations. This dissertation aims at constructing a historical understanding of the Brotherhood in years of "invisibility".[12] In order to get an inclusive understanding of how and why the Brotherhood continued to exist during these repressive years, this study will be conducted on three different but interchangeable levels of analysis. Hence, I borrow the multi-level approach devised by Donatella della Porta[13] in her seminal study on clandestine political violence.[14] In her

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[11] I will throughout the dissertation apply the concepts "clandestine organization", "underground organization" "hidden organization" and "secret organization" interchangeably.

[12] It is crucial to underline that previous research has not conceived of the Brotherhood as totally invisible. But as argued above, the main focus has been on the ideological development and not on the main organization. However, a systematic examination of the Brotherhood as an underground organization during this period has not yet been published, accounting for why the main personalities of the *Ikhwan* and historical events have been understudied.

[13] della Porta examines clandestine political violence committed by the extreme right-wing, extreme left-wing, ethnonationalists and religious groups. In applying della Porta's framework, I do so heuristically. I do not state that the Brotherhood outright turned to political violence once persecuted. On the contrary, I treat the period of 1954-70 as a dynamic period in which the Brotherhood's stance towards political violence transformed and developed in different ways.

[14] della Porta 2013, 26-7.

approach, della Porta distinguishes between macro level features such as escalating policing[15] and structural political and social contexts, meso level characteristics in which the organizational structures and mechanisms are in focus, and micro level aspects where the individual motivations are emphasized.[16] By applying this multi-leveled social movement approach this dissertation can create a link between the structural/contextual, the organizational and the individual aspects to understand the continuing existence of the Brotherhood during authoritarian years.

The different levels of analysis will not be organized in different segregated parts or sections of the analysis but will be applied interchangeably throughout the analysis. Consequently, the analysis will constantly move between these levels to grasp the comprehensive development of the Brotherhood. Considering the chronological approach of this dissertation, this seems to be the most fitting way of applying the different levels of analysis.

At the macro level I will examine the domestic and regional social and geo-political developments. At this level, I will look mainly at the changeable domestic sociopolitical situation in Egypt, but also take into consideration the regional conflicts that had an impact on the *Ikhwan's* ability to endure.

At the meso level my emphasis will be on the organizational structures of the Brotherhood. I will examine how the complex structures of the *Ikhwan* and the idea of secrecy in organization was developed, and how these affect its ability to sustain repression. A discussion of the problems that evolve from secrecy and repression will also form part of the analytical approach.

At the micro level I focus on the personal accounts of motivation and activism offered by individuals in the Brotherhood and the life trajectory of Brothers who witnessed these eras. In this way, I attempt to nuance the history of the Brotherhood, thus shifting attention away from Qutb to some degree and adding a broader insight to other activists who played an essential role in the Brotherhood's development. Furthermore, I will examine the socio-economic backgrounds of these active members, their engagement with the organization during periods of repression,[17] and patterns of continued activism under suppression.

In the following sections, I will elaborate on these three levels of analysis to illustrate how each of them will contribute to our understanding of the Brotherhood's history during the repressive

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[15] The ways in which police and other security apparatus respond to protests and other forms of social and political activism.

[16] della Porta, 2013, 21.

[17] More particularly, I will study the periods of 1948-1951 and 1954-70 as two periods in which many of the Brothers witnessed persecution, prisons and exile. In doing so, I can reach an understanding of how and why the Brotherhood during these two periods managed to survive.

years. These levels, I believe, can get us closer to an understanding of my main questions: How and why did the Brotherhood survive harsh persecution, and what happens when the organization goes underground?

Posing the question of how, and not least why, the Brotherhood continued its existence despite the repeated dissolutions, hangings and persecution, one has to understand the domestic and regional context, i.e. the macro level, in which this continuation took place. In view of this, I argue that the domestic, and at times regional, situation was advantageous for the Brotherhood's ability to continue its existence despite repression. One such illustrative example is the 'Arab Cold War', as the inter-Arab struggle during the 1950s has been termed by Malcom Kerr.[18] By looking at this geo-political conflict that took place between the major players on the Arab scene, we can detect the political opportunities evolving for organizations like the Brotherhood when the domestic political spaces are limited or closed on account of repression. As explained by Wiktorowicz, it is crucial to incorporate "the influence of external factors and concomitant structures of opportunity and constraint" in order to contextualize collective action and understand how changes in the surrounding political, social and economic context affect the organization.[19] Consequently, a look at the domestic and regional political environment and the political opportunities and constraints for political activism that took place in the authoritarian years can get us closer to a contextualization of the Brotherhood's development in these crucial years. I maintain that there are substantial links between the domestic policies adopted by the state towards the Brotherhood, and the ways in which the Brotherhood structured its appearance in society. Therefore, the dissertation will apply della Porta's analytical framework of causal mechanisms to better grasp how the domestic context affected the Brotherhood. Della Porta has for example examined how tough policing triggers political violence in the context of clandestine political movements.[20] This causal link between tough policing and violent responses by organizations can be helpful in understanding the reactions of the *Ikhwan* who faced state-repression.[21]

By shedding light on how and why the Brotherhood was able to endure the persecution of the

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[18] Kerr 1975. The two major antagonists in this Arab Cold War were Egypt (UAR) and Saudi Arabia. They represented two competing visions, i.e. Pan-Arabism advocated by Nasser's Egypt and his allies on one hand and on the other hand Pan-Islamism advocated by Saudi Arabia and its allies, among those the Muslim Brotherhood.

[19] Wiktorowicz 2004, 13-14.

[20] della Porta, 2013, 67, 111.

[21] Although the Brotherhood was exposed to a severe policy of suppression, tough policing in della Porta's words, with at times thousands of its members arrested, a clear majority of the *Ikhwan* did not turn to political violence or terror. In fact, after October 1954 the Brotherhood did not commit any kind of organized violence against the Egyptian state. Therefore, it is crucial to study how the Brothers reacted to the severe persecution that followed the Manshiyya incident.

Egyptian regimes during the two "ordeals", this examination is of current significance. The Brotherhood has yet again been forced underground as a result of exhaustive persecution that followed the coup d'état of 3 July 2013. Therefore, this dissertation can contribute with significant insights into the ways in which the Brotherhood historically has reacted to harsh persecution.

One central theme of this thesis is to address the internal affairs of the Brotherhood, with a particular focus on periods of persecution and organizational secrecy. This focus, as I will show throughout the dissertation will help us conceive a somehow overlooked but nevertheless crucial side of the Brotherhood's history. Alison Pargeter has for example suggested that the Brotherhood has a "mentality of a semi-clandestine opposition movement, trusting only its own rather than working in a truly consensual manner".[22] This semi-clandestinity, Pargeter tells us, has characterized the *Ikhwan* for eight decades. One purpose of this study is to look into how and why such a mentality of clandestinity occurred in the past. In that way, I link the macro level analysis with the meso level, i.e. the regional and domestic political opportunities and constraints with the concomitant development inside the organization. Accordingly, it is the argument of this thesis that the semi-clandestinity of the *Ikhwan* has a long history going back to its formative years, when the organization, headed by Hasan al-Banna, constructed an idea and structure of secrecy.[23] This construct, as I will explain in chapter two, was erected as a result of a historical context of colonization, political instability and at times political crises involving reciprocal violence. Accordingly, I treat the Brotherhood in periods of repression as an organization that applies mechanisms of secrecy as a preemptive measure to continue its activism and survive repression; in so doing, I hope this dissertation will answer the important but yet understudied question of what happens to the Brotherhood when it is forced underground?

It goes without saying that the study of a secret organization sets the researcher a difficult task. Because of their secret nature, these organizations try to stay out of sight, or under the radar, and they do their best not to be observed by the repressive state-system under which they operate. This of course means that they very often do not appear in registers and archives, as their ultimate tactic is to remain unseen. Hence, the researcher faces the challenge of uncovering something that tries to

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[22] Pargeter 2016, 1, 89.
[23] As I will show in chapter two, the Brotherhood developed a clear-cut organization with clear traces of secrecy during the years of the Second World War. These secret structures were developed in order to combat the British and to secure the Brotherhood's durability in the face of repression.

stay hidden.[24]

In 1906, Georg Simmel's seminal study "The Sociology of secrecy and secret society" was translated into English.[25] Simmel offered a detailed analysis of secrecy and secret societies and the psychological features surrounding secret activism, and understood secrecy as "a universal sociological form". Simmel presented a number of features that according to his understanding necessarily must figure in secret societies: Secrecy is gradual and can characterize entire societies[26] or be limited only to aspects of the society, be it the names of its members, its structural details, its sources of finance, its relationships to other actors, its purposes, etc. Furthermore, it is a hierarchical construction designed deliberately to control its followers.[27] In this way, the organization/society can protect itself from outside infiltration.[28] And because secrecy gives rise to isolation and individualization, the secret societies socialize their adherents in order to better secure the protection of the society from infiltration and disloyalty. As understood by Simmel, secrecy is the choice of the weak and a response to the risk of suppression. Simmel underlined that "the secret society emerges everywhere as correlate of despotism and of police control. It acts as protection alike of defense and of offense against the violent pressure of central powers".[29] Thus, the secret society usually operates in an asymmetric power-relation, the weak against the strong, and it goes without saying that the weak will be the one obliged to acquire secrecy to protect his existence.

In opposition to Simmel's insistence on hierarchy as an inevitable aspect of secret societies, Erickson and P. Gist argue that secret societies take different structural forms, and are not necessarily hierarchical in their structures. Erickson draws our attention to the significance of looking into the social and political atmosphere surrounding the secret society in order to better grasp its structures. "If conditions include risk, as when the members of a secret society risk imprisonment or injury or death, the processes generating the society's structure are distinctive ones".[30]

My understanding of the Brotherhood as a clandestine/secret organization builds selectively on

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[24] However, when the disadvantageous circumstances change, be it with a shift of regime, or a shift in the policies towards the Brotherhood, the organization may opt for overt activities; as was the case with the Brotherhood following the regime-shift in 1970.

[25] I only use the English translation from 1906 by Albion W. Small in this dissertation.

[26] Society is here understood as a group of people who are involved in a persistent social or political interaction.

[27] Simmel, 1906, 463, 470, 478-9.

[28] By being hierarchical, classified information can be restricted to top-tier members, thus keeping the "secrets" of the organization concealed when deemed necessary. Furthermore, the hierarchical construction of secret societies will, according to Simmel, secure an initiation period in which the newcomers can be initiated in the society, thereby keeping the secrets of the organization restricted to those who have proven their loyalty.

[29] Simmel, 1906, 477, 472.

[30] P. Gist, 1937, 349; Erickson, 1981, 188-9.

the concepts coined by, among others, Simmel, Gist and Erickson.[31] I define a secret society in this dissertation as: A group of individuals, united by a specific ideology or commitment to an organization with persisting relationships/membership, and with some aspects of the organization deliberately hidden from people outside it.[32]

Secrecy is here understood by graduality, which means that the degree and form of it can, and most probably will, change over time. In contrast to Simmel's insistence on hierarchy, I do not view hierarchy as an unavoidable and necessary feature of the secret society, but as we will see, hierarchy was an important component of the Brotherhood's organization. Yet, it is imperative to note that this dissertation is a historical work and my main focus is to study the historical development of the Brotherhood rather than concentrating on secrecy as a phenomenon. Accordingly, while I certainly will discuss organizational problems that emerge as an outcome of clandestinity, my main focus will nevertheless be on the historical development.

I argue that we can trace a continuation of the organizational structures of the Brotherhood during these years of secrecy. Organizational structures are understood as the hierarchy, official functions[33] of the Brotherhood and the persons involved in it.[34] By looking into the history of the Brotherhood, this dissertation will show that a clear continuation can be seen throughout repressive periods, but also that the structures of secrecy, which I maintain was vital for the *Ikhwan's* survival, had a long history in the Brotherhood.

I apply this definition of secret society as an ideal type "formed by the one-sided *accentuation* of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent *concrete individual* phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified *analytical* construct", to borrow Weber's definition. [35] Furthermore, as put by Weber, "[i]n its conceptual purity, this mental construct (*Gedankenbild*) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality".[36] By studying the *Ikhwan* in these years of secrecy through this specific understanding of secrecy and its historical traces in the Brotherhood's past, I will provide insight into the internal history of the organization during

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[31]Simmel, 1906; Gist 1937, 350; Erickson, 1981, 189.

[32] Such aspects can include but are not exclusive to; membership, structures, ideas, activities/operations, finance, etc.

[33] Like for example *Murshid* (the leader Hasan al-Hudaybi continued to lead the organization throughout the era), *Maktab al-Irshad* (the executive office), etc.

[34] We will of course also see discontinuation, especially with regard to persons. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue that there was a continuation of persons. However, as it may be expected with the course of harsh persecution, some members opted to leave the organization, while new members joined the *Ikhwan* during this era.

[35] Weber 1949, 90.

[36] Ibid.

repressive periods.

The motivations presented by *Ikhwan* members for their continued activism, the patterns of activism during periods of secrecy and the ideological transformation among the Brothers, and the socio-economic backgrounds and ideological standpoints of different members of the organization will be my main concern at the micro level of the study. In this way, I hold that a more nuanced understanding of the Brotherhood can be reached in which less well-known *Ikhwan* become central in this research. In contrast to most studies, in which Sayyid Qutb takes center stage, I maintain that a broader study of rank and file and other leading members of the Brotherhood can contribute to our perception of this heterogeneous organization. Thus, I intend to highlight the agency of the rank and file of Brotherhood members and the role they acquired in these years. To reach as comprehensive an overview of the Brotherhood's different ideas and motivations as possible, I have collected an enormous amount of autobiographies and accounts of Brotherhood members and leaders who were active in the period under study.[37] By including this literature, the dissertation will demonstrate how Brotherhood activists explained their continued engagement despite repression and how a radicalization of a faction of the Brotherhood took place long before Qutb's influential writings emerged. Among other things I reflect on, how the religious vocabulary and self-perception of the Brotherhood was applied to harness the support to, and continued engagement with, the organization. The *Ikhwan* members, we are told, perceived themselves as religious individuals representing an Islamic organization fulfilling an obligatory mission (*daʿwa*), and any persecution of the Brotherhood was therefore portrayed as a persecution of the Islamic "mission". Such interpretations, Aminzade and J. Perry argue, can encourage oppositional activism:

> "Religious beliefs contain multiple contradictory messages that can be appropriated for conservative as well as revolutionary purposes. Religions have diverted people's attention from their misery and supported an oppressive status quo, just as they have also encouraged people to collectively challenge injustice and oppression".[38]

The same appropriation of religious beliefs can be observed in the Brothers' personal accounts, in which they present themselves as religious individuals and activists whose enterprise is an Islamic obligation. Adding to this, Al-Anani has shown that the *Ikhwan* constructs a peculiar identity which

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[37] A more comprehensive description on sources and methodology follows in the next chapter.
[38] Aminzade & J. Perry, 2001, 157.

plays a central role in strengthening the endurance of the Brotherhood rank and file especially in periods of persecution, a view with which I concur.[39]

As we will see from the various accounts offered by Brotherhood activists, this discourse of religiosity and the idea of working for Islam was applied by the Brotherhood as a central reason for their continued activism, and as a justifying explanation for why they were exposed to persecution and repression, thereby transforming the continuing activism into a religiously ordained obligation and the tribulations as a natural result of being religious under anti-Islamic regimes. Furthermore, the Brothers interpret their "sufferings" as part and parcel of the history of the Islamic *daʿwa* going back to early Islamic history in Mecca, when the Prophet's *daʿwa* was similarly "persecuted".[40] In so doing, they manage to transform a political conflict with national regimes into a religiously explicated conflict in which their persecution becomes a link in a chain of historical events, one where the Islamic movement, being the legitimate heir to the first Islamic *daʿwa*, will always be subjected to persecution by the "enemies of Islam".[41] This perception of being a persecuted movement (*jamāʿa mumtaḥana)* has been a deep-rooted part of the Brotherhood's narrative since its early history. As a case in point, in 1939 al-Banna penned one of his much-quoted epistles, *Bayn al-Ams wal-Waym* (Between yesterday and today) in which he advances this idea. To al-Banna, there is no doubt that the Brotherhood would be exposed to "severe antagonism and cruel enmity" and directing his words to his followers he proclaimed "you will encounter hardships in abundance and many obstacles will rise up in front of you. Only at that time will you have begun to follow the path of those who hold to a *daʿwa*".[42] This would undoubtedly happen, according to al-Banna, when the *daʿwa* and its ideas and aims became known. At that time, "the people's ignorance as to what constitutes the true Islam will stand as a barrier in your way, and you will find among the religious people and the official clerics those who will find your understanding of Islam odd".[43] At that time, al-Banna warned his followers, "[you] will experience tribulations and ordeals, will be imprisoned, arrested, transferred, displaced, your interests [properties] will be confiscated, and your employments will be suspended, and your homes will be searched. This period of tribulation may go on for a long time".[44] But all this is a natural and inescapable part of the historic tradition of

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[39] Al-Anani, 2016, 84.
[40] Mashhur 1987, 10.
[41] For such an account, see for example Rizq 1978, 28. Rizq argues for example that the Nasserite regime tried to "weaken the Brotherhood's religion" by persecuting and torturing them, Rizq adds however, that "the believing group" stayed almost intact.
[42] Al-Banna 2004, 108-9.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.

religious missions as underlined in the Quran, al-Banna underlines: "Do the people think that they will be left to say, "We believe" and they will not be tried?".[45] Thus, the persecution of the Islamic *daʿwa* is as old as Islam itself, according to al-Banna.

Weismann claims that this kind of persecution of the *daʿwa* which took place in the Nasserite years created the impression that the "*daʿwa* [religious missionary] was impossible in the face of persecution" and was why Sayyid Qutb put forward the idea of *jihad* "in the sense of armed rebellion" as a countermeasure.[46]

Although correct in his assessment, I will add to this understanding by showing that this idea of *jihad* as a means to protect the *daʿwa* against persecution did not emerge in the Nasserite period, but had already been integrated into the ideas of the Brotherhood prior to Qutb's formal connection with the Brotherhood in 1953. We can rather trace this back to at least the post-war years when the Brotherhood, like other radical sociopolitical groups, initiated an anti-colonial struggle against the British occupation and their political struggle with the Egyptian government in 1948 as a *jihad* against an un-Islamic regime.

Design of study

The dissertation consists of seven chapters which are ordered chronologically but will concurrently include a thematic order so as to cover the subjects that characterize the different periods under study.

Chapter one is a presentation of the state of the art and a critical discussion of the existing literature. In addition, it will present my own contribution and how this study is positioned in light of the existing literature. Furthermore, it includes a methodological discussion of the source material of this study. **Chapter two** presents a historical discussion of the Brotherhood's construction of structures of secrecy during the formative period (1938/9-1945). **Chapter three** considers the first serious experience of state repression and the ways in which the *Ikhwan* reacted to and resisted this repression. By going back to the period 1948-1951, this chapter will show that already in these years the Brotherhood developed a blueprint for how to endure state suppression, a blueprint that became crucial in the subsequent waves of suppression. In this chapter the discussion will mainly but not exclusively be on the meso level; the Brotherhood's structures, hierarchies and institutions and how the domestic political context, the macro level of this study, influenced the

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[45] Ibid.
[46] Weismann 2017, 52.

organization's development. **Chapters four and five** set the stage for the suppression of the Brotherhood in late October 1954. By studying the change in leadership following al-Banna's death in 1949 we can trace important ruptures, reconstructions and crises in the Brotherhood's internal affairs. Furthermore, by studying the strained relationship between the Brotherhood and the military junta we can reach an understanding of why the Brotherhood clashed with the military regime in the following period, leading to the Brotherhood's dissolution and repression. Furthermore, a vital aspect of these chapters is to show that the *Ikhwan* at this point in time was faced with the question of whether to rid itself of militancy or to maintain its armed structures, despite the change of regime after 1952. **Chapters six and seven** deal chronologically with the post-Manshiyya period. I try to understand the magnitude of the crisis and how the repression affected the organization and its ideas. But as I will show, this period was not only about crisis. While chapter six deals with the early continuation of the Brotherhood (1954-1957), chapter seven takes a longer perspective and discusses the activities of the Brotherhood in the following period (1958-1970) and traces the degree of activism, recruiting and internal reflections that took place in this crucial period. Chapter seven will in some detail reflect on the role of Qutb in the Brotherhood.

1. State of the Art and Sources

Scholarly research on the Brotherhood, and more particularly the Egyptian mother-branch, is abundant. The recent decades have seen a proliferation of studies on Islamism in general and researchers have particularly been interested in the *Ikhwan* organization. This discussion of historiography will therefore have its primary focus on studies dealing with the Brotherhood during periods of repression, and most significantly the Nasserite years.[47] However, by including a wider range of studies in my discussion, I will be able to situate my own research in the broader literature on the Brotherhood's history. The literature discussed below should therefore not be regarded as a complete list of scholarly research on the Brotherhood. Rather, these studies have been selected on account of their relevance in underscoring some imperative aspects of the Brotherhood's encounter with authoritarianism in Egypt.

The discussion will begin with a section on early Western literature on the Brotherhood, before chronologically moving forward towards more recent studies. My discussion of the literature will

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[47] While a limited number of existing studies have examined the first *miḥna* as part and parcel of the Brotherhood's history, no study has yet delved into the historical development of the *Ikhwan* organization during this period. Most significantly we can mention Richard Mitchell's (1993) discussion of the first dissolution in late 1948 and Omar Ashour's (2009) discussion of al-Hudaybi's attempt to dissolve the Special Apparatus following his appointment as leader of the organization in 1951.

fall into three sections, the first two of which will be structured chronologically mapping the historical development of studies on the Brotherhood since the early 1950s while the last section will be structured around a thematic core. The last section will shed light on the research on the Brotherhood in the oppressive periods and most particularly the Nasser era, where the main contribution of this dissertation lies.

Subsequently, I will discuss the primary source material and the methodological considerations of this dissertation.

1.1. Early Western Literature: The Secular Modernity Paradigm

Literature on the Muslim Brotherhood has a long history going back to 1950,[48] when research began to emerge linking the foundation and development of the Brotherhood with the Western intrusion in countries with Muslim populations. Perceiving the Brotherhood as a direct expression of anger against Western expansion and sovereignty, and as a traditional rejection of the effects of modernity, these early studies branded it a xenophobic and anti-modern organization.[49] Hamilton Gibb, the leading orientalist of the English-speaking world at that time,[50] argued that with the formulation of a politico-religious doctrine, the *Ikhwan* aimed primarily at counterbalancing the tides of modern life that submerge religious faith and practice. Studies of this time predominantly understood the Brotherhood as a reactionary group working to inhibit the necessary modern development of societies. At the heart of this 'reactionism' and 'non-modernism', as understood by these scholars, stood the *Ikhwan's* obsolete worldview and doctrine which at the core was itself based on Islam. One such assessment is put forward by Manfred Halpern in his well-known and often cited "The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa". In it, Halpern describes the Brotherhood as an "anti-modern" organization that promises to "turn popular frustrations primarily against foreign rulers and foreign capital".[51] Historian Cristina P. Harris agreed with this understanding. In her book on the Brotherhood and the Egyptian revolution of 1952, Harris claims that the *Ikhwan* has a "narrow and literal interpretation of Koran, […which] prevented his [al-Banna's] realizing that a truly progressive society can only march forward and achieve progress with the aid of a flexible legal system" which, in Harris' understanding, is the

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[48] Heyworth-Dunne argued that his examination of the Brotherhood from 1950 was the first "comprehensive study on this group in any language" (Heyworth-Dunne, 1950, v).
[49] Harris 1964, 172, 235.
[50] Lockman 2011, 103.
[51] Halpern 1965, 48, 138.

opposite of Islamic law as advocated by the Brotherhood.[52]

As shown by these examples, this early literature was strongly influenced by modernization theory, particularly hegemonic in the 1950s and 60s.[53] Rather than being a complete theory, it was a way of understanding the political, social and cultural developments in societies.[54] Modernization scholars argued that developing countries "must change their traditional organization of production, culture, and beliefs to catch up with Western modern societies".[55] Taking its point of departure in Max Weber's distinction between "traditional" and "modern" societies, this school of thought argued that traditional societies had dominant traces of religion and other forms of supernatural belief; traces that will keep them non-modern. Yet, in contrast and as evidence of their "non-traditionality", modern societies were "rational, scientifically oriented, democratic and relatively egalitarian".[56] Hence, in order to become truly modern, developing countries need to get rid of "traditionalism", most significantly religion, so their analysis goes. It was through this hegemonic paradigm that the early perception of the *Ikhwan* occurred among western scholars. They examined the Brotherhood through this normative perception of religion as "raditional and thereby archaic and antithetical to modernity.

Influenced by this particular paradigm, Richard P. Mitchell set out to study the historical, ideological and organizational aspects of the Brotherhood. "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", the title of this authoritative classic on the *Ikhwan,* was published in 1969 as the first in-depth study of this organization.[57] Nevertheless, like other researchers of his time, Mitchell's analysis was also influenced by the hegemonic modernization theory of that period. As an example of the impact of modernization theory on his work, and of particular interest for this study, is his assessment of the Brotherhood's ability to survive in a modern world. One has to keep in mind that Mitchell wrote his book during the 1960s, a period of Egypt's history often described as the pinnacle of modernization and secularity.[58] Accordingly, when discussing the Brotherhood's ability to survive Nasser's authoritarian regime, Mitchell held that "the essentially secular reform nationalism now in vogue in the Arab world will continue to operate to end the earlier appeal of this organization [the

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[52] Harris 1964, 227.
[53] Lockman 2011, 134.
[54] Ibid., 134-5.
[55] Gogmen 2008, 594-5.
[56] Lockman 2011, 135.
[57] Despite being strongly influenced by the modernization theory, Mitchell's book is still today a classic and a main source of information about the early history of the Brotherhood. His study covers the period between the emergence of the Brotherhood in 1928 and its second dissolution in 1954.
[58] Harris 1964, 235.

Brotherhood]".[59] This assumption of a near end of the Brotherhood was again highlighted by Mitchell when he dwelt on the reemergence of the Brotherhood in 1965. Mitchell maintained in this regard that this reappearance did not "signal a general resurrection of the Society of the Muslim Brothers. Rather, it was a predictable eruption of the continuing tension caused by an ever-dwindling activist fringe of individuals dedicated to an *increasingly less relevant Muslim 'position' about society*".[60] Put differently, Mitchell was in 1969 forecasting the end of the Brotherhood; primarily because he considered it a traditional religious organization that could not have a role to play in a truly modernized [viz. secular] Egypt.[61]

By dint of this, and as exemplified by Mitchell's work, the early scholars shared the widespread impression that the Brotherhood, held to be a traditional organization, was on its last legs. "The future role of a fundamentalist movement like the Muslim Brotherhood is not predictable. It would certainly seem that the secular, tolerant spirit of the times in Egypt would militate against a revival in the near future", was Harris' judgement in 1964.[62]

Yet, a few exceptions to this perception of a vanishing Brotherhood were put forward by scholars of the time, such as Ishaq Musa Husaini's study from 1956.[63] In contrast to the abovementioned contemporary hegemonic perception, Husaini conceived of the *Ikhwan* as an intrinsically modern organization, operating in a modern context.[64] By this account, Husaini did not predict the near extermination of the Brotherhood as a result of state repression and the modernization of society.[65]

1.2. Islamic Resurgence and the Resurgence of Western Brotherhood-studies

In the wake of the publication of Mitchell's book in 1969, almost no study on the Brotherhood in western languages appeared throughout the 1970s.[66] This lack of studies may be attributed to the prior mentioned assumption of the Brotherhood as having vanished or been strongly marginalized. However, an upsurge in research on the Brotherhood occurred in the 1980s, resulting from what has been labelled as the Islamic resurgence. This resurgence or revival of religiosity in the public sphere

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[59] Mitchell 1993, xxiii-xxiv.
[60] Mitchell 1993, xxiii (Italics not in original).
[61] Ibid., xxv.
[62] Harris 1964, 235.
[63] Was published first in Arabic in 1952.
[64] Husaini 1956.
[65] Ibid., 151
[66] Members of the Brotherhood were gradually released from Egyptian prisons during the first half of the 1970s and exiled Brothers were invited home. The Brotherhood began working overtly in society during the Sadat-era (1970-1981). Sadat aligned himself with the Islamists against the remnants of the ancient régime; what was known as the 'power-bases' (*marākez al-quwā*) to secure his hold on power. In 1976 as an example of the Brotherhood's return to overt activism, its magazine *al-daʿwa* reappeared in Egypt and became the organization's mouthpiece.

generally,[67] and Islam in particular, gave rise to extensive research into this phenomenon within which the Brotherhood acquired a key-position. New studies appeared in which the Brotherhood was interpreted as a modern organization that reinterprets classical Islamic concepts to apply them in a modern context.

These studies perceived the Brotherhood generally as the "first modern Islamist group to be formed"[68] and argued that "[t]he movement's leaders may be considered the main initiators of the early formulations of a concept of political Islam in the Arab world".[69]

Brynjar Lia, a leading scholar on the Brotherhood, studied the Brotherhood as a modern organization which took part in the emerging mass politics of the early 20th century. In the context of a stratified and occupied Egypt, Hasan al-Banna[70] constructed a modern ideology of a politicized Islam to counter these challenges, so Lia's main argument.[71]

This dissertation agrees with the general claim that the Brotherhood is a modern organization that reinterprets Islamic concepts to fit a modern context. I concur with the assumption that the *Ikhwan* organization adhered to the path of previous modernists by reinventing classical Islamic concepts such as *jihad, shūrā* (consultation) and shariʿa (Islamic law) to be applied in the modern framework of the nation-state (*al-dawla*). The emergence of Islamic modernity can be traced back to the late 19th century when its proponents, aware of the *umma's* (Muslim society) backwardness vis-à-vis the west, advanced the idea of selectively embracing modern European ideas and institutions to revive the *umma*.[72] Islamic modernists like Abdel Rahman al-Kawakibi[73], Muhammad Abduh[74] and others

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[67] Cf. H. Hafez, 1997; Arjomand, 2010.

[68] Rubin 2010, 1.

[69] Ayubi 1993, 98. See also for studies on the Brotherhood, the Islamic resurgence, Islamic reform and Islamic modernity; Aly &Wenner 1982; Davis 1983; Sattar 1995; Khatab 2001; Arjomand 2010; Commins 2008; Krämer 2010; El-Awaisi 2010. For comparative analysis of the Brotherhood in Egypt and Sudan, see Zahid & Medley 2006. On the Muslim Brotherhood's role in the Palestine, see e.g. Jankowski 1980; Gershoni 1986; El-Awaisi 1998; On the Muslim Brotherhood as a social movement, see Munson 2001; Wickham 2002; Hafez & Wiktorowicz 2004; Anani 2016. On the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, see for instance Maréchal (2008); Vidino (2010); Rich (2010); Khosrokhavar (2010). (This list of literature is limited to studies dealing primarily with the Egyptian Brotherhood, the main exception being the studies dealing with the Brotherhood in Europe).

[70] Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) was born in al-Mahmudiyya in the governate of Buhayra. After completing his studies at the Dar al-Ulum in Cairo from 1923-27, he was assigned as schoolteacher in al-Ismailiyya in 1927. Upon moving to al-Ismailiyya, which was characterized by a large presence of British soldiers and westerners living in the city and working at the Canal Zone establishment, Hasan al-Banna found a city with a "peculiar inspiration". The concomitant British presence and the disparity between the extravagant neighborhood with big houses inhabited by foreigners and the small and humble houses inhabited by the Arabs was hurtful to the young Banna and to "every nationalist". These characteristics "inspired the missionary [al-Banna]" who established the Brotherhood in March 1928. (al-Banna 2013, 94-5).

[71] Lia 2010, 282-3.

[72] Weismann 2017, 35.

[73] See Weismann 2015.

[74] See for example Haddad 2008.

advocated the necessity of sticking to Islam to restore the greatness of the *umma,* and argued that Islam is fully compatible with modernity. Thus, they embraced modern ideas such as constitutionalism and religious and political reform and interpreted them as naturally compatible with Islam.[75] Even more, as shown by Weismann, the Islamic modernists contended that "the pristine model of the ancestors […], was the blueprint for, activating new ideas of liberty, science, solidarity, and progress in the struggle against Muslim ignorance and despotism". In this way, the Islamic modernists "strove to establish a balance between Islamic authenticity and Western-inspired modernization".[76] Since its establishment in 1928, the Brotherhood epitomized the modernist ideas formulated by the preceding Islamic modernist thinkers. To al-Banna, as with most of his followers, there was no contradiction between Islam and modernity. The feeling that the Islamic *umma* was in decline had influenced al-Banna's thinking since his adolescence, so he tells us in his memoirs.[77] But as he understood it, this stagnation of the Muslim Society was not due to the unsuitability of Islam with modernity, but rather a result of the stagnation of the traditional Islamic institutions. These institutions had failed to find compatible solutions to challenges posed by modernity. In light of this, al-Banna advocated a form of "Islamic counter-measure" to cope with what he perceived as a "western intrusion" spreading atheism in the name of personal freedom.[78] To al-Banna, and the Brotherhood, the solution to these predicaments was to be found in *al-Niẓām al-Islāmī* (the Islamic Order). Islam, so al-Banna's idea went, is a comprehensive and holistic religion encompassing all aspects of life and fitting to all times. Hence, the Islamic *daʿwa* (mission) of the twentieth century, which according to al-Banna was a continuation of the *daʿwa* of the prophet in the seventh century, could solve the predicaments of the Islamic *umma* by returning to the unblemished roots of Islam, the Quran and prophetic tradition (*sunna*). Social reform, anti-colonialism, political and social struggles and the modern structure of governments were all aspects to be found in Islam, he asserted.[79] When taking these facts into consideration, I agree with Weismann in conceiving of the Brotherhood as "heir to the Islamic modernism[80] of Afghānī and the young ʿAbduh in its embrace of Western innovations and in its active struggle to revive and reunite the Muslim Umma".[81] I also concur with Dietrich Jung in perceiving the Brotherhood as playing a "paradigmatic role" in

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[75] See for example Jung 2011, 224.
[76] Weismann 2017, 42.
[77] Al-Banna 2013, 61.
[78] Ibid., 65-6.
[79] Al-Banna 20004, 93-106, 317-8.
[80] Should not be confused with the 'secularist' modernity of the early scholars discussed above.
[81] Weismann 2017, 50.

transforming the "Islamic reform from an elitist intellectual movement into a mass organization".[82]

Adding to this understanding of the Brotherhood as heirs to Islamic modernity and as transformers of the revivalist idea into a mass organization, I argue that the study of the Brotherhood during the Nasserite era helps create a link between the early modernist thinkers and what has been termed as the Islamic revival or resurgence, a phenomena traced back to the 1970s by a number of researchers. Kepel maintained for example, that the decay of religion prior to this Islamic "revival" had "appeared to be an irreversible trend of modern life".[83] However, by studying the Brotherhood during the Nasserite years, I emphasize that we can trace a continuation of Islamic activism during these years of the socalled religious decay. Although repressed, the activism of the Brotherhood continued throughout the period, hence linking the pre-revival era which has been studied as the heyday of secularism, at least in Egypt, Syria and Iraq to mention a few Arab countries,[84] with the post-Nasser era which witnessed this so-called religious revival.

1.3. Studies on the Brotherhood in the Nasser era

For many Brotherhood members, the period 1954-70 represents a focal point in the organization's history. The clash with the military regime in late October 1954 marked a radical change for the Brotherhood and its members; what occurred after that evening of late October was radically different for the *Ikhwan* in terms of persecution and restricted opportunities. This period left many deep scars, no doubt, but it also presented the Brotherhood with particular opportunities for development and continuation. Despite the monumental importance and centrality of this period in the history of the Brotherhood, there are a surprisingly limited number of studies dealing with its history in these crucial years.

Most studies dealing with the Brotherhood in the aftermath of al-Banna's death in 1949 have largely been dominated by investigations of the radicalizing role of Sayyid Qutb on members of the Brotherhood at the expense of focus on the *Ikhwan*'s organizational structures, and its social, political and religious activities during years of political repression.

A seminal study of this era is Kepel's *Muslim Extremism in Egypt, the Prophet and the Pharaoh* from 1985. In explaining the ideological evolution of the militant radicals in the Sadat era, Gilles Kepel traced their ideas back to Sayyid Qutb and particularly his book *Maʿālem fī al-Ṭarīq* (Milestones). His argument went as follows; the repression of the Brotherhood from 1954 exposed

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[82] Jung 2011, 250.
[83] Kepel 2014, 5.
[84] Ibid., 46.

the ideological deficiency that had emerged as a result of al-Banna's unexpected death in 1949. Qutb stepped therefore forward to fill out this ideological vacuum. And it was in this respect that his prison-literature,[85] and most particularly 'Milestones' from 1964, became crucial.[86] Milestones was a harsh and indiscriminate critique of the current situation, describing the ruling regimes and societies in rather bleak terms. Kepel held that the indiscriminate and radical ideas of Milestones were a result of a writer that only knew Nasser's concentration camps.[87] Thus, Kepel was one of the first scholars to study the ideological development of the Brotherhood in the post-Banna era. In his analysis of the Qutbian ideology, he offered an explanation in which he correlated the radicalization of Qutb's ideas with his experiences in Nasserite jails. In so doing, Kepel pointed to the role of government oppression in radicalizing the thoughts of activists. As a consequence, Kepel did not delve into a broad study of the Brotherhood's history during these years of 'invisibility'.

In a more recent book, Kepel claimed that the Brotherhood during the Nasserite-years seemed insignificant. He described it as an organization "broken apart" which was "in any case no more than a holdover from colonial times".[88]

Sayed Khatab agreed with Kepel's overall argument in understanding Qutb's ideology as imperative for the radicalization of younger radicals.[89] However, Khatab went even further by suggesting that the understanding of al-Hudaybi as being diametrically opposed to Qutb and as a moderating factor inside the Islamic organization was completely wrong. In support of this account, Khatab highlighted that the book *Duʿāt la Quḍāt,* which has been generally perceived as a sharp refutation of Qutb's radical worldview, was not authored by al-Hudaybi, despite being published in his name. Al-Hudaybi did not write a single word of *Duʿāt*, stresses Khatab.[90] On the contrary, and in direct disagreement with those who understood al-Hudaybi as a source of moderation, Khatab contended that al-Hudaybi "accepted the theory and practice, namely, the book *Maʿālem* and its milestones and recommended them for his group. It is noteworthy that al-Huḍaybī did *not*

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[85] Qutb penned a number of books during his prison time (1954-64, 1965-66), the most well known of these being Milestones (1964) and "In the shade of the Quran", a Quran exegesis of 30 volumes published in 1960 as a second and revised edition. The first edition had been published by a Brotherhood magazine in the early 1950s. As his bibliographer, al-Khalidi, put it, this second edition of the 'shade' was highly affected by Qutb's prison experience. Besides being a 'Quran exegesis' it consisted of Qutb's understandings of the role to be played by the Islamic movement. (al-Khalidi 1994, 544-7).

[86] Kepel 1985, 37.

[87] Ibid., 57.

[88] Kepel 2014, 29-30.

[89] Khatab 2001, 451; Khatab 2002, 163. In this article Khatab describes Sayyid Qutb as "*the key figure of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose works were considered as the manual of the Islamic groups, al-Jamāʿāt al-Islāmiyya, in Egypt and abroad*" (Italics in original).

[90] Khatab 2001, 465.

recommend the book Duʿāh wa laysa Quḍāh [sic (Preachers not Judges)], which was attributed to him".[91] Thus, Khatab promoted an understanding of the Brotherhood as a generally radical organization. By refuting the perception that al-Hudaybi had a moderating influence inside the *Ikhwan*, Khatab underlined that the understanding of Qutb as being *the* radical ideologue was actually incorrect; the Brotherhood as a whole is influenced by radicalism.

Fawaz Gerges, like Kepel, attributed much significance to Qutb and his ideas. In his book from 2018, he outlined the political picture in the post-colonial Middle East as one characterized by conflict between Arab nationalism and Islamism. But in order to grasp this conflict, he maintains, one has to go back to the Nasserite era, because this lasting conflict was molded in Egypt's first post-colonial period under the regime of Abdel Nasser, when "the official rupture of the nationalist movement into two separate strands" took place.[92] Gerges aims to bridge the gap between the studies of Nasserism and nationalism on the one hand and the studies of Qutb and the Brotherhood on the other hand, by comparing them in his study.[93] He states that while the existing literature hitherto has studied these two camps with an outright dichotomy, he intends to show that "[i]t was not until the late 1950s, after the confrontation between the Free Officers and the Ikhwan, that ideological lines between Arab nationalist and Islamist truly hardened. Before that rupture, the distinction between them was blurred" and they had "much in common and might easily have found ways of cooperating in governance".[94] In contrast to the ideological analysis offered by Kepel, Gerges contends that this conflict was in its essence a political struggle for power, in which religious and cultural concepts were utilized to legitimize both camps' perspectives and discourses. Gerges adopted an idea of 'repression induce radicalization', stressing that the imprisonment and torture of Brotherhood members gave rise to a radicalization and militarization of Islamic activism.[95] Like Kepel, Gerges highlights the importance of Qutb in constructing an ideology and a guidebook for the disillusioned young members of the Brotherhood who were in dire need of an ideological worldview after the 1954 tribulation.[96]

In stark contrast to the abovementioned studies, Barbara Zollner conducted an analysis of the discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of Hasan al-Hudaybi (1951-1973).[97] In

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[91] Ibid., 468. (Italics in original).
[92] Gerges 2018, x.
[93] Ibid., xi.
[94] Ibid., 7, 77.
[95] Ibid., 10.
[96] Ibid., 140.
[97] Zollner 2011.

her study, Zollner broke with the perception of the Brotherhood as a monolithic and necessarily radical organization. Zollner draws our attention to the importance of al-Hudaybi in leading the *Ikhwan* in a moderate direction. In her analysis of al-Hudaybi's book *Duʿāt la Quḍāt,* published in 1969, she emphasizes the crucial role he played in shaping the world of ideas of the Brotherhood and its followers. Thus, as understood by Zollner, the Brotherhood opted during the late 1960s for a moderate path and rebuffed the radical worldview of Qutb. Tracing the genealogy of Qutb's most illustrious ideas, Zollner stressed that some of his ideas such as *al-jāhiliya*[98] (ignorance) and *ḥākimiyat Allah* (the absolute sovereignty of God) had previously been coined in South Asia by Abul Aʿla al-Mawdudi and Abul Hasan al-Nadwi, and translated to Arabic in the early 1950s.[99] In this way, Zollner stressed that Qutb's ideological development was "as much a continuum of existing key concepts as it is a response to imprisonment or to the ideological vacuum within the Brotherhood".[100]

Jung has also pointed to the fact that Qutb to a large extent followed Mawdudi's ideas when he formulated his most controversial concepts. In addition to the influence of Mawdudi, Jung points to Alexis Carrel's[101] *L'homme, cet inconnu* (Man, the unknown) as another inspirational source to Qutb's ideas of divine sovereignty and modern barbarism. Qutb had read the Arabic translation of Carrel in 1959/60 while in prison.[102]

Another important argument offered by Jung is that the Brotherhood already possessed an armed wing years before Qutb's radicalization. As pointed to by Jung, and as I will discuss in some detail in this dissertation, the Brotherhood had already since the early 1940s developed an armed and secret organization which took part in the nationalist struggle against the British and in the War in Palestine and engaged in anti-regime violent eruptions during different phases.[103] Thus, the idea of a linear radicalization taking place after 1954 and having Qutb as its main proponent should be reconsidered. As I will demonstrate, the Brothers had during the era of al-Banna acquired militancy as a part of its anti-colonial program and in their domestic struggles with the Saadist regime, particularly in 1948. Therefore, the radical development inspired by Qutb in the prisons, which some authors have pointed to, cannot be understood as the first experience of radicalization, but

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[98] Referring to the pre-Islamic era known as *jahiliyya.*
[99] Zollner 2007, 415. The concept '*Jahiliya*' was first used in a modern context by al-Mawdudi in 1941. Nasr 1994, 20
[100] Zollner 2007, 415.
[101] Born in Lyon in 1873, Carrel was a surgeon and medical doctor. Thanks to his experiments at the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, New York, he received the Nobel Prize in medicine in 1912 (Jung 2011, 257).
[102] Jung 2011, 256-7; See also Moussalli 1992, 20. Moussalli maintained that Qutb radicalized the Jahiliya concept, formulated previously by Mawdudi.
[103] Jung 2011, 257.

should be seen as part and parcel of a development which characterized the Brotherhood and the whole generation of disillusioned young men in the context of an occupied and stratified Egypt.

Omar Ashour offered a similar interpretation of the development of the Brotherhood under al-Hudaybi's leadership. Ashour examined the ways in which the *Ikhwan* and other Islamist groups in Egypt and in Algeria went through a process of deradicalization. Ashour depicted deradicalization as a *"process of relative change within Islamist movements, one in which a radical group reverses its ideology and de-legitimizes the use of violent methods to achieve political goals"*.[104] To Ashour, deradicalization occurred in the Brotherhood between 1969 and 1973 due to three causal variables: Firstly, a consensus in the leadership of the Brotherhood to discredit violence as a means to achieve political change. Secondly, social interaction within the organization constructed a near consensus among the members of the Brotherhood to favor deradicalization. Finally, both state repression and selective inducement were aimed at discrediting the radical ideas of the Brotherhood. Thus, Ashour saw the 1960s as fundamental for the deradicalization of the Brotherhood. While I concur with Ashour's general assessment of the 1960s as a period of deradicalization, I argue that one cannot point to 1969 as the focal point for the Brotherhood's deradicalization. As is my main argument throughout the thesis, the radicalization and deradicalization of the Brotherhood did not take a linear path but occurred at different stages throughout the period.

This dissertation will try to contribute to this field of research by exploring the historical development of the Brotherhood during two periods of repression (1948-1951 and 1954-1970). By so doing, this study attempts to shed important light on the post-Banna era and to emphasize how the Brotherhood developed in the context of colonization and state repression. While most studies have discussed the radicalizing role of Qutb as opposed to the moderating influence of al-Hudaybi, I contend that the radicalization of Brotherhood activists should be studied in a historical context going back to the time of al-Banna. It is in this context, I argue, that we have to consider the role played by Sayyid Qutb. Lastly, I try to fill the gap in the history of the Brotherhood's organization through an examination of the underground activism of the *Ikhwan* by studying the imperative years of Nasserite rule. In so doing, I critically assess the notion that the Brotherhood was largely insignificant during the revolutionary years.

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[104] Ashour 2009, 5-6.

1.4. Project-focus in Light of the State of the Art

As depicted in the discussion above, most research has tended to focus on the ideological aspects when studying the Brotherhood's history of repression. The Muslim Brotherhood has been addressed within the scope of radicalism and the studies of the organization have for a long time been concentrated on the late ideas of Qutb. As maintained by Itzchak Weismann, for example, "the persecution of the Muslim Brothers at the hands of the military regimes that took over Egypt, Syria, and other Arab countries after independence resulted in radicalization within its ranks".[105] I believe that taking an approach that "persecution leads to radicalization", although important, is too narrow to clarify the development of the Brotherhood in these years. In my view, the radicalization of the Brotherhood did not take a linear path following their persecution at the hands of the military regime, but rather we can observe a fluctuation between radicalization and deradicalization during the late colonial period which saw an escalation of anti-British activities and the organization's participation in the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948. I argue that the Brotherhood had been radicalized prior to the repression of 1954 as a result of its anti-British activities and through its opposition to the monarchy and minority governments, which is why they went into their conflict with Nasser as a radical organization.

Therefore, to understand the development of the Brotherhood it is necessary to conduct a close examination of the internal organizational dynamics of the Brotherhood going back to their formative period. While most studies of the post-Banna period have paid attention to the role of the Qutbist radical ideology in shaping the Islamic groups that emerged in the aftermath of Nasser's death in 1970, it is the aim of this project to examine the historical development of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout two periods of repression. It is the continuation and transformations of the Brotherhood, the inside developments of the organization, their clandestine activities and the structural opportunities and limitations which surrounded the Brotherhood that will be the focus of this dissertation.

It is the project's hypothesis that the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization did not cease to exist following the suppressive campaigns of 1948 and from October 1954 but continued to varying degrees until the end of repression. Thereby, the project perceives the Muslim Brotherhood as an inherent part of the political landscape of the first post-colonial order in Egypt which emerged following the military coup in July 1952. By looking at the Brotherhood in these periods as a

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[105] Weismann 2017, 51.

clandestine organization, we can explore the continuation of their social and political underground activism and understand how and why they survived the extensive suppression they experienced. Put differently, I am interested in the continued activism of the *Ikhwan* in periods of oppression; what happens when the organization transforms to clandestinity to endure repression?

I consider the Muslim Brotherhood as a diverse and not an essentially radical and/or violent organization; while some periods witnessed non-violent activities, others did in fact see the Brothers use violence. By studying this particular phase, I can trace the ideological variations in the Brotherhood and the ambiguities its activists struggled with regarding violence and non-violence. As I will show, the ideas espoused by Qutb in "*Maʿālem fil-Ṭarīq*" (Milestone) were not the only ideas existing in the Brotherhood, and in the end, the *Ikhwan* opted for a divergent view, namely that presented by Hasan al-Hudaybi.

1.5. Sources

Examining the above issues necessitated working primarily as a historian. To a large extent the work consisted of the historiographical enterprise of mapping, collecting, critically evaluating and triangulating sources and studying the historical periods from different standpoints. However, in addressing the ideological and organizational developments of the Brotherhood, my work involved a more analytical approach. These two approaches are not separated into different sections but represent an organic part of my analytical and descriptive approach. As highlighted by Ludmilla Jordanova, "Historical work is based on identifying an issue that requires explanation", [106] and along these lines, I combine traditional historical descriptiveness with analytical approaches throughout the dissertation to reach answers to the thesis questions.

On account of the richness of primary sources, which will be listed below, historical method and source criticism was applied in order to reconcile sources and arrive at assessments. The primary sources studied in this project can roughly be divided into three categories. The Brotherhood's own accounts, the accounts penned by members of the military-junta and other intelligence officers and lastly British and American intelligence and diplomatic sources. A discussion of these three categories will follow, so as to evaluate their accuracy, biases and importance for this study.

The largest and most crucial source for this study is the Brotherhood's own published and unpublished writings and other documents. This is a body of thousands of pages and several hours of recorded interviews or recollections consisting mainly of autobiographical accounts, memoirs

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[106] Jordanova 2019, 199.

and shorter biographical narratives, written by Islamist activists and published online in magazines and books. Since the 1970s and 1980s there has been a prodigious output of memoirs and accounts by Brotherhood activists who witnessed its history firsthand. Many of these Brotherhood activists felt obliged to publish their own memoirs "to inform the public" and to enlighten future *Ikhwan* and Islamist generations, as they put it. These accounts offer essential insight into the internal activities, ideas and discourses that materialized during the "*sanawāt al-miḥna*" (the years of ordeal/persecution) and depict the way in which the *Ikhwan* factions understood and wished to present their own history and self-perception.[107] These accounts, which have not been exclusively studied yet, offer a new source of knowledge about these crucial but still understudied periods of the Brotherhood's past and the life trajectories of more or less unknown Brothers. These are memoirs and accounts written by inner circle members of the Brotherhood who witnessed this period, many of whom had either been incarcerated or continued their engagement with the Brotherhood during the repressive years.[108] Of the less well known memoirs, those of for example Kamal al-Firmawi, Muhammad al-Sarwi, Abdel Halim Khafaji and Jaber al-Hajj are important to mention.[109]

In addition to this published material, I have collected considerable source material consisting of, inter alia, unpublished Brotherhood documents and other material, such as bylaws, letters, profile descriptions of and recollections by *Ikhwan* members, videotaped interviews and recollections. These primary sources, which have not yet been studied, offer a deep insight into the internal affairs of the Brotherhood and make it possible to unearth key events in the periods under study. The unpublished nature of this material is of importance. Considering the fact that not every member of

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[107] As a result of the so-called corrective revolution in 1971 to purge the state of Nasserite remnants and the concomitant political liberalization that took place under the auspices of the late Anwar al-Sadat (d.1981), a vast number of memoirs were published by Brotherhood activists and by activists from other political currents, describing the political, social and cultural life in Nasser's Egypt. What these accounts had in common was in large part a condemnation of the previous military regime. This freedom to write extensively on the Nasserite years and the harsh condemnations of the prison experiences present in many of these accounts written by a plethora of political activists, continued following Sadat's death in 1981. Husni Mubarak, like al-Sadat, saw no threat in letting the political activists bemoan a harsh past in which they were persecuted. By demythologizing Nasser and his regime, his successors were able to portray themselves as a lesser evil.

[108] al-Tilmisani (1985), Abul Nasr (1988) Shadi (1987), al-Ashmawi (1977), Abdel Khaleq (1987). They all played a very central role in the events that followed the coup in 1952. Al-Tilmisani and Abul Nasr went to the top of the Brotherhood as its third and fourth *Murshid* (leader) respectively.

[109] Al-Firmawi (1976), Rizq (1978;), Raif (1986 and1990), Abdel Majid (1991), al-Sarwi (2004) and Khafaji (2006); al-Hajj (1977; 1987;1995) See also Duh (1983 and 1989), Hammuda (1985), al-Tilmisani (1985), al-Bess (1987), Abdel Rauf (1988), al-Qaradawi (2002, 2004 and 2006) al-Sisi (1981; 1987; 2003), Abdel Halim (2013 Part I-III). Amongst the most famous of these accounts is al-Ghazali's (2012) *Ayām min Ḥayātī (*Days of my Life) which was translated into English, French, Persian and other languages. Al-Ghazali was one of the leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood organization which emerged in the late 1950s. She describes the horrors she and other members of the Brotherhood were exposed to.

the Brotherhood was capable of writing proper memoirs, this form of recollection, in which the ordinary Brother is interviewed verbally, represented for many of them an alternative to the written text. Hence, these unpublished sources furnished me with a broader picture of the activities and thoughts of many ordinary Brothers. In other words, this unpublished material offers an account from the bottom, and includes those Brothers who are not always heard.

This collection is treated as a primary source particularly because it was authored by people who were active in the Brotherhood themselves and presents the story of their organization and their own lives. This corpus is hagiographic and tends to present the Brotherhood as a victim of international conspiracies and unjust repression, which is why a critical assessment of the information presented in it will be one of my main tasks. Furthermore, as memoirs penned long after the events they intend to describe, they can naturally be affected by the filter of time and a need to explain and even justify the actions of their authors. These represent the main and most significant biases of this source material. Nevertheless, as this is not the sole source of information available to me, the validity of these accounts can and will be checked with other sources in order to reach as accurate an account as possible. Furthermore, the principal problem of these memoirs and accounts is their accuracy, or the lack of it to be more precise. However, this challenge will be managed by triangulation, by which the validity of facts, dates and numbers can be checked and assessed when judged against other sources and data available to me. By triangulating sources penned by, let's say, *Ikhwan* members with contemporary archival material produced by British intelligence services, the CIA or accounts by representatives of the Egyptian authorities who witnessed this period, I can to a greater extent substantiate the information these sources offer. However, in contrast to material authored by external actors, be it the British and American diplomats or even the members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC),[110] the importance of the Brotherhood accounts lie largely in their ability to offer an insight into the organization's inner workings and thinking, which are an exclusive feature limited to them as internal actors. The juxtapositioning of *Ikhwani* accounts with intelligence source material of British and US diplomats will by far be the key part of validating the Brotherhood sources. This is due to the contemporary nature of these intelligence sources and, to a greater degree, the impartial position (although not completely impartial) which renders them a more accurate and unbiased source of knowledge when compared to the other source categories.

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[110] The ruling military Junta which seized power in July 1952 came since January 1953 to be known as the Revolutionary Command Council (*Majles Qiyādat al-Thawra*).

In addition to the sources written by Brotherhood activists, I draw on memoirs and accounts written by non-*Ikhwani* activists and officers who also witnessed these years firsthand. In contrast to the Brotherhood activists, these were not always aware of the internal activities, developments or discourses inside the Brotherhood, but are important as they present me with a counter-narrative to that of the Brotherhood. Important to mention are the accounts penned by members of the RCC such as Abdel Latif al-Baghdadi, Khaled Muhyiddin, Anwar al-Sadat and al-Shafiʿi, and intelligence officers such as Sami Sharaf and Fuad Allam.[111] Like the Brotherhood accounts, this corpus can also be influenced by the desire to legitimize the actions of the authors and will therefore be treated in the same way as the Brotherhood sources. My employment of this source material will naturally be more limited than my application of Brotherhood and Intelligence sources. In view of their external position, RCC members and intelligence officers were not always aware of the Brotherhood's inner workings, especially in periods of secrecy. Hence, my implementation of them in validating the Brotherhood sources and discussing specific events will be of secondary importance.

Most of these primary sources are not easily obtainable. Because of their very old nature, and due to a lack of interest in them, most of these books are not republished and are oftentimes hard to acquire. These difficulties made it almost impossible to get hold of every one of them, as some of them were out of print. However, the non-systematic nature of these sources led me, since 2013, on some exciting and much appreciated journeys in various countries to collect as many of the sources as possible. Beirut and Tripoli in Lebanon, Amman, Cairo, Alexandria, Marrakesh, London, Exeter, and Oslo were among the places I enjoyed visiting to collect some of these sources. In Egypt, The Brotherhood have since the coup in 2013 been disbanded and persecuted, which is why any questions about the *Ikhwan* or its publications was no uncomplicated task. In Jordan, the Brotherhood's offices have been shut down since 2016, but in the dusty corners of old bookshops in central Amman one could find a number of Brotherhood publications together with non-Brotherhood material, but as one bookshop owner, himself close to the Brotherhood, told me, "these [*Ikhwani*] books have to stay in the corner, due to the political situation." Additionally, the unpublished source material of the Ikhwan has either been collected in these various countries or been obtained from the Brotherhood online database 'Ikhwan-Wiki'. To collect the sources, I have

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[111] Al-Baghdadi (part 1 and 2, 1977), Muhyiddin (1992) Naguib (1984; 2011), al-Sadat (1957;1978), for al-Shafiʿi, see (edt.) Mansour 2004; Allam 1996; Sharaf 2015 part I-V.

also been in contact with Brotherhood leaders and members outside Egypt[112], in Istanbul, London and Amman, which has expanded my understanding of this organization.

Finally, I rely on the vital archival material from the two influential powers in this period, the USA and Great Britain. Contrary to memoirs penned long after the events they purport to present, diplomatic reports provide contemporary observations and assessments of events unfolding in their times. While their conclusions may prove wrong at times, their descriptions and estimates mirror the contemporary views and are therefore free of post-rationalizations and retrospective considerations, which render them a unique source of information about the social, political and economic situation in Egypt during the years under study. Designed to aid policymakers at home to grasp Egyptian circumstances and political developments in the region and thus to establish operative responses, diplomatic reports require meticulousness in accounts of conditions, developments and discussions. Accordingly, in contrast to the Brotherhood and RCC sources, I found these reports at times more accurate with regard to numbers and dates. A possible problem with diplomatic reports is however their external provenance. As outsiders, the intelligence officers and diplomats had at times to rely on descriptions offered to them by Egyptian police officers, military men or policymakers while they at other times had direct access to Brotherhood activists and sympathizers. Accordingly, their narratives and accounts constitute an interpretation based on what Egyptian sources were informing them. Furthermore, the assessments put forward by the diplomats were personal appraisals and interpretations influenced by their way of thinking and the time context in which they perceived the developments, and thus they were biased by the viewpoints of their authors. However, their accuracy, which was improved by the fact that they were written contemporarily, renders them an important source of knowledge and a vital source to validate the information presented by the Brothers. Accordingly, I evaluate these sources critically as I do the other source material mentioned above.

This archival material has been gathered in the British Foreign Office's National Archives and online from the CIA database, made available a few years ago. With regard to the CIA sources, they consist of, inter alia, Intelligence Reviews, Bulletins, Intelligence Estimates and National Security Council briefings, while the British sources consist of Foreign Office material: FO 141 (Egypt: Embassy and Consular Archives) and FO 371 (General Correspondence), in addition to WO 201 (Military Intelligence Headquarters, Middle East) and WO 208 (Military Intelligence Middle East

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[112] It was not safe to get in contact with Brotherhood members in Egypt due to the political situation in the country since 2013.

and Egypt).

Source-based skills, as defined by Ludmilla Jordanova, can be said to cover these considerations about the source material. These skills, as explained by Jordanova, include identifying the right sources, reading them critically and then integrating them into a historical account. This approach will methodologically guide my study. A central aspect of my work with this myriad of sources is to approach them critically, asking who, why, when, where, how, etc., each time I analyze and critically measure a source. As argued by Jordanova, "The manifest content has to be clearly understood, but so do any hidden agendas".[113] I argue that these "hidden agendas" are very crucial for a historian to identify and understand in order to arrive at as close a reconstruction of events as possible. By this critical reading of sources, one can come to disclose the tendencies, biases and values that necessarily exist in man-made sources and thereby reach some conclusions.

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[113] Jordanova 2019, 206-7.

2. Building Structures of Secrecy: The Brotherhood in Pre-revolutionary Egypt

On 12 February 1949, Hasan al-Banna was assassinated in front of the Young Men's Muslim Association (YMMA) in Cairo. His unexpected death marked a crucial turning point in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood. The organization had lost its founding leader, ideologue and the single most important persona in its ranks. Yet, despite this loss of al-Banna and the leadership crisis that followed, the Brotherhood proved able to survive, continued its activities and took part in the nationalist struggle against the British in the Suez Canal Zone.[114] The survival of the Brotherhood following Hasan al-Banna's death clearly demonstrated the importance of the sharply defined organizational structures, ideological framework and working procedures which had been developed during the preceding years, and in particular during the war years. Hence, I challenge the widespread understanding in parts of the existing literature that the success of the Brotherhood should be understood as exclusively linked to al-Banna's charismatic leadership.[115] Without disregarding al-Banna's role in the development of the Brotherhood, which cannot be overstated, I maintain that the organization structures of the Brotherhood's modern mass organization as developed during al-Banna's lifetime signified the most important asset for its survival.[116] These same structures, ideological frameworks and methods would become crucial again during the Nasserite years when the Brotherhood once again endured repression. It is therefore important to consider the development and application of these structures in order to understand the Brotherhood's vitality. In addition, I suggest that the dissolution and repression of the Brotherhood in 1948-51[117] gave the organization an understanding of and ideas for how to deal with and endure suppression. In so saying, I do not claim that a calculated strategy was developed by the *Ikhwan* to

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[114] The events that took place from October 1951 to late January 1952 are known as the War in the Canal Zone. These events followed the unilaterally Egyptian abrogation of the 1936 agreement, which made the presence of British troops in Egypt illegal. What followed were guerilla attacks by Egyptian groups against British soldiers and installments. Of these groups, the Brotherhood took the leading role, as the most organized and best equipped organization in Egypt at that time. We will turn to these events in the third chapter. (for a detailed account of the war see Thornhill 2006).

[115] Cf. Harris 1964, 151; Sattar 1995, 10-12; al-Tilmisani 2003, 17.

[116] By so contending, I agree with the line put forward by Brynjar Lia that the Brotherhood's success in becoming a major mass organization during the period of 1928-1942 lay in the structures, ideology and activities of the organization, rather than being only a result of al-Banna's charismatic leadership. Lia 2010, 120.

[117] The Brotherhood witnessed its first major crisis in December 1948 when the Saadist government led by Premier Mahmoud Fahmy al-Nuqrashi dissolved the organization and arrested its leading figures. Reacting to this dissolution, members of the Brotherhood retaliated by assassinating al-Nuqrashi, which resulted in a worsening of the repression of the *Ikhwan* and the subsequent assassination of al-Banna in February 1949.

endure repression. My line of reasoning is, however, that the valuable experience gained in the course of the formative years of the Brotherhood and more significantly during the first *miḥna* provided the Brotherhood rank and file and leaders with a frame of mind preparing them to deal with similar repressions, but it did also furnish the *Ikhwan* with specific operational procedures and practices which became vital especially during the second *miḥna*. It is in this regard imperative to note that the different waves of repression carried out against the Brotherhood differed in severity and duration and resulted in varying degrees of political opportunity, which is why the reactions to them also differed. However, as the subsequent chapters will illustrate, comparable operational procedures, a sort of pattern, can be discerned from the organization's reaction to different periods of repression. This crucial, if painfully acquired experience, created a set of recurrent patterns of methods to withstand repression, which were reapplied time and time again.

In this regard, I will divide this chapter into two sections representing two distinctive but respectively crucial historical contexts in the history of the Brotherhood. These two sections will serve as an analytical introduction to the *Ikhwan's* construction of a structure and mindset that prepared it for surviving repression and endowed it with structures of secrecy.

The first section deals with the war years 1939-1945 which I will argue presented the *Ikhwan,* in the Egyptian context, with a ready atmosphere to develop a sharply defined organization with many aspects of modern means of communication, structuring and strategies for activism. Most important, as I will show, it was during these war years that the Brotherhood established its secret structures among the civilian members and in the army and police. Therefore, this section intends to demonstrate that the *Ikhwan* during these years of world rupture and crisis developed a blueprint for how to engage secretly, and developed structures that subsequently became crucial in surviving suppression. Furthermore, 1941 presented the *Ikhwan* with the first, if limited, experience of repression and restraints when Hasan al-Banna was exiled and subsequently arrested, and I thus suggest that it was from that particular time that the organization constructed a mindset of secrecy as a protective measure against repression.[118] In other words, I contend that this period came to represent a formative period in the structural making of the Brotherhood.

The second section will have the post-war years as its focus point. This period, starting from the end of the Second World War and culminating with al-Banna's death in February 1949, confronted the Brotherhood with a tumultuous context in which their previous ideas of anti-British *jihad* and secrecy were translated into tangible activities. Thus, what had been developed as secret structures

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[118] For this repressive experience see Lia 2010, 261-65.

and an understanding of an anti-colonial *jihad* responsibility during the war years was put into operation in the following years.

Consequently, as this chapter will explicate, the secrecy of the Brotherhood which appeared during subsequent periods of repression was a continuation of a secrecy that had been developed and institutionalized during this particular period and which was applied actively in the post-war years.

The events presented in this chapter will be analyzed at the meso and macro level of this study. At the meso level, I will discuss how the structures of the Brotherhood were adjusted deliberately to achieve an ability to transform into secrecy when necessary. At the macro level, the discussion will be on how the political context and the exclusion of the Brotherhood from the formal political landscape pushed the *Ikhwan* towards what Carrie R. Wickham has coined the "dynamic periphery"[119], a periphery that the Brotherhood opted for again during the first and second *miḥna*.[120]

2.1 The Muslim Brotherhood and the Nationalist Movement: Building Structures of Secrecy

Founded in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood managed during the first half of the 1940s to develop a well structured organization consisting of welfare institutions, a clearly defined hierarchical order with all members organized into cells, and an ideology and political vision in which Islam was reinterpreted and propagated as a modern thought system.[121]

By the beginning of World War II, the Brotherhood had expanded from its modest beginnings in the Suez Canal Zone area to become the largest Islamist organization in Egypt. The organization kept growing through the war years and by 1944 it had established between 1000 and 1500

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[119] Wickham 2002, 13, 93: That is, spaces distanced from the political core consisting of the representative institutions, the government and the parliament. The dynamic periphery can therefore refer to non-political institutions such as, inter alia, schools, clinics, economic enterprises, by which the organization can reach the masses without directly challenging the political regime.

[120] According to Brotherhood historiography, the first tribulation started with the dissolution of the Brotherhood on 8 December 1948 and continued until 1951 when restrictions on the Brotherhood were eased by the Wafdist-government. The second *miḥna* began with the repression of the *Ikhwan* in late 1954 and ended with Nasser's death in 1970.

[121] For an elaborate discussion of the Brotherhood's expansion and its ideas through the 1930s and early 40s see Lia, 2010). For example, Hasan al-Banna bemoaned the conditions of the "Eastern" societies as deprived of their integrity, dignity, independence and dispossessed of their blood and money. These societies are "subdued by the Western yoke which has been forced on them. Therefore, these people are trying to get rid of this yoke by whatever power they can mobilize". However, and in contrast to the nationalistic approach, this anti-colonial approach was to be found in Islam as a central demand, according to al-Banna (al-Banna 2004, 19-20).

branches throughout Egypt.[122] A systematization and structuring of the organization's hierarchies took place concurrently with the expansion in the number of branches and membership, which resulted in a qualitative and quantitative growth of the Brotherhood. By way of illustration, in every province, there were established administrative offices (*Makāteb Idāriya*) with a senior Brother to head the organization in each province. This offered an effective line of communication between the central leadership in Cairo and the members in the provinces. These new structures outlined the organizational maturation of the Brotherhood and the attention it paid to attain a decentralized structure, which would be more effective in tying Cairo and the provinces together. Concomitantly, this decentralization provided the organization with an increased resilience in the face of state repression.[123]

According to Farid Abdel Khaleq, a senior *Ikhwan* member, al-Banna saw in the war years an opportunity to extend the Brotherhood at a rapid rate and he therefore insisted on avoiding outward political disputes and struggles[124] in order to prevent much unnecessary attention from the authorities.[125] Yet, contrasting Abdel Khaleq's account the Brotherhood stood behind a number of secret anti-British activities, which points to the rising activism of the Brotherhood in this period and the escalation of competitiveness in its ranks. And as I will illustrate shortly, these activities

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[122] Lia 2010, 256. This was a remarkable expansion, considering the relative insignificance of the *Ikhwan* just prior to the war. Despite what is reported as a "particularly active" Muslim Brotherhood in 1938, it is argued by the Director-General of the Egyptian Public Security that "as these societies were trivial and had no real background, their activities need not be taken seriously". However, the British were more anxious of "the scurrilous anti-British articles which have appeared in "El Nazir", the organ of the Moslem Brethren's Association". Therefore, the activities of the Brotherhood were described as "undesirable" and "some action […] to curtail these activities" was called for by the British. Anti-British policies in Egypt and Palestine were among the main activities conducted by the Brotherhood, according to the British complaints to the Egyptian Public Security Director-General. (FO. 371/21881, E 5898/10/10, Telegram No.1077, (8/259,38), Embassy in Alexandria to Halifax, 26 September 1938. In another report from October 1939, The Brotherhood was described as a "fanatical and subversive anti-British association of Moslems, led by one, Hassan al-Banna". The *Ikhwan* was in touch with German agents in Egypt, so states this report from late 1939. Such reports point to the increasingly active role attributed to the Brotherhood by the British from late 1938. (WO 208/502, No. SD. P. 866, Note on Wilhelm Stellbogen, 23 October 1939). (see also WO 208/502, Correspondence and notes of MP. Wilhelm Stellbogen).

[123] Cf., Abdel Khaleq 1987, 33; Zaki 1954, 107-108; Lia 2010, 190; Mitchell 1993, 168.

[124] This cautious policy of the Brotherhood did not win consensus inside the organization. In 1939, a group of Brothers left the Brotherhood and formed a rival faction called *Shabāb Muhammad* (The youth of Muhammad). Having voiced an appeal for a more active resistance to the British, this faction became alienated with what it perceived as a too passive policy of the Brotherhood under the leadership of al-Banna. This incident resembles to a great degree the fragmentation that characterized the early years of al-Hudaybi's leadership: Brotherhood historiography has labelled this group as an early manifestation of reckless young men, who did not understand the gradual strategy of the Brotherhood. Therefore, they were hasty and did not follow the strategy of the *Ikhwan*; but as such incidents demonstrate, there was a radicalization of members already as far back as 1939, if not before. (al-Sisi 2003, 51).

[125] Abdel Khaleq (1915-2013) was born in Faqus, a little town in the province of Sharqiyya. He moved with his family to Cairo to study at the higher institute for education from which he graduated in 1936. He joined the Brotherhood in 1941 and became one of the closest associates of al-Banna who appointed him to the Constituent Board of the Brotherhood in 1943; Ikhwan-wiki (undated) https://bit.ly/2RPw50a (consulted 13.12.19); Abdel Khaleq 2004 I https://bit.ly/33ZG1GB (consulted 12.12.19); Abdel Khaleq 1987, 32-3.

were extensively reported by the British embassy, which indicates that the Brotherhood was becoming an object of attention for the British at this time. These activities which occurred throughout the war years were, in the words of the British ambassador to Egypt, Sir Miles Lampson, conducted by "anti-British elements" and "xenophobic movements[…]" among which he mentions the *Ikhwan* as a central actor.[126] In 1939, a British report discussing subversive German activities in Egypt, referred to the Brotherhood as "a fanatical and subversive anti-British association of Moslems", which was, in the words of the British authorities, conspiring with the Germans against their interests.[127] Thus, as early as 1939 and even before that,[128] the British had come to consider the *Ikhwan* as a central anti-British element in the country. The British estimates during the initial war years point to a growing concern in Britain at subversive Brotherhood activities against their presence in Egypt.[129] Thus, we can argue that these early incidents from the late 1930s, that according to British reports included a militant rhetoric, came to represent the Brotherhood's first experience as a radical anti-colonial organization. I will now give a short presentation of British descriptions of the Brotherhood's activities at that point in time, before I move on to discuss the organization's secret structuring.

In 1942, and in light of the growing wartime censorship, it was reported that continuing secret meetings of the Brotherhood were held in which Hasan al-Banna instigated his followers to fight the British in Egypt. The report noted that "while being discreet on more public occasions al Banna does express such sentiments in secret".[130] It is of course difficult to assess the level of activities conducted by the Brotherhood against the British in this period, as they were clandestine, but the British reports indicate that they perceived such anti-British activities as growing and that British officials suspected the *Ikhwan* of being a prime instigator. As a case in point, the British noted on different occasions that while al-Banna "wished to avoid conflict with the government or ourselves [the British authorities]" he and his followers were anti-British in sentiments and actions. It was for example claimed that "a secret meeting of Ikhwan leaders is alleged to have declared that 'If the

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[126] The exact nature of these activities was not mentioned by this particular dispatch, but they were characterized as anti-British and supported by former Prime Minister Ali Maher. The report further claimed that "The object of all these organisations was to marshal the coming generation under the flags of royalism, extremist nationalism, xenophobia, Islamic obscurantism […] and against the foreign Power in occupation" FO 371/27428, [J 352/18/16] No. 64, Egypt and Sudan Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden, 24 February 1941.
[127] WO 208/502, No. SD.P. 866, "Note on Wilhelm Stellbogen" 23.10.1939
[128] FO 371/21881, No. 1077, (8/259/38) British Embassy Alexandria, 26 September 1938. The report mentions the Brotherhood as "particularly active" in making "propaganda locally against the British policy in Egypt and Palestine under the guise of religion".
[129] See for example WO 208/1560, Security Intelligence, Summary 456, 10 March 1941.
[130] WO 208/1561 Security Summary idle East No. 13, Published by S.I.M.E. Cairo, 17 January 1942.

British lose the war, we shall have the complete support of the Axis; but if the British win, they will deal with the Egyptians as they dealt with the Arabs of Palestine'". The report further outlined that "new sections of the Ikhwan are being formed throughout the country, and that their power and influence is constantly increasing".[131] The very fact that these British reports point to "secret" Brotherhood meetings can be assessed in different ways. On the one hand, it may be assumed that the British were receiving intelligence from the Egyptian police which most likely had been able to infiltrate some Brotherhood meetings and report from them. But another possibility is that the British themselves had informants in the Brotherhood's own ranks. Be that as it may, the very fact that the British were reporting such meetings illustrates that at this stage they perceived the *Ikhwan* as a subversive organization working clandestinely against their interests in the country, though as yet on a limited scale. These reports also contradict the account of Abdel Khaleq, mentioned above, as they point to an increasing subversive nature of the Brotherhood's activities during these years, although clandestinely.

Accordingly, if we look at the internal developments in the Brotherhood during this era, we can observe a growing institutionalization and structuring of secrecy, which lends support to the abovementioned British estimates of a growth in the *Ikhwan's* anti-British sentiments and subversive activities. Two key examples of this institutionalization of secrecy in the Brotherhood will be discussed to provide a clear depiction of this early development of secrecy in the *Ikhwan's* ranks. First, I will examine the Brotherhood's establishment of a secret and armed organization of Brotherhood civilians, the Special Apparatus (*al-Niẓām al-Khāṣ*), which was founded at this stage. Second, I will discuss the Brotherhood's recruitment of both army and police officers to form secret cells inside the army and police. The following examples will be discussed in the light of the pervasive troubled reality the whole region was witnessing. I will illustrate that the development inside the Brotherhood was closely tied to the domestic and regional problems facing Egypt, above all the Second World War and its implications for Egypt.

These two examples offer an insight into the early secrecy developed by the Brotherhood, revealing that the *Ikhwan's* secrecy had a long history going back to this formative period. The general structures of the Brotherhood, i.e. the general mass organization and its structures, were also, as I will show, in some respects prepared for secrecy, and these structures will therefore also be discussed.

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[131] FO 141/838, 305/37/42 "The Ikhwan al Muslimin Reconsidered" 10.12.1942.

2.1.1 The Special Apparatus "*al-Niẓām al-Khāṣ*"

It was at this stage that the Brotherhood began to establish a secret and armed organization, [132] an organization which came to be known as "*al-Niẓām al-Khāṣ*" (the Special Apparatus) by its own activists and "*al-Tanẓīm al-Sirī*" (the Secret Organization) by its adversaries.[133] As a sign of the Brotherhood's increasing secrecy and anti-British activities and sentiments, this *Niẓām* was established to include the most zealous members of the Brotherhood. Its purpose, according to its founders, was to launch a training program in which bodily exercises were merged with ideological indoctrination and instructions in secret activities such as secret communication, distribution of pamphlets and the use of weapons. All these activities would fall under the concept of *jihad*, as the *Niẓām's raison d'être*.[134] This organization was established to prepare for a struggle against the British and its 'lackeys' in Egypt, if we are to believe the accounts of its founding members.[135] Many of these structures, but even more importantly the mindset developed alongside these structures in which secrecy was central, would subsequently become key to the Brotherhood's ability to survive state-persecution. This secret *Niẓām* represented what Philip Selznick has defined as the "organizational weapon". In this form of organization, the ordinary and legitimate modes of action are substituted by others that are "unacceptable to the community as a legitimate mode of action".[136] Among the traits of the "organizational weapon" is a "fuller mobilization" which "integrates the members so effectively that they become available for continuous deployment in many arenas". In this way, it "can be used outside the normal framework of political controversy. A source of power is tapped which may be used in conspiratorial ways to gain influence".[137] With the establishment of the Apparatus sometime between 1938 and 1940, the *Ikhwan* gained aspects of the "organizational weapon", which were applied to achieve different ends during the following years. To these ends I will return later in this chapter.

This growth inside the Brotherhood did not go unnoticed by the British. By late 1941, the Brotherhood had gone from being a relatively insignificant organization, to having, in the eyes of

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[132] For a detailed account of the Special Apparatus, its founders, *raison d'être* and history cf., Shadi 1987; Adel Kamal 1989; al-Sabbagh 1989, 1998; Ramadan 1993.

[133] No exact date of its establishment has been offered by the Brotherhood; different actors have offered different dates. But the main figures of the Apparatus date its establishment to between 1938 and 1940.

[134] Abdel Halim 2013 I, 289.

[135] Ibid., 288. According to Mahmoud Abdel Halim, who by his own account was one of the founding figures of this organization, it was established to protect the Brotherhood from the "British and their lackeys of Egyptian rulers".

[136] Selznick 1952, 2.

[137] Ibid, 2.

the British, achieved "a predominant position among subversive associations in Egypt". A British report expected that a growing repertoire of subversive tactics would be applied by the *Ikhwan* against its interests in Egypt:

> "Anti-British propaganda was apparently not to be the only objective; major sabotage when a successful German offensive was in progress was also envisaged. With this latter end in view, information was collected, contacts established, and plans elaborated for the disruption of internal communications".[138]

In May 1942, the British reported that some Brotherhood members in the provinces and in student circles in Cairo continued their anti-British agitation despite the "prospects of police action against the Ikhwan al Muslimin [sic]".[139] Such accounts give an impression of the rising perception by the British of the *Ikhwan* as an anti-British organization, with a growing presence on the "dynamic periphery" [140], such as the provincial cities, where "denunciations of Great Britain have been loudly broadcast[ed]".[141] The Brotherhood deliberately opted for this "dynamic periphery" as a tactic to continue their anti-British activism, while being discreet in Cairo so as to avoid unnecessary attention by the authorities.[142]

In mid-May 1942, it appears that the British authorities had gotten wind of the existence of some kind of Apparatus, presumably the *Niẓām Khāṣ*, despite not knowing its exact nature. At a meeting between Amin Othman, a senior Wafdist,[143] and representatives from the British embassy where the topic was the Muslim Brotherhood and how to deal with it, the British notified the Egyptian side that "there was more and more evidence to show that the Ikhwan el Muslimin [sic] had been very carefully organized for Fifth Column purposes".[144] The British added that the *Ikhwan* "had laid

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[138] WO 208/1560, "Fifth Column Activities in Egypt", 20 November 1941.
[139] WO 208/1561, "Security Summary Middle East No. 44", published by S.I.M.E, Cairo, 12th May 1942.
[140] Wickham 2002, 93.
[141] WO 208/1560, Fifth Column Activities in Egypt, 20 November 1941.
[142] WO 208/1561 "Security Summary Middle East No. 54", Published by S.I.M.E, Cairo, June 15, 1942.
[143] Al-Wafd, a nationalist liberal party, was founded in 1918 by Saad Zaghloul (1857-1927), a lawyer, journalist and politician, representing "the secular moderate generation of Egyptian nationalist leaders". Zaghloul's "moderation" stood in contrast to the extremist nationalists and Pan-Islamic groups also present at that time. The newly formed party, which came as a response to Egyptian aspirations for independence after the First World War, appealed to students, Copts, and intellectuals. Prior to the formal foundation of the Party in late November 1918, Zaghloul and his associates had set about forming a delegation to go to London to present Egyptian National demands. Among these demands was the abolition of martial law and Protectorate, and that Egypt should be heard at the Paris Peace talks to be held shortly. This delegation became the formal 'Wafd-Party'. In 1919, the newly formed Wafd had succeeded in rallying countrywide support for its position on the Egyptian case. From that time until the 1940s the Wafd represented Egypt's mass-Party. (Vatikiotis 1985, 260-5).
[144] FO 141/838, telegram D.S. (E)/ 200/42 reporting "First fortnightly meeting with Amin Osman Pacha held at the Embassy on 18.5.1942".

down the nuclei of sabotage organizations and it was believed that a number of the members had for some time been engaged in espionage on behalf of the enemy".[145] The British provided Othman with a list of Brothers whom they "regarded as dangerous". It was however agreed not to take any offensive measures against the Brotherhood, but to try instead to "create a schism in the party [Brotherhood]" and to "introduce reliable agents into the Ikhwan to keep a close watch on [their] activities". Despite the apparently growing danger of the Brotherhood as conceived by the British side, it was agreed that there "should be no offensive action against" the organization in order not to "drive them underground".[146] The British suspicions seem to have been reinforced in December 1942, when a report stated that the Brotherhood had developed "suicide squads" alongside other formations of the organization which had been modelled after the Nazi and Fascist organizations. The report added that the Brotherhood "had sought to buy arms, and they could bring out shock-troops in a time of disturbance. In Sept. 41 Hassan al-Banna[sic] is reported to have said that he had 2000 picked armed men ready to obey his orders; the reference is probably to the Kata'ib [sic]".[147] Hence, the British suspected, at this time, the Battalions of being a cover for a militant wing of the Brotherhood. Contemporary researchers have correspondingly indicated that the Battalions were projected by the Brotherhood as a preparatory stage for the Special Apparatus and as an instrument to propagate the idea of *jihad* in its ranks. Abdel Azim Ramadan for one has claimed that the Special Apparatus emerged in this period as a result of this groundwork that had begun with the organization's establishment of Battalions and *Jawālla* (Rover scouts) during the late 1930s.[148] Yet, nothing points to the *katāʾib* (plural; *katība* in singular) (Battalions) or the Rover scouts as being comprised of armed men, as claimed by the British report and as suggested by Ramadan. Established in 1937 and expanded during 1938, the battalions were devised as a vehicle for the *takwīn* (formation) and *tarbiyya* (education) of Brotherhood members on a broader and more structured basis. A Battalion consisted of between 10 and 40 members, aged between 18 and 40 years, and was only accessible for individuals with a prior background in the *Ikhwan*.[149] The purpose of this structure was to systematize the education and formation of Brotherhood members, and reach out to greater parts of the membership in a structured way. It is however possible that the British confused the Battalions, which were known and overt structures, with the covert Special Apparatus that was established in this same period. A possible reason for this confusion, as shown

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[145] Ibid.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Fo 141/838 "The Ikhwan al Muslimin Reconsidered" 10.12.1942.
[148] Ramadan 1993, 42-3.
[149] For a discussion of the battalions see Lia 2010, 172-7; see also Abdel Aziz 2004, 36-43; Haydar 1989, 98.

by Lia, was on account of the "heavy emphasis on militancy and struggle in the ideological preparation of the Battalions" and due to the physical training exercised in them and their emphasis on secrecy in the *tarbiyya* of their members.[150]

Accordingly, the battalions may have represented a suitable pool from which the leaders of the *Ikhwan* could vet young members and select those seen as fitting recruits to the Special Apparatus. But no evidence at hand indicates that the Battalions or Rover scouts themselves consisted of armed groups. One could however assume that the British at this time had gotten wind of the existence of some kind of organization (i.e. the Apparatus) which they may have confused with the Battalions. I will now turn to this Apparatus that represents a clear instance of institutionalization of secrecy and militancy in the Brotherhood to describe its foundation and ideas, as portrayed by its own members.

One account on the history of the Apparatus can be found in the memoirs of Mahmoud al-Sabbagh.[151] Al-Sabbagh joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1939 after being introduced to the *Ikhwan* by Mustafa Mashhur, subsequently the Brotherhood's fifth *Murshid*.[152] Both men hailed from al-Sharqiyya in northern Egypt, from where they had moved to Cairo to study at the University. Like many others of the Brotherhood members, they epitomized the growing upwardly mobile stratum known as the *effendiyya* which represented a newly urbanized and educated middle class.[153] At Cairo University where they both studied at the faculty of science, Mashhur invited al-Sabbagh to join the *Ikhwan*. The Brotherhood was, Mashhur told his peer, an organization that "seriously wanted to fight the British by engaging them in an armed struggle".[154] This anti-British drive was envisioned by Mashhur as "a *jihad*, obligatory for every Muslim man and woman".[155] Al-

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[150] Lia 2010, 173.

[151] Al-Sabbagh (1918-2011) was born in a small village called Hariya Razna in the governate of al-Sharqiyya to a family working with cotton-trade. His childhood is described as harmonious, he spent his time at school and the leisure time with football and attending the mosque. He describes an early nationalism, recalling how he named his football club after the "great Egyptian hero Ahmed Urabi". Due to this early nationalism, he describes how he felt strongly embittered by what he perceived as an abandoning of the nationalist cause by the established parties. They had all, according to al-Sabbagh, seemed to accept the British presence in Egypt (al-Sabbagh 1989, 31-2). For al-Sabbagh, the nationalist cause and particularly the evacuation of the British army from Egypt could only be achieved by an armed struggle - a fulfillment of the *Jihad* obligation, so he understood it (al-Sabbagh 1989, 49).

[152] Mashhur (1921-2002) came from the village of al-Saadiyin in the governate of al-Sharqiyya. Born to a large family of six boys and 4 girls, Mustafa's upbringing is described as religious. His father, who was a pious man, endowed the young Mustafa with religious learning and the desire to memorize the Quran and attend the mosque. During his time at secondary school, Mashhur moved to Cairo to attend the last years of his secondary education at the Fuad the first secondary school where he got acquainted with the Muslim Brotherhood and became a member at the age of 15 (Muhammad & Mashhur 2005, 13-5).

[153] As Eppel has shown in his paper on the conceptual meaning of *Effendiyya,* the concept has had different meanings at different times and in different contexts, but in the Egyptian context, which interests us here, it referred to the "(primarily urban) middle class and the *bashawiyya,* the wealthy ruling elite", (Eppel 2009, 535).

[154] Al-Sabbagh 1989, 62-3.

[155] Ibid., 63.

Sabbagh, who since his childhood had combined his concern for the nationalist cause with an early religiosity, found the words of Mashhur interesting and decided to visit al-Banna at the Brotherhood's headquarters to hear from the man himself. Upon his first encounter with al-Banna, al-Sabbagh immediately decided to join the Brotherhood. In his memoirs al-Sabbagh relates this first meeting with the *Murshid* in which the latter recited verses from the Quran "as if they were tailored as solutions to our modern times problems".[156] Soon after joining the *Ikhwan*, al-Sabbagh was introduced to Abdel Rahman al-Sindi, head of the *Niẓām*, which at this time was in its initial phase.[157] Al-Sindi, Mashhur and al-Sabbagh, together with Ahmad Zaki Hasan[158] and Ahmad Hasanein,[159] became collectively the leading committee of the Apparatus.[160]

Organized into cells of five members with a leading Brother in each cell, the Apparatus was a tightly constructed hierarchical structure. The initiated member, who was chosen on basis of his deep understanding of the Brotherhood's principles and desire to struggle for these principles, had to undergo a period of harsh testing to guarantee his desire to "give up his life for Egypt […] and his ability to work inside the Apparatus".[161] The initiated members went through a long period of training and indoctrination to secure their efficiency in this elite force of the Brotherhood.[162] Muhammad Mahdi Akef[163], who became the seventh *Murshid* of the Brotherhood, recalls how he was introduced to the Apparatus by al-Banna with the aim of becoming a part of an elite group of

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[156] Ibid., 64. Such accounts, describing al-Banna as applying the Quran to present solutions for the current problems, are in abundance in the accounts of Brotherhood members (cf. al-Kilani 2006, 49; Shadi 1988, 20).

[157] Al-Sabbagh 1989, 65-7.

[158] Zaki (1924-?), a schoolteacher from Giza who joined the Special Apparatus in 1944 and became a leading member of it.

[159] Hasanein (1919-2007), from the governate of Qalyubia, was born into a rural family. He joined the army in 1939 and moved to Cairo to take up his duties in its ranks. He joined the Brotherhood in 1940 after meeting al-Banna at the Brotherhood's headquarters in Cairo; he recounts that he immediately understood that "this course [the Brotherhood's] is obligatory" and that it required "self-sacrifice and struggle". (edt.) Ikhwan-wiki (undated) https://bit.ly/2Peh6uT (consulted 12.12.19).

[160] Al-Sabbagh 1989, 87-95.

[161] Ibid., 131. NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb* I 1954, 33, Hindawi Duwayr's testimony (d.1954). Hindawi, who in 1954 was head of the Apparatus in Imbaba, a popular neighborhood in the northern part of Giza, explained that the Apparatus fulfilled the Islamic obligation of fighting the British and liberating the Arab and Muslim countries from foreign colonization. But because the government forbids organization to acquire arms, the Apparatus had to take a secret form.

[162] Maḥkama 1954 part I, 40-41.

[163] Akef (1928-2017), born in Kafr ʿAwaḍ al-Sinīṭa, a village in the province of Daqahliyya. A son of a wealthy landowning family, Akef was the middle of twelve kids, and he describes his childhood in the village as harmonious and happy. Akef recalls how his father endowed him with a religious upbringing, instructing him in the Quran and the Islamic rules while life in the village presented him with the meanings of "manhood and responsibility". He moved with his family to Cairo to attend the upper secondary school in 1940. There in Cairo, he became aware of the Muslim Brotherhood which had succeeded in mobilizing a number of students to its ranks. Akef joined the local Brotherhood branch in 1941 in al-Sakakini neighborhood where he lived. He recalls how during his university days he studied the ideas of Sayyid Abu Aʿla al-Mawdudi alongside the ideas of al-Banna, Akef (2017-8) I-III, https://bit.ly/34fVEdf ; https://bit.ly/2YIxDuo and https://bit.ly/2PCjeM6 (consulted 12.12.19).

the Brothers selected to fulfil the task of accomplishing special missions. The principal task of the Apparatus was to combat the British occupation militarily, and to "erase the military-ignorance" of the population in Egypt, according to Akef.[164] And to achieve this end, the selected elite was trained in the use of firearms and educated in military tactics, and instructed in producing explosives and collecting intelligence.[165] According to the British intelligence reports from 1942, the production of explosives had been carried out by the Brotherhood since the late 1930s. "During the Palestine Rebellion, however, they [the Brotherhood] were reported to be sending funds and arms to the rebels, making propaganda on their behalf, and trying to organise the making of explosives for them".[166] In a report by the War Office from 15 March 1943 it was believed that "some of his [al-Banna's] thousands of followers have in the past contemplated sabotage and insurrection and bought illicit firearms is probable".[167] Once again, such assessments by British intelligence officers and diplomats speak to the Brotherhood's active engagement in anti-British preparations and even activities at this point in time. The fact that the British had intelligence about these early preparations may indicate that they were receiving information from local actors, most probably the Egyptian police. Yet, when we compare the accounts presented above by Brotherhood actors, who themselves were part of these preparations and subversive activities, with the British estimates, we find them corresponding, which supports their credibility.

The Apparatus, and the ideas it epitomized particularly with regard to militant resistance, represented for the Brotherhood a clear manifestation of what della Porta has described as "competitive escalation". As stated by della Porta, "causal mechanisms for radicalization are activated not only by interactions between movement activists and opponents but also by competition inside social movement families[168] […]".[169] We can argue that the development of the Apparatus and its subsequent activities represented a clear instance of "competitive escalation" in which interaction inside the same "social movement" resulted in a radicalization of actions and strategies. As an example of this competitive escalation, in 1939 calls for "radical action and confrontation" by a radical fringe of Brothers had increased inside the Brotherhood, pressing the

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[164] Akef 2017 IV, https://bit.ly/2t3zwpt (consulted 12.12.19).
[165] Ibid.; see also Al-Sabbagh 1989, 150, 162.
[166] FO 141/838 "The Ikhwan al Muslimin Reconsidered" 10 December 1942.
[167] WO 208/1562 "The outlook for security in Egypt", 15 March 1943.
[168] "Movement families are located within a social movement sector, that is, "the configuration of social movements, the structure of antagonistic, competing and/or cooperating movements which in turn is part of a larger structure of action"". (della Porta 2013, 74).
[169] della Porta 2013, 74.

leadership of the *Ikhwan* to adopt a more violent rhetoric and action.[170] This internal escalation undoubtedly came to shape the course of the Brotherhood, as the secret strategies adopted by the *Ikhwan* at this particular time were influenced by the fact that a growing number of Brothers were requiring and even expecting it. Stated differently, the fact that a fringe of Brothers exerted pressure on the leadership for a more radical activism forced the organization towards an escalation of means to comply with their expectations. As an unambiguous example of this, in 1943 the British authorities suggested that the Brotherhood "as a whole is still Fabian, not revolutionary, in its methods, and that it is likely to remain so as long as al Banna [sic] is at its head". This assessment followed a description of a small current inside the Brotherhood which, according to the British intelligence officers, conducted subversive activities such as buying firearms and preparing acts of sabotage against British forces in Egypt.[171] This appraisal of a group pushing for more radical measures, and even planning such anti-British actions, again underlines the idea that the Apparatus represented a manifestation of "competitive escalation" in the ranks of the Brotherhood.

Having discussed the Apparatus as an early manifestation of secrecy and militancy in the ranks of the *Ikhwan*, I will now address the general structures of the Brotherhood to illustrate how the idea and mindset of secrecy was instilled in the general structures of the organization too. To do so, I will briefly describe the *Niẓām al-Usar* (Family System) and the modus operandi adopted by the Brotherhood in this period to continue its activities when it was exposed to the first wave of restrictions. This presentation will illustrate how the Brotherhood opted for a set of procedures whenever its overt activities were contained, or its members and leaders persecuted. In addition, I argue that these procedures and ideas presented below indicate that secrecy went far back in the history of the *Ikhwan*, as this discussion demonstrates.

2.1.2. Secrecy as a Protective and Anti-colonial Mechanism

Disgruntled by the British occupation of Egypt, the Brotherhood, like other actors in Egypt, began preparing for secret structures and activities as a means to combat the British presence in Egypt. In the example of the Brotherhood, we can trace this construction of secrecy to the the early years of its establishment. In 1932, it was explicitly required of the Brothers to keep their weekly meetings secret and "in secret places"- no one outside the Brotherhood was allowed to attend these

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[170] Lia 2010, 253-4.
[171] WO 208/1562 "The outlook for security in Egypt", 15 March 1943.

meetings unless the outsider was allowed to do so by the head of the meeting.[172] This deliberate exclusion of outsiders represents an early example of the *Ikhwan's* attempts to make the organization impenetrable and to keep its internal affairs confidential for outsiders. Such secrecy was soon to grow and become vital for the organization's continuity in periods of repression, as we shall discuss throughout this dissertation. Now, however, I will turn to the early formative construction of secrecy in the organization which I argue was a direct result of and reaction to the *Ikhwan's* first experience of concrete repression.

As mentioned briefly in the above introduction of the Battalion formation of 1937, the idea of secrecy, loyalty, action and obedience had been embedded in the organizational thinking of the *Ikhwan* and represented a crucial element of the education and indoctrination of its members. The importance of secrecy as a protective measure and a mode to evade repression became even more central in the early 1940s when the war efforts brought forth an increase in repressive measures by the authorities in Egypt. The Egyptian governments had since 1941,[173] in collaboration with British authorities, restrained freedoms and tried to subdue oppositional voices in light of wartime censorship and as an attempt to fortify the Allies' positions in North Africa. The Egyptian border-region had since the beginning of 1941 witnessed a German expansion headed by the brilliant general Erwin Rommel, commander of the "Afrika Korps". The German commander known as "the Desert Fox" succeeded in swiftly winning spectacular triumphs against the British, pushing their forces back.[174] By July 1942, the "Korps" had advanced towards the Egyptian-Libyan border and was within 100 kilometers reach of Alexandria, forewarning something of a near collapse of the Allied forces in North Africa. It was not before November 1942 that Rommel's exhausted forces were pushed back when he commanded an attack on Cairo and the Suez Canal Area ordered by Adolf Hitler. The advancing forces were defeated by the British at al-Alamein west of Alexandria. The tremendous German offensive which lasted almost two years was accompanied by increasing anti-British sentiments in Egypt, embodied in demonstrations shouting pro-Rommel slogans and student demonstrations calling for a German advance, strongly troubled the British in Egypt. Their position in the country was apparently on the brink of a breakdown, considering the mounting

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[172] (edt.) Dessouqi 2012, 17.

[173] The independent Hussein Sirri Pasha headed the government from 1940 to February 1942, when the disreputable "February coup" took place. As a result, Sirri Pasha was dismissed and a Wafdist government was established. The first government came as a result of a British demand for the resignation of Ali Maher, who was known to possess "fascist leanings" while the Wafdist government was a result of a direct British intervention, as will be discussed below. (Rogan 2009, 210).

[174] Rogan 2009, 209.

political opposition to their presence and worsening of the socioeconomic situation in the country.[175] While British officials considered the general support of the Germans in Egypt as limited, there was reportedly a "pro-Axis minority" working against their interests in the country.[176] The *Ikhwan* was explicitly counted as being a forceful component of the latter. As an example, British intelligence officers pointed to the Brotherhood as "an important element in the body politic" which openly declared its "bitter hatred of Great Britain" and worked subversively to subvert the British position in Egypt.[177] In July 1942 and as a sign of the growing mistrust of and concern about the *Ikhwan*, the Brotherhood was classified by the British as "the most serious danger to public security" in Egypt.[178] Against this troubled background, British officials contemplated drastic measures to address these challenges. They talked in this respect about greater need "for governmental action to control both the enemy agents and their dupes" and endorsed the arrest of Hasan al-Banna as an effective way of countering anti-British activities.[179] In a more drastic consideration that clearly bears witness to how critical the situation was, the British suggested that "[s]ooner or later we may, in all probability, have to bring King Farouk to heel or remove him from the Throne".[180] It was in light of these problems facing the British that they sought to curtail opposition to themselves by adopting restrictive policies to secure stability in the country.[181] Undoubtedly, as seen from the abovestanding accounts, the *Ikhwan* had at this time acquired a reputation as a leading anti-British element. Intelligence reports produced by the British were in no doubt, for example, that the Brotherhood was instigating the pro-German demonstrations in the major cities.[182]

In February 1941, and as an example of the political restrictions stemming from the above sketched events, the authorities exiled Hasan al-Banna to the remote Qena in Upper Egypt in an attempt to curtail his freedom and ability to influence his followers. In October of the same year, al-Banna, together with other leading Brothers, was arrested for a month by reason of a public speech in which he attacked imperialism and expressed his "bitter" hatred of the British and demanded the application of Islamic laws. The arrest of al-Banna and his lieutenants came after a request by the

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[175] WO 208/1560, "Fifth Column Activities in Egypt", 20 November 1941.
[176] FO 371/27428, [J 352/18/16] No. 64, Egypt and Sudan Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden, 24 February 1941; WO 208/1561, S.I.M.E. Cairo, Security Summary Middle East No. 65, 27 July 1942.
[177] WO 208/1560, "Fifth Column Activities in Egypt", 20 November 1941.
[178] Ibid.; see also Frampton 2018, 79.
[179] FO 371/27433, No. 900 (1/112/41) British Embassy Cairo, 23 September 1941.
[180] Ibid.; WO 208/1560, "Fifth Column Activities in Egypt", 20 November 1941.
[181] Marsot 2007, 118-20; Rogan 2009, 210.
[182] WO 208/1561, S.I.M.E. Cairo, Security Summary Middle East No. 20, 12 February 1942.

British ambassador to the Egyptian government.[183]

The British conceived of this measure as successful in weakening the Brotherhood and its anti-British activities, but maintained that Al-Banna was "still able to communicate instructions to the Committee who are trying to take his place" while he is in prison.[184]

The Brotherhood was in this same period, and within the framework of official action taken against "anti-British elements", exposed to a number of repressing procedures, such as having all their meetings banned and their publications prohibited.[185]Another restrictive measure occurred in March 1942 in the context of the parliamentary elections to be held in that month. When the Brotherhood decided to put forward a list of 17 candidates headed by al-Banna who was to stand for al-Ismailiyya, Prime Minister al-Nahhas ordered al-Banna to withdraw his and the Brothers' candidature. Al-Nahhas threatened al-Banna with arrest if he did not comply; al-Banna agreed to withdraw his candidacy in return for governmental endorsement for his organization to continue its activities and increase its recruitment.[186] These incidents, which represented for the Brotherhood an exclusion from formal politics and a limitation of freedoms, embodied the restrictiveness with which the Brotherhood was met at this point in time in the context of political disorder. As a consequence, we can from this time forward observe a rising commitment to secrecy by the *Ikhwan* in an attempt to stay resilient in such times of restrictions and oppression.[187]

For instance, when restrictions were put on the Brotherhood's overt meetings in the early 1940s, it was declared in a British report that "meetings attended by any of the leading members are stated to have taken place in one or other of their private houses". The report went on to say that "meetings there [in Ismailiyya] are now taking place in the greatest secrecy and only the most trusted members are admitted".[188]

Another decisive and far-reaching reaction to this restrictive context was the creation of the *usar* system (plural; *usra* singular) as an all-encompassing organizational structure to include every member of the organization. The construction of this system can be said to signify an institutionalization of secrecy into the ranks of the Brotherhood. It was an organizational attempt by the organization to overcome the problems that had evolved from the restrictions it had been

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[183] FO 371/27434, J. 3601, No 3570, From Cairo to Foreign Office, 14 November 1941.

[184] WO 208/1560, "Fifth Column Activities in Egypt", 20 November 1941.

[185] Ramadan 1993, 42.

[186] Bayyoumi 2012, 105.

[187] Lia 2010, 261- 5, 268-9; Krämer 2010, 63-4; Abdel Aziz 2004, 236-8, 272-6.

[188] FO 141/838, 15322, telegram No. (E)140/1 from R.J. Maunsell GHQ ME, Cairo to Walter Smart, the British Embassy in Cairo "with reference your OS/294/1 of 7th October 1942", October 10, 1942.

exposed to during particularly 1941 and 1942. By developing this structure, the *Ikhwan* buttressed its ability to survive repression and the lack of centralized leadership which occurs in such periods of repression, as had been the case when al-Banna and his closest associates were put away. This was the manifestation of the Brotherhood's response to repression and came in the form of decentralized formations.

This bedrock of the organization, which was founded in 1943 - less than two years after al-Banna's detention, came as a replacement for the battalions and became imperative in the Brotherhood's organization and indoctrination of members. The *usra* was then, and still is today, a tightly-knit hierarchical structure of cells composed of five members in each including a *naqīb* (chief) responsible for his "family". All cells in any given geographical area are organizationally put under the command of the local *shuʿba* (singular; *shuʿab* in plural, branch headquarters) and the head of the local branch, who is selected by the General Guidance Office, is in command of all cells under his authority. The branches (*shuʿab*) in an area are in turn organizationally situated under the command of the local headquarters (*maktab idārī*)[189] which is organically connected to the *Murshid* and the headquarters (*al-Markaz al-ʿĀm)* in Cairo. In this way, the Brotherhood was able to effectively connect the organization's different branches and even the smallest units with the central leadership in Cairo, and concurrently ensure that every unit could continue decentralized activism and low-key connections in periods of repression. In other words, when the headquarters were closed down and the Brotherhood's freedom curtailed, the family-system ensured that the *Ikhwan's* activities could continue and that members were able to meet persistently notwithstanding restrictions. The *usra,* which obligated regular weekly meetings, was an effective way of creating a sense of communality, mutual responsibility and close-knit relationships between the various members of the cell, and in turn linked the organization together.[190] Its construction came at a time when the *Ikhwan* had had a rapid increase in membership but was concurrently going through restrictions and was lacking operational freedom. By way of illustration, in 1943 the Brotherhood's branches were closed and its meetings had come under increased constraints. Accordingly, the restrictiveness of the political scene in Egypt and the simultaneous growth of the Brotherhood accounted for the erection of the family-system as an attempt to streamline the members' education and protect the members from repression.

The establishment of the *usar* was in that sense a formalization of the Brotherhood's *tarbiyya*

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[189] Consisting of about 18 different offices in 18 geographical areas.
[190] Abdel Aziz 2004, 9; Mahmoud 1997, 124; Zaki 1954, 101.

(education) of the growing number of members and at the same time a way of continuing the links of the members when under restrictions or repression. This was an effective way of putting every member of the Brotherhood into a hierarchical cell, which, in its original form, is centrally controlled and connected to the local branch headquarters, but which in periods of limited freedom can work independently and largely removed from direct control of the central leadership. Among its working procedures, in times of political freedom and repression alike, was to keep its weekly meetings detached from the branch *shuʿab* (branches). Instead, the meetings were to be held in private homes or similar "non-official" places, thereby enabling the members to persevere their affiliation when the organization is proscribed. Since then, as will be illustrated in subsequent chapters, this structure has been key to affording the organization the means to endure repression and to continue effectively even when the branches were closed and the senior leadership arrested.[191] Asserting its importance, Mitchell pointed correctly to the *usar* system as "the real basis of the power" of the Brotherhood.[192]

The Brotherhood's integration of the idea of secrecy and steadfastness was also manifest in its oath (*bayʿa*) which represented a key aspect of the *Ikhwani* indoctrination. A distinct oath was drafted for each rank of the Brotherhood membership.[193] As a case in point, the lowest ranking Brothers pledge "to stay loyal" to the principles of the Brotherhood, while the succeeding rank pledges to "obey the *Murshid*" and to "work to achieve the ends of the *jamāʿa* (society)". The two highest ranking of these oaths avow to "endure harm for the championing of the principles" and to "carry out *jihad* for the championing of the religion".[194] The ascending formulation of the oath from a mere pledge of loyalty to the more compelling formulation of enduring harm for the *Ikhwan* shows the techniques applied by the Brotherhood to acquire the full commitment of its members; such techniques were depicted by Simmel as natural ways of securing secrecy inside an organization.[195] The indoctrination of the Brothers in the idea of protecting the *daʿwa* and keeping the secrets from outsiders undoubtedly helped create a mindset which became important in subsequent periods of repression. Pointing to this, Khalil al-Anani contended that the "*jamāʿa* paradigm is a social construct that has been crafted over years of intricate development" providing

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[191] Cf. Shalabi 1978, 408-27; Zaki 1954, 101-8; Lia 2010, 176.
[192] Mitchell 1993, 198.
[193] The membership of the organization was in 1932 divided into four different ranks; *akh* (Brother) *ʿāmil* (working Brother) *naqīb* (head of a cell) and *naʾib* (head of Brotherhood department).
[194] (edt.) Dessouqi 2012, 16-19.
[195] Simmel argues for instance that secret societies seek "means psychologically to promote that secretiveness which cannot be directly forced". Among the instruments applied by these societies to secure the secret is according to Simmel the oath, but also threats and penalties (Simmel 1906, 473).

the Brothers with a distinct identity. "[I]t would have been quite difficult for the Brotherhood to survive regime repression without such a coherent and solid sense of identity", maintained al-Anani.[196]

This hierarchical structuring of the Brotherhood and the emphasis on loyalty, secrecy and endurance of harm for the sake of the *Ikhwan* and its Islamic principles was a means to secure the loyalty of members and their continued adherence in times of repression. This is what della Porta has defined as "symbolic incentives".[197] The linking of the oaths with Islamic traditions was deliberately devised to imbue the oath with religious and thereby sacred meanings, thus strengthening its symbolic underpinnings and elevating its connotations. In other words, when a Brother took an oath of allegiance, he did so not only to the organization but also to God, which made the violation of the oath a religious violation.[198]

2.1.3. Organizing Secretly in the Army and Police

"Unless I hear by 6 pm that Nahhas Pasha has been asked to form a cabinet, His Majesty King Farouk must accept the consequences", so was the ultimatum presented by the British ambassador to King Farouk on 4 February 1942, with British tanks surrounding the Abdin Palace. Fearing the consequences, the King felt compelled to yield to the ultimatum. This incident[199] was enormously discrediting for the established political order in Egypt, represented by its three pillars: The King, the Wafd and the British. The King's surrender was perceived by Egyptian nationalists as a betrayal of the nation - he did not stand up to a foreign intervention and yielded his power to the occupying forces. The incident came also to symbolize for many Egyptians the British disregard for Egypt's national sovereignty and autonomy, and certainly hardened the attitudes towards the colonizing power. Yet, if the British and the King were discredited by this incident, the image of the Wafd was in every respect devastated by what was perceived as an acceptance by the party to "come to power by the bayonets of the British".[200]

Nationalism and the agitation for complete evacuation of the British army from Egypt had been

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[196] Al-Anani 2016, 66.

[197] della Porta 1988, 166.

[198] In the oaths different verses from the Quran are cited and represent "symbolic incentives". One of these is for example the 17th and 18th verse of *Sūrat al-Fatḥ,* describing an oath taken by the prophet's companions: (17) "Certainly was Allah pleased with the believers when they pledged allegiance to you, [O Muhammad], under the tree, and He knew what was in their hearts, so He sent down tranquillity upon them and rewarded them with an imminent conquest. (18) "And much war booty which they will take. And ever is Allah Exalted in Might and Wise".

[199] It came to be known as the February Incident or the Abdin incident.

[200] Rogan 2009, 210.

the main *raison d'être* of al-Wafd, and with this incident it seemed like it had sold out on both; it had collaborated with the British against the popular will and thus sold out on its principles.[201] This particular episode in the history of Egypt, in which the sovereignty of Egypt was violated, is often described as a turning point in the lives of many nationalists, who, according to their own narratives, came to distrust the entire political elite and system following this decisive incident. This event, which came to stand as a symbol for the inability of the established parties to deliver a satisfactory solution to the national issue, pushed a segment of the nationalists towards political radicalism.[202] One could even talk about a discontented generation of nationalists who turned towards radicalism to achieve Egypt's independence, as a result of this disheartening event.

Disillusioned army officers, constituting one branch of this generation of discontented nationalists, began to look for other means to end the British occupation of Egypt. What they had in common with the remaining nationalists was their resentment toward the British and disillusion with the political system, both buttressed by the Palace incident. As remembered by officer Anwar al-Sadat, who became President of Egypt between 1970-1981, "February 4,1942, is a date our generation cannot forget. It was on that day that Mustafa el-Nahhas Pasha lost our respect".[203]

The discrediting results of the 4 February incident for the established political system generally, and the Wafd particularly, undoubtedly played into the hands of the radical anti-establishment organizations such as the *Ikhwan* and the Young Egypt organization.[204] The Brotherhood, having been active since 1940 in recruiting army officers to its ranks, saw this as an ideal opportunity for recruitment; an opportunity they did utilize expeditiously.[205] The intrinsic desire to change status quo, get rid of the British, and establish a new order for Egypt, was the common ground on which the officers, the Brotherhood and the other nationalists could stand.[206] Those young officers, embodying the upwardly mobile middle and lower middle class, represented a social refashioning of the officers corps which had taken place since 1936. In that crucial year in the history of the Egyptian army, but certainly also in the history of Egypt, the officer corps, formerly a small closed

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[201] Following the 4th February incident, the British noticed a widespread dissatisfaction with al-Wafd's assumption of power. "About 5000 students presented a petition at the Palace, in which they demanded that Ali Maher should form a government". The report furthermore recorded "If their demands were not accepted, they threatened [with] a general strike and widespread sabotage". WO 208/1561, Security Summary Middle East No. 20, 12th February 1942.
[202] Marsot 2007, 120.
[203] El-Sadat 1978, 32.
[204] *Maṣr al-Fatāt* (Young Egypt) was a radical nationalist party founded in 1933 by Ahmad Hussein. The movement merged extreme patriotism with a religious discourse.
[205] El-Sadat 1978, 22-3.
[206] Abdel Rauf 1988, 26: He noted in his memoirs that what he had in common with officers like Al-Sadat and others was their shared hatred for the British, whom they perceived as the main reason for the weakness of the Egyptian army: See also Vatikiotis 1978, 49.

circle dominated by sons of elite families with traditions of enrolling into the corps, opened its doors to a wider segment of young recruits. What enabled greater numbers of lower middle class young recruits to enroll was the significant reduction or complete remission of fees for attending the academy. Hence, these changes brought into the Egyptian officers' corps young men characterized by nationalist sentiments and experienced since their adolescence in anti-British and anti-establishment activities. The enrollment of "ordinary" Egyptians into the corps furthermore paved the way for this generation to acquire key positions in the army and consequently take power less than two decades after this refashioning. It was also on account of this reorientation of enrollment criteria, and thereby the remapping of the social construction of the corps, that radical non-elite organizations such as the Brotherhood, the communists and others acquired the ability to recruit from these hitherto elite institutions.[207]

Thus, from the early 1940s, but especially after 1942, we can trace a deliberate strategy of the Brotherhood to contact and recruit young officers to enlist them in its secret structures. This recruitment should be seen in light of the *Ikhwan's*, at this time, growing presence as a radical alternative to the established parties. The Brotherhood, like other radical groups, offered these discontented officers and young nationalists a platform and opportunities to work actively for the betterment of what they perceived as an unbearable political and national situation.

Abdel Munʿim Abdel Rauf was one of those disgruntled officers who joined the Brotherhood, eager to change the existing state of affairs.[208] Impressed by what he perceived as an *Ikhwani* spirit and on account of his animosity toward the British, Abdel Rauf decided to join the Brotherhood in May 1942 to facilitate the "establishment of a group of army-officers who adopt the principles of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is righteousness, strength and freedom, a group that will become a nucleus from which cells will proliferate in the entire army".[209] Abdel Rauf was assigned to work under the direction of Mahmoud Labib[210] to contact and recruit army officers to the Brotherhood.[211]

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[207] Vatikiotis 1978, 47-8.

[208] Abdel Munʿim Abdel Rauf (1914-1985) known for his abortive attempt to help ʿAziz al-Misri to escape Egypt in May 1941 to participate in Rashid Ali al-Kilani's uprising against the British in Iraq.

[209] Abdel Rauf 1988, 25, 41.

[210] Labib was a retired major and a veteran from the Ottoman army who had joined the Sannusi campaign on Egypt in 1915 in an Ottoman attempt to seize the Suez Canal from the British during World War I. When the campaign failed, Labib fled to Istanbul, where he stayed until 1924. Labib joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1938 - two years after he had retired from the army. He became deputy of the Brotherhood for military affairs in 1947 and a member of the General Guidance Office. (Shadi 1987, 176; Mitchell 1993, 97; Hammuda 1985, 29; Abdel Rauf 1988,43)

[211] Abdel Rauf 1988, 41-2. The idea of having Brotherhood cells in the army went back to 1939, according to Abbas al-Sisi, who recalls that al-Banna encouraged him and other *Ikhwan* to join the army as early as 1939. Al-Sisi adds that he joined the army that year and at once began to proselytize in the army among the rank and file and invite them to the regular Brotherhood meetings every Thursday (al-Sisi 2003, 53-5).

Abdel Rauf was not the only young officer who was attracted by the Brotherhood at this time: Anwar al-Sadat recalls that "many of our [the RCC's] officers sympathised with the Brotherhood". It was the magnetism of nationalism and the anti-establishment sentiments that attracted young officers to the organization. Mahmoud Labib, the Brotherhood's deputy for military affairs, became responsible for the initiation of new officers to the *Ikhwan's* ranks.[212] That it was the Brotherhood's deputy that undertook this task points to the importance ascribed to this recruitment by the *Ikhwan*.

In this same period and as an indication of the Brotherhood's active involvement in the Egyptian army, a British Security Summary disclosed that "pamphlets have been distributed to Egyptian Troops in the Canal Zone inciting them to resist our carrying-out of demolition schemes in the event of a German Invasion".[213] These pamphlets were, according to Abdel Wahab Bakr Muhammad, a chronicler of the Egyptian army's role in the first Arab-Israeli war, definitely written and distributed by the *Ikhwan*.[214] The Brotherhood, according to Muhammad, had been distributing such pamphlets since 1941 when the first pamphlet appeared in the Egyptian army, clearly carrying the Islamic discourse of the Brotherhood. Interestingly, the pamphlets were signed by "the free soldiers of the Egyptian army", which may represent our first encounter with what became the Free Officers' movement (*Ḥarakat al-Ḍubāṭ al-Aḥrār*).[215]

The contacts between discontented officers and the Brotherhood did not go unnoticed by the British either. As early as October 1942, R. J. Maunsell, Head of Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) informed Sir Walter Smart, the Oriental Minister at the Embassy in Cairo, that "Hasan el Banna had had meetings with Egyptian Army Officers", clearly pointing to an early British awareness of such activities.[216] Again in December 1942, the British embassy reported that the Brotherhood had the sympathy of "a considerable proportion of the police and government officials" and the organization had acquired an "influence[…] among all ranks of the Egyptian Army".[217]

Such early signs of activism inside the army signify the rising trend of covert Brotherhood activism in different domains, where especially the army had become a hub for recruitment of a potential force of angered young men who could be effective in securing a transformation in Egypt.

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[212] Al-Sadat 1957, 80.
[213] WO 208/1561 "Security Summary Middle East No. 54", Published by S.I.M.E, Cairo, June 15, 1942.
[214] Muhammad 1982, 303.
[215] Ibid., 301-3.
[216] FO 141/838, 15322, telegram No. (E)140/1 from R.J. Maunsell GHQ ME, Cairo to Walter Smart, the British Embassy in Cairo "with reference your OS/294/1 of 7th October 1942", October 10, 1942.
[217] FO 141/838 "The Ikhwan al Muslimin Reconsidered" 10.12.1942.

Gamal Abdel Nasser,[218] who became president, Hussein Hammuda, Hussein Kamal al-Din,[219] Husayn al-Shāfiʿi,[220] and Khaled Muhyiddin[221] (all senior members of the Free Officers' movement that planned and executed the coup d'état of July 1952) were among the first officers recruited to the Brotherhood, according to Abdel Rauf's memoirs.[222] What started as a core group of officers began to grow quickly, indicating the increasingly important role played by the Brotherhood in offering an alternative discourse to that of the secular nationalistic Wafd. Al-Sadat contended in this regard that the "Wafd had no attraction for the younger generation, being, at bottom, reactionary. The Brotherhood, therefore, absorbed these dynamic and explosive forces". The Brotherhood was, to al-Sadat and many other officers, "a powerful group, and the only one with which we could safely co-operate in the difficult years which lay ahead of us". Such a cooperation would, in keeping with al-Sadat's account, "strengthen our [the officers] position".[223]

Attracted by the concomitant nationalist and Islamic discourse of the Brotherhood, Hammuda recalls how he was introduced to the *Ikhwan* by Abdel Rauf, who he met at the third infantry battalion in 1943. Lamenting the British occupation of Egypt, the corruption of the political elite, and the exploitation of the wrecked people of Egypt, the two officers agreed that "an armed revolution prepared and executed by the faithful young men of the army and the people was the only viable way to rescue the Egyptian people from British occupation and the corrupt royal rule".[224] Attracted by the holistic understanding of Islam, as presented by al-Banna, Hammuda joined the Brotherhood to achieve its goals "in reviving the glory of Islam and liberating the Muslim land from colonization and the implementation of shariʿa in Egypt and the rest of the Muslim world". [225] Hammuda eventually began recruiting other officers to the Brotherhood, thereby continuing a calculated attempt by the organization to enlist as large a number of officers as possible.[226] Accounts such as those presented by Hammuda and Abdel Rauf indicate clearly the Islamic modernity of the Brotherhood. For these young officers, the only way to achieve the

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[218] This account was verified in a series of articles from October 1952 believed to be presenting Nasser's own recollections. In these articles it is argued that Nasser met with Labib in the summer of 1944 on the Tea Island in Cairo Zoo, and he was "profoundly affected" by what he heard from Labib (Shadi 1987, 164; Mitchell 1993, 97).

[219] Kamal al-Din Hussein was one of the Free Officers and a member of the RCC. His first public office following the coup d'état in 1952 was as minister of Social Affairs. From 1956 he became secretary of general education.

[220] (edt.) Mansour, 2004, 54.

[221] Khaled Muhyiddin, a member of the RCC, recalls in his memoirs that he was introduced to Gamal Abdel Nasser by Abdel Rauf, who also introduced him to Mahmoud Labib. (Muhyiddin 1992, 43).

[222] Abdel Rauf 1988, 43.

[223] Al-Sadat 1957, 79.

[224] Hammuda 1985, 25-6, 31-32.

[225] Ibid.

[226] Ibid.

betterment of Egypt was through "reviving the glory of Islam" by returning to the religion's pristine roots. In other words, Islam was understood as the perfect system to cure the "illnesses" of these times.

In early 1944, the Brotherhood had, according to Hammuda, recruited seven officers representing the leading cell of army officers in the Brotherhood.[227] This cell (*usra*) began organizing weekly meetings throughout the period 1944-1948, meetings which, according to Muhyiddin who later became a leading member of the Revolutionary Command Council, were organizationally administered by the *Ikhwan*: In his memoirs he defined the meetings as "*Ikhwani* meetings".[228] By *Ikhwani* meetings, Muhyiddin was referring to the *usar* system which met weekly and discussed a variety of issues such as religious subjects and political and cultural issues. When new officers were recruited, they were enlisted in military-*usar* consisting of military men under a specific leadership, as opposed to the civilian *usar* of the Brotherhood. By enrolling the officers into Brotherhood cells, the organization intended to instruct them in the ideas of the *Ikhwan*, indoctrinate them, and retain the ability to oversee their activities.

However, despite the central position the Brotherhood ideas played in recruiting some officers, not all officers joined the *Ikhwan* on account of a full-hearted faith in its principles, if we are to believe the words of some leading officers. Khaled Muhyiddin who joined the Brotherhood in 1944 is a good example. He maintains that what attracted him was not the religious discourse of the Brotherhood but the desire to liberate Egypt from the British. The Brotherhood provided this generation of officers and troops with a structured organization and a strong ideological framework enabling them to achieve their ends, so his contention.[229] In the example of Muhyiddin, we observe a clear instance where the nationalist zeal and the yearning for change was what attracted him to the Brotherhood rather than anything else. As recalled by Muhyiddin, "the nation needs sacrifice, and the Islamic trend is able to incite the spirit of sacrifice among the young".[230] The officers who joined the Brotherhood did not all share the same degree of loyalty to the Brotherhood, but they were all part of the same milieu in which the anti-colonial and anti-establishment sentiments were decisive: And the Brotherhood offered an organized and powerful platform for the fulfillment of

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[227] Hammuda 1985, 32-33.
[228] This group consisted of Abdel Rauf, Abdel Nasser Kamal al-Din Hussein, Saʿd Hasan Tawfiq, Khaled Muhyiddin, Hammuda, Salah al-Din Khalifa. Attending these meetings was Mahmoud Labib, the deputy for military activities in the Brotherhood. These meetings acquired a secret nature held in private homes as recollected by Khaled Muhyiddin and Hammuda (Muhyiddin 1992, 44; see also Hammuda 1985, 33).
[229] Muhyiddin 1992, 43.
[230] Ibid.

their dreams.

Thus, while some officers were dedicated *Ikhwan,*[231] others were "just individuals who sought a way, we were not against the Brotherhood, on the contrary, we were with them, but we were not wholly with them" as Muhyiddin described it.[232] This was the beginning of a pragmatic relationship between these young officers and the Brotherhood, a relationship that built on a shared desire to combat the British and change the status quo in Egypt.[233] Thus, we observe from this period a revolutionary trend in the ranks of the Brotherhood epitomized here in the desire to change the established order.

Upon recruitment, the officers were enlisted to the Brotherhood's Special Apparatus, into which they were initiated by taking an oath of allegiance at the home of al-Sindi, the head of the Apparatus.[234] Muhyiddin describes how he and Nasser were brought to an old apartment in the quarter of Al-Darb al-Aḥmar near the well-known al-Sayyida Zaynab neighborhood in the southern part of Cairo. There, in a dark room with a person they could not recognize,[235] they "took an oath of allegiance on a Quran and a gun, pledging to obey the General Guide both in times of ease and hardship".[236] The oath introducing the officers to the Apparatus was taken on a gun and a Quran, symbolizing the intrinsic correlation between the nationalistic patriotic duties represented by the gun and the obvious religious symbolism of the Quran. This is a clear example of how the Brotherhood by such symbolic rituals combined ancient Islamic traditions, like the wording of the pledge, with modern rituals, such as taking an oath on a gun in a dark room. Simmel described such symbolic occurrences as psychological means "to promote that secretiveness which cannot be directly forced".[237] The description presented in this section is a concise illustration of how the Brotherhood was organizing secret structures among its civilian and military followers at a time of domestic instability, restrictions and oppression on account of the ongoing World War. As will

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[231] Abdel Rauf, Hammuda, Salah Khalifa, Maʿruf al-Hadri were among those who continued their loyalty and affiliation with the Brotherhood.

[232] Muhyiddin 1992, 44. Muhyiddin, Nasser, Abdel Hakim Amer were among the officers who at a particular point in their ideological upbringing joined the Brotherhood, but as stated by Muhyiddin, they were not unconditionally with the Brotherhood.

[233] Cf. al-Sadat 1957, 80; Muhyiddin 1992, 45.

[234] Hussein Kamal al-Din cited in; Jawhar 1976 31-3; see also Muhyiddin 1992, 45.

[235] This "unknown" figure was according to different accounts presumably Saleh Ashmawi, the deputy of the Brotherhood, and a leading figure in the Special Apparatus. According to Mahmoud Abdel Halim, Ashmawi was chosen by Hasan al-Banna as a head of a five-man group to establish the Apparatus in 1940 (Abdel Halim 2013 I, 288).

[236] Muhyiddin 1992, 45. For another account on this initiation ceremony see al-Sadat 1957, 80. The phrase applied by the Brotherhood "in ease and hardship" has its roots in the Islamic tradition. According to this tradition, the companions of the Prophet took an oath of allegiance in which they "pledged to the Messenger of Allah to hear and obey, both in times of ease and hardship […]" (Sunan an-Nasa'i 4149).

[237] Simmel 1906, 473.

become clear in later discussions, these structures and the mindset of secrecy which had been developed in this formative period as a reaction to repression and discontent with the status quo became crucial in successive periods of repression. All this leaves us with the picture of the Brotherhood as a well-structured organization that had acquired some success in recruiting among different social groups in society and built a complex organization throughout Egypt. The next section will therefore address the anti-British activities of the *Ikhwan* as they were presented by the activists themselves and by the British diplomats and intelligence officers.

2.2. The Execution of Political Activism and the Turn Towards Radicalism

"This movement does not involve itself in politics", so the second article of the Brotherhood's first bylaw from September 1930 maintained. The purpose of the *Ikhwan* organization, according to this first law, was to be limited to social and religious works like "the purification" of society, the spreading of Islamic regulations, fighting illiteracy and to "cure the social plagues which have multiplied in the *umma* (community)*,* such as drunkenness, drugs, gambling and prostitution"[238]. In this bylaw, important aspects like anti-colonialism and the struggle for the liberation of Egypt were not mentioned, and it is only vaguely mentioned that the organization aims at "defending Islam within the limits of law".[239]

This emphasis on the non-political nature of the Brotherhood would very soon be overruled by a much greater involvement in political activism. And as we shall see, it was notably its anti-colonial agitation which would, in a short time, become a central aspect of the Brotherhood's actions. In contrast to this early statement on nonpolitical commitment, the *Ikhwan* would soon afterwards identify politics as an essential part of Islam, constituting a pillar in its holistic interpretation of religion. So, what form did the Brotherhood's political engagement take, and what role did its secret structures play in this regard? These are the main questions this section will attempt to answer.

Yet, it is of importance to underline that the Brotherhood was, in this period of wartime restrictions, excluded from formal political participation, as shown above in the example of its failed attempt to field candidates for parliamentary elections in 1942. Another event that clearly illustrates the exclusion of the *Ikhwan* from formal politics took place in January 1945 when the Brotherhood once again tried to field candidates for the parliament. This time, in what was said to be "among the more obviously dishonest [elections] held in Egypt", al-Banna and five leading

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[238] (edt.) Dessouqi 2012, 5-7.
[239] Ibid.

Brothers were defeated in constituencies where they were "certain of victory", according to Mitchell.[240] Thus, when I maintain that the Brotherhood became more politically active in the post-war years, I refer to the "dynamic periphery" as pointed to by Wickham, in which the Brotherhood could be politically active without direct access to formal political institutions such as the parliament.[241] One may even ask whether this exclusion from the formal political arena further set the stage for the radicalization of the Brotherhood's means, and pushed a fringe of the Brothers towards an active militarization that became increasingly visible during the post-war years. By radicalization I mean the growing toleration and even adoption, by at least a group of Brothers, of violence and militancy against the succeeding governments and the British. Throughout this disseration, I understand radicalization in a broad sense. According to the Oxford Dictionary's definition of radicalization, it is "the action or process of making someone become more radical (= extreme) in their political or religious beliefs". Accordingly, I understand radicalization along these lines, and place it in contrast to non-"extreme" methods. Simply put, while participation in elections and other formal political activities is considered non-radical, the turn to underground activism, militant rhetoric and armed resistance (or the willingness to engage the government in armed resistance) is considered radical. The reasons for radicalization can be radical themselves, such as a government's turn to extra-legal killings and/or its application of extensive repression of all forms of political opposition.

The propagation of a political discourse became explicit in 1939 during the Brotherhood's fifth conference. During al-Banna's speech in which he presented the ideas of the *Ikhwan* as they had become a decade after its establishment, he underlined the centrality of nationalist politics in the ideas of the Brotherhood. "The Islam of the Brotherhood", he maintained, is holistic in nature and has to govern "every aspect of human life".[242] Al-Banna went on by stating that "Islam is creed and worship, nation and nationality, religion and state, spirituality and work, holy book and sword".[243] Al-Banna combined Islam with politics, and held that one of his organization's aims is to support any party which directs its efforts towards rule by "the Islamic and Quranic methods", but if no such party appears, then the Brotherhood will "have it in their program to rule".[244] What is more central for this discussion is al-Banna's treatment of the nationalist anti-British ideas as perceived by the Brotherhood at this time. Al-Banna's description of the *Ikhwan's* anti-colonialism as it had

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240 Mitchell 1993, 33.
241 Wickham 2002, 13, 93.
242 Al-Banna 2004, 118-9, 136-7.
243 Ibid.
244 Ibid.

become a decade after the foundation, brought to light how the Brotherhood had changed its attitude with regard to politics, in contrast to the non-political pledge made in 1930.

Speaking about the struggle for Egypt, he depicted it as a task of a vanguard, of which he would take the lead:

> "at the time when there are among you, the Muslim Brotherhood, 300 battalions which have been prepared mentally and spiritually with *īmān* (belief) and *ʿaqīda* (creed), and rationally with *ʿilm* (knowledge) and *thaqāfa* culture, and physically with training and sport, at that time, ask me to lead you through the depths of the seas, and to break with you into the skies, and to defeat with you every stubborn and tough [person/enemy], for I will do so, if God wills […] for as the Prophet genuinely has said, twelve thousand men will not be defeated as a result of being few."[245]

This elect group of members, *al-mujāhidūn,* was the "elite" of the Brotherhood that would be able to endure the difficulties of *jihad* and the exhausting work which would be required, according to al-Banna.[246] In this way he sowed the seeds for what was to evolve into a nationalist struggle following the Second World War, in which his selected few would take a central role.

We learn from leading *Ikhwan* members, as discussed in detail in the previous sections, that al-Banna at this same time was forming the Special Apparatus to actualize the ideas he had about an anti-colonial struggle. The Apparatus was, in keeping with a number of Brotherhood accounts, founded around 1938-1940 as a realization of this idea of an anti-colonial *jihad*, and as an institution well-prepared to instruct and include this elite: an elite equipped physically, ideologically and mentally to wage *jihad* against the enemies of Egypt.[247]

By constructing this elite organization, the Brotherhood was facilitating its entrance to the political struggle for Egypt's independence. Concurrently, the *Ikhwan* combined these organizational structures with a conceptual vision in which the nationalist struggle was assigned Islamic meanings. This combination did undoubtedly appeal to the Brotherhood's main group of followers, namely the newly urbanized and educated lower middle class which had become exposed to the nationalist struggle in the urban centers, many of whom comprehended the struggle for Egypt

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[245] Ibid., 128.

[246] Ibid., 128.

[247] Adel Kamal, one of the leading members of this Apparatus, who joined it in 1946, argued that the idea was conceived of by Abdel Rahman al-Sindi in 1938 (1918-1962), the head of the Apparatus until 1953. The purpose of this Apparatus was to wage *jihad* in defense of Muslim nations, such as Palestine, Iraq and Syria, as we learn from Adel Kamal (Adel Kamal 1989, 150).

in religious terms.[248] "It is every Moslem's duty to fight Great Britain with all his might", was the idea al-Banna articulated secretly among his followers in this period, according to British reports.[249] British observers noted in July 1944 that "it was the task of the Ikhwan to rid Egypt of foreign influence". And in order to do so, "the Ikhwan would try to create a strong body of anti-foreign feeling that would support them irresistibly in the demand for Egyptian independence". [250] As further noted by the British, the Brotherhood merged the national cause with Islamic beliefs, declaring that Islam "did not tolerate domination by peoples of other religious [convictions]". [251] In other reports from these post-War years, we observe an apparent British perception that the Brotherhood was becoming more political. As an example, reporting following a meeting between al-Banna and Walter Smart, the British Oriental Counsellor, stated that the latter maintained that al-Banna had "made an appeal for the [British] acceptance of Egypt's national claims". According to this British account, Smart called into question the growing political engagement of the Brotherhood. "At recent meetings of the Ikhwan el-Muslimin, he [al-Banna] had come out with clearly political objectives." Despite the fact that "when I [Walter Smart] had last seen him some eighteenth months ago, he had been at great pains to explain to me that the objectives of his Society were religious, cultural and social".[252] The report illustrates with lucidity the growing outward politicization of the Brotherhood: Hasan al-Banna used the opportunity of meeting Smart to press Egypt's national goals, underlining that "the religious objectives in Islam were inevitably at times political".[253] These meetings between al-Banna and British diplomats certainly point to the importance the *Ikhwan* had acquired at this point in time. Yet, the very fact that al-Banna in this period was discussing such issues with the British points to his pragmatism in achieving the national goals of Egypt.

It was also during this period that the Brotherhood had established a secret organization within the army and the police to take up the struggle for Egypt's independence, according to the *Ikhwan's* own words.[254] Therefore, the organization came out of the war as a potent force, one which, according to British reports, had become the Wafd's "only serious rival to popularity".[255] A concomitant growing structuring and building of hierarchy took place inside the Brotherhood which

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[248] Gershoni & Jankowski 2002, 12-13.
[249] WO 208/1561 Security Summary idle East No. 13, Published by S.I.M.E. Cairo, January 17, 1942.
[250] FO 371/41334 P.I.C. Paper No. 49 (Revised) "Ikhwan el Muslimeen, PIC/117, 25 July 1944.
[251] Ibid.
[252] FO 371/45927 228/38/45, Dispatch no. 1441, British Embassy in Cairo to FO 27th October 1945.
[253] Ibid.
[254] Shadi 1987:160; al-Sisi 2003: 52.
[255] WO 208/1561 Security Summary Middle East No. 22, Published by S.I.M.E. Cairo February 20, 1942.

marked the development of a highly-structured mass organization. In 1945, for example, when the *Ikhwan* issued an addition to its bylaws, it pointed to the growth the organization had experienced during the war years and the structural complexity which had been built during the preceding phase.[256] This development was also spotted by the British in 1944, when they for instance noted that "[t]here are now thought to be over a thousand branches" spread throughout Egypt. And describing the rising decentralization of the Brotherhood, it was reported that these branches;

> are grouped into Shubas [sic] or districts, each shuba [sic] being controlled by a President and eleven councilors. The Shubas [sic] are arranged in a series of zones of which there are seventeen, each possessing its own administrative body of four officials. This decentralisation means that the activities of the organisation should no longer be handicapped or disturbed by the closing of meeting places or by arrest of leading members, and many of the smallest sections are now able to operate without the direction of a senior body".[257]

The report also voiced explicit concerns for the Brotherhood's ability to pose a risk to the established order in Egypt and to the British presence in the country: "The militant and xenophobic character of the Ikhwan, and the fact that there are throughout Egypt a large number of arms (largely obtained from abandoned dumps in the Western Desert) that could be brought into use should feeling be sufficiently aroused, make the Ikhwan a potential danger that cannot be discounted".[258] Such reporting indicates the growing politicization of the Brotherhood as understood by contemporary observers and the involvement of the organization on the political scene. But what was this "danger" of the Brotherhood following the War and how did it manifest on the ground? This is what I will discuss in the following by firstly considering the post-War political circumstances before then looking into the Brotherhood's anti-British agitation as presented by its own members. In so doing, I attempt to show how the Brotherhood began at this juncture to engage in militant activities, representing an early radicalization of the *Ikhwan.*

2.2.1 Post-War Brotherhood: Engaging in the Nationalist Struggle, Secret and Subversive Activities of the Brotherhood 1945-1949

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[256] (edt.) Dessouqi 2012, 82-5.
[257] FO 371/41334, J 3812/16/44, "PIC Paper No. 49 (Revised): Ikhwan el Muslimeen" 25 July 1944.
[258] Ibid.

The end of the war brought with it a renewed emphasis on nationalist demands in Egypt. The call for an unconditional evacuation of the British troops from Egypt came to the fore as soon as the war was drawing to a close.[259] The vigor behind this claim, was "gravely underestimated" by the British, who failed to comprehend how central this issue was for many Egyptians.[260] Egypt witnessed, as a result, a severe political crisis: one that ended with the demise of the monarchy and the evacuation of the British.

On 24 February 1945, and as a warning of what was to come, the Egyptian Prime Minister and leader of the Saadist party,[261] Ahmad Maher, was assassinated in the parliament building by Mahmoud al-Issawi,[262] a young member of *al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī* (The Nationalist Party).[263] Maher was assassinated just as he had secured parliamentary endorsement to declare war against the Axis.[264] By committing Egypt to the war, his assailant believed that Maher had committed treason by allying Egypt with the UK, the power occupying Egypt. Accordingly, his death was conceived as a nationalistic act. Maher was succeeded by Mahmoud Fahmy al-Nuqrashi,[265] a co-founder of

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[259] Louis 1985, 229.

[260] Ibid., 231-2. Such demands had been voiced by the Egyptian representatives and public already during the war in return for "Egyptian co-operation in the war". "British evacuation of Egypt and the Sudan is now being mentioned as an Egyptian desideratum which it is to England's interest to satisfy." So a dispatch from the British Embassy in Cairo reported on 8 October 1940. FO 371/24627, No. 938, (1/186/40) British Embassy in Cairo to Halifax 8 October 1940.

[261] The Saadist party, an offshoot of the Wafd (taking its name from Saad Zaghloul), was formed in 1938 by Ahmad Maher (1888-1945) and Mahmoud Fahmy al-Nuqrashi (1888-1948) previously two senior-members of the Wafd who had been expelled from the party in 1937. The new party had taken the name of Saad to show that the mother-party had deviated from the principles laid down by its founder Zaghloul. But as argued by Marsot, "whether Wafd or Saadist, they were groupings round individuals and differed in style and manner rather than in content or platform". (Marsot 2007, 117-8) The two founders of the party, Maher and Nuqrashi, would both become victims of political assassinations, Maher in 1945 and Nuqrashi in 1948.

[262] This incident is surrounded by some controversy; Ahmad Hasan al-Baqouri, a former leading member of the Brotherhood, claimed in his memoirs that the assassin was a zealous member of the Brotherhood who executed the orders of the Special Apparatus (al-Baqouri 1988, 49). Al-Sadat made the same claim in his personal account of the July-revolution, which he penned a few years after the repression of the Brotherhood, claiming that the Brotherhood stood behind the assassination (al-Sadat 1957, 56). Yet, despite these claims, no hard evidence points to the Brotherhood's culpability. Issawi confessed that he was a member of the Nationalist Party, and shortly after being arrested and interrogated al-Banna was released alongside other leaders of the Brotherhood, which may have been on account of the lack of evidence against them (Mitchell 1993, 33-4). The two abovementioned accounts are more than likely affected by prejudice, as both were influenced by their authors' wishes to discredit the Brotherhood. See also FO 371/73464, No. 170, 17/4/49G, British Embassy Cairo, 21 March 1949, in which Ronald Campbell underlines that the Brotherhood did not kill Othman.

[263] The Nationalist Party was founded in 1907 by the Egyptian nationalist Mustafa Kamil.

[264] By declaring war on the Axis, Egypt could secure a diplomatic advantage for Egypt in the post-war negotiations, such as for example the right to attend the San Francisco Conference which required a previous war-declaration on the Axis.

[265] Al-Nuqrashi (1888-1948) born in Alexandria, received his education at the University College (now University of Nottingham) in Nottingham, 206 km north of London. Upon graduation, al-Nuqrashi returned to Egypt where he taught at school, before joining government in 1920. In 1937 he was expelled from the Wafd Party, upon which he participated in establishing the Saadist party in 1938. When Ahmad Maher, the other founding figure of the Saadist party, was shot dead on 24 February 1945, al-Nuqrashi succeeded him as Prime Minister of a government that lasted until February

Maher's Saadist party.

Ahmad Maher's assassination heralded a change in the nationalist agitation - and it forewarned the intention of the nationalist movement to take radical measures to achieve independence for Egypt.[266] The lack of a solution to the national cause and the concurrent socioeconomic problems came to radicalize currents of this generation, embodied in al-Issawi, Maher's assassin.[267] This radicalization may also be linked to the exclusive nature of the political system which held groups such as the Brotherhood away from the formal political system.

In the wake of the war, the Brotherhood began voicing louder appeals for the nationalist cause, "calling for the prompt settlement of the Egyptian national claims", as noted by one British report.[268] The report paid attention to the explicit "declaration of political objectives" voiced by al-Banna, in contrast to earlier non-political declarations that the "Brethren did not interfere in politics". The report remarked moreover that the Brotherhood was voicing an increasingly militant anti-foreign discourse: "Egyptian, Arab and Islamic peoples will be obliged to take a stand against the aggressive foreign states as well as the unpatriotic Governments which help such foreign states inside the countries they are governing". Such statements, prevalent in this post-war period, signified the rising politicization of the Brotherhood's discourse and its adoption of an unequivocal anti-colonial rhetoric.[269]

The new Prime Minister, al-Nuqrashi, who certainly could feel this fervent popular claim for a formal independence, took it upon his shoulders to meet the nationalist aspirations by promising to obtain national independence. In an attempt to gain ground against the Wafd and temper the calls put forward by radical organizations like the Brotherhood, the Saadist-led government requested a revision of the 1936 treaty on 20 December 1945.[270] The two principal claims put forward by the Egyptian side were the evacuation of British troops from Egypt and the unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian crown.[271] As Roger Louis put it, "evacuation of British Troops [… and] 'the unity of the Nile Valley'" were the two points "on which the King, the leaders of the Wafd, and

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1946. Al-Nuqrashi returned as Prime Minister in December 1946 after the fall of the government of Ismail Sidqi. He suffered a similar fate to that of Maher when he was assassinated by a member of the Brotherhood in December 1948.

[266] Louis 1985, 232. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin noted that the military position of his country, as a prime target, should be secured.

[267] Vatikiotis 1985, 355.

[268] FO 371/45926, 288/27/45, telegram no. 1332 from British Embassy in Cairo to FO, 3rd October 1945.

[269] Ibid.

[270] The treaty signed in 1936 had legalized the presence of a force of 10.000 British troops in Egypt for twenty years under the pretext of protecting the Suez Canal.

[271] Marsot 2007, 120.

virtually all other Egyptians could agree".[272] But the British response was unsatisfactory as it "only" expressed its intentions "to look into the possibility of preliminary talks",[273] which of course was much less than the Egyptians had hoped for. The British showed no intention to budge an inch on the question of its presence in Egypt.[274] The Egyptians were only offered a few modifications of the 1936 treaty, like the reduction of the number of British troops in the Canal Zone from 10.000 to 5.000, but the Egyptians had expected more. This 'failure' to recognize the Egyptian resolve to achieve a fundamental change in its relationship to Great Britain provided the basis for an escalation in the nationalist struggle against the British, giving rise to what Hopwood described as a "period of desperation".[275]

Arising from this unfulfilled national desire and the concurrent social unrest was a period of nationalist agitation against the British and the established order in Egypt, an unrest that oftentimes took a violent form. The frustration of nationalist aspirations resulted, from February and March 1946, in "unprecedented ferocity and bloodshed", as Vatikiotis said of this period.[276]

It was at this particular time in the history of Egypt that the Brotherhood evolved as an active and overt actor on the informal political scene, taking a leading role in anti-British activism and participating in the violent conflicts troubling Egypt. Thus, I argue that it was at this particular point in time that we can observe a "militarization of actions" by a segment of the *Ikhwan*. In so arguing, I challenge the idea of a linear radicalization taking place in Nasser's prisons inspired by Sayyid Qutb. The role of Qutb and the radicalization of Brotherhood members will be discussed more extensively in chapter seven. However, this section will illustrate how an early militarization took form at this point in time, putting an important segment of the *Ikhwan* on a radical course.

We learn from various Brotherhood accounts, that the post-war period witnessed a more active execution of what al-Banna, in his speeches and pamphlets, coined the "executive phase of the Brotherhood's strategy" (*al-marḥala al-tanfīdhiya)*.[277] The following is accordingly a brief

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[272] Louis 1985, 229.
[273] Vatikiotis 1985, 358.
[274] Louis 1985, 231-2.
[275] Hopwood 1993, 23; Richard P. Mitchell describes this period as one characterized by "internal disorder and violence" and marked by a "collapse of parliamentary life and the rule of law" (Mitchell 1993, 36). For a contemporary report on the situation in Egypt, see Country Report on Egypt, Report to the Special Ad Hoc Committee by the SWNC Subcommittee for the Near and Middle East", 31 July 1947, CIA-RDP78-01617A003000050001-2. The report further observed that the "prevailing poverty of the majority of the population, disparity in the distribution of wealth and inflated prices have combined to produce an undercurrent of restlessness".
[276] Vatikiotis 1985, 358.
[277] In 1939, at the tenth anniversary of the Brotherhood, al-Banna described the Brotherhood's strategy as subdivided into three different stages, of which the executive stage (*marḥalat al-tanfīdh)* was pointed to as the very last. The two preceding stages are *al-taʿrīf* (propagation) and *al-takwīn* (formation).

presentation of the anti-British activism of the Brotherhood in these years prior to Hasan al-Banna's death in February 1949. I will analyze this historical context to highlight how the secret structures of the Brotherhood, which had taken form during the war years, were applied as a basic tool in their nationalist agitation. I argue that these post-war years represented for the Brotherhood a pivotal era in which the organization went from previously building structures of secrecy to activating these structures.

Following the war, British diplomats began conceiving of the Brotherhood as a growing danger which had to be dealt with. The *Ikhwan* was described as becoming "stronger in universities than the Wafd or any other section" and was seen as generally "growing in strength".[278] More relevant for this study however, Britishdiplomats described the Brotherhood as "a danger" the Egyptian government should be aware of.[279] In February 1944, one year before the conclusion of war, the Brotherhood was labelled by the British as having a "militant and xenophobic character" which combined with "a large number of arms" could render it "a potential danger that cannot be discounted".[280] Such estimates illustrate clearly how the Brotherhood was looked upon by its adversaries. Yet, these assessments were corroborated by Brotherhood accounts that point to a growing Brotherhood agitation in this post-War period. Kamil al-Sharif remembers that the organization had, since 1945, engaged in "assassinations of British soldiers in Cairo and Alexandria and bombed a number of British installments", as a key component of the *Ikhwan's* growing anti-British role in this period.[281] Al-Sharif adds that the Brotherhood had carried out intelligence work against the British since 1945 in the course of their anti-British undertakings. Brotherhood members had "collected intelligence on British troops and maps on British bases, intelligence that was sent immediately to the leadership of the Secret Apparatus".[282] A contemporary British report from the same period confirms this account. The report claims that the *Ikhwan* "were collecting information on British troop movements, and making contacts with employees on the railways and in British military workshops and despots; it was suspected that they were making plans or eventual sabotage

[278] FO 371/45932, Mr. Bowker telegram no. 2353, From Cairo to FO.
[279] Ibid.
[280] WO 201/2647, P.I.C. paper No. 49, "The Ikhwan El Muslimeen", 25 February 1944.
[281] Al-Sharif 1987, 28, 56. Al-Sharif (1926-2008) was born in al-Arish in the Sinai Peninsula, where he was endowed with religious learning from his parents, both of whom had been Sufis. The young Kamil moved subsequently to Cairo to study journalism. In 1947 he moved to Palestine to the coastal city of Jaffa in northern Palestine where he met the local Muslim Brotherhood chapter and joined the organization. Al-Sharif took part in the Palestinian-Israeli struggle, and he fought alongside the Palestinian Brotherhood during the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948. He met Hasan al-Banna in Palestine and was appointed to lead the *Ikhwani* volunteers sent from Egypt to fight in Palestine. Al-Uqayl (undated) https://bit.ly/36mLvNn (consulted 12.12.19).
[282] Al-Sharif 1987, 40-1; Al-Bahi 2011, 31.

of our vital communications and installations".[283] In further corroborating the account of al-Sharif, the embassy claimed on a later date that forces from the British army had discovered documents proving that *Ikhwan* members had attained detailed plans "of camps, houses, etc. including that of the Commander in Chief's and other Senior Naval and R.A.F. personell".[284] To the British, there were no doubts that these plans were part and parcel of the Brotherhood's anti-British plans "to carry out a major campaign in the Canalarea [sic.]".[285]

From late 1945 on, a proliferation of violent attacks against the British took place as a consequence of the heightened tensions in the country. As a case in point, Shadi, a senior member of the Brotherhood, recalls that three Brothers under his command attacked a British train going through Cairo "transporting troops from Egypt to Palestine".[286] A British report noted in this regard that an attack had taken place on the "Palestine train [...] in consequence of which two British "other ranks" were wounded".[287] This was not the only violent incident in this period but signified a pattern in Egyptian anti-colonial agitation and the rising violence on the internal political scene in Egypt. In December 1945, as evidence of this violent turn, an abortive assassination attempt was made on al-Nahhas Pasha's life. According to al-Sadat, he had himself masterminded this attempt and chosen Hussein Tawfiq[288] to undertake it.[289] A month later, Tawfiq tried his luck again. This time he targeted Amin Othman, the wartime minister of finance, who was widely accused of having too friendly relations with the British; he is often cited as saying "Egypt and Great Britain are bound by a catholic marriage".[290] Al-Sadat was also implicated in the murder of Othman, according to his own account.[291] Pointing to this general development, the British depicted the "public security" in "the provinces of Upper Egypt" as "in a shocking state" and pointed to "gangs of

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[283] FO 141/838 "The Ikhwan al Muslimin Reconsidered" 10.12.1942.

[284] FO 141/1342, "Arab Societies, Ikhwan el Muslimeen" 108/2/49G, Jenkins, Cairo to Head of SIME, GHQ MELF, DS (E) DS/P/62, 6 January 1949.

[285] Ibid.

[286] Shadi 1987, 71.

[287] FO 371/53330, XC15172, Mr. Bowker to Mr. Bevin telegram No. 499, March 16, 1946.

[288] Tawfiq (1925-83) was a young nationalist agitator who had established a secret organization to combat the British. According to Anwar al-Sadat, Tawfiq had been active in assassination attempts against British soldiers in al-Maʿadi neighborhood; both men saw it as their main task to remove "the men who had supported the British - those led by Mustafa al-Nahhas" according to al-Sadat's account. (El-Sadat 1978, 58).

[289] El-Sadat 1978, 71; Mitchell 1993, 59.

[290] Shadi 1987, 73; Mitchell 1993, 59.

[291] El-Sadat 1978, 59. Ironically, in the mid-1950s, when al-Sadat had just been successful in attaining power with the other officers following the July coup dé'tat, and in a time when the officers were penning their own history and attempting to discredit the Brotherhood by portraying it as a violent organization responsible for political assassinations, al-Sadat commented on this incident and more generally on political assassinations by stating "[w]e disapproved of these [political] assassinations [...] because we did not wish to associate ourselves in any way with a group which was more concerned with personal glory than anything else" (al-Sadat 1957, 74). Yet, at a later time, when he had become president, al-Sadat took credit for some of these assassinations himself.

bandits who are strongly armed with modern weapons".[292]

From 1946 it had become common that British troops were attacked in the large cities and when they were evacuated to the Canal Zone in March 1947 as a result of these assaults, the attacks followed them to the Zone.[293] Shadi describes one such incident which took place in 1946, when he ordered an attack on the King George Hotel in Ismailiyya, a hub for British troops and their agents in the Canal-Zone. The operation was undertaken by a Brother from the Egyptian Air force, but ended up in failure.[294] Another such incident took place in late 1946 as a response to the undesirable results of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations; the Special Apparatus carried out a coordinated attack on different police stations in Cairo to display its disaffection with these negotiations. These attacks were intended to send a message of anger, according to Adel Kamal, a senior member of the Special Apparatus who took part in this operation. Further attacks took place against British trains, and on Christmas Eve 1946, for example, attacks were carried out against British soldiers in Cairo, attacks that according to Adel Kamal were organized and executed by the Apparatus.[295] These incidents did not of course go unnoticed by the British. In March 1946, James Bowker, the assistant undersecretary for foreign affairs, informed Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, that "British Institutions in the Provinces are subjected to molestation and partial boycotts".[296] The British official pointed for instance to an attack with a grenade on a Cairo cinema "particularly frequented by British soldiers" which saw two people killed and "some thirty-seven injured, including nine British soldiers".[297] While British reports clearly point to such attacks and the agitation against them and the role played by the Brotherhood, I found the reports lacking in details on the extent of these attacks. This is not to suggest however that the Brotherhood did not actively engage in anti-British agitation, but may indicate that these attacks were wrapped in a cloack of secrecy, why the perpetrator was not always known.[298] Another reason for the lack of detailed British reports on these attacks may be due to the rudimentary nature of many of these assaults. A majority of these attacks consisted of throwing small bombs or shooting at British cars or trains, accounting for why it might have been difficult to identify a specific perpetrator. Mitchell maintains

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[292] FO 371/53330, XC15172, Mr. Bowker to Mr. Bevin telegram No. 499, March 16, 1946.
[293] Mitchell 1993, 60.
[294] Shadi 1987, 87-91 for a full account on the incident. See also al-Sisi 2003, 133.
[295] Adel Kamal 1989, 184-5, 186-7. The British suspected the Brotherhood of being behind these bombings, see for example FO 371/62990, J 722/13/G16, "Defence Security Summary of Egyptian Affairs" December 1946, cited in Frampton 2018, 118.
[296] FO 371/53330, XC15172, Mr. Bowker to Mr. Bevin telegram No. 499, March 16, 1946.
[297] Ibid.
[298] See for example FO 371/62990, J 722/13/G16, "Defence Security Summary of Egyptian Affairs" December 1946.

that such attacks had been taking place since 1946 and involved all political groups, and thus we may assume that it was difficult for the British to point to the actual instigators. Mitchell pointed to the Brotherhood's role in such attacks contending that they "used this kind of operation as 'training tests' for the personnel of the secret apparatus".[299] However, the dimensions of these attacks indicate that they were perceived by the Brotherhood as more than 'training tests'.

Offering further evidence, in July 1947 for example, a report compiled by the US "Subcommittee for the Near and Middle East" observed that "the flush of nationalist exuberance, occasioned by the final departure of British troops from Cairo to the Delta, have led to an increase in xenophobic incidents directed primarily against the British".[300] Assessing the possibilities of an emergency situation arising in Egypt, the report conceived it possible that a "popular revolt touched off by failure of the UN to reach a satisfactory solution of the Anglo-Egyptian problem" could erupt against the "British, the ruling class or the present government". The report considered "the religious extremists" as possible perpetrators but did not rule out the possibility of Communist and nationalist participation. [301] The above description leaves us with the picture that the Brotherhood at this point in time had militarized its means, thus giving rise to its participation in anti-British violence.

In addition to the Special Apparatus which played a key-role in these events, the Brotherhood students also had their share in this period's radical agitation. Mustafa Mu'min[302], Said Ramadan[303], Hasān Hathut[304] and Hasan Duh[305] signified the growing engagement of this important social group, who all had the national cause at heart, if we are to believe their accounts. They provided the

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[299] Mitchell 1993, 60.

[300] CIA-RDP78-01617A003000050001-2, Country report on Egypt, Report to the Special Ad Hoc Committee by the SWNC Subcommittee for the Near and Middle East, 31 July 1947.

[301] Ibid.

[302] Mu'min, a powerful orator and student leader from the college of engineering had been a member of the Brotherhood since the 1940s. Ma'mun became an active member of the Brotherhood and a strong agitator for the nationalist cause.

[303] Said Ramadan (1926-1995), a young activist from Tanta, who had joined the Brotherhood while studying law at the Fuad University (later Cairo University) and soon acquired a leading role in the organization. What strengthened his position even more was that he became al-Banna's son-in-law and personal secretary. Ramadan is described as a brilliant orator and a diligent activist of the Brotherhood. (see e.g. al-Uqayl 2008, 288-9).

[304] Endowed with nationalist ideas by his mother, Hathut (1924-2009), who was born in the provincial town of Shibin al-Kum in the province of al-Munufiyya, joined the Brotherhood in the early 1940s after he had moved to Cairo to study at the Faculty of Medicine. He took an active role in the political agitation of this period and became a close associate of al-Banna (Hathut 2000, 17).

[305] Hasan Duh was born in 1921 in Ṭafnīs, a little village on the western shore of the Nile in the province of Qana. He was son to the ʿumda (village chief). Deeply affected by the traditional life of the village where he had "learned everything about life", he was stunned by what he perceived as the "strange customs of the city" when he moved to the provincial town Asna to complete his schooling. Following his subsequent move to Cairo to study law at Cairo University, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and became acquainted with Mu'min and Ramadan, the Brotherhood's two influential student orators (Duh 1983, 5-19).

Brotherhood with a young generation of preachers and political activists with an outreach to different social strata as they travelled the country, preaching the concepts of the Brotherhood, and inciting hatred against the British, but also engaging in street fights against the police and organizing demonstrations against the British.[306]

As a case in point, it was noted that "[a]nti-British speeches and para-military training have taken place of studies in universities and schools" led by members of the *Ikhwan*.[307] Thus, this generation of politicized and active students provided the Brotherhood with cadres capable of adopting the nationalist agenda and assuming responsibility for it. The student activists were organized at the different institutes of the university, where each institute had an official student representative from the Brotherhood leading his fellow-*Ikhwan*.[308] Farid Abdel Khaleq was appointed head of the "*Qism al-Ṭalaba*" (the students' department) which was the general department responsible for the student from 1942-1951.[309]

Such organizational structures as the "students' department" and the decentralization that took place inside the Brotherhood in these years[310] stand in contrast to the prevailing understanding of the Brotherhood's success during the al-Banna-era as being exclusively a result of his charismatic leadership.[311] This has been excellently discussed by Lia, who argued that the Brotherhood developed the "bureaucratic organization of office" and "did embrace permanent institutions".[312] I concur with this interpretation of the Brotherhood's history, and argue that this institutionalization of the Brotherhood and the leadership herein represented an instance of what Dietrich Jung has defined as the process of the transformation of charismatic authority into the political legitimacy structures; such structures can be manifested in state-structures or as in our case in the structures of an organization.[313] Hence, the development of structures and departments, such as the abovementioned, explains the Brotherhood's subsequent ability to survive when it had lost al-

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[306] Hathut 2000, 17. According to Hasan Duh's own pen, he became a revolutionary orator whose speeches acquired a violent tone (Duh 1983, 24-5).

[307] FO 371/5330, XC15172, Mr. Bowker to Mr. Bevin telegram No. 499, March 16, 1946.

[308] Osman 2011, 40-41.

[309] Abdel Khaleq (2004) https://bit.ly/33ZG1GB. (consulted 12.12.19).

[310] FO 371/41334 P.I.C. Paper No. 49 (Revised) "Ikhwan el Muslimeen, PIC/117, 25 July 1944.

[311] Harris argued, for instance, that "Hasan al-Banna *was* the Brotherhood in the early stages of its development. He gave the Brethren (*Ikhwan)* their group characteristics as well as their program; he inspired them with his ardor and his sincerity; and his magnetic personality attracted an ever swelling stream of adherents to the movement. Until within a few months of the end of his life, Hasan al-Banna kept the power in his hand and personally directed the program and the policies of his organization", (Harris 1964, 151). Sattar on the other hand maintained that the success of the Brotherhood in mobilizing a half million members was due to a combination of "organizational skill and charismatic leadership, (Sattar 1995, 10).

[312] Lia 2010, 114-5.

[313] Jung 2018, 207.

Banna. This institutionalization of the Brotherhood proved vital, as al-Banna was no longer indispensable.

2.3. Conclusions

To sum up, we can contend that the Brotherhood during the war years established secret structures to address the challenges it was facing in this period of world rupture. Within the framework of political restrictions and exclusion from the formal political scene, the Brotherhood opted for secrecy as a means to continue its activities in society. This became considerably visible with the establishment of the *usar*-system, which appeared shortly after the *Ikhwan's* first experience of arrests and restrictions. The *usar,* being a tightly-knit, low-key organizational structure, became key in the Brotherhood's ability to endure persecution and continue in times of extensive repression. In addition, this period also witnessed a decentralization of the Brotherhood as a reaction to the repressive reality it faced during the war years. When the *Ikhwan* in the period 1941-1943 witnessed a lack of leadership due to al-Banna's forced exile and subsequent arrest, it realized the importance of having clearly defined structures that can function even when the leadership is incarcerated. Accordingly, in contrast to many accounts which concentrate on al-Banna's charismatic leadership and his significance in all Brotherhood matters, I argue that the Brotherhood built in these years of restriction a well-structured organization in which the agency of its members became central alongside the organizational complexity which accounted for its survival. This was vital to its ability to continue its activities despite being pushed to the "dynamic periphery" without direct access to formal political institutions.[314] We can in hindsight ask whether these structures were established at this early period to enable the *Ikhwan* to change the status quo in the long run?

The two examples of secrecy presented in this chapter, the Special Apparatus and the secret cells among army and police officers, not to mention the secrecy instilled in the general structures of the *Ikhwan* as exemplified here by the *usar*, show clearly that the Brotherhood at least from 1938-1940 had begun to radicalize its techniques and was preparing for the encounter with the British. This engagement was then translated into attacks on the ground against British troops and bases beginning from at least 1946, as shown by the Brothers' own accounts and British intelligence reports.

The more general idea of this chapter is that the conception of militant *jihad* had been present

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[314] Wickham 2002, 13, 93.

among a segment of Brothers since this time of early anti-British engagement. A group of Brothers came to conceive of militant *jihad* as a legitimate means to confront the 'enemies of the Islamic *daʿwa*'; and at times these enemies would be Muslim Egyptians themselves. This will be discussed in more depth in the next chapter.

3. Forced Underground, the First *Miḥna 1948-1951*

The Brotherhood came out of the Second World War as a stronger organization. The war years had presented the *Ikhwan* with a formative period in which it had experienced growth in membership and branches and institutional consolidation. The organization had during the war years built well-defined structures of organization and leadership and formulated an ideology based on an Islamic discourse. As I have argued in the preceding chapter, the Brotherhood had developed a blueprint for how to operate secretly and thus to survive persecution. By constructing its general structures, it had substituted its early reliance on the strong leading figure of al-Banna with a well-defined hierarchy and complex structures. As illustrated, these structures, starting from the smallest unit, the *usra,* all the way up to the General Guidance Office, the Brotherhood's executive authority, were constructed on an idea of "keeping the secrets".[315]

The Brotherhood's formative period can therefore arguably be said to have ended simultaneously with the war in 1945. As we have seen, following the war the organization went into a new phase of execution (*tanfīdh*) in which the idea of anti-colonial *jihad* was transformed into active engagement with the British authorities in Egypt and at times with the Egyptian government and security establishment. This radicalization of means, which would start after 1945 on a trivial scale, was escalated as a result of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 as this chapter will show. It was also during this period, and closely related to the Palestine issue, that the Brotherhood established branches in various Arab countries and acquired a reputation of transnationalism. Having developed the necessary structures for *jihad*, the Brotherhood went out of this post-War phase with many members having obtained military experience by engaging in a regional war[316] and in acts of violence nationally.

Consequently, this chapter will start with a brief presentation of the Brotherhood's early engagement with pan-Islamism, chiefly but not exclusively via the Palestine-cause. In so doing, I intend to exemplify how the Brotherhood went from being a small and insignificant religious group among many equals during the 1930s, to become *the* leading Islamist organization not only in Egypt, but in the Arab World too, less than a decade later. The discussion of the *Ikhwan's* role in the Arab-Israeli war will likewise serve as an illustration of how the events in Palestine, beginning

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[315] Mahmoud 1997, 124.
[316] The role of the Brotherhood in the first Arab-Israeli war will be discussed in more detail below.

in 1936, but more evidently as a result of the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948, radicalized segments of the membership, who then came to understand and define armed struggle against the British and the Zionists as an obligation of *jihad*. As a result of this radicalization, this understanding of *jihad* as an armed battle was translated into domestic violence against the Saadist government - 'The lackeys of the British', as they were held to be by a group of Brothers. In view of this, I attempt to illustrate that the radicalization of the Brotherhood, and the idea and experience of an armed *jihad*, existed by this time among a faction of members during this post-war era.

It was also in this critical period, 1948-1951, that the Brotherhood for the first time in its history faced a critical crisis in which its very survival was on the line. By being dissolved, repressed and having lost its founder and single most important figure, al-Banna, the Brotherhood faced a new and hitherto untried reality: Its very existence hung by a thread. This was, as described in *Ikhwan* narratives, the first serious ordeal (*miḥna*) in the *Ikhwan's* history. Yet, as this chapter will establish, it was by enduring this first *miḥna* that the Brotherhood further developed a mindset[317] of secrecy and a pattern of working procedures for how to endure waves of repression.

3.1. Formulating a Vision of Pan-Islamism

The Brotherhood's engagement with Palestine as an Islamic and Arab cause goes far back and can be said to represent the Brotherhood's first political engagement. Palestine had, since the early 1930s, begun to acquire a principled position in the writings of al-Banna.[318] In 1931, al-Banna sent a letter to the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, in which he congratulated him for his "*jihad*" in organizing the first "Muslim Conference" which was to be held in Jerusalem in December 1931. Directing his words to the conference attendees, al-Banna stressed that the "Brothers will take part in any decisions reached at the conference". He went on by listing a number of suggestions as to what the conference could practically do to assist the Arab cause in Palestine. Al-Banna emphasized "that speeches and protests were of no benefit" and why concrete activities were needed. It is significant in this regard to mention that this idea of 'insufficiency of speeches and protests' remained a consistent conviction of al-Banna's throughout his enterprise. Among the recommendations for such concrete activities was to "establish an Islamic monetary foundation" as an initiative to counter the "Jewish purchase of land". Hasan al-Banna promised to send a symbolic

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[317] This mindset had already been existing since the early 1940s as put forward in the preceding chapter.
[318] According to Ikhwan-Wiki, the Brotherhood's online database, Hasan al-Banna wrote his first article on the Palestine issue in 1929. Al-Ikhwan wal-Qaḍiya al-Filisṭīniya (The Brotherhood and the Palestine question) (edt.) Ikhwan-Wiki (undated) https://bit.ly/2M5mvlY (consulted 18.12.19).

amount of five EGP if they decided to carry out the idea. [319] Such declarations were congruent with the ideas on how the Brotherhood, at that time, understood the Muslim community (*umma*) and what they perceived to be its obligations especially with regard to anti-colonialism and the combatting of missionary campaigns.[320] The struggle in Palestine was, as understood by al-Banna, embedded in a greater and more far-reaching struggle encircling all Muslim nations. "Hostilities towards Muslims everywhere" had become a commonplace, like the example of "missionaries trying to convert our Brothers into Christianity" and their attempts to "expel those who own the land [Palestinians] to the desert and usurp their properties by force".[321] For al-Banna, the aggression was collective: "They have all united against you, and they have coordinated their words on terrorizing you [the Muslim peoples] and even if they disagree in their greed and differ in their competition, there is one path they agree on and share [the responsibilities] to accomplish, and that is to put an end to Islam and the Muslims".[322] At this early stage of his thinking, it was the missionary-menace that symbolized the greatest threat to all Muslims. For that reason, he urged all Muslims to unite against these "collective" hostilities, and to "coordinate their efforts" to withstand it.[323] In other words, al-Banna envisioned this modern struggle for national liberation as a religious battle between opposing camps, signified first and foremost by religious demarcations. He conceived it as a zero-sum battle, in which all Muslims were targets. Important, however, for this study, is that al-Banna's, and thereby the Brotherhood's, politicization can be traced back to the early 1930s when they began devising a political vision for the region and the conflicts encircling it. The battles for liberation, the right to choose an Islamic system for governance, and the combatting of missionaries represented to al-Banna vital parts of a common battle against an opposing 'Western' camp, characterized by Imperialism, Zionism and Christianity.

In 1935 the Brotherhood increased the degree of its engagement with Palestine and neighboring Arab countries in the organization's quest for influence in the region. In that year, a delegation consisting of al-Banna's younger Brother Abdel Rahman accompanied by the Brotherhood's general secretary Muhammad Asʿad al-Hakim and the Tunisian nationalist Abdel Aziz al-Thaʿalbi visited Palestine to meet Amin al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem. This journey which continued to neighboring Arab countries such as Syria and Lebanon symbolized the overarching idea of pan-

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[319] Al-Banna in (edt.) Abdel Aziz 2006b, 33-9.
[320] For the Brotherhood, the missionary "problem" and the challenge of colonialism were often intermingled into one greater challenge of foreign dominance and intrusion.
[321] Al-Banna in Majalat al-Fatḥ No. 255, sixth year, June 18, 1931, cited in Abdel Aziz 2006a, 33-4.
[322] Ibid.
[323] Ibid.

Islamism as understood by the Brotherhood. To spread the *daʿwa* of the Muslim Brotherhood in these "sister-countries" had become one of its key objectives from this time.[324]

Israel Gershoni has posited that the Palestine issue was "almost nonexistent" to the Brotherhood prior to the revolt in Palestine in 1936 and it "did not appear on its agenda".[325] Yet, we have clearly noted that the Palestine issue had been on the agenda of the Brotherhood already since 1931, although admittedly not to the same degree as it would become in subsequent years.

Consequently, when the "Great Arab Revolt"[326] broke out in Palestine in 1936, the Brotherhood seized on it as an opportunity to advance the idea of an Islamic obligation to support the Arabs of Palestine and engage in an obligatory *jihad* for an Islamic and Arab cause.[327] And in so doing, the organization transformed the abovementioned pan-Islamist ideas into tangible activities. It was from this period that the Brotherhood began to actively engage in the conflict in neighboring Palestine, if we are to believe the *Ikhwan's* own accounts. According to Kamil al-Sharif, the Brotherhood began supplying the Palestinians with "what fell in their hands of money and firearms" just prior to the revolt in 1936. Al-Sharif narrates that Brotherhood volunteers had fought alongside Izz al-Din al-Qassam[328] in northern Palestine in 1935 as the earliest example of transnational *Ikhwani jihad*.[329]

While Christina P. Harris has claimed that the revolt in Palestine offered al-Banna "an unexpected opportunity for action and expansion - an opening he was quick to seize"[330], I contend,

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[324] Al-Banna 2013, 268-269.

[325] Gershoni 1986, 368.

[326] The revolt (1936-39) started following the death of Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, a Syrian born cleric who had organized secret cells in Palestine to fight the British. He was killed after an armed battle with British troops in November 1935. The following months witnessed violent incidents, which from the spring of 1936 turned into a proper revolt which lasted for three years.

[327] Al-Banna 2013, 278-85.

[328] Al-Qassam (1882-1935). Born in Syria, al-Qassam took part in the Syrian anti-French resistance in 1921, which is what forced him to flee his native country and relocate in Haifa in the British mandate of Palestine. As a religious cleric, al-Qassam began using the mosques in Haifa to preach anti-British and anti-Zionist messages to the local inhabitants. By combining religious learning with anti-colonial agitation, al-Qassam quickly came to acquire a mobilizing voice among disillusioned Palestinians. In 1930, al-Qassam began organizing small squads of armed men, named "*al-Kaf al-Aswad*" (the black hand), to resist his two main enemies, the British and the Zionist. His organization, which was very limited in size, acquired a strong symbolic legacy as an early *jihad* group, combining religion with nationalism. After conducting a number of subversive actions against the British and the Jews, together with his fellow "*al-Qassāmiyūn*" (the Qassamiyans), al-Qassam was killed by the British army after a manhunt and a gun-battle. His fall made a martyr and a hero of him, and still today he is remembered as a symbol of anti-British resistance. As an example, Hamas' military branch, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades are named after him.

[329] Al-Sharif & al-Sibaʿi 1984, 46. This is of course difficult to confirm due to the lack of other reliable sources, but his statement does bear some significance, notwithstanding its accuracy. Such stories have become standard narratives among Brothers who underpin the *Ikhwan's* long history of *Jihad* against injustice, as they portray it. See also Baqouri 1988, 45. Al-Baqouri mentions Ahmad Rifʿat as one of the Brothers who fought and died alongside al-Qassam. Hasan al-Baqouri, a senior Brother, went as far as stating that al-Qassam himself was a member of the Brotherhood. (Al-Baqouri 1988, 45).

[330] Harris 1964, 178.

and have illustrated above, that the Brotherhood had developed links and contacts to other Arab countries prior to the revolt in Palestine. In contrast to Harris, I assert that the revolt in Palestine was not the beginning of the Brotherhood's expansion but came to boost an expansion already underway.[331] Amin al-Husayni stated before an Egyptian court in 1948 that the Brothers had taken part in the 1936 events, by funding the revolt, supplying it with arms and also participating in it with volunteers.[332] And by so doing, I argue that the Brotherhood appeared on the regional scene as an influential player and one to be reckoned with.

The magnitude of the Brotherhood's participation in and propaganda for the Palestinian cause had been so significant that it made them appear "on the British Radar for the first time", argues Martyn Frampton in his excellent study of the Brotherhood and the West.[333] This early engagement with the revolt in Palestine is significant, as it shows that some Brothers, as early as 1936, had considered themselves entitled to engage in a transnational conflict, and even to take up arms under the banner of "pan-Islamism".

An example of this 'early' British awareness of the Brotherhood is exemplified in a report from 1938. In the report it is stated that the Brotherhood had recently been inciting their audiences to "volunteer their services in aid of the Palestinian Arabs in their fight against the British and the Jews". The Brotherhood, among others, decided "to incite the young men to volunteer for the defence of El Aksa Mosque [sic]".[334] Such descriptions by the British illustrate unequivocally how the Brotherhood's advocacy of the Palestine issue in this period had reinforced their presence on the political scene, in Egypt certainly, though on a smaller scale in the region too.

While the revolt came to an end in 1939, Palestine did not evaporate from the *Ikhwan's* rhetoric, maintaining its key position as an 'Islamic' cause. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, the Brotherhood tried throughout the war years (1939-1945) to remain as discreet as possible, while establishing its structures and building a mass membership; a low-key rhetoric about neighboring Palestine can consequently be observed during these years. However, as the war ended bringing a decrease of war-restrictions, the Brotherhood intensified its engagement regionally. In 1945 and as a manifestation of this regional expansion, the Brotherhood began to establish organizational

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[331]Cf. Al-Banna in the weekly al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin newspaper, first year, No. 17, 9 November 1933, p. 20, cited in (edt.) Abdel Aziz 2006b, 40-1; Al-Banna in the weekly al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin newspaper, fourth year, No. six May 19, 1936, p. 19-20, cited in (edt.) Abdel Aziz 2006b, 42-4; Al-Banna in the weekly al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin newspaper, fourth year, No. seven, May 26, 1936, cited in (edt.) Abdel Aziz 2006b, 45-6.
[332] Cited in al-Sabbagh 1989, 172-4.
[333] Frampton 2018, 40.
[334] FO 371/21881, E-5898, No. 1077, (8/259/38). British Embassy, Alexandria, 26th September, 1938.

branches in neighboring Arab countries. The Brotherhood's establishment of a branch organization in Palestine illustrates this point clearly. Upon establishing its first branch in Palestine following the war[335], it quickly gained success in mobilizing a noticeable number of followers. According to an intelligence report from the CIA, citing the British General Staff Intelligence's assessments, the organization had obtained a membership of 20,000 adherents within the first six months of its establishment.[336] The report added that the *Ikhwan* was "reportedly growing" in Palestine and that Said Ramadan had been the driving force in establishing these branches.[337] This extraordinarily fast recruitment by the Brotherhood at this time points to the enthusiastic reception of its pan-Islamist ideas among a segment of Palestinians. This acceptance of the Brotherhood ideas may very well be related to the organizations earlier efforts to support the revolt in the late 1930s, which may have introduced the Brotherhood to a wider segment of the population in neighboring Palestine.

Rhetorically, al-Banna continued to attach pan-Islamic and pan-Arab symbols to the issue in Palestine, as the organization had done in previous years. In 1945, and as an example of this line, al-Banna described the defense of Palestine as integrated into the defense of the very existence of the Arab nations and peoples. Addressing the West, al-Banna maintained that,

> The establishment of a Zionist entity in Palestine will be a threat to the international peace […] it will spoil the expected friendship and be an obstruction to the awaited collaboration between the East and the West[338], and between 400 million Muslims in Africa and Asia and between Europe and America.[339]

Al-Banna also warned that "the martyr-Palestine" could become the spark that would ignite World War III, adding that "millions of Egyptians, Arabs and Muslims everywhere ask God in their prayers to reward them martyrdom in His way". He further emphasized that these millions of people "who did not know of a battlefield to acquire martyrdom" would find "this desired battlefield" in

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[335] According to Brotherhood accounts, the first branches had already been established in Palestine as early as 1936-7; but probably as integrated branches of the Egyptian Brotherhood, and not as autonomous organizations. (edt.) Ikhwan-Wiki (undated) *Tārīkh al-Ikhwan fī Filisṭīn* (The history of the Brotherhood in Palestine) https://bit.ly/3aqWTd1 (consulted 04.03.20).

[336] Within six months of its establishment, the Brotherhood in Palestine was estimated to have almost outgrown the two major Arab para-military groups in the country, i.e. the Najjadah and Futtuwah which had estimated memberships of respectively 3-8.000 and 6-13.000.

[337] CIA-RDP82-00457R000100570002-0, Intelligence Report, Central Intelligence Group, "Arab Para-military Groups" Palestine, 13 December 1946.

[338] East and West should here be understood as the Muslim 'East' and the Christian non-Muslim 'West'.

[339] Al-Banna in Majalat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, No. 76, third year, November 3, 1945, p. 3, cited (edt.) Abdel Aziz 2006b, 107-8.

Palestine where "the British, Americans and Zionists have agreed to do the Arabs injustice".[340]

However, as mentioned above, the Brotherhood's organizational expansion was not limited to Palestine, but spread out to a great part of the Arab world.[341] This was not a new strategy. The Brotherhood had made contacts and worked on spreading out its ideas regionally from the early thirties; but this expansion became more institutionalized following the war. The inception of this institutionalization took place in 1944, when the Brotherhood established a department whose purpose was to "link the Muslim countries together and reconcile their general policies". Given the name 'The department for the outreach to the Muslim world', it was established to increase and formalize the Brotherhood's contacts outside Egypt. Yet again, this department shows the increasing structuring of the Brotherhood as opposed to the early reliance on al-Banna's charismatic leadership.

Among the department's obligations, as formulated in its bylaws, was to "free these nations from every political, economic, military, cultural and social shackle" and to "establish branches of the Brotherhood in the various Arab and Islamic countries".[342] The Brotherhood had in 1945-48 founded branches in, among others, Jordan, Syria, Sudan, Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine. The first branch established outside Egypt was surprisingly in Djibouti, when a Djiboutian man who had visited the Brotherhood's branch during a stay in Egypt returned to Djibouti in 1932 to found its first branch organization abroad.[343]

This deliberate strategy of the Brotherhood to achieve a transnational character and to expand its presence in the region is significant. As we will see in the next section, the organization benefited enormously from this policy of "trans-nationalization" especially in times of restriction in Egypt. We will return to that shortly.

Also, this transnational self-perception, which had started first and foremost with the Brotherhood's adoption of the Palestine case, made the organization enter the '*jihad*' scene from an early stage. This was the case when the *Ikhwan* militarized their discourse and presumably their actions to support the Arab revolt in Palestine from 1936. This engagement with the revolution, and the concurrent militarization of rhetoric and means, was a formative experience in which the ideas

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[340] Ibid.

[341] For an in-depth discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood's expansion in the Arab and Muslim countries, see Frampton 2018, 125-34.

[342] Dessouqi 2012, 129-31.

[343] (edt.) Ikhwan-Wiki (undated) *Tārīkh al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi Djibouti* (The history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Djibouti) https://bit.ly/34BKqQC (consulted 19.12.19).

of *jihad* for the first time could be connected to a concrete case and realized on the ground. Now we turn to this '*jihad* experience' as it crystalized through the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948.

3.2. Execution of *Jihad,* The First Arab-Israeli War and its Aftermath

Within a few years of the end of World War II, the Muslim Brotherhood had become a regional actor, with branches spread in all Egypt and in a large part of the Middle East. In March 1946 the British embassy in Cairo described the Brotherhood's members as the "most dangerous elements", signifying the importance the organization had achieved in the eyes of the British at this stage.[344] The Brotherhood had written extensively and agitated strongly for a number of issues in the region, such as the anti-colonial struggles in North Africa and in the Levant, for the rights of Muslims in India[345] and the independence of Indonesia, while Palestine had remained the crown jewel of the Brotherhood's regional discourse and engagement since the 1930s.[346]

Against this background, it comes as no surprise that the Brotherhood came to play a vital role in the events in Palestine that took place following World War II. This engagement of the *Ikhwan* in this historic war was for many members their gateway to armed *jihad.* When compared to the subversive actions undertaken by a small fraction of Brotherhood militants in Egypt in the post-war period, the Arab-Israeli war came to involve a larger and more diverse group of the Brothers and thus expanded the idea of *jihad* to greater numbers of the membership.

The UN General Assembly's adoption of the 29 November 1947 resolution to partition Palestine into two states militarized the conflict over Palestine, and made war an imminent outcome. Events immediately after the vote in New York took the form of scattered violent incidents and clashes on the local scale, but indicated the uneasy situation existing in the country. Still, regular war would not break out before mid-May 1948, when the last British troops evacuated Palestine as planned, resulting in the formal declaration of the state of Israel. The concurrent evacuation of the British from Palestine and the declaration of an independent Israeli state on the former Palestinian mandate led the armies of five Arab countries to declare war on Israel.[347] However, notwithstanding the unrestrained and powerful rhetoric of the Arab armies and their pronounced goal to "push the Jews to the sea", the Arab forces "were incapable and insufficient for taking over the whole country", as argued by Gelber.[348] What resulted from this "insufficient" Arab intervention in Palestine was a

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[344] FO 371/53286, XC15100, J 946, telegram no. 377, Lord Killearn to FO, 3rd March 1946.
[345] Abdel Aziz 2006a, 99-101.
[346] FO 371/45927 228/38/45, Dispatch no. 1441, British Embassy in Cairo to FO 27th October 1945.
[347] The Egyptian, Syrian, Transjordanian and Iraqi armies declared war on Israel.
[348] Gelber 2001, 137.

debacle that remains unresolved today.

Hasan al-Banna announced in October 1947 that the "only way to rescue Palestine is by brute force", and based on this, he proclaimed that the Brotherhood "will marshal 10,000 of its best striving (*mujāhidīn)* members in the service of the Arab League as a first battalion" [349]. Defining the struggle in Palestine as a collective responsibility for every Arab and Muslim, he described the decision to divide Palestine as an "opportunity to strive for reward in this life and dignity in the hereafter". Al-Banna was in no doubt that the struggle for Palestine would take the form of an armed encounter for which the Muslims from all Muslim countries together with the Christians of Palestine had to be prepared.[350] Such sentiments did not go unnoticed by the US intelligence officers who forecasted the possibility of a "[g]eneral Arab uprising growing of a pro-Zionist solution of the Palestine Problem".[351] Measuring the consequences of the partition plan, the CIA noted that it "is very possible that certain religious organizations will take the initiative in organizing Arab resistance in Palestine". The report went on to characterize the Brotherhood in Palestine as "one of the most active branches" and expected the *Ikhwan* to be the "spearhead of any "crusade"".[352] Such estimates by the CIA were presumably influenced by statements voiced by Brotherhood leaders, as when Said Ramadan, echoing al-Banna, announced on Syrian radio that "10,000 young men of his organization had volunteered for Palestine's 'defense'".[353]

This unambiguous commitment to Palestine and any war that might arise there, as illustrated by al-Banna's declarations and the abovementioned expectations of the CIA, was transformed into tangible engagement on the ground.

Kamil al-Sharif, who came to play a leading role as the commander of the Brotherhood battalions in Palestine, notes that the Palestine issue was central for the Brotherhood due to its Islamic connotations, and it had been so since the 1930s.[354] In fact, as al-Sharif states, the Brotherhood had since the end of World War II been immersed in secret training and preparation of Palestinians, working closely with local groups in Palestine such as al-Najjadah and al-Futtuwah and training them in armed combat. To this end, the Brotherhood had delegated to Palestine senior members,

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[349] Al-Banna cited in Ghanem 2011, 178, 184-5, 188-9.
[350] Ibid.
[351] CIA-RDP78-01617A003000050001-2, Country Report on Egypt, Report to the Special AD HOC Committee by the SWNC Subcommittee for the Near and Middle East, 31 July 1947.
[352] CIA-RDP78-01617A003000180001-8, Central Intelligence Agency "The Consequences of the Partition of Palestine" Ore 55, 28 November 1947.
[353] CIA-RDP78-04864A000100040003-2, "Arab States' Attitudes, Plans, and Activities Relative to possibility of Palestine Civil War, Central Intelligence Group, Information Report, Report no. oo-F-31, 6. November 1947.
[354] Al-Sharif & al-Sibai 1984, 45-6.

such as Mahmoud Labib, the *Ikhwan's* deputy for Military affairs and Muhammad Farghali, the head of the Brotherhood branch Headquarters in Ismailiyya[355], to prepare for the battle. [356]

In total, the Brotherhood marshalled three *katāʾib* (battalions) to take part in the war. Muhammad Farghali and Kamil al-Sharif commanded the first battalion, which headed towards Breij in today's Gaza. The second *katība* under the leadership of Captain Mahmoud Abduh was sent to Qatana in southern Syria, where it received military training before heading towards Palestine. The third battalion obtained its training in the Huckstep camp in Egypt,[357] whereupon it entered Palestine under the command of the retired Lieutenant colonel Ahmad Abdel Aziz[358].[359] Thomas Hegghammer has in a recent study referred correctly to the Palestine campaign as "an early precedent for the Islamist foreign fighting of the late twentieth century".[360]

The collective narrative of the Brotherhood is filled with accounts on the heroic acts of the Brotherhood's volunteers for the sake of Palestine, and the centrality of the Palestine issue for the Brothers. Al-Sisi relates one such story of the 'heroic *jihad* acts' of Brotherhood members. A story cited by him goes as follows: "A father who had just lost his martyred son took up his son's gun without weeping to fight those who had killed his son". This heroic act of the grieving father, who "conceived of his son's death as an honor he also hoped to achieve",[361] should symbolize the position of this "sacred war" in the eyes of the *Ikhwan*. As described by deputy of the Brotherhood, Saleh Ashmawi,[362] "Palestine is a case which represents a nation and a religion, and it is a cause for every Arab and Muslim".[363] Adding to the description of Ashmawi, al-Sisi describes the battle for Palestine "as a sacred war" for the sacred land which could only be freed by a holy war carried out by "purified Muslims".[364] In other words, Palestine's symbolic power has played an essential function in the Brotherhood's self-perception as those who were committed to *jihad*, and who lost

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[355] Farghali (1906/7-1954) joined the Brotherhood in its early days in al-Ismailiyya. "Endowed with a strong and persuasive spirit", as described by al-Banna, al-Farghali became the head of the Brotherhood in al-Ismailiyya *(Raʾīs al-Maktab al-Idārī)* and a member of *Maktab al-Irshād* (Al-Sharif 1987, 63). He was hanged in December 1954 following the abortive attempt on Nasser's life in Alexandria.

[356] Al-Sharif & al-Sibai 1984, 46; Shadi 1987, 94; al-Jamal 2000, 21-22.

[357] The Huckstep camp east of Cairo had been a major base for the allied forces during the Second World War.

[358] Abdel Aziz (1907-1948) retired from the Egyptian army to command the volunteers in the war. He was killed in Gaza in August 1948.

[359] Cf. Al-Jamal 2000, 22-3; Hathut 2000, 53-4; Sadiq 1987; 13-5.

[360] Hegghammer 2020, 16.

[361] Al-Sisi 1981, 274-5.

[362] Ashmawi (undated), https://bit.ly/2MvsBwi (consulted 26.12.19)

[363] Saleh Ashmawi (1910-1983) grew up in a religious home in Cairo where he memorized the Quran at an early age. He graduated from the Faculty of Economics at Cairo University in 1932 and began a political journey, searching for a political party to join, but without luck. In 1937 he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and was afterwards appointed as editor in chief of the Brotherhood's first political magazine, *Al-Nadhir* (the harbinger).

[364] Al-Sisi 1981, 274.

many Brothers in that struggle. By way of illustration, when the Brotherhood had suffered heavy casualties following their first battle in Kfar Darom near Gaza with 12 dead and numerous injuries,[365] the *Ikhwan's* press announced that all these 'martyrs' had been "shot from the front and many of them more than once" and all those who were wounded "continued the fight with guns in hand".[366]

Notwithstanding the fact that the accounts of the Brotherhood's actual involvement in the war are hagiographic and filled with inaccuracies and exaggerations,[367] there can be no doubt that the Brotherhood was fully committed to the struggle, as underlined by Frampton.[368] Thomas Mayer has discussed the Brotherhood's overall contribution to the war, arguing that their "words spoke louder than action", adding that it was the *Ikhwan's* propaganda that "encouraged the military intervention" of the Egyptian army in Palestine.[369] According to Mayer, its contribution lay chiefly in stimulating the public awareness, rather than engaging directly in the conflict.[370] However, the Brotherhood did more than stimulate the public awareness and spread propaganda. While the organization admittedly failed to send the 10,000 men[371], as pledged by al-Banna, the war in Palestine was wholeheartedly adopted by them. As an example, various army officers belonging to the Brotherhood such as Abdel Munʿim Abdel Rauf, Maʿrouf al-Hadri, Hasan al-Jamal, Hussein Ahmad Hijazi, Mahmoud Abduh, Ahmad Labib al-Turjuman and Kamal al-Din Hussein, the future Minister of Social Affairs, volunteered to participate in the war, emphasizing the importance attributed to this involvement.[372] According to Shadi, the Brotherhood lost about 100 members who were killed, while approximately the same number were taken prisoner and some injured.[373] Prior to the war the *Ikhwan* had established training camps to prepare Egyptian and Palestinian volunteers for the struggle and by January 1948, together with the Young Egypt movement, they had recruited 500 volunteers.[374] The *Ikhwan* participated actively in various battles and took a leading role in

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[365] Gelber 2001, 57.

[366] Cited in al-Sisi 1981, 274.

[367] Abdel Rahman al-Bannan, one of the volunteers who went to Palestine at the age of 16, noted that 900 Brothers had volunteered to go to Palestine in 1948 (edt.) Saleh & Dessouqi 2009, 126. Abdel Rauf recounts that the Huckstep battalion consisted of 280 volunteers, of which most were from the Brotherhood. Abdel Rauf adds that Brotherhood members from North Africa also arrived in Huckstep (Abdel Rauf 1988, 47).

[368] Frampton 2018, 136.

[369] Mayer 1982, 109-111.

[370] Ibid.

[371] Ronald Campbell, the British Ambassador to Cairo, estimated in March 1949, that 2000 Moslem Brotherhood members had "volunteered for active service in Palestine" (FO 371/73464, No. 170, 17/4/49G, British Embassy Cairo, 21 March 1949).

[372] Abdel Rauf 1988, 51-3.

[373] Shadi 1987, 102.

[374] Gelber 2001, 28, 57; Gerges 2007, 153.

some of the encounters, which points to their resolute intervention on the ground.[375] The organization also used every opportunity to declare its rejection of a ceasefire and to demand the continuation of the fighting.[376] The CIA underlined that al-Banna, even after the dissolvement of his organization in Egypt on 8 December 1948, had continued "encouraging the members of the Lebanese and Syrian branches to resume fighting in Palestine", which clearly indicates his and the Brothers' commitment to the war.[377]

Understanding their participation in Palestine as a *jihad,* many members had acquired experience of armed struggle and thereby militarized their ideas and actions. The death on the battleground had become "a much-coveted honor" for the Brothers, as described by al-Banna.[378] Another "battleground" would also develop in Egypt simultaneously with the struggle in Palestine, leading to a harsh domestic wave of violence in Egypt and strongly involving the Brotherhood.

3.2.1. Towards Reciprocal Violence; "Escalation of Policing" and the Radical Response

An exacerbation of events in Egypt occurred concomitantly with the escalation of conflict in Palestine. On 19 January 1948, a few months before regular military operations were launched in Palestine, 15 *Ikhwan* members were apprehended training in firearms in the al-Muqattam hills on the outskirts of Cairo, in possession of a stockpile of arms and bombs. These were members of the Brotherhood's Special Apparatus, training in arms and explosives. When arrested, the Brothers explained that these arms and explosives were collected for the imminent war in Palestine.[379] They were all released a few days after.[380] However, what is significant about this and similar incidents is that the Brothers were moving towards what della Porta has described as "action militarization",[381] a development which accelerated on account of the changing political atmosphere of this period.[382]

It is vital to briefly mention in this regard that this action militarization which we notice in the

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[375] Cf. Gelber 2001, 147, 200, 205; Gerges 2007, 153.
[376] CIA-RDP82-00457R002500210003-2, Information Report, CIA "Activities of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Moslem Brotherhood) Lebanon, 22 March 1949. According to this report, ten members of the Brotherhood had arrived in Lebanon to urge the "Moslem Organizations [there] […] to demand that the Lebanese Government resume fighting in Palestine".
[377] CIA-RDP82-00457R002500210003-2, Information Report, CIA "Activities of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Moslem Brotherhood) Lebanon, 22 March 1949.
[378] Cited in al-Sisi 1981, 278-9.
[379] Adel Kamal 1989, 194.
[380] Azb & Khalifa 2011, 328; Abdel Halim 2013 II, 31.
[381] della Porta 2013, 176.
[382] By macro-structures I mean the conflict in Palestine which undoubtedly lead to a radicalization of Brotherhood members and the increasingly militarized political landscape in Egypt.

Brotherhood's ranks was not unparalleled at this time, as "paramilitary formations for the National Party, for the Wafd, and for the YMMA also appeared publicly in Cairo - all boasting arms, munitions, and explosives to be used in Palestine and against the British, but also, apparently, for use against fellow Egyptians".[383] As a case in point, two failed attempts on al-Nahhas Pasha's life took place in April and November 1948. In both incidents high-ranking members of the Saadist party were accused to have been the perpetrators.[384] In other words, the political situation domestically and regionally, the macro-level of this study, resulted in a militarization of actions not only among the Brothers, but more generally among political activists from seemingly all political factions of the time. Abdel Aziz Kamil, a senior member of the Brotherhood, described the spirit of the times as generally characterized by "a firearm, a grenade and dynamite",[385] and the Brothers undoubtedly contributed to this radicalization.

It was at that point in time that the most notorious violent incidents which implicated the Brotherhood took place, leading to the organization's first serious *miḥna* in late 1948. However, in order to understand this radical escalation of the *Ikhwan's* "action militarization" we have to consider the role of agency in such developments. Della Porta has pointed to the importance of agency in the occurrence of political violence. She claims that "structural explanations do not take into account the role of agency. The passage from structural causes to effects is not automatic".[386] And as the following section will show, agency played an influential role in the obvious radicalization that took place, manifesting itself in incidents of political violence.

The first of these serious incidents took place on 22 March 1948, when Ahmad al-Khazindar the deputy of court of appeal in Cairo was assassinated by two young members of the Brotherhood. Al-Khazindar had convicted a member of the Brotherhood for attacks on British soldiers and sentenced him to prison. On account of this conviction, members of the Special Apparatus decided to kill the judge, who they considered a traitor to the national cause.[387] This incident points in particular to a degree of radicalization of a faction of Brothers, who acquired for themselves the agentic responsibility of defending the 'Islamic *daʿwa*' and the nationalist movement against its enemies - be they Muslims or non-Muslims. Al-Khazindar came in other words to personify the enemy when he convicted nationalists for their deeds, such was the rationale of these young radicals.

Prior to this incident, the Brotherhood's violence had been mainly directed against the British in

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[383] Mitchell 1993, 60.
[384] Ibid., 63.
[385] Kamil 2006, 59.
[386] della Porta 2013, 74.
[387] Azb & Khalifa 2011, 330.

Egypt and against the Zionists in Palestine, and no noteworthy violent incidents had yet been directed against fellow Egyptians, for not to say against a high-profile and reputable judge. That the incident was not applauded by all Brothers indicates the agentic role played by the members who took the case into their own hands. According to al-Sabbagh, a senior member of the Special Apparatus, the assault on al-Khazindar was conceived of at that time as the gravest mistake in the history of the Brotherhood. Al-Sabbagh remembers that al-Sindi, the head of the Apparatus, ordered this attack due to nationalist sentiments, in direct opposition to the Brotherhood's principles.[388] Adel Kamal, another senior member of the Apparatus, noted that this "unlawful killing" was a manifestation of the "rush of youth". Adel Kamal emphasized that the assassination was not ordered by al-Banna, but was a decision taken individually by al-Sindi himself.[389] Such claims can be dismissed as apologetic accounts intended to clear the name of the Brotherhood. Yet, these accounts can also denote that a "competitive escalation" took place inside the organization in which a group of Brothers came to see themselves as a vanguard of *jihad* fulfilling such a task against the direct orders of the leadership of the Brotherhood, thus illustrating the abovementioned agentic independence. If that is the case, and the above accounts are indicative of such a development, then we can observe an unequivocal organizational compartmentalization as specific individuals or groups inside the Brotherhood began to adopt violent tactics against the will of the *Ikhwan's* upper echelons.[390] Abdel Aziz Kamil recalls in this regard that a faction of Brothers advocated violence against the adversaries of the *Ikhwan*: "Those who have been killed have aggressed against Islam and deserved therefore to be killed", was the justification presented by this faction, according to Kamil.[391]

Another essential point is that the very incident and the dispute it generated in the ranks of the Brotherhood points to a lack of complete control of the Apparatus. That al-Sindi was ostensibly responsible for the assassination of the judge against the orders of the Brotherhood leadership suggests that the *Ikhwan* had failed to streamline this secret structure under the general hierarchy of the organization. The Apparatus had at this point in time begun to work independently and against the direct orders of the civilian leadership of the Brotherhood, personified in al-Banna. Accordingly, the assassination of al-Khazindar epitomized an unmistakable incident of compartmentalization of the Brotherhood and indicates a lack of control by al-Banna and his associates on this armed

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[388] Al-Sabbagh 1989, 256.
[389] Adel Kamal 1989, 220-1.
[390] della Porta 2013, 151.
[391] Kamil 2006, 67.

structure. The seemingly uncontrolled violent acts executed by young members of the Apparatus during this period of intensified conflict, such as the murder of al-Khazindar, indicate that the organization had failed in vetting the members of the Apparatus whereby the rules and commands of the Brotherhood could have been enforced on them. In other words, the centralized control of these structures had remained weak at this time, and such autonomous violent actions thus took place against the guidelines of the *Ikhwan* organization.

This escalation of violence continued throughout 1948, a year that witnessed political turmoil and violent conflict, culminating in the dissolution of the Brotherhood on 8 December.[392] The Saadist government of Fahmy al-Nuqrashi published an explanatory note summarizing the reasons for dissolving the *Ikhwan* organization. The note consisted of thirteen points of charges against the Brotherhood, among which were "its planning" since 1942 to "overthrow the existing order", a number of violent incidents attributed to the Brotherhood and its possession of and training on firearms.[393] A wave of arrests was directed against the Brotherhood which saw hundreds of its members apprehended and others driven underground as an immediate outcome of the dissolution order. At the same time, the Brotherhood headquarters were closed, and its funds and estates confiscated, signifying the toughest ever repression in the *Ikhwan's* history. This "tough policing", to apply della Porta's term, resulted in a growing radicalization in the Brotherhood's ranks, leading to the assassination of Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi on 28 December. The assassin, Abdel Majid Ahmad Hasan, a twenty-one-year-old member of the Brotherhood and its Special Apparatus, carried out the orders of his leadership when he shot and killed the Prime Minister as he was entering the Ministry of Interior. Al-Nuqrashi's death came in retaliation for his dissolvement of the Brotherhood and was ordered by the Special Apparatus.[394]

Ibrahim Abdel Hadi, al-Nuqrashi's party colleague and former head of the Royal Cabinet succeeded al-Nuqrashi. The new Premier was determined to "stamp" out the Ikhwan and "complete their suppression", as British officials were told by the Egyptian Ambassador.[395] On 12 February 1949, and as a link in the chain of events, al-Banna was shot dead in front of the headquarters of the YMMA.

What evolved from the dissolution of the Brotherhood and the subsequent assassinations of Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi and al-Banna was a deepened transformation of the Brotherhood

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[392] For an account of the violent incidents cf. Ramadan 1993, 74-8; Azb & Khalifa 2011, 327-331.
[393] Muhammad 1987, 411.
[394] Adel Kamal 1989.
[395] FO 371/69212, J 8308/68/16G, Foreign Office to Ambassador in Cairo, 29 December 1948.

towards clandestinity, and a consequential radicalization of sections of the membership.[396] In the following, I will provide a few examples, authored by the Brotherhood members themselves, to exemplify how Brothers at this point in time espoused a more radical world-view in their conflict with the government.

Jamal al-Banna, Hasan al-Banna's youngest brother, who was not a member of the Brotherhood himself, notes in his biography that the dissolution of the organization in December 1948 made the killing of al-Nuqrashi justifiable. Jamal al-Banna highlighted that "al-Nuqrashi had to be killed" because he had "killed 500,000 members of the *Ikhwan* by disbanding their movement".[397] Such sentiments were expressed by numerous Brothers who did not regret the murder of al-Nuqrashi but rather hailed it as a justifiable action. In contrast to the regret of the assassination of al-Khazindar, as shown above, this time the murder of al-Nuqrashi was conceived of as a *jihad* against an enemy of Islam, thus indicating a clear radicalization in thoughts and actions. If one bears in mind that al-Nuqrashi was a Muslim, then the justification of his murder as a *jihad* "against an enemy of Islam" can arguably be interpreted as an incidence of *takfīr* (excommunication of a self-proclaimed Muslim). And the Brothers did not hide their sentiments towards al-Nuqrashi. Al-Sabbagh explains in his memoirs that al-Nuqrashi, by dissolving the organization, had shown his true face "as a western agent".[398] What is even more noteworthy for this analysis is that al-Sabbagh explicitly declared that any government antagonistic to the Brotherhood is understood as a "government that is opposed to Islam", which is why the assassination of its head was and would be Islamically legitimate.[399] In a similar vein, Ahmad Adel Kamal labelled the disbanding of his organization as an "aggression against Islam" and the killing of al-Nuqrashi was therefore legitimate.[400] Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the renowned Azhari-scholar, who is known to be a non-radical,[401] recalled in his

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[396] I continue to argue that "a section of the Brotherhood" was radicalized as it is significant to underline that the Brotherhood as whole continued as a moderate organization, without a violent scheme.

[397] Al-Harani 2014, 44. (Jamal al-Banna was presumably hinting towards how Hasan al-Banna had perceived the dissolution. When asked about the dissolution of his organization, Hasan al-Banna replied, "it is like losing your birth certificate". (Al-Qaradawi 2002, 323).

[398] Al-Sabbagh 1989, 450.

[399] Ibid.

[400] Adel Kamal 1989, 277.

[401] Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926-) was born in Ṣafṭ al-Turāb a small and traditional village, located 21 kilometers from Tanta, the capital town of the Sharqiyya governate. Al-Qaradawi's upbringing was religious, he attended a kutab in his village where he memorized the Quran at the age of nine and had his first schooling. The young Yusuf also attended a modern school, and as such he recalls that he "collected the good of both institutions". In his memoirs he recounts the obvious inequalities in his little village, which had an impact on him, because he came from a family that did not own any land. The young al-Qaradawi listened to al-Banna for the first time in 1940, when the latter was visiting Tanta. Two years later, in 1942, he officially joined the Brotherhood. Al-Qaradawi graduated from al-Azhar in the early 1950s (Al-Qaradawi 2002, 15, 44, 61, 126, 159, 178).

memoirs that the dissolution of the Ikhwan was perceived at the time to have been a result of Western pressures on al-Nuqrashi. [402] "We the young and students [of the Brotherhood] welcomed the assassination of al-Nuqrashi with relief and optimism", is how al-Qaradawi described the contemporaneous reception of the assassination of the Prime Minister, even though in retrospect he dissociated himself from political assassinations and violence.[403] Ali Sadiq remembers that he considered the assassination of al-Banna as a crime committed by "rulers of Egypt who at that time had grown up in the bosom of the colonizers", and thus argued that their fighting was an obligatory *jihad*.[404] Sadiq was at the time of the events a young Brotherhood radical who was fighting in Palestine, and he placed the *jihad* in Palestine and the *jihad* against the government on the same footing. We can thus argue that the intense radicalization that took place on the domestic and regional scene, manifested domestically in the political crisis and regionally in the first Arab-Israeli war, came to shape the perceptions of young radicals. Della Porta has suggested that political violence shall be understood as "one of the outcomes of intense interactions developing during moments of heightened conflict".[405] Considering the Egyptian case in the late 1940s, we can similarly contend that the moment of growing conflict domestically and regionally resulted in a radicalization and consequential turn to political violence.

Taking the young radicals' attitudes from this period into consideration, we can maintain that their ideas constituted an early resemblance of the worldview put forward by Sayyid Qutb during his prison-years. The perception of the state as an "enemy of Islam" would become a core of Qutb's dealing with the state, just as it was for these young Brothers, as we shall see in chapter seven. Kepel has suggested that Qutb, as a result of his prison experience in the Nasserite years, developed his discourse of *jihad,* along with his understanding of general society as dissociated from Islam - the two main tracks of Qutb's radical worldview. Along these lines, Kepel claimed that the radicalization of the Brotherhood, under the ideological guidance of Qutb, took place in post-

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[402] Al-Qaradawi 2002, 324. According to this account, diplomats from the British, French and American embassies had collectively urged al-Nuqrashi Pasha to disband the organization. This was, according to al-Qaradawi, a natural request from colonizing countries, as they conceived the Brotherhood as the major barrier to their greed in the region. Whether the Western governments had urged al-Nuqrashi to dissolve the *Ikhwan* or not is beyond the scope of this study and cannot be assured due to the lack of official documents, but the reactions of British diplomats to Egypt expose an explicit support of this measure, which was seen as "belated" but the Egyptian government had at last "agreed on the necessity of pursuing the recently adopted out-and-out policy against the Moslem Brethren". (FO 371/73462, J304/1015/16, No. 14, British Embassy Cairo, 5th January 1949).

[403] Al-Qaradawi 2002, 335, 337. See also Abdel Halim 2013 II, 37; he claims that al-Nuqrashi's death was a result of his "malice and narrowness of sight and his tyranny with regard to his opinion and his surrender to the usurping colonizers".

[404] Sadiq 1987, 45.

[405] della Porta 2013, 111.

revolutionary Egypt because "most Egyptian governments had not seriously impeded the preaching of al-Banna and his disciples" prior to 1952.[406] However, as this section has shown, we can trace the radicalization of thoughts and actions back to pre-revolutionary Egypt, and more specifically to this first *miḥna* when the movement was repressed.

However, it is crucial to mention that not all members shared this trajectory at this point in time, and some *Ikhwan* were directly opposed to the radical ideas presented by the militants. For instance, Hasan al-Banna bemoaned the violent incidents committed by members of his organization, describing them as unlawful crimes. However, in an apologetic tone, al-Banna proclaimed that the "tough policing" applied against the Brotherhood, beginning with its dissolvement, had brought forth the undesirable but anticipated side-effect, namely the retaliation against the Prime Minister. By cutting of the rank-and-file from their leadership, the government had hindered the *Ikhwan* leaders from circumscribing such acts, and the Brotherhood could therefore not be held responsible for such acts committed by individual members.[407] This statement points furthermore to some of the general problems that emerge from secrecy. When an organization turns to secrecy it oftentimes suffers from compartmentalization, lack of centralized control of members and the isolation of individual members, with the result that such uncontrolled incidents can occur. And in view of al-Banna's response to these incidents we can imply that they were symptomatic of such lack of control. Hathut, a young medical doctor and member of the Brotherhood, stresses that al-Banna was unambiguously against violence in the aftermath of the dissolvement of his organization. If true, then the incidents are unambiguous examples that al-Banna had lost control of at least a faction of the organization in his last days.[408]

Della Porta has pointed to a correlation between state repression and political violence; "political violence throughout the world is intertwined with state responses to social movements in a sort of macabre dance".[409] Taking my point of departure in this claim, I have suggested that the repressive measures undertaken by the authorities in this period, and the exclusion of the Brotherhood from formal politics, led to an escalation of the violent actions of the Brothers.

Yet, one has to remember that the Brotherhood had already utilized violence long before this period of repression. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Brotherhood actions had already been radicalized through its anti-colonial activism and its participation in the struggle in Palestine as

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[406] Kepel 1985, 55.
[407] Al-Banna, *Qaḍiyatunā* (our cause) undated https://bit.ly/35ZIIsR (consulted 16.01.20) also titled as "*al-Qawl al-Faṣl*" (the final say) quoted in al-Sisi 1981, 315-7.
[408] Hathut 2000, 71-2.
[409] della Porta 2013, 33.

early as 1936. Thus, the radicalization of late 1948 was unique inasmuch as the Brothers at this stage legitimized violence against national regimes, and even voiced for the first time normative religious reasoning for such violence against fellow Muslims.

I will now briefly describe the role played by the *Ikhwan* in radicalizing the political picture in Egypt to show how this period clearly witnessed a radicalization of means among a current of Brothers. By so doing, I intend to trace the genealogy of the domestic *jihad* conducted by Brotherhood militants against the local authorities in this period of the late 1940s. It was at this juncture, I argue, that a group of young radicals labelled the regime as "anti-Islamic" and thus legitimized violence against it.

As an example, on 13 January 1949 an attempt was made to get rid of documents seized by the Egyptian police in the well-known Jeep-case from 11 November 1948[410]; documents that betrayed vital data on the Special Apparatus. On that Thursday in January 1949, Shafiq Ibrahim Anas, a member of the Special Apparatus, tried to eliminate the abovementioned records by placing a bomb in the courthouse. The bomb went off, but the documents remained intact, to Shafiq's regret. Anas was arrested directly after the incident.[411] By bombing the courthouse, killing a judge and a Premier, the Brotherhood showed that the radical actions hitherto almost exclusively directed against the 'foreign occupation' or against the Zionists in Palestine, were now increasingly being directed within Egypt and against legitimate symbols of law and order. British and US diplomats predicted that the Brotherhood would not cease causing trouble in Egypt any time soon. On 14 January 1949, one day after the explosion in the courthouse, the CIA received warnings that "Ikhwan members still have large stocks of arms" and that "assassination threats have been made against King Faruq, the Minister of National Defense, and the new Commandant of the Cairo police".[412] Such threats were not mere fantasies by western diplomats, but mirrored the developments on the ground in Egypt, as highlighted by al-Sisi, a middle-ranking Brother from Alexandria. He recalls that *Ikhwan* members at this time widely distributed leaflets declaring "Farouq's head for al-Banna's head" and that they were preparing to avenge al-Banna.[413] One main

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[410] On 11 November 1948 a jeep was searched by police officers who to their surprise found the jeep fully packed with arms, explosives and documents. The jeep belonged to the Brotherhood's Special Apparatus, and contained important documents and plans belonging to this Apparatus. This in fact was the first case in which the Apparatus, its nature, size, hierarchy, senior-members and ideas were disclosed by the authorities. (Adel Kamal 1989, 238-41).

[411] Adel Kamal 1989, 291-3; Mitchell 1993, 68.

[412] CIA-RDP82-00457R002200760006-2, Information Report, Central Intelligence Agency "Activity of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin", Egypt, 14 Januar 1949.

[413] Al-Sisi 2003, 229. Ahmad Adel Kamal recalls that the King feared for his life, as the Brotherhood members had thought about directing their revenge against him personally (Adel Kamal 1989, 291).

target for such revenge was Premier Abdel Hadi, held personally responsible for the assassination of al-Banna: "Abdel Hadi was a natural target for retaliation following al-Banna's death", stresses al-Sisi.[414] Carrying out the threats, a Brotherhood cell made an attempt on Abdel Hadi's life. The cell that for a long period had been searching for the right time and place for the assassination, made the attempt on the Prime Minister on 5 May 1949 in the leafy al-Maadi suburb, south of Cairo. Armed with firearms and grenades and positioned in a well-chosen spot from where they could observe Abdel Hadi's car, the cell opened fire on a car they believed to be Abdel Hadi's. The assailants soon realized that the car, which was a similar model to that of the premier, belonged to Hamid Juda, head of the Lower House of Parliament. Ten members of the Brotherhood were immediately apprehended and brought to trial in what came to be known as the Hamid Juda case.[415] Interestingly, stories about this abortive attempt are abundant in Brotherhood accounts, and not much regret is uttered in this regard besides the regret that Abdel Hadi survived. In the opinion of these Brothers, avenging al-Banna by killing another Prime Minister was legitimate. Ali Sadiq, who was among the organizers of the incident, relates that the assault on Abdel Hadi was thought of as revenge for his role in the assassination of al-Banna. To fight Abdel Hadi and his government was perceived by Sadiq as a continuation of *jihad* against "those traitorous creatures of colonization".[416] This evidently shows how the understanding of *jihad* by this segment of Brothers had transformed into a legitimizing tool for domestic violence against fellow Egyptians.

During April and May 1949, regular shootouts between Brotherhood members and the police were reported, and reports of the discovery of arms and "terrorist plots" had become an almost daily routine.[417] Many of the Brotherhood members who had managed to escape arrest had gone underground and were willing to fight the state, which they considered the enemy.[418] Such instancesof underground cells spread all over Egypt came publicly and legally to be known as *al-Awkār* (the cells), of which almost fifty members were put on trial.[419]

Another immediate outcome of this first *miḥna* was the Brotherhood's first real experience of widespread secrecy as a means to survive persecution. I will now turn to this particular experience,

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[414] Al-Sisi 2003, 229.
[415] Al-Sisi 2003, 229; Shadi 1987, 114-5; Abdel Halim 2013 II, 222.
[416] Sadiq 1987, 49-50.
[417] See for example FO 371/73464, J 2907/1015/16, DS (E) DS/P/62, British Embassy, Cairo, 6 May 1949, in which it is reported that an "impressive" number of arms had been discovered in one of the Brotherhood's hideouts.
[418] Al-Sisi 2003, 229. See also CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010037-9, Intelligence Summary, Vol. IV, No. 3, Office of Reports and Estimates, CIA, 26 January 1949; CIA-RDP82-00457R002400240004-9, Information Report, CIA, "Alleged Financial Support of Ikhwan al-Muslimin by Soviets" Egypt/USSR, February 24, 1949.
[419] Sadiq 1987, 47; Abdel Halim 2013 II, 223.

to demonstrate how the organization reacted to the "tough policing" it endured following its dissolution. By so doing, I propose that we can come to understand the Brotherhood's ability to survive political repression and we can trace the roots of what Pargeter has termed "a mentality of semi-clandestinity".[420]

3.3. Going Underground 1948-1951

The claim of this chapter thus far has been that the momentous events of late 1948 represented a conspicuous instance of political repression directed towards the *Ikhwan* which led to an "action militarization" of a current of Brothers.[421] The Brotherhood had in its early history experienced different periods of limited persecution, imprisonments and restrictions but what occurred after its dissolution in 1948 and the subsequent assassination of the organization's founder and life-long leader had far-reaching effects.

However, as I will demonstrate in this section, this decisive phase in the history of the Brotherhood provided the organization with a formative experience of secrecy which evolved into a mindset and a pattern of working procedures for how to endure repression. This, I argue, enabled the *Ikhwan* to continue its existence in subsequent periods of harsh repression and provided it with mechanisms to survive. Alison Pargeter has attributed a "semi-clandestine" mentality to the Brotherhood, arguing that this mentality prevented the *Ikhwan* from achieving political success when the Brotherhood's political party acquired power following the 2012 elections in Egypt. This mentality has shaped the Brotherhood's worldview for almost eight decades and obstructs the *Ikhwan* from becoming a true advocate of pluralism and liberalism, claims Pargeter.[422] While I agree with Pargeter in perceiving the Brotherhood as semi-clandestine in its organizational structures, I consider it important to historically analyze how and why this mentality has developed. By studying such periods of secret activism which occurred when the Brotherhood was oppressed and exposed to restrictions, I argue that we can come to an understanding of the Brotherhood's inner dynamics with regard to this so-called mentality. By studying the Brotherhood during this first *miḥna*, I contend that the *Ikhwan* did not cease to exist but transformed its activities into clandestinity in order to survive. In this way, I emphasize that there was a continuation of the Brotherhood's ideas and activism during these years of repression, although certainly in an altered

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[420] Pargeter 2016, 1, 89.
[421] della Porta 2013, 38-9; della Porta points out that "escalating policing has been an important causal mechanism at the onset of clandestine political violence" and "produces martyrs and myths; this process justifies violence and pushes militant groups underground".
[422] Pargeter 2016, 1, 85, 89.

form. The *Ikhwan*, when repressed, would time and again opt for the "dynamic periphery", as defined by Wickham,[423] in order to carry on its activities.

Analyzing this first ordeal of the Brotherhood, Zollner argued that "the established network of personal relations saved the Brotherhood from disappearing into public oblivion. Political and personal relations spun in the 1940s were vital for the continuation of the Society underground".[424] Whereas I agree that these personal networks undoubtedly had a vital role in sustaining the *Ikhwan's* existence, I maintain that the organizational structures and the idea of secrecy integrated into these structures, played an even more critical role in the Brotherhood's continuation and survival. To demonstrate this, I will highlight different examples of continuation representing different patterns of how the Brotherhood reacted to this intensifying state repression.[425] Accordingly, I will highlight aspects representing continuation of hierarchy, organizational structures, personal links and international networks, demonstrating how the Brotherhood sustained its existence in society. It is important to keep in mind that this section remains a sketch. I will not provide an exhaustive presentation of all the examples of Brotherhood activism during this period. Notwithstanding this, I hope the section will give the reader an idea of how the Brotherhood continued its activism during this 'period of secrecy'. This section thus signifies that the Brotherhood had developed, long before the repression of 1954-70, a blueprint of secrecy as a defensive mechanism,[426] which became crucial in later periods of repression.

3.3.1. Hierarchical Continuity

In keeping with Erickson's definition of 'Secret Societies', such societies are required to involve "secret activities" and have "persisting structures"; i.e. to compose a 'society' it is necessary that these structures and activities are not a "one-time collaboration" but include persistence. Hierarchy, Erickson tells us, is not a necessity of secret societies but can be one form of structure, and when hierarchical, the rigidity of this hierarchy can vary in degree.[427] In the case of the Brotherhood, we observe a continuation[428] of hierarchy, but not in a rigid way. One such example of this persisting hierarchy comes from an account by Ahmad Hasan al-Baqouri, one of Hasan al-Banna's closest

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[423] Wickham 2002, 13, 93.
[424] Zollner 2011, 16.
[425] Hafez 2004, 46-7.
[426] Simmel, 1906, 472.
[427] Erickson 1981, 188, 191.
[428] By continuation I mean the persistence of organizational forms and structures, persons, leadership and ideas.

associates. Upon the dissolvement of the *Ikhwan* in December 1948 al-Baqouri was selected by al-Banna to take the reins of the Brotherhood while the *Murshid* was disappearing underground, relates al-Baqouri. Al-Banna, who was planning to go underground to avoid persecution, denied leaving the Brotherhood leaderless, which is why he chose al-Baqouri as a temporary caretaker during his absence. By selecting an interim leader, al-Banna was making sure that the Brotherhood did not fragment during his absence.[429] According to British reports, al-Banna had shortly before his death decided "to retire to the country and to continue to supervise the activities of his followers from there", and thus he chose an alternate leader to take over in Cairo.[430] This was not an accidental or novel tactic applied at a moment of crisis, but was a manifested aspect of the Brotherhood's organizational thinking going far back in its history. As early as 1942, a British report stated that "al-Banna is believed to have chosen a series of substitute leaders in case the present leaders of the movement in Cairo and the provinces were simultaneously arrested".[431] This illustrates that the Brotherhood at some early point in its history had begun preparing for such periods of repression and lack of leadership; and it is no coincidence that these preparations had occurred concurrently with the wave of arrests the leadership of the organization had been exposed to in the early 1940s, as discussed above. Adding to this, in July 1944 the British authorities in Egypt noticed that the *Ikhwan* had acquired a decentralized form of organization which "means that the activities of the organisation should no longer be handicapped or disrupted by the closing of meeting places or by the arrest of leading members and many of the smallest sections are now able to operate without the direction of a senior body".[432] These accounts are consistent with the development of the Brotherhood's structures in the 1940s as represented in the preceding chapter. For example, as previously highlighted the lines of communication between the *usar* and the local branch organizations (*shuʿab*) were designed as a way of decentralizing the low-key activities of the members and enabling the organization to continue its undertakings in the event the upper echelons of the Brotherhood were obstructed from leading the organization. This came in 1943, in a period when the *Ikhwan* was experiencing the first restrictions and presumably as a direct response to these restrictions. This is consistent with what al-Anani has described as a concomitant dynamic centralization and decentralization of the organization. As stated by al-Anani, while the *Ikhwan*'s hierarchical structures are centralized, a decentralization characterizes its extensive network, which

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[429] Al-Baqouri 1988, 81-2.
[430] FO 371/73463, No. DS (E) P. 997, J.G. Tomlinson, British Embassy, Cairo, 14 February 1949.
[431] FO 141/838, General HQ Middle East, "The Ikhwan al Muslimin Reconsidered" (Appendix A to Security Summary Middle East, No. 103, 10 December 1942).
[432] FO 371/41334, J 3812/16/44, "PIC Paper No. 49 (Revised): Ikhwan el Muslimeen" 25 July 1944.

offers the "local branches and offices" a freedom in "running the movement's activities according to current circumstances and needs without needing to confer with the leadership".[433] Thus, this dynamic continuation of hierarchy serves as an example of the organizational thinking which can be traced back to the formative period of the Brotherhood.

In light of Erickson's definition,[434] I argue that the maximization of security was the primary motive of the Brotherhood in these years and would become more so with every wave of harsh persecution. As an example of this, we learn from the *Ikhwani* accounts that the hierarchical structuring, as a modus operandi, continued uninterrupted when the Brotherhood-leadership went underground as a reaction to repression. On the contrary, a hierarchical dimension operated inside the Brotherhood to consolidate the organization's activities. As an example, provincial representatives, consisting of lower-ranking Brotherhood activists, arrived in Cairo to meet with the interim leadership to discuss and plan and future activities of the organization. In this way, and by such low-key methods, the Brotherhood insisted on a hierarchical way of operating and sustained a line of command and action. Such meetings were held in secrecy as a means to maximize security, we are told by some of the Brothers who participated in them. And when leading members of the Brotherhood were arrested, others undertook the responsibility of the organization, thereby guaranteeing a degree of continuity.[435] In addition, also in the detention camps where the Brothers were interned, we can observe a continuation of hierarchy.

We learn from al-Qaradawi, who was interned at al-Tur, that the Brotherhood members inside the prison camp established a hierarchical organization to manage their activism and coordinate their relationships. The camp *cum* detention center housed a large number of Brotherhood detainees who had been arrested in major parts of Egypt.[436] Al-Bahi al-Khouli, a senior member of the Brotherhood, was chosen as head of the Brothers in al-Tur, and when he was transferred to Cairo after a short period of his detention, the inmates appointed Muhammad al-Ghazali as al-Khouli's successor. As such examples demonstrate, the hierarchy of the Brotherhood continued even in detention, where the Brothers preferred a hierarchical leadership structure to administer their presence in prisons. By so doing, the *Ikhwan* could regulate member behavior in prison and secure that the members continued their affiliation with the Brotherhood. Furthermore, by appointing a leadership in every prison, they could streamline the activities of the members and represent the

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[433] Al-Anani 2016, 111.
[434] Erickson 1981, 188.
[435] Abdel Halim 2013 II, 439. Mahmoud Abdel Halim recalls that such meetings were held, among other places, in mosques where security measures are limited.
[436] Al-Qaradawi 2002, 68-9, 358.

Brotherhood collectively vis-à-vis the prison authorities and ensure their continuing communication with Brothers outside the prisons.[437] And while the hierarchy continued inside and outside the prison walls, so did the Brotherhood's activism, to which I now turn.

3.3.2. Continuation of Activism and Personal Links

In keeping with the above sketched definitions of secrecy and secret societies[438], I will give some examples of the Brotherhood's continued organization and activism to show how they reacted to the increasing risk they faced. Yet, as will become apparent from this discussion, the function of the Brotherhood's secrecy was the will and desire to survive as a cohesive organization.

An assessment of the Brotherhood after al-Banna's death presented by Soage and Franganillo stated that "The assassination of Hasan al-Banna plunged the society into a period of uncertainty".[439] While such views correctly point to the extent of the crisis engulfing the Brotherhood at this stage, they do not take the contemporaneous organizational complexity of the *Ikhwan* into account. In contrast, while I agree that the loss of al-Banna undeniably plunged the Brotherhood into a crisis, I stress that the structures built by the Brotherhood in the 1940s and the comprehensive ideology formulated during al-Banna's lifetime meant that he was no longer indispensable for the *Ikhwan*. This is consonant with my line of reasoning that al-Banna's charismatic leadership, since the early history of the Brotherhood, had been replaced by institutionalized structures and lines of authority.[440]

British Ambassador Campbell pointed to this fact shortly after al-Banna's death in a report he compiled to describe the status quo in Egypt. In the report, from March 1949, Campbell drew attention to "the high degree of internal organisation which the Moslem Brethren Society had attained, and which to some extent has so far survived the murder of the leader".[441] And as the following discussion will show, the Brotherhood was far from terminated as a result of al-Banna's demise and the concurrent repression of the Brothers and dissolution of the organization.

As an example of this incessant activity, Hasan al-Ashmawi, a jurist and one of the leading members in this period, narrates that prominent members of the *Ikhwan,* such as Munir al-Dilla,

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[437] Al-Qaradawi 2002, 359: This term is derived from a prophetic tradition which had it that "When three are on a journey, they should appoint one of them as their commander [*amīr*]. Sunan Abi Dawud 2608, https://bit.ly/3aAjq8f (consulted 23.01.20).
[438] Simmel 1906, 471-2; Erickson 1981, 195, 199.
[439] Soage & Franganillo 2010, 41.
[440] Jung 2018, 225.
[441] FO 371/73464, No. 170, 17/4/49G, British Embassy Cairo, 21 March 1949.

Salih Abu Ruqayiq and Abd al-Qader Hilmi, held regular meetings in Cairo to discuss and plan the Brotherhood's activism throughout this phase, thereby filling the gap left by al-Banna.[442] By maintaining a structure of command, the Brotherhood was able to continue some degree of activism in these times of uncertainty. A similar account is offered by al-Sisi, who recalls that members of the organization continued to meet in mosques of the Islamist association *Anṣār al-Sunna,* where state shadowing was ineffective. In the mosques, meetings were held between leading members of the Brotherhood and representatives from the provinces to sustain a line of communication and orders.[443] As pointed to by Aminzade and Perry, religious institutions like mosques limit the state's ability to repress political activism and provide politico-religious movements with some shelter to avoid surveillance.[444] Furthermore, the sites of activism chosen by the Brothers, such as the mosques and the provincial cities, show how the "dynamic periphery" gave the organization a lifeline by which it could endure repression.

Another way of overcoming security measures was by including the women's branch of the *Ikhwan* organization into 'secret' activities. Up until this time, the "section of the Muslim Sisters" had been apolitical, limiting its activities to religious and social aspects. However, this was to change as a result of the *miḥna.* This change is exemplified in the case of Amal al-Ashmawi, sister of Hasan al-Ashmawi and wife of Munir al-Dilla, both senior members of the Brotherhood. Amal al-Ashmawi, like other female members, came to play a vital role in sustaining the organization in this period. The severe treatment of arrested individuals had led to a situation where "families of internees often suffered financial hardship", according to Vatikiotis.[445] As a consequence, al-Ashmawi began organizing campaigns to support these families and began collecting money, which was distributed among the families of Brotherhood activists.[446] This endeavor became institutionalized in the Sisterhood following the persecution, with official structures constructed to fulfill the task of sustaining the Brotherhood and supporting the bereaved families.[447] As will be established in the discussion of the second 'ordeal', this inclusion of the women's branch into the Brotherhood's activities became an important pattern to which the *Ikhwan* returned during the second *miḥna*.

These abovementioned examples point to the degree of continuity that occurred in this period of

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[442] Cited in Rizq 1991, 23.
[443] Al-Sisi 2003, 258-9.
[444] Aminzade and Perry 2001: 159.
[445] Vatikiotis 1985, 366.
[446] (edt.) Ikhwan-Wiki (undated) *Amal al-Ashmawi*, https://bit.ly/3awFCAf (consulted 20.01.20).
[447] Khayal & al-Jawhari 1993, 239.

repression, but also to the patterns of endurance that were developed to respond to repression, patterns that re-occurred in a similar form during the second tribulation.

Al-Baqouri illustrates this continuity very clearly. In his memoirs, we are told that despite, the restrictions on the Brotherhood's freedom he continued to meet with fellow *Ikhwan* to discuss the appropriate way of dealing with the crisis. An interesting aspect of al-Baqouri's account is his insistence on the secret character of these meetings.[448] This insistence on secrecy as a means to avoid interruption clearly shows its rationale as a defensive mechanism to reduce risk.

This continuation of actions, though in secrecy, was also observed by British diplomats who were clearly convinced that the Brotherhood would continue despite its dissolution and persecution. On 13 December 1948, it was argued in a British telegram that while some Brothers with government jobs "may be frightened off by the repressive measures now being taken by the Government", the "fanatical members may succeed in maintaining some sort of organisation".[449] In another report, compiled shortly after al-Banna's death, J.G. Tomlinson from the British Embassy in Cairo stressed that the persecution of the Brotherhood and the death of al-Banna may lead to "underground warfare" by the "remnants of the Ikhwan el Muslimeen [sic]". Thus, he was in no doubt that the Brotherhood would address this challenge by transforming to secrecy. Tomlinson predicted that the "effective followers as remain at liberty will tend to harden", which also was the case for some Brothers, as I will show shortly.[450]

As already demonstrated, British authorities were by no means optimistic as regards the elimination of the *Ikhwan*. They were aware of its continuing activism in different arenas, where the "dynamic periphery" especially played an important role in sustaining the organization. British concern that the harsh repression of the *Ikhwan* would eventually lead to a "militarization of actions" among the Brothers was significant. TROMBONE, an Egyptian informant from the Egyptian security apparatus, informed the British officials that "the Police were up against something really big in trying to squash the Ikhwan, but that they fully realized the danger of such a society existing in the country".[451] Trying to clarify the reasons for this difficulty in wiping out the

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[448] Baqouri 1988, 82. Muhammad Hamed Abul Nasr, a senior Brother, recounts in his memoirs that an office had been formed in Cairo where senior Brothers such as Munir al-Dilla, Hasan al-Ashmawi, Fahmy Abu Ghadir, and Taher al-Khashab met to study the situation of the Brotherhood, to collect funds for the organization and to consider the situation of its members. (Abul Nasr 1988, 52).

[449] FO 371/69212, J 8096, 172/65/48, British Embassy, Cairo, to African Department, Foreign Office, 13 December 1948.

[450] FO 371/73463, No. DS (E) P. 997, J.G. Tomlinson, British Embassy, Cairo, 14th February 1949.

[451] FO 141/1342, "Arab Societies, Ikhwan el Muslimeen" 108/2/49G, Jenkins, Cairo to Head of SIME, GHQ MELF, DS (E) DS/P/62, 6 January 1949.

Brotherhood, TROMBONE pointed to the *Ikhwan's* numerical strength and its organizational complexity as the main grounds: "[T]here were 6 or 7 hundred thousand members and it would be necessary to arrest at least 5 or 6 thousand before the movement could in any way be considered as having been partly broken". He therefore concluded that this offensive against the Brotherhood felt "like looking for a nail in soft mud".[452]

Donald Campbell, the British Ambassador to Cairo, underscored in March 1949 that "[i]t was not to be expected that the issue of a proclamation dissolving the Moslem Brethren Society would *ipso facto*[453] ensure the cessation of subversive activity and planning by its more fanatical and extreme members".[454] For ambassador Campbell, there was no doubt that the Brotherhood would continue its activities clandestinely. He reported for instance, that the organization had had "a secret wireless transmitter stated to have been operated by Moslem Brethren for the purpose of communicating instructions and propaganda to their provincial branches, and perhaps also to branches outside Egypt". According to him this "is an illustration of a determination on the part of some at least of the late Hassan al Banna's followers to continue their association and activities clandestinely".[455] This impression of continued activism was buttressed by the CIA. A report dated 14 January 1949, a month prior to al-Banna's assassination, asserted that "countermeasures" taken by the police against the Brotherhood had been "largely ineffective".[456] In the words of this report, the *Ikhwan* members continued their activities and contacts to their supreme guide, and the funds of the organization were sustained through voluntary subscriptions, collection of jewelry from members and contributions from labor syndicates. Besides that, the report noted, al-Banna used the premises of the YMMA to continue his meetings with the members.[457] This account is backed up by Mahmoud Abdel Halim,[458] a chronicler of the Brotherhood's history, who claimed that al-Banna

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[452] Ibid.
[453] Italics in original.
[454] FO 371/73464, J2528, 517/4/49G, No. 170, British Embassy Cairo, 21 March 1949.
[455] Ibid.
[456] CIA-RDP82-00457R002200760006-2, "Activity of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin: Information Report, Central Intelligence Agency", Egypt, 14 Januar 1949.
[457] Ibid.
[458] Abdel Halim (1917-1999) hailed from Rashid, a coastal town 65 kilometers east of Alexandria. Abdel Halim moved to Alexandria in 1929 where he was enrolled at upper secondary school after completing his primary school in Rashid. He had the desire from an early age for activism, which is why in Rashid he had established the society "enjoin the good and prohibiting of the evil". While he was inspired by the nationalistic vision of Wafd, he longed after an Islamic conception which could integrate Islam with the nationalist cause. Upon finishing secondary school, he moved to Cairo to study at the faculty of agriculture. In Cairo he met al-Banna, who in his outlook combined the Islamic and modern outlook; "he had a beard of an Azhari and the clothes of a modern man". Inspired by the ideas of the Brotherhood, he joined the organization in 1936, and became a close associate of al-Banna and a member of the *Ikhwan's* consultative assembly. (edt.) Ikhwan-Wiki (undated) *Mahmoud Abdel Halim, Namūzaj al-Qiyāda wal-*Jundiya (Mahmoud Abdel Halim, a model of leadership and soldiery), https://bit.ly/2RcnRhG (consulted 21.01.20).

had obtained a membership in the YMMA at the beginning of this crisis to secure a lifeline for his continued activities.[459] In other words, the *Ikhwan's* organizational structures, which had been built around the idea of secrecy, played a significant role in ensuring the Brotherhood's continuity.

Consistent with Erickson's assertion that strong ties are preferred for secret societies facing risk,[460] we observe that the Brotherhood opted for strong ties in order to withstand the threats it faced at this point in time. This was not a period of recruiting new members, but a period in which already existing "ties" inside the Brotherhood continued.[461]

In the biography of Fathi Osman[462], authored by his daughter Ghada Osman, we find such an account. Based on her late father's experience, Osman describes how the government's attempts to scatter the organization by re-posting its members to distant areas like Aswan in Upper Egypt "fostered new relations between them. These Muslim Brothers, often previously strangers to each other, now roomed together, with three or four to an apartment, creating a surrogate family and a new community",[463] thereby consolidating the strong ties of the Brotherhood. Similar accounts are also offered by a number of Brotherhood members who underwent the same experience. Thus, the repression and the concurrent attempt to 'scatter' the members came to play into the hands of the Brothers, as such examples demonstrate. Shadi, a police officer and high-ranking Brother, relates that he was transferred to Aswan where he became acquainted with the "trustworthy missionary Fathi Osman". There in the remote Aswan, Shadi, Osman and numerous other Brothers created stronger links and continued their Brotherhood activities, according to their accounts.[464] In this way, by transferring members to remote areas the regime may have succeeded in distancing them from the political epicenter in Cairo and to a lesser degree Alexandria, but it also allowed members to get acquainted with segments of the Brotherhood previously unknown to those from the major cities because of the geographical remoteness, thereby creating a sense of communality between them. Having discussed the continuing activities of the Brotherhood as presented by the Brothers and the

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[459] Abdel Halim 2013 II, 71,74.

[460] Erickson 1981, 195.

[461] Abdel Halim 2013 II, 439: He maintains that by knowing each other, the Brothers could exclude any outsider who could possibly be infiltrators.

[462] Osman (1928-2010) was born in al-Minya, a town 150 miles south of Cairo. He was exposed to political discussions during his early adolescence when he accompanied his father to the coffeeshops; this did endow him with interest in politics, which at this time meant interest in the national cause. Attending a speech of Hasan al-Banna in his hometown, al-Minya, Fathi Osman was attracted by the way in which al-Banna presented Islam as relevant for the success in this life and not only in the hereafter, in contrast to the traditional preachers he had been used to hearing. He joined the Brotherhood in 1942. In 1948, at twenty years old, he graduated from the History department at Cairo University (Osman 2011, 1-5, 30-3, 69).

[463] Osman 2011, 81-2.

[464] Shadi 1987, 113; Al-Sisi 2003, 225-7, 254.

US and British diplomats, the next section will be a concise discussion of the opportunities that evolve from such periods of underground activism and exile.

3.3.3. New Opportunities; Continuation and Trans-nationalization

As a consequence of escalating policing, della Porta observed that "repertoires of action have also been sensitive to changing (opening and closing) windows of opportunity".[465] And by conceiving imprisonment and persecution as an escalation of "policing" we can contend that this phase of conflict had a notable effect on the "windows of opportunity" for the Brotherhood. To give an example of the scale of "policing", an estimated 4,000 members of the Brotherhood were arrested and detained during this period, while an unknown number were either exiled to remote areas of Egypt or fled Egypt to avoid persecution.[466]

However, while some windows of opportunity undoubtedly were closed as a result of this persecution, others were opened. I will therefore point to some of the opportunities that evolved out of this phase of repression, to nuance my discussion of the first *miḥna*. In so doing, I contend that from this first ordeal we can observe some patterns of opportunities that would remerge in subsequent periods of repression. However, by taking this position I do not attempt to idealize repression and the Brotherhood's experience with repression, but I suggest that a discussion of the opportunities that emerge from such periods is vital to understanding the *Ikhwan's* ability to endure.

One such illustrative example was the opportunities that emanated from the detention camps that housed large numbers of Brothers. We learn from a number of Brotherhood members that these camps, despite the difficulties naturally linked to them, presented the inmates with windows of opportunity. Al-Qaradawi, one of those detained in a camp in al-Tur in southern Sinai, recalls that as a consequence of the large number of arrested *Ikhwan*, the detention cells were overcrowded. Housing members of the Brotherhood from every corner of Egypt, the camp created a sense of communality among the incarcerated Brothers and brought them closer together, relates al-Qaradawi. With seven or eight Brothers in each cell, he recounts that they supported and amused each other, and even established courses to educate fellow Brothers in Quranic verses and other religious subjects, thereby making a '*minḥa*' (gift) out of the '*miḥna*' (ordeal). He also points to the fact that many Brothers became familiar with other members they had never met, as the detention

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[465] della Porta 2013, 57.
[466] Mitchell 1993, 72.

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camp huddled *Ikhwan* together from various geographical areas and from different age groups.[467] This account is substantiated by Duh, who narrates that the many Brothers concentrated in the same camp became acquainted with each other, and "lived as one big family" where they "studied aspects of our religion and *daʿwa*".[468]

Al-Tilmisani,[469] who became the Ikhwan's third *Murshid* in 1973, recollects that the Brotherhood inmates continued to organize "Tuesday's Seminars" which had been the practice of al-Banna every Tuesday prior to his death.[470] Such accounts figure in abundance in *Ikhwan* memoirs, pointing to a continuation of activities inside the prisons. In other words, by concentrating many Brothers in the same place, the authorities unintentionally came to create ties among them.

Another 'window of opportunity' that presented itself in this period of expanding restrictions and repression,[471] was the increasing trans-nationalization of the Brotherhood. Alongside the dissolution the government had simultaneously issued an official declaration closing the organization's branch headquarters, seizing its money and confiscating publications and documents authored by its members, and prohibiting any Brotherhood gathering consisting of five members or more.[472] These procedures clearly display the restrictiveness of this period towards the *Ikhwan*. In response, an unknown number of Brotherhood members managed to escape Egypt to continue their activities from abroad. Some of these early exiles fled to Libya where they were granted asylum by the Senussi-order.[473] In 1949, and probably as a result of this interaction between Brotherhood exiles and Libyan society, the American Consul to Tripoli in Libya reported that "Moslem Brotherhood ideas and techniques are gaining importance" in the country.[474] According to al-Sisi, who was familiar with some of the Brothers who fled to Libya, they spent a period of time in neighboring

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[467] Al-Qaradawi 2002, 68-9, 358-9.

[468] Duh 1983, 51.

[469] Al-Tilmisani (1904-86) Born in Cairo to a cotton-trading family. His grandfather was a diligent reader of Wahabism and he published a number of Ibn Abdel Wahab's books. The young Umar was therefore brought up in a religious atmosphere in this home of middle class parents. In 1933 he graduated from law school and established a law office in Cairo. In the same year, he joined the Brotherhood to become the first lawyer in its ranks. In 1973 he was appointed the third leader of the *Ikhwan*, a task he held until his death in 1986. (al-Uqayl 2008, 657-658).

[470] Al-Tilmisani 1985, 42.

[471] Yavuz 2004, 270: Yavuz describes opportunity spaces as including "independent newspapers, TV stations, magazines, financial institutions, and private educational facilities, all of which provided autonomous networks of association for the production and dissemination of religious values and ways of life." We can similarly argue that the Brotherhood had enjoyed such spaces of opportunity in non-repressive periods prior to the 1948-dissolution.

[472] (edt.) Ikhwan-Wiki (undated) *Al-Amr al-ʿAskarī bi-Ḥal al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin li-Sanat 1948* (The military commandment for dissolving the Muslim Brotherhood, for the year 1948) https://bit.ly/2O2RAYJ (consulted 27.01.20).

[473] Al-Sisi 2003, 223. The Senussis were a well-known sufi order, clan and politico-religious movement. Idris al-Senussi, a grandson of the clan-founder, became king of Libya in 1951. He was toppled by a coup d'état in 1969 by army-officer Muammar al-Gaddafi.

[474] 865.014/3–2149, Telegram, "The Consul at Tripoli (Taft) to the Secretary of State", Tripoli, March 21, 1949.

Libya before they continued their journey of exile to Europe, and more particularly, London.[475] As al-Sisi noted, "these *miḥan* (ordeals) of displacement" offered the Brotherhood an opportunity to reach out to new regions, increasing the transnational nature of the organization and spreading its ideas to new domains.[476] British mandarins also reported growing *Ikhwan* activities in the Sudan at this time, indicating that the Brotherhood was planning a "terrorist campaign" similar to that "already carried out in Egypt".[477] The British officials also voiced fears of the Brotherhood's transnational character at this time. For example, it was reported that the Brotherhood was active in Yemen and was receiving monetary support from various countries. Furthermore, in what seems to be a considerable exaggeration, Egyptian police informed British officials that they had come into possession of documents written "to HASSAN EL BANNA [sic] from Pakistan saying that he could rely on at least a million members"[478]. While such reports were exaggerated, they point to the transnationality of the Brotherhood in this period as perceived by the Egyptian and British officials.

The Levant was also a destination for the Brotherhood's exiles in this period. At the end of December 1948, the CIA reported that more than ten members of the Egyptian Brotherhood had arrived in Beirut from Egypt, where they met with representatives of Islamic organizations in Lebanon and the Mufti of Lebanon, Muhammad Tawfiq Khalid. On 5 January 1949, meetings were reportedly held in Tripoli in northern Lebanon with representatives of the Islamist organizations there and with members of the Syrian Branch of the Brotherhood, among them Muhammad al-Mubarak, a well-known leader of the Brothers in Syria. The representatives from Egypt delivered a message from the Supreme Guide, al-Banna, which underscored, among other things, the necessity of "recruiting the largest possible number of Muslims" and "spreading as much propaganda as possible*"*. It was furthermore resolved that these meetings should be held periodically.[479] CIA reports, going back to April 1947, reveal that Brotherhood delegates from Egypt, among them the prominent student-leader Mustafa Muʾmin, had "been sent to Syria and Lebanon on behalf of the Moslem Brotherhood Society in Cairo in order to study the unity of the Moslem Brotherhood Societies in the Levant".[480] More interestingly, the CIA officers noted that the Brotherhood in Egypt

[475] Al-Sisi 2003: 223. One of those Brothers who reached London at this early stage was Izz al-Din Ibrahim. Ibrahim received his PhD from Cambridge in 1963, after which he continued his work in the Gulf (al-Qaradawi 2004, 472-3).
[476] al-Sisi 2003, 256.
[477] FO 141/1342, 108/3/49 G, DS (E) DS/P/62, "Arab Societies, Ikhwan El Muslimeen" G.J. Jenkns, British Embassy, Cairo, 20 January 1949.
[478] FO 141/1342, 108/4/49 G, DS (E) DS/P/62, G.J. Jenkins, British Embassy, Cairo, 28 January 1949.
[479] CIA-RDP82-00457R002500210003-2, Information Report, Central Intelligence Agency "Activities of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin" Lebanon, 22 March 1949.
[480] CIA-RDP82-00457R000400630001-1, Intelligence Report, Central Intelligence group, "Egyptian Attempts to strengthen Moslem Brotherhood in Lebanon and Syria", Lebanon/Egypt, 2 April 1947.

"attempt to effect their [Ikhwan branches] cooperation for the defense of their status in all the Arab countries",[481] which points to a deliberate course of action adopted by the Brotherhood since that time.

Thus, as early as 1947, if not earlier, the Brotherhood began to think of ways to continue their activities in periods of persecution. Against this background, the transnational character of the Brotherhood became vital. More importantly, one could argue that the Brotherhood's regional character, which had been developed since the formative period, as we have noted in this chapter, offered the organization a lifeline in severe periods of repression. This understanding was explicitly acknowledged in January 1949 by the British authorities in Egypt. Commenting on the ability to suppress the Brotherhood, G.J. Jenkins noted, "If Egypt was the only country that had members of the Ikhwan it might be easier". [482] In other words, the transnational character of the *Ikhwan* reinforced its vitality.

3.4. Conclusions

Simmel describes secrecy as a "correlate of despotism and of police control. It acts as protection alike of defense and of offense against the violent pressure of central powers".[483] With this understanding in mind, I argued that the secrecy of the Brotherhood, beginning as a defensive mechanism, came to have a variety of effects on the organization and its trajectory. The Brotherhood has in a recent study been described as an organization with a semi-clandestine mentality.[484] However, as was shown in this chapter, in order to comprehend this so-called 'mentality' we have to dig into this period as a formative period of extensive secret activism to understand how and why such secrecy developed in the ranks of the *Ikhwan.* When the persecution began, first with the dissolution of the Brotherhood, and then with the assassination of its leader and the detention of its active members, the structures of the organization were to a large degree transformed into secrecy in an attempt to survive persecution. This period has gone down in the *Ikhwan's* own historical narrative as the first *miḥna* in which a great deal of injustice and persecution was done to them. Zollner described the state of the Brotherhood, after the death of Hasan al-Banna, as one of deep crisis.[485] Although correct in her assessment, Zollner's contention

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[481] Ibid.
[482] FO 141/1342, 108/2/49G, DS (E) DS/P/62 "Arab Societies, Ikhwan el Muslimeen", Jenkins, Cairo to Head of SIME, GHQ MELF, 6 January 1949.
[483] Simmel 1906, 472.
[484] Pargeter 2016, 1, 89.
[485] Zollner 2011, 16.

does not fully account for the historical development of the *Ikhwan* in this period. As I have contended, the Brotherhood utilized this period to develop mechanisms of clandestine activities and a mindset of secrecy in order to survive this and subsequent periods of state persecution. As a well-organized and highly structured mass organization with grassroots structures, the *Ikhwan* did not merely disappear when persecuted but continued its activities covertly, a pattern that we shall see remerging in the Nasserite era. Thus, this period revealed the "flouting of state authority and power by the Ikhwan", as underlined by Vatikiotis.[486]

When the persecution peaked with the assassination of Hasan al-Banna and the arrest of an estimated 4,000 members of the organization,[487] an escalation towards "action militarization"[488] took place in parts of the Brotherhood. This militarization, which had deep roots in the *Ikhwan's* history, became more radical in this period. This was illustrated by the violent campaign executed by a fringe of Brothers in what they perceived as a *jihad* against an anti-Islamic regime. This early experience of armed struggle against domestic governments indicates that the idea of *jihad* against fellow Muslims was not invented by Qutb, but rather had existed among some Brothers as early as 1948. For example, the assassination of Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi was normatively explained by many Brothers as a *jihad* against 'an enemy of Islam'.

On 25 July 1949, Ibrahim Abdel Hadi left office, to be succeeded by the independent Hussein Sirri Pasha, who formed a caretaker government of all major parties to prepare for elections at the beginning of 1950. In January 1950, the Wafd was re-elected, with Mustafa al-Nahhas as Prime Minister, marking the way out of this first *miḥna*.[489] The Brotherhood had during the Saadist period been standing trial for different incidents,[490] such as planning the overthrow of the political order.[491] While the court found evidence of a "criminal conspiracy for murder and destruction", it acquitted the Brotherhood of the charges concerning an alleged conspiracy to overthrow the regime.[492] Of those charged in the Jeep case, which came to be held as the main case against the Brotherhood because it involved documents which according to the prosecution could prove the intention to

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[486] Vatikiotis 1985, 366.
[487] Mitchell 1993, 72.
[488] della Porta 2013, 196.
[489] Hopwood 1993, 29. The dismissal of Abdel Hadi's cabinet was understood as the king's "Bairam [Eid] gift to the nation", indicating how unpopular the Prime Minister had become in his last days. (FO 371/80347, JE 1016/23, 1011/9/50, No. 49, British Embassy, Cairo, 25 January 1950). The same celebration of the dismissal as an "Eid-gift" is also to be found in the Brotherhood accounts, see for instance al-Tilmisani 1985, 26; al-Banna, (undated) https://bit.ly/35ZIIsR (consulted 16.01.20).
[490] Four main cases were raised against the Brotherhood; 1) the Jeep case, 2) the case regarding the assassination of al-Nuqrashi, 3) the *awkār* (nests/cells) case, and 4) the Hamid Juda case.
[491] For a detailed outline of the court case, see Mitchell 1993: 73-79.
[492] Mitchell 1993, 78; Abdel Halim 2013 II, 302.

stage a coup, 14 were acquitted of all charges while 18 received minor sentences of between one and three years in prison. The judge announced that those accused had had "nationalist incentives, as sons of an occupied nation" and had been under influence of the "Palestine catastrophe", declaring that the court "commends the principles of the Brotherhood". On a later date, this same judge announced, "I was prosecuting them, now I am one of them".[493]

The change of government and the acquittal on charges regarding a conspiracy to overthrow the regime marked the end of one period and the beginning of another in the history of the Brotherhood. What had forced the organization underground was now over, and the Brotherhood could return to the surface; demonstrating that it had not vanished due to repression.

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[493] Abdel Halim 2013 II, 303.

4. A new era: Hasan al-Hudaybi and the Muslim Brotherhood

Between Moderation and Radicalization

Upon his appointment as *Murshid,* Hasan Ismail al-Hudaybi (1891-1973) formally announced that one of his main tasks would be to rid the *Ikhwan* of secrecy and militancy. As a conservative judge, a respected public figure, and an experienced man of 60 years of age, al-Hudaybi seemed the perfect candidate to fulfill this task. From a western point of view, also, al-Hudaybi seemed promising. As someone representing conservatism and moderation, al-Hudaybi was looked upon as a person whose "first object appears to be to show that the Brotherhood is respectable" and as a man "of different type from the fanatical Hassan al Banna". This seemed to be the view of both American and British diplomats.[494] However, al-Hudaybi's task proved more complicated than he may have expected.

The dismissal of Abdel Hadi's government in 1949 and the subsequent return of the Wafd to power in January 1950 marked a relatively favorable change for the outlawed Brotherhood. After a period of outright repression and dissolution which had forced them underground, the *Ikhwan* were promised a return to an overt and legal existence by the Wafd, in return for their support of the latter in the parliamentary ballots.[495] However, as the events unfolded, it quickly became apparent that the new government was just not prepared to let the Brotherhood back onto the public scene. Going back on its pledge to bring the Brotherhood back to legality, the Wafd tried to marginalize the organization and restrict its freedom of action. Faced with this reality, the *Ikhwan* opted, in the first part of the post-Saadist period, for a semi-legal presence and for semi-clandestine activities in order to safeguard its existence and continue its activities, until such time as the restrictions on them were eased. In other words, the period that preceded al-Hudaybi's appointment was characterized by political contention and disagreement between the two major actors on Egypt's pre-revolutionary scene, *al-Ikhwan* and the Wafd: When the Brotherhood was denied access to the formal political arena, it chose the "dynamic periphery"[496] to carry on its activities and presence in society.

This chapter will therefore focus primarily on discussing the development of the Brotherhood under the leadership of al-Hudaybi from 1950. When al-Hudaybi was chosen as second *Murshid* in 1950, ending a leaderless period that lasted for about two years, it soon became obvious that the

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[494] FO 371/96870, JE 1018/1, No. 1, 1012/1/52, British Embassy, Cairo, 1 January 1952.
[495] Mitchell 1993, 81.
[496] Wickham 2002, 93-4.

'new Hasan' lacked charisma and oratory skills, and when compared to al-Banna he seemed quite the opposite. Accordingly, when al-Hudaybi initially declared that he intended to rid the Brotherhood of its militancy and secrecy, a strong faction of the organization stood up to him. This chapter will therefore begin with a discussion of this change in leadership and strategy, as personified in al-Hudaybi in his leadership of the *Ikhwan.* Omar Ashour has argued that al-Hudaybi "initially started a process that aimed to completely dismantle the SA [Special Apparatus]" but that upon facing "several obstacles" he "pragmatically changed the objective into the reformation, rather than the dismantling of the SA".[497] While I concur in understanding al-Hudaybi's initial task as ridding the *Ikhwan* of militancy, I argue that the change of heart by al-Hudaybi with regard to militancy and secrecy should be understood in the context of the continuing British presence in Egypt and the heightened anti-colonial struggle that emerged in the Canal Zone in late 1951, known as the War in the Canal Zone. Accordingly, by studying the engagement of the Brotherhood in the Canal Zone, I will critically assess the historical events that altered al-Hudaybi's initial objection to secrecy and militancy. What role did the War in the Canal Zone play in changing al-Hudaybi's heart?

Discussion of al-Hudaybi's early leadership and the Brotherhood's engagement in the Canal Zone is vital to an understanding of the history of the *Ikhwan* and their subsequent relations to the military regime in the 1950s. I argue that the continuation of the Brotherhood's secret structures, and particularly the Special Apparatus which epitomized the militant idea of the *Ikhwan*, came to play a crucial role in intensifying the conflict between the military junta and the Brotherhood in 1954.

4.1. Hasan al-Hudaybi, a New Direction?

With the loss of Hasan al-Banna in February 1949, the Brotherhood was left without a leader to fill the gap left by the Brotherhood's founder. As we saw in the previous chapter, the organization had survived during the first *miḥna* on account of its highly structured organization and due to its hierarchical dimension, which saw different leading members assume responsibility to secure its continuity. However, the loss of al-Banna undoubtedly marked a leadership crisis in the ranks of the Brotherhood which lasted for two years. Hamed Abul Nasr, the fourth *Murshid*, describes the

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[497] Ashour 2009, 64.

period that followed al-Banna's death as an "uneasy sea of confusion".[498]

Accordingly, the appointment of a new leader acquired high-priority status for the *Ikhwan* as soon as the political change had taken place with the dismissal of Abdel Hadi's government in late 1949, and the subsequent liberalization, although limited, that occurred with the election of the Wafd in early 1950.[499] Against this background, four competing blocs evolved in the Brotherhood, each represented by a senior Brother:[500] 1) Abdel Rahman al-Banna[501], Hasan al-Banna's younger Brother, who claimed leadership by inheritance - his legitimacy stemmed from his blood-relation to Hasan al-Banna and his early affiliation with the *Ikhwan*.[502] 2) al-Baqouri, the de-facto leader of the Brotherhood in the period of 1949-1951 when he was chosen interim caretaker of the *Ikhwan* by al-Banna and a highly respected Azhari scholar.[503] 3) Abdel Hakim 'Abdin, Hasan al-Banna's Brother in law and the general secretary of the Brotherhood.[504] 4) Salih Ashmawi, the deputy of the Brotherhood, editor in chief of al-Daʿwa magazine, and a close ally of the Special Apparatus.[505]

The contenders could not agree to choose one of them as *Murshid*, resulting in an increasing rivalry that threatened the very coherence of the *Ikhwan*.[506] The perception was that the appointment of one of the nominees, without the endorsement of his rivals, would split the organization.[507]

In an attempt to ease this tension, a fifth camp therefore evolved, consisting of upper-class

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[498]Abul Nasr 1988: 53- Abul Nasr (1913-1996) is a descendant of Ali Ahmad Abul Nasr, a respected Azhari who took part in the Urabi uprising in the late 19th century. Hamed Abul Nasr was born in Manfalut, a city located on the west bank of the Nile in the Asyut Governorate, about 360 Kilometers south of Cairo. The young Abul Nasr began participating in socioreligious movements before his association with the Brotherhood. In the early 1930s he was a member of the YMMA, before he eventually joined the *Ikhwan* in 1934. He quickly climbed the ladder inside the Brotherhood, becoming a member of its general assembly and subsequently its general guidance office, before he was appointed as its fourth general guide in 1986 (Al-Uqayl 2008, 834-5).

[499] FO 371/80343, JE 1013/18, No. 82, "From Cairo to Foreign Office" 3 April 1950. The British embassy seems to have followed the developments inside the Brotherhood closely. In this report, penned by Sir. R. Campbell, it is argued that al-Baqouri has been elected as al-Banna's successor. Although mistaken, such assessment was probably based on discussions inside the Brotherhood, where al-Baqouri indeed was one of the nominees for the position.

[500] I will not go into depth with describing these events that occurred when the *Ikhwan* was looking for a new leader. These events have already been described by Mitchell 1993, 84-7.

[501] Abdel Rahman changed his surname to Al-Banna after Hasan al-Banna's death in 1949; he had previously been known as "al-Sa'ati" (the watchmaker, which was his father's occupation). This alteration was presumably an attempt to consolidate his position in the Brotherhood, as a senior member and as the rightful inheritor of its leadership.

[502] Abdel Halim 2013 II, 445; Shadi 1987, 122.

[503] Abul Nasr 1988, 51; Abdel Khaleq 1987, 61; Shadi 1987, 122.

[504] Abdel Rahim 1989, 23; Shadi 1987, 122.

[505] Shadi 1987, 122; Abul Nasr 1988, 52.

[506] Ibid., 122.

[507] Mitchell 1993, 85; Shadi 1987, 122. Rumors about this conflict had also reached British diplomats in Cairo in April 1950: FO 371/80343, JE 1013/18, No. 82, "From Cairo to Foreign Office" 3 April 1950.

Brothers headed by Munir al-Dilla.[508] Al-Dilla's star had risen following the first *miḥna*, as he, his wife Amal al-Ashmawi and his brother-in-law Hasan al-Ashmawi, had played a central role in directing the activities of the Brotherhood and supporting the families of arrested Brothers.[509] This fifth camp, which arguably can be conceived of as a camp of compromise, looked upon Hasan al-Hudaybi as a solution that could serve the *Ikhwan* in different ways. On the one hand, by choosing al-Hudaybi as heir, the Brotherhood could internally reach a settlement without risking a split in its ranks.[510] On the other hand, as a respectable judge for more than 25 years who had served on the highest court in Egypt, the cessation court, and a respected figure with connections to upper-echelons of society, al-Hudaybi could help restore the good reputation of the *Ikhwan* after a period of political crisis in which they had been singled out as a terrorist organization.[511]

When first approached by senior Brothers in early 1950, Al-Hudaybi refused the offer. With no experience in leading a mass organization, he cited bad health as one excuse, and the disagreements between the leading figures in the Brotherhood as another.[512] However, sometime after this first approach and on the heels of a campaign to convince him to take over the position,[513] al-Hudaybi was informally[514] appointed the successor to al-Banna, thereby becoming the *Ikhwan's* second General Guide. Al-Hudaybi's appointment was made official on 19 October 1951, after a period of keeping it unofficial and concealed as he was still serving as judge.

After his appointment, al-Hudaybi did not immediately convince the *Ikhwan's* rank and file of his ability to lead their organization: He seemed to be diametrically opposed to al-Banna. While al-

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[508] Munir al-Dilla (1921-74) was born to a rich landowning family in Upper Egypt. He moved to Cairo, at some point to study law at Cairo University. While in Cairo, the young al-Dilla befriended a fellow law student, Hasan al-Ashmawi, son of Muhammad al-Ashmawi, Minister of Education during different periods. When he graduated from law school, al-Dilla became councilor of state, and soon after he married Hasan al-Ashmawi's sister, Amal al-Ashmawi. It was about this time that he also joined the Brotherhood. That was, according to Richard Mitchell, in 1947; his joining was described as "the introduction into the movement of 'Cadillacs and aristocracy'" (Mitchell 1993, 85). A devout follower of Hasan al-Banna and the principles of the Brotherhood, al-Dilla and his wife contributed immensely to the Brotherhood.

[509] Rizq 1991, 23; Mitchell 1993, 85; see also, Al-Antabli (undated) https://bit.ly/2u7KMl6 (consulted 26.11.18).

[510] According to the recollection of Abdel Qader Hilmi who attended the meeting in Al-Dilla's home, which was organized to find an heir to the vacant post, al-Dilla asked the four contenders to choose one of them to lead the Brotherhood; but no agreement was reached. Munir al-Dilla therefore outlined the potential dangers a crisis would trigger if they did not come to an agreement. The impression from the meeting was one of total disagreement. Against this background, al-Dilla mentioned Hasan al-Hudaybi as a candidate to the position of General Guide. As we learn from Abdel Qader Hilmi, the reaction to this idea was not one of rejection. Cited in Shadi 1987: 124.

[511] Abdel Khaleq 1987, 64; Abul Nasr, 1988, 54; Abdel Halim 2013 II, 469.

[512] Abdel Khaleq 1987, 64.

[513] The British Embassy in Cairo points to May 1950 as the date for al-Hudaybi's appointment as leader of the *Ikhwan* (FO 371/96870, JE 1018/1, No. 1, 1012/1/52, British Embassy, Cairo, 1 January 1952).

[514] On the one hand, the Brotherhood had not yet regained its legality. On the other, al-Hudaybi was still a functioning judge, who according to Egyptian law was not allowed to be a member of a political party or organization, hence why his appointment as *Murshid* had to remain unofficial until he retired as a judge. He did so in October 1951.

Banna had resembled many of his Brothers - newly urbanized, middle class background, non-elite and with a remarkable talent to address the masses,[515] al-Hudaybi was just the opposite. An upper-class judge, affiliated with the country's political elite and the palace[516] and characterized by introverted forms of behavior, al-Hudaybi lacked the very qualities that had distinguished his predecessor and made him a leader of men; in other words, the very attributes he had been chosen for became his initial disadvantages. Introverted in his outlook and behavior, al-Hudaybi "listened more than he spoke", and it was one of the difficulties that the Brotherhood members came across at the outset of his leadership.[517] He represented the classical bourgeois, which derived its autonomy from being sovereign, rational, tempered, and introverted.[518] In direct contrast to al-Banna whose oratory skills had been excellent according to a majority of Brothers, al-Hudaybi was no orator at all, and he was not able to arouse the same degree of warmth towards his person as his predecessor had. Even more disadvantageous to al-Hudaybi was the fact that he had not been a regular member of the *Ikhwan*. When looked upon by a majority of the Brothers as an outsider and a newcomer to the organization, al-Hudaybi's position was further weakened in the Brotherhood's ranks. Accordingly, at an early stage of his appointment, the British expected al-Hudaybi to be "a mere figurehead" who "is neither an impressive figure nor a particularly good speaker".[519]

Thus, al-Hudaybi, a conservative judge with no experience in mass politics, had acquired the leadership of a mass organization that was still hovering between an existence of secrecy and non-secrecy.[520] Therefore, the senior Brothers who had fancied themselves as leaders of the *Ikhwan* prior to al-Hudaybi's appointment considered his role to be symbolic, leaving day-to-day administration of the Brotherhood to the already existing structures of leadership.[521]

However, shortly after his appointment we observe a clear attempt from al-Hudaybi's side to consolidate his hold on the organization, which points to an early confusion about what role the new *Murshid* should play. This consolidation, that al-Hudaybi attempted to push through, was closely

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[515] Lia 2010, 118; Tilmisani 1985, 107.
[516] The chief of the royal household was al-Hudaybi's Brother-in-law (Mitchell 1993; 85; Ramadan 1993: 92).
[517] Shadi Cited in Rizq 1991, 45; See also Ahmad 1977, 5; Abdel Halim 2013 II, 491.
[518] Jung & Zalaf 2019, 7.
[519] FO 371/90115, JE 10110/18, 1011/16/51G, British Embassy, Cairo, 17 May 1951.
[520] In March 1951, less than a year after al-Hudaybi's de facto appointment as leader, the British and Americans were still considering the possibility of "reemergence of the assassination-type of politics of the Moslem Brotherhood"; See for example CIA-RDP79T01146A000100200001-9, Daily Digest of Significant Traffic, Office of Current Intelligence, 23 Marts 1951.
[521] Shadi cited in Rizq 1991, 47.

connected to his and his associates'[522] intent to move the *Ikhwan* away from militancy and secrecy. Against this background, al-Hudaybi set about restructuring the leadership of the *Ikhwan,* effectively bringing it under his control. For example, he appointed Abdel Qader Uda as his new deputy, depriving Ashmawi of his hitherto powerful position as deputy.[523] This reshuffle in the higher levels of the *Ikhwan* by the new *Murshid* symbolized a clear challenge to the more radical faction of the Brothers, embodied in the Special Apparatus and its close ally and patron Saleh Ashmawi.[524] Uda, like al-Hudaybi, was a newcomer to the *Ikhwan,* and shared both social background and the profession of judge with the new leader. The replacement of the radical Ashmawi with a conservative judge demonstrates the course al-Hudaybi had opted for at this early stage of his leadership. To further consolidate his influence, he demanded the appointment of a new General Guidance Office,[525] from which senior names were excluded, while close associates of his were elevated to key positions. As a case in point, Munir al-Dilla, who had played a key role in appointing al-Hudaybi as leader, became treasurer of the organization and a member of the Guidance Office. Remarkably, al-Dilla was also a magistrate, which implies that al-Hudaybi was attempting to change the social make-up of the *Ikhwan's* highest leadership.[526]

What al-Hudaybi and his associates had in common was their disapproval of the Special Apparatus and their relative moderation in comparison to the radical faction endorsing the Apparatus and its ideas. For al-Hudaybi and many of his close associates, the Apparatus was at this particular stage[527] seen as the main reason why the Brotherhood had been dissolved and why al-Banna had been killed. Hence, I argue that al-Hudaybi's appointment, and his early attempts to restructure the leadership, came to deepen the rifts between different leading groups of the *Ikhwan*. In this regard, his early intention to dissolve the Special Apparatus and appoint newcomers to the leadership of the *Ikhwan* was considered especially high-handed and authoritarian, and thus

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[522] As I will highlight in coming sections, al-Hudaybi was strongly supported by the upper-class Brothers who at first had suggested his appointment; among these Brothers were al-Dilla, Ashmawi, Farid Abdel Khaleq, Salah Shadi, Abdel Qader Hilmi and others. This group of Brothers had the social background in common, most of them had upper-class backgrounds, while they also had family connections. A number of them had matrimonial alliances.

[523] He demanded that Abdel Qader Uda be appointed his deputy (*wakil)* (Ahmad al-Bess cited in Rizq 1991, 100; Abul Nasr 1988, 56; Abdel Khaleq 1987, 67).

[524] Saleh Ashmawi was, according to some accounts, the founder of the Apparatus. When al-Sindi acquired the leadership of the Apparatus sometime after its establishment, al-Ashmawi stayed in close contact with him and a strong relationship seems to have continued throughout the years (Shadi 1987, 128; Abdel Halim 2013 I, 289).

[525] The organization's top executive authority.

[526] Abul Nasr 1988, 55-7. Tariq al-Bishri stated that al-Hudaybi, upon his appointment, purged the leadership of opponents while he chose associates from judiciary posts and members known for their moderate stances (al-Bishri 2002, 455).

[527] I say at this particular stage, because as we will see later, al-Hudaybi seems to have changed his mind at a later point in time, restructuring the Apparatus instead of dissolving it.

explains why he faced strong opposition.[528]

Farid Abdel Khaleq, a close associate of al-Hudaybi, explicitly points to al-Hudaybi's intent to rid the Brotherhood of the Special Apparatus as a step towards a deradicalization. Abdel Khaleq maintained that the Special Apparatus had harmed the Brotherhood and had through its mistakes been partly responsible for the death of al-Banna. Abdel Khaleq added that he "as a member of the mainstream Brotherhood, like Hasan al-Banna before his death and Hasan al-Hudaybi as his successor, arrived at the conclusion that the Apparatus was inappropriate and secret activism should not exist".[529] Muhammad Khamis Hamida, deputy of the Brotherhood in 1954, offered a similar explanation. Testifying before Jamal Salem's[530] 'people's court' in November 1954, he claimed that upon al-Hudaybi's appointment it was deliberately decided to disband the Apparatus. The reason for this, as explained by Hamida, was that the Apparatus had created a dichotomy inside the organization and in its decision-making mechanisms. So, in order to secure a streamlined leadership and cohesiveness, it was decided to dissolve the Apparatus.[531]

Consequently, according to statements of senior Brothers who were close to the *Ikhwan's* decision-making at this time, al-Hudaybi became, shortly after his appointment, determined to abolish the most potent structure of the organization, i.e. the Special Apparatus. But as underlined by Hamida, this was no easy task considering that a sizeable group inside the Brotherhood conceived of the Apparatus and its members as representatives of the obligation of *jihad*, an obligation the *Ikhwan* could not abandon.[532]

In February 1951, a few months after al-Hudaybi's appointment, it was noted that a split had occurred in the upper echelons of the Brotherhood, leading to two competing factions in the Guidance Office. This "definite split" as it is described by the CIA, occurred between Saleh Ashmawi and the new Guide.[533] This conflict, which had taken place less than a year after al-Hudaybi's appointment, was unquestionably due to his initial desire to rid the Brotherhood of the Apparatus and his power struggle with its patron, al-Ashmawi. For the CIA, there were no doubts that there existed in the Brotherhood two diverging factions, with al-Hudaybi, "the judge", looked upon as a moderating but still weak factor, pitted against the "fanatical" Ashmawi and the current

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[528] For such argumentation, see for example Adel Kamal 1989, 318.

[529] Abdel Khaleq 2004, VII https://bit.ly/31jRVvk (consulted 03.02.20).

[530] Jamal Salem (1918-1968) was a member of the Revolutionary Command Council and military judge in the court-martial established to prosecute the Brotherhood for the assassination attempt on Nasser's life in October 1954.

[531] NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb* III, 557-559.

[532] NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb* III, 559.

[533] Saleh Ashmawi is described by the British as "fanatical and, in many ways, irresponsible in his actions" FO 371/90115, JE 10110/18, 1011/16/51G, British Embassy, Cairo, 17 May 1951.

he represented.[534]

In keeping with Ashour's definition of "deradicalization",[535] I argue that al-Hudaybi shortly after assuming leadership of the Ikhwan set about a process of moving the Brotherhood away from militancy and radicalism. There was a lack of consensus regarding this step, which led to internal divisions at various levels of the membership. By questioning the necessity of the Apparatus, al-Hudaybi ran into fierce resistance from a powerful faction in the Brotherhood. He had made it clear that "there is no secrecy in the service of God" and "there is no secrecy in the Message and no terrorism in religion"[536] in an explicit challenge to the Apparatus. More than that, the pro-Hudaybi faction perceived the Apparatus as an obstruction to a unified leadership of the entire Brotherhood. As long as the Apparatus existed, it would point to a duality (*izdiwājiya*) in the Brotherhood's ranks and leadership. Thus, the dissolution of the Apparatus was necessary in order to streamline the leadership, ran the argument of the anti-Apparatus faction.[537] This in turn prompted opposition from those who considered themselves representatives of this Apparatus which they deemed a vehicle through which the *jihad* obligation is fulfilled.[538] In keeping with their position, the very *raison d'être* of the Apparatus, i.e. the occupation of Egypt, remained unchanged and hence the Apparatus continued to be a necessity.[539]

If al-Hudaybi was determined to dissolve the Apparatus shortly after his appointment, a decisive event took place which came to affect the political situation in Egypt, but also influence the decision of al-Hudaybi. That was the War in the Canal Zone, which I will discuss now.

4.2 The Canal War and the Militarization of the Ikhwan

Al-Hudaybi's well-known slogan "no secrecy in Islam"[540] signified the new Murshid's scheme to direct his organization away from secrecy and militancy. But as leader of a nationalistic organization with a history of militant struggle against the British, the Zionists in Palestine and at times against the Egyptian government, al-Hudaybi was soon to learn that the odds were against him. It is however important to mention that the violence of the Brotherhood was not an exclusive

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[534] CIA-RDP82-00457R007100070004-6, Information Report, "Fu'ad Siraj al-Din and the Ikhwan" Egypt, 28 February 1951. See also FO 371/90115, JE 10110/18, 1011/16/51G, British Embassy, Cairo, 17 May 1951, in which the British describes al-Hudaybi as a "mere figurehead" and not near Hasan al-Banna's personality.
[535] Ashour 2009, 5-6.
[536] Mitchell 1993, 88.
[537] Adel Kamal 1989, 327.
[538] Ibid., 318.
[539] See for example Hamida's statement in court in 1954. (NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb* III, 559).
[540] Mitchell 1993, 88.

mark of this organization, but instead characterized a pattern in the context of the anti-colonial politics of pre-independence Egypt. As pointed to by the British Ambassador Ralph Stevenson, the violent incidents which involved the Brotherhood, such as the murders of al-Khazindar and al-Nuqrashi, were "symptomatic of a <u>malaise</u> deeprooted in Egyptian life and politics. Every Egyptian political party has either used or connived at the use of violence for political ends". [541] In other words, it was a "signature" of the historical context and the spirit of the times. Following a concise presentation of the historical events that led to what came to be known as the Canal War, I will discuss how the War blocked al-Hudaybi's early efforts to dismiss violence, putting the *Ikhwan* on a direct confrontation with the British forces in Egypt and thereby escalating the *Ikhwan's* self-perception as a group responsible for the execution of the *jihad* obligation. To do so, I discuss the Brotherhood's engagement in these crucial events and the ideological underpinnings of this participation. In concluding, I ask the question, was al-Hudaybi himself won over by the *jihad* approach dominating the Brotherhood at this stage? The discussion of the *Ikhwan's* role in the Canal Zone War is significant, as it reveals that the Brotherhood at this time opted for a militant engagement with the British as a continuation of the organization's anti-colonial agitation. In so arguing, I contend that the Brotherhood went into the post-colonial era as a militant organization that was prepared to use violence and had in fact constructed the necessary structures for the application of nationalist violence. In addition, the presentation of the crucial events that took place in this period, and more particularly my discussion of the role played by the Brotherhood, is significant for our understanding of the history of the *Ikhwan*. While these events that saw the Egyptian nationalists engage the British-troops in guerilla-warfare were of pivotal importance in the history of Egypt and the Brotherhood, scholarly accounts of the role played by the *Ikhwan* are inadequate. Accordingly, a discussion of the role played by the Brotherhood in this battle is important. The war, I argue, thwarted al-Hudaybi's initial idea of "dismissing militancy", causing the new *Murshid* to instead make it his intention to control and direct the secrecy and militancy of the *Ikhwan*.

Nationalism and anti-colonialism continued to characterize Egyptian politics, as had been the case almost since the occupation of the land on the Nile in 1882. Since being elected in January 1950, the Wafd had based its political promises on achieving a solution to the national question, which ultimately involved the attempt to end the British occupation of Egypt. As a result of this, in March 1950 it requested a reopening of talks with the British government over this unresolved

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[541] FO 371/90115, JE 10110/15, 1019/27/51, No. 167, British Embassy, Cairo, 2nd May 1951. (Italics in original).

issue.[542] However, as the months went on without any notable results, the popular feeling was one of growing exasperation, requiring an escalation of Egypt's approach. This had become evident since early 1951, when nationalist fever was intensified and popular demands for the government to break off the negotiations with the British side were becoming loud.[543] While not delivering any solution to the national issue, a general discontent towards the Wafdist government was felt among "all classes" which resulted in the impression "that the situation was thoroughly bad".[544] Therefore, as a consequence of the deterioration of the public feeling the Wafd began directing its energies against the British, presumably to satisfy the public and draw attention away from socio-economic problems. As pointed to by Roger Louis, the Egyptian side, and especially the Wafd, had no choice but to demand evacuation of British troops from Egypt so as to satisfy popular claims. From the British point of view on the other hand, the Suez Canal epitomized a crucial base for British security and global influence, which "seemed to be at stake" if any change to its status occurred.[545] Egypt was seen by the British as "the only country that fulfilled the strategic requirements of housing a base capable of supporting a major campaign in the Middle East".[546] On that account, an evacuation of this crucial base seemed inconceivable for the British authorities. In late May 1951, as an example of the deteriorating situation in Egypt, a British report described the state of affairs in Egypt as an "increasing drift towards extremism".[547]

By the summer of 1951, negotiations were characterized by distrust and disagreement, and the whole situation appeared to be moving towards confrontation. During talks between the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the British Ambassador to Egypt, the latter was told categorically that "unless satisfactory bases for negotiations [...] had been found by the end of the present Parliamentary session, the Egyptian Government would be compelled to publish the documentary exchanges and to declare their inability to continue the conversations." Responding to this, the Ambassador warned him of the "seriousness of the consequences" if he did so.[548] In light of these confrontational attitudes, British forces in the Canal Zone began preparing for large disturbances from August 1951.[549] The following month, Stevenson expressed to the Egyptian Minister of Interior, Siraj al-Din, his growing anxiety with regard to the Egyptian public discourse which had

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[542] Vatikiotis 1985, 368.
[543] FO 371/90115, JE 10110/4, "Protest March in Cairo, Student Demands", 15 January 1951.
[544] FO 371/90115, JE 1011/7/51G, British Embassy, Cairo, 23 February 1951.
[545] Louis 1985, 691.
[546] Ibid., 720.
[547] FO 371/90115, JE 10110/19, 1011/42/51, No. 191, British Embassy, Cairo, 23 May 1951.
[548] FO 371/134, JE 1051/131, No. 458, Alexandria to Foreign Office, 6 July 1951.
[549] Thornhill 2006, 34

turned virulent against the British. As identified by Stevenson, publications in various organs encouraged citizens "to undertake "guerilla" or "irregular" warfare against British forces in Egypt".[550] This development was "extremely disturbing" to the British and indicated the intensification of the Egyptian discourse against the British. The ambassador branded one author, "Maitre Sayed Kotb [sic]", whose violent articles appeared in, inter alia, the *Ikhwan's* al-Da'wa magazine, as embodying this development. If this advocacy of violence continued unrestricted, it would "lead to violent attacks against British individuals".[551] This description of Sayyid Qutb in a British report as violently nationalist and anti-British suggests that Qutb in this period, much like the radical nationalists of this time, shared the anti-British sentiments and considered the Egyptian case as a key issue. It was the nationalist cause that predominantly occupied Qutb at this time, rather than the Islamic nature of the state. It is interesting to note also that the *Ikhwan's* publications continued to be a platform for anti-British agitation and radical discourses despite the moderating stance voiced by al-Hudaybi, which indicate that he had not yet been able to impose his will on the Brotherhood.

In September 1951, in a sign of the role played by the *Ikhwan* in intensifying the conflict, clashes were reported to have taken place between demonstrators and the police as anti-British demonstrations took place in major cities. A demonstration 10,000 strong, "largely under the control of members of the Ikhwan al Muslimeen", was angrily reported by the British Ambassador, Stevenson, who maintained that "[m]ore such manifestations of feeling may, of course, be expected".[552]

By the autumn of 1951, the Egyptian government had reached the conviction that the British "purpose was merely to drag out the conversations", concluding that no resolution to the issue of the national question could be achieved except by "drastic measures".[553] These drastic measures arrived on 8 October 1951 when al-Nahhas announced before the Lower House of parliament, "for Egypt I signed the defence treaty and for Egypt I abrogate it", thereby abrogating the 1936 Treaty of Friendship and the 1899 Sudanese Condominium.[554] On 16 October, the abrogation was approved in parliament, thus making the British presence in Egypt illegal in Egyptian eyes. The British diplomats lamented this unilateral step, maintaining that "the Treaty could not be unilaterally abrogated". Despite the British complaints, the Egyptian side went ahead with its decision, leading

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[550] FO 371/90117, JE 10110/71, 1657/2/51, British Embassy, Alexandria, 26 September 1951.
[551] Ibid.
[552] FO 371/90115, JE 10110/26, 1011/4/13/51, No. 307, British Embassy, Alexandria, 5 September 1951.
[553] Louis 1985, 732.
[554] Vatikiotis 1985, 368.

ultimately to a breakdown in diplomacy.[555]

In so doing, al-Nahhas Pasha paved the way for what came to be known as the War in the Canal Zone, of 1951. The abrogation of the 1936 Treaty reinforced claims of the British presence in Egypt being an illegal occupation of another country, consequently leading to a hardening of popular attitudes towards the British and resulting on the ground in attacks on British troops and installations, sabotage of British utilities and withdrawal of the Egyptian workforce from British bases. Interestingly for this study, the conflict became a catalyst for the Brotherhood's anti-colonial agitation, as a strong current of the organization perceived it as their obligation to take part in this *jihad.*

The government of al-Nahhas intended to utilize this abrogation for political purposes; the intent was to push the British towards a solution of the national issue and to divert attention away from the government's internal shortcomings, not bring about a war against the British.[556] This becomes evident when one examines the decisions taken by the Egyptian side immediately after the abrogation.[557] In a conciliatory statement, al-Nahhas Pasha asked the Egyptian people "to abstain from any demonstration in the national interest whilst the Government prepares the necessary further steps towards the achievement of its mission".[558]

However, despite this 'non-militant' stance taken by the Egyptian government, the events that followed the abrogation came to play a significant role in molding the future and shaping the development of the Brotherhood. *Ikhwan* members, like other Egyptian radicals, seized this opportunity to militarize their discourse and actions against the British. In so doing, the Brotherhood came to promote itself as an anti-colonial organization responsible for the conduct of *jihad* against the occupier, thereby making al-Hudaybi's intentions to dissolve militancy even harder. This we shall see now, before discussing the approach of al-Hudaybi to this militancy.

4.2.1. Brotherhood Militancy and the Battle in the Canal Zone

Immediately after al-Nahhas' declaration, the British and Americans did not waste any time pointing to the Brotherhood as a main, if not *the* main, perpetrator of anti-British agitation in the Canal Zone and other parts of Egypt. On 20 October 1951, only five days after the abrogation had been passed by parliament, the CIA stressed that the Brotherhood was beginning to stir. According

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[555] WO 236/15, Narrative of Events in the Canal Zone, October 1951-April 1952.
[556] Thornhill 2006, 34.
[557] FO 371/90116, JE 10110/33, No. 699, From Alexandria to Foreign Office, 11 October 1951.
[558] FO 371/90116, JE 10110/37, No. 757, From Alexandria to Foreign Office, 17 October 1951.

to reports reaching the Americans, the "fanatic Moslem Brotherhood is planning to go ahead with a program of violence and terrorism" to be directed against the British. The CIA believed that the Ikhwan would go ahead with this program "regardless of Egyptian Government policy"[559]. To fulfill this enterprise, a Brotherhood group had acquired "25 machine guns" to use against the British.[560] To the CIA it was beyond doubt that the "hypernationalistic Moslem Brotherhood [sic]" has the "chief responsibility for a continuation of disturbances in Egypt or any eruption of violence in the other Arab countries".[561] The American Ambassador to Cairo described the situation as a "dead-end loaded with dynamite" into which he thought his government should "not get involved".[562] As the following presentation of British diplomatic material will show, diplomats definitely perceived the Brotherhood at this time as a radical anti-British organization consisting of a militant cadre prepared to carry out a violent campaign against their forces in Egypt.

In broad agreement with the US assessment, the British considered the Brotherhood to be a main contributor to the escalating conflict in the Canal-Zone. On 11 October 1951, a few days after al-Nahhas Pasha's announcement before parliament, the Brotherhood's students issued a proclamation urging the Egyptian government to announce that "Egypt was in a state of war with Great Britain" and asking it to declare the British forces as "enemy forces".[563] The statement went on to urge the government to allow the carrying of firearms and to deem attacks on the British unpunishable under Egyptian law.[564] This discourse, voiced by the *Ikhwan,* confirmed what anxieties the British authorities had had about the result of the abrogation decree. The Brotherhood was asking the government to permit and even organize "[a]ttacks on the British". The Brothers presented the idea of forming "a national guard of 16,000 volunteers, consisting of those who fought in Palestine", to accomplish the "Islamic Liberation".[565]

In a sign of the Brotherhood's involvement in the conflict and its militancy at this time, on 17 October the Ismailiyya branch, located in the Canal Zone, declared *jihad* on the British.[566]

Such proclamations may be dismissed as merely rhetorical. However, when studying the events, it becomes abundantly clear that the Brotherhood did in fact take part in the violent incidents that

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[559] This was probably referring to the government's 'non-militant' attitude which had become clear shortly after the abrogation, as we have noted.

[560] CIA-RDP79T00975A000400250001-9, Central Intelligence Bulletin, Copy No. 47, 20 October 1951.

[561] CIA-RDP79T00975A000400320001-1, Central Intelligence Bulletin, Copy no. 47. Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, 28 October 1951.

[562] Ibid.

[563] FO 371/90117, JE 10110/60, No. 276, British Embassy, Alexandria, 16 October 1951.

[564] Ibid.

[565] Ibid.

[566] Mitchell 1993, 89.

occurred in the Canal Zone. By 19-20 October, minor incidents were beginning to take place in the Canal Zone, such as ambushing of British vehicles and attacking British bases.[567] On 19 October 1951 it was reported that Egyptian workers were not cooperating with their British employers in Suez.[568] The *Ikhwan*, according to the British reports, had threatened labor contractors not to supply workforce to British installments, thereby using the workforce blockade as an effective measure against the British.[569] This seems to have been a highly effective tactic. On 29 October, the Commanders in Chief Middle East maintained that "[v]irtually all our labour is leaving us on account of intimidation" exercised by the Brotherhood and the Egyptian police.[570]

Yet, from a British perspective, another more disquieting threat was developing. On 23 October 1951, a British report observed that the "[t]errorist pattern of the I.E.M. [Ikhwan el-Muslimin[sic]] [was] becoming more apparent".[571] The British were receiving reports of the Brotherhood collecting arms, and believed that the "thing most to be feared was the rising danger of the Ikhwan El Muslimin [sic]".[572] British anxieties were growing by the day. On 27 October, for example, it was reported by the British Commanders in Chief that there was "increasing evidence of preparations for terrorist activity by IKHWAN and Socialist Egyptian Party [Young Egypt][573] extremists in the Canal Zone". With regard to the specific activities of the Brotherhood, the Commanders in Chief believed that about 1,000 *Ikhwan* members were training in Cairo "for operations in the Canal Zone".[574] Such rumors had to be taken with the utmost seriousness, according to British diplomats. Should such preparations continue undisrupted, an anti-British campaign would become "firmly established" and it could lead to a real threat to British security in the Zone and "British lives [would be] sacrificed".[575] Accordingly, British officials in Egypt saw no way out of an escalation of events unless they were immediately authorized to "arrest and detain ringleaders of Ikhwan and other terrorist organisations whenever they can be identified in the Canal Zone".[576] British concerns plainly show that the Brotherhood was looked upon as a key perpetrator of events.

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[567] FO 371/90116, JE 10110/49, 32524 G (0) A, From G.H.Q, Middle East Land Forces to War Office, 20 October 1951.
[568] FO 371/90116, JE 10110/49, 32336G (o) A, From G.H.Q, Middle East Land Forces to War Office, 19 October 1951
[569] FO 371/90116, JE 10110/49, Recd: 2353, 19 October 1951.
[570] FO 371/90118, JE 10110/77, from G.H.Q. Middle East Land Forces to Ministry of Defence, London, 29 October 1951.
[571] FO 371/90116, JE 10110/49, Recd: 2227, 23 October 1951.
[572] FO 141/1433, 1011/35/51G, W. Morris, 6 November 1951.
[573] It changed its name to the Social Party after World War II.
[574] FO 371/90117, JE 10110/73, from G.H.Q Middle East Land Forces to Ministry of Defence, London, 27 October 1951.
[575] Ibid.
[576] Ibid.

As a result of the British fears regarding the role of the Brotherhood, the British military staff in the Canal Zone was authorized to "arrest and detain ringleaders of I.E.M. [Ikhwan el-Muslimin] and other terrorist organisations whenever they can be identified in the Canal Zone.[577] Such measures were out of the ordinary, as admitted by James Bowker, a British mandarin, but they were necessary due to the immense threat posed by the Ikhwan to "the security of British forces and their families".[578] To the British, in other words, the *Ikhwan* embodied the gravest danger at this time of escalating conflict.

It was at this point in time that the Brotherhood in light of these developments translated its anti-British *jihad* discourse into tangible actions, thereby continuing the pre-Hudaybi militancy which had been developed in the post-war years. The concrete decision to participate in this anti-British struggle was taken shortly after al-Nahhas' declaration in mid-October 1951. Kamil al-Sharif, a Palestine veteran of the Brotherhood, was chosen by the General Guidance Office to direct the Brotherhood's activities in the Canal-Zone.[579] This decision to 'adopt' armed resistance against the British heralded the beginning of the Brotherhood's active engagement in the anti-British engagement in this period. Importantly, this decision came to radicalize segments of the Brotherhood, who after this conflict perceived themselves to be the real defenders of the nation.

Hasan Duh, one of the Brotherhood's student-leaders who took part in these events, offers such an interpretation. Following the abrogation of the treaty "we conceived of it as an opportunity to attain our goal, i.e., the government's cooperation with us in forcing the British out of Egypt". To his frustration, however, the government intended to limit its actions to "diplomatic and political pressure" which could not, according to Duh, secure British withdrawal. What was needed was a military confrontation with the British. "I believed and still do, that military power is the only tool and way to achieve our rights",[580] said Duh when describing their incentive to militarize their activism in this period. He strongly lamented the "non-militant approach" favored by the government at the time.[581] This radical response to the government's policies was also mirrored in the Brotherhood's official magazine *al-Daʿwa*. British mandarin Willie Morris reported that the magazine criticized the inaction of the government, stating that "if the Government can't do

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[577] FO 371/90117, JE 10110/74, From Ministry of Defence, London to G.H.Q. Middle East Land Forces, 30 October 1951.
[578] FO 371/90117, JE 10110/74, Memorandum by Bowker, 30 October 1951.
[579] Al-Sharif 1987, 43.
[580] Duh 1983, 52-5.
[581] Ibid.

anything with the British, let them make way for someone who can".[582]

And just as forecasted by the British, events did escalate towards violence. By late October 1951, British troops were being attacked and casualties in their ranks were on the rise.[583] One such incident took place on 22 October in Belbeis, a little town in Sharqiyya province. A British missionary school was attacked by mobs and "looted and very severely damaged" while the five British individuals present at the scene "narrowly escaped the gravest personal injury".[584] What was described as a "particularly disquieting feature" of this event was the role played by a local leader of the Brotherhood. According to the report, the local *Ikhwan* leader incited the crowd to enter the house, where the British individuals had taken refuge, to attack them. The report concluded that this Brotherhood leader acted as "if he had been a person of recognised authority".[585] It is no coincidence that such incidents, reportedly incited by local *Ikhwan* activists, took place in the towns of al-Sharqiyya province on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. This area was, according to al-Sharif, key for the Brotherhood in mobilizing an effective campaign against the British. Therefore, an essential step had been, since the outset of events, to create bases in this province, enflame the local feelings against the British through an Islamic and nationalistic discourse and to mobilize its population to take part in the resistance.[586]

On 26 October, British ambassador Stevenson warned his government that a "reaction from the extremists and terrorists is on the way",[587] thus pointing to the increasing involvement of the *Ikhwan* in radicalizing the conflict. Continuing in the same vein, the British authorities informed the Egyptian side on 28 November that the British authorities would not "allow further British lives to be sacrificed without taking some counter action". Pointing to the lethal attacks on British lives, the British diplomats contended that such attacks must be the result of Brotherhood cooperation with communists.[588]

Further evidencing the Brotherhood's role as it was perceived by the British, diplomat W. Morris[589] compiled in November 1951 a list of the "extremist elements in Egyptian politics". Morris, who described all existing groups in Egypt as "groups [that] consist of leaders with political

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[582] FO 371/90119, JE 10110/106, "Extremist Groups in Egypt" W. Morris, 7 November 1951.
[583] FO 371/90118, JE 10110/75, From G.H.Q. Middle East Land Forces to War Office, 18 October 1951.
[584] FO 371/90118, JE 10110/87, no. 284, 1011/4/42/51, Stevenson, Cairo, to Mohamad Salah El Dine Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 31 October 1951.
[585] Ibid.
[586] Al-Sharif 1987, 46-8; see also Duh 1989, 55; Al-Jamal 2000, 114.
[587] FO 371/90118, JE 10110/88, No. 366 (1011/4/40/51), British Embassy Cairo, 26 October 1951.
[588] FO 141/1433, 1011/41/51G, Record of Conversation, 28, November 1951.
[589] W. Morris (1919-1979), a diplomat who joined the Foreign Office in 1947 and served most of his diplomatic life in the Middle East. In 1968 he was appointed British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.

ambitions looking for supporters", perceived the Brotherhood in a very different light. Morris underlined that these "remarks do not apply to the MOSLEM BROTHERHOOD (Ikhwan al Muslimin) [sic] which has a country-wide organisation and mass support".[590] Hinting at the organization's ability to continue its anti-British agitation, Morris noted that it still had "a cadre of trained terrorists, and probably a fair amount of armament," and with a mass organization "firmly entrenched throughout the provinces" it makes them "the chief perpetrators of terrorist acts either in the Canal Zone or elsewhere".[591] As such reports palpably illustrate, the Brotherhood was classified by the British as the key perpetrator of these violent outbreaks. This is crucial to understanding the continuing secrecy under which the *Ikhwan* organization at a later point clashed with the military regime, leading to the second *miḥna* in late 1954. Accordingly, as these estimates show, the Brotherhood still had a radical fringe, and the idea of *jihad* was still very much present among a group of its members.

The Brotherhood's planning and preparations for the events had been organized by three different Brotherhood sections, i.e. students' section, the Special Apparatus, under the heading of Yusuf Talʿat,[592] and 'the Units' section' consisting of military and police officers and headed by Salah Shadi. The Brotherhood erected training camps in the areas adjacent to the Canal Zone and at Egyptian universities to prepare a cadre of militants to take part in the attacks.[593] The units organized to participate in these events came to be known as "*Katāʾib al-Taḥrīr*" (Liberation Regiments) as a general designation for all the volunteer forces taking part. W. Morris's assessment at the time was that "the bands in operation are probably Ikhwan, although Ibrahim Shukri, the Socialist deputy, is said to be in the Canal Zone with 80 volunteers".[594]

Against this background, violent incidents against the British began to take place on a more regular basis from November on, and would seriously escalate in quality and quantity from

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[590]FO 371/90119, JE 10110/106, "Extremist Groups in Egypt" W. Morris, 7 November 1951. (Emphasis in original).
[591] Ibid.
[592] Talʿat (1914-1954) was born to a poor family in al-Ismailiyya, the city in which al-Banna placed the foundation stone for the Brotherhood, when the young Yusuf was 14 years of age. After finishing primary school, the poor Yusuf became a carpenter to earn a living for his family. Soon after the establishment of the Brotherhood in 1928, he became an early attendee of its meetings and was introduced to the Brotherhood's first excursion troop at a young age. Through this early engagement with the Brotherhood and directly with its founder al-Banna, Talʿat became a respected and appreciated member of the Brotherhood. When the Special Apparatus was founded sometime between 1939 and 1940, he became the leader of this paramilitary foundation in his hometown al-Ismailiyya, a centre for anti-British activities. There, Talʿat became renowned for his engagement against the British and in his participation in the first Arab-Israeli war, earning himself the nickname "*Asad al-Canāl*" "The lion of the Canal [Zone]". He was hanged by the military regime in 1954. (al-Bahi 2011; al-Uqayl 2008, 1234-1251).
[593] Duh 1983, 54.
[594] FO 371/90119, JE 10110/112, No. 54, from British Middle East Office (Fayid) to Foreign Office, Sir T. Rapp, 16 November 1951.

December. As an example, in November 1951 armed Brotherhood members established roadblocks on the Cairo-Ismailiyya road at Belbeis and Abbasa, two towns in al-Sharqiyya province.[595] Although this action did not lead to violence, it pointed to the growing confidence of the *Ikhwan* radicals.[596] Throughout November, reports of attacks on British and other Western individuals seemed to be increasing, such as the attack on three British soldiers "by a gang of Egyptians in European clothes" that took place on 10 November. The three soldiers were rescued, but "were badly injured".[597] On 19 November it was estimated that six private cars belonging to R.A.F. personnel and two R.A.F. welfare buses had been destroyed, while at least fourteen other cars belonging to army personnel had been burnt since the beginning of these events. Furthermore, on 17 and 18 November, it was reported that "violence and much shooting" had taken place in al-Ismailiyya.[598] The violent incidents that occurred on these two days resulted in the deaths of five British officers.[599]

The increase in "terrorist acts" was seen by British officials as an indication that there was "some organisation behind them". These incidents involved "home-made bombs of various types".[600] The British embassy was informed by Egyptian security sources that the Brotherhood was responsible for the attempted demolition "of the pipelines of the water filtration plant at Suez on December 17th", as an example Brotherhood involvement in this escalation.[601] CIA perception of the situation was similar. On the one hand, they perceived the position of the British Military as being strong, as the number of British soldiers in the Canal Zone had increased to about 50,000 (it was about 36,000 on the day of the abrogation). Yet, on the other hand, the CIA reported that the British authorities were facing a number of "difficult problems". One problem mentioned was the departure of Egyptian workforce from British bases, which seems to have become a real issue for the British authorities at this time. According to the CIA's evaluation, 70,000 Egyptian laborers had left the British base in Fayid.[602] If true, and we have no reason to believe otherwise, such numbers were

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[595] FO 371/90118, JE 10110/91, No. 15, from British Middle East Office (Fayid) to Foreign Office, 6 November 1951.

[596] FO 371/90119, JE 10110/109, 1041/2/362/51G, Ralph Stevenson to Ibrahim Farag Pasha, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cairo, 30 November 1951.

[597] See for example: FO 371/90119, JE 10110/115, No. 304, 1041/2/295/51G, 14 November 1951; FO 371/90119, JE 10110/112, No. 54, from British Middle East Office (Fayid) to Foreign Office, Sir T. Rapp, 16 November 1951; FO 371/90119, JE 10110/113, No. 1018, from Cairo to Foreign Office, 17 November 1951.

[598] FO 371/90119, JE 10110/118, No. 62, from British Middle East Office, Fayid, to Foreign Office, 19 November 1951.

[599] FO 371/90120, JE 10110/143, No. 86, T. Trapp to Foreign Office, 1 December 1951.

[600] Ibid.

[601] FO 371/96870, JE 1018/1, No. 1, 1012/1/52, British Embassy, Cairo, 1 January 1952.

[602] CIA-RDP79S01060A000100260001-6, Current Intelligence Review, 19 December 1951, Vol. I no. 19; The Anglo-Egyptian Crisis.

massive. In any case, it caused serious problems for the British, who tried to replace this labor with workers from Malta, Cyprus and Kenya, undoubtedly a costly affair for the British government. Another serious problem described by the CIA was the violent incidents directed against the British in the Canal Zone.[603]

It was shortly before this period of escalation, which saw a group of Brothers undertaking a militant agitation against the British, that al-Hudaybi announced his intention to dismiss secrecy and militancy. Having just assumed the leadership less than a year before these incidents and without the prior experience of leading a mass organization, not to mention an organization active in anti-colonial *jihad*, he faced tremendous difficulties in carrying his plan through. Once the wheels of this crisis were set in motion, the Brotherhood's radical fringe saw no way back. As the following section will discuss, the new *Murshid* did not stick to his initial vow of "no secrecy in Islam", but seems to have had a change of heart in light of the escalating nationalist struggle.

4.2.2. Al-Hudaybi and the Idea of *Jihad*

"As violent entrepreneurs, clandestine groups contribute to shaping their environment, as well as being shaped by it", della Porta states.[604] In the same vein, this section will argue that al-Hudaybi's initial intention to dismiss violence and secrecy was transformed into an acceptance and perhaps even an adoption of *jihad* against the British. This may be attributed to the environment which came to shape al-Hudaybi's perception of violent encounter with the British. I contend that the strong demand for an anti-British *jihad,* as a result of the abrogation of the treaty and the resulting War in the Canal Zone, altered al-Hudaybi's previous intentions. In so arguing, I show that the *Ikhwan* went into the Nasserite era as an organization possessing an armed underground wing.

As we observed in the preceding section, upon his appointment al-Hudaybi had resolved to disband the secret structures of the Brotherhood by dissolving the Apparatus and leading the *Ikhwan* towards deradicalization.[605] According to British assessments, al-Hudaybi intended to get the Brotherhood "out into the open as a political party" and away from underground activism.[606] To the US and British officials, al-Hudaybi initially represented a moderating factor. The British were for

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[603] Ibid.

[604] della Porta 2013, 172.

[605] Kamil al-Sharif notes in his book that al-Hudaybi endured a lot of criticism as "the one who thwarts the Brotherhood in participating in an armed struggle" (1987, 42). One such example came on 1 January 1952, when the prominent Egyptian author and activist Sayyid Qutb, at that time not yet a member of the Brotherhood, asked for an unambiguous position from al-Hudaybi regarding the Canal Zone battles (Abdel Halim 2013 II, 504).

[606] FO 141/1433, 1011/39/51G, Record of Conversation, 24 November 1951.

example told by Andraos Pasha, honorary economic adviser to the Royal Palace, that al-Hudaybi had assured the King that his organization "did not intend to use violence either against foreigners or Egyptians".[607] In December of the same year, Sir Cecil Campbell from the British Embassy referred to al-Hudaybi's advocacy "of peaceful measures and his denial that the Brotherhood were [sic] forming any Liberation Battalions".[608] In late November and at the beginning of December 1951, D.L. Stewart, Foreign Office official, met with Farkhani Bey, a close friend and adviser of al-Hudaybi. In the report on their meetings, Stewart gave the same impression as that mentioned above. Farkhani had repeatedly claimed that al-Hudaybi "is an entirely different type from Hassan Al Banna". Farkhani also impressed Stewart as being truly pro-British, and he told Stewart that al-Hudaybi "is capable of leading the Ikhwan to much better purpose".[609] As regards the Americans, they had come to a similar judgment. On 19 December, it was reported that "King Farouk and the powerful Minister of Interior have even conferred with the Moslem Brotherhood leader in an effort to gain his support for limiting violence".[610]

So, how do we understand this obvious divergence between the moderate utterances of people such as Farkhani Bey and al-Hudaybi himself, and the events on the ground which demonstrated that a faction of the *Ikhwan* certainly took part in, if not led, the operations against the British. No doubt, when al-Hudaybi took over the leadership of the Brotherhood, he genuinely intended to lead it in a moderate direction. This had already been observed in February 1951 when CIA reports perceived Hudaybi as a conservative judge, who on account of his background would be against the Brotherhood's application of "other means".[611] But as the events in the Canal Zone clearly revealed, al-Hudaybi quickly came to realize how difficult a task it was, and the domestic context only served to make it harder. The self-perception of a group of *Ikhwan* as being representatives of a nationalist and Islamist anti-colonial organization, with a past of anti-colonial *jihad,* had taken root among many members. Consequently, when Suez Conflict was set in motion, the rank and file and many senior members of the Brotherhood understood it as their own struggle, and an opportunity they had long waited for.[612] We find in the accounts of Brotherhood members and leaders an abundance of stories about their *jihad* in the Canal Zone. Therefore, despite al-Hudaybi's statements distancing

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[607] FO 141/1433, 1011/41/51G, Record of Conversation, 28, November 1951.
[608] FO 141/1433, 1011/44/51G, Cecil Campbell, 16 December 1951.
[609] FO 141/1450, 1011/3/51G, "Arab Societies: Ikhwan el Muslimeen" D.L. Stewart, 4 December 1951.
[610] CIA-RDP79S01060A000100260001-6, Current Intelligence Review, 19 December 1951, Vol. I no. 19; The Anglo-Egyptian Crisis.
[611] CIA-RDP82-00457R007100070004-6, Information Report, "Fu'ad Siraj al-Din and the Ikhwan" Egypt, 28 February 1951.
[612] Al-Jamal 2000, 109.

his organization from violence in the Canal Zone, the Brotherhood *did* continue to be involved in the conflict. Cecil Campbell described the statements of al-Hudaybi as "inexplicable", for while al-Hudaybi publicly dissociated the Brotherhood from violence, intelligence reports frequently described violent operations involving the Brothers.[613] This contradiction between statements and actions indicates that the 'radical choice', if we may describe the battle against the British as such, was preferred by a significant and powerful part of the Brotherhood. This may be an indication of the strength of the faction advocating *jihad* inside the *Ikhwan*. That al-Hudaybi announced that his organization would not get involved in the violent campaign, while the Brothers were fighting on the ground,can be assessed as a sign of his weakness vis-à-vis the militant segment, or that al-Hudaybi was disguising his real position towards militancy. His first attempt to direct the *Ikhwan* in a new direction, one away from violence, had obviously failed, as the events signify. As explained by the Brotherhood lawyer Tahir al-Khashab in this regard, "the rule of the Ikhwan is for the Guide to submit to the decision of the majority […] Therefore, if the Ikhwan as a body decided […] to resort to violence, the Guide would have to submit to this decision".[614]

In later accounts, Brotherhood leaders such as Farid Abdel Khaleq and Kamil al-Sharif have clarified that al-Hudaybi's dismissal of violence against the British should be understood as a pragmatic, cautious and diplomatic standpoint, which did not represent his real viewpoints. As argued by Abdel Khaleq, the *Murshid* was denying any responsibility for the ongoing events in the Canal Zone, while "the battalions of the *Ikhwan* were participating in battles of the Zone".[615] Kamil al-Sharif offers a similar account. He acknowledged that al-Hudaybi did utter conservative views with regard to the battles in the Canal, but according to al-Sharif that was, a part of al-Hudaybi's wisdom. "With his balanced and thoughtful nature, he does not resort to clowning and exaggerations, but he prefers to let the actions represent themselves", was al-Sharif's clarification.[616] Moreover, because of his lack of confidence in the government, al-Hudaybi feared that repressive measures would be taken against the *Ikhwan* if they publicly claimed responsibility for the events, and he therefore preferred to prepare and engage in the battle silently and secretly, letting others "deliver the thunderous speeches".[617] The British also had similar suspicions of al-Hudaybi's 'real' attitude with regard to the battle. And as we shall see in the next chapter, al-

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[613] FO 141/1433, 1011/44/51G, Cecil Campbell, 16 December 1951.
[614] CIA-RDP82-00457R007100070004-6, Information Report, "Fu'ad Siraj al-Din and the Ikhwan" Egypt, 28 February 1951.
[615] Abdel Khaleq 1987, 73.
[616] Al-Sharif 1987, 42.
[617] Ibid.

Hudaybi did also at some point accept the existence of the Special Apparatus, and even appointed Yusuf Talʿat, who was loyal to the *Murshid*, to reform and control the Apparatus, not to dissolve it.

While some diplomats, understandably, seem to have believed al-Hudaybi to be a genuine moderate,[618] others suspected his stance was misleading. One such suspicion was voiced by Cecil Campbell who pointed to the contradictions between al-Hudaybi's advocacy of "peaceful measures" and his simultaneous request for "arms [to] be given to would-be assassins". One explanation offered by Campbell was that al-Hudaybi probably "has surrendered to the extremer Brethren".[619] Whether this is true, or whether al-Hudaybi had been convinced of the necessity of *jihad* is difficult to say, yet we clearly notice that he had altered his initial position. Al-Hudaybi announced in January 1952 that "We have no 'Liberation Squads', but we have men, of whom, each one is a squad in himself, armed with faith and resolution. If the Government wishes us to send them to the Canal we will send them, but we must have reassurance: we hesitate only for fear least what has happened in the past should happen again."[620]

Along these lines, it is possible to assume that a change had occurred with al-Hudaybi as a result of the circumstances surrounding the Brotherhood. As an example of this possible change of heart, Al-Hudaybi made a public statement in Alexandria on 14 December 1951 in which he supported the government's abrogation of the treaty, adding "Our attitude from the Islamic point of view is also clear: if an enemy occupies any Islamic territory it is the duty of every Moslem to make war on him and expel him".[621] In direct contrast to his prior moderate utterances, al-Hudaybi announced that "it is our duty to make war on the British since they are enemies invading our territory". He contended that the Brotherhood had waited for the government to do its job following the abrogation, "and we thought it better to wait so that our plans should not conflict with those of the Government".[622]

So, as noted above, whether al-Hudaybi genuinely came to support the battle or not is difficult to say, but in the eyes of those Brothers who actually took part in the battle, al-Hudaybi was a supporter of their actions. Their view was that he wished to avoid another dissolution and repression of his organization, and thus he publicly stated that the *Ikhwan* had no part in the ongoing events. To the ears of the British too, al-Hudaybi's dismissal of violence frequently sounded very hollow, on account of the Brotherhood's continuing attacks on its soldiers even as the *Murshid* dissociated it

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[618] See for example FO 141/1450, 10112/4/51G, "Arab Societies, Ikhwan el Muslimeen, II".
[619] FO 141/1433, 1011/44/51G, Cecil Campbell, 16 December 1951.
[620] FO 371/96870, JE 1018/1, No. 1, 1012/1/52, British Embassy, Cairo, 1 January 1952.
[621] Ibid.
[622] Ibid.

from violence.[623]

Stevenson claimed in this vein that despite the moderate statements of al-Hudaybi, one could not dismiss the role played by the Brotherhood. As he explained, on the one hand "the Egyptian is not particularly good at taking in instructions and he is always likely to interpret so as to suit his own situation and opinions". On the other, "Hassan al Hodeibi [sic] may be the servant or even the tool, of the Supreme Guidance Office rather than its chief".[624] In other words, even if al-Hudaybi genuinely wanted to distance his *Ikhwan* from violence, Stevenson perceived that to be a complicated task; the radicals had their voice in an organization with a past "smelling strongly of dynamite and gunpowder". Stevenson would not exclude the possibility that al-Hudaybi's respectable reputation and background was being utilized as a "camouflage by unrepentant terrorists who have learnt some subtlety through adversity".[625]

4.3. Conclusions

I started this chapter by arguing that al-Hudaybi undertook the task of ridding the *Ikhwan* of secrecy and violence. First behind closed doors upon his appointment as *Murshid,* in May 1950 and then in October 1951 when his appointment was confirmed publicly, al-Hudaybi had thus worked towards a de-escalation of violence and secrecy inside the organization. To do so, he tried to weaken the Special Apparatus by restructuring the Brotherhood's upper echelons and making public statements distancing the *Ikhwan* from militancy.

This determination by al-Hudaybi to dismiss violence resulted in a compartmentalization of the organization: Al-Hudaybi and his closest associates advocated the idea of "no secrecy in Islam" while a strong faction in the Brotherhood saw the struggle against the British and their 'lackeys' as a religious obligation, which necessitated both violence and secrecy. Neither al-Hudaybi, nor anybody else, had the right to dismiss the obligation of *jihad,* so their argument went. Therefore, when the war in the Suez Canal broke out in October 1951, just as al-Hudaybi's appointment had become official, the idea of *jihad* resurfaced as an urgent task. Al-Hudaybi's first attempt to guide his organization away from militancy no doubt triggered a compartmentalization, which was observed by Ishak Musa Husaini who noted that "one party condemned Hudaybi" while another party praised the new *Murshid* "for his political astuteness".[626] Omar Ashour has argued that al-

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[623] Ibid.
[624] Ibid.
[625] Ibid.
[626] Husaini 1956, 122-3.

Hudaybi made his first attempt to deradicalize the Brotherhood over the period of 1951 to 1953. Yet, as I illustrated in this chapter, al-Hudaybi did not unreservedly stand up against his organization's armed activism in the Canal Zone. In contrast to Ashour's argument that al-Hudaybi was against "any type of armed action", I contend that al-Hudaybi's position should be assessed using a more nuanced approach. Ashour is right in claiming that al-Hudaybi uttered anti-violent statements in the press, and may genuinely have been against violence; however, as the battle in the Suez Canal escalated, al-Hudaybi began altering his position towards a greater acceptance of militancy. We noticed in this vein that al-Hudaybi sometime into the war perceived it as an obligatory *jihad*, which may serve as a sign of his changing attitude. This was also evident in a letter he sent to Nagib al-Hilali, Prime Minister of Egypt, on 27 March 1952, in which he urged the premier to continue the armed struggle against the British.[627] Therefore, I assert that al-Hudaybi during late 1951 changed his initial position towards armed *jihad* into one of greater acceptance.

Thus, the Brotherhood went into the post-monarchical period as a radical organization, one which took it upon its shoulders to accomplish the task of *jihad,* comprehended as an individual obligation for every Muslim (*farḍ ʿayn*).[628]

Accordingly, when the revolution *cum* coup d'état broke out on 23 July 1952, the *Ikhwan* was looked upon and perceived themselves as the major political actors on the Egyptian scene. A significant number of the military officers who had led the revolution had either been in close contact with the Brotherhood before and during the revolution or had themselves been previous members of the Brotherhood's secret structures.[629] Nasser and his fellow officers had also cooperated with the Brotherhood in their anti-British battles in the Canal Zone, which made the idea of a necessary cooperation prevalent. [630]

Yet, the initial harmony and expected cooperation between these two dominant actors, turned rapidly into dispute and conflict. Thus, early partnership and the idea of shaping post-colonial Egypt together was replaced by acrimony and rivalry. As a result, a radicalization of means came to shape the conflict between these recent allies, ending up with the persecution of the Brotherhood in late 1954. In other words, the pre-*miḥna* era contributed to the radicalization of the Brotherhood in its

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[627] Ahmad 1977, 147-151.
[628] Ibrahim al-Tayyeb, a senior member of the Special Apparatus and head of the Apparatus in Cairo since February 1954, explained before court in November 1954 that the task of the Apparatus and of the Brotherhood was to prepare a generation of well-trained and armed men who could fight an obligatory *jihad* against occupying forces in "Tunis, Algiers or Egypt" (NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb* II, 431-2).
[629] See chapter two.
[630] Shadi 1987, 192, 207.

conflict with the young officers, paving the way for what Fawaz Gerges has described as "the clash that shaped the Middle East".[631]

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[631] Gerges 2018.

5. The Route Towards Conflict: The Brotherhood and the Officers' Revolution

Mahmoud Abdel Latif's botched attempt on premier Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser's life on 26 October 1954 marked a watershed in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood and especially its Special Apparatus. With a past of political assassinations, secrecy and underground activism, the *Ikhwan's* Special Apparatus, and to some degree the Brotherhood itself, had acquired a notorious reputation as a group of lunatics responsible for countless violent incidents. Yet, with the unsuccessful attempt on Nasser's life on al-Manshiyya square in Alexandria, the Apparatus was moving towards its end. Its failures rather than any strategic planning seem to have ended its existence, as this chapter will argue. In the following we will see how the Brotherhood went into conflict with the military regime as a compartmentalized organization; a significant fringe of the *Ikhwan* had been radicalized by the political dispute with the young officers, explaining why suggestions to violently confront the government occurred. In so arguing, I critically assess the contention that the radicalization of the Brotherhood in their struggle with the officers took place only from behind the prison walls and in some organically connected way to Qutb's worldview.[632] In contrast, I argue that a radicalization can be traced back to this pre-*miḥna* era, which indicates that Qutb's radicalization from the 1960s represented a continuation of previous thoughts. By so arguing, I do not deny that a radicalization took place in the prisons, but I contend that we can see an earlier radicalization taking place in this pre-prison period, which is important for the understanding of the conflict between the officers and the *Ikhwan*.

The facts of the Manshiyya incident remain disputed. While Brotherhood accounts unanimously protest the organization's guilt and have done so since the beginning, accounts penned by RCC members and antagonists of the Brotherhood refer to this particular incident as evidence of the organization's violent past (and present).[633] Some historical questions and dilemmas remain unanswered, and this may very well remain the case. Notwithstanding the veracity of the official story and the account offered by the Brotherhood, this incident marked a peak point in the conflict between these two actors. The incident was not the beginning but the highpoint of conflict between the junior army-officers led by Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Brotherhood led by Hasan al-Hudaybi.

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[632] For such an account, see for example Kepel 1985.
[633] Sharaf 2015 IV, 964-5; Allam 1996, 54; 99.

This struggle, which took its most radical turn on 26 October, came to shape the Brotherhood's future, and even the future of Egypt and the Middle East, if we are to agree with Fawaz Gerges.[634]

Barbara Zollner has for instance argued that "there are in fact indications that the attempt [on Nasser] was instigated in order to create an opportunity to ward off the Muslim Brotherhood as well as Nasir's [sic] opponents within the RCC".[635] Such assessments as posited by Zollner and many other researchers indicate the degree of uncertainty regarding this incident. While I concur with the assumption of a probable "instigation" of this assassination attempt, I intend to study the path that led the Brotherhood towards this critical point of "action militarization".

In so doing, I maintain that an "action militarization" took place prior to the notorious incident in Alexandria which eventually led to this showdown with the military regime. The militarization of conflict did not happen abruptly and unexpectedly on the 26 October, but rather was an ongoing process within a historical context in which the battle for a post-colonized Egypt had been going on for some decades. The erstwhile allies, the radical officers and the radical Brothers who had fought side by side in Palestine and in the Canal Zone, ended up being the 'last men standing' in an Egypt advancing towards independence, but none of them were willing to budge an inch, and that is why a showdown, as this chapter will highlight, seemed inevitable. This "action militarization" was in other words a by-product of the years-long struggle in a context of colonialism and nationalism in which Egypt, and in particular the generation of which the officers and Brothers were a part, had gone through a long period of anti-colonial cultivation and struggle which radicalized their means of action.

Seeing this conflict as one for Egypt's future, Gerges claimed that "[i]n one stroke, he [Nasser] sought to crush the only remaining viable opposition to his rule [the Brothers]". Gerges added that Qutb, in response to this attempt to crush the Brothers, "would resist Nasser's hegemony to the end, offering a revolutionary Islamist alternative. He would spearhead resistance to Nasser from behind the prison walls".[636] Similarly, Gilles Kepel argued that the radical worldview which interpreted the fight against the Egyptian state under Nasser, and subsequently under Sadat, as an Islamic *jihad,* had evolved in "the Nasser regime's concentration camps". "In the Beginnings Were the Camps", argues Kepel.[637]

While I acquiesce to the general interpretation of this conflict as a political struggle for the rule of

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[634] Gerges 2018, x.
[635] Zollner 2011, 37; see also Toth 2013, 79.
[636] Gerges 2018, 186.
[637] Kepel 1985, 27.

revolutionary post-colonial Egypt, I intend to show that the idea of a revolutionary Islamist alternative had already existed from the first day of the nascent revolutionary regime of July 1952. As this chapter will illustrate, the idea of resisting the regime, and conducting a revolutionary *jihad* against it, was not established by Qutb and did not have its roots in the prison experience, but rather had existed prior to the Manshiyya incident. To put it differently, the beginnings were before the camps. Yet, the camps certainly played a significant role in further radicalizing a current of Brothers as the following chapters shall show. Thus, as opposed to the idea of a linear 'radicalization' taking place as a direct result of the Nasserite-'concentration camps', I argue that the historical context prior to this incident played a major role in the radicalization of the conflict. As shown in previous chapters, the context of colonialism and regional rupture had played a key role in radicalizing segments of the Brothers and the rest of their generation.

Consequently, I perceive the Manshiyya-incident as marking the apex of conflict, no matter the veracity of its details. The radical ideas that justified violence against local rulers were already in abundance among the Brothers prior to the assassination attempt, as will be illustrated in this chapter.

This brings me back to the central concern of this dissertation, i.e. secrecy and the *jihad* aspects of the Brotherhood. The main argument of the previous chapters has been that the Brotherhood constructed a blueprint of secrecy during periods of "tough policing" and developed an unambiguous self-understanding as an anti-colonial organization responsible for the fulfilment of *jihad*. This secrecy and *jihad* self-imagination, which was developed as an integrated part of the *Ikhwan's* organizational thinking and worldview, was made use of in different periods of political struggle, which involved the British as well as internal enemies, i.e. the Egyptian government.

The purpose of this chapter is to show that the Brotherhood, prior to the Manshiyya-incident, had held on to the secret structures, with al-Hudaybi having reversed his initial commitment to "no secrecy in Islam".[638] In so doing, this chapter aims at providing further proof of the overarching argument, namely that the means of secrecy and the idea of *jihad* had been manifest in the organization and that the radicalization of parts of the Islamist movement had taken place prior to Sayyid Qutb's influential writings. This radicalization was, I argue, part and parcel of the anti-colonial struggle, which the Brotherhood interpreted and propagated through an Islamic vernacular.

Regardless of whether the botched attempt on Nasser's life was ordered by the Brotherhood or not, the argument is that their view on the conflict with the regime advanced towards a

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[638] NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb* IV, 826.

militarization of means, which in the end resulted in a readiness among some members of the *Ikhwan* to use violence against the state. In other words, even if the Brotherhood did not execute the attempt, the organization was prepared to apply violent means in confronting the regime at this point in time.

5.1. The Brotherhood and the RCC: Between Cooperation and Conflict

This section will briefly present the early relationship between the nascent military regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, I aim to highlight how the initial alliance between these two actors very quickly began to sour, paving the way for the confrontations in January and late October of 1954. This presentation will remain short and superficial; it is beyond the scope of the dissertation to study the early relationship between the RCC and the *Ikhwan,* but an illustration of this immediate souring of the relationship can help demonstrate how this early phase moved the Brotherhood towards an "action militarization".

The Brotherhood was sympathetic and welcomed the coup at first. The British Embassy in Cairo remarked that a couple of days after the coup the Brotherhood urged its members to back the military takeover, which they described as "a genuine movement against corruption and [one that] was working for the good of Egypt".[639] On 28 July, al-Hudaybi met with General Muhamamd Naguib, lead figure of the junta. Following their meeting, al-Hudaybi issued instructions to the *Ikhwan* to support Naguib's group.[640] On 1 August, the Brotherhood issued an official statement applauding the political change taking place in Egypt. The statement, which praised the "blessed movement" (*al-ḥaraka al-mubāraka*) of the army for opening the "gates of hope for the resurrection of the *umma* and the revival of its glory", publicized the reform-scheme envisioned by the *Ikhwan.* Underlining that these reform suggestions were drawn from the Quran, the statement listed a number of aspects that were necessary for a sincere change of political regime.

Among the proposed reform points were a complete and comprehensive purge of the political system and the abolishment of martial law and every law contradicting public freedoms. Furthermore, the statement declared that the military achievement which has delivered this "blessed movement, should work for the creation of virtuous individuals, achievable only through religious education". By so doing, Egypt could acquire a generation "embedded with the spirit of religion, ethics, and nationalism".[641] Unquestionably, in reading the communique issued by the Brothers, it

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[639] FO 371/108319/ JE 1016/12, "The Moslem Brotherhood under the Naguib Regime" February 1954.
[640] Frampton 2018, 205.
[641] Shadi 1987, 391-4; FO 371/96879, JE 1018/292, No. 1162, Sir R. Stevenson to Foreign Office, 2 August 1952.

becomes clear that the *Ikhwan* was endeavoring to continue the ideas of gradual reform, as envisioned by the late al-Banna.[642]

This statement, which is the first written declaration of the Brotherhood in the post-monarchy era, is interesting as it gives some insight into how the Brotherhood envisioned its role in this nascent order. Considering themselves a prime partner of this 'blessed movement', the Brotherhood perceived its task to be to counsel the young officers and to guide them on the right path of organizing society 'Islamically'.

As has been shown in different studies and noted by members of the RCC themselves, the junior officers who attained power had at this early stage not yet developed an ideological blueprint nor a clearly defined reform program to act upon.[643] Accordingly, the Brotherhood perceived themselves as the main political organization in Egypt embedded with the right to authoritatively guide the 'blessed movement' and its reform program in an Islamic direction.[644] This, according to senior members of the Brotherhood, had been the deal struck between the officers and the Brotherhood when preparing the coup. The Brotherhood had sworn to stand by the officers and lend them their support on the precondition that the officers cooperated with the Brothers in applying Islamic law, which was the original 'goal of revolution', as Brotherhood leaders contend.[645] In other words, the *Ikhwan* perceived themselves as equal partners with the officers.

At this early stage, British diplomats were alarmed that the country could fall into the hands of an extremist alliance consisting of the Brotherhood and the officers. For instance, a British report, directed to NATO on 1 August 1952, noted that "[t]he military group headed by General Neguib [sic] who are chiefly responsible for planning this coup d'état are probably connected with extremist elements in Egyptian politics and in particular with the Moslem Brotherhood".[646] The statement warned that whereas the situation in Egypt "is for the moment fairly well under control", if the country fell "into the hands of extremist elements, a terrorist campaign of far greater ruthlessness and efficiency than that which was set in motion against the British forces last winter may be expected".[647]

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[642] Al-Banna 2004, 235.
[643] Gordon 1992, 57-8; (edt.) Mansour 2004, 78: Shafiʿi explains that decisions taken at this early point of time were not a part of a pre-conceived plan but were taken as the issues occurred. He also points to the fact that the officers did not wish to acquire state power, but intended to be guardians of the revolutionary course on which they had put Egypt (2004, 114).
[644] Abdel Khaleq 1987, 84-5.
[645] Ibid., 84; al-Ashmawi 1977, 23; Shadi 1987, 213.
[646] FO 371/96879, JE 1018/289, "Statement on Egypt for Nato", 1 August 1952.
[647] Ibid.

Therefore, when Ali Maher's government, which had been in office since the first day of the coup, resigned on 7 September 1952 as a result of disagreements over an agrarian reform proposed by the junta to limit the property of land to a maximum of 200 feddans,[648] it seemed that the fears the western diplomats harbored with regard to an officer-Brotherhood "extremist-alliance" were being borne out. Muhammad Naguib succeeded Maher and came to head a government of civilians. In this regard, special US and British attention was paid to Shaykh Ahmad al-Baqouri, a senior member of the Brotherhood who was appointed as Minister of pious endowments (*Awqāf*) by Naguib. Al-Baqouri came to symbolize this extremist turn which the British and Americans had been worried about. US Ambassador Caffrey noted for instance that "it is not pleasant to have men long on extremism and short on admin. experience" in government. Among those referred to as "long on extremism" was al-Baqouri of the *Ikhwan*.[649] British Ambassador, Stevenson, likewise lamented this development. While he acknowledged that al-Baqouri may be "less extreme than [Salih] Ashmawi, the Secretary-General of the organisation," Stevenson emphasized that al-Baqouri was a member of the Brotherhood and like al-Ashmawi had been an aspirant "for the post of Supreme Guide in succession to Hassan el Banna [sic], and were passed over in favour of the "moderate" Hodeibi [sic]".[650] Thus, al-Baqouri, who was not an all-out extremist, was nevertheless perceived as an extremist due to his membership in the Brotherhood. He was in any case less moderate than Hudaybi, which is why in Stevenson's estimate his appointment heralded the revolution's turn towards extremism.

Yet, despite the abovementioned anxieties of US and British diplomats regarding an RCC-Brotherhood alliance, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the RCC-regime was beginning to show cracks at this very early stage. I will now point to a few disagreements that caused this deterioration of the relationship, in order to then discuss how the subsequent political conflict shaped the military-Brotherhood relationship and pushed a current of the *Ikhwan* towards secrecy and radicalization. I argue in this regard that the closing "windows of opportunity", to use Simmel's term, that resulted from this political conflict came to push the *Ikhwan* towards secrecy and subversion as a means to secure its existence.[651] In other words, this early honeymoon period between the two major actors on the Egyptian scene at this point in time laid the foundations for the

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[648] Ali Maher refused to let the officers push the law through without his acceptance, which is why he resigned in protest.

[649] 774.00/9–852: Telegram No. 1006 The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State, Cairo, September 8, 1952.

[650] FO 371/96881, JE 1018/362, No. 1333, 13 September 1952.

[651] Simmel, 1906, 472.

bloody conflict that subsequently took place, culminating in late October 1954. Thus, while Western diplomats feared an 'extremist-alliance', a conflict was brewing under the surface between those same 'extremists'.

5.1.1. The Path to Disharmony

Al-Baqouri's appointment as minister came to epitomize the first instance of real disagreement between the two parties.[652] When approached by the RCC to join the new government on 9 September 1952, al-Baqouri did not hesitate to accept the appointment, seeing it as an opportunity he could not afford to miss. Al-Baqouri relates that in accepting the appointment he was following the reform path laid out by al-Banna.[653] However, in so doing, al-Baqouri had acted in direct opposition to a decision taken by the Brotherhood not to participate in government. Al-Baqouri, up until then a senior member of the Brotherhood who had been among the foremost candidates to succeed al-Banna, was dismissed from the organization on the grounds that he had transgressed the *Ikhwan's* decision not to participate in government.[654] The dismissal of such a personality of al-Baqouri's standing was perceived by the revolutionary regime as an act of hostility by the Brotherhood, and came to be a cause of disagreement between them. As noted by Mitchell, by dismissing al-Baqouri, it seemed as if the Brotherhood was "withdrawing their support from the regime", an act that represented "a serious matter in those early days" when the military-junta lacked popular backing.[655] In addition, as explained by Mitchell, this early "cabinet *débâcle*"[656] came to presage the personal antipathy between al-Hudaybi and Nasser, an antipathy that would characterize the conflict for the whole of this period. The antipathy between them had emerged following their first encounter, according to accounts within the Brotherhood. In the words of Farid Abdel Khaleq, rarely a week had gone by after the coup before the relationship between Nasser and al-Hudaybi had turned lukewarm. At their first meeting after the coup, Nasser had made it abundantly clear that the Brotherhood would not acquire an advising prerogative in the new regime, hence al-Hudaybi's intimation to his Brotherhood-advisors that "this [the coup] is not an Islamic movement (*ḥaraka islāmiya*) that follows the path and goals envisioned by the *Ikhwan*. It is at best

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[652] For an in-depth discussion of this issue cf. Mitchell 1993, 107.
[653] Al-Baqouri 1988,118.
[654] Abul Nasr 1988, 71.
[655] Mitchell 1993, 108; For the RCC's lack of popular support, see e.g. FO 371/108319/ JE 1016/12, "The Moslem Brotherhood under the Naguib Regime", February 1954.
[656] Mitchell 1993, 108.

a reform movement (*ḥaraka iṣlāḥiya*)".[657] In denying the *Ikhwan* an authoritative role, Nasser had, in the eyes of the Brothers, broken the deal they had struck. Therefore, Brotherhood accounts date the first conflict between the RCC and themelves back to this first meeting.[658]

The second main cause of disharmony occurred in early 1953. Martyn Frampton has accurately described 1953 as 'the year of division'.[659] The year started with the dissolution of all political parties on 17 January - except the Brotherhood, on the grounds that the *Ikhwan* was not a political party. Concurrent with the decree of dissolution, the junta declared a three-year transition period during which Naguib would rule. In so doing, the military had de facto acquired the reins of power in the country. It was at this point, argues Gordon, that the junta began to "fancy itself a revolution".[660] And it was soon afterwards that the junta came to be known as the Revolutionary Command Council (*Majlis Qiyādat al-Thawra*).[661] This consolidation of power had been underway for some time, according to American intelligence. In October 1952, the CIA pointed to "evidence that the army is steadily consolidating its position". Adding to this, the report maintained that the junta was trying to "to curb the Brotherhood's influence".[662] In keeping with this, from early 1953 the RCC began formulating its own agenda in which it envisaged an unchallenged position for itself. The RCC "has complete control over the Egyptian Government", so the assessment put forward by the CIA in early 1953 read.[663]

Shortly after dissolving all political parties in January 1953, the RCC announced the foundation of a political body designated "to provide a new center around which political support for the new regime can be organized".[664] The "Liberation Rally" (*Hayʾat al-Taḥrīr*), as this body was named, was envisioned as a political organization assigned to mobilize popular support for the officers and arouse sentiment for the junta. The Rally organized mass rallies and public events with its main task being to fuel popular enthusiasm. Gordon has maintained that *Hayʾat al-Taḥrīr* "never succeeded in surpassing its rivals, the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood", as a grassroots political organization, but it came to spotlight the officers' entrance onto the political scene.[665] The Rally was constructed

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[657] Cf. Abdel Khaleq 1987, 85; Shadi 1987, 226; Abdel Halim 2013 III, 165; al-Tilmisani cited in Qaud 1985, 95.
[658] Ibid.
[659] Frampton 2018, 215.
[660] Gordon 1992, 77.
[661] Ibid.
[662] CIA-RDP79T00975A000900050001-6, Current Intelligence Bulletin, 16 October 1952.
[663] CIA-RDP79R01012A002500040001-1, National Intelligence Estimate, "Probable Developments in Egypt", 25 March 1953.
[664] Ibid.; For a British estimate of the Rally's purported role, see FO 371/108319/ JE 1016/12, "The Moslem Brotherhood under the Naguib Regime", February 1954.
[665] Gordon 1992, 80-1.

as an organization with branches on campuses and in factories and with a hierarchical leadership aimed at disseminating the political visions of the junta. Muhammad Naguib was named president, and Nasser secretary, while other RCC figures also assumed leading positions in the Rally. Yet, Gordon declares that the real "directors" were lower-ranking Free Officers such as Ibrahim al-Tahtawi and others.[666]

From its early days, the Rally became a source of disharmony between the RCC and the Brothers. Seeing themselves as the civilian part of a civilian-military coalition, the Brotherhood viewed the newly minted formation as unnecessary competition to their envisioned position and as an attempt by the RCC to isolate them from real influence. Along these lines, Abdel Khaleq argues that Nasser and his military colleagues were at this point in time unable to drum up popular support and enthusiasm and were thus dependent on the support of *Ikhwan*-grassroots to obtain this backing. Therefore, in an attempt to find another source of support and free themselves from this *Ikhwan*-dependency, Nasser set about creating the Rally. In his position as secretary of the Rally, Nasser invited the Brotherhood to join it, direct its programs, and in the end fuse with it. The *Ikhwan* could not accept such a scheme, relates Abdel Khaleq, who at that time discussed the matter with Nasser.[667]

From the Brotherhood's viewpoint, their role was to be that of an equal partner, not a subordinated support-group, and they thus refused to become a second-tier member in their relationship with the officers. Lending support to this argument, al-Tilmisani points out that the Brotherhood had agreed to back the "blessed movement" provided that the officers went on with the social, religious and economic reforms agreed on with the Brothers prior to the coup. "Our popular assistance put the coup on a strong foundation in Egypt, but our backing was not an empty shell without meanings and viewpoints [...] we insisted on the application of Islamic law from day one".[668] The Brotherhood thus took it upon their shoulders to mold the new order Islamically, but the young officers were not prepared to follow the line envisioned by the *Ikhwan.*

For the second time since the Baqouri-'*débâcle',* the Brotherhood had exhibited its refusal to accept being a junior partner to the RCC. As explained by Shadi, the Brotherhood perceived such an inclusion into the Liberation Rally as a restriction to its influence and freedom, to which they could

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[666] Ibid.

[667] Abdel Khaleq 1987, 86, see also al-Tilmisani's view; Qaud 1985, 101. The British support this reading. A British report claims for instance that al-Hudaybi perceived the rally as "a threat to the Brotherhood [...]". It was argued that if the Rally succeeded, "the Army would be less inclined to rely on his [Hudaybi's] support"; FO 371/108319/ JE 1016/12, "The Moslem Brotherhood under the Naguib Regime" February 1954.

[668] Qaud 1985, 94.

not assent.[669] As a result of the RCC's consolidation of power by dissolving the parties and establishing the Rally, "the Muslim Brotherhood openly declared war [on the junta]", argues al-Sadat. For him, the Brothers had the "obvious intention of overthrowing us and taking over the rule of Egypt".[670] In the same vein, Hussein al-Shafiʿi, another leading RCC member, considered the establishment of the Liberation Rally and the Brotherhood's reaction to it as an early source of discord. He points to the Brotherhood's oppositional position and recalls al-Hudaybi saying "you aspire to remove the banners of the Brotherhood to replace them with banners of the Rally".[671] Such statements illustrate the disharmonious effects of the Brotherhood's refusal to join the Rally.

Nevertheless, while the conflict was looming, both parts did their best to uphold a façade of friendship and harmony, although we can argue that it remained a hollow façade.[672] This was a battle of wits between erstwhile allies for the rule of Egypt. Despite the antagonism, however, there was no outbreak of hostilities during this first period of revolution. However, an important consequence of this disharmony was an internal compartmentalization of the Brotherhood, a discussion of which I turn to now.

5.1.2. Internal Splits Among the Brothers

The environment of competition, unease and suspicion between the officers and Brothers led to a serious split inside the Brotherhood on how to deal with the officers. As noted above, al-Hudaybi had since the early days of the coup been suspicious of the officers' intentions and had thus been cautious about going too far in the relations with them. Yet, a strong faction inside the Brotherhood perceived these officers and their 'revolution' to be an outcome of the Brotherhood's year-long anti-regime activism, and their post-monarchical regime as representing the dreams of the Brotherhood. Mahmoud Abdel Halim recalls for example that many Brothers celebrated the "successful movement [*cum* coup] completed by our officer-Brothers, as being their own".[673] Accordingly, the Brotherhood, as this section will show, was greatly divided as it entered the height of the conflict with the officers.

Al-Hudaybi's mandate had been weak since the early days of his appointment as *Murshid*. As noted in the previous chapter, al-Hudaybi had lacked the personal charisma of al-Banna and he had

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[669] Shadi cited in Jawhar 1976: 44.
[670] El-Sadat 1978, 124.
[671] (edt.) Mansour 2004, 138-9.
[672] Mitchell 1993, 111; al-Sisi 2003, 312.
[673] Abdel Halim 2013 III, 165.

failed in creating harmony in the Brotherhood following his appointment. So, while his dealings with the officers were lukewarm, al-Hudaybi was facing internal problems inside the Brotherhood too. The officers though, many of whom had been in close contact with the *Ikhwan* for years before the coup, knew exactly what was going on inside the organization. Aware of these internal divisions between factions headed by al-Hudaybi, Abdel Rahman al-Banna (Hasan al-Banna's younger brother), and Saleh Ashmawi, the former deputy of the Brotherhood and the strong supporter of the Special Apparatus, the officers began cultivating ties to al-Hudaybi's rivals.[674] In so doing, the officers hoped to influence the course of the Brotherhood in a more pro-junta direction, as opposed to al-Hudaybi's skeptical attitude towards them. This fragmentation had become glaring during the early months of 1953.

In March 1953, in an unambiguous example of this conflict, Ashmawi "castigated" the Murshid "for having forced Sheikh al Baqouri to resign from the Brotherhood on the grounds that he had accepted office without consulting the Supreme Guide and in a government not based on strictly Koranic principles".[675] Advocating a closer cooperation with the new regime, Ashmawi declared that the *Ikhwan* must "play an active role in the reform movement and exploit their influence as the most powerful organisation in the Middle East". In a concluding remark, Ashmawi maintained that this could not be achieved "while Al Hodeiby [sic] remained Supreme Guide".[676]

According to US assessments, the Brotherhood was split between two competing factions, one of which, that headed by Hasan al-Banna's younger Brother Abdel Rahman al-Banna, was encouraged by the RCC to oppose al-Hudaybi. US diplomats concluded that the RCC had by this time decided that the Brotherhood would be "dealt with" in some way if the anti-Hudaybi faction did not prevail.[677]

This perception of a "serious deterioration in relations between the Moslem Brotherhood and the Army" was also shared by the British. This dispute between the Brotherhood and the RCC had led to an internal split inside the Brotherhood, between "Hodeibi and his faction" on the one hand and the "anti-Hodeibi faction" on the other, according to British intelligence, and was understood as a dispute over tactics. While the Hudaybi "faction" was unwilling to give the RCC a "carte blanche", the anti-Hudaybi clique was, in the words of the British report, "probably mainly for opportunist reasons" advocating a closer cooperation with the RCC, which explains why they were "supported

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[674] Gordon 1992, 103.
[675] FO 371/ 102704, JE 1015/51, No. 67, Ralph Stevenson, from Cairo to Foreign Office, 17 March 1953.
[676] Ibid.
[677] Frampton 2018, 227.

by Colonel Nasser".[678] Nasser had frankly intimated to Trefor Evans, the Oriental Counsellor of the British Embassy in Cairo, that he expected the anti-Hudaybi faction to take control of the guidance council (*Maktab al-Irshād*) at the upcoming council elections in October 1953.[679] In so hoping, Nasser undoubtedly yearned for a closer relationship with the Brotherhood, in which al-Hudaybi, who hitherto had been seen as the greatest obstacle to cooperation, would be out of the way or at least strongly weakened.[680] On 10 September 1953 Nasser had in person informed Trefor Evans that he was personally on "bad terms" with al-Hudaybi "and his immediate supporters, including Munir Dallah [sic], Abu Rouqak [sic] and Sayed [sic] Ramadan".[681] Referring to the internal split in the Brotherhood, Nasser underlined that he had the support of the "anti-Hodeiby [sic] faction headed by Abdul Rahman Banna (brother of the late Supreme Guide), and Saleh Ashmawi, and also that of the followers of Sheikh al Baquri [sic]".[682]

These frictions affecting the internal harmony of the Brotherhood show clearly that the *Ikhwan* had suffered a blow to their coherence following the coup. What can be asserted with confidence is that the Brotherhood, or at least its upper echelons, went into this crucial phase of conflict with the military regime as a divided organization. Consequently, when the RCC decided to dissolve the Brotherhood on 13 January in a clear escalation of the conflict, it did so to a fractured organization. As I argue in the following section, until this dissolution which marked a turning point in the conflict between the Brotherhood and the RCC in terms of "escalating policing" and the closing of opportunity windows, al-Hudaybi had undertaken an effort to limit the secrecy of the Brotherhood. Yet, with the heightening of conflict with the regime, peaking at this time with the dissolution of the Brotherhood in January 1954, we observe a reversal of this nascent aim of "no secrecy in Islam", which he had declared upon his appointment.[683] Following this instance of "tough policing" and the concomitant repression of its members, a current of the Brotherhood began seeing the conflict with the regime as heading towards an imminent showdown, and an "action militarization" thus took place which culminated with the Manshiyya-incident.

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[678] FO 371/102706, "The Long-term prospects of the Army Movement" British Embassy, Cairo, September 1953.
[679] Frampton 2018, 228.
[680] Al-Sisi 2003, 308.
[681] FO 371/102706, JE 1015/129, 1012/22/53, British Embassy Cairo, 17 September 1953.
[682] Ibid.
[683] Mitchell 1993, 88.

5.1.3. Reforming Secrecy

Secrecy is a correlate of despotism and harsh policing, reasons Simmel.[684] The secrecy of the Brotherhood developed along these lines as well. One of the earliest examples of this secrecy in the Brotherhood's structures can be traced back to 1938, when an oath was formulated for its "battalions" encompassing "work, obedience and to keep the secrets".[685] In 1943, in institutionalizing this idea of secrecy as a defensive structure against persecution, the "*usar*" structure was developed as a blueprint for the organization to endure repression.[686] Additionally, as shown in previous chapters, the Special Apparatus was also developed in the early 1940s as a structure enabling the Brotherhood to engage in the anti-colonial and nationalist struggle for Egypt and to protect the organization. Thus, the secrecy of the Brotherhood had a long history going back to its formative years.

Upon his appointment as *Murshid*, as noted in the previous chapter, al-Hudaybi insisted upon the dissolution of secret structures inside the Brotherhood as a step towards refurbishing the *Ikhwan's* image. During 1953, the RCC, and especially Gamal Abdel Nasser, had explicitly requested the abolition of secrecy from the Brotherhood's ranks. If such structures remain in post-monarchical times, Nasser argued, it would signal bad intentions from the Brotherhood's side towards the revolution.[687] However, as this section will argue, al-Hudaybi, shortly after the accomplishment of the coup, did opt for controlling and reforming the secrecy rather than abolishing it; why did this change of heart occur? what were his motives?

Since his appointment as *Murshid,* Al-Hudaybi had become the target of hostility from Abdel Rahman al-Sindi, head of the Apparatus,[688] and from a leading faction of its members who perceived his slogan "no secrecy in Islam"[689] as a dangerous agenda, stripping the Brotherhood of its *jihad* aspect. They argued that by eliminating secrecy and dismissing armed *jihad,* the *Ikhwan's* slogan "*Jihad* is our path" would be rendered hollow.[690]

As argued by Ashour, al-Hudaybi had faced "several obstacles" upon his initial attempt to dissolve the Apparatus, and that is why he "pragmatically changed the objective into reforming

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[684] Simmel 1906, 472.
[685] Abdel Aziz 2004, 36.
[686] Ibid., 9. This was discussed in chapter two.
[687] NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb* V, 1062.
[688] Abdel Halim 2013 III, 222: Abdel Halim claims that al-Sindi perceived al-Hudaybi's consolidation of power inside the Brotherhood as a challenge to his powerful position as an undisputed powerbroker.
[689] Mitchell 1993, 88.
[690] Al-Sabbagh 1998, 70.

rather than dismantling" the Special Apparatus.[691] While I partly agree that al-Hudaybi's early change of heart can be understood as being prompted by these "obstacles" he faced, I also argue, as I have done in chapter four, that al-Hudaybi on account of the Brotherhood's *jihad* activities during the Canal War became convinced of the necessity of possessing an armed formation in the Brotherhood, capable of fulfilling the task of *jihad*.

Rather than being only a "pragmatic" decision, I argue that the Canal war and the internal pressure from the Brothers to engage in the anti-British struggle, convinced al-Hudaybi of the necessity of such an Apparatus to fulfill this task and obligation of *jihad*. Al-Hudaybi argued along these lines before Gamal Salem in the "People's Tribunal". Here, al-Hudaybi maintained that upon his appointment as *Murshid* he had decided to abolish the Apparatus, but that at a later time he assigned Yusuf Talʿat to lead the Apparatus in "forming individuals who could defend the nation, not individuals who commit terror".[692] In other words, al-Hudaybi revised his nascent commitment to dissolve the Apparatus and decided instead to control and lead it. Al-Hudaybi explained that its aims were legitimate, stating that he wanted to possess a formation able to "prepare Muslim individuals to protect Muslim land".[693] The Apparatus, he maintained, was assigned the task of "fighting the British in the Canal Zone or fighting in Israel".[694] This change of heart came at a time when the Brothers were heading towards conflict with the regime and seeking to continue its anti-British activities. These two factors, the anti-British ideas prevalent among the Brothers and the fear of regime-crackdown, were key to al-Hudaybi's chang of heart, so my argument.

As an example of these continuing anti-British sentiments among the *Ikhwan*, British ambassador Stevenson informed premier Winston Churchill on 21 May 1953 that Brotherhood members continue to "send messages to Naguib signed in blood, and telegrams to this Embassy stating that they seek 'evacuation or annihilation'".[695] In other words, the Brothers continued to harbor strong nationalist sentiments and the desire to transform these sentiments into tangible acts. Thus, when in 1953 the Free Officers commenced a guerrilla campaign to harass the British and force them to reach a solution to the national cause, the Brotherhood participated actively in this struggle.[696]

It was against this backdrop that al-Hudaybi appointed a committee headed by Abdel Qader Uda,

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[691] Ashour 2009, 64.
[692] NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb* IV, 789.
[693] Ibid.
[694] Ibid., 826.
[695] FO 371/102704, JE 1015/77, No. 121, 1011/41/53, British Embassy, Cairo, 21 May 1953.
[696] Al-Sabbagh 1998, 111. For the British point of view; FO 371/102810, JE 1192/342, No. 136 (s) Sir Ralph Stevenson, From Cairo to Foreign Office, 5 June 1953.

the deputy of the *Ikhwan*, and consisting of five leading members of the Special Apparatus and Hussein Kamal al-Din and Husni Abdel Baqi from the Brotherhood's guidance office to explore the appropriate ways of reforming the Apparatus.[697] These reform attempts came at a time when the regime was demanding the abolition of the Special Apparatus, as a step towards eradicating secrecy from the Brotherhood's ranks.[698] Yet, despite these demands, al-Hudaybi was determined to keep the Apparatus. What al-Hudaybi had decided, in his own words, was not to dismiss secrecy, but to control it and put it under a leadership he appointed.[699] For this reason, it was decided to merge the cells of the Special Apparatus with the *usar* system of the Brotherhood and to put both structures under the same command. By so doing, it was envisioned that a streamlining of command-structures and communication could be achieved, thus removing the dichotomy the Apparatus had created in the past.[700] However, the decision to keep these secret structures continued to be a point of contention between al-Hudaybi and the officers.[701]

On 19 November 1953, in what seems to have been a reaction to al-Hudaybi's attempts to consolidate his hold of the Apparatus, Sayyid Fayez, a senior member of the Apparatus and an associate of al-Hudaybi, was killed by a bomb delivered to his home in a box of sweets. Fayez, Abdel Halim underlines, was a close associate of al-Hudaybi who had grown tired of al-Sindi's "recklessness" and had "decided to help the *Murshid* free the Apparatus from the authority of al-Sindi".[702] On this issue, Nasser told the British embassy that the death of Fayez had come as a result of the latter's move to the Hudaybi-faction "about a fortnight before his death".[703] Following the assassination of Fayez, al-Hudaybi dismissed four leading commanders of the Apparatus; Abdel Rahman al-Sindi, Mahmoud al-Sabbagh, Ahmad Adel Kamal and Ahmad Zaki.[704] Ahmad Adel Kamal has ever since been suspected of the murder although no charge has been filed against him.[705] According to a widely cited story, on the day of his death Fayez was scheduled to hand al-Hudaybi a report detailing "the long-concealed data on the Apparatus".[706] At this crucial point in time when al-Hudaybi was balancing between putting an end to secrecy and controlling it, the

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[697] Al-Sabbagh 1998, 89; NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb* V, 1028-9.
[698] Al-Sabbagh 1998, 91.
[699] NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb* IV, 789-90.
[700] Adel Kamal 1987, 330.
[701] See e.g. FO 371/108319/ JE 1016/12, "The Moslem Brotherhood under the Naguib Regime" February 1954.
[702] Abdel Halim 2013 III, 229.
[703] FO 371/108319, JE 1016/1, 1012/5/53G, British Embassy Cairo, 30 December 1953.
[704] Abdel Halim 2013 III, 231.
[705] Adel Kamal 1989, 144-5.
[706] Mitchell 1993, 122; For a contemporary account, see FO 371/108319, JE 1016/1, 1012/5/53G, British Embassy Cairo, 30 December 1953.

Brotherhood accounts clearly indicate that the balance was tipping towards controlling and preserving it rather than ending it. As we will see shortly, following the first dissolution of the Brotherhood under military rule in January 1954, which marked a clear instance of "tough policing", the balance tipped heavily towards preserving secrecy. Thus, I claim that the prospects of repression by the regime further convinced al-Hudaybi of the necessity of keeping secrecy and secret structures. In so arguing, I understand al-Hudaybi's change of heart as a reaction to "despotism" and to the prospects of "police control", along with the simultaneous undercurrent of anti-British agitation cited in the preceding chapter. This is consistent with the causal mechanisms posited by della Porta, such as escalating policing and closing of opportunity windows, which pave the way for a radicalization of means.[707]

Sayed Fayez's death represents one of the most controversial incidents in the history of the Brotherhood, and signifies the harsh fragmentation of the *Ikhwan* at this time. For the first time, a Brotherhood assassination had taken place in which the victim and most probably the perpetrator were Brothers. As argued by della Porta, underground groups tend on account of "internal competition for leadership, to escalate their forms of violence, moving towards the use of lethal and sometimes indiscriminate violence".[708] With this incident, we observe an unambiguous turn towards organizational competition which is "a potential cause for violence as, especially in situations of declining mobilization, violence is an instrument for attracting consent".[709]

In the wake of the dismissal of the Apparatus leaders, al-Sindi supporters stormed al-Hudaybi's home on 27 November 1953 to press for his resignation, which he refused to offer. When al-Hudaybi supporters showed up at his house, the mutineers went to the *Ikhwan's* headquarters, announcing that they would stage a sit-in until the dismissal of the four Apparatus commanders was suspended and an investigation into the matter completed.[710]

Yet, the death of Sayyid Fayez and the subsequent insurgency was not all harmful for al-Hudaybi, as he utilized these incidents to consolidate his grip on the Apparatus, and more generally of the Brotherhood. Following this "coup-attempt", al-Hudaybi moved swiftly to purge the insurgent leaders which included the dismissal of Saleh Ashmawi and the renowned cleric Muhammad al-Ghazali, two of the staunchest proponents of the anti-Hudaybi and pro-RCC faction.[711] With this incident, representing the gravest event of compartmentalization inside the

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[707] della Porta 2013, 39.
[708] Ibid., 150.
[709] Ibid., 151.
[710] For a detailed account see Mitchell 1993, 122-3; Shadi 1987, 147-154.
[711] Shadi 1987, 154; Abul Nasr 1988, 92.

Brotherhood, al-Hudaybi seems to have gained the upper hand against his antagonists, at least for a while. In the aftermath of this plot, al-Hudaybi continued his reconstitution of the Special Apparatus, naming Yusuf Talʿat as its new leader. Talʿat was appointed by virtue of his esteemed position in the Brotherhood and its Special Apparatus, but also on account of his strong support of and loyalty to al-Hudaybi.[712] By so doing, Hudaybi had once again shown that his initial idea of dismissing secrecy was turned on its head.

5.2. The First Showdown: The path towards All-out Confrontation (January-October 1954)

As argued in the previous sections, the Brotherhood and the RCC had since the early days of revolution lived in an atmosphere marked by tension and mistrust. While the personal relationship between al-Hudaybi and Nasser is known to have been strained since their first encounter, the general relationship characterizing the military junta and the Brotherhood was also marked by tensions and conflict. Having overcome the internal plot against him, al-Hudaybi seemed to have secured a vital base of support inside the Brotherhood. By changing the leadership of the Apparatus and putting a loyalist at its head, he was on track to bringing the Brotherhood under his control. Therefore, Mitchell maintained that al-Hudaybi's victory over the plotters was "a blow to the government" which "prompted its decision to dissolve the organization shortly afterwards".[713] Nasser, referencing the Brotherhood, intimated to the British shortly after al-Hudaybi's consolidation that the regime could not "tolerate a State within a State - he feared that there would be further trouble".[714] It was thus at this point in time, when al-Hudaybi had overcome the worst incident of division inside the Brotherhood, that the RCC "finally decided to dissolve the Brotherhood at the first suitable opportunity".[715]

On this account, I argue that this incident of "tough policing" which took place when the regime dissolved the Brotherhood and arrested 450 mostly senior members including al-Hudaybi in mid-January 1954,[716] and again in February and March when other leading members of the organization

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[712] Adel Kamal 1989, 360; Abdel Halim 2013 II, 471.
[713] Mitchell 1993, 126.
[714] FO 371/108319, JE 1016/1, 1012/5/53G, British Embassy Cairo, 30 December 1953.
[715] FO 371/108319/ JE 1016/12, "The Moslem Brotherhood under the Naguib Regime" February 1954.
[716] FO 371/108319, JE 1016/2, No. 54, Sir R. Stevenson, From Cairo to Foreign Office, 13 January 1954, see also, Mitchell 1993, 127; al-Sisi 2003, 370; Abdel Halim 2013 III, 285. (According to official announcements, following the dissolution 450 members were arrested while 20 were immediately released.)

were arrested[717] and Brotherhood officers were either court-martialed or fired,[718] put the Brotherhood on a track of clandestinity which brought about the final showdown in October 1954. In so claiming, I challenge the notion that the idea of confronting the regime emerged in the prison camps following the Manshiyya incident, as Kepel has argued.[719] This section will therefore proceed by discussing the deliberations which took place inside the Brotherhood on account of this first showdown in revolutionary Egypt. I thereby intend to show that it was during these months leading up to the Manshiyya-incident in late October that the *Ikhwan* developed a strategy of "action militarization" to deal with the military regime. Whereas al-Hudaybi had been balancing between the idea of secrecy and the principle of non-secrecy which he had uttered in the early days of his leadership, at this point in time, with the prospect of conflict a reality, the Brotherhood obviously tipped towards a militarization of means. Therefore, as argued at the beginning of this chapter, regardless of whether the failed attempt on Nasser's life (the Manshiyya-incident) was staged by the regime or ordered by the *Ikhwan*, the ensuing showdown came at a time when the Brotherhood had radicalized its means. In contrast to Kepel's account of "In the Beginning were the Camps",[720] I hold that the 'beginnings' came before the 'camps', although the subsequent treatment of the Brothers in the camps undoubtedly came to further radicalize a group of Brothers, as we shall see.

5.2.1. 'Action militarization' and the Path Towards al-Manshiyya

By dissolving the Brotherhood in January 1954, the regime had taken a drastic step against its erstwhile ally and partner. Following the dissolution, which was announced on 15 January 1954, the government issued a communique explaining its action and outlining its main accusations against the *Ikhwan*. Upon declaring the Brotherhood a political party, the communique announced that the Brotherhood was subject to the 1953 law of dissolution of parties. Among the charges levelled against the organization were its efforts "to bring about a coup d'état under the cover of religion", to endeavor to infiltrate the army and police "in order to rouse opposition to the Government", and to

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[717] Qaud 1985,105. Among the arrested Brotherhood leaders was Abdel Qader Uda (until then a strong voice in the pro-Nasser faction of the Brotherhood, but who had played a major role in directing the pro-democracy demonstrations which requested the dissolution of the RCC and the army's return to its barracks on 28 February 1954) and Umar al-Tilmisani.

[718] Shadi 1987, 350; Abdel Rauf 1988, 107-9. (Among the arrested and court- martialed officers were Colonel Abdel Munʿim Abdel Rauf, Major Maʿruf al-Hadri, Lieutenant Colonel Abu al-Makaram Abd al-Hayy and Major Hussein Hammuda).

[719] Kepel 1985, 26-8; (edt.) Bergesen 2008, 4; Calvert 2010, 203.

[720] Kepel 1985, 27.

have contacted the Oriental Counsellor of the British Embassy while the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations were ongoing in April 1953.[721] By so doing, the government was, in the words of the British Embassy, trying to "smear the Moslem Brotherhood by showing that they have been intriguing with the British" against the nationalist cause.[722] In the following days, a media campaign was launched against the Brotherhood highlighting their dangerous malicious intentions. On 17 January 1954, the Minister of Interior issued a communique stating that "a secret store containing explosives and fire-arms to the value of £E 20,000 had been discovered on the estate of Hassan Ashmawi in Sharkiya Province".[723] The statement added that the uncovered explosives "would have been enough to blow up an entire city". The government continued releasing stories of the unearthing of dangerous elements of the Brotherhood and the discovery of quantities of explosives and other material such as wireless equipment belonging to the Brotherhood.[724] Additionally, regime sponsored media continued besmirching the *Ikhwan*, accusing them of being a "reactionary force" working "hand in hand" with imperialism and exploiting "the faith of the masses in order to satisfy its lust for power".[725]

In the following, I will present a few examples which exemplify the development of radicalization inside the Brotherhood. As these examples will show, a current of Brothers began interpreting their struggle with the military regime as a *jihad* against despotic and un-Islamic rulers, thereby legitimizing anti-regime violence.

After the dissolution, which had taken the Brothers aback, we witness a militarization of means as described in the Brothers' own words. While this first dissolution and repression under military-rule 'only' lasted for two months,[726] we learn from Brotherhood accounts that to many of them it came to reveal the repressive and violent face of the post-monarchical regime.

Mahmoud Abdel Halim, for instance, relates that upon the arrest of the Brothers in January 1954 and as a result of the "deceitful accusations" raised against the *Ikhwan*, he came to the conclusion that Nasser was "a dangerous man who cannot be trusted, because he has no principles, morals nor

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[721] FO 371-108319, JE 1016/4, No. 61, Sir Stevenson addressed to Foreign Office, 15 January 1954; for the full communique, see Shadi 1987, 401-10.

[722] Ibid.

[723] The Brotherhood would continually insist that these accusations, and in particular those regarding the weapons discovered on al-Ashmawi's estate, were forged by the regime to defame the organization and to acquire the necessary evidence to dissolve it. Al-Ashmawi continued claiming that he had helped Nasser move and hide these illegally held weapons in January 1952 following the notorious Cairo-burning on 26 January 1952. Al-Ashmawi 1985, 30; al-Ashmawi 1977, 19-22, 53; Shadi 1987, 207.

[724] FO 371-108319, JE 1016/9, No. 13, Stevenson from Cairo to Foreign Office, 19 January 1954.

[725] FO 371-108319, JE 1016/7, No. 11, Stevenson addressed to Foreign Office, 18 January 1954.

[726] Most Brothers, including al-Hudaybi, were released on 25 March (Moussalli 1992, 34).

religion […] which is why the dealing with him should be cautious and in a cunning way, for one has to fight fire with fire".[727] Against this background, Abdel Halim, while in prison, envisioned that the Brotherhood should assume control of the country as soon as it gained freedom, and totally "paralyze Nasser's maneuvering". To do so, it was necessary to undertake a "positive task, quickly", no matter the costs. This had to be done, according to Abdel Halim, to safeguard the people's aspirations. What Abdel Halim was envisioning was to confront the regime head-on, fearing that "Nasser would not give us time to rest". He relates confronting al-Hudaybi and other senior Brothers and lamenting their indolent reaction to Nasser's intrigues, as he put it.[728] Such anti-government sentiments and the desire to confront the authorities were also present among the rank and file of the *Ikhwan*. Yusuf al-Qaradawi offers such an account. Shortly after his release from prison in late March 1954, he remembers that a confrontation took place between local *Ikhwan* members in his village in the Gharbiyya province and the local police. The local Brothers, according to al-Qaradawi's account, perceived the authorities as an adversary, and thus that such confrontations with the authorities were legitimate. Such instances were plentiful at this stage, and indicate the growing sense of militarization of action, at least among a segment of Brothers.[729]

As della Porta has argued, "when normal channels of access to the political system are blocked, activists perceive terrorism as necessary", and we observe a similar development among some Brothers who perceived their persecution as a blocking of "normal channels of access to the political system" or even to informal political participation.[730] As a case in point, Abdel Munʿim Abdel Rauf, a former Colonel in the army who had been exiled to Gaza in October 1952 and subsequently forced to retire in December 1953 only to be arrested in January 1954 and court martialed, offers such an account.[731] By enduring retirement and then imprisonment, Abdel Rauf had been isolated from the "normal channels". He recalls a meeting with al-Hudaybi in which he warned the *Murshid* that the regime will "repress the Brotherhood's members and it will not abstain from erecting a prison camp in the desert to throw us in".[732]

On account of this 'closing of opportunity windows', Abdel Rauf agreed with al-Hudaybi to undertake the task of organizing the Brotherhood officers in the army and to organize and train the

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[727] Abdel Halim 2013 III, 298.
[728] Ibid., 322-24.
[729] Al-Qaradwi 2004, 55.
[730] della Porta 2013, 34.
[731] Abdel Rauf 1988, 91, 99.
[732] Ibid., 103; Shadi recalls likewise that he together with more than 50 officers in the police were retired before the January arrests. (1987, 350).

members of the Special Apparatus. These preparations, Abdel Rauf recalls, were necessary to "deal the RCC a decisive blow". As a result of this meeting which took place between late December 1953 and early January 1954, he began working with Yusuf Talʿat, the new commander of the Special Apparatus, to prepare a core of cadre capable of confronting the regime.[733] On 18 January 1954, Abdel Rauf and other Brotherhood officers such as al-Hadri, Abdel Hay and Hammuda were arrested, accused of subversive activities, and of mobilizing officers to the ranks of the Brotherhood. This "unjust" arrest, as Abdel Rauf describes it, seems to have further radicalized his views on how to deal with the regime. At this point in time, he concluded that it had become necessary to conduct "a *jihad* against those despots" of the RCC. To fulfill this *jihad* and to "deal with this autocratic regime", he requested from Hussein Kamal al-Din, member of the Brotherhood's general guidance office and leader of the Brotherhood in Cairo, 500 well-trained and fully armed *Ikhwan*, that Abdel Rauf would lead in this *jihad* against Nasser and his fellows. However, to his disappointment and "typical of the Brotherhood's leaders" as he describes it, they did not react to his request. Abdel Rauf, who had decided to fight the regime at any cost, sent al-Hudaybi a message asking for his consent to break out of prison and resist the 'autocratic regime'. Abdel Rauf received al-Hudaybi's approval of escaping, but no answer to the latter question. He escaped prison in May 1954, aided by Muhammad Mahdi Akef, at that time a member of the Brotherhood's Special Apparatus.[734]

Once free, Abdel Rauf bemoaned the unpreparedness of the Brotherhood. According to his account, he was at this time asked by Yusuf Talʿat and Ibrahim al-Tayyeb (head of the Apparatus in Cairo) to prepare for "an Islamic coup".[735] Thus, according to accounts by leading members of the Brotherhood, this period witnessed a turn towards action militarization by a segment of Brothers. Not all Brothers, however, adopted such an approach. Farid Abdel Khaleq, a close associate of al-Hudaybi, claims that the *Murshid* had instructed the Brothers "not to apply violence against the existing regime". Al-Hudaybi, Abdel Khaleq contends, envisioned a mass-demonstration to protest the autocratic nature of the regime, echoing the pro-democracy demonstrations of February 1954.[736]

Be that as it may, a strong current inside the Brotherhood perceived the conflict with the regime as a zero-sum battle. Hasan Duh, a leading activist, recalls that the Special Apparatus was, following the January arrests and dissolution, prepared to engage the military regime in an armed

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[733] Abdel Rauf 1988, 103-5.
[734] Ibid., 103-5, 145, 148-9, 156.
[735] Ibid, 163-65.
[736] Abdel Khaleq 1987 106; Abdel Khaleq 2004, XII https://bit.ly/3ePTqGW (consulted 22.07.2020); Shadi 1987, 337.

battle. The Brotherhood, Duh argues, was certainly prepared to confront Nasser if he tried to repeat the "aggression against them as he had done in January 1954".[737]

The prison experience no doubt had a significant impact on the Brotherhood and their perception of the regime; these were, as defined by della Porta "escalating moments, providing […] justifications for violence".[738] Upon release from prison, and as a consequence of mistrust towards the regime which they perceived as disingenuous, the Brothers began organizing their ranks and preparing for a showdown. This showdown, Duh believed, would inevitably occur and they would have to be on guard and ready.[739] During the summer of 1954, in an atmosphere of tension, the Special Apparatus established a number of training camps to provide its members with the necessary training for an imminent encounter with the regime. Leading in these preparations, as mentioned, was Abdel Rauf, the fugitive officer who had, in his own words, decided to engage the 'tyrants of the RCC' in an armed *jihad.*[740] Hindawi Diwayr (head of the Apparatus in Imbaba in northern Giza and who was hanged by the regime in late 1954) offered a similar assessment. Witnessing before the 'people's court', he claimed that Abdel Rauf had worked with the Special Apparatus in "rebuilding" and reforming it. This was a period, he argued, where the Apparatus was being expanded and many new members were being incorporated into its ranks, enabling it to "fight the occupation and protect the *daʿwa*".[741] "Protecting the *daʿwa*" was more than likely meant as a protection against government repression. However, the hasty incorporation of large numbers of Brothers to the Apparatus without them having completed a challenging and extensive vetting and training process certainly created some significant problems for the maintenance of the Apparatus' rules and commands. Among the problems such expansion created were the difficulties in indoctrinating and controlling the new recruits; many had never been a part of secret structures, and an effective line of command was lacking due to the novelty of these new structures. Another challenge was following the rules and commands regarding secrecy in practice. As a fragmented organization at this point in time, it was arduous to streamline these structures. Adel Kamal offers such an account. According to him, the details of the "Secret" Apparatus were known to everyone outside the Brotherhood, which indicates that its "secrecy" was at least weakened.[742]

On 4 May 1954, in an example of the growing tensions between the government and the *Ikhwan*,

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[737] Duh 1989, 78, 83.
[738] della Porta 2013, 65.
[739] Duh 1983, 69.
[740] Abdel Rauf 1988, 182-4.
[741] NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb*, I, 34, 40-2.
[742] Adel Kamal 1989, 360-1.

al-Hudaybi sent a letter to premier Gamal Abdel Nasser attacking the regime for breaking its promises to the Brotherhood from late March 1954, and demanding social and economic reforms. Al-Hudaybi furthermore urged the government to prepare the army and people for the struggle against the British. Al-Hudaybi reminded Nasser that "speeches and declarations will not force the British to leave Egypt, what will, however, is a hard and long struggle [against them]".[743] This letter was also circulated as a pamphlet in the streets, which antagonized Nasser and his fellow officers. Such a statement, circulated to the Egyptian masses, was understood as a clear challenge to the legitimacy of the nascent regime.[744] To American officials, such statements indicated that the Brotherhood was heading towards an escalation with the regime, which could include bloodshed.[745] Hamed Abul Nasr maintains that Nasser perceived this letter as a threat, and thus his reaction was aggressive. Consequently, a wave of restraints was once again directed against Brotherhood members, many of whom were exiled to remote areas or fired from their jobs.[746]

At this time of increased tension and uncertainty, al-Hudaybi left Egypt in June 1954 for a tour of the Arab countries. According to Abul Nasr, al-Hudaybi urged the leaders of the Brotherhood to strike a deal with the regime while he was abroad.[747] Some leading members considered al-Hudaybi an obstacle to achieving better relations with the regime, and thus hoped that his absence could help restore peace. Khamis Hamida and Abdel Rahman al-Banna, both leading members of the Brotherhood, met with Nasser to find a solution to unresolved issues. Hamida, the vice-*Murshid*, later stated that al-Hudaybi's absence represented an opportunity to find a solution to the conflict with the regime.[748] The talks that took place between June 1954 and October of the same year between regime- and *Ikhwan* representatives revolved primarily around the Brotherhood's Special Apparatus and their members in police and army. Nasser pressed for the dissolution of the Apparatus and the retirement of all officers belonging to the Brotherhood before a solution could be reached, but those were demands that these *Ikhwan* could not accept - mainly because the Brotherhood disagreed on this question.[749]

The split in the upper echelons of the organization arose at this time between three significant groups. One group was headed by al-Hudaybi and his allies such as Hasan al-Ashmawi, Munir al-

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[743] al-Hudaybi cited in Ahmad 1977, 178-9.
[744] Mitchell 1993, 135.
[745] Frampton 2018 242.
[746] Abul Nasr 1988, 125-6.
[747] Ibid., 126.
[748] NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb* III, 622-30; Mitchell 1993, 135.
[749] NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb* III, 627.

Dilla, Farid Abdel Khaleq and Salah Shadi. This faction had been the main force behind the appointment of al-Hudaybi in 1950 and was also bound together by both family relations and on account of their social background; many of them represented the upper class. It was in control of the Special Apparatus and strongly opposed to the government, which is why it directed the anti-government activities of the time. A second group consisted of veteran Brothers such as Abdel Rahman al-Banna, Saleh Ashmawi, Muhammad al-Ghazali, al-Bahi al-Khouli and others who advocated close cooperation with the government and was at direct odds with al-Hudaybi, even calling for his dismissal as a step towards better relations with the government.[750] This faction had emerged shortly after al-Hudaybi's appointment but had become strong in its criticism of the *Murshid* during 1953, when veterans such as Ashmawi and Ghazali were dismissed from the organization. A third group consisted of members of the Guidance Office such as Khamis Hamida (vice-*Murshid*), Umar al-Tilmisani, Abdel Muʿiz Abdel Sattar and others. This faction worked towards securing support of a majority of the Brotherhood's General Assembly for closer cooperation with the government. In contrast to the second faction, however, this group did not explicitly challenge al-Hudaybi's legitimacy, but envisioned non-oppositional policies towards the regime and wanted to do so through securing a majority in the Guidance Office and General Assembly.[751] Consequently, the rank and file of the Brotherhood was split between these different factions, each of which could command the support of a considerable group of Brothers. Al-Hudaybi's faction represented the confrontationists in this period of time while the two latter factions were the accommodationists, with regard to their position towards the regime.

This fragmentation of the Brotherhood leadership became conspicuous in the organization's dealings with the government in this last phase leading up to the final showdown. While leading Brothers representing the accommodation factions were meeting with Nasser and other representatives of the junta to find a peaceful solution to the issues at hand and trying to mend the relationship between the government and *Ikhwan*, the Hudaybi-faction continued opposing the regime clandestinely, thereby contributing to a further escalation of the conflict. For instance, the confrontationist faction had since late May[752] circulated a series of secret pamphlets entitled "The Muslim Brotherhood in Battle" (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fī al-Maʿraka*), harshly condemning the regime and propagating the ideas of the *Ikhwan*. These secret pamphlets denounced the regime as

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[750] Abul Nasr 1988, 108.

[751] NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb* III, 668.

[752] These pamphlets were issued as a reaction to the restrictions imposed by the government on the Brotherhood's weekly newspaper (NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb* IV, 726).

oppressive and as compromising Egypt's national rights in its negotiations with the British.[753] The author of these pamphlets was Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), who had joined the Brotherhood in 1953,[754] and the pamphlets were printed and distributed by members of the Special Apparatus, against the will of the two other factions who sought a solution with Nasser.[755] The two pro-cooperation factions conceived such activities as dangerous and unnecessarily provocative and requested an end to them, but to no avail.

In an example of the continuing anti-government agitation, when the Egyptian and British governments on 27 July 1954 announced their mutual approval of the 'heads of agreement' as a preliminary foundation for a new treaty between them, al-Hudaybi strongly denounced it from Beirut.[756] In so doing, he provoked the ire of the regime, and especially Nasser, and further split the *Ikhwan*.[757]

Accordingly, during August 1954 the Brotherhood became the subject of a strong media campaign in Egypt denouncing them as the "bearded charlatans" who trafficked in religion and who misrepresent the Islamic faith for their own gain.[758] In the following period, frequent violent clashes occurred between Brotherhood members and security forces leading to an exacerbation of tensions. One such incident took place on 27 August when Hasan Duh, a prominent Brotherhood activists and preacher, reportedly denounced the regime from the pulpit of the Sharif mosque in Cairo, and according to British reports urged the worshippers to "oppose the present régime and calling for violent action". Following his sermon, Duh led a demonstration into the streets which resulted in clashes with police and the subsequent arrest of Duh and about "thirty to forty" Brotherhood-sympathizers.[759] A similar incident occurred on 10 September 1954 following the Friday prayers, when a violent clash erupted between Brotherhood members and the police, leading to the arrest of seventeen Brotherhood members and four people injured. The clash was sparked by police intervention during the Friday sermon where the preacher, who according to British reports was "surrounded by an armed bodyguard of Moslem Brethren", had described the RCC as "heretics".[760] Such discourse signifies the radical development of the conflict and indicates how some Brothers

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[753] Mitchell 1993, 136.
[754] Al-Khalidi 1994, 323.
[755] NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb* III, 629; Toth 2013, 79.
[756] Mitchell 1993, 136.
[757] Abul Nasr 1988, 127-9. For Brotherhood criticism of Nasser from Damascus see also FO 371/110840, V1781/7, 17806/8/54, British Embassy Damascus, 15 September 1954.
[758] Frampton 2018, 244.
[759] FO 371/108319, JE 1016/13, No. 187, Ralph Stevenson, from Cairo to Foreign Office, 30 August 1954; For Duh's account on the incident, see Duh 1983, 71.
[760] FO 371/108319, JE 1016/14, No. 198, R. Stevenson, from Cairo to Foreign Office, 14 September 1954.

looked upon the officers as legitimate targets.

By September, the Hudaybi-faction had reached the conclusion that the government had committed to a crackdown on the *Ikhwan*, and they therefore began escalating their secrecy. By this point in time some five hundred Brotherhood members had been arrested, and many had gone underground to avoid the same fate.[761] Anxious about the government's intentions to either arrest him or kill him, al-Hudaybi went underground in early September, signaling the level of conflict that had been reached at this stage. Hasan al-Ashmawi, a close associate of al-Hudaybi who had gone underground with him, recalls that the crackdown on the Brotherhood was growing at this time. The increase in numbers of arrests heralded an imminent showdown between the officers and the Brothers. Hasan al-Ashmawi relates that Brotherhood leaders met at this time to discuss the proper way of dealing with the regime's policies towards them, but they could not agree on a strategy to defend themselves. He lamented that "the revolutionary energy of a majority of them [the Brotherhood leaders] was an energy to endure persecution rather than confronting the oppressor to end his oppression".[762]

Such was the picture in September 1954, one month prior to the Manshiyya incident. On account of these tensions, a British report noted that the Brotherhood had decided to "take the strongest measures possible to gain their own ends". Among the measures reported by the British ambassador Ralph Stevenson was "the assassination of Colonel Nasser". According to Stevenson "four Brethren are said to have volunteered for the task".[763] Nasser had stopped appearing publicly during this same period, undoubtedly due to such reports.[764] Thus, an obvious radicalization of the conflict had taken place by this time, with some Brothers envisioning a clash with the regime, and some of them such as Hasan al-Ashmawi wanting it to be revolutionary, i.e. violent . The accuracy of the abovementioned British assessments would appear to be corroborated by the Brothers' own words. Al-Hudaybi testified before the 'People's Tribunal' that Yusuf Talʿat had warned him that a radicalization had occurred among a segment of Brothers due to tensions with the regime. Talʿat had warned him "that an incident could be executed by a lunatic".[765] Such testimonies indicate that the incorporation of large numbers of young members to the Special Apparatus, without extensive indoctrination and vetting, along with the fragmentation of the Brotherhood's leadership, had weakened the command-lines of the Apparatus.

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[761] Al-Ashmawi 1977, 60.
[762] Ibid, 63.
[763] FO 371/108319, JE 1016/14, No. 198, Ralph Stevenson, from Cairo to Foreign Office, September 14, 1954.
[764] Mitchell 1993, 142.
[765] NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb* IV, 844.

Hasan al-Ashmawi relates that the Brotherhood had decided to launch an anti-regime demonstration guarded by armed Brotherhood members to denounce the regime's autocratic nature and demand democratization. The demonstration was planned to take place on 29 October. No plan, argues al-Ashmawi, was put forward to kill Nasser.[766] However, as this section has clarified, the idea of confronting the regime with violence had been present, at least among a faction of Brothers, prior to the Manshiyya incident. As the example of Abdel Rauf and the Special Apparatus has shown, a militarization of the Brotherhood took place at this time as a reaction to the "escalating policing" and closing opportunity windows. Accordingly, prior to the Manshiyya incident, the Brotherhood had developed the means to confront the government, as exemplified in their training camps and preparation for a showdown, and the militarization of actions among members of the *Ikhwan*. This preparation and expansion of the Special Apparatus, as Talʿat testified before court in late November 1954, came as a correlate of the repression the Brotherhood had experienced in January 1954.[767]

5.3. Conclusions

Brotherhood accounts generally dismiss the Manshiyya incident as a fabrication, made up by the regime to frame the Brotherhood and use it as a pretext to repress them. It was a conspiracy (*muʾāmara)* and a staged act (*tamthīliya*) in which the Brotherhood played no role, so argue most Brothers.[768] However, as this chapter has demonstrated, the lead up to this pivotal moment of the conflict saw a militarization of means in which a current of the Brotherhood went towards radicalization in the conflict with the regime. As demonstrated in the accounts of leading members of the *Ikhwan*, such as Abdel Munʿim Abdel Rauf, Mahmoud Abdel Halim and Hasan al-Ashmawi, some Brothers interpreted their conflict with the regime as an Islamic *jihad* against a despotic government which did not apply the rules of Islam, thus justifying the fight against it. I contend that the Brotherhood had long before its repression in late 1954 pivoted towards clandestinity and radicalization as a way of confronting the military regime. Accordingly, as a consequence of this development as illustrated in this chapter, it is arguably immaterial whether the Brotherhood was behind the assassination attempt or not: As shown in this chapter, the time was ripe for such an action, even if the Manshiyya attempt was concocted by the regime.

There has been in parts of the existing research an underlying truism coupling the idea of *jihad*

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[766] Al-Ashmawi 1977, 66.
[767] NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʾb* VI, 1302.
[768] Cf. Al-Hajj 1993, 116-7; Abdel Rauf 1988, 193-4; al-Sisi 1987, 76.

and the violent history of the Brotherhood with Sayyid Qutb and his well-known writings. However, the period in the Brotherhood history studied above evidently disproves the notion that Qutb had the leading role in radicalizing the Brotherhood through his prison-literature of the 1960s. On the contrary, senior Brothers such as Hasan Duh held the presumption at this early stage that a government which does not apply Islamic law should be perceived as "heretic" and can legitimately be fought.[769] Kepel has for instance argued that "[i]n the seclusion of the Nasser regime's concentration camps, new strategies were developed to fight against a state whose totalitarian character the imprisoned Brethren quickly perceived". To Kepel, the "concentration camps" had a key role in shaping the anti-regime worldview of the Brothers[770]. Yet, as this study has highlighted, the idea of "fighting the state" had in fact been present among many Brothers since at least 1948. One could therefore reasonably ask whether Qutb's affiliation with this radical fringe of the Brotherhood had resulted in his radicalization, rather than the other way around?

What I will argue in the subsequent chapters is, that by experiencing the failure of "fighting the state" and the harsh repercussions such a fight had brought down on their organization, many Brothers denounced anti-state violence and opted for non-violent activism, but a further attempt would first be made, as we shall see. The Brotherhood went into the prisons wounded and split, but was by no means an exterminated organization. To the Brothers, the aftermath of the Manshiyya incident represented the second *miḥna* (tribulation) in its history, in which the grim face of the military regime was unmasked. By being tortured, imprisoned and hanged, the *Ikhwan* was subjected to a repression of unprecedented dimensions.

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[769] FO 371/108319, JE 1016/14, No. 198, R. Stevenson, from Cairo to Foreign Office, 14 September 1954.
[770] Kepel 1985, 27-8.

6. The Muslim Brotherhood Going Underground: Continuation under Suppression

As 1954 came to an end, the Muslim Brotherhood seemed to have reached its final stage. Having challenged the military regime without the necessary means to compete with it, the Brotherhood saw itself beaten by a stronger opponent. It went into the conflict with Nasser and his fellows as a fragmented organization, and thus the officers managed to stamp out the regime's last and most serious opponent on the local scene with remarkable ease. The focal point of this conflict between the one-time allies took place on 26 October 1954, when the notorious attempt on Nasser's life occurred. In the few weeks that followed, a far-reaching suppression of the Brotherhood was set in motion, leading to the arrest of most senior members of the *Ikhwan* and the ransacking and subsequent burning to the ground of the Brotherhood's headquarters. On 30 October 1954 al-Hudaybi was arrested, marking the definite defeat of the *Ikhwan* and signalling the commencement of a comprehensive propaganda campaign against the Brothers, which would continue for a good part of the next two months. This media campaign, employing the pens of some of the most established authors in Egypt,[771] labelled the Brothers as wayward conspirators who "arrange death and fear" to their "Brothers in nation, religion and life" and who utilize Islam to champion their misdeeds.[772] Ali Amin, in a mocking tone described "*Ikhwani*-Egypt", had the assassination of Nasser succeeded, as a country without banks, barbers, trousers, cars, foreign languages or modern studies.[773] Daily reports of arrests and confessions revealing a 'comprehensive and evil' conspiracy to kill the premier and overthrow the government filled the pages of newspapers almost every day in this period.[774] In addition, proof was produced to demonstrate that the Brothers were agents of foreign powers and enemies of the nation.[775] The Brotherhood was experiencing the most severe crisis in its history.

On 1 November the military junta established 'the People's Tribunal' (*Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb*) under the direction of Gamal Salim, the RCC's "wild man", together with Anwar al-Sadat and Hussein al-Shafiʿi to prosecute those responsible for the botched attempt on Abdel Nasser's life.[776] When legal proceedings were commenced on 9 November, they were broadcast live and applied as

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[771] Among these authors were for example Taha Hussain and Ali Amin.
[772] Taha Hussain cited in (edt.) Mesbar 2014, 15-6.
[773] Ali Amin cited in (edt.) Mesbar 2014, 30-1.
[774] Mitchell 1993, 152.
[775] Cf. Taha Hussain cited in (edt.) Mesbar 2014, 23; Mitchell 1993, 152.
[776] Frampton 2018, 248.

a platform for character assassination of the Brotherhood and its leaders. Gamal Salem, in a grotesque manner, behaved as a chief prosecutor rather than judge, intimidating the prosecuted and at various times threatening them. Salem, who seemed to be engaged in a personal vendetta, set witnesses against each other, insulting them and making the audience ridicule them. A great part of the questioning was irrelevant for the particular case, being applied instead to present the Brotherhood as "merchants of religion" and "lackeys of foreign powers". This would indicate that the court was generally thought of as a platform to discredit the Brotherhood, its leaders, ideas and history, rather than actually indicting those responsible for the attempt. Salem, for example, accused Brotherhood members of considering Hasan al-Banna a "prophet" and unceasingly described them as a group of hypocrites (*munāfiqūn*).[777] This was essentially an attempt to bring down the Brotherhood and eliminate what popularity it still might have among the general population.

Thus, the Brotherhood at this point in time no doubt seemed eradicated. Following the arrest of al-Hudaybi on 30 October, other senior members were brought in throughout November. Khamis Hamida, the vice-*Murshid* was arrested on 11 November and the following days witnessed the arrest of Ibrahim al-Tayyib (head of the Apparatus in Cairo) and Yusuf Talʿat (general leader of the Apparatus) who was arrested on 14 November. When brought before Salem and subjected to his harsh assaults and intimidations,[778] most Brothers seemed unable to stand up for themselves or their organization, which certainly strengthened the impression of the Brotherhood as a group lacking the will and capacity to defend itself. By the end of November the government announced that it had arrested 1,000 members of the Brotherhood. As observed by Mitchell, the "speedy collapse of the organizational fabric was partly due to torture in the prisons".[779] On 4 December the first verdicts of the 'People's Tribunal' were pronounced. Seven members of the Brotherhood, among them al-Hudaybi, were sentenced to death, while seven members of the Guidance Office received life imprisonment with hard labor and two members of the Office were sentenced to 15 years in prison. On 9 December 1954, six of those sentenced to death were hanged,[780] while al-Hudaybi's death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment with hard labor. After the hangings, the work of the tribunal was assigned to three courts headed by junior officers. By February 1955, approximately

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[777] NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb* I, 154; II, 461.
[778] As an example, upon encouraging the audience to give its judgement of Ibrahim al-Tayyib, one of the attendees asked the court to "blow him up with a mine". (NA 1954, *Maḥkamat al-Shaʿb* II, 467).
[779] Mitchell 1993, 156.
[780] Those hanged were Mahmoud Abdel Latif (the would-be assassin), Yusuf Talʿat (head of the Special Apparatus), Ibrahim al-Tayyib (head of the Apparatus in Cairo), Hindawi Diwayr (head of the Apparatus in Imbaba), Abdel Qader Uda (a member of the guidance office) and Shaykh Muhammad Farghali (head of the Brotherhood in Ismailiyya).

1,000 Brotherhood members had been tried. [781]

Under these circumstances, most contemporary observers and scholars perceived the Brotherhood as an organization of the past, ultimately broken by the "secular, tolerant spirit of the times in Egypt" personified by the young officers.[782] Commenting on the Brotherhood's ability to endure, Harris argued that the Brotherhood's organization "had been broken up, without any likelihood of resurrection in the foreseeable future". Harris maintained, "[a]s of now, no attempt has been made by the dispersed members of the Brotherhood to rally anew against the Government […] it will be given no opportunity to become again a powerful movement, above ground".[783] In other words, writing in the 1960s, Christina Harris viewed the Brotherhood as exterminated, and did not expect it to re-emerge in the near future. Going even further, Richard Mitchell portrayed the organization as an archaic and conservative one "which […] sought to imbue the present with some sense of the past […]" To Mitchell, the Brotherhood came to epitomize a reaction to modernization, a modernization that was "transforming the tradition of which the organization was ostensibly the defender". Based on this understanding of the Brotherhood as representing traditionalism as opposed to modernism, Mitchell asserted that the *Ikhwan* would play no further role in the future of Egypt or the Arab world. Mitchell maintained in this regard that "the essentially secular reform nationalism now in vogue in the Arab world will continue to operate to end the earlier appeal of this organization". In a more explicit formulation of this prediction, Mitchell wrote "[a]nother dissolution and the hanging of six Brothers in December 1954 bring our history to its end". Whether Mitchell was concluding his own study, or the history of the Brotherhood is not up to us to say, but he certainly was of a firm conviction that its history was over.[784]

However, with President Abdel Nasser's unexpected death in September 1970 and the concomitant termination of the Nasserite regime, many observers came to see the resurgence of the Brotherhood as imminent. By way of illustration, in May 1971 the British Embassy in Tel Aviv reported such rumors of "more power for the Moslem Brotherhood".[785] Inquiring about the Brotherhood's position in Egyptian society, the embassy asked whether the *Ikhwan* had influenced al-Sadat's (then president of Egypt) "corrective revolution" of 15 May 1971 in which he purged Nasserite and leftist elements of the government. The telegram in hand added that it kept hearing

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[781] Harris 1964 222; Mitchell 1993, 160-2.
[782] Harris 1964, 235.
[783] Ibid., 235, 224.
[784] Mitchell 1993, 331, xxiv, xxv.
[785] FCO 39/970, File no. NA U 1/11, British Embassy Tel Aviv, 25 May 1971. (It is important to note that Sadat was never officially a member of the *Ikhwan*).

that "Sadat was formerly a member of the Brotherhood and that they [the *Ikhwan*] may even have been behind his actions".[786] In June of the same year, the British embassy in Cairo added emphasis to this argument. Discussing the prospects of a Brotherhood resurgence in Egypt, Richard Ashton Beaumont, British Ambassador to Cairo (1959-73), stressed that his Egyptian contacts "have been telling" that the Brotherhood was becoming "a force to be reckoned with".[787] Echoing the abovementioned rumors, the Ambassador referred to rumors saying that "Sadat is trying to encourage the Muslim Brethren to recruit again, as a possible antidote to Communist infiltration", and that "a Muslim Brother has been placed in each battalion of the Army to inculcate correct religious ideas in the impressionable young". Beaumont, who advised caution in believing such reports, did however conclude that "Sadat seems to be using the basic appeal of the Brotherhood for his own ends".[788] Reports to the same effect explicitly noted that large a number of Brothers had been released and repressive measures against the organization had been brought to an end as part of a policy designed "to balance Leftist influence in the new A.S.U. [Arab Socialist Union]".[789]

The appearance and frequency of such rumors less than a year after Nasser's death clearly suggest that the Brotherhood had continued to exist depite repression. As soon as Nasser's regime had come to an effective end, rumors of an imminent resurgence of the Brotherhood became abundant.

That being so, I intend to study these crucial years in the history of the Brotherhood that followed the repressive events of late 1954. While most Western researchers have regarded the Nasserite years as insignificant or not pertinent in the history of the Brotherhood, I claim that the Brotherhood's story was never concluded despite the repressive and harsh treatment they underwent during the Nasserite years (1954-1970). In so doing, I contend that through a historical study of these years we can trace a continuation of the Islamic modernist school that "strove to establish a balance between Islamic authenticity and Western-inspired modernization".[790] Accordingly, this chapter aims to bridge the history of the Brotherhood by shedding light on this understudied period in the *Ikhwan's* history. In arguing that the Brotherhood continued its existence during these years, I challenge the general presumption that the organization disappeared and then "re-emerged"

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[786] Ibid.
[787] FCO 39/970, File no. NA U 1/11, 1/1, "Muslim Brotherhood" R. A Beaumont, British Embassy Cairo, 11 June 1971.
[788] Ibid.
[789] FCO 39/970, File no. NA U 1/11, (1/8) P. Joy, "Release of Muslim Brethren in U.A.R." 24 June 1971. (The A.S.U. was the official political party founded in 1962 by Nasser as the country's single party; it remained functioning until 1978).
[790] Weismann 2017, 42.

following the demise of the Nasserite regime.

Gilles Kepel argued that following the suppression of 1954 the Brotherhood "began a sojourn in the desert that was to last two decades in Egypt".[791] Accordingly, while I disagree in understanding the *Ikhwan's* history during these important years as a "sojourn in a desert", I nevertheless attempt to historically present an insight into what happened to this organization, and how it continued during these repressive years. Thus, this chapter, and the next, are an attempt to examine the historical developments that took place following the dissolution of the Brotherhood in late October 1954. What happened to the Muslim Brothers who were repressed and imprisoned and subjected to harsh treatment following the botched attempt on Nasser's life? How, and even more importantly, why did the organization survive these years of "tough policing" and "closing opportunity windows"? These are the main question I attempt to answer in the following. This chapter will examine the first part of this era, i.e. 1954 to 1957, during which the first period of repression forced the organization underground and left a majority of its rank and file separated from senior leadership. This discussion will be taken up again in the following chapter, where I will discuss the eventful years of 1958 to1970. In dividing this period into two subsequent chapters, I attempt to show how the Brotherhood in the first period continued on the agency of individual and often young members who perceived it as their personal obligation to continue working in the ranks of the organization. My main focus will be on those young and often inexperienced members who decided after the imprisonment of most active senior activists and leaders to continue their activities despite the risks entailed. I discuss the organizational developments at this time but also the ideological reactions to the harsh repression they were exposed to. Furthermore, I will discuss the developments in prisons, because I maintain that the Brothers do not cease to be *Ikhwan* when imprisoned, but more often than not they continue to play a role from inside the prison walls. Chapter seven, which is a chronological continuation of this chapter, deals with the nationwide reorganization of the Brotherhood, known in the research as 'Organization 65'and the role played by Sayyid Qutb in these events.

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[791] Kepel 2014, 30.

6.1. Repressed Yet Enduring (1954-1957)

On a cold Tuesday on the 7th of December 1954,[792] and despite widespread appeals for clemency from the Syrian government and popular pleas from a number of Arab countries, the death sentences were carried out on six members of the Brotherhood. Representatives of the press, including a number of Western correspondents, witnessed the execution and were, in the words of a British report, "impressed by the bearing of the six men in their last moments". Muhammad Farghali did not utter any anxiety, but declared moments before his execution, "I am ready to die, I welcome the meeting with God". Abdel Qader Uda uttered the forceful words "Praise be to God that He has made me a martyr, and may He make my blood a curse upon the men of the revolution". Yusuf Talʿat's last words were "may God forgive me, as well as those who have done harm to me".[793] Yet, apart from the strong bearing of the executed men, there existed no signs of outright resistance by the *Ikhwan* to the harsh policing it was facing. It seemed as if the Brotherhood had accepted its destiny at the hands of a stronger opponent, i.e. the military regime. According to Mitchell, the hangings were received with "stunned and horrified silence", thus suggesting the Brotherhood's inability to react strongly.[794] Besides protests in neighboring Arab countries, by and large organized by the local branches of the Brotherhood,[795] virtually no objections were voiced in Egypt - The Egyptian Brotherhood remained almost silent. The aftermath of the hangings was "anti-climactic".[796] This lack of reaction from an organization of the Brotherhood's dimension undoubtedly forewarned its end for contemporary observers.

However, as this chapter will discuss, this anti-climactic course of events was not so much an indication of the end of the Brotherhood as it was a reflection of the harsh policing inflicted on the *Ikhwan* at this point in time and the broken coherence with which the organization went into conflict with the regime.[797] Yet, this chapter will show that the incarceration and repression of the *Ikhwan* did not result in the extermination of the Brotherhood, but rather in its continuity as a secret underground organization. As developed throughout this dissertation, I understand secrecy as a protective measure against persecution and repression. I do not argue that the very existence of the

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[792] FO 371/108319, JE 1016/24, No. 226, (1012/126/54) Murray, British Embassy Cairo, December 11, 1954; Other authors offer conflicting dates of the execution; Mitchell and John Calvert date it to 9 December (1993, 161; 2010, 194) while James Toth puts it at 4 December (2013, 79).

[793] FO 371/108319, JE 1016/24, No. 226, (1012/126/54) Murray, British Embassy Cairo, December 11, 1954; for the last words of the Brotherhood members, see Mitchell 1993, 161; Abu al-Fadl 2012, 89; al-Qaradawi 2004, 122.

[794] Mitchell 1993, 161.

[795] The Syrian Brotherhood mobilized for example popular protests against the repression (Sharaf 2015 IV, 998).

[796] Mitchell 1993, 161.

[797] The fragmentation of the Brotherhood was discussed in chapter five.

Brotherhood became a secret following this wave of persecution, but that as the persecution of the Brotherhood was intensified, a wide-reaching secret organizing took place to secure the *Ikhwan's* endurance. In other words, the disappearance of the Brotherhood from the public realm following the Manshiyya incident was not a sign of the Brotherhood's extermination, but a sign of the organization's attempt to continue its existence covertly to minimize repression. This is consistent with the conception of secrecy articulated by Simmel. When societies are persecuted by the state, Simmel tells us, they are often "obliged to withdraw their meetings, their worship, their whole existence, from public view". [798] As will be discussed in this chapter, a similar development took place inside the Brotherhood during this period.

Additionally, an organization turning towards secrecy, generally speaking, is confronted with a number of organizational problems and challenges. Among these challenges are, e.g., how to continue operating and meeting despite the dangers of repression, how to recruit new members under oppressive conditions, and how to scrutinize new members to be able to root out *agent provocateurs*.[799] In the case of the Brotherhood, these were also some of the problems they had to deal with, as will become evident in the course of the historical discussion below. Concomitantly, this chapter will also highlight the compartmentalization that commonly occurs in organizations that transform towards clandestinity, especially when its leadership is subjected to either imprisonment, exile or the lack of desire to continue working under a repressive environment. As argued by della Porta, "adaption to both increasing repression and decreasing support brought about an *organizational compartmentalization*; that is, groups became increasingly isolated in their structures - hierarchical but also fragmented".[800] A similar compartmentalization and dissent over activities took place inside the Brotherhood, as we shall see in this chapter and the next. However, as this is a historical analysis of the Brotherhood's continuation during these years of oppression, the discussion of problems emanating from secrecy will not stand as a separate part of the discussion but will be an integrated aspect of the historical examination in these chapters.

I will now turn to the historical discussion of the *Ikhwan's* continuation during this second *miḥna* to highlight how and why the Brotherhood continued despite this period of harsh persecution. In highlighting different aspects of the Brotherhood's enterprise in prisons and in Egyptian society, I contend that the Brotherhood, although repressed and almost beaten, continued its existence. Barbara Zollner has maintained that "silence is the most remarkable feature of the years until 1957",

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[798] Simmel 1906, 472.
[799] Marx, 1974.
[800] della Porta 2013, 147 (italics in original).

adding that "[t]here are no signs of any organisational structure or of any activities" and that a "sense of desperation might describe the mood". While I concur with Zollner in understanding the Brotherhood as in a "mood of despair" [801], I maintain that we clearly can observe a continuation of activities and organization. I also contend that this despair was not a constant throughout the period, as will become clear in my discussion. Thus, I do not claim that the same level of organizing and activities continued during these years of repression as had been the case before this second *miḥna*. That was simply not possible due to the repressive nature of the state. However, I do argue that low-key organizing, recruiting and activities kept the Brotherhood in existence and that these are therefore considered important aspects of the Brotherhood's continuation. The chapter will proceed as follows: After a short exposition of the repression faced by the *Ikhwan,* the chapter will then discuss the continuation of the Brotherhood inside the prisons and outside. This description will remain an outline. I hope however that the examples presented in this chapter will give the reader an understanding of the Brotherhood's continuation during these crucial years.

6.1.1. The Aftermath of al-Manshiyya; a Repressed Brotherhood

As a direct consequence of the Manshiyya incident, an unrelenting wave of persecution was directed against the Brotherhood. Besides the abovementioned executions of six members, an unknown number of members were incarcerated under cruel conditions. James Toth has for instance claimed that "thousands of its members [were] rounded up and jailed" while Zollner holds that the numbers made official only represent a "glimpse of the scale of the persecution" faced by the Brotherhood.[802] Such descriptions indicate the imprecise knowledge at our disposal with regard to this persecution. Brotherhood accounts go even further, putting the figure of arrested Brothers at tens of thousands.[803] Be that as it may, on all accounts the degree and nature of persecution was of unprecedented scale in the Brotherhood's history. This fact, alongside the fragmentation of the Brotherhood prior to the Manshiyya incident,[804] may account for the Brotherhood's initial weak reaction to this repression. Yet, as I will describe in some detail now, when imprisoned or

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[801] Zollner 2011, 39.

[802] Toth 2013, 79; Zollner 2011, 38; in July 1955, the "Free Egypt Committee" announced that 50,000 political prisoners were in jail in Egypt; FO 371/125415, JE 1015/135, 16821/2/57, British Embassy Washington DC, 9 April 1957. Pamphlet title "A record of Tyranny, Corruption and Mediocrity, Memorandum Submitted to the U.S Government by the Committee for Free Egypt, Beirut, July 5, 1955."

[803] Al-Sarwi 2006, 72; Duh 1989, 85; al-Sisi 2003, 499; See also in a pamphlet directed to President Dwight D. Eisenhower in July 1955, mentioning that the incarcerated members of the Brotherhood were 20,000, FO 371/125415, JE 1015/135, 16821/2/57, British Embassy Washington DC, 9 April 1957.

[804] For the fragmentation of the Brotherhood at this time, see Ashour 2009, 73.

underground, the members did not stop being Brothers, but rather sustained their affiliation with the *Ikhwan*, thus continuing the organization. In addition, the Brothers who were at liberty, either underground in Egypt or outside Egypt, maintained their opposition to the regime through a kind of "shadowboxing" with the hegemonic Nasserite-discourse. In so saying, I do not claim that the Brotherhood posed an existential threat to the regime in these years, but instead that they continued offering an alternative and competing worldview based on Islam to Nasser's Arab-nationalism.

Furthermore, since its establishment, some Brotherhood activities had always been directed towards religious education and proselytizing alongside its political activities. On account of this 'duality' therefore, when the "windows of political opportunities" are closed, it does not ultimately result in the termination of the Brotherhood. On the contrary, as I will demonstrate in the following, with the disappearance of windows of political opportunity, the Brotherhood directed most of its attention towards "*da ʿwa*" (preaching Islam, teaching people in Islamic principles and persuading them to adopt a more religious lifestyle), thereby continuing a central aspect of its activities, namely the religious. We can argue that this turn towards religious education represented the Brotherhood with a "periphery" outside the direct attention of the regime, given the regime's major concern on limiting political opposition rather than religious education. In other words, the Brotherhood does not have to engage in the political sphere to exist: In being a politico-religious organization, many of the Brothers continue to meet and discuss religious questions, thereby continuing the Brotherhood's existence without being a direct political threat to the regime. Another central aspect of this ability to continue the organization "unnoticed" has to do with what Simmel has described as "the secret life".[805] The Brotherhood, as argued throughout this dissertation, had since the late 1930s built its structures around an idea of secrecy. The *usra,* into which every member is initiated, was since its establishment in 1943 thought of as a structure providing the *Ikhwan* with an ability to secure "the secret life". Being a low-key structure, with meetings held in private spaces, and having the religious studies as its curriculum and benevolent works as its activities, this structure, I argue, became central in continuing the Brotherhood, both inside and outside the prisons.[806] I will now briefly depict the magnitude of repression during the first phase of this *miḥna* before I move on to discuss the activities of the Brotherhood.

In the first phase following the arrests, when the interrogations were still ongoing, a majority of Brothers were brought to the notorious *al-Sijn al-Ḥarbī* (the Military Prison), known for its severe

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[805] Simmel 1906, 472.
[806] Abdel Aziz 2004, 9. Abdel Aziz maintains that the usra structure was established to secure the *Ikhwan* against infiltration, ensure its continuation despite persecution and to protect it against repression.

torture and mistreatment of inmates. Muhammad Hamed Abul Nasr, at that time a member of the Brotherhood's Guidance Office, describes in his memoirs these painful early days of arrest. He was arrested on 19 November 1954 in Manfalut, his hometown, to be brought to the military prison in Cairo for interrogation. This was the beginning of a journey of torture, persecution and then imprisonment that would last for twenty years. In an atmosphere of intimidation and humiliation he was, upon entering the prison gates, met with a beating meted out by a group of prison guards.[807] These "welcome-sessions", as they are described by the Brotherhood inmates, were a common feature inflicted on most new arrivals to the prison.[808] Such welcoming was an attempt by the authorities to break the confidence of the inmates and to subject them to the new reality they were going to live. To the bewilderment of many Brotherhood members, however, this "welcoming" only marked the beginning of a period of interrogation and repression, in which the oppressive state unveiled its most violent and brutal face. Brotherhood accounts, describing the first phase of the second *miḥna*, are replete with stories about the harsh treatment they were exposed to, especially under interrogation. The arrested were subjected to a variety of harsh treatments and torture, including, inter alia, the extraction of fingernails and toenails, whipping and beating with clubs, being held in a room filled with cold water for hours, kept awake under questioning for prolonged periods, and subjected to attack-dogs. According to a report compiled by the oppositional "Committee for Free Egypt" in July 1955, many prisoners had died under torture.[809] According to Abdel Khaleq who witnessed this suppression firsthand, 29 Brothers had died under torture between late October 1954 and early 1955.[810] The torture, mistreatment and humiliation were intended to break the identity of the Brothers and their confidence in their organization and ideas. As an example of this attempt, *Ikhwan* members were lined up as an orchestra in the prison-yard with al-Hudaybi standing as maestro, forced to sing "Gamal [Abdel Nasser] oh symbol of nationalism, our most beautiful holidays were when you survived on the day of Manshiyya […]".[811] As another example of such humiliating treatment, leading Brothers were given severe beatings in front of their

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[807] Abul Nasr 1988, 144-8.

[808] Cf. Duh 1983,76; Abu al-Fadl 2012, 71; al-Tilmisani 1985, 133; Abdel Halim 2013 III, 441; Ahmad al-Assal cited in Rizq 1991, 109; (edt.) Saleh, & Dessouqi 2009, 254; al-Sisi 2003, 472.

[809] FO 371/125415, JE 1015/135, 16821/2/57, British Embassy Washington DC, 9 April 1957. Pamphlet title "A record of Tyranny, Corruption and Mediocrity, Memorandum Submitted to the U.S. Government by the Committee for Free Egypt, Beirut, July 5, 1955." See also; Rizq 1978, 29; Duh 1989, 82-5; Abul Nasr 1988, 149; al-Sarwi 2006, 71-2; al-Sisi 2003, 572. WO 208/3965, Canal Zone Local Intelligence Committee, ISUM [Intelligence Summary] No. 7/54—1454, Volume IX, ISUM 12/54, "Covering the Period 11th November to 24 November 1954".

[810] Abdel Khaleq 1987, 107; Al-Qaradawi 2004, 115-7; Abu al-Fadl 2012, 85; al-Sisi 2003, 484; Al-Sarwi argues that the number was as high as nearer to 100 (2006, 71).

[811] Al-Qaradawi 2004, 111; al-Tilmisani 1985, 112; al-Sisi 2003, 507. This song was composed following the Manshiyya incident and performed on various occasions by Um Kalthoum, Egypt's most celebrated female singer.

followers, and some of them were photographed in a sack under interrogation and had these photos published in the media.[812] Mohammed Mahdi Akef looked back at the experience in the military prison as "black and miserable", and of its brutality he stated that no one's "imagination can understand the cruelty of that torture".[813] Al-Qaradawi, who experienced this persecution on his own body, recalls his first impression upon entering the prison: "We were welcomed with whips, cursing and to a gruesome spectacle".[814]

One could discount these descriptions as mere propaganda written in retrospect by Brotherhood members to discredit the Nasserite regime and portray it as inhumane. However, evidence points to the credibility of these accounts. In 1957, when a group of army-officers were standing trial alongside leading members of the Wafd party, charged with preparing a coup d'état against the regime, some of the officers described the same forms of torture as had been applied to the Brothers. In one instance, army officer al-Islambouly withdrew his confession, which he claimed had been obtained under torture, adding before the court, "[t]hey [the interrogators] threatened me: 'If you do not tell us everything we will imprison your wife and your children will remain without food. You know what happened to the Moslem Brothers - you know we have the whip and other means".[815] Contemporary British reports also support such accounts, describing the methods applied by the Egyptian police as "forcible interrogation" which includes "unorthodox and ruthless" treatment.[816] Consequently, while I maintain that such accounts cannot be dismissed as mere fabrications, I concede that some of them might contain a degree of exaggeration.

Following the initial period of interrogation, and when the verdicts against the Brothers had been meted out during late 1954 and the early 1955, the question of the accommodation of such a large number of prisoners came about. To solve this issue, the authorities sent leading members of the Brotherhood, such as members of the Guidance Office and leading militants of the Special Apparatus who had been sentenced to long prison terms with hard labor, to Liman Tura[817]. In this prison located just south of Cairo, the Brotherhood inmates were put to work crushing stones and other kinds of hard labor. The treatment in this prison was characterized as the most rigorous and harsh, only exceeded by the military prison. Al-Hudaybi and the members of the Guidance Office

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[812] Duh 1989, 84; Abdel Halim 2013 III, 445; Abul Nasr 1988, 150-4; al-Sisi, 485; For the picture see https://bit.ly/34RQYMM.

[813] Akef 2008 III, https://bit.ly/3bvmsup (consulted 22.04.20); al-Tilmisani 1985, 141, 143.

[814] Al-Qaradawi 2004, 111.

[815] FO 371/125423, JE 1019/1 Middle East Mirror "US Plot Against Nasser Regime", 18 August 1957.

[816] WO 208/3965, Canal Zone Local Intelligence Committee, ISUM [Intelligence Summary] No. 7/54—1454, Volume IX, ISUM 12/54, "Covering the Period 11th November to 24 November 1954".

[817] Built by the British in 1886 in the Tura district just outside Cairo.

began serving their sentences in "department 1" of Liman Tura but were soon transferred to a desert camp in the Wahat al-Kharja, located in no-man's land about 600 kilometers south of Cairo.[818]

Younger and lower-ranking Brothers who had been sentenced to between five and ten years in prison were sent to provincial prisons such as al-Qanatir, Qena, al-Minya, Bani Swief and Asyut.[819] In addition, a number of Brothers - estimates put them at about 1,000 - were incarcerated without being brought before a judge or after receiving suspended sentences. These Brothers remained under arrest in the military prison or *sijn al-qalʿa* (the citadel prison) for about two years before being released.[820] In this way, the authorities intended to cut the rank and file from the leadership by putting the leading and instrumental members as far away from influence as possible.[821] In so doing, the authorities intended to split the organization and prevent it from continuing any form of communication.

John Calvert has argued that this treatment during the interrogations and subsequent imprisonment, which left many of them "[w]ounded physically, but also psychologically", turned them against Egypt's new regime, and "sharpened" their contempt for it.[822] While I agree with Calvert that the harsh treatment of the Brothers further sharpened their views on the government, I argue that the persecution of the Brothers led to a concomitant fortifying of the Brothers' cohesion following a period of fragmentation that preceded this second *miḥna*. Supporting this, Brotherhood memoirs are replete with accounts describing the solidity of the *Ikhwan* despite repression, or even as being a result of this repression. For example, many Brothers have argued that al-Hudaybi, who more than any other had personified the previous fragmentation of the Brotherhood, now came to symbolize faithfulness in the face of persecution and became a figure of unification and endurance for many members. Hamed Abul Nasr remembers that al-Hudaybi emerged in prison as a "striving, steadfast [leader], who mocks the events notwithstanding how heavy they are". Elsewhere, al-Tilmisani describes the *Murshid* at this time as an "honorable symbol for the movement […] recognized as *Murshid* by all Brothers and consulted by the members on all the organization's issues".[823]

Accordingly, even at this time of harsh repression which by all accounts represented the darkest

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[818] WO 208/3965, Canal Zone Local Intelligence Committee, ISUM [Intelligence Summary] No. 7/54—1454, Volume IX, ISUM 12/54, "Covering the Period 11th November to 24 November 1954".
[819] Al-Sisi 2003, 577; Al-Sarwi 2006, 81.
[820] Al-Shawi 1998, 200.
[821] Abul Nasr 1988, 160; Al-Sarwi 2006, 83.
[822] Calvert 2010, 198.
[823] Abul Nasr 1988, 160, for similar accounts, see al-Sarwi 2006, 82; Ahmad 1977, 45; Abu al-Fadl 2012, 79, al-Tilmisani 1985, 112; al-Sisi 2003, 482; Al-Ghazi 2008, 152; al-Kilani 2006, 82.

moment in the Brotherhood's history, we observe a continuation of activities - which clearly speaks to the organization's vitality. In order to analyze this continuation, I will proceed by shedding some light on how the Brotherhood maintained its organization and activities inside the prison walls and how those Brothers who remained free restructured their organization, activities and ways of behavior to sustain the Brotherhood. The discussion will also take into consideration the effects of domestic and regional political developments on the Brotherhood's ability to endure.

6.1.2. Brothers Behind Bars

By the late 1954 and early 1955, the world's largest Islamist organization in modern times had been defeated by a stronger opponent, i.e. the military regime, which had outmaneuvered and outclassed it. Hence, as the defeat had become an unpleasant fact for the Brotherhood and its sympathizers, a period of persecution came about which saw the Brotherhood's upper hierarchy imprisoned and isolated from the rank and file. Yet, as this section will argue, the Brotherhood and its activists do not merely disappear when imprisoned, but continue to exist and operate, though under different circumstances. I thus contend that the idea of an exterminated Brotherhood does not fully cover the historical development of the *Ikhwan* organization in this period of time. On the contrary, I will demonstrate that the prison experience of the Brotherhood played a significant role in shaping the course of the organization, leading at the end of this period to a "deradicalization" of a segment of the Brothers and a further "radicalization" of a second faction. Mahdi Akef offers a detailed account of life in prison. Akef, who was sentenced to death by the People's Tribunal but had his verdict commuted to life with hard labor, remained in prison for twenty years.[824] Having been a member of the Brotherhood's Special Apparatus in Cairo since 1946, he participated as a volunteer in the first Arab-Israeli war and in the anti-British activities in the Canal Zone in 1951. However, more decisive for his verdict was his involvement in anti-government activities during the first two years of Nasserite rule. All this had gained Akef a reputation as a Brotherhood hardliner. Owing to his long-term sentence and his standing as an influential Brother, he was initially transferred to Liman Tura alongside 200 of the leading members of the organization. In Tura, Akef shared a cell with al-Hudaybi and Abdel Aziz Atiyya, member of the Brotherhood's Guidance Office.

Tura, Akef remembers, was in the beginning a very tough place. With shackles around arms and legs, they were assigned hard labor, such as breaking stones. As a maximum-security prison, the

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[824] FO 371/108319, JE 1016/23, No. 263, Mr. Murray, addressed to Foreign Office, 15 December 1954.

Liman had very severe rules; inmates were prohibited from having ordinary everyday necessities such as tea and sugar, and were subject to harsh treatment. No doubt, by putting the influential members under such circumstances, the authorities were attempting to break them. However, it was not all bad, if we are to believe Akef's account. The *Ikhwan,* he recalls, soon began unearthing ways to get around these restrictions and to continue a life despite difficulties. For example, it did not take long before a "secret" life had developed in prison, in which Brotherhood members began smuggling a variety of food and other "forbidden stuff" into the prison.[825] But even more importantly, they built communication structures to activists outside the prison walls. "We had people inside the prison who helped us smuggle a variety of things in and out of the prison", Akef recalls. He also recounts having contact with Sayyid Qutb who remained most of the time in the prison infirmary of Liman Tura due to bad health.[826] Judging by such accounts, the Brotherhood quickly became able to reach out to individuals outside the prisons, and even to uphold contact with inmates in other prisons through such structures of communication.

Furthermore, in the words of Akef, the prison turned into a "permanent camp" of the Brotherhood, where members could be instructed in memorizing the Quran, circles were established to study different religious books, and sessions of physical training organized. Akef recalls being appointed "head of the Brothers" in the Liman and having a direct link to the members of the Guidance Office through Saleh Abu Ruqayiq, himself a member of the Office.[827] Thus, a hierarchical structure of the Brothers was constructed inside the prison to organize the Brotherhood's activities, and to represent the organization before prison authorities. Substantiating the account of Akef, Abdel Rahman al-Bannan tells us that Liman Tura was turned into a Brotherhood camp. Al-Bannan, who at the time of his arrest was a 22-year-old Humanities student at Cairo University, was sentenced to 15 years in prison with hard labor. In his memoirs, al-Bannan relates that the Liman Tura, despite its harshness and difficulties, was turned into a "camp of knowledge, culture and new experiences, it was a bizarre but at the same time enjoyable period".[828]

In May 1955, about six months into their term at Liman Tura, one hundred leading members of the Brotherhood, including Akef, were, transferred to the remote Wahat al-Kharja prison camp.[829] This transfer was presumably intended to further isolate these influential Brothers from the *Ikhwan's* rank and file, by placing them in the desert beyond the reach of any activists. Among the

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825 Akef 2008 III https://bit.ly/3bvmsup (consulted 22.04.20).
826 Ibid.; see also al-Sisi 2003, 568-9.
827 Akef 2018 XVII https://bit.ly/2XLPZf6 (consulted 09.06.20).
828 (edt.) Saleh & Dessouqi 2009, 254-6.
829 Akef 2008 II & III, https://bit.ly/3eJVT6C; https://bit.ly/3bvmsup (consulted 22.04.20).

exceptions to this transfer was Qutb, who had been sentenced to 15 years in prison with hard labor but stayed in the Liman's infirmary because of his poor health. Qutb's stay at the infirmary presented him with relative freedom to study and to write and publish a number of books, the most celebrated of these being 'Milestones'.[830] As will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter, the prison clinic also afforded Qutb an opportunity to meet and discuss his ideas with Brothers from other prisons who were temporarily transferred to Liman Tura for treatment. This made the prison hospital a nexus for communication and the exchange of ideas and viewpoints between Brotherhood members who were scattered among various prisons. In other words, the continuation of literary production and discursive interaction illustrates that a functioning network existed at this point in time, with the Liman infirmary at the epicenter. Inmates who were transferred to the Liman for treatment carried messages to and from their own prisons, thus continuing a line of communication.[831]

When the leading members left Liman Tura, other lower-ranking members succeeded them in organizing the members in the prison and structuring the everyday life. Ahmad al-Bess, a member of the Special Apparatus, remembers that a command structure was established to direct the activities inside prison. Being a middle-ranking Brother in the Liman, he was appointed head of the commanding committee, with a Brother responsible for every aspect of the prison activities.[832] The prisons also came to represent a domain where Brothers from many different geographical locations and social backgrounds were gathered together, which enabled them to build relational bonds that had not existed before.[833]

In al-Wahat, a similar organization of activities emerged soon after the Brothers arrival. The prison camp assembled a significant number of Brotherhood leaders and active members such as Mustafa Mashhur, al-Tilmisani, Akef, Muhammad Hamed Abul Nasr, Salah Shadi, Hussein Kamal al-Din and others who had leading and active positions in the Brotherhood prior to their arrest. According to Akef, who spent about nine years in this remote area, the prison was soon transformed into a hub of activities, sports and lectures. As with life in the Liman, al-Wahat came to host a variety of activities such as sporting events, teaching of illiterate Brothers, and religious seminars.[834] The prison also became an arena for ideological discussions. Shortly after the arrival of the Brothers, a group of about fifty communists were transferred to al-Wahat and placed side by

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[830] Al-Khalidi 1994, 361; Hammuda 1987, 131. For a list of his prison-authored books, see al-Khalidi 1994, 367.
[831] Al-Bess 1987, 54.
[832] Ibid., 54-5.
[833] Ibid.; al-Sisi 2003, 570; Abul Nasr 1988, 159-60.
[834] Akef (2018) XIX https://bit.ly/2Un3b7W (consulted 09.06.20).

side with the Brotherhood inmates. As a result, ideological differences arose and deliberations occurred, and heavy discussions came to occupy some of the inmates, among them Akef, who was known as a determined anti-communist.[835]

A similar account is presented in a poem composed by Mustafa Mashhur at that time while in prison. The poem, which urges courageousness and offers an ironic account of life in prison, describes prison life as comprising meetings among Brothers and as filled with training sessions, football and basketball matches.[836] Furthermore, in letters he sent to his family during the prison years, Mashhur describes the prison experience as a God's ordained tribulation, and a test of the Brothers' belief in their cause which will be rewarded in the afterlife if they withstand hardships in God's way. Accordingly, Mashhur encouraged patience and fortitude and described it as a religious obligation.[837]

As such accounts clearly reveal, a continuation of Brotherhood activities and relationships took place inside prisons. However, these accounts stand markedly in contrast with the early experiences during the first period of arrest and interrogation in the notorious military prison. When depicting their experiences in the military prison upon arrest, most Brothers agree on describing it as a period of humiliation and despair in which "most inmates were submissive and passive, unable to voice a 'why', nevermind a 'no'".[838] In the words of a Brother, "the military prison was pure hell".[839] We can ascertain from such descriptions that what Zollner has described as a "mood of despair"[840] was very present at the early stage of arrest, where "the atmosphere of pain and horror" was predominant.[841] Abbas al-Sisi gives a similar description. He explains that the hanging of six Brothers left the members of the *Ikhwan* in a state of "astonishment, silence and grief" [842] However, this state of mind did not remain constant throughout the prison period as the descriptions cited above indicate. On the contrary, when the first period of very tough policing was over, concomitant with the conclusion of legal proceedings in early 1955, we observe a relative normalization of conditions in prisons. This normalization, which occurred when the *Ikhwan* began serving their prison terms, gave the Brothers breathing room which they utilized to continue their *Ikhwani* affiliation. Al-Tilmisani points to this continuation of the Brotherhood as a hierarchical organization

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[835] Ibid.
[836] Muhammad, & Mashhur 2005, 34-5.
[837] Ibid., 49.
[838] Al-Qaradawi 2004, 111.
[839] (edt.) Saleh & Dessouqi 2009, 250, 254; Abu al-Fadl 2012, 72-4.
[840] Zollner 2011, 39.
[841] Abu al-Fadl 2012, 74.
[842] Al-Sisi 2003, 536.

despite persecution explaining that "the Brotherhood continued [upon the dissolution] as if it had only been dissolved on papers […] When two Muslims meet, to sit down and study the Quran, or to get trained in the prophetic *Sira* (biography), Islamic jurisprudence, Quranic exegesis or to discuss the conditions of the nation and population, such activities cannot be prohibited by law".[843] Such meetings, which took place discreetly, continued inside and outside the prison walls.

Thus, the prison-period was not constantly characterized by the same degree of "tough policing" as had been the case in the extraordinary treatment the internees had been subjected to in the military prison. "When we entered prison, no one dared to talk back to the interrogators […] but soon we began meeting and talking to each other and criticizing the regime", relates Ahmad Raif, a Brotherhood activist who was interned in the military prison.[844]

6.1.2.1. To support or oppose the regime? Deliberations inside prisons

By 1955 all sentenced Brothers had been transferred from the detention centres to the prisons where they would serve their terms. It was at this point in time that one of the most serious issues appeared in prisons and came to preoccupy a great deal of the *Ikhwan's* thinking. The Brothers had entered prisons on account of their opposition to the nascent military regime that was consolidating itself against any diverging voice. Upon consolidating its hold on power, the military junta was not prepared to allow any form of political divergence, and thus all oppositional groups were suppressed, and many political activists imprisoned, a majority of whom were Brothers. Importantly, however, as has been discussed in chapter five, not all Brothers had been staunchly against the regime prior to the showdown and the subsequent repression. On the contrary, many of them had seen Nasser as a Brother and the "revolution" as their own. These were the Brothers I described in the previous chapter as the accommodationists. In addition, as staunch nationalists who had perceived themselves to be the vanguard of a nationalist *jihad* against the British colonization, the Brothers were faced with a fundamental dilemma when the Suez Crisis erupted in the autumn of 1956 following Nasser's momentous nationalization of the canalon 26 July.[845] The Suez Crisis, or the tripartite aggression as it is known in Arab historiography, amounted to a full scale attack on Egypt, first by Israeli forces, then followed up by a British-French intervention. The British and French intervention turned into a debacle when the invaders were forced to withdraw from Egypt

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[843] Al-Tilmisani 1985, 112.
[844] Raif 1990, 39.
[845] Eisenhower 1965, 33.

following warnings from the US government.[846]

Consequently, the question for the *Ikhwan* provoked by this "aggression" was how to position themselves on this issue. We can even trace a compartmentalization in the Brotherhood's ranks over this question, which in many ways resembles the accommodationists versus confrontationists split prior to the repression of late 1954.

One group of Brothers was prepared to support the regime under certain circumstances, which included foreign aggression against the nation. Duh, who was serving a 15-year term with hard labor, recalls organizing a meeting in the Liman Tura, to discuss the inmates' standpoint regarding the aggression. After long deliberations, they agreed to send a letter of support to the government and to offer themselves as volunteers to fight alongside the army, but in a separate "Ikhwan regiment". In a frank recollection, Duh recalled that "we expected to be released […] but our hopes were disappointed".[847] This accommodationist or pragmatist faction attracted a number of Brothers in various prisons but became particularly popular in al-Wahat prison camp where the circumstances were severe and where many Brothers suffered deprivation, as their families could not visit them due to the remoteness of this camp.[848]

However, underscoring the differences in the Brotherhood's ranks at this time, another group denied sending letters of support to the government under any circumstances, seeing that as a legitimization of the regime and a repudiation of the Brotherhood and its leaders.[849] This group of hardliners was headed by al-Hudaybi and other leading members of the *Ikhwan* who took an uncompromising stance against the military regime.[850] Indeed, according to sources al-Hudaybi was approached during this period by representatives of the government to work out a deal between the Brotherhood and the regime. The deal would allow the Brotherhood to return to normality provided that it denounced its oppositional stance and agreed to support the government.[851] In this same vein, contemporary US reports noted that senior Brotherhood leaders had been contacted by the government to see if they could arrive at a joint understanding. In response, al-Hudaybi took an unyielding stance and rejected any such arrangement, replying that Nasser should discuss this issue

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[846] Rogan 2009, 303.
[847] Duh 1989, 96.
[848] Al-Bess 1987, 83.
[849] Akef 2008 III, https://bit.ly/3bvmsup (consulted 22.04.20); Muhammad, & Mashhur 2005, 37.
[850] These groups should not be understood as static, as we observe a high degree of flexibility in moving the one way or the other under different circumstances. As an example, Umar al-Tilmisani, who was a strong proponent of accommodation prior to the October repression, subsequently came to strongly reject any recognition of the regime and remained in prison for more than twenty years.
[851] Husaini 1956, 153.

with Abdel Qader Uda (who at that time had been hanged by the regime).[852] The refusal of senior Brothers, such as al-Hudaybi, al-Tilmisani, Hamed Abul Nasr, Mustafa Mashhur and Mahdi Akef, to strike a deal with the government, stood in marked contrast to the abovementioned accommodationist current.[853] Sami Sharaf, an intelligence officer who became the secretary to President Nasser, points to these attempts of reconciliation between the Brothers and the Government. Sharaf mentions that Mustafa al-Sibai, leader of the Brotherhood in Syria, approached leading Brothers in Egypt and urged them to end their opposition to Nasser. This overture came, according to Sharaf, after the Sibai's meeting with Nasser in Syria, which may indicate that the Egyptian side had put al-Sibai on such a mission of mediation.[854] It is interesting to note that all these hardliners reached the top of the Brotherhood's hierarchy, all becoming General Guides, which points to the appreciation of such "steadfastness" among the Brothers. According to Hussein Hammuda, who was among those who signed a support-telegram, a great majority of the Brothers in prisons refused to sign, and they were headed by members of the Brotherhood's Guidance Office in prison.[855] Supporting this argument, Joel Gordon maintains that "for the Muslim Brothers, no such reconciliation [in contrast to the remaining political parties] was conceivable […] Leading Brothers convicted by the People's Tribunal remained in prison until shortly after Nasser's death".[856] However, not all Brothers were as steadfast. Al-Bess recalls that a group of leading Brothers decided to support the government, thereby causing a disagreement in the Brotherhood's upper echelons.[857] Underscoring the severity of the disagreement and fragmentation this issue caused, Mahdi Akef, who was among the hardliners, describes this issue in strong terms as a *fitna* (sedition/strife) which saw some Brothers compelled to declare their support to the government, thereby dividing the leadership.[858]

In one meeting, held in the Wahat prison, between a number of Brotherhood leaders including Umar al-Tilmisani, Mustafa Mashhur and Muhammad Mahdi Akef,[859] and an officer, the Brothers were asked to send Nasser a telegram of support in order to get better conditions in prison, and they were threatened with repercussions if they refused. Umar al-Tilmisani rejected the request in strong

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[852] Frampton 2018, 260.
[853] Abul Nasr 1988, 161-2.
[854] Sharaf 2015 IV, 999.
[855] Hammuda 1985, 121.
[856] Gordon 1992, 197.
[857] Al-Bess 1987, 83.
[858] Akef 2018 XXI https://bit.ly/30pYaza (consulted 09.06.20).
[859] All three would subsequently become general guides.

terms, adding that he would prefer to stay in prison rather than support the Nasserites.[860] Al-Tilmisani, who was representing the hardline current of the *Ikhwan's* leadership, became since then a symbol of steadfastness and durability.[861] Meanwhile, in an attempt to push through such declarations of support for the regime, the authorities initiated a project in prisons that came to be called "re-socializing" by the government and was understood as an effort of brainwashing by the *Ikhwan*.[862] This "re-socializing" included religious sermons by Islamic scholars who offered religious reasons for the obligation of supporting the government, political lectures dealing with the national issues and pointing to nationalist credentials of the regime, and even promises of parole and threats of punishment as inducements to convince the Brothers to declare their support. [863]

On this account, I argue that such attempts to enlist the support of the Brothers for the government, and to sow dissension in the *Ikhwan's* ranks by punishing those who refuse and promising parole to those who support, indicates that the regime at this point in time still perceived the Brotherhood as a potent actor, and explains why further measures were still ongoing despite the *Ikhwan's* political defeat.

In 1956, presumably as the regime began to feel itself more consolidated in power, it began to release Brotherhood members who had been sentenced to short terms or had been arrested without being brought before a judge. In this way, a chapter in the lives of these Brothers was concluded, and a new journey was to be undertaken outside prison, to where this discussion now turns.

6.1.3. Continuing Underground in Society

What had befallen the Brotherhood during the late months of 1954 amounted to a tough blow which certainly weakened the organization extensively. The degree of repression, the savage torture and the draconian sentences they were subjected to, could not but signify the darkest days in the Brotherhood's history hitherto. Nevertheless, even during these years of harsh repression, the Brotherhood did not cease to exist in society but continued underground. Having previously built a mass following consisting of hundreds of thousands of members, the Brotherhood continued to retain a great number of those even during this second *miḥna*. According to estimates, the Brotherhood counted a membership of 250,000 to 300,000 "secret adherents" during these years in

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[860] Muhammad, & Mashhur 2005, 36.
[861] Al-Bess 1987, 84.
[862] Al-Tilmisani cited in Qaud 19875, 133; Rizq 1979, 51.
[863] Adel Kamal 1989, 435.

which its existence was illegal and its members were persecuted.[864] Discussing the prevailing current political system in Egypt under Nasserite rule and the potential political opponents to his government, Maxime Rodinson pointed to the Brotherhood as the only "dangerous" element in society at that time. While he maintained that the Brotherhood may "have lost many supporters" due to its dissolution, he underlined that it had continued its existence, as it could rely on "well-organized and perhaps armed underground groups". Pointing to the Brotherhood's continuity in society, Rondinson remarked that its "civilian supporters can occasionally express their ideas in disguise: e.g. when writing in defence of Islamic values and traditions".[865] With this in mind, the purpose of this section is to discuss how and why the Brotherhood continued in society despite the tough repression it experienced. In so doing, I aim to shed light on an understudied period in the Brotherhood's history, where the affiliation with the organization became a "secret" in order to avoid repression. As opposed to Zollner's contention that there "are no signs of any organizational structure or of any activities" until 1957,[866] this section will clearly show that a continuation of activities took place during this period. Considering the Brotherhood as "under risk" at this stage, I argue that the society's structures were revised in order to protect the members from repression. Furthermore, as the repression increased, we observe a turn away from hierarchical and centralized structuring to a highly diffuse and low-key organizing as a means of securing the endurance of the Brotherhood. This does not contradict the previous structures of the Brotherhood, which combined hierarchical structures, e.g. the guidance office, the general assembly and the various geographical departments of the Brotherhood with low-key decentralized structures such as the *al-usar* (the family system), which is a low-key and close-knit structure with weekly meetings usually at the homes of the members. I argue that this structure becomes crucial for the Brotherhood's ability to continue activism when the central leadership of the organization is repressed and its official branches sealed.[867] Khalil al-Anani argues correctly that the *Ikhwan* is a centralized organization that has "two-pronged decision-making mechanisms" combining centralized decision making with decentralized implementation.[868]

Shortly after the repression of the *Ikhwan,* British and American diplomats began reporting of

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[864] Cf. Kedourie 1980, 58.
[865] Rondinson 1968, 108.
[866] Zollner 2011, 39.
[867] Lia 2010, 176-7.
[868] Al-Anani 2016, 110.

continuing Brotherhood activities in opposition to the regime.[869] This continuation of activities among *Ikhwan* members who had not been arrested took the form of low-key meetings to discuss and plan the continuation activities, to direct the support of bereaved families and to execute propaganda campaigns against the regime.[870] This was "silent work"[871] in light of the intense repression of the Brotherhood, according to one of those *Ikhwan* who took part at the time. However, what started as low-key meetings soon turned into more organized networks of Brothers who undertook the task of supporting the families of Brotherhood detainees and refugees, affording shelter to fugitives who had been sentenced in absentia and distributing pamphlets criticizing the current regime and describing its mistreatment of political detainees.[872] In February 1955 in a sign of the ongoing organizing, a group of *Ikhwan* individuals were arrested and brought before court accused of trying to revive the Brotherhood. This was the first instance of "uncovering" of Brotherhood cells, and as we shall see, this became a recurring feature of this period. This organization undertook the task of supporting Brotherhood families, hiding Brothers on the run, forging identity cards for Brothers in hiding and distributing propaganda pamphlets attacking the regime.[873]

Furthermore, this early "reorganizing" clearly points to the continuation of the Brotherhood even at this early stage. Barely one month had gone before a new "Brotherhood Organization" was uncovered in March 1955, this time consisting of about 200 members.[874] This organization was spread out to nine different geographical areas all over Egypt, which points to an escalation of Brotherhood activities shortly after the persecution.[875] The geographical scope of this organization and subsequent organizations reflected the geographical limitation of the repressive measures. While the persecution was noticeably strong in Cairo and other major cities perceived by the authorities to be important centers where political opposition could not be tolerated, the repression was pursued less vigorously in more remote provinces, where opposition was considered less threatening. Accordingly, these areas came to represent a "dynamic periphery" for the Brotherhood, where the risks were considerably lower. Such an account is offered by Ali Ashmawi, who

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[869] Cf. CIA-RDP91T01172R000300170001-1, "Nasr Regime Alienating Egyptian Masses", 16 December 1954; FO 371/113579, JE 1015/27, "Mr. Shuckburgh's Conversation with Nuri el Said on June 11" T.E. Bromley, 16 June 1955.
[870] Ashmawi 1993, 34.
[871] Khafaji 2006, 132.
[872] Ibid., 132-3.
[873] Ibid., 133.
[874] Al-Sisi 2003, 587; Frampton 2018, 258.
[875] Al-Sarwi 2004, 92-6 (see list over those arrested with names, age and profession).

alongside other Brothers continued meetings and activities in the provinces.[876]

Adding credibility to such accounts, US reports noted that Brotherhood members were being continuously arrested in this period for their sustained involvement in *Ikhwan* activities. According to US assessments, this durability was especially strong at university campuses, where the Brotherhood previously had had considerable success in recruiting followers.[877] Such assessments are consistent with the lists of arrested Brothers from this period, which confirm that a majority of those arrested were young students. And as we shall see, the campuses remained an important site for Brotherhood activities throughout this second *miḥna*.

Moreover, British assessments at this time also perceived the Brotherhood as a persistent threat to the regime, despite repressive measures being taken against the organization. One British account maintained that the Brotherhood possess a large cadre of well-trained members including about "some two thousand unmarried men who were prepared to give their lives in order to ensure the success of any assignments given to them".[878] The report claimed furthermore that the Brotherhood has collected arms for many years and "it seems unlikely that recoveries [of arms] have accounted for anything like a major part of the stocks",[879] thus implying that the danger of the organization was still very present. Certainly, the British still perceived the Brotherhood as a potent and destructive force, which would for the time being represent a serious threat to the regime. Alongside the emphasis on the "danger" of the Brotherhood as perceived by the British, the diplomats pointed to the *Ikhwan's* experience of underground activism in previous periods of "proscription" which would undoubtedly enhance the Brotherhood's ability to survive this wave of persecution. As further evidence of the abovementioned accounts, the report noted that the Brotherhood continues to be the "main preoccupation of the police" in various Egyptian cities.[880]

The Brotherhood no doubt remained a potent but covert force in society. It was reported, for example, that the measures taken against the Brotherhood remained insufficient, and local police in the Canal Zone "are reported to be worried that the organisation has merely been driven underground" in order to operate more safely. It was further claimed that the Brotherhood's "capacity for trouble-making still exists" from this underground reality it had opted for.[881] Adding

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[876] Ashmawi 1993, 35.
[877] Cited in Frampton 2018, 258.
[878] WO 208/3965, Canal Zone Local Intelligence Committee, ISUM [Intelligence Summary] No. 7/54—1454, Volume IX, ISUM 12/54, "Covering the Period 11th November to 24 November 1954".
[879] Ibid.
[880] Ibid.
[881] WO 208/3965, Canal Zone Local Intelligence Committee, ISUM [Intelligence Summary] No. 7/54—1454, Volume IX, ISUM 13/54, "Covering the Period 24th November to 7th December 1954".

to this, British intelligence maintained that the Brotherhood continued to command some popular support in the Canal Zone, and more particularly in al-Ismailiyya, where it was noted that anti-government Brotherhood activities had continued despite the repression. In the words of a British report, it was noted that the local Egyptian police in the Canal Zone "are far from satisfied that the danger presented by the Moslem Brotherhood has been overcome" despite the hangings of six leading members and the suppression of large numbers of *Ikhwan*.[882] Such British estimates were based on information they were receiving from Egyptian police and from sources inside the Brotherhood, and thus reflect the contemporary views of people working on the ground in Egypt or with firsthand insight from the Brotherhood organization. However, while a part of these assessments, such as the claim that 2,000 Brotherhood members are prepared to give their lives "to ensure success", seem exaggerated, the overall impression of a continuing underground Brotherhood activism is consistent with the information we have from *Ikhwan* accounts of this period.[883]

In July 1955, as further evidence of the Brotherhood's persistence, a new Brotherhood organization was uncovered by the security Apparatus. The regular uncovering of organizations, as had been the case since the early 1955, signifies the continuing reorganization of the Brotherhood since its dissolution. The organization consisted mainly of university students who met secretly in small cells to discuss the affairs of the Brotherhood and continue its activities secretly.[884] The organization which was comprised of 475 members, 90 percent of whom were aged under 30 years, was hierarchical, with a five-man commandstructure headed by Sulayman Hajar, a middle-ranking activist of the Brotherhood. The background of the members and leaders of this organization signifies a pattern of the *Ikhwan's* working-procedures when its senior leaders are imprisoned or exiled. As seen through the previously mentioned organizations of early 1955, when the known senior leaders of the Brotherhood were unable to lead the organization, other lower-ranking activists, as embodied here in Hajar, assumed responsibility and took control of activities in society. Yet, contrary to the organizations exposed between January and March 1955, this new organization aimed at avenging what they perceived as the unjust dissolution of the Brotherhood and mistreatment of its members since October 1954.[885] In other words, this organization was founded on the idea of taking radical measures against the authorities in retaliation for the repression of late

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[882] WO 208/3965, Canal Zone Local Intelligence Committee, ISUM [Intelligence Summary] No. 7/54—1454, Volume IX, ISUM 14/54, "Covering the Period 8th December to 23rd December 1954".
[883] Qamiha 2009, 130.
[884] Abul Fadl 2012, 96.
[885] Khafaji 2006, 145-6.

1954. Such incidents of "action militarization" were seemingly few in this period but indicate an ongoing reaction to the tough policing directed against the Brotherhood. Furthermore, the harsh repression of activists pushed a fringe of them towards a militant reaction, a reaction that we also observed during the first ordeal (1948-51).

When secrecy is a result of a desire to maximize security and minimize risk, the form chosen by an organization depends on these reflections with regard to security. Thus, when the Brotherhood was forced underground as a result of repression, the activities of the organization turned away from centralized control, and the members preferred a more diffuse structuring of their activism in order to avoid repression. This was not the outcome of a predetermined masterplan, but a result of the repressive context in which the members found themselves following the showdown. As the repression grew in intensity, ordinary members, oftentimes students or other young members[886] without an effective senior leader, began forming their own cells or meeting in their *ikhwani*-families in order to continue the organization. This low-key procedure was not a novelty to the Brotherhood but had been established as a natural part of the *usar*-structures. As a case in point, Medhat Abul Fadl, a middle-ranking Brotherhood activist, points to the importance of the *usar* in continuing the Brotherhood meetings during periods of repression. Abul Fadl, who was released from prison after a year and a half, remembers that soon after his release he began to meet with members from his *Ikhwani usra* to renew the pre-imprisonment bonds. He relates that what started as irregular encounters soon turned into organized and frequent, almost daily, meetings.[887]

Supporting such accounts, the CIA maintained in late 1955 that it seemed unlikely that the RCC could secure "spectacular gains in achieving organized support from important Egyptian political elements". Accordingly, it was claimed that the opposition "remains strong among urban intellectual and professional elements" and "other politically alert civilian elements" as a result of the regime's exclusionary policies.[888] In light of this exclusion of "politically conscious elements in Egypt", as perceived by the CIA, the hostility towards the regime was expected to remain intact. It was in this respect estimated that the Brotherhood would continue its oppositional work against the regime, trying to force "its downfall".[889] As discussed above, the active fringe of the Brotherhood that continued its oppositional work was mainly derived from this "politically conscious" social group, which points to the concurrence between these reports and the actual events on the ground.

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[886] Ibid., 134.
[887] Abul Fadl 2012, 99.
[888] CIA-RDP79R01012A005700050001-5, National Intelligence Estimate; Number 36. 1-55 "The Outlook for Egyptian stability and foreign policy", 15 November 1955.
[889] Ibid.

The report added that there existed a possibility of a Brotherhood alliance with a "military-Wafdist group in the overthrow of the regime".[890] As we know, such an alliance did not materialize, but the very assessment is vital to understand the contemporary views on the circumstances in Egypt and the role of the Brotherhood at that time.

By 1955, therefore, the Brotherhood had survived the extensive repression it had been exposed to, and was, according to British and American intelligence reports, continuing its activities and offering an Islamic current, as opposed to the regime's hegemonic pan-Arab discourse.

In this light it is reasonable to maintain that the continuing unearthing of Brotherhood organizations throughout 1955 lends support to my argument that the *Ikhwan* continued its engagement in society.[891] During the summer of 1955, a Brotherhood source informed US officials that the organization was preoccupied with restructuring itself into "a completely underground movement" and further informed the American diplomat that the *Ikhwan* was planning a propaganda campaign against the regime for its "brutal and undemocratic" nature.[892] As a result of this vitality of the *Ikhwan*, the Egyptian authorities told US diplomats that the Brotherhood had *not* been eradicated but had remained "bodily intact".[893]

American diplomats linked this continuity of Brotherhood activities with the transnational character of the organization and the support it was receiving from abroad. US reports maintained, for instance, that much of the money devoted to support the families of the Brotherhood and the ongoing activities of the organization, was smuggled into the country from abroad on a weekly basis, thereby sustaining the Brotherhood's vigor.[894] It was claimed that King Saud on two occasions had donated large sums of money to the Brotherhood, channeled through Said Ramadan, the exiled senior Brother.[895] As further evidence of this support from abroad, Nasser lamented in March 1955 the "unwise" use of money by King Saud, during talks between Nasser and Selwyn Lloyd, the British foreign secretary. Nasser was particularly "annoyed by Saudi gift of money to Moslem Brotherhood".[896] This assistance that the *Ikhwan* was receiving from abroad was the outcome of the organization's transnational character which been developed since the 1940s.

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[890] Ibid.
[891] Al-Qaradawi 2004, 160-1.
[892] Frampton 2018, 263: See also Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 23, 1955, Washington, June 23, 1955; CIA-RDP79R01012A005700050001-5, National Intelligence Estimate; Number 36. 1-55, "The Outlook for Egyptian stability and foreign policy", 15 November 1955.
[893] Cited in Frampton 2018, 259.
[894] Ibid., 262.
[895] Department of State, Central Files, 641.74/3–756, 175. Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, London, March 7, 1956.
[896] Ibid.

During the first "ordeal", a number of Brothers had fled Egypt and built networks in various Arab countries, in order to endure the organization in Egypt. This working procedure was re-applied in this second *miḥna*, when prominent Brothers, such as Said Ramadan, Kamil al-Sharif, Hasan al-Ashmawi, Abdel Hakim Abdin, Abdel Munʿim Abd and many others fled Egypt and established vital lines of support from abroad, thereby reinforcing the Brotherhood's durability in Egypt.[897] This transnational aspect is an important factor for our understanding of the *Ikhwan's* survival in Egypt during periods of repression.

As seen thus far, the activities of the Brothers had been characterized by individual endeavors to meet in small cells to discuss the ideas of the Brotherhood and to continue different forms of low-key activities. These endeavors were mostly directed at charitable and religious work and low-level political propaganda, but as seen in the case of the July 1955 organization, a militarization of action had occurred among a group of younger members, who began thinking of ways to fight the Nasserite regime. I will now turn to a discussion of the Brotherhood's history during 1956-7 when a limited liberalization on the domestic scene resulted in a quantitative increase in the Brotherhood's activities and a qualitative progress of the organization outside prisons.

6.1.3.1. New Opportunities and Further Organizing

During the summer of 1956 the government began releasing the Brothers who had been sentenced to short prison terms or subjected to indefinite detention. This development was most probably an indication of the regime's, and more particularly Nasser's, sense of confidence, which had increased following a number of successes on the international scene. In March 1955, Nasser participated in the well-known Afro-Asian Bandung Conference in Indonesia, where he joined nonaligned leaders such as Tito of Yugoslavia, India's Nehru and Chou En-lai of China, in dismissing superpower hegemony (declaring non-alignment). His participation in the conference won him great prestige on the international scene as an influential statesman.[898] In September of the same year, Nasser added to this prestige by concluding the "Czech" arms deal, which amounted to a coup on the international scene as he became the first leader of a non-communist country to obtain arms from the Soviet Bloc.[899] These international successes were utilized domestically in an attempt to normalize the political scene after a two year period of rather tough authoritarianism and exclusion of all diverging political forces. On 25 June 1956, this (rather limited) attempt to

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[897] Harris 1964, 236.
[898] CIA-RDP78-02771R000500030002-9, "EGYPT'S ROLE IN THE MUSLIM WORLD" March 9, 1956.
[899] Aburish 2004, 83-4; Sharaf 2015 IV, 998.

liberalize the political system was manifested in the abolition of the RCC, the announcement of a constitution and the installment of Nasser as president. Furthermore, Nasser declared that the regime had released "all detainees, without exceptions".[900] These steps were intended to symbolize the restoration of democracy in Egypt, after a period of revolutionary/military rule.[901]

It was in light of this refurbishing of the political system in Egypt that the abovementioned release of Brothers from prisons and detentions came about. Mahmoud Abdel Halim, who was released in June 1956 as part of this development, describes it as a tour de force. This "symbolic liberalization", as Abdel Halim describes it, was utilized by the regime to "present itself as democratic", a development, he maintains, that was not translated into real policies on the ground.[902] However, regardless of the reasons for this development, it came to offer the Brotherhood a boost in society and an enhancement of its spirit. In other words, the change on the domestic political scene, which was directly linked to regional and international politics, represented an opening for the Brotherhood in Egypt.

When Brothers were released, they were strongly advised by the security authorities to stay away from any Brotherhood activities and warned that they would remain under constant surveillance. Abbas al-Sisi, a middle-ranking Brother who was released in this period, recalls that he was asked by the local police to sign a document pledging not to participate in any activities of the Brotherhood, and warned of the consequences if he violated this. Such warnings from the security apparatus point to their knowledge of a continuing *Ikhwani* presence in society which they felt compelled to warn against.

Al-Sisi remembers this first period upon release as difficult; most people were afraid of talking to him, he had to accustom himself to this new reality and to find a job to take care of his family.[903] Mahmoud Abdel Halim describes life after release as one where "we are under surveillance, constantly and everywhere".[904] In other words, when the Brothers were released they went through a new journey of challenges and hardships. Undoubtedly, such restrictions on the freedom of those Brothers and their feelings of being watched resulted in a sense of isolation and made their continuing activism after release even more difficult. Because they were known to be *Ikhwan* by the authorities, their freedom of maneuvering was naturally more limited than the Brothers who were unknown to the security agencies. However, as we shall see in the following, such problems had

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[900] Sharaf 2015 IV, 996.
[901] Gordon 1992, 189.
[902] Abdel Halim 2013 III, 495.
[903] al-Sisi 2003, 594.
[904] Abdel Halim 2013 III, 495.

varying outcomes among the released Brothers: while some of them complied with security commands, others continued their activism regardless of the risks it entailed.

As a case in point, Abdel Halim was sometime after his release approached by a group of Brothers, mostly younger men, who had remained at liberty following the repression of the Brotherhood. Many of these *Ikhwan* had been too young to be fullyfledged members of the organization before the persecution. They chose however to engage in Brotherhood activities when the older Brothers had been repressed, relates Abdel Halim.[905] Bemoaning the regime's deviation from Islam and the widespread injustice levelled at the Brotherhood, they asked Abdel Halim to join them "in a positive action" to alter the status quo. Abdel Halim, who felt he was being watched everywhere, thanked the Brothers for their enthusiasm but declined their invitation out of fear of the repercussions. These young members, longing for an organized reaction to repression, lamented Abdel Halim's refusal and perceived it as cowardice.[906] Such accounts illustrate the effects of decentralization on the organization and its rank and file. As the Brotherhood had gone underground and opted for secrecy in order to secure its endurance, those young Brothers who remained at liberty lacked an established leader to direct their activities, hence the different scattered attempts to resume activism noted above.

Abbas al-Sisi offers a similar account. In 1956, he was visited after his release by different groups of younger Brothers who wanted to continue the activities of the Brotherhood. Al-Sisi was pleased with those Brothers who "awaken hope and bolster our ability to carry on and endure" as he describes them.[907] In his memoirs, al-Sisi celebrates these young men as "the vanguards of a new generation" and praises them for their belief in the cause. The young members who had already initiated a multiplicity of activities asked al-Sisi to work with them to support the families of the Brothers and to study the ideas of the *Ikhwan*. Al-Sisi, who perceived such a continuation of the Brotherhood's activities as an Islamic obligation, agreed to join their ranks.[908]

As these two examples illustrate, the reactions from senior Brothers differed a great deal. While some Brothers perceived the engagement with the Brotherhood as an Islamic obligation, others were not prepared to accept the risks such activities involved. In addition, these examples, which were common in this period, show that the activities of the Brotherhood were decentralized and took the form of low-key endeavors organized by Brotherhood rank and file on their own initiative.

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[905] Ibid., 497.
[906] Ibid., 497.
[907] Al-Sisi 2003, 598.
[908] Ibid.

And importantly, the activities were more often than not launched by young members without the direction of older and more established Brothers.

Yusuf Nada,[909] known today as the Brotherhood's "foreign minister", was among the Brothers who were released in 1956 after being held in indefinite detention since November 1954. Upon his release, the young Nada went back to study agriculture at university in Alexandria, where he got acquainted with a group of like-minded young Brothers and sympathizers from Alexandria and its environs.[910] Looking for a way to support Brotherhood families and continue a low-key activism, Nada and his peers began frequenting regular meetings in which they discussed the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood and initiated a charity campaign to support the families of imprisoned Brothers. This group of *Ikhwan* was among the young men who frequented al-Sisi's home and discussed with him the proper ways of continuing the *da'wa* of the Brotherhood.[911] According to Nada, such activities carried a high risk, and could lead to accusations of conspiracy, but evidence points to their persistence. Nada maintains in his biography that "[w]hen the Brothers were being herded into jails, others tried to help their families with food and money".[912]

That such activities went on in this period, speaks to the Brotherhood's vitality in periods of lack of political opportunity. Such accounts of the Brotherhood continuation during this first phase of repression represents a pattern of how the *Ikhwan* continued (and continues) its activities when forced underground. Barbara Zollner maintains that there is "no information available on activities or discourse among the Brothers [prior to 1957/8]",[913] but as the accounts above and the US and British documents clearly illustrate, the activities did in fact continue throughout this period. Yet, to understand the nature of this continuation it is imperative to keep in mind that the Brotherhood consists of more than political activism. As a politico-religious organization with social and cultural aspects and activities, the continuation of the Brotherhood was not limited to its ability to participate in the political process or to propagate an oppositional discourse against the regime in power. As most Brotherhood accounts illustrate, the motivating force at work for their continuation consisted at this point in time of religious incentives to sustain the Islamic *da'wa* and to put into action the Islamic principle of charity and social responsibility which entailed, inter alia, upholding

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[909] Nada (1931-) was born to an Alexandrine family of standing. Upon graduating from high school, the young Nada attended university to study agriculture. Nada joined the Muslim Brotherhood in October 1948, shortly before the organization was dissolved for the first time in December 1948.
[910] Nada and Thompson 2012, 25; al-Sisi 2003, 600.
[911] Al-Sisi 2003, 600.
[912] Nada and Thompson 2012, 25-7.
[913] Zollner 2011, 39.

social relationships among the Brothers and studying religion in groups of *Ikhwan*. As formulated by Nada, "[t]he Muslim Brotherhood is not a club, it is an organisation based on the ethics of the Islamic religion. It's about trying to help people comply with the ethics in their life".[914] Such descriptions are common in Brotherhood memoirs and point to the Brothers' self-perception as fulfilling a religious task. This is in keeping with the procedure of *tarbiyya* (education) applied by the Brotherhood to form the identities of its members. As al-Anani put it, *"tarbiyya* is a key tool that enables the Brotherhood to instill its norms and code of values in an individual's identity".[915] Among the objectives of this *tarbiyya* are, inter alia, fortifying the members' devotion to the organization and their loyalty to the leadership, connecting members and creating strong bonds between them, and encouraging them to continue the *da'wa.*[916] This education had since 1943 been mainly fulfilled by the family-system. Accordingly, the continuity of the abovementioned activities was understood by these members as a natural aspect of being "a Brother" and a Muslim.

Nevertheless, as the following will illustrate, the Brotherhood did not limit their activities to charity but increased the oppositional work as a result of the limited opening on the political scene which followed the Suez crisis. Put differently, the opening on the domestic scene in Egypt, the macro-level of this study, served the Brotherhood's ability to continue its "shadowboxing" with the regime. It is still important to remind the reader that this "opening" remained limited and restrictions on political participation were on all accounts strict. The political settings, in other words, were still characterized by closed windows of opportunity, limitations and repression, which is why the political groups had to utilize what small openings did occur on the political scene. This limitation of possibilities obliged the *Ikhwan* to continue their activities underground insofar as any overt political work was censored and could ultimately lead to repression.

Nevertheless, the release of a large number of Brothers during 1956 gave the *Ikhwan* a new lease of life, which was reflected in its activities. During late 1956 and throughout 1957 the Brotherhood began increasing its oppositional works in the "dynamic periphery" which can be seen reflected in British and American reports of the time. In December 1956, British reports maintained that the Brotherhood had "gained some ground" and that a "revived Brotherhood" might be in a position to "succeed Nasser".[917] It was feared that if "Nasser fell now, he would probably be replaced by a still more extreme form of government and there has been talk of the Brotherhood in this connexion".

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[914] Nada and Thompson 2012, 25-6.
[915] Al-Anani 2016, 85.
[916] Haydar 1989, 100.
[917] FO 371/125416, JE 1015/155 G, A, "Some developments in the internal situation in Egypt and Nasser's position" Foreign office, 30 December 1956.

British diplomats in Egypt were obtaining such reports from a number of local observers and regional leaders.[918] While it goes without saying that such viewpoints were exaggerated, they clearly illustrate that the Brotherhood was still very present in the minds of local actors of this time. This clearly contradicts the presumption that the Brotherhood's existence had been terminated at this point in time. On the contrary, local observers and diplomats from the British and American embassies had since 1955, as we have noted, considered the Brotherhood as a potent underground current, despite its repression.

During the early months of 1957, and underscoring the *Ikhwan's* endurance, British officials maintained that Nasser "is still worried by the Moslem Brotherhood".[919] Such assessments were arriving at a time when the regime in Egypt was considered to be suffering "formidable problems" due to domestic difficulties, especially economically.[920] It was in light of this deteriorating domestic situation that the Brotherhood was reappearing on the radars of the US and British embassies as a potential threat to the Nasserite regime.

What these reports reflected was the widespread rumors that existed at this time which considered the Brotherhood as representing an alternative undercurrent in society, and a possible replacement should the regime fall.[921] As an example of this impression, this time depicted by the CIA, it was noted on 13 June 1957 that the Brotherhood "has renewed terrorism in the election campaign". According to the CIA, the Brotherhood's return to "terrorism" had followed the "suppression of a prison riot [Liman Tura] on 1 June in which several prominent Brotherhood leaders were killed."[922] What "renewed terrorism" the report was referring to is difficult to tell, as no evidence at hand points to Brotherhood-connected violence at this point in time. However, the CIA report is another example of the way in which British and American diplomats and intelligence officers perceived the Brotherhood as a potential threat. However, as I will show now, these rumors were not mere imaginations, as we can observe a clear increase in the *Ikhwan's* oppositional activities at this stage.

The organization, which had lain in wait for an opportunity to increase its political discourse, utilized the political opportunities that emerged amid the electoral campaign for the country's first

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[918] Ibid.

[919] FO 371/125416, JE 1015/155 G, "Reports since January 7 on the internal position in Egypt" Watson, January 15, 1957.

[920] FO 371/125416, JE 1015/155 B, "Repots since December 30, 1956 on Internal Position in Egypt", Foreign Office 7 January 1957.

[921] See for example, FO 371/125416, JE 1015/155 G, F, "Egypt: Internal position, reports received since January 28" 1957.

[922] CIA-RDP79-00927A001300030001-6, Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, 13 June 1957.

post-revolutionary parliament in 1957 to boost its anti-regime propaganda in society. A CIA report noted in this vein that the *Ikhwan* "retains a large number of sympathizers", suggesting why such a propaganda-offensive might achieve a degree of resonance in society.[923] As an example of the Brotherhood's expanded activism during this period and the oppositional form it was taking against the regime, a British diplomat recorded in July 1957 that the *Ikhwan* was "active against Nasser both inside and outside Egypt".[924] The British underlined that these activities were especially strong in Jordan, where the *Ikhwan* was reported to have waged a "vigorous campaign of propaganda". Buttressing this, British officials observed that the government's "main pre-occupation" is with the July elections where the Brotherhood "seem to be causing the régime some anxiety".[925] Such activities did in no respect represent an existential threat to Nasser's regime, but they accounted for a "shadowboxing" with the regime and highlighted the Brotherhood's endurance.[926] Sami Sharaf relates that the Brotherhood in this period, beginning in 1954, had conducted a zealous propaganda campaign against Nasser's policies, describing his socialism and Arabism as being at odds with Islam.[927]

Having discussed how the Brotherhood was perceived by external actors, I will now turn to the Brotherhood's internal development as described by the members themselves, to see how the organization reacted to this relative easing of repressive measures from the second half 1956. In this vein, we observe an increasing hierarchy taking place in connection with the Brotherhood's activities outside prisons. I claimed previously that the majority of the Brotherhood's activities during the first period of repression were distinguished by a high level of decentralization. The young members had, as I described it, taken the matter into their own hands when continuing to operate as members of the *Ikhwan*. However, as more senior members were released from prisons during 1956, we observe a partial turn towards centralization of action. Alberto Melucci has noted that repressive political systems may foster the establishment of "centralized and sectarian organizations".[928] Yet, as I have demonstrated so far in this chapter, when repressed the Brotherhood witnessed a decentralization as its ability to uphold a centralized structure outside prisons became subject to restrictions. Accordingly, when repressed, the *Ikhwan's* local networks

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[923] CIA-RDP79R01012A009800030005-8, National Intelligence Estimate, Number 36.1-57, Supersedes NIE 36.1-55, The Outlook for Egypt and the Nasser Regime, 12 November 1957.
[924] FO 371/125416, JE 1015/155 G, "Egypt: Internal political situation, reports received up to June 24" 1957.
[925] Ibid.
[926] FO 371/125444, JE 1052/20, J.H.A. Watson July 9, 1957, attached brief "Egypt".
[927] Sharaf 2015 IV, 999.
[928] Melucci 1996, 317.

became key in continuing the activities of the organization without the need of a centralized leadership to direct them.[929] This was highlighted by Ahmad Adel Kamal who formed one of the Brotherhood's organizations that continued its activities in society on a decentralized basis: "I conceived it most fitting to continue our bonds without a hierarchy. We meet and abide to our relationships and we support each other in religious matters, but without mentioning it to any outsider".[930] Such examples were common at this point in time which saw plenty of *Ikhwan* groups working without a direct contact to the central leadership.

Ahmad Abdel Majid, who gained a B.A. in law and was hired as an official at the War Ministry's department of military secrets during the prison years, offers a similar account.[931] Unknown to the authorities as a Muslim Brother, he began, together with like-minded young Brothers, establishing a small network to support the Brotherhood and to keep the Islamic identity alive among themselves and in society. Bemoaning the corruption encircling Egypt, as he describes it, Abdel Majid recalls that their intention was "to do our outmost to rescue the country from falling into oblivion".[932] To this end, small-scale organizations were established in various cities under local leadership.[933]

However, as restrictions began to decrease, we observe a turn towards semi-centralized organizing, especially in the larger cities. A case in point was Farid Abdel Khaleq's assumption of responsibility for the Brotherhood in Cairo upon his release from prison in 1957. In so doing, the Brotherhood was attempting to reestablish a leadership structure to command and lead the activities inside Egypt, and to concentrate it under a senior leader. Abdel Khaleq recalls that upon assuming the leadership in Cairo in 1957, he became responsible for the contact between Brotherhood members and Hasan al-Hudaybi - the latter had been transferred from prison to house arrest due to his advanced age (mid-sixties) and bad health. In addition to securing the contact between the Brotherhood rank and file (both domestic and exiled Brothers) and the *Murshid,* Abdel Khaleq undertook the responsibility of receiving funds from Brotherhood exiles in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries to support the organization. The support from Brotherhood exiles was imperative in sustaining the families of Brothers and in funding the activities of the organization.[934] As a result, we clearly see a turn towards a centralization of the Brotherhood's activities, although still on a limited basis.

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[929] Al-Anani 2016, 110-1.
[930] Adel Kamal 1989, 441.
[931] (edt.) Ikhwan-Wiki (undated) "Ahmad Abdel Majid" https://bit.ly/2SF7xGE (consulted 07.05.2020).
[932] Abdel Majid 1991, 43.
[933] Jawhar 1977, 49-50; Ashmawi 1993, 47; Abdel Majid 1991, 45.
[934] Abdel Khaleq 2004, XIV https://bit.ly/30PVf1F (consulted 22.07.2020).

A similar development took place in Alexandria, where a hierarchical leadership was established in 1958 to run the activities of the Brotherhood in the city. Abbas al-Sisi became head of a leadership structure in Alexandria consisting of four Brothers. The main task of this leadership was, in the words of al-Sisi, to form a new generation of Brothers by fulfilling the *tarbiyya* among them and thereby create a cadre of active Brothers who are able to continue the work of the Brotherhood.[935] The leadership of the organization also undertook the task of creating links to the leadership of the *Ikhwan* in Cairo, thus connecting the Brotherhood on a nationwide basis. This development was becoming a pattern at this point in time, as we observe similar developments in different parts of Egypt, such as al-Buhayra, Daqahliya and Damietta.[936] Accordingly, a turn towards a more centralized structuring, or at least an attempt to create such a centralization in these years of repression, can be seen in this period that followed the release of a large group of Brothers.

6.2.   Conclusions

This chapter began by critically assessing the argument presented by Zollner, Harris and other researchers that points to a termination of Brotherhood activities and organization in this first period of repression. In the wake of the botched assassination attempt, many observers and researchers came to believe that the *Ikhwan* organization was heading towards its end as a result of its failed challenge of the Nasserite regime.

However, as discussed in this chapter, the Brotherhood was not destroyed but turned quickly to secrecy as a defensive measure to protect the organization from the "tough policing" it was exposed to. After a period of harsh repression in which the Brotherhood faced torture, hangings and the arrest of thousands of its members, the *Ikhwan* exhibited a desire to continue their activism despite the risks such activities entailed. This continuation, which this chapter has illustrated, was at this point in time characterized in the main by decentralization and was oftentimes carried out on the initiative of young Brotherhood members. Those members who conceived the work in the ranks of an Islamic organization obligatory, continued to do so covertly. These enduring activities consisted mostly of charitable work and low-key religious studies and propaganda, but the violent measures taken against the Brotherhood undoubtedly came to radicalize a current of those members, though on a limited scale.

While there is little evidence pointing to *Ikhwan* attempts to overthrow the regime, we clearly

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[935] al-Sisi 2003, 598, 606-613.
[936]Ibid.: See also Sharaf 2015 IV, 1000.

observed an ongoing "shadowboxing" between the Brotherhood and the Nasserite government, in which the Brotherhood attempted to offer an alternative current to the hegemonic Pan-Arab ideology. Adding to this, the Brotherhood's internal organization and working procedures were closely correlated to the political situation domestically and regionally. When the government chose to limit its repressive policies, the Brotherhood found increasing spaces to continue its activities in society, even though these activities remained under restrictions from the security apparatus. Regionally, the Brotherhood benefitted from the transnational character it had built and from the regional support it received, such as the financial support it received from the Saudi King.

However, as we shall see in the following chapter, a radicalization of thought occurred among a group of Brothers which resulted in their attempt to militarize the conflict with the regime during the 1960s. In this connection, I will discuss the involvement of Sayyid Qutb and ask whether the well-known ideologue came to play a radicalizing or deradicalizing role in the Brotherhood's anti-Nasserite activities of the 1960s. Accordingly, I will discuss Qutb's trajectory as part of the greater history of the Brotherhood during these events.

7. Action Militarization and the Role of Sayyid Qutb (1957-1970)

Why did the Brotherhood experience another repression and executions in 1965-66? This chapter will examine the eventful years that preceded the unearthing of 'Organization 65' and discuss the internal repercussions that occurred following these events. While most studies link these events to the person of Sayyid Qutb, attributing to him the major role in the development of this organization, I intend to discuss the historical evolution of this organization as part and parcel of the history of the Brotherhood. In so doing, I maintain that this organization, which came to be known as '*Tanẓīm 65*' named after the year it was revealed, represented a continuation of the Brotherhood's history. Scholars have claimed that the idea of *jihad* as "necessary to depose the corrupt rulers of the Muslim world" was formulated by Qutb during his prison years (1954-1964, 1965-6). [937] Yet, as discussed in previous chapters, parts of the Brotherhood had already during the second half of the 1940s and in the first years of the 1950s gone through a radicalization, which saw some of them prepared to use and legitimize armed *jihad* against the rulers.[938] Consequently, the idea of *jihad* against local foes did not have a linear path that developed in post-1954 prisons, but had been embedded in the anti-colonial struggles and local conflicts that took place in Egypt and the region. That this 'Organization 65' came as an organic continuation of that trajectory of Egyptian history, is my contention.

As seen in the preceding chapter, during the period of 1955 to 1957, a number of small organizations had cropped up in different parts of Egypt as low-key attempts to continue the activities of the Brotherhood.[939] While most of these organizations had adopted non-violent methods and aims, a minority of them had agreed on armed struggle against the regime as the appropriate means to avenge the Brotherhood and to alter the status quo. This is consistent with the argument put forward by della Porta that the "very choice to go underground of a relatively small group of activists is heuristically relevant, as it triggers a spiral of radicalization, transforming political organizations into military sects".[940] On this account, I consider 'Organization 65' a link in the chain of the events that occurred following the repression of the Brotherhood in late 1954. It was from that time that small groups of Brothers began organizing themselves in small organizations, ending up with what came to represent a "strong and violent" militarization of this

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[937] Soage & Franganillo 2010, 42.
[938] Chapter 3-5.
[939] Al-Sarwi 2004, 89.
[940] della Porta 2013, 7.

conflict, as stated by Sami Sharaf, Nasser's personal secretary.[941]

Rather than understanding this new organization as a *"phoenix from the ashes",* as Zollner proposes,[942] I claim that this *tanẓīm* and the reactions to it epitomize a continuation of the Brotherhood since late 1954: The organization did not suddenly emerge in 1957/8 as a phoenix from the ashes but signified the ongoing activities of the Brotherhood ever since the persecution, and was a living proof that it had not been eradicated. Accordingly, Qutb's influence became pivotal when he offered this organization an ideological framework by which they could in more explicit terms define their views on society and regime. Yet, prior to Qutb's involvement in it, the organization had been founded and had shaped a specific worldview in which the resumption of the Brotherhood was their main task and the violent retaliation against the regime had occupied some of them. My argument is that Qutb's role should therefore be understood as providing this organization with a powerful manifesto in terms of his renowned prison book 'Milestones'. Thus, as this chapter will illustrate, the radicalization of this organization had taken place long before Qutb became its formal leader and theoretician.

This chapter will furthermore discuss other aspects of the Brotherhood's endurance in this period. As a mass organization with branches in all parts of the Arab world at this point in time, the Brotherhood managed to utilize this transnationality to resist repression and to uphold an oppositional voice against the Pan-Arabism sponsored by the Nasserite-regime. I will touch upon this aspect to show how crucial this characteristic was for the continuation of the Brotherhood: However, an in-depth discussion of this transnational character of the Brotherhood remains beyond the scope of this study.

7.1. From Decentralized Organizations Towards Unification

On 1 June 1957, in what came to be the single bloodiest day in the struggle between Nasser and the Brotherhood, a massacre took place in Liman Tura. The massacre resulted in 21 Brotherhood members being killed and approximately the same number injured in cells echoing with the terrifying noise of automatic weapons. This event, which has not been extensively investigated despite its magnitude, was disturbing for a majority of Brothers. As a continuation of the repression that had begun in late 1954, the Tura massacre was of unprecedented cruelty. The authorities described what had happened as a "suppression of a prison riot"[943], while Brotherhood accounts

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[941] Sharaf 2015 IV, 1000.
[942] Zollner 2011, 39 (italics in original).
[943] CIA-RDP79-00927A001300030001-6, Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, 13 June 1957; Abul Fadl 2012, 101.

have ever since described it as an outright manslaughter directed against the *Ikhwan* inmates.[944] It was, according to recollections of Brotherhood inmates who survived the massacre, a truly villainous crime: Injured Brothers were exposed to severe beatings when removed from their dormitories and some of them died of their injuries.[945]

Certainly, there is a firm link between the implementation of political violence by socio-political organizations and state responses to social movements - they are intertwined in a sort of "macabre dance", as illustrated by della Porta. Repression and state-violence plays a major role in justifying the use of counter-violence; "transformative repressive events" provide justification for violence and impel militant groups to move toward secrecy.[946] Pointing also to this reciprocal link, violence becomes most probable when regimes "attempt to crush Islamic activism through broad repressive measures", contends Hafez and Wiktorowicz.[947] On this account, and taking my inspiration from these considerations, I hold that a similar "macabre dance" took place in the case of the Brotherhood and its relation to the Nasserite-state, reinforced by the massacre in Liman Tura.

Tough and repressive policing of the Brotherhood had characterized the post-Manshiyya period. From late 1954, the repression of the *Ikhwan* had taken various forms including the imprisonment of the Brotherhood's upper echelons, the harsh treatment of *Ikhwan* inmates which regularly involved torture and humiliation, the hanging of leading members and the closing of "windows of opportunity" for Brothers outside prison. The exclusion of Brotherhood members was primarily carried out through the regime's law of "political dismissal" which authorized it to discharge individuals involved in political opposition from their jobs and obstruct their way to state-employment.[948] The violence and cruelty which characterized the relationship between the state and the Brotherhood remained a defining feature in these years, although the severity did fluctuate during the period. However, I argue that the Tura massacre in 1957 came to represent what della Porta has coined a "transformative repressive event". We can, following this event, observe a substantial increase in the emergence of clandestine structures of Brothers outside prisons. This development was further promoted by the release of Brothers who had served their prison terms of up to five years.

Abbas al-Sisi recalls the fury and awe with which he and other Brothers received the news of the

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[944] For a list of the Brotherhood inmates in Tura at the time of the Massacre and the names of the victims see Rizq 1979, 159-71.
[945] Atiya Muhammad Aql cited in Rizq 1979, 63.
[946] della Porta 2013, 33.
[947] Hafez & Wiktorowicz 2004, 62.
[948] Abdel Khaleq 2004, episode 14.

massacre. More than anything else, this "transformative event" came to be a catalyst for the increasing clandestine activity of the Brotherhood in society.[949] The unprecedented number of victims in one single day, and the young age of most victims, caused great despondency and increased the emotional reaction among the Brothers. Bewilderment turned into anguish among many Brothers. Della Porta has observed that "waves of repression" are cited by participants of clandestine movements as a motivating cause for them to join these movements.[950] We find an analogous reasoning cited by activists of the Brotherhood. "We began thinking of ways to rescue ourselves and our Brothers from falling into oblivion […] the religious man was persecuted everywhere [in Egypt]", states Ahmad Abdel Majid looking back at the beginning of his engagement with the underground network of young Muslim Brothers. He therefore established, as a reaction to these feelings, an *Ikhwani* organization which would become later a nucleus of 'Organization 65'.[951]

What started as a small network of young Brothers who met in a private apartment in Cairo to discuss the ideas of the Brotherhood and the circumstances in Egypt, developed soon afterwards into a hierarchical group with a clearly defined pecking-order and a modest set of rules. Ali Ashmawi, a former member of the Brotherhood's Special Apparatus, became the *amir* (commander) of this organization, while Amin Shahin was put in charge of its financial aspects and Abdel Majid was responsible for intelligence. The organization chose a study program and was, according to one of its leaders, founded on the idea of "complete secrecy and great caution in movement and contacts".[952] Abdel Majid, one of the founding fathers of this organization, relates that only Brothers who were convinced 100 percent could be a part of the organization. By necessitating the members' total conviction, Abdel Majid and his co-activists were trying to preclude the possibility of betrayal. Simmel argues in this regard that "[t]he probability of betrayal, however, is subject to the imprudence of a moment, the weakness or the agitation of a mood, the perhaps unconscious shading of an accentuation".[953] Taking this into account, we may likewise assume, that such organizations which were constructed at times of high risk were subject to a probability of betrayal, and thus why the total conviction among its recruits became a requirement. Nevertheless, this nascent organization began subsequently to recruit members; the organization was not confined to a geographical area, but had most success in recruiting members in Cairo, al-

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[949] Al-Sisi 2003, 605-6.
[950] della Porta 2013, 44.
[951] Abdel Majid 1991, 43.
[952] Abdel Majid 1991. 46-8.
[953] Simmel 1906, 473.

Giza southwest of central Cairo and al-Daqahliya northeast of Cairo.[954]

At approximately the same time, and for roughly the same reasons, a similar organization was underway, established by another group of young Brothers who had either been sentenced to short terms in prison, placed under indefinite detention or had remained at liberty. The nucleus of this organization had been a group of imprisoned Brothers who had planned to establish a Brotherhood organization once released. With their release forthcoming, they began discussing how to proceed with the activities once free and they asked themselves, what are we obliged to do as working Muslims in light of this "despotic" regime?[955]

Deliberations involved such questions as what form the organization outside prison should take? If there was to be an organization, how should it respond to Nasser's repression and cruel treatment? Should the Special Apparatus be established once again? And should it have as its main target to kill Nasser and thus avenge their Brothers? The deliberations inside prison and their collective enmity towards the regime was transformed into an organization in Damietta, al-Buhayra and al-Daqahliya once they were released.

Abdel Fattah Ismail, a young student at al-Azhar from Damietta,[956] became a leading figure together with two other Brothers in this emerging organization, which came into being around 1957, consisting in the beginning mainly of young Brothers who had been released in 1956 and 1957 and some of the Brothers who had remained at liberty in this period.[957] As the abovementioned deliberations portray, the nuclei of this organization had considered the idea of assassinating Nasser and founding a commando group to confront the regime. This is interesting because it illustrates that the militarization of thoughts had existed at this relatively early stage, long before Qutb's involvement in these nascent organizations.

Similar organizations emerged concurrently in almost all parts of Egypt as a result of the release of a large group of younger Brothers who came in contact with Brotherhood activists who had been active in the underground since 1955.[958] The increase in organizations and activism should be understood in light of the relative liberalization which had taken place since late 1956. These

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[954] Abdel Majid 1991. 46-8. See also Allam 1996, 119-20 (Fuad Allam, then an intelligence officer, substantiates this account, arguing that such activities took place in several provinces).
[955] Al-Sarwi 2004, 101.
[956] Ismail (1925-66) was born in Damietta in northern Egypt in a little village called Kafr al-Batikh. After a short period at the Azhar preparatory institute he left school and began earning his living as merchant. He joined the Brotherhood at an early age and is described as a close adherent of Hasan al-Banna. He founded an organization in 1957 that became a nucleus for the well-known 'organization 65'. Ismail was hanged together with Qutb in August 1966.
[957] Al-Sarwi 2004, 101.
[958] See chapter 6.

endeavors were still at this point in time characterized by decentralization, as Brothers in a given geographical area gathered to resume low-key activities without links to the central leadership in Cairo, or the *Murshid* for that matter. These were, in other words, local attempts not yet unified by a collective leadership. However, this was to change soon, as we shall see.

In 1957, on a journey to Mecca to perform the obligatory pilgrimage, Abdel Fattah Ismail,[959] who came to be known as the "dynamo of the Brotherhood" and who would figure heavily in the forthcoming events, got acquainted with the female activist Zaynab al-Ghazali.[960] Around 1955-56, Al-Ghazali had joined a group of female members of the Brotherhood in putting into action an organized venture to support the bereaved families of imprisoned or dead Brothers and to maintain the vital communication between the imprisoned Brothers and those still at liberty. The female branch could maintain this vital communication with lower risk, because they were subject to very little surveillance compared to the male activists.[961]

This first encounter between al-Ghazali and Ismail marked the beginning of an agreement to unify the Brotherhood and resume its activities. "We took an oath to strive in the way of God and to do our outmost to unify the ranks of the Brotherhood […] we took an oath before God to strive and die in the path of the Islamic *daʿwa*", recalls al-Ghazali of her agreement with Ismail.[962] Upon their return from Mecca, al-Ghazali and Abdel Fattah Ismail embarked on an endeavor to recruit and unite Brotherhood members and religious young men from all parts of Egypt.[963] Al-Ghazali, who, like Ismail, looms large in the story of this organization from here on, argues that al-Hudaybi, prior to the initiation of any activities, was approached and gave his explicit consent to this enterprise. However, close associates of al-Hudaybi, such as Farid Abdel Khaleq, insist that the *Murshid* had not agreed to such a nationwide reorganization but that he had been aware of ongoing underground activities of young Brothers and gave his consent to continue such low-key activities.[964] This disagreement has been a source of controversy ever since. In any case, the activities of this distinct, and at this time dispersed, Brotherhood organization continued unabated. The question of whether

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[959] Mubarak 2017, https://bit.ly/2UAcxNJ (consulted 11.06.2020).

[960] Al-Ghazali (1917-2005) was born in Buhayra to a religious family- her father was an Azhari scholar who died before she turned 11. In 1934 al-Ghazali became a disciple of Huda Shaʿrawi and joined the latter's "Egyptian Feminist Union" formed along European lines. However, in 1935 the young Zaynab took a different path when she devoted her life to Islamic activism and in 1936 she founded the Society of Muslim Women. In 1948 she joined the Muslim Brotherhood and in 1951 she married the *Ikhwani* businessman Muhammad Salem. (see al-Ghazali 2012).

[961] Ibid, 69; (edt.) Ikhwan-Wiki (undated) *Amal al-Ashmawi*, https://bit.ly/3awFCAf (consulted 20.01.20); Abdel Hadi 2011, 55-65.

[962] Al-Ghazali 2012, 64.

[963] Ibid., 65; al-Tuni 1975, 287-8.

[964] Abdel Khaleq (2004) episode 14; Abdel Khaleq 1987, 113.

al-Hudaybi had consented to its organization or not, illustrates the continuing hierarchical aspect of the Brotherhood. These young Brothers, many of whom were lower-ranking activists of the organization, needed to assert that their endeavor was accepted by the Brotherhood's leaders to be able to continue their activities as legitimate representatives of the *Ikhwan*.[965] However, despite Abdel Khaleq's denial, evidence points to al-Hudaybi's knowledge of at least a part of these activities. Besides having given his consent to a continuation of the Brotherhood's local activities, as pointed to by Abdel Khaleq, al-Hudaybi's wife, daughters and sons were all active in continuing the activities of the Brotherhood, which points to the *Murshid's* prior knowledge of such undertakings. As an example of these activities by al-Hudaybi's nearest family, Maʾmun al-Hudaybi, the *Murshid's* son who himself became the sixth *Murshid*, was at this time active in supporting the Brotherhood through financial support he received in Gaza where he worked; the money was being transferred from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, inter alia, and collected locally in Gaza. Maʾmun al-Hudaybi's task was then to pass this funding to Cairo where it was distributed to Brotherhood activists and families.[966] I will now turn to the inner workings of these organizations to see how they were able to recruit new members and continue their activities.

7.1.1. Recruiting and Working Underground; the Route Towards 'Organization 65'

The different organizations, which had been founded since 1957 and were scattered all over Egypt, had at this point in time achieved some success in recruiting new members to their ranks. The recruitment took place in the provinces of Upper Egypt, the delta, in Cairo and its environs and in other parts of Egypt. As a case in point, Muhammad Badiʿ, the current *Murshid*, was recruited to the Brotherhood in 1959. Badiʿ, who at the time was 16 years old, was recruited by a Syrian member of the Brotherhood who was studying at university in Egypt. In his case, Badiʿ was approached by the Syrian Brother at the campus where he was attending the preparatory school for the faculty of science. The young Badiʿ went through a period of trial and education by the Syrian Brother from Hama before he was introduced to other members of the Brotherhood and eventually enlisted into an *usra*.[967] The way in which Badiʿ was recruited represents a working pattern at this time. New recruits went through a period of vetting and examination before they were actually told about the *Ikhwan*. This was a way of minimizing the risks and keeping out potential infiltrators.

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[965] Ashmawi 1993, 44.
[966] Al-Tuni 1975, 315-6.
[967] Badiʿ (undated) https://bit.ly/2AnSJpP (consulted 12.05.2020).

Accordingly, the recruitment of new members was, on account of the great risks involved and the "probability of betrayal", to borrow Simmel's words,[968] restricted to men "who exhibited religiosity", like for example praying in the university prayer halls or attending a mosque regularly, as well as to individuals with prior links, such as men from the neighborhood who were already known to the recruiter as family members, friends or colleagues. This approach limited the recruitment of the *Ikhwan* but was a way of securing the already active members. The recruitment was usually begun with a trial period in which the recruit was asked to join a religious study-circle without it being divulged that this circle is connected to the Brotherhood. This is in keeping with the problems of recruiting members, as established by Erickson in her study of secret organizations under risk. "Strong ties are always preferred as the building blocks of secret societies", argues Erickson, and we can observe a similar procedure by the Brothers at this time of "escalating policing".[969]

As the following examples will demonstrate, universities, mosques, local neighborhoods and family links became pivotal in this period's Brotherhood recruitment.[970] Muhammad al-Sarwi, who joined the Brotherhood in the early 1960s, offers such an account. He was recruited to the Brotherhood by fellow university students who invited him to the organization following a long period of informal meetings in which the recruiter talked generally about Islam without explicitly mentioning the Brotherhood. Al-Sarwi was put through a period of testing where his personality and relationships were scrutinized. At the end of the period of trial, he was finally asked to join the Brotherhood, which was the beginning of his journey with this organization. As such examples illustrate, the Brothers were at this time still able to recruit new members, mainly young university students who yearned to take an active role in society and to shape it Islamically, as they relate.[971]

The Brotherhood's activities seem to have been particularly functional at the university campuses where young men in large numbers could meet and spend time together, discussing religious and political issues without great complications. Along these lines, Mahmoud Izzat, the Brotherhood's contemporary Deputy *Murshid*, joined the Brotherhood in 1962 upon getting in touch with *Ikhwan* activists at the university.[972] Similar stories, especially from the technical faculties, such as the

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[968] Simmel 1906, 473.
[969] Erickson 1981, 195.
[970] Al-Ashmawi 1993, 47.
[971] Al-Sarwi 2004, 163; for a similar story, see Afifi 2013, https://bit.ly/2WnjdjA (consulted 11.05.2020).
[972] (edt.) Ikhwan-Wiki (undated), *Mahmoud Izzat*, https://bit.ly/2xSlFoV (consulted 11.05.2020).

faculty of engineering, are common from this period.[973] Regarding the organizational structure of these young members, when new recruits were introduced to the organization they were organized in close-knit cells (*usar*), consisting of approximately 3 members in each *usra*, and the member of an *usra* would only know the members of his own *usra* in an attempt to maximize security.[974]

Ibrahim Ghusheh, a Palestinian member of the Brotherhood's Jerusalem branch, who studied in Cairo in the second half of the 1950s, substantiates these accounts. Describing the repressive climate towards the Brotherhood which he witnessed when landing in Cairo in 1955, he recalls how he was advised by *Ikhwan* members to conceal his affiliation with the Brotherhood. However, soon after his arrival he realized that the Brotherhood was still organized in society, but they were "on the highest level of alert, and [had] to have a sense of security, control and discretion".[975] Pointing to the organization of the *Ikhwan*, he recalled that Brotherhood students from various Arab countries studying in Egypt had organized themselves hierarchically on campuses, with a person in charge of Brotherhood students from his respective country.[976] In this way, these Brothers could work as a unified group and offer some support to the Egyptian Brotherhood in withstanding the repressive climate they were enduring. As illustrated in this section, this period was characterized by a vibrant *Ikhwani* activism which attempted to recruit new members and increase the activities of the Brotherhood on the ground. I will now move on to discuss the emergence of 'Organization 65', its *raison d'être* and its founding figures. In so doing, I attempt to clarify the role of Sayyid Qutb in this organization and more generally his influence in the Brotherhood.

7.1.2. The Emergence of a Nationwide Organization, 'Tanẓīm 65'.

The result of the abovementioned efforts to recruit new Brothers and to gather the dispersed members, working independently in small organizations, was the nationwide 'Organization 65'. The beginning of this organization was in 1962, when the organization headed by Abdel Fattah Ismail and another led by Ali Ashmawi and Ahmad Abdel Majid were merged to work for a unification and reorganization of the Brotherhood as a cohesive and nationwide organization. What appears to have started as coincidental, when different Brothers, representing separate secret groups, learned of each other's existence, led to the cooperation and merger of these organizations. The outcome was a

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[973] Rizq 1978, 47; al-Sarwi 2004, 134, he relates the story of Mubarak Abdel Azim, a member of the Brotherhood who in this same pattern was able to recruit a number of young students; Ashmawi 1993, 100.
[974] Al-Arusi 1995, 252.
[975] Ghusheh 2013, 53-4.
[976] Ibid.

new organization led by five commanders; Abdel Fattah Ismail, Muhammad Fahti Rifaʿi, Ali Ashmawi, Ahmad Abdel Majid, and Magdi Abdel Aziz.[977]

Interestingly, the objectives of this organization are a source of disagreement among its commanders, especially as regards violence. While Ahmad Abdel Majid and Ali Ashmawi assert that the organization headed by Abdel Fattah Ismail had it as its sole aim to assassinate Abdel Nasser in revenge for the repression of the Brotherhood, Zaynab al-Ghazali, a close associate of Ismail, claims that her and Ismail's intentions were utterly educational "to create the Muslim society" and that revenge was not part of their aims.[978] However, as seen previously, different Brotherhood organizations had since 1955 entertained the idea of assassinating Nasser as retribution for the repression of the *Ikhwan*, for which he personally was held responsible by many Brothers. Accordingly, the possibility that some of these new groups were erected on the idea of violently responding to repression is plausible. Della Porta has argued that harsh repression of movements, such as the repression inflicted on the Brothers in the wake of the Manshiyya incident, plays an "important and dramatic role in the radicalization of Islamic movements".[979] In keeping with this, I argue that a radicalization, as a result of the 1954 repression, can be traced back to 1955 when a small number of Brothers considered a violent reaction to repression.[980] On this account, the organization began organizing camps to carry out physical exercises and sending young Brothers to officer-schools to gain entry to the officers' corps.[981] Such measures clearly point to a desire to at least prepare for the possibility of violence, if not prepare themselves for a violent showdown. This radicalization can be understood as a continuation of the radicalization that had been present among some Brothers during the monarchical era, as discussed in chapters three and four.

The organization had also secured a solid source of financing which enabled it to continue its activities. The organization had established contacts to Brotherhood-exiles in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries through regular journeys to Mecca and other Arab countries where Brotherhood exiles had found refuge. The seasonal travels to Mecca for pilgrimage became a convenient and essentially safe way of meeting with Brothers outside Egypt. As a case in point, Abdel Fattah Ismail had raised 4000 E£ to spend on the organization, through his journeys to Saudi Arabia.[982] In continuing this line of communication, fundraising and bonding with Brothers in the

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[977] Abdel Majid 1991, 51-2, 60; (details on the commanders' professions, responsibilities and contacts).
[978] Ibid., 50; Ashmawi 1993, 53; al-Ghazali 2012, 66; see also Abdel Khaleq 2004, episode 14.
[979] della Porta 2013, 57.
[980] Jawhar 1977, 47.
[981] Abdel Majid 1991, 61-2.
[982] Ashmawi 1993, 54; al-Ghazali 2012, 160.

region, Ali Ashmawi travelled to Saudi Arabia on the pretext of performing the Islamic pilgrimage to discuss proper ways of supplying the organization with funds and arms. It was arranged for him to meet a number of Brotherhood exiles in Jedda under a cloak of secrecy. When asked, during one of these meetings, whether his organization needed money, Ashmawi maintained that what the organization was in dire need of was assault weapons, sniper-rifles, explosives and grenades, "enough to arm a thousand-man force with arms and grenades".[983] The Brotherhood exiles in Saudi Arabia arranged for Mustafa al-Alem, an exile Brother who had gained experience of weapon-smuggling during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 and the Canal War in 1951, to purchase the requested arms in southern Sudan, in order to send it to Egypt at a later time. Abdel Majid corroborates this account but argues that Ashmawi took this initiative single-handedly against the consensus of the commanding group.[984] Be that as it may, this incident clearly demonstrates that at least some of these Brothers were preparing for violence against the government, as the request for weapons shows without any doubt. This affair, which unambiguously shows an action militarization in the course of this organization, took place in 1962 two years before Qutb's assumption of the organization's leadership.[985] As the abovementioned discussions have shown, the organization that occurred as a unified body in 1962 began as an attempt by scattered groups of Brothers to resume the activities of the Brotherhood. While some Brothers presumably thought of assassinating Nasser as revenge for the regime's treatment of the *Ikhwan,* other activists aimed at continuing the organization and conducting an Islamic *daʿwa* in society. I contend therefore that the attention given to Sayyid Qutb on account of his radicalizing influence of this organization somehow distorts its history. Rather than pointing to Qutb as the main actor in reviving the Brotherhood, as has been claimed by Gerges,[986] I argue that Qutb's role should be put into the correct historical context. The nuclei of this organization, aiming at reviving the Brotherhood, began working long before Qutb was affiliated with them, and the main "dynamo" of this revival was Abdel Fattah Ismail.[987] As this discussion has clarified, the reorganization of the Brotherhood occurred as an organic continuation of the previous attempts to resume the activities of the *Ikhwan* since 1955,[988] which is why the role of Qutb in this reorganization should be contextualized in this historical framework. I have through this discussion of the early history of 'Organization 65' and its trajectory attempted to show that a

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[983] Abdel Majid 1991, 68; Ashmawi 1993, 64.
[984] Ibid.
[985] Ashmawi 1993, 58-66.
[986] Gerges 2018, 243.
[987] Raif 1986, 239; al-Khalidi 1994, 377.
[988] Jawhar 1977, 49.

high degree of activities had taken place during these years of repression and that an action militarization occurred without Qutb's influence, as a consequence of repression.

I will now turn to the role of Qutb in the last phase of this organization, namely from his assumption of its leadership in 1964 until its uncovering by the authorities in the summer of 1965.

7.1.3. Qutb Leading the Organization

With the organization firmly in place, the commanding committee began looking for a senior Brother to head it. The search for a senior leader turned out to be more difficult than expected. Seeing the *tanẓīm* as a risky business and a potential pretext for repression, a group of senior Brothers renounced the whole idea, which ultimately resulted in a fragmentation of the Brotherhood. As a case in point, when Abdel Khaleq, at that time the head of the Brotherhood in Cairo, was asked by the organization's command committee to head their organization and to endow it with legitimacy as a leading member of the Brotherhood, he refused. Seeing the organization as a possible pretext for the repression of the whole *Ikhwan*-organization, if their undertaking was uncovered, Abdel Khaleq and Munir al-Dilla[989] urged al-Hudaybi to censor it.[990] Farid Abdel Khaleq argues in his memoirs that al-Hudaybi, on account of these warnings, appointed him in 1964 to dismantle the organization.[991] However, other Brotherhood accounts, close to 'Organization 65' clearly underline that al-Hudaybi had endorsed the organization and its continuation.[992] In any case, the abovementioned example illustrates the fragmentation inside the Brotherhood at this time. A leading Brotherhood circle personified by Abdel Khaleq, al-Dilla, Salah Shadi, Abdel Qader Hilmi and others was strongly against such a reorganization which in their view was a far too dangerous gamble. They perceived low-key activities without a nationwide reorganization at that point in time as the best way of enduring repression.[993] In addition, as historic leaders of the Brotherhood, the abovementioned leading group might have seen this reorganization as a challenge to their own standing in the Brotherhood, which is why they reacted with ferocity. Pointing to this disagreement, Ahmad Abdel Majid recalls that this leading circle did all in its

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[989] In addition to the two, the opposing group comprised of Salah Shadi, Abdel Qader Hilmi and Saleh Abu Ruqayiq, all of whom had been close associates prior to the repression of the *Ikhwan*. This group was also bound together by family relations.

[990] Abdel Khaleq 2004, XIV https://bit.ly/30PVf1F (consulted 22.07.2020).

[991] Ibid.

[992] Abdel Majid 1991, 71, 72; Raif 1986, 239, Abdel Majid quotes al-Hudaybi as telling the opposing faction "let the young men who want to work and attain martyrdom be, these are people who want to attain martyrdom, so let them attain it".

[993] Al-Khalidi 1994, 375.

power to oppose his nascent organization, warning members against joining the organization and waging "a war against us and persecuting us everywhere".[994] According to another account, Salah Shadi went as far as asking his son-in-law, Murad al-Zayat, to turn the organization in if its leaders did not dismantle it.[995]

In light of this repugnance they were met with and as an attempt to counterbalance the opposition, the commanders of the organization continued their search for a senior member to lead their organization and bestow on it legitimacy. Consequently, in about 1963, Abdel Aziz Ali, previously a minister in the first period of post-monarchical rule and a former member of al-Hizb al-Watani, was chosen to head the organization. Ali was experienced in clandestine activism, having co-founded and participated in a covert anti-British organization during the 1919 revolution, which gave him some credentials to lead an underground organization. However, this association did not last long, as the members of the organization disliked his high-handed style of leadership and did not find him fit for the task. Once they had decided to part ways with Abdel Aziz Ali, the committee began looking for a new leader, and their choice fell on Sayyid Qutb, whose writings and viewpoints from prison had inspired them.[996]

In May 1964, Sayyid Qutb was released from prison after having suffered a heart attack, severely weakening his health. Qutb's release came after an intervention on his behalf from the Iraqi president Abdel Salam Aref who had learned of Qutb's illness from the Iraqi branch of the Brotherhood.[997] Once released, he was approached by the leading committee of the *tanẓīm*. The first meeting was between Abdel Fattah Ismail and Sayyid Qutb and took place in Qutb's house in Helwan, a well-known suburb of Cairo. Ismail told Qutb that he was working with a group of young religious men and that they were looking for a guide, but he did not disclose the details of the organization. However, after a few meetings between Qutb, Ismail and Ashmawi, they arranged a number of meetings between Qutb and all five leaders of the organization, after which they formally asked him to lead them. Upon seeking and being granted the approval of the *Murshid,* Qutb agreed to lead the organization. [998]

Earlier, while Qutb was in prison, the group had asked him to recommend reading material for them, and he had done so since 1962 when he sent them, inter alia, draft extracts of his then

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[994] Abdel Majid 1991, 71; Ashmawi 1993, 70.
[995] Ibid.
[996] Ashmawi 1993, 68.
[997] Al-Khalidi 1994, 372-3.
[998] Al-Arusi 1995, 99; Abdel Majid 1994, 69-70.

incomplete book 'Milestones'.[999] But this had remained an informal connection, and Qutb had been unaware of the existence of a proper organization.[1000]

In other words, the formal association between Qutb and the organization began in 1964, when he joined the organization as Ali's successor. Corroborating this, Qutb argues that his association with the organization was limited to the period that followed his release and was restricted to six months in which he held about twelve meetings with its leading group.[1001]

The compartmentalization, which had characterized the organization's relationship to a leading faction of the Brotherhood, continued despite Qutb's assumption of leadership. As an example, Qutb relates that Munir al-Dilla warned him of an organization consisting of "reckless young men" who, in the words of al-Dilla, were "infiltrators employed by an American Intelligence agency through Zaynab al-Ghazali" - al-Dilla was of course talking about 'Organization 65'. This leading faction also warned Qutb that Abdel Aziz Ali had contacts to "the Americans and had infiltrated the Brotherhood".[1002] Notwithstanding the truth of such suggestions, they show the compartmentalization this organization had created and the distrust the decentralized underground reality of the Brotherhood had created at this point in time.

In January 1965, Qutb was told by the commanding group that the main purpose of this organization was to carry out an attack to "remove the circumstances and persons who had suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood and stopped their *da'wa"*, and consequently to stage a coup. He was also informed that weapons would be transferred to Egypt from the Sudan to arm the group, sent from Brothers in Saudi Arabia.[1003] Thus, by Qutb's own account, when he assumed the leadership of the organization, it consisted of a group of zealous young men who were thinking of avenging the Brotherhood by launching attacks against the regime.

The group's reasoning for and justification of violence, as revenge for the dissolution of the Brotherhood and repression of its members, resembles essentially the reasoning of the *Ikhwan* radicals who in 1948 and 1949 had fought the Egyptian government as a consequence of the latter's repression. Then, the Special Apparatus had conceived al-Nuqrashi as an enemy of Islam, and in the same vein, those young Brothers explained their intentions to avenge the repression of the Brotherhood as a justified retribution against a despotic regime.[1004] Therefore, I argue that the

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[999] Milestones was published in January 1964.
[1000] Abdel Majid 1991, 53; Ashmawi 1993, 68-9; al-Arusi 1995, 94.
[1001] Qutb 2007, 100.
[1002] Ibid., 106.
[1003] Ibid., 101; Al-Arusi 1995, 99-101.
[1004] Qutb 2007, 104.

influence attributed to Sayyid Qutb by a number of researchers, as regards his position as the *main* initiator of a radicalization process, somehow lacks nuance. Fawaz Gerges, for instance, claims that,

> "Qutb eschewed gradualist political engagement and social mobilization in favor of nourishing a subversive vanguard that would spearhead the institution of his new utopia. Although Banna had founded the original chapter of the Secret Apparatus (Al-Nizam al-Khass [sic]), he aimed to keep its role limited".[1005]

However, as I will demonstrate in the following, such a comparison between Qutb and al-Banna does not take into full consideration the context of the two men. It is true that al-Banna did aim to keep the role of the Apparatus limited, but evidence points to Qutb's intentions to do the same, i.e. to have a well-organized and armed cadre with the purpose of defending the Brotherhood and hindering a repetition of the 1954 repression and the cruel massacre of Brotherhood inmates in Tura in 1957. Furthermore, in contextualizing the course of 'organization 65' one has to keep in mind that this organization was on account of the repressive nature of the regime and the lack of political opportunities in no way able to take part in "gradualist political engagement", in contrast to the context of al-Banna's time. Moreover, as discussed in previous chapters, the Brotherhood had also in the previous contexts of closed opportunities during al-Banna's lifetime, best illustrated by the showdown with the Saadist regime, been pushed towards radical means to counter state-repression. In so saying, I contend that this radicalization which occurred following the repression of the *Ikhwan* in late 1954 was a continuation of earlier turns to radical means as a reaction to repression. Thus, while I agree with Kepel in understanding the prison years as leading to radicalization, I maintain that this was not the beginning of radicalization in the ranks of the Brotherhood, but a link in the chain of *Ikhwan* reactions to repression in different periods. I will now return to the discussion of Sayyid Qutb's influence on, and role in, this organization.

According to Qutb's own account, when he learned of the organization's violent intentions, he warned them that any rushed and spontaneous act could, if it failed, be fatal for the Islamic movement (*al-ḥaraka al-Islāmiya)* which was already suffering from fragmentation and weakness. Instead of executing a coup d'état or avenging the Brotherhood by violent means, which Qutb perceived as "meaningless goals", the organization should aim at constructing a generation of young enlightened Muslims "who understand their religion" and are able to propagate the Islamic

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[1005] Gerges 2018, 243.

message among the masses.[1006] The endurance of the Brotherhood as an organization of religious activists representing a bulwark against "the diffusion of atheistic thoughts and immorality" was of acute importance for Qutb, even more important than seizing power.[1007] Sayyid Qutb was, in other words, aiming at Islamizing society rather than toppling the regime.

As such, he asserted that "the eradication of the Islamic Movement represents a very outrageous act that amounts to a crime", and thus the protection of this "Islamic movement" should become a first priority.[1008] Qutb added that the conditions encircling the Brotherhood in this phase resembled the state of affairs when Islam "was revealed for the first time" as regards persecution and repression. Accordingly, he maintained that the establishment of an "Islamic order (*Niẓām Islāmī*) or the application of the *Sharia*" should not be the organization's first objective under such circumstances. Rather, "the Islamic movements should start from the grassroots to bring the right understanding of the Islamic creed (*aqida*) to the hearts and minds of people […] The Islamic order cannot and should not be established through a seizure of power. Only when the Islamic base [*qāʿida*] in societies demands the implementation of the Islamic order can it become a reality".[1009] Qutb added that "our first aim is *not* to demand the Islamic order or the implementation of Sharia. The first aim is to bring the societies, rulers and ruled, to the correct Islamic concepts". Only when there is in society a popular base or a group of people who are able to "guide society towards the readiness to establish the Islamic *Niẓām*" then it can become a reality.[1010]

In this way, Qutb endeavored to regulate the zeal of his followers by drawing a roadmap in which violent attempts to implement the Islamic order from the top was replaced by a bottom up scheme, entailing an educational program to enlighten the masses on the "meanings of Islam and the substance of the Islamic creed".[1011] Accordingly, Qutb met regularly with the leading members of the organization to educate them in the abovementioned principles. He set about studying with them "the history of the Islamic movement [tracing it back to the early days of Islam] and the position of the atheistic, Zionist and crusading powers towards Islam in ancient and modern times". Qutb underlined explicitly that he convinced the organization of the inefficiency of the violent methods to bring about a "change of the governing system or the establishment of the Islamic system". Such a

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[1006] Al-Arusi 1995, 98.
[1007] Ibid.
[1008] Qutb 2007, 87.
[1009] Ibid, 88.
[1010] Ibid., 2007, 85-8, 96-7.
[1011] Ibid., 96

reformation had to come through grassroots education, he argued.[1012]

Yet, as with al-Banna, one could say that Qutb did not dismiss violence unconditionally. In what became the crux of the case against the organization, once it was uncovered, he relates that "we decided to apply force if any aggression against the organization occurred".[1013] Therefore, he allowed the organization to maintain the paramilitary training which had been established before his assumption of leadership. However, he demanded that only Brothers "who have understood their creed and have a matured awareness" should have access to this training. He envisioned a paramilitary group of well-trained cadres that "does not start any aggression or attempt to execute a coup d'état, nor does it take part in the domestic political process". This group will stay passive as long as "the movement is safe and are able to educate society and as long as the *daʿwa* is possible without being repressed by force".[1014] In so doing, Qutb maintain that he was implementing the Quranic commandment "So whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way that he has assaulted you".[1015]

Accordingly, while Qutb moved the group away from the intention to avenge "the aggression the Brotherhood had endured in 1954 and 1957 in the form of arrests, torture and the suppression of every human dignity through torture, killing and the destruction of homes and the dislocation of families", he was, like his followers, resolved not to surrender to a repetition of the vicious suppression it had been exposed to previously.[1016] Undoubtedly, Qutb and a large group of his followers had been affected by the harsh policing their organization had been subjected to since late 1954 and was reacting to it. As noted by della Porta, when policing is perceived as "tough and, especially, indiscriminate and unjust" it contributes to "justifying violence and pushing militant groups towards clandestinity".[1017] On this account, as the words of Sayyid Qutb clearly illustrate, the justification of violence as a defensive measure was firmly linked to what was perceived as an indiscriminate and unjust repression having befallen the Brotherhood in the past and of fears of a recurrence. Qutb pointed to that explicitly when he explained that it was the violent repression of 1954 and its aftermath which shaped the idea of defensive violence as a countermeasure among the members of 'Organization 65'.[1018]

[1012] Ibid., 99, 100; Ashmawi 1993, 77.
[1013] Qutb 2007, 87, 104.
[1014] Ibid., 87.
[1015] Ibid., 87, 104; Quran, 2:194; See also Ashmawi 1993, 99.
[1016] Qutb 2007, 104.
[1017] della Porta 2013, 33.
[1018] Qutb 2007, 129.

As a result, Qutb asked the organization to compile a plan for self-defense, should any crackdown occur. In this regard, different suggestions were made by the leading committee on how to effectually limit the harm of such an assault. Knowing that the state would be too strong to stop, the plan was envisioned to be a "repelling strike which halts the aggression [by the state] for a while, thus securing as large a number of the young Muslims as possible".[1019] Among the suggestions made was to strike hard by immediately assassinating president Nasser, premier Ali Sabri, among others, and to attack critical infrastructural sites to paralyze the state structure. However, while the latter was dismissed as harming the Egyptian nation and society, the former was admitted as being too demanding for the organization to put into effect, as the president and Prime Minister were too well protected while the organization lacked the necessary number of men, armament and training. In light of this, they decided to accelerate the training "because there were signs of an imminent crackdown on the Brotherhood".[1020] As these deliberations illustrate, these young members, many of whom had been exposed to the regime's brutal repression, had acquired violent intention which they understood as a defensive measure against the repressive measures they expected and feared to be exposed to. Certainly, the torture, imprisonment and even killings of Brotherhood members had pushed a faction of Brothers towards a militarization of thoughts and actions. Turning now to the uncovering of this organization, I will discuss how another repressive chapter in the history of the Brotherhood occurred and how the members reacted to this repression.

[1019] Ibid.,104.

[1020] Ibid., 104-5, 129.

7.2.   Crackdown and Repression

On 29 August 1965, Gamal Abdel Nasser declared in a speech in Moscow that the authorities had uncovered a plot organized by a nationwide Brotherhood organization to stage a coup against his government. In a follow-up, on 7 and 8 September, the Egyptian press publicized "sensational revelations" about this alleged coup. According to these reports, the Brotherhood had prepared itself for an extensive violent campaign, which would have included the assassination of President Nasser, the demolition of key infrastructural installations and the attacking of cultural sites such as cinemas and theatres. Adding to this, the reports revealed the discovery of large quantities of firearms and explosives and disclosed that the organization allegedly had collaborated with the CENTO[1021] through Said Ramadan.[1022]

Subsequently, government-run newspapers launched a harsh attack on the Brotherhood and described the "horrors that would have been unleashed on the Egyptian public" had their plot succeeded. Interestingly, the propaganda campaign attached much importance to the religious violations the Brotherhood was committing by "conspiring against the government". In planning a coup, the Brotherhood had deviated from correct Islam, was the judgement.[1023] In continuing this thread, the authorities issued in October 1965, merely two months after the first revelation, a book entitled "*Jarāʾim ʿIṣābat al-Ikhwan*" (the crimes of the Brotherhood gang), in which it presented a detailed account of the Brotherhood's alleged plot and violent intentions. Interestingly, the book placed much emphasis on the contention that the Brotherhood had "deviated from the right way of Islam, distorted religion and corrupted its brightness and light". The editor of the book continued the religion-based reproach of the *Ikhwan*, asking, since when "did religion allow aggression, assassinations and rebellion".[1024] Such statements were common at this time, portraying the government as the defender of true Islam against the wayward "demented fanatics" of the Brotherhood.[1025] The application by the authorities of an Islamic discourse to strongly condemn the Brothers as "deviators from the true religion" may be a reflection of the Brotherhood's appeal in society, based on its religio-political discourse which it applied in its opposition to the regime. Consequently, one may assume that the regime felt compelled to apply a similar discourse to counterbalance the Brotherhood's outreach and growing appeal. For, as seen in the previous

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[1021] The Central Treaty Organization was founded in 1955 and included the UK, Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran until 1979.
[1022] 371/183884, VG 1015/21, No. 55, Mr. Wilton, from Cairo to Foreign Office, 10 September 1965.
[1023] FO 371/183884, VG 1015/21, No. 58, from Cairo to Foreign Office, 10 September 1965.
[1024] (edt.) Lajnat Kutub Qawmiya, 1965, 4.
[1025] FO 371/183884, VG 1015/21, No. 58, from Cairo to Foreign Office, 10 September 1965.

sections, the Brotherhood had through its application of an Islamic discourse succeeded in recruiting a number of young middle class students to its ranks.[1026] Pointing to this, a British mandarin highlighted that the magnitude of the repression and the media campaign against the *Ikhwan* at this time indicates that "their appeal was judged to be growing". It was further evaluated that the group has a wide appeal and "can attract religious zealots".[1027]

The Brotherhood's success in appealing to segments of the population came at a time when the popularity of the regime was declining as a result of a number of political debacles. By way of illustration, we may mention the breakdown of the union between Egypt and Syria in 1961 and the costly war in Yemen into which the Egyptian army was sent in 1962.[1028] We can accordingly assume that the Brotherhood utilized this popular discontent to appeal to the young educated and politically aware middle class by offering a diverging discourse, formulated in Islamic terms.

The very facts of this alleged plot are difficult to assess with certainty as the stories presented by the Brotherhood and representatives of the regime vary to a great degree. While Brotherhood accounts emphasize that the plot was a fabrication invented by the security authorities to repress the organization, an account that was supported by Anwar al-Sadat,[1029] regime narratives uphold that the Brotherhood was in fact plotting to kill Nasser and overthrow the regime.[1030] However, some conclusions can be arrived at from the sources at hand. On the one hand, it is a known fact that the Egyptian regime was, at this point of time, facing considerable difficulties on both the domestic and international scene, which may have made the Brotherhood a convenient scapegoat for the authorities to move attention away from other challenges. With regard to the discontent in society, which was increasing at this time, a crackdown on the Brotherhood with harsh repression could be an opportune way of frightening other discontented groups.[1031] The British Embassy in Cairo reckoned that popular resentment was increasing in Egypt at this time, which is why the regime was "faced with a choice between admitting a nationwide Moslem Brotherhood plot or admitting nationwide discontent", with the report concluding that the authorities had "chosen the former as the lesser evil".[1032] On the other hand, however, as discussed in preceding sections, this organization, which represented a faction of the Brotherhood, had been working underground with

[1026] FO 371/183884, VG 1015/38, D.J. Speares, 1 December 1965.
[1027] FO 371/190189, VG 1015/89, "The Trials of the Moslem Brothers in the U.A.R., 1965-6." 1967 (undated); see also FO 371/190187, 1015/51, (1016/66) Canadian Embassy, British Interests Section, Cairo, 8 September 1966.
[1028] See e.g. FO 371/157387, E 1015/9, MA/549/166, 26 October 1961.
[1029] El-Sadat 1978, 49, 165.
[1030] Allam 1996, 128; Sharaf 2015 IV, 1001.
[1031] For such a judgement, see FO 371/190188, VG 1015/53, "UAR: Internal Situation" 8 September 1966.
[1032] 371/183884, VG 1015/21, No. 55, Mr. Wilton, from Cairo to Foreign Office, 10 September 1965.

members considering the idea of assassinating Nasser, which indicates that some degree of plotting had taken place, although the official account presented by the authorities was highly exaggerated and on many points self-contradictory.

Be that as it may, prior to Nasser's revelation from Moscow, an organized crackdown had been initiated by the Military Security Service headed by Shams Badran and the General Intelligence under the ministry of interior, in which a large number of Brotherhood members were detained. The roundup that started on 29 July 1965 with the arrest of Muhammad Qutb, Sayyid Qutb's younger brother, was followed up with the arrest of Sayyid Qutb on 9 August together with a group of Brothers. On 20 August, Abdel Fattah Ismail, Ali Ashmawi and other senior members of the organization were arrested. When Ali Ashamwi was subjected to severe torture, he led the investigators to the entire organization, which was subsequently rounded up in all parts of Egypt.[1033] Brotherhood accounts describe the torture meted out to the members as savage and merciless, "carried out by monsters".[1034] In fact, a number of Brothers, including Rifʿat Baker, Sayyid Qutb's nephew, and Ismail al-Fayumi, a member of the Presidential Guard accused of being the would-be assassin of Nasser, died under torture, which points to its severity.[1035]

According to British estimates, the Egyptian authorities were "surprised by the apparent strength of the Brotherhood" but maintained that "Egyptian security was easily able to crush its outbreak with rapid and widespread arrests".[1036] Following this crackdown, which saw thousands of Brothers arrested[1037], a tribunal was set up to persecute those involved in 'Organization 65' and in reorganizing the dissolved Brotherhood.

In all, 195 activists were convicted of felonies related to the organization and around the same number were convicted of "attempting to revive the Brotherhood",[1038] while thousands of detainees remained under arrest without trial. Altogether, seven cases were brought before a "state security court", four of them directly related to 'Organization 65', while three revolved around the resurgence of the Brotherhood. The trials lasted throughout the summer and autumn of 1966,

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[1033] Rizq 1978, 38, 48-9.
[1034] See e.g. Abdel Majid 1991, 127.
[1035] Rizq 1978, 43, Rizq mentions five names of young men who died under torture. See also FO 371/190189, VG 1015/89, "The Trials of the Moslem Brothers in the U.A.R., 1965-6." 1967 (undated).
[1036] CIA-RDP79T00826A003200180001-1, Current Intelligence Country Handbook, United Arab Republic (Egypt), OCI No. 1925/66, August 1966.
[1037] FO 371/183884, VG 1015/20, (1011/65) British Embassy Cairo, 1 September 1965; FO 371/190189, VG 1015/89, "The Trials of the Moslem Brothers in the U.A.R., 1965-6." 1967 (undated); Sharaf 2015 IV, 1000 (Sharaf claims that 5,000 members were arrested).
[1038] Allam 1996, 133; for a list of all verdicts see al-Sarwi 2004, 330-7.

announcing the first convictions in August 1966.[1039] The first seven convicts, accused of being the commanders of 'Organization 65' and for plotting to stage a coup d'état, were condemned to death; twenty-five others were sentenced to life imprisonment, while the remaining Brothers received varying prison terms. Al-Hudaybi, who did not play an active role in the organization, was sentenced to three years in prison in the resurgence case.[1040] On 29 August 1966, shortly after the announcement of verdicts, Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Yusuf Hawwash[1041] and Abdel Fattah Ismail were hanged. The other four death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment with hard labor.[1042] The British mission to Cairo interpreted the harsh sentences meted out to the Brotherhood as a reflection of "the Brotherhood's strength". A British mandarin added that the Brotherhood is clearly "the main threat to the régime".[1043] In the last document penned by Qutb, in which he gave his testimony about the key events that occurred prior to his arrest in the summer of 1965, he expected this outcome. Introducing his account, Qutb wrote "It is about time for a Muslim man to offer his head as a price for the discovery of an existing, but forbidden, Islamic Organization".[1044]

Qutb was not the founder of this organization, but he became its "martyr". As we have seen, the Brotherhood clearly resurfaced on the Egyptian scene during the 1960s, indicating that the organization had stayed alive despite the repression. Assessing this resurfacing of the Brotherhood, Mitchell argued that it did not signal a resurgence of the *Ikhwan*.[1045] However, as this dissertation has argued, the Brotherhood did not cease to exist, but had continued as an underground organization.

[1039] Abdel Majid 1991, 201; Al-Arusi 1995, 233-41.
[1040] Abdel Majid 1991, 201; see also FO 371/190189, VG 1015/89, "The Trials of the Moslem Brothers in the U.A.R., 1965-6." 1967 (undated).
[1041] Hawwash (1922-1966), a working-class Brother who was Qutb's prison companion for the better part of the latter's ten-year imprisonment and was strongly affected by Qutb's worldview. He was released in 1964, shortly after Qutb. Hawwash was accused of being the second-in-command of the organization, which is why he was sentenced to death together with six others and hanged alongside Qutb and Ismail. His wife, Fatima Abdel Hadi, a female activist of the Brotherhood, argues that Hawwash did not play a key role in the organization, but was hanged on account of his ideas which corresponded with Qutb's. (Abdel Hadi 2011, 46, 51).
[1042] Abdel Majid 1991, 1993.
[1043] FO 371/190187, VG 1015/45, P.W. Unwin, 31 August 1966.
[1044] Qutb 2007, 73.
[1045] Mitchell 1993, xxiii. (Italics not in original).

Conclusions

Following the Six-Day War of June 1967, a CIA "National intelligence estimate" from April 1968 upheld that the Brotherhood had proven its "great staying power in the face of official repression". Pointing to the *Ikhwan's* reorganization in 1965, the report maintained that they had exhibited a strength that had "surprised and shocked the government". Furthermore, considering the fact that the Brotherhood had endured the tough repression it had been exposed to, the CIA assumed that the organization "continues to have considerable appeal throughout the country".[1046] Such assessments, which were common at this point in time at the height of the second *miḥna*, clearly perceived the Brotherhood as an organization that had survived Nasser's heavy-handed persecution. In fact, from that time on, and as indication of the *Ikhwan's* endurance, British and American reports began pointing to the *Ikhwan* as a feasible alternative should the Nasserite regime fall as a result of the Six-Day debacle.[1047] According to the CIA, the Brotherhood's endurance and continuation had taken place despite the widespread arrests of 1965 and its appeal to "certain discontented and disillusioned elements" was estimated to be considerable.[1048] The thesis of this dissertation is precisely this claim, that the Brotherhood did not disappear under repression but continued to exist, though as a secret underground organization. To highlight this continuity, I examined two decisive chapters of repression in the history of the *Ikhwan,* i.e., the first and second *miḥna*, as the Brotherhood terms the periods of 1948-51 and 1954-70 respectively. By so doing, I was able to exemplify how the Brotherhood restructured its organizational makeup into secrecy in order to survive tough policing and continued to exist as an underground force, challenging Nasserism.

The dissertation set about showing how the *Ikhwan,* as a result of the restrictive policies adopted by the British administration during the Second World War, constructed the *usar* system as a bedrock organization to continue its activities in the face of restrictions, repression and the apprehension of the organization's leadership and the sealing of its branches. I argue that these *usar* became vital during later periods of repression, when the Brotherhood was forced underground and had to opt for low-key activities to resist repression. As seen, during both ordeals, the *usar* came to stand as a key structure in continuing the Brotherhood's contacts, communication, organizational relations and activities in society, representing an important instance of organizational continuity. I

[1046] CIA-RDP79R00967A000800010010-2, No. 8-68, "Special Memorandum, Nasser's Limited Options" 15 April 1968.
[1047] FCO 17/224, "Recent Muslim Brotherhood Activity in the United Arab Republic" (undated) 1968.
[1048] CIA, Special National Intelligence Estimate No. 36.1-67, "The Situation and Prospects in Egypt, 17 August 1967.

argue therefore, that this family-system stands as *the* central element of secrecy in the structures of the *Ikhwan.*

The main questions of this dissertation were, how and why did the Brotherhood survive the tough policing it was exposed to during the first and second ordeals? As shown throughout the study, I perceive the *Ikhwan's* organizational dynamic and ability to transform into secrecy as key elements to understand the Brotherhood's endurance. The secrecy, which had been built into the structures of the *Ikhwan* since 1943, came to represent a vital element in the Brotherhood's continuation. The *Ikhwan* had the ability to "go underground" when repressed, and that reinforced its survival ability. As shown in chapter three, the *Ikhwan* did not cease to exist when the organization was dissolved in December 1948 but altered its existence into a secret one. This was obvious in the case of the organizing of underground cells and the transformation of *Ikhwani* meetings into low-key gatherings, such as in mosques and in private apartments in order to stay "unseen". While I partly concur with Zollner in considering the Brotherhood during the first *miḥna* as an organization in "a deep crisis", I disagree with her contention that "the survival of the idea of this political-religious movement was at stake".[1049] By contrast, my discussion of the working-procedures of the *Ikhwan* during this first "ordeal" demonstrated clearly that the organization, although in crisis, continued to exist in society and upheld a hierarchical structuring both inside and outside prison walls. While the Brotherhood was repressed, its survival was not in question due to the complex organizational structure it had constructed in previous years.[1050] My discussion of the first *miḥna* also illustrated how the repression of the *Ikhwan* in this period offered the organization a number of opportunities that it utilized. On the one hand, the limiting of political opportunities for the *Ikhwan* in Egypt forced a number of members to escape the country, thereby leading to an expansion of the Brotherhood's presence in neighboring Arab countries and, to a lesser extent, even in Europe. On the other hand, the concentration of large numbers of Brotherhood members in the detention centers and in remote areas came to reinforce the organizational bonds of the *Ikhwan*-activists across geographical and generational boundaries and created stronger bonds among them.

In the aftermath of the Manshiyya incident (1954) and the consequent repression of the *Ikhwan*, researchers and observers conceived the Brotherhood as an organization on its last legs. Historians such as Richard Mitchell and Christina P. Harris, writing contemporaneously with the events, regarded the Brotherhood as an antiquated organization that had challenged the modern and secular

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[1049] Zollner 2011, 16.
[1050] See chapter two.

nationalist government, and suffered a shattering defeat. Accordingly, both researchers, representing a current of this time, predicted the *Ikhwan's* extermination at the hands of Nasser's secular regime.[1051] Interestingly, more recent researchers have equally considered the Brotherhood's existence during the Nasserite years as marginal, at best. As an example, Barbara Zollner maintained that the organization disappeared following the 1954 repression and did not reappear until 1957. In her discussion of the immediate aftermath of the repressive events of late 1954, Zollner claimed that "silence is the most remarkable feature of the years until 1957. There are no signs of any organizational structure or of any activities". In concluding her study, Zollner suggested that the *Ikhwan* "was able to continue only on the informal level of personal relations".[1052] Continuing in a similar manner, Peter Weber claimed that the Brotherhood was "almost completely destroyed" as a result of the 1954 repression.[1053] However, as this study has clearly illustrated, the Brotherhood was far from destroyed in this period. In fact, my story showed the direct opposite. As described in chapter six, the Brotherhood was surprisingly quick in continuing its activities shortly after the abortive assassination attempt on Gamal Abdel Nasser and the following crackdown on the organization. From late 1954, and more significantly from the beginning of 1955, we observed an increasing Brotherhood activism in society, which by all accounts contradicts the claim that "silence was the most remarkable feature". Sami Sharaf, one of Nasser's most noted intelligence officers, argued in this regard that the Brotherhood as early as 1954 had initiated a propaganda campaign against the government, portraying it as being in opposition to Islam.[1054] In this way, we can observe as early as 1954-5 ongoing *Ikhwan* activities in which the organization continued to embody an undercurrent in society, challenging the dominant secular pan-Arab doctrine put forward by the Nasserite regime.

I therefore claim that the Brotherhood, in a period that is considered as the heyday of secularism in Egypt, still represented an Islamic alternative and challenged the dominant Nasserite doctrine.[1055] Thus, by studying the *Ikhwan*-organization during this most noteworthy period of repression in the Brotherhood's history, this dissertation revises the thesis that the Brotherhood disappeared during the second ordeal and re-appeared subsequently, as has been put forward by a number of studies.[1056] In contrast, I hold that the Brotherhood as an organization continued to exist and function despite

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[1051] Mitchell 1993, xxv; Harris 1964, 235.
[1052] Zollner 2011, 39, 148.
[1053] Weber 2013, 517.
[1054] Sharaf 2015 IV, 999.
[1055] Cf. Kepel 2014, 46; Harris 1964, 235.
[1056] Weber 2013, 517; Zollner 2011, 39; Mitchell 1993, xxiii-xxiv; Harris 1964, 235, 224.

the repression it was exposed to. This continuation of an Islamic undercurrent, challenging the Nasserite pan-Arabism, persisted throughout the era, constituting a kind of 'shadowboxing' between the *Ikhwan* and the military regime. This contention is in accordance with my argument that al-Banna's charismatic leadership, which had been predominant in the early history of the *Ikhwan*, had been replaced by institutionalized structures and lines of authority.[1057] Accordingly, as a result of this structuring of the Brotherhood and the decentralization of its activities, the organization could survive harsh repression due to pre-existing structures and working procedures. Thus, as argued in chapter three, the institutionalization of secrecy in its structures had made al-Banna no longer indispensable for the Brotherhood.

In addition, this institutionalization of secrecy generated a number of problematic internal issues for the *Ikhwan*, which came to shape its future trajectory. On the one hand, when secrecy became predominant during the first and second *miḥna,* we noticed a severe fragmentation of the Brotherhood's leadership that resulted in a decentralization of leadership and a lack of streamlined tactics.[1058] As discussed in chapter four, the first *miḥna* which resulted in the death of al-Banna and the imprisonment of many leading Brothers, left the *Ikhwan* without a defined leadership, and a disagreement over the appropriate candidate to replace the late al-Banna. This led to a compartmentalization of the Brotherhood, a near-split of the organization, and came to weaken the *Ikhwan's* cohesion.[1059] On the other hand, as seen in chapter three, the Brotherhood's transformation towards underground activism led to uncontrolled violent incidents committed by a faction of radical Brothers on their initiative. This was best illustrated by the assassination of Premier al-Nuqrashi in late December 1948 and the attack on a courthouse in January 1949.[1060] Such incidents suggest that the Brotherhood's leadership had lost control of a faction of its membership as a result of its turn to secrecy. This was at least what Brotherhood members argued in their memoirs.[1061] These uncontrolled violent incidents were, without any doubt, an outcome of the lack of centralized control of important Brotherhood structures, such as the Special Apparatus. This lack of control became more evident following al-Banna's death in February 1949, when a small but nonetheless strong faction of the Brotherhood, embodied in the Special Apparatus, took it upon its shoulders to avenge al-Banna, thus escalating the militant character of the conflict. This resulted

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[1057] Jung 2018, 225. See chapter two.
[1058] See chapters three to seven.
[1059] See for example Mitchell 1993, 84-7.
[1060] Adel Kamal 1989, 291-3; Mitchell 1993, 68.
[1061] Hathut 2000, 71-2.

in a circle of violent incidents between the Brotherhood and the government, in which Brotherhood militants for example attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Abdel Hadi.

More so, as discussed in chapter five, the secrecy of the Brotherhood and the lack of a centralized leadership led to a hardening of some young militants of the Brotherhood, leading them to confront the Nasserite regime in 1954.[1062] Accordingly, I argue that the Manshiyya incident, representing a defining moment in the conflict between the military regime and the *Ikhwan*, should be understood as an outcome of this secrecy, which had rendered parts of the Brothers radicalized and uncontrolled by the general leadership of the *Ikhwan.* As contended in chapter five, regardless of whether the Brotherhood stood behind the attempt on 26 October 1954 or it was a a conspiracy (*muʾāmara)* fabricated by the regime,[1063] the lead up to this pivotal moment had seen a militarization of a group of Brothers who perceived the assassination of Nasser as a way out of their conflict with the regime. In so arguing, I contend that the clash between the Brotherhood and the military regime was, inter alia, a result of the Brotherhood's secrecy, which had militarized the thoughts and actions of a group of Brothers.

This argument is consistent with the causal mechanism framework put forward by della Porta. In her study of clandestine political violence and its causes, della Porta pointed to a correlation between state repression and political violence, illustrating how state-repression leads to counterviolence by clandestine organizations.[1064] As seen throughout this dissertation, the repression of the Brotherhood led to a counterviolence by a segment of Brothers. The study thus suggests that the radicalization of the *Ikhwan* was first and foremost an outcome of the historical context, characterized in particular by the ongoing British occupation of Egypt and the pivotal developments in neighboring Palestine. *Jihad* came mainly to stand for decolonization while *daʿwa* was about changing Egyptians' moral status. This was exemplified in the radicalization observed among segments of the Brothers following the first Arab-Israeli war and the war in the Canal Zone of 1951. Consequently, I argue that radicalization did not develop from the religious worldview of the Brotherhood alone, but should rather be seen as the result of an environment characterized by occupation and the struggle for Egyptian independence. To underline this point, I pointed to the fact that secular Egyptian nationalists, as the example of Hussein Tawfiq and the young Anwar al-Sadat clearly illustrated, were radicalized on account of the historical context just as members of the

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[1062] Al-Sabbagh 1998, 70.
[1063] Cf. Al-Hajj 1993, 116-7; Abdel Rauf 1988, 193-4; al-Sisi 1987, 76.
[1064] della Porta 2013, 33.

Brotherhood were. In this context the oppression of the *Ikhwan* in 1948-1951 and again in 1954-1970 escalated a radicalization process further that already was underway.

Thus, alongside the organizational continuity thesis, this study argues that there was a continuous radicalization in terms of the justification of military means among segments of the Brotherhood. While researchers, such as Gilles Kepel, have claimed that the radicalization of *Ikhwan* rank and file mainly occurred as a result of Nasser's "concentration-camps", I traced the process of militant radicalization back to the al-Banna-era, and more specifically during the years of 1948-1949. It was at that time, that Brotherhood members for the first time considerably clashed with the national regime, causing the death of a Prime Minister and Hasan al-Banna. To be sure, this is not to say that the Nasserite "camps" did not have a radicalizing effect on the activists. However, I claim that this radicalization is part and parcel of the radicalization and militarization of parts of the Brotherhood that had taken place during earlier periods of anti-colonial contention and oppression by the Egyptian government. As an example, when the Brotherhood was dissolved in January 1954, facing a limited oppression, a segment of the Brotherhood, personified by among others Hasan Duh, Mahmoud Abdel Halim and Abdel Munʿim Abdel Rauf, voiced radical ideas, calling for a showdown with the regime. Duh advocated, for example, violent action against the military regime,[1065] while other Brotherhood preachers described the new rulers of Egypt as "heretics". [1066] These reactions to repression clearly prove that a group of Brothers were radical before they entered Nasser's "concentration camps" from late 1954.

This argument concurs with another important finding of this dissertation with regard to radicalization and deradicalization. While a number of studies have traced the *takfīrī* world-view to the post-Nasserite era, claiming that it evolved out of the ideas of Sayyid Qutb's prison literature,[1067] I showed that Brotherhood-members as early as 1948 had expressed what can be perceived as a "*takfīrī*" discourse. Peter Weber, to take one example, juxtaposed the Muslim Brotherhood and the *takfiri* position of later groups, claiming that "until 1952, the Muslim Brotherhood had legitimized its attacks against the state by identifying Great Britain as the enemy and the local rulers as ''puppets'' of foreign imperialism".[1068] However, as illustrated in chapter three, many Brothers came to see the Saadist leaders as "enemies of Islam" on account of the

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[1065] FO 371/108319, JE 1016/13, No. 187, Ralph Stevenson, from Cairo to Foreign Office, 30 August 1954; For Duh's account on the incident see; Duh 1983, 71.
[1066] FO 371/108319, JE 1016/14, No. 198, R. Stevenson, from Cairo to Foreign Office, 14 September 1954.
[1067] Cf. Kenney 2006, 124-5; Kepel 1985, 72; Gerges 2018, 243; Weber 2013, 517-8.
[1068] Weber 2013, 517-8.

government's repression of the *Ikhwan*, thereby putting these Muslim politicians outside the fold of Islam. Consequently, we observed a widespread endorsement of conducting an "Islamic *jihad*" against the government and its representative. This was translated into the violent conduct against the regime and the approval of al-Nuqrashi's death at the hands of Brotherhood-radicals. Al-Sabbagh, who was a leading member of the Special Apparatus at that point in time, described the killing of al-Nuqrashi as a legitimate assassination of a leader opposed to Islam, thereby highlighting this "*takfiri*" trend in his own words. [1069] Commenting on this development among Brotherhood militants, Abdel Aziz Kamel, a senior Brother, recalls that *Ikhwan* members at that time adopted a radical worldview, justifying violence against fellow-Muslims and depicting them as "aggressors against Islam". [1070] Thus, one may ask whether an *avant la lettre* "*takfīr*" had seen the light of day at this early stage.

This assumption also relates to the role of Sayyid Qutb in the Brotherhood. The findings of the dissertation indicate that the interpretation of Qutb's role in the history of Islamist radicalization might be re-examined. The fact that young members of the *Ikhwan* had turned to radical means during the first ordeal and that some of them had even legitimized the killing of other Muslims, describing them as "anti-Islamic", paves the way for the question whether it was indeed Qutb who introduced *jihadist* and *takfīrī* thinking to the *Ikhwan?* By tracing the trajectory of these ideas back to the late 1940s, this thesis questions the assumption that the radicalization of *Ikhwan* activists and their ideas were ultimately connected to Qutb. In so saying, I do not contend that Qutb did not have a radicalizing effect on the Brothers, but that radical views had been present among the *Ikhwan* long before his affiliation with the organization. This leads to the question whether, to a certain degree, Qutb was rather a result of the Brotherhood's pre-existing radicalization than the initiator of a new radicalization process.

As seen in the discussion of 'Organization 65' and its trajectory in chapter seven, Sayyid Qutb did not radicalize the ideas of its young members but undertook the leadership of an already radical organization. Moreover, the ideas of the young members of 'Organization 65' resembled to a large extent the young radicals who had assassinated al-Nuqrashi and subsequently fought the government, seeing that as a legitimate *jihad* against non-Islamic rulers. Fawaz Gerges has claimed that, "unlike Banna, Qutb eschewed gradualist political engagement and social mobilization in favor of nourishing a subversive vanguard that would spearhead the institution of a new Islamist

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[1069] Al-Sabbagh 1989, 450.
[1070] Kamil 2006, 67.

utopia".[1071] However, as discussed in chapter seven, Qutb's role in "nourishing" this "subversive vanguard" should be reassessed. When Qutb undertook the leadership of 'Organization 65', it was already a radicalized group of young men, which had amongst its aims to assassinate Nasser in retaliation for his repression of the Brotherhood. These young men, oftentimes educated middle class Egyptians, perceived the regime's crackdown on the Brotherhood as an aggression against the Islamic principles formulated by the *Ikhwan* and a hinderance to the Brotherhood's ability to perform the Islamic *da'wa* in society. Therefore, they came to see Nasser and his regime as inhumane, despotic and anti-Islamic, and consequently as legitimate targets.

There are a number of subjects pertaining to Qutb's influence on the Brotherhood that could indicate new avenues for further research. First, as already said, it is vital to ask whether Qutb's role as a radicalizing figure was as influencial among the Brothers as earlier perceived. This study has indicated that Qutb may even have attempted to deradicalize the young activists whose leadership he assumed in the summer of 1964. Qutb explained in his last written text that he had attempted to move the young men away from their intention to kill Nasser. He perceived such an act as insignificant and lacking a strategic dimension. By contrast, Qutb tells us, he envisioned bottom-up education of society as the best way of reforming the masses and establishing a truly Islamic society.[1072] Accordingly, he set about educating the young members of "Organization 65" in what he perceived as the proper way to establish Islamic system (*al-Niẓām al-Islāmī)*. Importantly, he told his followers that such a system could not and should not be brought about through "violent methods". The only way to construct the right system of governance should be through grassroots education, he underlined.[1073] In light of this, one may ask, did Qutb in fact adopt a gradualist approach, in many ways similar to that of Hasan al-Banna?

Furthermore, and in contrast to the viewpoint that Qutb was *the* radical ideologue of the *Ikhwan,* one may ask whether Qutb was as much influenced by the *Ikhwan* as he influenced them. Was Qutb radicalized by his interaction with the radical fringe of the *Ikhwan* and did he attempt to direct his young followers away from violence? For as seen throughout this study, when Qutb joined the Brotherhood, there already existed in its ranks a radical and militant fringe that had fought the state and normatively justified this violence as an "Islamic *jihad".*

This study has also shed some critical light on the role of Hasan al-Hudaybi in directing the

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[1071] Gerges 2018, 243.
[1072] Qutb 2007, 97.
[1073] Ibid., 99, 100; Ashmawi 1993, 77.

Brotherhood away from radicalization and militancy. As shown in chapters four and five, al-Hudaybi had shortly after his appointment as *Murshid* attempted to direct the Brotherhood away from secrecy and militancy, uttering his well-known slogan "there is no secrecy in the service of God" and there is "no terrorism in religion".[1074] However, as the discussion proceeded, we observed that al-Hudaybi altered his initial position, adopting a more militant discourse with regard to the anti-British struggle. Also, as the relations between the military-junta and the Brotherhood deteriorated during 1953 and 1954, we noticed that al-Hudaybi adopted a confrontational line against the government, which ultimately led to the showdown between them. Thus, a future research area could be to investigate the life trajectory of Hasan al-Hudaybi and a critical assessment of his influence on the Brotherhood. Did al-Hudaybi at some point in his leadership of the *Ikhwan* get radicalized by the organization?

Finally, a new examination of the transnational character of the Brotherhood that expanded during these years of repression could be a future field of research. As touched upon during my discussion, the *Ikhwan*-exiles that fled Egypt came to play important roles in their host countries. Some of them even became ministers or political advisers for the royal families in Jordan and the Gulf states. A study of these Brothers who did not cease to be *Ikhwan* members in exile would further illuminate our understanding of the Brotherhood's history during periods of repression and the more general influence this organization and its members exerted on Middle East politics.

[1074] Mitchell 1993, 88.

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