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Abstract

During the ‘Golden Age’ of industrial Capitalism in the historical period after World War II, a substantial share of women were excluded from formal employment in many western European societies. In the early 1970s a steady growth in women’s employment started nearly everywhere in Western Europe. However, this rise largely came to a stop during the economic recession of the early 1990s. This paper challenges a common assumption based on a functionalist argument, which is that women’s integration into postwar capitalism was based on the integration of non-employed housewives into the employment system. It introduces a theoretical framework that is based on the assumption that capitalism does not determine the development of women’s employment. It argues that women’s employment can take different trajectories in capitalist societies and that it is therefore also possible to assume that women’s introduction into capitalism took different development paths. It argues, that besides the trajectory that can be characterized as “introduction of housewives into the employment system”, another trajectory was historically relevant that can be described as “restructuring of women’s employment”. The paper explains the differences between both development paths on the basis of differences in the main forms of women’s social integration in the historical situation before the increase in women’s employment rate started, and with differences in the relevant factors that have promoted the change. On the basis of a comparative case study for West Germany and for Finland, the paper analyses the differences between the different trajectories of women’s integration into postwar capitalism in both countries, and the reason for the differences. The empirical study is based on a combination of different methods, which include data from public statistics and national and international surveys, document analysis and secondary analysis of empirical studies. The findings show that the differences between the trajectories can mainly be explained by differences in women’s integration into society before the change, and with differences in the role of culture and welfare state policies in the historical processes.

Introduction

The main focus of this paper is on the increase in women’s employment rates in the postwar period of capitalist development after World War II in Western European societies, which mainly took place from 1970-1990. It aims to answer the question: What were the main factors that led to the increase in women’s employment rate during this time period?

In the 1950s and 60s - the first two decades of postwar Europe - Western Europe experienced the prospering of industrial capitalism and the ‘Golden Age’ of the welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990). During the ‘short dream of permanent prosperity’ (Lutz 1984) that the economically leading countries experienced in this time period, it was possible for the industrial sector to expand, owing to the availability of a workforce from the traditional rural areas and migrant workers from less affluent countries. During this period, the European labor force remained predominantly male, and there was a relatively large gender gap in the employment rate in
employment in Western Europe (45% in 1970; OECD, 2016). In many Western European countries, a substantial share of women acted as housewives in the context of a male breadwinner marriage; in other countries, the majority of women were economically active in the traditional economy, mainly in agriculture (Pfau-Effinger, 2004a).

In the early 1970s, the rate of women’s employment started to rise everywhere in Western Europe. From 1970 to 1990, it increased on average from 42% to 51% (OECD, 2016), and the overall gender gap in employment in Western Europe fell to 29% This trend came to an end in the early 1990s, when the Fall of the Wall and the start of post-socialist transformation caused a huge economic and labor market crisis, not only in Eastern Europe, but also in many parts of Western Europe. As a consequence, between 1990 and 2000, the increase in women’s employment slowed down in many countries, and even decreased in some (OECD, 2016).

There is a general tendency in the debate to treat the historical increase in women’s employment as a uniform trend that was based on the shift from women’s role as housewives in a male breadwinner marriage towards women’s integration into employment. Different factors are discussed that contributed to the integration of housewives into the employment system in the postwar period, such as the growing need of capitalist industry for workers, cultural change towards greater gender equality, the extension in the supply of public childcare by welfare states, and the role of the feminist movement. This paper argues instead that women’s integration into the modern capitalist economy from 1970-1990 was based on different trajectories in different societies. It distinguishes two typical trajectories, which can be characterized as the ‘integration of housewives into employment’ and the ‘restructuring of women’s employment’.

According to the main assumption of the paper, the set of main causal factors and processes that contributed to the increase in women’s employment differs in the context of these different trajectories. The paper evaluates the role of cultural factors, welfare state policies, economic factors and actors for the increase in women’s employment in the context of the different trajectories of women’s integration into capitalism. The study analyses the causal relations and processes that led to an increase in women’s employment from 1970 until 1990 in a cross-national comparative and longitudinal study for West Germany and Finland, which represent the two different trajectories of women’s integration into capitalism.

The paper makes an innovative contribution to the theoretical debate and research about women’s integration into capitalism in Western European societies in the postwar area after World War II. It offers new insight into the main historical factors and processes that contributed to the growth of women’s employment in postwar capitalism. It shows that women’s entry into postwar capitalism was based on a differing logic in the context of different historical trajectories of women’s integration into capitalism.

In Part 2, the paper gives an overview of the state of theorizing and research. Part 3 introduces the theoretical framework of the study, and Part 4 gives an outline of the methodological approach. Part 5 introduces and discusses the findings of the cross-national longitudinal study, and in Part 6 the paper offers a short summary and final conclusions.

State-of-the-Art

According to Karl Marx (1963, [1923]) “Capitalism” means a specific form of the economy, in which the production of goods and services is based on private ownership of the measures of production and waged work, and the organization of the distribution of goods and services on the
basis of markets and money as a generalized medium of exchange. Because it is also based on competition and profit orientation of enterprises, capitalism has a strong growth dynamic, since it is constructed as an economy in which enterprises aim to increase their profits. What is particular for the development of capitalism in many countries in Western Europe since the early 20th Century is that the regulation of production and distribution on the basis of market principles was restricted by welfare state policies with the aim of reducing problematic consequences of capitalist economies in terms of social inequality (Flora, 1987; Kuhnle, 1989). On the basis of a relatively strong role of the state and differences in the role of market competition, most parts of Western Europe diverge from the main features of many Anglo-American societies, where the market economies resemble more the ideal-typical market-based capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2002).

In social sciences it is common to assume that the development of capitalism and of women’s work was closely connected. According to this argument, the integration of women into the capitalist economy has occurred everywhere as a three-phase process: from the extensive integration of women into societal production in pre-capitalist and early capitalist societies, to their wide exclusion with the shift from developed industrial capitalism, and finally to their reintegration into formal employment during the further course of capitalist development. The supposition has tended to prevail that the private household, and housework, as independent societal spheres, differentiated themselves together with the development of modern industrial capitalism. In this paradigm, wives were charged, in society, with family care and housework, husbands with participation in the labour force as the family providers. The establishment of the “male breadwinner family” as the dominant family model was, according to this, an inevitable result of the evolution of capitalist, society. This argument is supported by structural-functionalist theory (Goode, 1963; Parsons and Bales, 1955) as well as in feminist-oriented theories based on the patriarchy approach, in which the dominance of the male breadwinner marriage is criticized as the basis of discrimination against women in industrial capitalistic societies (Walby 1990: 20). It is also supported in feminist approaches that use the concept of the ‘separate spheres’ in order to describe the development of the male-breadwinner family model, in which the husband is active in the public realm and the wife in the private sphere of the household. The nineteenth century is usually seen as the period in which this separation took place (see Scott and Tilly 1978).

However, contrary to this assumption, empirical historical research has provided a richer view of the development, showing that in developed capitalist societies such as the UK or West Germany, blue-collar working class women could often not afford to act as housewives, but had to take waged work (Hall 1999; Krueger, Born and Lorenz-Meyer 1996). Empirical research for Sweden and France for the 1960s and 70s, for example (Henz and Sundström 2002; Pedersen, 1993) reveals that married women in these countries were then already participating to a large degree in the labor force.

According to Pfau-Effinger (1993, 2004b), the supposition that the housewife marriage is historically inseparable from the evolution of capitalist industrial society is theoretically, as well as empirically, problematic: on the theoretical level because it is one-sidedly justified in functionalist or structuralist terms, which neglect differences in cultural traditions and the roles of social actors in social change and societal transformation. On the empirical level it is untenable because, as Pfau-Effinger shows, the share of married women who acted as housewives was rather different in western European societies in the ‘Golden Age’ of industrial capitalism of the postwar era. It is nevertheless still a common assumption that the departure from the housewife
family was the main point of departure for the growth in women’s employment in the second half of the twentieth century.

Authors who aim to explain this increase, often see the causes in a uniform set of factors. Those who argue on the basis of capitalist development argue that this is caused by prospering capitalist economies’ growing need for workers (Streeck, 2014; Estevez-Abe, 2005; Morgan, 2006). Researchers in comparative welfare state research instead argue in part that welfare state policies that support extra-familial provision of daycare for preschool children were a main precondition for the rise in women’s employment (Blome, 2016; Cooke, 2011; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Fleckenstein, 2011; Henninger et al., 2008; Lundqvist, 2015; Seelaib-Kaiser & Toivinen, 2011).

Culture is another explanatory factor that is stressed in the debate. It was argued that cultural change among policymakers and in the population that strengthened the orientation towards the cultural value of gender equality has also contributed to an increase in women’s employment (Jensen, 1998; Pfau-Effinger, 1993; 1998). Pfau-Effinger argues on the basis of her theoretical approach of the “gender arrangement”, that differences between cultural, political, socio-structural and economic factors and in the role of actors contribute to the explanation of cross-national differences in the development of women’s employment and working time patterns. However, so far there is a lack of theorizing and research about the causal factors that contributed to the increase in women’s employment in the context of different trajectories of women’s historical integration into postwar capitalism.

**Theoretical approach**

This paper challenges the assumption that women’s integration into post war capitalism in the second half of the 20th Century was based on a uniform logic in all Western European societies. It argues that the assumption that the development of women’s employment in post war capitalism went along a single development path based on the integration of non-employed housewives into the employment system would be misleading. Against the functionalist approach on which the common argument is based, the paper argues that capitalism does not determine the development of women’s employment. It argues instead that women’s employment can take different trajectories in capitalist societies, depending on the ways in which culture, state policies, socio-structural and economic factors interact in their role for women’s employment integration, and how these factors develop in the context of conflicts and negotiation processes taking place between the relevant groups of social actors.

**The role of cultural change**

It can be assumed that cultural change that strengthened the cultural value-orientation towards gender equality is an important factor that explains women’s integration into postwar capitalism. The paper defines ‘culture’ as the system of collective constructions of meaning by which human beings define reality and to which they orient their behavior. It includes values, models and belief systems. This cultural framework can be contradictory and contested and subject to change (Pfau-Effinger, 1998).

It is argued here that the relationship between work, family and care in a society is framed by a specific set of cultural values and models at the macro-level of society – the “gender culture” – among which some are dominant and others marginalised. They form an important (and sometimes contradictory) basis for – besides family policies – the employment behavior of women who are mothers.
For a comparative purpose and the analysis of historical change, it is important to use a theoretical approach to the classification of the cultural basis of women's integration into society. This paper uses the theoretical approach of the author (Pfau-Effinger, 1998, 2004a) to the classification of “cultural family models”. It is based on the classification of cultural models – the Leitbilder or 'ideals' – of the family, The “cultural family models” refer to the prevalent cultural values in a society regarding suitable ways of sharing the work in a family, and about the “best way” of care for children. One or several such models in combination can dominate culturally in the gender arrangement of a society. The models can be classified on the basis of three theoretical dimensions which are measures of the generational and gender relations within the family. These are:

(a) Cultural values about which social spheres should be the main areas of work for women and men respectively, and how the relations of these areas to each other should be arranged (symmetrically or complementarily);
(b) cultural values about dependencies between women and men (autonomy; mutual or unilateral dependency); and
(c) the cultural values surrounding the relations between generations, that is, concerning childhood, motherhood and fatherhood.

This classification lends itself to 'cross-sectional' analysis: different societies can be compared with respect to the cultural basis of their family models; it also permits the historical evolution of the family in various countries to be analysed and compared longitudinally. For western Europe at least six different cultural models of the family can be identified which vary in the three dimensions given above. These include (1) the family-economy model; (2) the housewife model of the male breadwinner marriage; (3) the male breadwinner/part-time carer model (4) the dual breadwinner model with childcare by the extended family; (5) the dual breadwinner/state care model, and (6) the dual breadwinner/dual carer model (Pfau-Effinger 1998, 2012).

Using this theoretical classification approach, the authors showed on the basis of a comparative historical studies that the cultural ideal of the “male breadwinner family” only in parts of Western Europe formed the main cultural and structural basis of the family in the first half of the 20th Century. It only played a strong role in the continental European countries and UK, and to a limited degree in the Nordic countries (Pfau-Effinger, 2004a,b). Another cultural family model, the “family economy” model was the main cultural and structural basis of the family in other parts of West Europe, such as Finland and parts of Southern Europe (Pfau-Effinger et al., 2009).

However, it is important to consider that culture does not determine women’s employment behavior and other factors can modify the role of cultural family models. Women’s predominant social practices in managing employment and childcare are influenced both by the predominant cultural values and models in relation to gender, care and employment in the respective society, as well as by options and restrictions in the context of welfare state policy and social and economic factors impeding the realisation of their cultural orientations. It is therefore also the interaction of culture with other factors in the specific societal context that should be taken into account to achieve an adequate explanation.

The role of welfare state policies

It is commonly argued that welfare-state policies that support public day-care lead to high employment rates of women who have children under school age, and that a lack of welfare-state
support of public day-care characterises welfare states with low employment rates in mothers of children under school age (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Leitner, 2003; Pascall and Lewis, 2004).

There is no doubt that cross-national differences in family policies towards childcare contribute substantially to the explanation of cross-national differences in the employment rate of mothers of children under age three. However, it should be considered that these policies are only relevant for mothers of children under school age. The family-policy explanation also has some limitations in its explanatory power in relation to this group of women. Policies alone do not determine behavior, and the actual outcomes of family policies can differ from their aims and the incentives they set. There is considerable evidence that women in some countries or regions behave differently to what might be expected (Crompton and Harris, 1998; Duncan, 2005; Pfau-Effinger and Smidt, 2011).

It is important to consider that culture can modify the impact of welfare state policies on women’s employment behavior. Contemporary German society is a good example: The welfare state offers an individual right for children age 1-6 to affordable fulltime public daycare, which includes children aged 0-1 if their parents are employed, and one year of generously paid parental leave. However, the employment behavior of mothers of children under three differs substantially between West and East Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016): their employment rate is substantially higher in East Germany than in West Germany (39% versus 30%), and if mothers of children under three are employed, their part-time rate is far higher in West Germany than in East Germany (76% versus 46%). Cultural differences offer a main explanation: The share of people aged 15-49 who think that it is best for a child under age three to receive care from its mother/parents is far higher in West Germany (72%) than in East Germany (25%). Also, the share of people who think that employed women with pre-school children should work part-time is far higher in West Germany (78%) than in the East (44%). (Allensbacher Archiv, IfD-Umfrage 6127, 10091,2013; Pfau-Effinger & Smidt, 2011).

The role of political actors and social movements

Political actors and social movements are also relevant in the context of explanatory factors for the growth in women’s employment. Social movements can be drivers of cultural change, while political actors are important actors in the context of welfare state policy change.

The paper assumes that cultural factors, welfare state policies, socio-economic restructuring of women’s work as well as actors constellations, and the interplay of these factors, can contribute to explaining the increase in women’s employment rates from 1970-1990. However, it assumes that the set of factors that led to women’s integration into capitalism was different between the two different trajectories of the restructuring of women’s work.

Methodological approach

The empirical study uses a cross-national and longitudinal perspective to analyse how the trajectories of women’s integration into postwar capitalism from 1970 until 1990 differ, and how the differences can be explained, using the example of West Germany and Finland. These countries were selected for the study because they vary considerably with respect to the main family models that were culturally and structurally dominant in the mid-20th Century, before the development started that is analysed here. In West Germany, the housewife model of the male breadwinner family was dominant at the cultural and structural level in the mid-20th Century, while in Finland the family economy model was culturally and structurally dominant (Pfau-
The study uses document analysis, analysis of statistical data, secondary analysis of qualitative empirical studies, and on data of national surveys and of international surveys like ISSP and EVS. In part it also uses findings from previous research on the basis of country specific case studies of the author (for West Germany, The Netherlands and Finland: Pfau-Effinger, 2004; for Germany, Finland and Spain: Pfau-Effinger, Jensen & Flaquer, 2011; for Sweden and Italy: Pfau-Effinger 2005).

The growth of women’s employment in the context of two trajectories of women’s integration into post war capitalism

This section analyses the differences in the trajectories of women’s integration into post war capitalism in West Germany and Finland from 1970 until 1990.

West Germany: Integration of housewives into employment

By the end of the Second World War West German society had already completed its transition to an industrial society - a process that had started one hundred years earlier. During the period from 1960 until 1990, West German capitalism shifted from an industrial society towards a service society: in 1990, only 36% of the employees worked in industry, while 61% were employed in the service sector. Employment in agriculture was nearly eradicated during this period (from 14% to 3%) (Table 2). Until 1970, the majority of women stayed at home in order to provide unpaid informal housework and care; women’s employment rate was only 49% in 1960 and even decreased slightly during the 1960s (table 1). The increase in women’s employment rate between 1970 and 1990 was mainly based on change in the employment behavior of married women with children, who increasingly extended their participation in formal employment (Pfau-Effinger, 1988).

Among those women who were employed in 1960, nearly half (46%) were working in the service sector, and more than one third were employed in the industrial sector (36%). The share of formally employed women who worked in the agrarian sector was already relatively low (20%). The share of women who were employed in the service sector of all employed women was substantially extended until 1990 (75%), while women’s employment in agriculture had fallen dramatically (4%).

Finland: Restructuring of women’s employment

In Finland, the historical transition from agrarian society towards modern capitalist society took place rather late in the middle of the 20th Century. Until 1960, large parts of the population were part of the social class of free farmers (Kuhnle, 1998). In 1960, about one third of the working population was employed in the traditional agricultural sector, mainly on their own small family farms (35%). Within a period of 30 years Finnish society underwent radical modernization and developed into a service society, virtually skipping the industrial stage (cf. Flora 1987: 450): The share of employed people in the agrarian sector went down from 25% in 1960 to just 8% in 1990. The share of people who were employed in the industrial sector remained at a relatively low level (from 32% in 1960 to 28% in 1990), while the size of the service sector - equal to the size of the industrial sector in 1960 - doubled from 33% to 66% by 1990 (table 2).

Voipio-Juvas and Ruohutela (1947) indicate that in Finland, women’s employment rate had been high from the beginning of the 20th Century. In 1960, the majority of women was still employed
(61,1%) (table 1), It was never common in Finland for women to stay at home in order to act as a
housewife or to work part-time after having a child (Haavio-Manila, 1994). The size of women’s
employment rate is even under-estimated in the statistics. The proportion of housewives (in the
sense of the housewife model in a male breadwinner family) among female residents between 16
and 65 years of age had remained at a particularly low level - between 5% and 6% - according to
official statistics in 1960. The main reason why the statistics do not fully report women’s
employment is that women who were employed in the small family farms in the agricultural
sector were often not registered as employees, so that they were informally employed (Koistinen

In the following decade, from 1960 until 1970, there was nearly no change in women’s
employment rate. In the period from 1970-1990, women’s employment rate increased by 10 %.
This was mainly due to a structural shift in women’s employment from formal and informal
employment in the shrinking agricultural sector towards the strongly expanding service sector.
The share of women who were formally employed in agriculture fell from 38% to 5% between
1960 to1990, while the share of women who were employed in the service sector nearly doubled
from 42% to 81% (table 2).

Explanation of the differences in the development of women’s employment in the context of the two different trajectories

In this part, the paper analyses the main factors that contribute to the explanation of the
differences between the trajectories of women’s employment in West Germany and Finland.

Relevant factors for the explanation of the increase in women’s employment integration from 1970-1990 in West Germany

The role of cultural change

In West Germany, cultural change was a main trigger for the development in women’s
employment rate from 1970-1990. The housewife model of the male breadwinner family model
was the main cultural basis of the family in the 1950s and 1960s. This family ideal was based on
the premise of a fundamental separation of the ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres, and a corollary
location for both genders: the husband’s proper work is in the ‘public’ sphere, while the housewife
is responsible for the private household and childcare; her financial security exists on the basis of
his income. It is linked to the cultural construction of ‘childhood’, according to which children
need special care and comprehensive individual tutelage of the mother in the private household
(Pfau-Effinger, 2004a). Other orientations besides the housewife culture were not welcome and
were essentially taboo, as e.g. Pfeil (1966) and Sommerkorn (Sommerkorn 1988; Sommerkorn
and Liebsch 2002) show on the basis of surveys regarding women’s employment orientations. It
was also firmly established in the institutions of the newly-created Federal Republic of Germany
and strongly promoted by the government. The standard employment relationship and the
related social security measures referred to the employment biography of the male breadwinner,
the wage structure was based on a ’family wage’, and marriage was the central basis for the social
security of unpaid housewives. Some regulations that legally restricted the employment of
married women still applied

Although the cultural family model of the ‘housewife marriage’ was already the dominant ideal
of the family in Germany/West Germany since the turn of the 20th century, it became widespread
social practice for the first time only in the 1950s (cf. Kaufmann 1995; Nave-Herz 2002; Pfau-
Effinger, 2004b; Rosenbaum 1982). As far as women were employed, these included mainly also women of lower income families, who were employed because the welfare state did not provide low-income groups with the financial means to realize the housewife marriage (Willms-Herget 1985). Since many men had died in World War II, there was also a relevant number of unmarried women who were employed, since they could not rely on financial transfers in a housewife marriage (Adorno, 1954).

In the course of the postwar period West German society became increasingly more democratic and liberal. These processes caused an intensification of the cultural contradiction between the general notion of equality of the citizen on the one hand, and the construction of actual inequality in the ideal of the male breadwinner/female care family on the other. This contradiction was the main reason why the newly founded feminist movement was very successful, which initiated a new public discourse about gender inequality and justice. From the end of the 1960s, new cultural ideas about women’s labor market integration and gender equality quickly became popular among women and, later, among the whole population.

As a consequence, women – albeit mainly those from the younger generation - started to question the housewife ideal and demanded equal chances with respect to access to gainful employment (cf. also Rerrich 1988). A fundamental cultural transformation started, which exhibited a relatively high dynamic. The old housewife model of the male breadwinner family was increasingly replaced by the cultural ‘male-breadwinner/female part-time care model’. This cultural family model rests essentially on the vision of full integration of women and men into paid economic activity. At the same time, however, it presupposes that women as mothers may interrupt their economic activity for a few years, after which they combine employment and responsibility for childcare through part-time work, until their children are no longer considered to require particular care. The idea is that the mother should be employed, but also that ‘private’ childhood should still play an important role in family life (Pfau-Effinger, 2004a).

The decisive cultural turning point obviously came in the 1970s. Pross (1975) found on the basis of a representative survey (“Brigitte Studie”) that the expectations of society as regards women, had turned around by 180° in a very short time. The housewife role was no longer appreciated by the majority of the population. Instead, women who acted as housewives and fully devoted themselves to their families were disqualified as ‘non-workers’. Pross (1975) argues that the housewife role did no longer fit into an environment in which individuals were evaluated on the basis of their individual position in the professional hierarchy. At the end of the 1980s, the role of the housewife was mainly only accepted for women with care-dependent children (Ostner 1993, 1995).

As a consequence, a long-term development started in which gainful employment of mothers increasingly became socially acceptable and women increasingly participated in the labor market. Professional or higher education and gainful employment increasingly became fixed components in women’s lives (Geissler/Oechsle 1996). An increasing number of women based their employment behavior on the new cultural ideal about gender and the family. Mothers of children requiring day care who wanted to return to the labor market, or continued to work, usually chose part-time employment, although this significantly reduced their individual income and career opportunities in the long term. Consequently, part-time work has become a major element in the modernization of the work-family relationship on the basis of the male breadwinner model (Pfau-Effinger, 2004a).
This development was reinforced by the extension of the system of higher education with the aim to increase social mobility. It offered women better chances for employment with a high level of skills, even if it was not designed to support gender equality; the main aim was to increase social mobility in general (Trampusch, 2008). However, the increase in women’s employment rate already started before change in the educational and the economy led to a considerable extension of more attractive jobs for skilled professionals.

The role of welfare state policy

The development of welfare state policy did not correspond to the employment orientation of women: For a long time the increase in women’s orientation towards gainful employment received relatively little support from the welfare state. Family policies at the local level started in the late 1970s to offer some degree of public daycare for children age 4 and 5, mainly on a part-time basis, but there was no systematic political support for public childcare from the national welfare state. School times were usually restricted to the morning. Until 1990 West German policy lagged far behind the emancipation efforts of women.

The main reason why the central West German welfare state did not react to cultural change and the increase in women’s employment until the mid-1980s is that the society was still split in its cultural ideas about the family between women and men. The powerful actors in welfare state policy were mainly male, and female political actors only entered the political arena very slowly. It was also a problem that the feminist movement was deeply split with regard to its main aims and in most parts did not support state intervention into the family (Pfau-Effinger, 2004).

The introduction in 1984 of a parental leave program for parents of children below three years (‘Erziehungsurlaub’) was a first step of the national welfare state to support women’s employment. It was based on the right to paid parental leave until the child was two years old, after a period of 14 weeks of full paid maternity leave. During this time, the employment relationship of the caring parent was protected. Leave benefits were paid for two years with 300 German Marks (150 Euro) per month that was means-tested on the basis of the family income. The third year was unpaid. The new law supported women’s labour market integration to some degree, but it did not introduce a departure from women’s dependence in the male breadwinner marriage.

The role of economic development

It was sometimes argued that the growing demand for workers in the prospering post war economy was the main driving force of women’s labor market integration since the 1960s. However, this assumption is not supported by empirical data. Although many companies tried to motivate married women to take on jobs in the 1960s due to a shortage of labor, these efforts were not particularly successful. Women’s response to these attempts at recruitment remained weak, and women’s employment rate even decreased somewhat (table 1), since the housewife model was still the main basis of women’s employment behavior (Willms-Herget 1985, see also table 1).

Women’s participation in the labor market, especially among mothers, only increased significantly when women began to regard employment as an important component of their lives and to turn away from the housewife model. This started mainly in the early 1970s. The increase in the female rate of employment was not even halted by the deep labour market crisis in the first half of the 1980s. Women resisted being sent back to their homes and the share of those who demanded a job increased steadily. A growing number of women returned to their jobs after a break and women suspended their employment for shorter and shorter periods (Brinkmann et al.
Economical change was therefore not the primary factor that led to the increase in women’s employment rates, but it was reinforcing women’s employment integration. When women’s new employment orientation became more widespread after 1970, the expansion of jobs in the service sector was an important prerequisite for the integration of a larger share of women in the labor market. In general, the service sector was the main sector in West Germany which offered jobs for women. In 1960, 46% of all employed women had jobs in services, whereas only 34% of employed women were employed in the industrial sector. About half (49%) of all German workers in 1960 were employed in the industrial sector, but this was mainly a male-dominated field of work, and women were underrepresented. While the share of jobs in industry was considerably reduced until 1990, the share of jobs in services, the main sector for women’s employment, was substantially extended. (Table 2; see also Pfau-Effinger, 1988). The result was a ‘feminization’ of the employment system from which women profited. It should, however, be considered that the development was in part based on a positive feedback-loop: The increase in jobs in typical ‘female’ sectors was to some degree also a result of the increase in women’s employment, as private households increasingly purchased services in the market or expected the state to provide them rather than producing these services themselves (Häußermann/Siebel 1995).

It should be considered, however, that in West Germany, it was not always easy for married women with children to realize their orientation towards part-time employment. There were significant deficits as to the supply of part-time jobs, especially of the qualified type, as most companies did not see a reason to create new part-time positions. Also, the applicability of the norms related to the standard employment relationship was not fundamentally questioned within the system of industrial relations. The new labor market behavior of women that deviated from the standard case of the male breadwinner was not integrated as a new standard and used as a basis for new regulations but tended to be negatively sanctioned as ‘deviating behavior’. The lack of part-time jobs was an important cause of women’s limited integration in the labor market (Geissler & Pfau-Effinger, 1992).

Relevant factors for the explanation of the increase in women’s integration into the employment system in Finland

The role of cultural change

In Finland, the male breadwinner ideal never had great societal relevance. Neither in terms of cultural models, nor economically was there ever an historical ‘interim period’ with large groups of women excluded from production in society. During the first phase of Finland’s slow industrialization – from the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth century – the traditionally prevalent agrarian, “family-economy model” – although clearly a relatively egalitarian variant – remained the dominant family model. When, in the course of the drastic industrialization of the 1950s and

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1 For a theoretical and empirical explanation of why the housewife model of the male breadwinner marriage was only relevant in parts of western Europe, see Pfau-Effinger, 2004b.
60s, the society was transformed into a service-providing economy, the traditional model was replaced by a “dual-breadwinner/state care model” of the family. The main reason for this cultural shift was that women increasingly started to work outside the family farm, so that a new cultural idea and institutional concept of childcare was needed to fit with the new conditions of women’s employment. The new ideal-type of family is based on comprehensive, full-time integration of both genders into paid employment. Childhood is considered a life-phase requiring special care and instruction for which the state is responsible. According to this type of family ideal, women do not neglect the needs of their children when they pursue a full-time job (Anttonen 1997; Julkunen 1999).

The transition towards the new cultural family model and the according pattern of behaviour in relation to the modern labor market was supported by a general movement of young female and male academics (“Association 9”), who raised feminist policy demands as part of a general movement for democratization. This was to be achieved by change in welfare state policies towards an expansion of public childcare, the extension of parental leave, and the return of social democracy to government (Tyska 1993).

Like in other Nordic countries, the egalitarian family model in Finland included the idea that parents should have the option to choose generously paid parental leave for children younger than one year, in order to develop close boundaries, and for mothers to breastfeed their children as long as they desired (Lammi-Tuskula, 2010; Repo, 2010). It seems that this idea was supported more strongly in the Finnish context compared with Sweden and Norway (Bergmann 1999).

The role of welfare state policy

The first foundations of the welfare state were already laid when Finland was still an agrarian society. The large women’s associations played a decisive role in its construction and promoted a government policy that supported the agrarian family and particularly women in such families (Hobson, 1996). Accordingly, gender equality already played a relevant role in the gender culture as well as in the cultural basis of the welfare state. After World War II, a modern, strong welfare state was established that was oriented at the cultural ideas of social equality and universal social rights (Esping-Andersen, 1990). With regard to its main features, the development of Finnish family policies corresponded largely with the development of the dominant cultural orientation of the Finnish society towards a dual breadwinner/state care family.

The political actors in Finland relatively quickly reached an agreement with respect to the upholding of the basic values of solidarity and equality in the course of transformation to an industrial society and with respect to supporting gender equality on the basis of a strongly developing capitalist economy. The Finnish welfare state has strongly supported formal employment of mothers and collectivised childcare since the 1960s. Public childcare has been greatly expanded at the local government level. The Finnish government also introduced a social right for children from 3 to 6 to public childcare in the 1960s and extended it in 1990 to children below 3 years of age. Moreover, free childcare services were introduced for private households in times when the public childcare organisations were closed (Jolkonen et al., 2009; Kovalainen, 1999).

What was typical for the main features of family policies in Finland is that they offered different options for childcare, together with the promotion of gender equality. The full paid maternity leave that had existed from 1964 was considerably extended in length in 1970 to up to around 44 weeks. This was transformed into parental leave in 1982, when the option for fathers to share the
leave was established. The different forms of family leave are based on generous income-related benefits pay between 80% and 90% (Lammi-Tuskula, 2010).

The welfare state also strongly supported the increase in women’s employment rate in its role as employer. Together with the extension of public social services for extra-familial childcare, the Finnish welfare state also created a large number of new jobs in the fields of public administration and care work in the public sector, which were mainly offered to women. Also, professional and higher education in the field of care work and public administration was strongly extended in the 1960s and 1970s.

There was an additional element in these family policies that somewhat deviated from this general picture. As an alternative to municipal day care for children older than 10 months, a cash-for-care system on the basis of a flat-rate child home care allowance was introduced in 1984, paid to parents who did not want to place their 1-2 old children into public day care. It enabled parents to purchase childcare services from the market, or care for their children themselves in their home, while their workplace was protected. It included a relatively low basic allowance, which was paid separately for each eligible child, and a means-tested supplement. This cash-for-care system did not usually provide caring parents with means for financial autonomy (Repo, 2010; Salmi, 2006). Joronen (1994) argues, the childcare allowance can be seen a reaction to the ‘care crisis’ in the middle of the 1980s, which was caused by a lack of qualified personnel for a further expansion of the public day care system, and by the fact that the state therefore could no longer guarantee the public supply of places in public childcare (Joronen 1994). There is also another explanation by Bergmann (1999), who argues that the childcare allowance matches with particular needs of families in the rural areas, which were very sparsely populated and where it was difficult for parents to bring their children to public day care. However, the option to choose childcare allowance does not seem to be very attractive, since pay is only at the subsistence level, and the caring parent loses income and potentially also career chances.

There are different reasons why the welfare state had such a strong role for the development of women’s employment integration in Finland. The first reason is that the society and the welfare state were strongly oriented at the cultural value of social equality. Therefore, the political actors were open to the demand to support a more egalitarian policy. Also, it should be considered, that on the basis of powerful women’s associations and a high degree of female organization in political parties and state institutions, women have traditionally participated intensively in politics in Finland. Connecting to this tradition, the women’s movement gave up the character of a social movement and integrated into welfare state institutions on the basis of ‘state feminism’, which seems to have been a main reason for the dynamic to which policies were innovated on the basis of cultural ideas connected with the new cultural family model (Simonen 1990a). Since women constituted a large share of public sector employees, they contributed to shaping the new policy. Another reason might be that the strong welfare state was dependent of the integration of a major part of the population into employment as taxpayers (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

The role of the economic development

The welfare state had a strong role for the restructuring of the economy and women’s employment during the second half of the 20th Century, on the basis of the political orientation

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2 However, mothers of small children in rural areas did not usually act as housewife-and-mother. It was characteristic for the Finnish farm economy of those times that children were less supervised and received far less attention as, for example, in the German housewife family (Haavio-Manila 1972).
towards gender equality. The wage structure, the tax system, and the social security system were tailored to the individual rather than the family and an extensive system of public childcare and nursing was established that enabled parents and relatives of adults in need of care to work full-time. In this context a large sector of public social services was created and hence an important prerequisite for women to realize their orientation towards continuous employment, which mainly included full-time jobs in Finland (cf. Korppi-Tommola 1991).

Discussion and Conclusion

According to a common assumption, women’s integration into western European capitalism on the basis of a growing employment rate from 1970-1990 was based on a common logic, which can be described as integration of housewives into the employment system. The paper challenges this assumption. It argues that capitalism does not determine the development of women’s employment, and that it is plausible to assume that there were different trajectories of women into capitalism in the period after World War II. The aim of the paper is to explain the differences between such trajectories.

It shows that the historical development in West Germany and Finland represents two different trajectories. The development in West Germany can be characterized as “integration of housewives into the employment system”. The increase in women’s employment rate from 1970-1990 was mainly based on changes in women’s work-family behavior, on the basis of a delay of the age of childbirth, the reduction in birth rates and the slow abbreviation of the average time mothers stayed at home after childbirth. In Finland, the increase in women’s employment was mainly based on the restructuring of women’s work from formal or informal employment in the agrarian sector towards formal employment in the service sector.

The study shows that differences in the way in which women were integrated into society before the change started contribute to the explanation for the differences. In West Germany, women’s integration into society was mainly based on the “housewife model of the male breadwinner family” in the 1960s. Accordingly, after marriage, most women stayed at home in order to provide housework and to care for their children, until the children were adult. In Finland, women’s integration into society was based on a relatively egalitarian “family economy model” in the 1960s. The share of women who were formally employed was relatively high in 1960. It was in fact even higher than it seems from statistical data, since women were often informally employed in agriculture and therefore not registered.

In West Germany, a rapid cultural change that started in the late 1960s was the main trigger for the increase in women’s employment rates, and its support by a strong feminist movement. Some factors supported its realization after the change had already proceeded, such as the political extension of higher education and the extension of the service sector, whereas, for a long time, family policies still supported the old cultural family model. In Finland, the welfare state played the main role in women’s integration into capitalism, since it strongly supported women’s work in the modern capitalist economy through comprehensive public daycare provision and the extension of jobs for women in public social services. The government and the ‘state feminist’ movement were main actors of this change. Like in Germany, the political extension of higher education also contributed to the development. This paper concludes that altogether, the differences can mainly be explained by a differing role of culture and welfare state policies for the increase in women’s employment rates.
Since this paper only includes two country case studies, it does not reveal the precise nature of the relationship between the type of women’s trajectory into capitalism in a society and the main explanatory factors for the differences. Future research that includes more cases and a greater diversity of cases would be needed in order to gain elaborated broader picture of this relationship.

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References


### Tables

**Table 1: Development of women’s employment rate, women age 15-64, in %, 1960-1990**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>-1.3%</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>+7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>+10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*Value for 1990 minus value for 1970, in per cent points*

Employment rate defined as share of employed people to all people in working age (15-64);

**Table 2: Share of formally employed women by sector relative to total female employment** (in brackets: Share of all gainfully employed in the sector relative to total employment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>West Germany</th>
<th>Finland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>20(14)</td>
<td>38(33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4(3)</td>
<td>5(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>34(49)</td>
<td>20(32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>21(36)</td>
<td>14(28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>46(37)</td>
<td>42(33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>75(61)</td>
<td>81(65)</td>
</tr>
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